PLOTINUS'S METAPHYSICS: EMANATION OR CREATION? LLOYD P. GERSON vse rnsquevmy amavs casvat nereneNces to Neo-Platonie metaphysics as emanationist. It is somewhat less common to find analyses of the term “emanation” so used. In this paper I shall be concerned solely with Plotinus. I hereby set aside all questions regarding any common denominator one might suppose between Plotinus and, say, Proclus. ‘There are several texts in the Enneads which employ noun and verb forms of péw to describe the activity of the One in relation to complex entities. For example, For the soul now knows that these things must be, but longs to answer the question repeatedly discussed also by the ancient philosophers, how from the One, if it is such as we say itis, anything else, whether a multiplicity or a dyad or a number, eame into existenee, and why it did not on the contrary remain by itself, but such a great multiplicity flowed [2¢ppin] from it as that which is seen to exist in beings, but which we think it right to refer back to the One. (5.1.6.2-8)! This, we may say, isthe first act of generation: the One, perfect because it seeks nothing, has nothing, and needs nothing, overflows [orepeppin], as it were, and its superabundanee makes something other than itself, (6.2.1.5-10) ‘The first remark I wish to make about these passages is the obvious one that to think of emanating or flowing in contrast to creating is to make a sort of eategory mistake. For metaphors are not properly contrasted with technical terminology.’ If one wants convincing on this point, we need only reeall that Aquinas sometimes 1 translations are by A. H. Armstrong in the eight volume Loeb edition of the works of Plotinus (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966-88), * A similar point is made fragment de philosophie com, Fernand Brunner, “Création et émanation: e,” Studia Philosophia 33 (1973): 33-63, Review of Metophysics 46 (March 1999): 5 Met 1. Compright © 1998 by the Review af560 LLOYD P. GERSON uses the same metaphor in behalf of an explanation of creation, not in contrast to it Conceding this, there is still the reasonable su: picion that some fundamental difference remains between Plotinus’ metaphysics and a creation metaphysics such as that of Aquinas. T conjecture that the reason for this suspicion is that Plotinus is supposed to be the faithful inheritor of the Parmenidean legacy which lays down the axiom that ex nihilo nihil fit. Aquinas, however, understands creation as ex nihilo. So it would seem just incorrect to construe the metaphors of emanation in a manner which would make Plotinus contradict that axiom This reasoning seems less cogent when we begin to explicate the term ex nihilo; for one thing Aquinas does not mean by creatio ex nihilo is temporal origin. That God is the creator of all Aquinas believes he can demonstrate; that the world did not always exist is held by faith alone. Thus, the philosophical core of the notion of creation is causal dependence of being: Deus est causa universalis totius esse. The proper effect of God’s causal activity is the being of everything.® Let us compare this with a text of Plotinus But how is that One the principle of all things? Is it because as principle it keeps them in being, making each one of them tobe? Yes, and because it caused them to be. (5.3.15.28-30)" A good question for proponents of emanationism in Plotinus to ask themselves at this point is how this passage and similar ones express a nonereationist metaphy One proposal sometimes made in order to differentiate a non- t from a creationist metaphysics is that in the former in the latter they do not. cs, creation! creatures exist of necessity whereas ee, for example, Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, 4. 45, a. 1 icut igitur generatio hominis est ex non ente quod est non homo, ita creatio, quae est emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente quod est nihil” Heinrich Dorrie provides a useful survey of the literary uses of the language of emanation in his “Emanation. Kin unphilosophisches Wort im spitan. tiken Denken,” in Parusia, ed. Kurt Flasch (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1960), 211 4 See Summa theologiae I, 4. 46, a. 2 ‘Tllud autem quod est proprius effectus Dei ereantis, est illud quod praesupponitur omnibus aliis, seilicet esse absolute”; Summa theologiue 1, 246,05. "“Grus 62 ixcivo dpxi, rav xévrev; dpa, bre aire obte B txacror airév romioaoa dvat; 9 Kai ore bxéornaee aia.” Ch. Bnneads 3810.12, 4861-6, S3.1711-14, 5.5.5.5-7, 6742.11, 69.11-2LLOYD P. GERSON ion of creation, not the reasonable sus- s between Plotinus’ 1s that of Aquinas. is that Plotinus is armenidean legaey Aquinas, however, seem just incorrect anner whieh would begin to explicate ‘ot mean by ereatio ator of all Aquinas not always exist is ore of the notion of t causa universalis ctivity is the being of Plotinus: s?_ Is it because as ‘of them tobe? Yes, ) in Plotinus to ask imilar ones express lifferentiate a non- hat in the former ater they do not. sologive I, 4. 45, a. 1 vd est non homo, ita inte quod est nihil. uses of the language hes Wort im spaitan- ‘am Main: Minerva, vantis, est illud quod ‘Summa theologiae I Ennouds 38.10.1-2, PLOTINUS'S METAPHYSICS 561 Indeed, Plotinus does say that what exists does so necessarily and not as a result of the discursive reasoning (Aoyiaués) of the dpxi of all.” By contrast, Aquinas says in many places that Deus produit creaturas, non ex necessitate, sed per intellectum et voluntatem.* Of course, Aquinas also says that God’s knowledge is not discursive, and one of the reasons for this is that discursive knowing implies imperfection But Plotinus, too, says that the One is perfect and that it acts according to its will (B00Anas).” So, whereas Aquinas contrasts the alternatives of acting by necessity and acting by will (and intellect), Plotinus contrasts acting by necessity and acting on the basis of discursive reasoning. This should lead us to conclude that the “necessity” as attributed to creation by Plotinus and “ne- cossity” as denied of God's acting by Aquinas do not mean the same thing, In fact, there are at least two reasons why the necessary exis- tence of things does not entail that the One acts by necessity. First, the term avécyen in Plotinus implies constraint from outside. But there is nothing outside the One and it is constrained by nothing Second, the putative necessity by which the One acts cannot be really distinct from the One or indeed from its will, for this would negate its simplicity. So to say that the One aets by necessity could mean nothing else but that it acts according to its will, Another, albeit esoteric, facet of this second reason is that if the One acted by a necessity really distinct from it, then this would set up, counter to Plotinus’s express argument, a real relation between the One and what it produces. ‘This would be so because if there is something really distinet from the One, then the One is limited in relation to it; and what prevents the One from being really related to anything, is that it is unqualifiedly unlimited. Thus, it seems that if “neces sity” is understood as constraint ab extra, then the One does not act, of necessity. Since Aquinas's God does not act by this kind of né cessity either, we can hardly use it to contrast Plotinus’s metaphysics with Thomistic creation metaphysics. 7Cf, Bnneads 82.3.6. Cf. Summa theologiae I, q 19, a. 45d. 25, a. 5:4. 28, a 1, ad 8 Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra gentile 1.5% © Ennead 681378, 53 . 56. 5 Oday xpis, adder airroy Neyeur tore yap deep tort nai xp aaivaw tre rai ro tori Ggaupoiper, Gore Kai To xpix Ta ora dxwooin. . Breads 68813-16.562 LLOYD P. GERSON It is sometimes supposed that what distinguishes an emana- tionist metaphysics is an account of production by the firs ‘ple whereby this principle is emptied of all that is init." Alternatively, one may think of Russian dolls or a telescoped antenna where what is somehow contained within the whole is separated out from it. ‘There are certainly many texts in which Plotinus says that every- thing is contained within the One." But none of these texts, or indeed no other that I know of, claims that anything is ever “outside” of the One or separated off from it. Thus, the relation between the (One and everything else cannot be construed according to the above metaphors, where what is suggested is a two-phase process: first, everything is in the One, and second, everything is not in the One, but emptied out of or unfolded from it. ‘A somewhat more serious and complex suggestion for charac: terizing an émanationist metaphysics is to construe its account of causal dependence according to the model of a per accidens series. Ina per aceiidens causal series, as opposed to a per se causal serie ‘Ais the cause of B, Bis the cause of C, and soon. In a per se causal ries, A would be the cause of C, and B would be an instrument of ‘A’s causal activity. For example, the tree of Jesse is a per accidens ausal series; Jesse begat David who begat Solomon and so on. A man eausing a traffic accident with his car is an example of @ per se causally ordered series. Applying this distinetion to Plotinus's claims about the causal activity of the One, we might interpret hit to mean that the causality is according to a per accidens ordere« series, Thus, the One would cause vois to be, vos would cause sou to be, and soul would presumably cause nature to be."® = Gf. C. P, Gorman, “Freedom in the God of Plotinus,” New Schola: ticism 14 (1940): 379-405, Gorman uses the phrase “progressive unfoldin Of reality” to characterize the One’s relation to its products (p. 404), S For example, see Dnneads 5.5.9, 6.4.2, 65.126. CEH. F. Miiller, “Ist die Metaphysik des Plotins ein Emanation: system?” Hermes 48 (1914): esp. 416- ation is de Guively refuted. More recently, in the same vein Sronti della metafisiea di Plotino e la struttura della processione,” i Graceful Reason, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of M dieval Studies, 1983), esp. 153-8. “Just as the One overflows into Mind and Mind into Soul and So into the world, 50 the latent powers of Soul in their final exhaustion pa over into blank nothingness, or, in other words, beget or produce it”; B G.Puller, The Problem of Evil in Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge Un versity Press, 1912), 806.LLOYD P. GERSON distinguishes an emana- ion by the first principle at isin it!® Alternatively, soped antenna where what is separated out from it, Plotinus says that every tut none of these texts, or :anything is ever “outside” s, the relation between the ued according to the above ‘a two-phase process: first, orything is not in the One, ‘lex suggestion for charac- to construe its account of el of a per aceidens series :d to a per se eausal series, dso on. Ina per se causal would be an instrument of 20 of Jesse is a per accidens zat Solomon and soon. A car is an example of a per is distinetion to Plotinus's ne, we might interpret him to a per accidens ordered to be, vois would cause soul nature to be.” od of Plotinus,” New Scholas- ohrase “progressive unfolding 1 to its produets (p. 404), 65.126, des Plotins ein Emanations- tere this interpretation is de- e vein, see G. Reale, “I fonda- tuttura della’ processione,” in ito: Pontifical Institute of Me~ and Mind into Soul and Sou! in their final exhaustion pass rds, beget or produce it”; B. A. (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- pLOTINUS'S METAPHYSICS 63 We need to distinguish two different questions here. The first question is whether Plotinus’s account of metaphysical causality is ‘per accidens or per se, assuming that these alternatives are exhaus- tive. The second question is whether the selected alternative do indeed distinguish an emanationist from a creationist metaphysics. Regarding this question, Aquinas is clear that God’s creative activity does not operate instrumentally." So, were we to opt for a per accidens causal series, we should not therefore conclude that a per se ordered series is a differentia of a creation metaphysics. Let us turn now to the evidence pertaining to an answer to the first question. The main text supporting the interpretation of metaphysical causality as a per accidens ordered series is a continuation of the text cited above in which the term “emanating” appears This [vois], when it has come into being, turns back upon the One and. is filled, and becomes Intellect by looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its gaze upon the One, Intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it becomes at once Intellect and being. Resembling the One thus, Intellect produces in the same way, pouring forth @ multiple power— this is a likeness of it—just as that which was before it poured it forth, This activity springing from the substance of Intellect is Soul, which comes to be this while Intellect abides unchanged: for Intellect too comes into being while that which is before it abides unchanged. But Soul does not abide unchanged when it produces: it is moved and so brings forth an image. (5.2.1.10-19)"" If we employ the concept of a per accidens ordered causal series to interpret this passage, the causal activity of the One is limited to the production of vois. We could still say that without this first production nothing else would be produced, but the existence of the One would no longer be a necessary condition for the production of soul anymore than the existence of the grandfather is a necessai condition for the production of the grandson. Even if we insist that, the One exists necessarily, this existence is irrelevant to the causality of the being of soul, which, in the putative per accidens series, is attributed solely to vois. “Unde non potest aliquid operari dispositive et instrumentaliter ad hune effectum, cum creatio non sit ex aliquo praesupposito quod possit disponi per actionem instrumentalis agentis"; Summa theologiae I, 4. 45, "Cf. Bnneads 4.8.6, 6.7.42.17-20,564 LLOYD P. GERSON ‘The obvious impediments to the endorsement of this interpre- tation are the many texts where Plotinus says that the One preserves all things in being. It might be thought that the interpretation can be retained if this preservation is construed as a counterfactual." ‘Thus, the One preserves everything in being means that if per im- possibile the One were to cease existing, then everything else would cease existing as well. We can imagine if we like an Atlas holding the earth aloft, an Atlas who is no part of earthly production, but who could not simply disappear without his burden crashing down. ‘The problem with this construal is that it imports an unacceptable complexity into the One's causal activity. It presumes that the One is the cause of the being of vois and then operates differently in conserving the being of vois and everything else. However the ac- tivity of the One may be understood, we cannot accept an interpre tation which has it do two different kinds of things. How could we make a distinction within the One to account for this? So, either the One is the cause of the being of vois and everything else or it is the cause of neither. But the latter alternative is excluded by the texts Perhaps this line of argument will seem problematic. There is, however, another argument against the per accidens interpre~ tation which removes the possibility of construing preserving in being differently from causing being. The api of vois is the ulti- mate explanation or cause of thinking, life, and oisia.” It is suf- ficient at this point to note that it is obviously not the apxf of that which it receives from the One, the épx4 above it. Now if the One is the dpxq of the being or existence of vois, then in no case is vois the &px of the being or existence of anything else. If soul, for example, receives not only life, thinking, and oboia from vois but existence as well, then vois performs for soul the identical funetion ‘that the One performs for vois. ‘Then the uniqueness of the apy of being, to say nothing of its primacy, would be destroyed. I take Phere is some textual support provided for this in the conditional clause at Enneads 38.10.1-2: is ui) ovens oi” ay re wera. ® For example, see Enneads 6.7.18.2 1¢ also Pierre Hadot, ‘“Btre, Vie, Pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin,” in Les sources de Plotin (Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1960), 107-41. Hadot richly documents his conclusion that “la triade étre-vie-pensée révéle la structure de Intelli- genee.LLOYD P. GERSON dorsement of this interpre- says that the One preserves that the interpretation ean trued 18 peing means that if per im- then everything else would if we like an Atlas holding tof earthly production, but this burden crashing down. it imports an unacceptable 1. It presumes that the One hen operates differently in hing else. However the ac- 2 cannot accept an interpre- ds of things. How could we ecount for this? So, either and everything else or it is alternative is excluded by a counterfactual 1 seem problematic, ‘There t the per accidens interpre- of construing preserving in ‘The apyq of vois is the ulti- , life, and oieia."® It is suf- wiously not the &py® of that xi above it. Now if the One £ pois, then in no case is ois anything else. If soul, for ng, and obsia from vois but or soul the identical func! the uniqueness of the cpxi s would be destroyed. I take ion ded for this in the conditional 8 av rae rive. 42, See also Pierre Hadot, tin,” in Les sources de Plotin Hadot richly documents his révéle la structure de "ntelli- PLOTINUS'S METAPHYSICS ea it that any interpretation that leads to this result is to be firmly rejected.” If, owing to these objections against an interpretation of the aphysical causality in Plotinus in terms of a per accidens series, we opt for a per se ordered series, then the One is the gole cause of the being of everything else and the role of the other principles is at most instrumental. One of the central texts relevant to assessing this proposal is also perhaps one of the texts most frequently thought of as somehow expressing emanation: All things which exist, as long as they remain in being, necessari produce from their own substances [ougias], in dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality [i-rdaraow] directed to what is, outside them, a kind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced: fire produces the heat which comes from it; snow does not only keep its cold inside itself. Perfumed things show this particularly clearly. As long as they exist, something is diffused from themselves around them, and what is near them enjoys their existence. And all things when they come to perfection produce [y«va}; the One is always perfect and therefore produces everlastingly; and that which it pro- duees is less than itself. (5.1.6.31-8)"" There are many, many important features in this passage. Of par- ticular interest to us is just what it is that the One produces. From the above arguments, we can infer that the answer is not simply vois. On the other hand, we must bear in mind that vois is indeed a product of the One. It is in fact the “first” product, that which At Enneads 52.1.14-15 Plotinus says that vois “makes likenesses {ré 5uoca rove” as does the One. Armstrong is wrong to translate this, as “produces in the same way.” As the text goes on to make clear, the Point is that the relation of vois to what is below it is analogous to the tion of the One to vos. ‘The specific feature of the analogue is imagery or copying. ‘That is, the image of voir is analogous to the image of the One. This does not make vois the cause of existence of anything * Ct. Bnneads 48.68-12, 54.1.27-84, 681851. I doubt that 53.1220, Which seems to hold that the pirn tkpyeua is vois, should be taken to indicate that the distinetion between first and second vépyeia does not apply to the One. Rather, vois is where the concept of evepyact can be applied without the qualification oiay. ‘The px vovs is the xparrn wépy of oivia. Against Hans Biichner (Plotins Maglichkeitslehre (Munich: Anton Pustet, 1970], 99), Enneads 1.7..17-20 does not imply that there is no ipyca in the One, Rather, it implies that the évép'yca in the One, though producing a secondary aipy«ca, does not thereby erect a real relation be- tween the One and everything else. eS566 LLOYD P. GERSON is eternally in closest proximity to the source of all. All we are told in the present passage is that what is produced by the One is inferior (2darr0v) to it. In order to proceed further we need to adduce another text which will guide us toward the goal In each and every thing there is an activity of the substance [ixép-yeua ris ovcias] and there is an activity from the substance [ewépyeia & ris oveiash and that which is of the substance is each thing itself, while the activity from the substance derives from the first one, and must in everything be a consequence of it, different from the thing itself: as in fire there is a heat which is the content of its substance, and another which comes into being from that primary heat when fire exercises the activity whieh is native [oiuduror] to its substance in abiding unchanged as fire. So it is also in the higher world; and much more so there, while it [the One] abides in its own proper way of life, the activity generated from the perfection in it and its coexistent activity [ewoiens evepyeds] acquires existence [bxéeracw], since it comes from a great power, the greatest indeed of all, and arrives at being and substance [ra «ira kai obaiap}, for that [the One] is beyond being. That is the productive power [divayus] of all, and its product. is already all things [ré xavra]. (6.4.2.27-39)" As will I hope become clear, there is no doctrine in Plotinus which better illustrates his original use of his Platonic and Aris- totelian sources than the distinetion between wvépyeta ris obaias and ewipyac ix ris obvias. To begin with, the word évépyea is apparently of Aristotelian origin. There is no occurrence of the word form in Plato. I would add, though this is perhaps a bit more contentious, that the concept pair évépyea-divauis is not clearly to be found in Plato at all, though divayus does of course appear in the sense of “power” rather than “potency.”** Nevertheless, the use to which Plotinus puts the concept of erépyeta, particularly in reference to the One, is most un-Aristotelian For Aristotle, the most perfect éxépyca in the universe is the noetie activity of the unmoved mover. This activity of self-con- templation is the antithesis of an activity “in another”; and it is precisely because the unmoved mover is perfect that its activity is ® On the texts indicating gradation in the One's products, ef. Dominic O'Meara, Structures hiérarchiques dans la pensée de Plotin (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), esp. 120-4, 8 Of, Bnneads 26.9.14-28, 29.822. 62.22.24-9, 2 For example, Republic 509b9, in reference to the Form of the Good, © Cf. Metaphysics 1071b19-20, 1072b26-1, 5161-5, 5.1.6.34,5.8.7.28, 9.8.18,LLOYD P. GERSON source of all. All we are tis produced by the One is 20 adduce another text which ivity of the substance [ivépyeua com the substance [évepyau ex substance is each thing itself, derives from the first one, and of it, different from the thing is the content of its substance, from that primary heat when ive [eéugurov] to its substance also in the higher world; and J abides in its own proper way ‘erfection in it and its coexistent existence [imaeracw], since it st indeed of all, and arrives at x, for that [the One] is beyond ways] of all, and its produet 2.27-30)" 2 is no doctrine in Plotinus se of his Platonic and Aris- sween evépryeva THs ovoias and 2word ivépyeu is apparently urrence of the word form in raps a bit more contentious, 5 not clearly to be found in urse appear in the sense of rertheless, the use to which particularly in reference to pyae in the universe is the * This activity of self-con- vity “in another”; and it is s perfect that its is the One's products, ef. Dominie pensée de Plotin (Leiden: E. J. 151-5,5.1.6.34,53.7.23, 5.98.13, rence to the Form of the Good. 1. PLOTINUS'S METAPHYSICS 567 unqualifiedly immanent. To have an actuality outside of itself would mean that it had a potency in relation to that actuality and hence that it is imperfect in some respect. Thus, insofar as the actuality of an agent is in the movable, the agent is in potency to that actuality even if it is itself the movable” Aristotle does in fact make a distinction between something like an “internal” and an “external” ’wvépyata, as in the case of sight, on the one hand, and building a house on the other.” But these are different species of iwépyea, and there is no suggestion at all that an internal évépyeie has con- nected with it an external one necessarily. For example, what would be the external ixépyea following necessarily upon seeing? So when Plotinus makes the distinction between é&épyaa ris oboias and iwipyea ix ris obaias he may reasonably be thought to be quite con- sciously diverging from Aristotle’s use of the concept of wépyea. For a concept of external actualization we naturally look back to Plato, There are at least three relevant passages. First, there is the famous text regarding the Form of the Good which produces knowability, existence, and being in the other Forms.* Though this, text does not clearly distinguish between what the Form of the Good is or does in itself and what it produces outside itself, the analogical representation of it by the sun and the unique attributes it possesses, such as being éxéxewa ris odwias, make it reasonable to conclude at least that some such distinetion is in harmony with Plato’s intention. The second relevant text is the description of the Demiurge in the Timaeus. The Demiurge is good and so without grudgingness (olves)2® He desires that the world should be as mueh like himself as possible. So he creates order out of chaos. Notice that in the Demiurge benevolent desire cannot be capricious or transitory. He is permanently well-disposed. But here one hesitates—well- disposed to what? Not to a nonexistent creation, nor to the inchoate heaps of disordered quasi-clements which represent the necessity the Demiurge must overcome. Reflecting on an answer to this question, it is natural enough for Plotinus and indeed for an entire tradition to surmise that the Demiurge or épy4 of all or God or the gods are essentially benevolent in the sense that their goodness is always 2 Ct, Physics 202a13- {Metaphysics 1050028-9 & Republic 5096-10. Timacus 29¢568 LLOYD P. GERSON overflowing. Whether the result of this overflowing goodness is an adjunct to a product or the product itself, the idea that bonum est diffusivum sui can be traced back to this text, The last text that should be mentioned is from the Symposium, where Diotima declares that the pyor of love is birth in beauty.” More precisely, all men love to possess the good everlastingly and in their possession of it they produce beauty, particularly, as the passage goes on to say, the beauty that is true virtue." So here though it is not goodness that is itself diffusive, it is association with goodness that spontaneously, or better, naturally, produces.” ‘As suggestive as these three texts undoubtedly are, they do not quite amount to the distinetion between @épyea ris oicias and evépyete ex rs obeias as this is applied to the One. The Form of the Good works exclusively on the other Forms; these other Forms are, if anything, the causes of the being of their participants. ‘This would reflect the per accidens series we have already rejected. The Demiurge, which in neither Plato nor Plotinus is equivalent to the Good or One, quite explicitly works on a preexistent chaos, where for Plotinus there is no room for an independent &px “from below.” So, the pressing question is not merely why Plotinus endorses the axiom of the diffusiveness of goodness but why he reinterprets this, using or perhaps misusing an Aristotelian concept. Tanswer this question as follows. When Plotinus rejected the primacy of vois as postulated by Aristotle, he thereby rejected the primacy of odvia. Since oisia represents limitedness or distinetne in nature, the immediate consequence is that the apy of all is going to be beyond oii and so beyond limit.** ‘This much could be in- ferred alone from a reaffirmation of Plato’s account of the Form of the Good in opposition to Metaphysics 12. It is Aristotle who iden- tified primary oloia with pyc; it is Plotinus who reasoned that if the apyq of all is beyond obza, then it is beyond the kind of Ibid, 212a, For the documentation of the use of this principle in ancient Greek philosophy in and before Plotinus see Klaus Kremer, “Bonwm est diffusivum sui. in Beitrag zum Verhiltnis von Neuplatonismus und Christentum,” in Aufstieg und Niedergang der rémischen Welt, ed. Wolfgang Haase and Hildegard Temporini, teil 2, bd. 36.2 (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 994-1082, esp. 1002-11 Cf, Enneads 5.5, 4, 5.5.11.2-8, 6.7829.LLOYD P. GERSON ving goodness is an dea that bonwm est am the Symposium, s birth in beauty.” J everlastingly and sarticularly, as the virtues’ So here, «, it is association turally, produces. dly are, they do not ‘ae tis obgias and 2. The Form of the se other Forms are, ipants. This would sdy rejected. The 's equivalent to the cent chaos, whereas &pxi “from below.” otinus endorses the ve reinterprets this, 2pt lotinus rejected the rereby rejected the ness or distinctness oxi of all is going much could be in- vunt of the Form of Aristotle who iden- who reasoned that veyond the kind of iple in ancient Greek Bonum est diffusivwm und Christentum,”” Wolfgang Haase and ver de Gruyter, 1987), PLOTINUS'S METAPHYSICS 569 wépyea that is oigia, not beyond aépyea tout court. For, of course, that the One is beyond obaia does not mean that it is beyond existence or being altogether. Suggestions to the contrary are just misun- derstandings of Plotinus’s so-called negative theology. What Plo- tinus rejects in reference to the One is language that implies lim- itedness or complexity. ‘We must suppose that at this point in the reasoning Plotinus had to ask himself whether or not évépycia was s0 tied to oiia that to attribute it to the One was wrong. There is a text which clearly indicates his answer, Nor should we be afraid to assume that the first activity [vépyea] is, without substanee [obeial, but posit this very fact as his, 30 to speak, existence[vrdaracw]. But if one posited an existence without activity, the principle would be defective and the most perfect of all imperfect. ‘And if one adds activity one does not keep the One. If then the activity is more perfect than the substance, and the first is most perfect, the first will be activity. (68.20.9-16) It is not too difficult to see why this must be so. ‘The reasoning leading to the positing of an &pxf of all in the first place is reasoning from effect to cause. The first cause is not an essential cause, for that role devolves upon obaia, which does not explain the datum that the One is needed to explain. The only kind of cause that the first cause can be is an efficient cause. Thus, for the One to be the &pxi of all it cannot be deprived of ivépyea, To deny wépyeta of it would be to deny causal efficacy to it. For being an efficient cause means acting as an efficient cause. Arguing in this way, we reach a primary &vp-yea, but we do not yet have the premise that distinguishes its causal activity according to a per accidens or a per se ordered series. One might suppose, that is, that the evépyea é ris ovoias of the One is just vois alone. This, however, would imply a kind of limitedness in the One: its causal activity operates so far and no further. Yet there is nothing in the One to account for this limitedness; indeed, everything said of the One speaks against it. Another way, albeit rhetorical, of making the same point is to ask, Why should the One stop here, or here? Must not it operate Cf, Enneads 68.7.47-8, 68.13.7-8. © Cf. Ibid, 5.3.17.11-14; 5.3.15.12-13, 28; 6.4.101-31; 67.23.22-4; 6.18.7570 LLOYD P. GERSON up to the limit of logical possibility? An unlimited or infi- nite dépyea cannot, it seems, produce its proper effect restrictedly If this is so, then the ipa &x ris obsias of the One is neither vois alone nor just that which vois receives from the One. It is not the former because vois or oiia does not as such have an &pxi. That is, essence does not have an essential cause, It is not the latter because that would imply a limitation in the One. The évépyeva éx rig obaias is rather the being of everything that can possess being, from vois down to and including matter If this were the whole story, we could simply conclude that Plotinus’s metaphysies is creationist in the sense that the proper effect of the first principle of all is the being of everything else. But this would be an oversimplification. In rejecting a per accidens ordered series for metaphysical causality, we still have before us the alternative of a per se ordered series. As we have seen, according to Aquinas at least, if a per se series involves instrumentality, then it is not creationist. Surely the fact that vois and puxh are &pyai in themselves should give us pause. In fact, I have hitherto sup- pressed an important distinction in this matter: that between being and existence. To this I now turn. I shall not now recount the philological evidence, which is in any case ambiguous, though not as ambiguous as some would sup- pose. Several texts are, however, most revealing, because it [the One] is not really itself, while every other (6821.32-3) slaved to itself, but is only itself and thing is itself’ and something else. But where absolute substance [a’roovsiee][the One] is completely what it is, and it is not one thing and its substance [oigia] another, what it isitis also master of, and is no longer to be referred to another insofar as it is and insofar as it is substance. (6.8.12.14-7) But if it [the One] is needed for the existence of each and every sub- stance [is obeias ixcarne ixooraow|—for there is nothing which is, which is not one—it would also exist before substance and as gener- ating substance. For this reason also it is one-being [w ov}, but not first being and then one; for in that which was being and also one there would be many... (6.6.13.49-58)" " Cf. Brneads 5.5.12.44-50, where Plotinus bases the plenitude of ere- ation on the ungrudging nature of the One. "Cf. Enneads 5.5.3.25, 69.1.1-2.LLOYD P. GERSON unlimited or infi- its proper effect ! the One is neither the One. It is not uch have an épyi. Itis not the latter te. The exépyea tx can possess being, aply conclude that se that the proper erything else, But ing a per accidens till have before us ave seen, according y, then nd Yoxf are dipyai have hitherto sup- hat between being trumental dence, which is in 5 some would sup- out is only itself and ind something else, Js completely what a] another, what it ‘d to another insofar each and every sub- is nothing whieh is tance and as gener- veing [ev ov}, but not being and also one he plenitude of ere- PLOTINUS'S METAPHYSICS 871 Note that in the last text it is said that the One is needed for the existence of every oieia, and that the reason for this is that there is nothing which is not one. Since the One is unqualifiedly simple, the immediate inference is that the oneness and the existence re- ceived from the One are the same thing. Thus, it is false to suppose as some have that if the existence of things other than the One is to be accounted for at all, then that is to be done otherwise than by the One, for the One is simply and solely the cause of oneness. Per- haps a salutary reminder in this regard is that “One” is no more of a correct description of the dpi of all than is any other description, including, I must add, “px of all.” So, the One is the cause of the existence of obi. As is seen in the second text, there is no dis- tinction within the One between what it is and that it is, between its essence and existence, if you will. By contrast, in everything other than the One, such a distinction needs to be made. The dis- ction will be a real, minor one in Scholastic terminology, but that is not my main point here. Rather, I am concerned to show that in the presumed is a distinction between that which is the proper effect of the One’s causal activity, namely, existence, and the recipient of this endowment, which is strietly and literally ovsie. But oveia apart from existence has no reality for Plotinus; it is eternally in possession of its endowment. By “being” I mean whatever it is that is in possession of existence, ence really distinet from “what” it is With the distinction between existence and being, we can see the problem facing Plotinus. On the one hand, odgie or rois must be an dpxq distinct from the One, for the apxf of essence must be sufficiently complex to serve as the guarantor of all eternal truths. On the other hand, if the One is to be the apxi of all, oveia must be subordinated to it. Indeed, it is, but only by having its existence caused by the One, Oisia itself is a distinct apxq. If the One were understood as the cause of being as opposed to the cause of existence, it would assume an illicit complexity. In one place he does actu ally say that the One has all forms in itself “indistinctly” (wi dvaxexpyséva).* In fact, the reason given for the One's having the ability to give existence to everything is just that it has everything in it “beforehand.” It must have everything indistinetly, however, because otherwise this would compromise its simplicity. texts what ® Bnneads 53.15.81. Cf. 52.1.1, 54.217, 6.7.82.12, 68.188, 68.21.24-5,872 LLOYD P. GERSON Such language encourages the view that the Forms are emi- nently as well as virtually in the One. This view obscures the specific causality that the One exercises: for it suggests that the One give essence as well as existence to vois. If this were so, one might then suppose that yois does the same for what is below it. Against such a view are the texts in which Plotinus says that “there is no necessity for something to have what it gives,” and “the form is in that which is shaped (that is, rois), but the shaper was shapeless."” low then can we reconcile the indistinet existence of Forms in the One with the claim that it does not have them? Let us recall that vois eternally achieves its good by contem- plating the Forms with which it is identical. ‘The indistinet e: tence of Forms in the One cannot be a superior mode of existence for these Forms for , vois is the apyi of Forms Second, the Forms in rods are not an image of Forms in the One. If they were, then vois would not have knowledge of Forms, but only of images. Finally, indistinct Forms are not Forms at all, for the entire point of positing Forms in the first place is to explain distinet intelligible contents in the sensible world. If then vois achieves its good by contemplating Forms, can we give any meaning to that good achieved over and above vois itself? Yes, it is nothing but perfect noncomposite being, that is, existence. Forms are not an image of the One; the divided existence of yois is such an image. ‘The perfect simplicity of the One prevents it from having the Forms eminently. But the fact that the goodness in the life of vois is identified with imperfect oneness makes the Good or the One over and above it a necessary superordinate principle. ‘The problem of the equal versus subordinate status of vois in relation to the One comes plainly to the fore when we ask about the f the being of everything else, especially everything else below uxt, which is of course another px‘ and the source of an analogous problem. When Plotinus analyzes the being of things in the world he will analyze them into essence or image of essence and existence, positing the apxi of each as vois and One, respectively. ‘That is, the ‘One's proper effect here is evident solely as the existence of things, not their oleic, which derives from the second &px4. The One, then, is represented as primary cause of existence, but oivia is the everal reasons. Fi % Hnnends 6.7.17.8-4, 17-18,LLOYD P. GERSON 1e Forms are emi- sbscures the specific that the One give 50, one might then vit. Against such here is no necessity rm is in that which ‘less. How then ns in the One with 8 good by contem- che indistinet exis- mode of existence the apyi of Forms. rms in the One. If of Forms, but only orms at all, for the to explain di en vois achieves its eaning to that good vothing but perfeet ire not an image of nage. The perfect » Forms eminently. s is identified with wer and above it a inet te status of vois in nwe ask about the erything else below ree of an analogous shings in the world ence and existence, ively. Thatis, the istence of things, xi. The One, then, but obsia is the PLOTINUS'S METAPHYSICS 573, instrumental cause of being. Since there is no being without ex- istence, the One’s causal activity is completely instrumental, in- cluding even odie itself, which as such does not require a caus outside itself. In the being of oiia, the One uses vista as ment. So also with everything else. ‘An objection may occur to some. Does not the instrumental activity of ovcia or vois place some constraint or limitation on the One, counter to its purported unlimitedness as explained above? ‘This is an important objection, one which strikes a vital nerve. It is precisely owing to a suspected denial of omnipotence in Christian creation metaphysics, coming out of the Plotinian tradition, that ‘Aquinas refuses to join instrumentality with creation. I think that the correct answer to this objection is to admit that it does place a constraint upon the One, but to deny that it is the sort of constraint that Plotinus means to deny in saying that the One is unlimited. In endowing things with existence, the One is unlimited. It does not run out of power or goodness. There is nothing that could exist that does not. Yet what could exist is not the One's business. ‘That birds and bees can and do exist, that griffins could exist, but do not, and that square circles cannot exist, are owing to facts about obaia, to put it erudely. When the One produces existence, it uses the template of oisia. Its causal power is a pure stream, flowing out and over whatever it is that can receive it according to its own nature. No doubt Plotinus saw a certain advantage in instrumentalism. For example, he did not see it so much as a limitation but as a way to divest the One of responsibility for evil. ‘The ultimate explanation of evil is to be found in what things are, and for this the One is not the apx4. Ironically perhaps, Plato would have found it easier to assimilate oiaia to the Good, but only at the cost of making matter aseparate dpyi, independent of oisia. Yet Plotinus does come tan- talizingly close to undercutting the separateness of the épxi of obi when he says that all the Forms exist in the One indistinctly. One may perhaps usefully compare this with Anaximander’s aeipov, which at least on Aristotle's testimony appears to be a unique dxf in which all things are contained indistinetly and from which all things come. Although Plotinus's One is obviously a more sophisticated metaphysical principle that is the dmepoy of an instru- © Cf. Physies 187a20-1,574 LLOYD P. GERSON ‘Anaximander, there must be something in the nature of obeia or in the nature of the One which prevents Plotinus from collapsing the former into the latter. Itis well to be clear about the alternatives facing the philosopher who has arrived at this point. Hither oieia, shorthand for the locus of eternal truths, is a really distinet albeit subordinate apxi, or it is merely a conceptually distinct description of the One. I think we should resist concluding that Plotinus neatly accommodates both alternatives when he calls the One viov oivia. For this would be to undervalue his unqualified insistence that ovaia is an &py. To re- ject the first, Plotinian, alternative is either to introduce real eom- plexity into the One or to reduce all eternal truth to a single truth, perhaps least misleadingly represented as “the One exists.” Ihave of course left aside the theological adaptation of the first alternative wherein obsia becomes identified with the second person of the Christian Trinity. Returning to the question with which I began this paper, Is Plotinus’s metaphysics creationist or emanationist? if it is allowed that instrumental creationism is a legitimate species of creationism, then I think the answer is the former. If, on the other hand, one insists that there is no common genus for a metaphysics that holds that the existence of everything depends on the first principle and a metaphysics that holds that the being of everything depends on the first principle, then Plotinus's metaphysics is not accurately called creationist. But it is not emanationist either. Ido not have a convenient label to offer for this alternative. St. Michael's College, University of Toronto