CCLR 3|2015 A Shift in the Agenda for China and India 219

A Shift in the Agenda for China and India:

Geopolitical Implications for Future Climate
Governance
Dhanasree Jayaram*

2015 has marked a shift in stand for the world’s largest and third largest (in aggregate
terms) greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters – China and India – on the future of the global cli-
mate change negotiations. While China agreed for the first time to peak its carbon emis-
sions by 2030, India evaded such commitments but vowed to “set the agenda” for the up-
coming Paris Summit (COP-21). The two countries have shared a common platform (that of
the BASIC countries) at the climate change negotiations since the Copenhagen Summit
(COP-15) in 2009 but have since then developed divergent positions on many issues in sub-
sequent years. In this context, the article compares and contrasts the approaches and strate-
gies of India and China towards the Paris Summit, especially using the outcomes of U.S.
President Barack Obama’s meetings with the two countries’ top leadership. It analyses the
significance of geopolitics in the climate change negotiations and how the two countries
have manoeuvred their geopolitical ties with key players like the EU and G-77. The article
argues that despite this shift in stand and diverging positions, they are likely to stand to-
gether when it comes to issues such as equity and finance. It also proposes that the two
emerging Asian giants have the potential of strengthening bilateral ties to advance climate
goals.

I. Introduction an outcome of the 2007-08 financial crisis that hit the

2015 is a crucial year for the future of climate change
negotiations. This year at Paris (COP-21), the parties
are expected to reach a consensus on how the future
(post-Kyoto) climate treaty will look like. Six years
ago, at Copenhagen, the same international commu-
nity met to agree upon a post-Kyoto agreement and
on that occasion, the final “compromise” that was
reached was a geopolitical one that overlooked scien-
tific calculations and socio-economic realities. The
outcome of international climate change negotia-
tions is never solely determined by climate science
and the available technological or socio-economic op-
tions; geopolitics has always remained a key factor.
However, the Copenhagen Summit (2009) was
marked by a change in the geopolitical order (partly
* Dhanasree Jayaram is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of
Geopolitics and International Relations and Project Associate,
Manipal Advanced Research Group (MARG), Manipal University,
India.
West) that was not dominated by the industrialised
bloc only. Two parties – India and China – played a
crucial role in bringing the changing geopolitical or-
der as a key determinant in the negotiations. At the
summit, the U.S. and the EU were caught off-guard
by the geopolitical game choreographed by the Indi-
an negotiating team that brought together the emerg-
ing powerhouses of China, Brazil and South Africa
in one room to discuss the future of the global cli-
mate regime.
The convergences shown by India and China at
the Copenhagen Summit have waned since then ow-
ing to several reasons that are discussed in this arti-
cle. The fact of the matter is that the two countries
have diverging positions on a number of climate
treaty-related issues now. This became starkly appar-
ent in the outcomes of recent meetings during U.S.
President Barack Obama’s visits to China and India
– with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi. The meeting with President
Xi in late 2014 resulted in a landmark climate agree-
220 A Shift in the Agenda for China and India
ment in which China agreed to peak its emissions by
2030 and increase the share of non-fossil fuels in its
primary energy consumption. After the U.S.-China
joint announcement on climate change goals was re-
leased, expectations were high that India would also
announce concrete climate goals in a similar joint
communiqué during President Obama’s visit to In-
dia in early 2015. However, India chose not to pro-
pose any commitments that could potentially ham-
per its growth agenda. During a press conference
with President Obama, however, Prime Minister Mo-
di declared that India would be willing to work with
the rest of the world to agree on an international
treaty, which is perceived as a shift in India’s posi-
tion and as a proactive stand by many analysts, pri-
marily because of the emphasis laid by Prime Minis-
ter Modi on expanding the use of renewable energy.
But compared to China, the Indian position came
very late. When it comes to the submission of the In-
tended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (UNFCCC), China submitted its climate
action plan in June while India submitted its plan on-
ly in October. The two countries’ current position is
divergent, with China making significant promises
that increasingly embrace multilateralism (in com-
parison to its previous pledges) while India waiting
until the last moment to announce its contribution
to the post-2020 climate treaty and mostly limiting
its discourse to expansion of clean energy.
Against this backdrop, the article attempts to com-
pare and contrast the approaches and strategies of
India and China towards the upcoming Paris Sum-
mit that may well decide the fate of the post-2020 cli-
mate regime. Since India is yet to come up with its
INDC at the time of writing, comparisons cannot be
drawn between the two countries’ official strategies;
however, a few initial indications can be used to par-
tially ascertain which way India would sway during
the negotiations. The outcomes of President Obama’s
meetings with the Chinese and Indian heads of state
and the meeting between the two leaders will also be
analysed to bring out the convergences and diver-
gences on the climate deal-related issues between the
two countries. The article, in essence, investigates the
power politics between the two Asian giants in agree-
ing on various terms and conditions related to the
post-2020 climate treaty. It also gauges their ties with
other major players like the EU, G-77 and other mem-
bers of the BASIC (besides the U.S.); and determines
CCLR 3|2015
the future of their bilateral ties in relation to the glob-
al climate regime.
II. Copenhagen: Where It All Began
To date, the ghost of Copenhagen has not left the
room of climate change negotiations. For that reason,
it is important to discuss the geopolitical context of
the climate change negotiations. At the Copenhagen
Summit, the world witnessed what is considered the
rise of emerging powers (such as India and China)
and the relative decline of the West (the U.S. and the
EU). Four countries – India, China, Brazil and South
Africa – formed a bloc, BASIC, amid pressure from
the industrialised bloc to commit to emissions reduc-
tion targets. India is regarded as the chief architect
of this grouping as it joined hands with China and
convinced its IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa)
partners – Brazil and South Africa – to agree on dis-
agreeing with the demands of the industrialised
bloc.2 These demands included adoption of a legally
binding emissions reduction target from the emerg-
ing countries based on ‘shared responsibility’, global
emissions peaking date, and ‘international’ Measur-
ing, Reporting and Verification (MRV) for domestic
actions among others. The four emerging economies
jointly called on the developed countries to enforce
the second commitment period of the 1997 Kyoto Pro-
tocol. They insisted that all their mitigation actions
would be voluntary and not subject to “intrusive” in-
ternational scrutiny.3 The U.S. and EU’s attempts to
divert the debate away from the strict dichotomy be-
tween Annex I and non-Annex I parties and in effect
not adopt stronger commitments were thwarted. Nei-
ther the U.S. nor the EU foresaw this negotiating
move by the BASIC countries that was then steered
by the Chinese delegation towards its final execution.
In fact, Obama administration’s then Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton later admitted in her memoir
2 Cleo Paskal, “How Copenhagen Has Changed Geopolitics: The
Real Take-Home Message Is Not What You Think”, New Security
Beat, 4 January 2010, available on the Internet at <http://www
.newsecuritybeat.org/2010/01/how-copenhagen-has-changed
-geopolitics-the-real-take-home-message-is-not-what-you-think/>
(last accessed on 19 August 2015).
3 Saibal Dasgupta, “Copenhagen Conference: India, China Plan
Joint Exit”, The Times of India, 28 November 2009, available on
the Internet at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/
Copenhagen-conference-India-China-plan-joint-exit/articleshow/
5279771.cms> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
CCLR 3|2015
that the meeting of the BASIC leaders was literally
gate-crashed by Obama, a step that ultimately
brought the U.S. too on the negotiating table .4 In the
end, although it was a collective failure, China and
India were blamed for “sabotaging” the negotiations.5
This was a summit of many “firsts” in the geopo-
litical arena. This was the first time that India and
China spoke with one voice about the future of inter-
national climate cooperation. Although they have
taken similar stands on issues such as common but
differentiated responsibility (CBDR), climate finance
and transfer of technology (ToT), the fact that they
drafted the full text of the Copenhagen accord (albeit
with no legal subtexts) together, which would guide
the progress of climate change negotiations in the
coming years was beyond all expectations because of
the ongoing political rivalry between the two coun-
tries. This was the first time that India and China had
broken ranks with the G-77.6 Only a few countries
from the G-77 bloc had backed the Copenhagen Ac-
cord thrashed out by the BASIC countries.7 This was
the first time that the contested concept of G-2
emerged that refers to the U.S. and China being at
the forefront of the international order although
some analysts interpreted G-2 as the emergence of
China and India.8 This was the first time the EU was
forced to take the backseat during the climate change
negotiations and eventually had to be satisfied with
the lowest hanging fruit despite coming into the ne-
gotiations with high expectations, particularly with
respect to emissions cut targets from countries such
4 PTI, “How Obama, Clinton Crashed a ‘Secret’ Meet between
China, India”, First Post, 11 June 2014, available on the Internet
at <http://www.firstpost.com/world/how-obama-clinton-crashed-a
-secret-meet-between-china-india-1565611.html> (last accessed
on 19 August 2015).
5 Tobias Rapp, Christian Schwägerl and Gerald Traufetter, “The
Copenhagen Protocol: How China and India Sabotaged the UN
Climate Summit”, Spiegel Online International, 5 May 2010, avail-
able on the Internet at <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/
the-copenhagen-protocol-how-china-and-india-sabotaged-the-un
-climate-summit-a-692861.html> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
6 ET Bureau, “BASIC Difference at Copenhagen Summit”, The
Economic Times, 21 December 2009, available on the Internet at
<http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2009-12-21/news/
28448276_1_g-77-copenhagen-accord-climate-change> (last ac-
cessed on 19 August 2015).
7 PTI, “Bangladesh Disappointed by Draft Treaty Framed by India,
China”, The Hindu, 8 December 2009, available on the Internet
at <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/bangladesh
-disappointed-by-draft-treaty-framed-by-india-china/article61889
.ece> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
8 Paskal, “How Copenhagen Has Changed Geopolitics”.
9 Gavin Hewitt, “Europe Snubbed in Copenhagen?”, BBC, 22
December 2009, available on the Internet at <http://www.bbc.co
A Shift in the Agenda for China and India 221
as China and to a lesser extent, India. The EU had al-
ways led the process from the front since the begin-
ning of the negotiations.9
The Copenhagen Accord was nothing more than
a political agreement that left the negotiations
hostage to a geopolitical game between the major
powers of the world, while smaller countries that are
affected most by climate change clamoured for more
action. During the next summits at Cancun, Durban,
Doha, Warsaw and Lima that geopolitical game con-
tinued. The only difference is that the game kept
evolving and the actors’ positions and perspectives
changed. So did India and China’s positions. The uni-
ty among the BASIC countries began to weaken al-
ready one year later at the Cancun Summit (2010).
The split was inaugurated by Brazil and South Africa
that decided to join hands with the Alliance of Small
Island States (AOSIS) and the Least Developed Coun-
tries (LDCs), especially among the other Latin Amer-
ican and African countries respectively in calling for
greater climate action at the international level and
possibly a legally binding deal.10.
Traditionally, India and China have held similar po-
sitions on many issues including the CBDR11; equity
and climate justice; climate finance and ToT (from
the developed countries). Although these norms are
still adhered to by the two countries in principle, due
to increasing pressure on China, which became the
largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHG) in 200712
and per capita emissions rising rapidly, to commit to
legally binding emissions reductions targets, China
.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/2009/12/s_5.html> (last ac-
cessed on 19 August 2015).
10 NDTV Correspondent, “Cancun Setback: India, China Isolated”,
NDTV, 9 December 2010, available on the Internet at <http://
www.ndtv.com/india-news/cancun-setback-india-china-isolated
-441489> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
11 CBDR has two main implications – first, the common responsi-
bility of all nation states to protect the climate/environment at all
levels (national, regional, and global) based on the idea of com-
mon heritage of humankind; and second, differing contribution
of each nation state to the progression of climate change and
therefore acknowledgment on the part of the developed coun-
tries with regard to their historical responsibility; and third,
differing circumstances within a nation state-based on capabili-
ties, vulnerabilities and special needs (especially financial and
technological). For more information, refer to “The Principle of
Common But Differentiated Responsibilities: Origins and Scope”,
Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, 26 Au-
gust 2002, available on the Internet at <http://cisdl.org/public/
docs/news/brief_common.pdf>(last accessed on 19 August
2015).
12 John Vidal and David Adam, “China Overtakes US as World's
Biggest CO2 Emitter”, The Guardian, 19 June 2007, available on
the Internet at <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/
jun/19/china.usnews> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
222 A Shift in the Agenda for China and India
decided to split ways with India on the practical front.
In fact, India has also come to the understanding that
a strategic shift in its stand on climate change could
have multiple positive offshoots. At the Paris Summit,
India is likely to group China with the industrialised
countries – not only is China the largest emitter but
also its per capita emissions match that of the EU. Se-
condly, if China is forced to reduce emissions, this
could help shift some of the manufacturing activity
from China to India.13 Although there are common
issues on which the two countries still share similar
views that are discussed later in the article, the geopo-
litical “alliance” between the two countries formed at
the Copenhagen Summit, does not exist anymore.
The future of the climate regime was jeopardised
much before the Copenhagen Summit when the U.S.
chose not to ratify the 1997 Kyoto Protocol despite be-
ing the largest emitter at the time the agreement was
both signed and came into effect, and more impor-
tantly a member of the industrialised bloc and hence,
should have adopted legally binding emissions reduc-
tion targets. One of the primary reasons it cited for its
refusal to ratify was the fact that China (being a de-
veloping country) was not required to adopt any legal-
ly binding emissions reduction commitments.14 Af-
ter the Copenhagen Summit, it was clear that even the
EU and other industrialised countries were not eager
to take up commitments unless emerging economies,
especially China, also came on board. Many countries
including Canada, Russia and Japan (apart from the
U.S.), decided against taking on fresh targets in the
second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol that
was signed in 2012 (called the Doha Amendment) and
many others, against putting the Amendment into le-
gal force.15 To add to this, pressure is also being built
on the emerging economies such as China by LDCs
and AOSIS for more climate action.16
With many countries, and many others not besides
the clarion call from many LDCs and AOSIS for more
constructive action from emerging countries such as
China, there was immense pressure on it to act.
III. Obama’s Trysts with Xi and Modi
and their Geopolitical Implications
There are several instances that show the growing
differences between India and China but among all,
the varying stands taken by the two countries’ top
leadership during the visit of the U.S. President Oba-
CCLR 3|2015
ma stand out. After months of negotiations the U.S.
and China – the world’s largest GHG emitters – de-
cided to steer the negotiations forward for the Paris
Summit by signing an agreement that was regarded
by many analysts as a “landmark” and/or “historic”
one. Both countries decided to move away from busi-
ness-as-usual. The U.S. announced that it would re-
duce GHG emissions by 26-28% from 2005 levels by
2025. China announced its goal of peaking emissions
by 2030 (albeit without specifying the level) as well
as its goal to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in
primary energy consumption to around 20% by
2030.17 Previously, the U.S. had pledged to reduce
GHG emissions by 17% by 2020 and 83% by 2050
from 2005 levels. China had agreed to reduce carbon
emissions per unit of GDP by 40 to 45% from 2005
levels by 2020, besides boosting the share of non-fos-
sil fuels to around 15% by the same year.18
Politically, the agreement could be considered a
“historical one” but technically, this has been found
too little and too late by many scientists, according
to whom these targets are not enough to achieve the
goal of limiting global warming to 2 degrees Cel-
sius.19 In the geopolitical sphere, as far as the U.S. is
13 Vishwa Mohan, “Climate Talks: India Mulls Shift in Stand”, The
Times of India, 5 November 2014, available on the Internet at
<http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/environment/global
-warming/Climate-talks-India-mulls-shift-in-stand/articleshow/
45041325.cms>(last accessed on 19 August 2015).
14 John Hovi, Detlef E. Sprinz and Guri Bang, “Why the United
States did not become a Party to the Kyoto
Protocol: German, Norwegian, and US Perspectives”, 18 Euro-
pean Journal of International Relations (2010), at p. 130.
15 “Briefing Paper: Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol
(KP2)”, Southeast Asia Network of Climate Change Offices
(SEAN-CC), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and
Regional Gateway for Technology Transfer and Climate Change
Action in Latin America and the Caribbean (REGATTA), Novem-
ber 2012, pp. 1 et sqq., at p. 2.
16 Joel Jay Kassiola, China's Environmental Crisis: Domestic and
Global Political Impacts and Responses, 1st ed. (New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan 2010), at p. 79.
17 Mark Landler, “U.S. and China Reach Climate Accord After
Months of Talks”, The New York Times, 11 November 2014,
available on the Internet at <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/
12/world/asia/china-us-xi-obama-apec.html?_r=0> (last accessed
on 19 August 2015).
18 “From Copenhagen Accord to Climate Action: Tracking National
Commitments to Curb Global Warming”, National Resources
Defense Council (NRDC), available on the Internet at <http://
www.nrdc.org/international/copenhagenaccords/> (last accessed
on 19 August 2015).
19 Andrew Mayeda, “U.S.-China Climate Agreement Not Enough to
Slow Warming, World Bank Says”, Bloomberg, 24 November
2014, available on the Internet at <http://www.bloomberg.com/
politics/articles/2014-11-23/uschina-climate-agreement-wont
-slow-warming-world-bank-says> (last accessed on 19 August
2015).
CCLR 3|2015
concerned, the road ahead is not easy. The Republi-
cans were quick to slam the agreement, since in their
view this would give considerable leeway to China
to emit as much as it wanted until 2030, while the
U.S. would have to resort to economically unviable
measures to meet those steep targets, which would
eventually result in an economic slowdown in the
country.20 Some analysts claimed that, on the con-
trary, the U.S. would have an easy time achieving its
target since it only would need to maintain the cur-
rent rate of declining emissions (10-15% below 2005
levels and falling by about 1.5% per year).21 Others
pointed out that the U.S. targets are “ambitious – but
achievable” with measures such as GHG and fuel ef-
ficiency standards for medium- and heavy-duty ve-
hicles, reducing emissions from the power sector,
phase down the use of certain hydro-fluorocarbon
(HFC) gases, cutting methane emissions from natur-
al gas systems and other sources, setting renewable
portfolio and energy efficiency standards and so on.22
China agreed to bring about dramatic changes in its
future growth trajectory that might involve near-
term actions such as capping coal use by closing
down several coal plants, expanding the use of re-
newable sources (by installing more non-fossil fuel-
fired capacity than its current coal-fired capacity) and
increasing energy efficiency, and re-evaluating its
policies on pricing mechanisms involving fossil fu-
els and especially carbon; and in the medium-term,
readjusting the economy from manufacturing to ser-
vices.23
While it could be argued that China’s change in
stand might be attributed to international pressure,
20 Dhanasree Jayaram, “Sino-US Climate Change Deal may Shift
Agenda for Developing States”, Global Times, 18 November
2014, available on the Internet at <http://www.globaltimes.cn/
content/892409.shtml> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
21 Dana Nuccitelli, “Fact Check: China Pledged Bigger Climate
Action than the USA; Republican Leaders Wrong”, The
Guardian, 14 November 2014, available on the Internet at
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus
-97-per-cent/2014/nov/14/fact-check-china-pledged-bigger
-climate-action-republican-leaders-wrong> (last accessed on 19
August 2015).
22 Karl Hausker and Kristin Meek, “Obama’s Greenhouse Gas
Target for 2025 is Ambitious—But Achievable”, World Resources
Institute (WRI), 13 November 2014, available on the Internet at
<http://www.wri.org/blog/2014/11/obama%E2%80%99s
-greenhouse-gas-target-2025-ambitious%E2%80%94-achievable>
(last accessed on 19 August 2015).
23 “Taking Stronger Action on Climate Change: China and the
United States”, China FAQs, 26 November, 2014, available on
the Internet at <http://www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/
A Shift in the Agenda for China and India 223
the domestic challenges related to pollution could al-
so have played a big role in its decision to move away
from traditionally held positions. The worsening pol-
lution levels have been singled out as the cause for
deteriorating health, economic losses, poorer indus-
trial efficiency, and even lower agricultural produc-
tion in several parts of the country.24 The current sit-
uation is so damaging that this phenomenon has
been referred to as the “nuclear winter”25 (smog). In-
creasing discontent among the citizens26 and recur-
ring economic havoc due to air pollution have forced
the Chinese government to act more “responsibly” at
the national and international level.
Geopolitically, the U.S.-China announcement had
a huge impact on raising hopes in terms of emissions
reduction targets from the other major emitters. As
already specified, industrialized countries like Cana-
da and Australia have always argued that until and
unless the world’s largest emitters and their largest
trading partners (U.S. and China) do not take on
greater concrete commitments, neither would they.
With this precondition being served, expectations
were high that these countries would become more
proactive in terms of climate ambitions. However,
Australia did not release its INDC until the end of Ju-
ly (although its Environment Minister hinted at an
emissions reduction target of 30% below 2000 levels
by 2025 and 40-60% by 203027) while Canada’s INDC
has been called less than satisfactory with its stated
goal of reducing GHG emissions between 2020 and
2030 by approximately 1.7% per year (in comparison
to the 2.8% per year of the U.S. and EU). In addition,
Canada proposes to utilise international market
ChinaFAQs-Taking_Stronger_Action%20V3_0.pdf> (last accessed
on 19 August 2015).
24 “The East is Grey”, The Economist, 10 August 2013, available on
the Internet at <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/
21583245-china-worlds-worst-polluter-largest-investor-green
-energy-its-rise-will-have> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
25 Jonathan Kaiman, “China's Toxic Air Pollution Resembles Nuclear
Winter, Say Scientists”, The Guardian, 25 February 2014, avail-
able on the Internet at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
feb/25/china-toxic-air-pollution-nuclear-winter-scientists> (last ac-
cessed on 19 August 2015).
26 Gal Luft, “China’s Pollution Revolution”, Foreign Policy, 16
December 2013, available on the Internet at <http://foreignpolicy
.com/2013/12/16/chinas-pollution-revolution> (last accessed on
19 August 2015).
27 Stian Reklev, “Australia Hints at INDC Climate Target near US
Goal”, Carbon Pulse, 2 July 2015, available on the Internet at
<http://carbon-pulse.com/australia-hints-at-indc-climate-target
-near-us-goal> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
224 A Shift in the Agenda for China and India
mechanisms to achieve its target when many other
industrialised countries plan to do so without using
them.28
Similarly, expectations from India and Brazil also
soared in the wake of the agreement – to raise their
levels of commitment in the same vein as China. Like
China, Brazil has also announced climate commit-
ments in a joint statement with the U.S. such as elim-
inating deforestation and increasing the share of re-
newable sources in the energy basket to 33% by
2030.29 However, both Brazil and India did not sub-
mit its INDC before the end of July or an “intended”
goal of cutting GHG emissions before the Paris Sum-
mit. Former Special Envoy of the Indian Prime Min-
ister on climate change, Shyam Saran pointed out
that if China had agreed to peak its emissions in 2030,
then India could agree to do the same 15-20 years af-
ter 2030, taking into account India’s aggregate and
per capita emissions that are far lower than China’s.30
Although India is the third largest GHG emitter, its
per capita emissions stand at a meagre 1.7 tonnes CO2
per person – far behind the U.S.’ 16.6 tonnes and Chi-
na’s 7.4 tonnes. Even in terms of aggregate emissions,
in 2013 India accounted for only 6% of the world’s
total GHG emissions while China accounts for 29%
and the U.S., 15%.31
Due to the large gap between the emissions of the
top two and the third largest emitters, President Oba-
ma’s meeting with Prime Minister Modi was hailed
as a small “breakthrough”32, with the two countries
making headway at least on investments in solar en-
ergy and understanding on hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs). Although a “concrete” agreement (as op-
posed to China) was not reached in terms of GHG
emissions reduction commitments, a few crucial
steps were taken in the direction of securing a
stronger agreement at the Paris Climate Summit lat-
er in 2015. Prime Minister Modi’s statement during
the joint press conference held by the two leaders
made it clear that India would not only continue to
place equal emphasis on adaptation and climate fi-
nance (besides mitigation) at the negotiations, but al-
so avoid any commitments aimed at peaking emis-
sions. Although he underscored the sense of urgency
and severity associated with climate change, he also
asserted that India, being a sovereign country, can-
not be pressurized by any external force to take on
commitments (alluding to China’s agreement with
the U.S.). However, he refrained from emphasising
too much the traditionally held positions such as the
CCLR 3|2015
“common but differentiated responsibility” and in-
stead expressed willingness to work towards reach-
ing a robust global agreement at the Paris Summit –
which in itself is a major shift in India’s approach to-
wards global climate policy. The two countries suc-
cessfully concluded a Memorandum of Understand-
ing (MoU) on Energy Security, Clean Energy and Cli-
mate Change. Besides agreeing to advance research
and development in clean energy (to cut GHG emis-
sions), they also launched cooperative mechanisms
to improve air quality climate resilience in India.
Most importantly, India and the U.S. agreed to work
towards phasing down HFCs – a potent GHG that is
considered more detrimental than carbon dioxide to
the climate.33 For long, India had opposed any
amendment to the Montreal Protocol to include
HFCs among the gases that require to be phased out.
India’s decision to revive the Indo-US HFC Task Force
to discuss alternatives, technology transfer and fi-
nance and to cooperate under the auspices of the
Montreal Protocol has been viewed as a welcome step
by the U.S. and the rest of the international commu-
nity.34
28 Thomas Damassa and Taryn Fransen, “Canada's Proposed Cli-
mate Commitment Lags Behind Its Peers'”, World Resources
Institute (WRI), 15 May 2015, available on the Internet at <http://
www.wri.org/blog/2015/05/canadas-proposed-climate
-commitment-lags-behind-its-peers> (last accessed on 19 August
2015).
29 U.S.-Brazil Joint Statement On Climate Change, The White
House, 30 June 2015, available on the Internet at <https://www
.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/06/30/us-brazil-joint
-statement-climate-change> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
30 Indrani Bagchi and Vishwa Mohan, “After US-China deal, India
may have to Reset Climate Goals”, The Times of India, 13 No-
vember 2014, available on the Internet at <http://timesofindia
.indiatimes.com/home/environment/pollution/After-US-China
-deal-India-may-have-to-reset-climate-goals/articleshow/
45130021.cms> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
31 Jos G.J. Olivier, Greet Janssens-Maenhout, Marilena Muntean and
Jeroen A.H.W. Peters, Trends in Global CO2 Emissions: 2014
Report (The Hague: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency 2014), pp. 4 et sqq., at pp. 49.
32 Alan Neuhauser, “U.S.-India Deals on Clean Energy, Nuclear
Power Pave Way for Paris”, U.S. News, 26 January 2015, avail-
able on the Internet at <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2015/01/26/us-india-breakthrough-on-climate-change-nuclear
-power-pave-way-for-paris> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
33 Vishwa Mohan, “Obama-Modi Climate Deal: Unlike China, No
Emission Target for India”, The Times of India, 26 January 2015,
available on the Internet at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
home/environment/global-warming/Obama-Modi-climate-deal
-Unlike-China-no-emission-target-for-India/articleshow/46016298
.cms> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
34 Urmi A. Goswami, “Last Man Standing, No More: India Takes the
Plunge on HFCs”, The Economic Times, 20 April 2015, available
on the Internet at <http://blogs.economictimes.indiatimes.com/
GreyMatters/last-man-standing-no-more-india-takes-the-plunge
-on-hfcs/> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
CCLR 3|2015
IV. India and China: Convergences and
Divergences on the Climate Regime
Even though both China and India seem to be mov-
ing towards constructively engaging with the rest of
the international community to potentially reach an
agreement at the Paris Summit as stated in the pre-
vious section, their visions and approaches are vary-
ing. China is more open to talking about targets and
time-tables, norms that were set by the industrialised
countries as a part of the climate regime, albeit it is
still opposed to many ideas propagated by the indus-
trialised countries such as intrusive MRV of its do-
mestic actions.) India is on a completely revisionist
mode, looking to alter the very foundation on which
the negotiations are conducted – if not the whole of
it, at least some tenets – to make it fairer and equi-
table, in its view. One of India’s revisionist proposals
include a shift from a mitigation-oriented regime to
an adaptation-centred one. In its INDC, China reiter-
ated the commitments and goals outlined in the U.S.-
China announcement. Its intention to reduce carbon
emissions per unit of GDP (carbon intensity) by
60-65% by 2030 as well as to increase the forest car-
35 “Enhanced Actions on Climate Change: China’s Intended Nation-
ally Determined Contributions”, Department of Climate Change,
National Development and Reform Commission of China, 30
June 2015, at p. 5.
36 Jennifer Duggan, “China Makes Carbon Pledge Ahead of Paris
Climate Change Summit”, The Guardian, 30 June 2015, on the
Internet at <http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/
30/china-carbon-emissions-2030-premier-li-keqiang-un-paris
-climate-change-summit> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
37 Taryn Fransen, Ranping Song, Fred Stolle and Geoffrey Hender-
son, “A Closer Look at China's New Climate Plan (INDC)”, World
Resources Institute (WRI), available on the Internet at <http://www
.wri.org/blog/2015/07/closer-look-chinas-new-climate-plan-indc>
(last accessed on 19 August 2015).
38 Roger Harrabin, “China ‘Deserves More Credit’ for Renewable
Energy Effort”, BBC, 15 June 2015, available on the Internet at
<http://www.bbc.com/news/business-33143176> (last accessed
on 19 August 2015).
39 Feifei Shen, “Beijing to Shut All Major Coal Power Plants to Cut
Pollution”, Bloomberg, 23 March 2015, available on the Internet
at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-24/beijing
-to-close-all-major-coal-power-plants-to-curb-pollution> (last ac-
cessed on 19 August 2015).
40 Fergus Green and Nicholas Stern, “China’s “New Normal”:
Structural Change, Better Growth, and Peak Emissions”,
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and Environment
and Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, June 2015,
available on the Internet at <http://www.lse.ac.uk/
GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Chinas_new
_normal_green_stern_June_2015.pdf> (last accessed on 19
August 2015).
41 Fransen, Song, Stolle and Henderson, “A Closer Look at China's
New Climate Plan (INDC)”, supra note 37.
A Shift in the Agenda for China and India 225
bon stock volume by around 4.5 billion cubic meters
from 2005 levels by 2030 was made announced in
the INDC.35 Experts say that China is capable of
achieving much more than that and that those fig-
ures only represent what China could achieve with
the actions that would be undertaken or have already
been set in motion by the Chinese administration to
address air pollution domestically.36 The document
mentions a few policies that are aimed at tackling
other GHG gases such as methane, nitrous oxide,
HFCs. Up until now the political leadership has not
implemented any to address this issue, although
some analysts have expressed scepticism over the nit-
ty-gritty of these planned steps.37 China acknowl-
edges that its emissions have swelled rapidly since
1990, and that they almost match U.S.’ total historic
emissions, making it more difficult for China to keep
using the “common but differentiated responsibili-
ty” card (albeit it is mentioned in the INDC).
China’s primary achievement so far has been its
advancements in the expansion of renewable energy
sources in its energy basket and this forms the core
of its climate policy (and the INDC) so far. According
to the latest (2014) figures, its spending on renewable
energy ($80bn) is equal to the combined spending of
the U.S. ($34bn) and the EU ($46bn).38 Besides re-
newable energy, nuclear energy and natural gas also
form an important part of its climate policy as they
help reduce carbon emissions. In fact, China is al-
ready converting its coal-fired plants (especially the
old, more polluting ones) to natural gas-fired ones to
reduce pollution in its major cities, particularly Bei-
jing.39 This is also expected to aid China’s interna-
tional efforts on climate change. There are also
favourable views of China’s goals and its recent
achievements in addressing climate change. China’s
focus on spurring “better quality growth” with the
aid of structural changes in the economy to policies
on air pollution, energy efficiency and clean energy
is being regarded as the “new normal”.40 Internation-
ally, China’s efforts are being hailed but there are con-
cerns over the lack of transparency in terms of how
the targets would be achieved.41 For instance, the ex-
pected trajectory of GHG emissions from now to 2030
and the contribution of emissions from land-use
change and forestry in the overall CO2 peaking tar-
get have not been clarified.
As far as India’s INDC is concerned, reports sug-
gest that India could opt to submit two INDCs to the
UNFCCC – one that could be achieved with domes-
226 A Shift in the Agenda for China and India
tic resources and the other, with the help of financial
and technological resources from the developed
countries.42 At the outset, the decision to submit two
INDCs might look like a more feasible and the only
justifiable stand that India could possibly take at this
stage. India has had longstanding differences with
the developed countries over the preoccupation of
the climate regime with mitigation without giving
due importance to adaptation, climate finance and
loss-and-damage mechanisms. More than 300 mil-
lion people in India are still deprived of electricity.43
Furthermore, rural households that are inhabited by
nearly 70% of the Indian population emit 16 times
less than the urban households.44 Such a large divide
renders a nation-wide emissions reduction target
harder to set. Hence, Prime Minister Modi, despite
being the only political leader to have authored a
book on climate change45 after Al Gore, will be forced
to adopt the middle ground on climate change miti-
gation. India, at this stage, is keeping its options wide
open as energy security, self-reliance and poverty al-
leviation remain its top priorities. This is why in spite
of the fact that clean energy is one of Modi’s fore-
most priorities, the Government plans to double the
country’s coal production to 1 billion tons annually46
– something that cannot be considered a sustainable
or environmentally sound option.
During Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to
France and Germany, he declared, “India will set the
42 Joydeep Gupta, “India Offers Two Options for UN Climate Deal”,
India Climate Dialogue, 3 February 2015, available on the Inter-
net at <http://indiaclimatedialogue.net/2015/02/03/india-offers
-two-options-un-climate-deal/> (last accessed on 19 August
2015).
43 Rebecca Bundhun, “Challenge for India to Ease Power Shortage”,
The National, 28 June 2014, available on the Internet at <http://
www.thenational.ae/business/industry-insights/economics/
challenge-for-india-to-ease-power-shortage#full> (last accessed
on 19 August 2015).
44 “CO2 Emission by Urban Households 16 Times More Than
Rural Ones”, The Indian Express, 11 April 2014, available on the
Internet at <http://indianexpress.com/article/cities/mumbai/co2
-emission-by-urban-households-16-times-more-than-rural-ones
-report/#sthash.qXsLfGmU.dpuf> (last accessed on 19 August
2015).
45 “Modi Pens Book on Climate Change”, The Indian Express, 16
December 2010, available on the Internet at <http://indianexpress
.com/article/cities/ahmedabad/modi-pens-book-on-climate
-change/> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
46 Indo-Asian News Service, “Coal India to Produce 1 billion tonnes
by 2019: Goyal”, The Hindu, 6 November 2014, available on the
Internet at <http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/coal
-india-to-produce-1-billion-tonnes-by-2019-goyal/article6570749
.ece> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
CCLR 3|2015
agenda for the upcoming Conference of Parties”.47
The question is how and whether Prime Minister
Modi would be able to set the agenda. What has been
amply made clear by Modi’s rhetoric on climate
change is that he does not want the focus of the cli-
mate change negotiations to be only on emissions
cuts. Instead, he prefers to push the agenda on ‘clean
energy’ at the international level – a concern as well
as a demand that he raised when talking to the lead-
ers of the nations he visited. He underscored the
need for these countries to lend a helping hand to
India in advancing its clean energy goals that it has
set since he came to power in 2014.48 Finance Min-
ister Arun Jaitley’s statement in his budget speech
that India “plans to quadruple its renewable power
capacity to 175 GW by 2022,”49 is key to India’s main
bargaining chip at the climate change negotiations.
As a part of this target, India intends to add 100 GW
of solar energy, 60 GW of wind power, 10 GW of bio-
mass and 5 GW of hydro energy by 2022.50 Although
several questions still remain to be answered to
reach those targets such as the lack of vital infra-
structure (including the existing poor power grid
system) and land acquisition, it indicates the govern-
ment’s keenness to work towards definite renewable
energy goals. In order to tie energy security further
with the climate change debate, Modi has also reit-
erated his idea of replacing “carbon credit” with
“green credit” so that green/clean energy initiatives
47 Press Trust of India, “India will Set Climate Change Conference
Agenda: Narendra Modi”, The Indian Express, 14 April 2015,
available on the Internet at <http://indianexpress.com/article/
india/india-others/india-will-set-climate-change-conference
-agenda-narendra-modi/#sthash.wtV3WUXU.dpuf> (last accessed
on 19 August 2015).
48 Dhanasree Jayaram, “Under Modi, India’s Climate Goals Tied to
Clean Energy Development”, New Security Beat, 8 May 2015,
available on the Internet at <http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/
2015/05/modi-indias-climate-goals-tied-clean-energy
-development/> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
49 Ganesh Nagarajan, “India to Quadruple Renewable Capacity to
175 Gigawatts by 2022”, Bloomberg, 28 February 2015, available
on the Internet at <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-02-28/india-to-quadruple-renewable-capacity-to-175
-gigawatts-by-2022> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
50 The total renewable energy installed capacity in India at the end
of June, 2015 stood at 36470.64 MW (~36.5 GW) – wind power
(~24 GW), solar power (~4 GW), small hydro power (~4 GW)
and biomass (~4.5 GW). For more information, please refer to
“Programme/ Scheme wise Physical Progress in 2015-16 (During
the month of June, 2015)”, Ministry of New and Renewable
Energy, Government of India, available on the Internet at <http://
www.mnre.gov.in/mission-and-vision-2/achievements> (last ac-
cessed on 19 August 2015).
CCLR 3|2015
are given a priority in the international negotia-
tions.51
Very clearly, except the agenda on clean energy
(including nuclear energy) and the bottom-up ap-
proach to climate action, the two countries have di-
verged on many points including peaking of emis-
sions and emissions reductions commitments. The
leaders of the two countries, however, agreed on a
number of points when they met in May 2015 – in-
cluding “principles of equity and common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities and respective capabili-
ties, reflecting different historical responsibilities,
development stages and national circumstances be-
tween developed and developing countries”.52 The
joint document stated that not only does the onus
lie with the developed countries to upgrade their
emissions reduction targets (in relation to the tar-
gets mentioned in the INDCs submitted by them so
far) but also fulfil the promise of providing $100bn
per year by 2020 as well as technology and capacity
building support to developing countries. Both coun-
tries continue to agree on the principle of non-intru-
sive verification on climate actions that does not im-
pinge on their sovereignty in line with the CBDR.53
In fact, China’s willingness to consider a legally bind-
ing agreement is contingent on this provision. These
convergences may not translate into the kind of sol-
idarity the two emerging countries showed during
51 Indo-Asian News Service, “Focus on Climate Change Must Shift
to 'Green Credit': Modi”, Business Standard, 19 January 2015,
available on the Internet at <http://www.business-standard.com/
article/news-ians/focus-on-climate-change-must-shift-to-green
-credit-modi-115011901296_1.html> (last accessed on 19 August
2015).
52 Joint Statement on Climate Change between India and China
during Prime Minister's visit to China, Press Information Bureau,
Government of India, Prime Minister's Office, 15 May 2015,
available on the Internet at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease
.aspx?relid=121754> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
53 Ibid.
54 Dhanasree Jayaram, “Delhi Anti-pollution Efforts Could Look to
Beijing’s Stricter Standards”, Global Times, 19 March 2015,
available on the Internet at <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/
912969.shtml> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
55 Ed King, “China Set to Tighten Coal and Carbon Caps in Next
Five Year Plan”, Response to Climate Change (RTCC), 3 March
2015, available on the Internet at <http://www.rtcc.org/2015/03/
03/china-set-to-tighten-coal-and-carbon-caps-in-next-five-year
-plan/#sthash.GKzdA2aM.dpuf> (last accessed on 19 August
2015).
56 Chetan Chauhan, “13 Out of World's Top 20 Polluted Cities in
India, Only Three in China”, Hindustan Times, 10 August 2015,
available on the Internet at <http://www.hindustantimes.com/
india-news/india-s-cities-more-polluted-than-china-but-there-is
-still-hope/article1-1355013.aspx> (last accessed on 19 August
2015).
A Shift in the Agenda for China and India 227
the Copenhagen Summit, considering the fact that
they have set completely different tones for the Paris
Summit. The fact of the matter is that China has
come a long way since Copenhagen and has set its
foot firmly on the path towards low-carbon growth
in a big way – mainly to address domestic pollution,
while India has been struggling to do the same and
has only begun to talk big numbers in terms of both
renewable energy targets and clean energy invest-
ments. Even in the case of air pollution, Beijing has
not only adopted policies to introduce cleaner fuel
(Euro V was already added as the compliant fuel in
2013), incentivize purchase of electric vehicles,
phase out older vehicles, and restrict the number of
vehicles in the city among others, but also an-
nounced that it would shut down at least 300 pollut-
ing factories and cap coal and steel production.54 Re-
ports suggest that China may consider “tougher” coal
and CO2 caps under the 13th Five Year Plan to add
teeth to its existing goals (that are not long-term)
such as to limit coal consumption to 4.2 billion
tonnes of coal by 2020 and other capping targets for
specific cities.55 India has been slow in recognising
smog as a serious issue that needs to be tackled with
urgency. By tying domestic air pollution to the inter-
national climate agenda (climate action), China has
been successful in catering to the demands of both
domestic and international audience. India, on the
other hand, has kept the two largely separate. It is
very clear that even without climate change, India is
deeply affected by the scourge of pollution. In fact,
according to a study by the World health Organiza-
tion (WHO), 13 of the total 20-most polluted cities
are in India.56
V. Conclusion
With India and China drifting apart in more than
one way and the group of BASIC countries splintered
to a large extent, both countries are in the process of
realigning their geopolitical affiliations regarding cli-
mate change negotiations. This is more pertinent in
the case of India that has almost been singled out al-
though Brazil and South Africa (among the BASIC
countries) have not released their final version of the
INDC. The BASIC countries continue to meet annu-
ally but the only issues on which they agree to coop-
erate is that of climate finance – the developed coun-
tries’ pledge to deliver $100bn every year by 2020 to
228 A Shift in the Agenda for China and India
the poorer nations for both mitigation and adapta-
tion – and the “common but differentiated responsi-
bility” principle.57 This view is likely to dominate the
Paris Summit negotiations with not only the BASIC
but also the countries of the developing and LDCs
blocs demanding more ambitious actions by the in-
dustrialised countries. Earlier in 2015, BRICS (Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa) also explored
options to coordinate actions at the Paris Summit
such as the “Saint Petersburg initiative” for sharing
green technologies or the potential role of the New
Development Bank (NDB) in financing environmen-
tal projects.58 This is an important step since the
BRICS nations (except Russia) are a part of the BASIC
as well as the G-77. Historically, both India and Chi-
na have tried to lead the G-77. Now that China has
moved ahead of the rest in terms of its development
and mitigation goals, India is looking to step in to fill
the vacuum. The LDCs and AOSIS want the emerg-
ing economies like India to act more strongly on cli-
mate mitigation rather than exploiting the ‘develop-
ing country’ card to avoid taking on any emissions
reductions commitments and they fear that India
might succeed in doing so. India would like to over-
come these apprehensions and has expressed solidar-
ity with the African nations59 and the island nations60
in their objective of securing equal amount of fi-
nances for adaptation (as much as mitigation) at the
Paris Summit.
India is also reaching out to the industrialised
countries to secure financial support for its ambitious
renewable energy targets as well as reach a consen-
57 Text of the Joint Statement issued at the 18th BASIC Ministerial
Meeting on Climate Change, Press Information Bureau, Govern-
ment of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests, 8 August
2014, available on the Internet at <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/
PrintRelease.aspx?relid=108305> (last accessed on 19 August
2015).
58 Agathe Maupin and Elizabeth Sidiropoulos, “South Africa: Brics
and Climate Change”, All Africa, 6 July 2015, available on the
Internet at <http://allafrica.com/stories/201507062245.html> (last
accessed on 19 August 2015).
59 Press Trust of India, “India, Egypt Form Group to Cooperation on
Environmental Issues”, The Economic Times, 7 March 2015,
available on the Internet at <http://articles.economictimes
.indiatimes.com/2015-03-07/news/59869343_1_climate-change
-india-and-egypt-waste-management> (last accessed on 19
August 2015).
60 Chetan Chauhan, “Climate Change: India Seeks UN Reforms, Fair
Climate Treaty”, Hindustan Times, 21 August 2015, available on
the Internet at <http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/
climate-change-india-seeks-un-reforms-fair-climate-treaty/article1
-1382852.aspx> (last accessed on 21 August 2015).
61 Anand Upadhyay, “India Seeks Germany’s Push To Promote
Renewable Energy”, Clean Technica, 21 April 2015, available on
CCLR 3|2015
sus on the nature and scope of the post-Kyoto agree-
ment. Climate change and clean energy featured
prominently in all the meetings that Prime Minister
Modi held with the heads of state of Germany, France
and Canada as well. While Germany has pledged to
provide “technical and financial support for develop-
ing comprehensive solar rooftop and green energy
corridor projects in India”61, France has resolved to
generate 8-10 GW of solar power by 2020-2022.62 In-
terestingly, even though Modi’s visit to Canada was
dominated by oil, gas and nuclear deals, the reality
is that solar deals constituted “63% of the value of
the agreements” (accounting for more than $1bn) be-
tween the two countries.63 Since nuclear energy
(“clean” fuel) is an integral part of the country’s cli-
mate policy, the Modi Government has set a target of
17 GW of nuclear energy by 2024.64 India has forged
civil nuclear agreements with several countries in-
cluding the U.S., France, Canada, Australia, and
Japan. As a part of its solar strategy, India is making
efforts to gather the world’s 50 solar-power rich coun-
tries to form a consortium by working with the World
Economic Forum and Indian Renewable Energy De-
velopment Agency (IREDA).65 This would essential-
ly help advancing cooperation in research, develop-
ment and implementation of solar technologies and
equipment to increase energy access and availabili-
ty, especially to the poor sections of society across the
globe.
China is building stronger ties with the EU on the
climate front in the wake of the Paris Summit as ev-
idenced by the joint communiqué signed by the two
the Internet at <http://cleantechnica.com/2015/04/21/india-seeks
-germanys-push-promote-renewable-energy/> (last accessed on
19 August 2015).
62 Anand Upadhyay, “How France Is Helping India Meet Its 100
GW Solar Target”, Clean Technica, 14 April 2015, available on
the Internet at <http://cleantechnica.com/2015/04/14/france
-helping-india-meet-100-gw-solar-target/> (last accessed on 19
August 2015).
63 Dan Woynillowicz, “Canada’s Solar Success Overshadowed
During Indian PM Visit”, Clean Energy Canada, 23 April 2015,
available on the Internet at <http://cleanenergycanada.org/
canadas-solar-success-overshadowed-during-indian-pm-visit-2/>
(last accessed on 19 August 2015).
64 Neeta Lal, “India’s Nuclear Energy Imperative”, The Diplomat, 8
October 2014, available on the Internet at <http://thediplomat
.com/2014/10/indias-nuclear-energy-imperative/> (last accessed
on 19 August 2015).
65 Press Trust of India, “India to Create a Federation of 50 Solar
Power-rich Nations: Piyush Goyal”, The Economic Times, 17
February 2015, available on the Internet at <http://articles
.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-02-17/news/59232410_1
_ireda-solar-capacity-renewable-energy-minister> (last accessed
on 19 August 2015).
CCLR 3|2015
sides in June 2015. From complete opposition to any
type of legally binding mechanism at Copenhagen to
acceptance of legally binding bottom-up INDC
process now is a major shift in China’s stand in the
climate debate although the legal mechanisms that
China would be ready to accept have not been re-
vealed at this stage.66 Nevertheless, this has opened
up new opportunities of cooperation between China
and the EU. The two sides have agreed to work to-
wards an “ambitious and legally binding” climate
agreement, keeping some of the principles such as
“equity” and “common but differentiated responsi-
bilities and respective capabilities, in light of differ-
ent national circumstances” as well as demands such
as raised climate finance by the developed countries
intact.67 The fundamental point here is that China
has not sought any financial support for its own mit-
igation efforts considering it has emerged as one of
the biggest financiers of infrastructure projects in the
world. It has, therefore chosen to stand by the other
developing countries and LDCs while moving toward
targets on par with developed countries in the future
climate regime. It is rather clear that China would
maintain its ties with both blocs and would still back
India’s positions on issues such as finance and ToT,
but it is highly unlikely that it would support any of
India’s efforts to transform the regime – from miti-
66 Karl S. Bourdeau and Kristin H. Gladd, “China’s International and
Domestic Climate Change Policies: An Overview Leading up to
Paris”, The National Law Review, 21 August 2015, available on
the Internet at <http://www.natlawreview.com/article/china-s
-international-and-domestic-climate-change-policies-overview
-leading-to-paris> (last accessed on 8 September 2015).
67 EU-China Joint Statement on Climate Change, The European
Council, 29 June 2015, available on the Internet at <http://www
.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/06/29-eu
-china-climate-statement/> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
68 Gujarat CM Inaugurates Chinese Firm TBEA’s Green Energy Park
at Vadodara, Desh Gujarat, 28 June 2014, available on the
Internet at <http://deshgujarat.com/2014/06/28/gujarat-cm
-inaugurates-chinese-firm-tbeas-green-energy-park-at-vadodra/>
(last accessed on 19 August 2015).
69 Press Trust of India, “Govt clears MoU with China for Industrial
Parks”, The Times of India, 25 June 2014, available on the Internet
at <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/
Govt-clears-MoU-with-China-for-industrial-parks/articleshow/
37202878.cms> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
70 Non-Annex I parties are mostly developing countries. For more
information, please refer to United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC), available on the Internet at
<http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/
items/2833.php> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
71 According to the IMF estimates, the Chinese economy is worth
$17.6tn while the U.S. economy, $17.4tn. For more information,
please refer to ben Carter, “Is China's Economy Really the Largest
in the World?”, BBC, 16 December 2014, <http://www.bbc.com/
news/magazine-30483762> (last accessed on 19 August 2015).
A Shift in the Agenda for China and India 229
gation to adaptation, from emissions cuts to clean en-
ergy and from carbon credit to green credit among
others.
However, China’s advancements in renewable en-
ergy could be a fillip for closer renewable energy co-
operation between the two Asian giants. A few steps
have already been taken to press forward Sino-Indi-
an relations as specified in the joint statement in May
2015. More could be achieved on the ground to ad-
vance South-South cooperation in this field, especial-
ly since China looks like it is in a position to be a ma-
jor renewable technology vendor. A green energy
park set up by the Chinese based TBEA was inaugu-
rated in Vadodara, Gujarat.68 This was made possible
by Modi’s efforts in the past as the state’s Chief Min-
ister to create avenues for partnership in various
fields including renewable energy. India’s Commerce
Minister Nirmala Sitharaman signed a Memoran-
dum of Understanding (MoU) with her Chinese coun-
terpart on inviting Chinese investments in India dur-
ing her visit to China in 2014.69 Besides possible tech-
nological cooperation, India could now look for
greater Chinese investments in its renewable energy
sector. Rapid surge in energy demands and the
scourge of pollution in both countries as well as the
expectations from the two nations’ leaderships to
play a constructive role at the Paris Summit (2015),
places them in a position in which cooperation is in-
deed the best way forward.
China and India started from the same point (as
non-Annex I parties70 in the UNFCCC) in 1992 when
the negotiations process got underway with great ex-
pectations but they have moved at a different pace.
Both countries had one of the lowest GDP per capita
in the world. Both were mostly rural and attracted
very little foreign direct investment. China’s manu-
facturing boom and its deep integration with the
global economy (export-led economy) have made it
the the world’s largest economy (in terms of purchas-
ing power parity), according to International Mone-
tary Fund estimates, surpassing the U.S. in 201471;
but on the climate front, it has a lot to do. It is now
forced to act at the domestic level to avoid econom-
ic losses and public dissent as well as shift its stand
at the international level to not appear as an obsta-
cle to the negotiations process. The expectations that
the outcome of the Paris Summit will be a legally
binding agreement rose because of China’s latest
pledges but questions still remain on India’s position.
India is likely to wait until the end of the submission
230 A Shift in the Agenda for China and India
period to declare its INDC; moreover, its commit-
ments are likely to fall short of any solid emissions
reduction target. In this evolving geopolitical envi-
ronment, India and China would remain committed
to a bottom-up or pledge-and-review climate regime
and accordingly shape the climate negotiations. At
the same time, in light of their emerging common in-
CCLR 3|2015
terests in low-carbon energy they are likely to help
shape the global transition to clean energy over the
longer term. It remains to be seen how the two coun-
tries will manoeuvre their ties with the major deci-
sion-makers (such as the U.S. and the EU) and other
key players (such as the island nations) alike to es-
tablish a new climate regime.
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