ALLYKKA L.

CASISON BS PSYCHOLOGY 3A

THE TRAJECTORY OF TRUTH: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE

ILLUSORY TRUTH EFFECT

I. Henderson, E. L., Simons, D. J., & Barr, D. J. (2021). The trajectory of truth: A
longitudinal study of the illusory truth effect. Journal of Cognition, 4(1).

II. Article Identification

Author: Emma L. Henderson, Daniel J. Simons, David J. Barr
Title of the journal: Journal of Cognition
Year of publication: 2021

III. Summary

Repeated statements are subjectively more valid than equivalent new statements even though
repetition alone does not introduce further, substantiating information, a phenomenon referred to
as the illusory truth effect. In contrast to certain theoretical predictions, the magnitude of the
illusory truth effect appears consistent, whether the repetitions occur shortly after the initial
exposure or after a considerable time lapse. This article outlines a longitudinal investigation of
the illusory truth effect involving 608 participants (567 of whom were included in the analysis).
The study systematically manipulated the time intervals between sessions (immediate, one day,
one week, and one month) to assess the resilience of the illusory truth effect over time. Both of
their hypotheses were confirmed: they observed the illusory truth effect at all four intervals
(overall effect: χ2(1) = 169.91; Mrepeated = 4.52, Mnew = 4.14; H1), with the effect diminishing
as the delay between repetitions increased (H2). This suggests that false information repeated
within shorter timeframes may have a more pronounced impact on truth judgments than
repetitions occurring over more extended periods.

Notably, the effect was most pronounced immediately following repetition and decreased over
time. These findings challenged existing theories based on recognition, familiarity, and
processing fluency, raising questions about the role of cognitive cues in shaping truth judgments.
Moreover, the study indicated that the illusory truth effect exhibited a reliability of 85.2% among
participants, but its manifestation may be altered if participants are forewarned about
encountering false statements. Additionally, while age showed little correlation with the overall
effect, the trajectory of the impact over time appeared to vary with age, reflecting changes in
memory and cognitive processing. Older participants (50 years) exhibited a more pronounced
truth effect immediately after exposure to information but a reduced result after one month, in
contrast to younger participants (25 years).

The results suggest that researchers should consider the intersession interval when making
conclusions about the illusory truth effect, as the diminishing impact over time aligns with
ALLYKKA L. CASISON BS PSYCHOLOGY 3A

explanations involving recognition, familiarity, and processing fluency. The interaction between
repetition and interval implies that repeated false information over shorter timeframes may
significantly influence truth judgments more than when repetitions are spaced further apart.

IV. Critique

The study exhibits several commendable strengths. A noteworthy aspect is that the research
design employs repeated measures in a longitudinal approach, allowing a comprehensive
examination of the effect over time. This meticulous methodology provides a nuanced
understanding of how the illusory truth effect evolves. Additionally, the study's support for both
of its hypotheses underscores the robustness of the findings, lending credibility to the observed
trends. The high participation rate, with 85.2% of participants demonstrating the illusory truth
effect, showcases its reliability across a diverse sample. Moreover, the inclusion of an age
comparison, with distinct findings for older and younger participants, adds depth to the study's
conclusions, suggesting potential avenues for future research in this domain.

Several areas for improvement also mar the study. One notable concern arises from the potential
need for participant attentiveness throughout the study. The online format employed may need
more control over participants' engagement, raising uncertainty about the consistency of
attention levels across all phases. Additionally, the study's inability to measure individual
differences in task diligence beyond an overall phase duration metric leaves room for
interpretation. Long durations may not necessarily correlate with higher attentiveness, potentially
introducing confounding factors. Furthermore, the lack of a warning about the inclusion of
misleading claims, while reflective of real-world settings, may have influenced participant
replies and may have contributed to bias in the results. Finally, while the age-related findings are
noteworthy, the study's small sample size and demographic factors may restrict the study's
generalizability to larger populations.

Moreover, there are a few gaps and contradictions that warrant further consideration. One
significant gap pertains to the possible influence of participant warnings about encountering false
statements. While the study acknowledges that real-world scenarios typically lack such signs, it
does not explore how this absence might impact the illusory truth effect, leaving room for
uncertainty. Another noteworthy gap is the need for a direct measure of participants'
attentiveness, vital for interpreting the results. Participants who spent a longer time on the
activity may have been distracted, but without precise data, this notion remains speculative.
Furthermore, the findings of the study contradict previous studies in the sector. The decreasing
trend in the illusory truth effect seen in this study contradicts a previous meta-analysis that
revealed no such association, raising concerns about the consistency of the impact across
multiple investigations. These omissions and discrepancies highlight the importance of more
ALLYKKA L. CASISON BS PSYCHOLOGY 3A

study to resolve these difficulties and provide a more complete knowledge of the illusory truth
effect.

Despite these weaknesses, gaps, and contradictions, the study significantly contributes to
cognitive psychology. Their rigorous experimental approach allowed them to establish two
critical findings: firstly, the consistent presence of the illusory truth effect across all intervals,
affirming a primary effect (H1); and secondly, the diminishing size of the effect as the time
between repetitions increased, providing support for their second hypothesis (H2). This nuanced
understanding of how the illusory truth effect undergoes temporal evolution challenges previous
meta-analyses and introduces a valuable dimension to this domain's present corpus of research.
The authors' work provides critical insights into the intricacies of memory, recognition, and
cognitive processing, shedding new light on the mechanisms underlying the illusory truth effect.
This study stands as a pivotal contribution, advancing our comprehension of mental phenomena
and paving the way for further exploration in this area.

Furthermore, it provides valuable insights into the dynamics of this cognitive phenomenon over
time. Firstly, their observation of a diminishing illusory truth effect as the interval between
repetitions increased supports the notion of memory decay outlined in the Levels-of-Processing
framework (Craik & Lockhart, 1972). According to this theory, more deeply processed
information is better retained over time. In this context, the reduced effect after a delay can be
attributed to fading recognition and familiarity cues associated with previously encountered
statements. Secondly, the processing fluency account posits that familiarity and ease of
processing lead to increased truth judgments (Nadarevic & Erdfelder, 2014). By demonstrating
that the illusory truth effect was most pronounced immediately after repetition, even when
participants were likely to be aware of the repetition, they call into question the fluency
discounting explanation. This nuanced finding enriches our understanding of processing fluency
in real-world contexts. Thirdly, the consideration of age-related variations in the illusory truth
effect. The authors propose that older participants may rely more heavily on familiarity in the
immediate phase due to potential working memory limitations, resulting in a larger truth effect.
This aligns with the Dual Process Theory (Baddeley, 2003), which suggests that working
memory capacity diminishes with age. Additionally, the decline in the effect over a one-month
interval may be attributed to age-related changes in long-term memory processes (Salthouse,
2010). This finding underscores the significance of individual differences in cognitive
processing, particularly in memory-related phenomena like the illusory truth effect.

V. Insights

The study by Henderson et al. provides important implications for understanding how
misinformation spreads and persists. It implies that frequent exposure to misinformation can lead
to increasing belief, even if it is not expressly approved or thought to be factual. This is an
ALLYKKA L. CASISON BS PSYCHOLOGY 3A

especially alarming conclusion given the advent of social media, where incorrect information can
be quickly shared and circulated. The echo chamber effect can amplify the illusory truth effect
by increasing people's exposure to information that confirms their opinions.

This suggests there may be a window of opportunity for interventions to correct misinformation.
If interventions are implemented soon after misinformation is first encountered, they may be
more effective in preventing the ITE from taking hold. Thus, being aware of the cognitive biases
that might impact our truth judgments is critical. We must be willing to question facts and seek
confirmation from many sources. We should be aware of the possibility of bias in the sources we
rely on and be willing to explore alternate points of view. In this way, we may reduce the impact
of the illusory truth effect on our judgments.

VI. Conclusion

Overall, this research represents a substantial development in the field of psychology. The
researchers use a well-designed longitudinal study to uncover the complexity of the illusory truth
effect's progression over time. Their findings challenge existing theories related to recognition,
familiarity, and processing fluency, and the observed relationship between age and the effect's
trajectory opens new avenues for exploration. Despite certain limitations, such as the potential
for participant distraction and the absence of warnings about encountering false statements, the
study offers valuable insights into the intricate dynamics of this cognitive phenomenon. It
prompts reevaluating how we process and accept information, shedding light on the interplay
between memory, cognitive processes, and the illusory truth effect. This research has
far-reaching implications, extending from psychology to media literacy, and stands as a pivotal
contribution to our understanding of cognitive phenomena in the realm of truth judgments and
memory.

References:

Baddeley, A. (2003). Working memory and language: An overview. Journal of communication

disorders, 36(3), 189–208.
Craik, F. I., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972). Levels of processing: A framework for memory research.
Journal of verbal learning and verbal behavior, 11(6), 671-684.
Nadarevic, L., & Erdfelder, E. (2014). The initial judgment task and delay of the final
validity-rating task moderate the truth effect. Consciousness and Cognition, 23, 74-84.
Salthouse, T. A. (2010). Influence of age on practice effects in longitudinal neurocognitive
change. Neuropsychology, 24(5), 563.