2023 FORECAST - Remedial Law - Part 1

REMEDIAL LAW (Part 1)
based on the doctrines and cases cited

during the lecture of Dean Salvador N. Moya II
on August 13, 2023
Doctrine of Judicial Stability
The RTC of Makati City obviously violated the doctrine of judicial stability when it took cognizance
of Trackworks' Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus despite the fact that the said
case involved the same parties and the subject matter fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Pasig City from which the case originally emanated.
Verily, Trackworks' Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus ought to have been
dismissed at the outset for lack of jurisdiction as the RTC of Makati City is bereft of any authority
to nullify the orders of the RTC of Pasig City, a coordinate and co-equal court. In Barroso v.
Omelio, this Court explained the doctrine of judicial stability as follows: The doctrine of judicial
stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal court is an
elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by injunction with
the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant
the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the concept of
jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment therein has
jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its execution
and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of ministerial
officers acting in connection with this judgment. Metro Rail Transit Development Corp. v.
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc., G.R. No. 204452, [June 28,
2021]
Settled is the rule that a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction is null and void and
may be attacked anytime.
It creates no rights and produces no effect. It remains a basic fact in law that the choice of the
proper forum is crucial, as the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity.
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. All acts performed pursuant to it
and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Metro Rail Transit Development Corp. v.
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending and Promotions, Inc., G.R. No. 204452, [June 28,
2021]
Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

legaledge8@gmail.com
0917 – 894 53 56
Page 1 of 38
on August 13, 2023
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was eruditely expounded upon in the case of Solidum vs. People
as follows: Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as "the thing or the transaction speaks for itself."
The doctrine res ipsa loquitur means that "where the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want
of care." It is simply "a recognition of the postulate that as a matter of common knowledge and
experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence
on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of
some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior
logic of ordinary human experience and on the basis of such experience or common knowledge,
negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. x x x"
In UPCB General Insurance Co. v. Pascual Liner, Inc., this Court reiterated the applicability of res
ipsa loquitur in vehicular accidents, wherein it is sufficient that the accident itself be established,
and once established through the admission of evidence, whether hearsay or not, the rule on res
ipsa loquitur already starts to apply. As applied in the instant case, the fact that Angela was hit
by a moving vehicle owned by Maitim and driven by Santos is undisputed, and the same is
supported by the Traffic Accident Investigation Report dated April 25, 2006. The fact that Angela
sustained injuries in her collision with Maitim's vehicle is also not in question. Thus, since it is
clearly established that there was a vehicular accident that caused injuries, then the rule on res
ipsa loquitur shall apply. Maitim v. Aguila, G.R. No. 218344, [March 21, 2022]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no longer subject to change or revision.
A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. This quality of
immutability precludes the modification of a final judgment, even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. And this postulate holds true whether the
modification is made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. The orderly
administration of justice requires that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments/resolutions
of a court must reach a point of finality set by the law. The noble purpose is to write finis to
dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there
would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 2 of 38
on August 13, 2023
maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such
principle, must immediately be struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior
adjudication is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are ordinarily known as
courts, but extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred. Municipality of
Corella v. Philkonstrak Development Corp., G.R. No. 218663, [February 28, 2022]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or use.
In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction
over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not
serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the nature of things, it
cannot be enforced."
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the action for certiorari and prohibition filed by
petitioners has been mooted by the termination of the BOT Agreement of private respondents.
The staleness of the claims becomes more manifest considering the reliefs sought by petitioners,
i.e., to annul and set aside the BOT Agreement for the modernization of the POC; and to
permanently enjoin respondents from implementing the MPOC Project, are hinged on the
existence of the BOT Agreement. Corollarily, the eventual termination of the BOT Agreement
rendered the resolution of the issues relating to the prayers for certiorari and prohibition of no
practical or legal effect. Simply stated, petitioners in this case would no longer be entitled to any
actual substantial relief regardless of this Court's disposition on the merits of the present petition.
Cervantes v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 210805, [May 11, 2021]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 3 of 38
on August 13, 2023
In general, where administrative remedies are available, petitions for the issuance of the
extraordinary writs should not be granted by the courts in order to give the administrative body
the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, and to prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to courts. However, this principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not without exception.
Jurisprudence would reveal that the Court has set aside such rule: (1) when there is a violation
of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative
action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on
the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when
the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9) when
the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention. Light Rail Transit Authority v. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 211299,
[June 28, 2022]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
Balance of substantial justice and procedural rules
While the Court commends the NLRC and the CA in upholding substantial justice, such principle
must always be balanced with respect and honest efforts to comply with procedural rules. It
cannot always be about substantial justice, especially to the point of disrespect and utter
disregard to procedural rules.
In Tible & Tible Company, Inc. v. Royal Savings and Loan Association, an eloquent explanation
regarding this balance was made:
Much reliance is placed on the rule that "Courts are not slaves or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as they ought
to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on balance, technicalities take a backseat
against substantive rights, and not the other way around." This rule must always be used
in the right context, lest injustice, rather than justice would be its end result.

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 4 of 38
on August 13, 2023
It must never be forgotten that, generally, the application of the rules must be upheld,
and the suspension or even mere relaxation of its application, is the exception. This court
previously explained:
The Court is not impervious to the frustration that litigants and lawyers alike
would at times encounter in procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice
requires correct observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to
ensure its proper dispensation. It has long been recognized that strict compliance
with the Rules of Court is indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and
for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of judicial business.
Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be

ignored at will to suit the convenience of a party. Adjective law is important in
ensuring the effective enforcement of substantive rights through the orderly and
speedy administration of justice. These rules are not intended to hamper litigants
or complicate litigation but, indeed to provide for a system under which a suitor
may be heard in the correct form and manner and at the prescribed time in a
peaceful confrontation before a judge whose authority they acknowledge. cSEDTC
It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome

rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to be administered
according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, caprice, or whimsicality. x
xx
In the present case, we have already extensively discussed how respondents failed to adequately
explain and justify their non-participation in the proceedings before the arbiter. Thus, the
application of a more liberal policy is unwarranted, contrary to the rulings of the NLRC and the
CA. Reyes v. Rural Bank of San Rafael (Bulacan), Inc., G.R. No. 230597, [March 23, 2022]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
Substantial compliance to formal requisites allowed; procedural rules are mandatory but must
not frustrate the administration of justice.
Heirs of Deleste v. Land Bank of the Philippines declared that: Time and again, this Court has held
that a strict and rigid application of technicalities must be avoided if it tends to frustrate rather
than promote substantial justice. As held in Sta. Ana v. Spouses Carpo:

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 5 of 38
on August 13, 2023
Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. If the
application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it is always
within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from their operation.
Law and jurisprudence grant to courts the prerogative to relax compliance with the
procedural rules, even the most mandatory in character, mindful of the duty to reconcile
the need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be
heard.
Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:
We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit
liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside
technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with
the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods
set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules,
there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our
judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between
the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given
the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause. (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
In Durban Apartments Corporation v. Catacutan, the appellate court dismissed the petition on
procedural grounds for failure of the petitioner therein to attach a copy of the assailed decision
but upon review by this Court, the case was decided on its merits. This Court held:
[I]n the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the Court may disregard procedural lapses so
that a case may be resolved on its merits. Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat,
substantial justice. Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve
substantial issues raised by the parties.
It is well to remember that this Court, in not a few cases, has consistently held that cases
shall be determined on the merits, after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of
their causes and defense, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections.
In so doing, the ends of justice would be better served. The dismissal of cases purely on
technical grounds is frowned upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in
a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice, and thereby defeat their very ends. Indeed, rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to expedite the resolution of cases and other matters pending in court. A strict
and rigid application of the rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote justice must be avoided. De Jesus v. Inter-Orient Maritime
Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 203478, [June 23, 2021]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 6 of 38
on August 13, 2023
The Rules of Court provides that a party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause
of action and if, two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the
filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as ground for the dismissal
of the others.
As ruled in Coscolluela:
Indeed, in Goldberg v. Eastern Brewing Co., the New York Supreme Court emphasized
that:
It was held in the case of Bendernagle v. Cocks, 19 Wend. 207 (32 Am. Dec. 448),
that where a party had several demands or existing causes of action growing out
of the same contract or resting in matter of account, which may be joined and
sued for in the same action, they must be joined; and if the demands or causes of
action be split up, and a suit brought for part only, and subsequently a second suit
for the residue is brought, the first action may be pleaded in abatement or in bar
of the second action. . . .
It is not always easy to determine whether in a particular case under consideration, the
cause of action is single and entire or separate. The question must often be determined,
not by the general rules but by reference to the facts and circumstances of the particular
case. Where deeds arising out of contract are distinct and separate, they give rise to
separate cause of action for which separate action may be maintained; but it is also true
that the same contract may give rise to different causes of action either by reason of
successive breaches thereof or by reason of different stipulations or provisions of the
contract. The true rule which determines whether a party has only a single and entire
cause of action for all that is due him, and which must be sued for in one action, or has a
severable demand for which he may maintain separate suits, is whether the entire
amount arises from one and the same act or contract or the several parts arise from
distinct and different acts or contracts.
Where there are entirely distinct and separate contracts, they give rise to separate causes
of action for which separate actions may be instituted and presented. When money is
payable by installments, a distinct cause of action assails upon the following due by each
installment and they may be recovered in successive action. On the other hand, where
several claims payable at different times arise out of the same transactions, separate
actions may be brought as each liability accounts. But where no action is brought until
more than one is due, all that are due must be included in one action; and that if an action
is brought to recover upon one or more that are due but not upon all that are due, a
recovery in such action will be a bar to a several or other actions brought to recover one
or more claims of the other claims that were due at the time the first action was brought.

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 7 of 38
on August 13, 2023
In sum, petitioner may institute two alternative remedies against the spouses Berris: either a
personal action for the collection of the promissory notes issued under the Discounting Line or a
real action to foreclose the mortgage, but not both, simultaneously or successively. Although we
recognize the right of the mortgage creditor to recover the deficiency when the mortgaged
properties are not enough to satisfy the entire obligation, the action is only instituted after the
termination of the foreclosure proceedings and not during its pendency, so as not to violate the
prohibition against splitting of cause of action. Asset Pool A (SPV-AMC), Inc. v. Spouses Berris,
G.R. No. 203194, [April 26, 2021]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
Joinder of Indispensable Parties
The mandatory rule on joinder of indispensable parties is set forth in Section 7, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, to wit: SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties in interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs
or defendants.
"Indispensable parties are parties whose legal presence in the proceeding is so necessary that
'the action cannot be finally determined' without them because their interests in the matter and
in the relief are so bound up with that of the other parties." This Court has previously laid down
the test to determine if a party is an indispensable party, thus:
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter
that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that
interest, a party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy,
but also has an interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without
affecting his interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final
determination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also
been considered that an indispensable party is a person in whose absence there cannot
be a determination between the parties already before the court which is effective,
complete, or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one who must be included in
an action before it may properly go forward.
A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or

subject matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not
necessarily be directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 8 of 38
on August 13, 2023
between them. Also, a person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely
permit complete relief between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has
no interest in the subject matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a
person to be an indispensable party that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v. Abragar, G.R. No. 201022,
[March 17, 2021]
There are two consequences of a finding on appeal that indispensable parties have not been
joined.
First, all subsequent actions of the lower courts are null and void for lack of jurisdiction; second,
the case should be remanded to the trial court for the inclusion of indispensable parties.
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v. Abragar, G.R. No. 201022, [March 17,
2021]
The joinder of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power.
While the failure to implead an indispensable party is not per se a ground for the dismissal of an
action, considering that said party may still be added by order of the court, on motion of the
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just, it remains
essential — as it is jurisdictional — that any indispensable party be impleaded in the proceedings
before the court renders judgment. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent
actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties
but even as to those present. A void judgment is in effect no judgment at all, and all acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. The judgment is vulnerable to attack
even when no appeal has been taken, and does not become final in the sense of depriving a party
of his right to question its validity. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority v.
Abragar, G.R. No. 201022, [March 17, 2021]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 9 of 38
on August 13, 2023
It is axiomatic that issues raised for the first time on appeal should not be entertained because
to do so would be anathema to the rudiments of fairness and due process.
In S.C. Megaworld v. Parada, this Court ruled that:
It is well-settled that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised
in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to
the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need not
be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late
stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this rule. Any issue raised
for the first time on appeal is barred by estoppel. Horca v. People, G.R. No. 224316,
[November 10, 2021]
The civil aspect of the criminal case can survive an acquittal when it is based on reasonable
doubt. In this scenario, even though the evidence presented does not establish the fact of the
crime with moral certainty, the civil action can still prevail as long as preponderant evidence
tilts in favor of a finding of liability.
"This means that while the mind of the court cannot rest easy in penalizing the accused for the
commission of a crime, it nevertheless finds that he or she committed or omitted to perform acts
which serve as a separate source of obligation. There is no sufficient proof that the act or
omission is criminal beyond reasonable doubt, but there is a preponderance of evidence to show
that the act or omission caused injury which demands compensation." As applied in this case,
there is reason for this Court to believe that Horca should be held civilly liable to the Sisters of
Providence. The fact remains that Sister Reynolds and her congregation was prejudiced when
they paid for the tickets but did not get reimbursed when the flight was cancelled. This is also
supported by Horca's own acts when she acknowledged the need to return the money and when
she actually paid Sister Reynolds the amount of P90,000.00 to partially cover for the airline
tickets. To the Court, this essentially amounts to an admission of her liability to return the said
amount. Concomitantly, while this Court acquits petitioner because reasonable doubt exists
anent her guilt, We adjudge Horca to be civilly accountable considering that preponderant
evidence exists to establish her liability. Horca v. People, G.R. No. 224316, [November 10, 2021]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 10 of 38
on August 13, 2023
The determinative factor in violations of the rule against forum shopping is whether the
elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to
res judicata in another.
In Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development Co. (Intramuros), We

explained that "[f]orum shopping is the practice of resorting to multiple fora for the same relief,
to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable judgment."
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court prohibits forum shopping by requiring the plaintiff or
principal party to certify under oath that he or she has not commenced any action involving the
same issues in any court. In Orix Metro Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Cardline, Inc., We pointed
out that the "rule against forum shopping seeks to address the great evil of two competent
tribunals rendering two separate and contradictory decisions. Forum shopping exists when a
party initiates two or more actions, other than appeal or certiorari, grounded on the same cause
to obtain a more favorable decision from any tribunal."
The elements of forum shopping are: (i) identity of parties, or at least such parties representing
the same interest; (ii) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the latter founded on the
same facts; and (iii) any judgment rendered in one action will amount to res judicata in the
other action.
In Spouses Reyes v. Spouses Chung, We explained the test to determine whether a party violated
the rule against forum shopping, to wit:
It has been jurisprudentially established that forum shopping exists when a party avails
himself of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already
resolved adversely by some other courts.
The test to determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another. Simply put, when litis pendentia or res
judicata does not exist, neither can forum shopping exist.
The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the
two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 11 of 38
on August 13, 2023
amount to res judicata in the other. On the other hand, the elements of res judicata, also
known as bar by prior judgment, are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court
which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it must be
a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. Santos Ventura Hocorma
Foundation, Inc. v. Mabalacat Institute, Inc., G.R. No. 211563, [September 29, 2021]
An action for collection of sum of money may not be joined with an ejectment suit, otherwise
a misjoinder of causes of action would ensue.
Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court prohibits the joinder of an ordinary action, such as an
action for collection of sum of money and a special civil action, such as an ejectment suit. Said
provision reads:
Section 5. Joinder of causes of action. — A party may in one pleading assert, in the
alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing
party, subject to the following conditions:
(a) The party joining the causes of action shall comply with the rules on joinder of
parties;
(b) The joinder shall not include special civil actions or actions governed by special
rules;
(c) Where the causes of action are between the same parties but pertain to
different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in the Regional Trial
Court provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court
and the venue lies therein; and
(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, the aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction.
Thus, in Lajave, We pointed out that "an action for collection of sum of money may not be
properly joined with the action for ejectment. The former is an ordinary civil action requiring a
full-blown trial, while an action for unlawful detainer is a special civil action which requires a
summary procedure."
Thus, We explained, to wit: [I]nsofar as the complaint for collection of sum of money is
concerned, it is not a simple case of recovering the unpaid balance of rentals. It must be

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 12 of 38
on August 13, 2023
pointed out that there are several factors to consider if and when the collection of sum
of money will prosper, i.e., the determination if indeed recovery of the alleged balance is
proper, the correct amount of rental to be paid or recovered, the intention and/or
agreement of the parties as to the terms of payment of rental in order to arrive at a
correct amount, among others. Indeed, as correctly observed by the appellate court, the
resolution of whether Lajave paid the correct rental fees and if there is a deficiency in the
payment of rentals requires a full-blown trial through the submission of documentary and
testimonial evidence by the parties which cannot be passed upon in a summary
proceeding.
In the instant case, the Collection Case requires a full-blown trial for the parties to show evidence
on the propriety of paying rent and its rightful amount. These may not be accomplished in an
ejectment proceeding which is summary in nature. Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. v.
Mabalacat Institute, Inc., G.R. No. 211563, [September 29, 2021]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
Summary judgment is a procedural device that allows parties to avoid long litigation and
delays, where the pleadings show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried.
A genuine issue of fact is "such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived[,] or false claim." As such, an issue of fact is
genuine if it requires presentation of evidence to be resolved.
To determine if genuine issues of fact exist, the Court stated in Philippine Racing
Commission v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc.:
In Calubaquib v. Republic, the Court explained how trial courts may determine
genuine issues in this manner:
"A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and [the] moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments
is the existence of a genuine issue of fact, "as distinguished from a sham,
fictitious, contrived[,] or false claim." [A] factual issue raised by a party is
considered as sham when[,] by its nature[,] it is evident that it cannot be
proven[,] or it is such that the party tendering the same has neither any

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 13 of 38
on August 13, 2023
sincere intention nor adequate evidence to prove it. This usually happens
in denials made by defendants merely for the sake of having an issue[,] and
thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact that their answers are
not under oath anyway.
In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of

rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and
appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged
under oath by the parties and/or their witnesses in the affidavits that they
submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition. Thus, it is
held that, even if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a
summary judgment is proper so long as "the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not
genuine."
Additionally, in order for summary judgment to be granted in lieu of a full-blown

trial, the party moving for summary judgment must establish unequivocally the
absence of genuine issues of fact or that the issue posed is so patently
insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue.
When a party moves for a summary judgment, the trial court is duty-bound to examine the
motion and the supporting documents, as well as the corresponding opposition thereto, to
determine if there are genuine issues of fact that should be resolved by the trial court. Aljem's
Credit Investors Corp. v. Spouses Bautista, G.R. No. 215175, [April 25, 2022]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
The extraordinary factual circumstances surrounding the case of Mary Jane warrant the resort
to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
Is the prosecution's resort to Rule 23 of the Rules of Court in taking Mary Jane's testimony as a
prosecution witness proper? The Court rules in the affirmative.
At the outset, the Court is always guided by the principle that rules shall be liberally construed in
order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. Simply put, rules of procedure should facilitate an orderly administration
of justice. They should not be strictly applied causing injury to a substantive right of a party to

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 14 of 38
on August 13, 2023
case. This precept has been elucidated by the Supreme Court in De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,
to wit:
[T]he rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities
that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.
Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard
the rules can be so pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case. And
this is not without additional basis. x x x
There are several instances wherein the Court has relaxed procedural rules to serve substantial
justice because of any of the following reasons: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a cause not
entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules,
(e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
Nonetheless, the Court always reminds party litigants that bare invocation of "the interest of
substantial justice" is not a magic phrase that will automatically oblige the Court to suspend
procedural rules. To stress, "[p]rocedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
their non-observance may have prejudiced a party's substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed
to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in
not complying with the procedure prescribed." People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, [October 9,
2019]
The deposition by written interrogatories is pursuant to Mary Jane's right to due process.
Furthermore, to disallow the written interrogatories will curtail Mary Jane's right to due process.
The benchmark of the right to due process in criminal justice is to ensure that all the parties have
their day in court. It is in accord with the duty of the government to follow a fair process of
decision-making when it acts to deprive a person of his liberty. But just as an accused is accorded
this constitutional protection, so is the State entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It
must likewise be given an equal chance to present its evidence in support of a charge.
Here, the trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it granted the taking of Mary Jane's
deposition by written interrogatories. The grant of the written interrogatories by the Indonesian
Government perceives the State's opportunity to present all its desired witnesses in the

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 15 of 38
on August 13, 2023
prosecution of its cases against Cristina and Julius. It is afforded fair opportunity to present
witnesses and evidence it deem vital to ensure that the injury sustained by the People in the
commission of the criminal acts will be well compensated and, most of all, that justice be
achieved. Hence, the right of the State to prosecute and prove its case have been fully upheld
and protected.
Further, the right of the State to prove the criminal liability of Cristina and Julius should not be
derailed and prevented by the stringent application of the procedural rules. Otherwise, it will
constitute a violation of the basic constitutional rights of the State and of Mary Jane to due
process which this Court cannot disregard. People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, [October 9, 2019]
The deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional right to
confrontation of a witness.
The right to confrontation of a witness is one of the fundamental basic rights of an accused. It is
ingrained in our justice system and guaranteed by no less than the 1987 Constitution as stated
under its Article III, Section 14 (2), to wit:
Section 14. (1) x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that
he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
The right to confrontation is part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil
proceedings as well as in proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers. It
has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily, to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony
of the witness by cross-examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the
deportment of the witness.
True, Cristina and Julius have no opportunity to confront Mary Jane face to face in light of the
prevailing circumstance. However, the terms and conditions laid down by the trial court ensure
that they are given ample opportunity to cross-examine Mary Jane by way of written
interrogatories so as not to defeat the first purpose of their constitutional right. To recall, the
trial court requires Cristina and Julius, through their counsel, to file their comment and may raise

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 16 of 38
on August 13, 2023
objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the

prosecution. The trial court judge shall promptly rule on the objections. Thereafter, only the final
questions would be asked by the Consul of the Philippines in Indonesia or his designated
representative. The answers of Mary Jane to the propounded questions must be written
verbatim, and a transcribed copy of the same would be given to the counsel of the accused who
would, in turn, submit their proposed cross interrogatory questions to the prosecution. Should
the prosecution raise any objection thereto, the trial court judge must promptly rule on the same,
and the final cross interrogatory questions for the deposition of Mary Jane will then be
conducted. Mary Jane's answers in the cross interrogatory shall likewise be taken in verbatim
and a transcribed copy thereof shall be given to the prosecution.
The second purpose of the constitutional right to confrontation has likewise been upheld. As
aptly stated in the terms and conditions for the taking of deposition, the trial court judge will be
present during the conduct of written interrogatories on Mary Jane. This will give her ample
opportunity to observe and to examine the demeanor of the witness closely. Although the
deposition is in writing, the trial court judge can still carefully perceive the reaction and
deportment of Mary Jane as she answers each question propounded to her both by the
prosecution and the defense.
Indubitably, the constitutional rights of Cristina and Julius are equally safeguarded. The
parameters laid down by the trial court are sufficient in detail ensuring that Mary Jane will give
her testimony under oath to deter lying by the threat of perjury charge. She is still subjected to
cross-examination so as to determine the presence of any falsehood in her testimony. Lastly, the
guidelines enable the trial court judge to observe her demeanor as a witness and assess her
credibility.
Finally, it must be mentioned that a "dying declaration" is one of the recognized exceptions to
the right to confrontation. In the case at bar, it will not be amiss to state that Mary Jane's
deposition through written interrogatories is akin to her dying declaration. There is no doubt that
Mary Jane will be answering the written interrogatories under the consciousness of an impending
death — or execution by a firing squad to be exact. To stress, Mary Jane has been convicted by
final judgment and sentenced to death by firing squad. Mary Jane has already availed of all
available legal remedies and there is no expectation that her conviction will be overturned by the
Indonesian authorities. The only purpose for the grant of the reprieve was for Mary Jane to assist
the prosecution in erecting its case against her recruiters and traffickers. There was nary any
mention that the outcome of the legal proceedings here in the Philippines will have a
concomitant effect in Mary Jane's conviction by the Indonesian authorities. That Mary Jane is
facing impending death is undisputed considering the nature of her reprieve which is merely
temporary. It is therefore not a stretch of imagination to state that Mary Jane's declarations in
her deposition "are made in extremity, [she being] at the point of death, and x x x every hope of
this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 17 of 38
on August 13, 2023
most powerful considerations to speak the truth," to vindicate oneself, and to secure justice to
her detractors. People v. Sergio, G.R. No. 240053, [October 9, 2019]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
Time and again, the Court has declared that "the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor
a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal
must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so . . . leads to the loss of the
right to appeal," such as the instant case.
This Court finds no compelling reason to justify the relaxation of the rules. Settled is the rule that
"[a]nyone seeking exemption from the application of the reglementary period for filing an appeal
has the burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious instances warranting such
deviation." However, this Court finds that Ramirez failed to discharge the same, thus warranting
the appellate court's denial of her Motion for Reconsideration.
We are not unaware that the technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not
frustrate, the cause of justice. However, this liberality in the relaxation of the rules should be
carefully weighed against the orderly administration of justice. Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party's
substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most
persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed. Ramirez v. Elomina, G.R. No. 202661, [March 17, 2021]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
There is ample jurisprudence holding that both a notice of appeal and a record on appeal are
required for appealing final orders in a special proceeding case.
Here, respondents' long delayed filing of the record on appeal without any justifiable reason
clearly violated the settled rules thereon.

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 18 of 38
on August 13, 2023
This Court, in Chipongian v. Benitez-Lirio, once more elaborated on the consequence of a

failure to timely file a record on appeal, thus:
In Lebin v. Mirasol, the Court has discussed the justification for requiring the
record on appeal in appeals in special proceedings, viz.:
The changes and clarifications recognize that appeal is neither a natural

nor a constitutional right, but merely statutory, and the implication of its
statutory character is that the party who intends to appeal must always
comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals, or else the right
of appeal may be lost or squandered.
As the foregoing rules further indicate, a judgment or final order in special

proceedings is appealed by record on appeal. A judgment or final order
determining and terminating a particular part is usually appealable,
because it completely disposes of a particular matter in the proceeding,
unless otherwise declared by the Rules of Court. The ostensible reason for
requiring a record on appeal instead of only a notice of appeal is the multi-
part nature of nearly all special proceedings, with each part susceptible of
being finally determined and terminated independently of the other parts.
An appeal by notice of appeal is a mode that envisions the elevation of the
original records to the appellate court as to thereby obstruct the trial court
in its further proceedings regarding the other parts of the case. In contrast,
the record on appeal enables the trial court to continue with the rest of
the case because the original records remain with the trial court even as it
affords to the appellate court the full opportunity to review and decide the
appealed matter. xxx xxx xxx
The elimination of the record on appeal under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
made feasible the shortening of the period of appeal from the original 30
days to only 15 days from notice of the judgment or final order. Section 3,
Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, retains the original 30 days as the period for
perfecting the appeal by record on appeal to take into consideration the
need for the trial court to approve the record on appeal. Within that 30-
day period a party aggrieved by a judgment or final order issued in special
proceedings should perfect an appeal by filing both a notice of appeal and
a record on appeal in the trial court, serving a copy of the notice of appeal
and a record on appeal upon the adverse party within the period; in
addition, the appealing party shall pay within the period for taking an
appeal to the clerk of court that rendered the appealed judgment or final
order the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 19 of 38
on August 13, 2023
A violation of these requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal by

record on appeal, or the non-payment of the full amount of the appellate
court docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of the trial court may be a
ground for the dismissal of the appeal.
Considering that the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in

accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not perfect his appeal of the
judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal became
final and immutable. He now has no one to blame but himself. The right to
appeal, being statutory in nature, required strict compliance with the rules
regulating the exercise of the right. As such, his perfection of his appeal
within the prescribed period was mandatory and jurisdictional, and his
failure to perfect the appeal within the prescribed time rendered the
judgment final and beyond review on appeal. Indeed, we have fittingly
pronounced in Lebin v. Mirasol:
In like manner, the perfection of an appeal within the period laid

down by law is mandatory and jurisdictional, because the failure to
perfect the appeal within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court
causes the judgment or final order to become final as to preclude
the appellate court from acquiring the jurisdiction to review the
judgment or final order. The failure of the petitioners and their
counsel to file the record on appeal on time rendered the orders of
the RTC final and unappealable. Thereby, the appellate court lost
the jurisdiction to review the challenged orders, and the petitioners
were precluded from assailing the orders.
Hence, this Court finds no error when the RTC denied respondents' notice of appeal and the
subsequent omnibus motion for reconsideration. While this Court is aware that limited
exceptions may be considered in the strict application of the rules, mere inadvertence and honest
belief that the record on appeal is not yet due are simply unacceptable. An attorney seeking a
review or reversal of a judgment or order against his client must fully observe scrupulously the
requisites for appeal prescribed by law, with keen awareness that any error or imprecision in
compliance therewith may well be fatal to his client's cause. Brual v. Contreras, G.R. No. 205451,
[March 7, 2022]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 20 of 38
on August 13, 2023
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known.
The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates the particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has
determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to
be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the
merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order
or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done
in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. East West Banking Corp. v. Cruz, G.R. No. 221641, [July 12,
2021]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
To begin with, it is settled that only questions of law should be raised in a petition for review
filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This Court is not a trier of facts. As such, it will not entertain questions of fact as the factual
findings of the appellate court are final, binding, or conclusive on the parties and upon the High
Court when supported by substantial evidence.
In Lorzano v. Tabayag, Jr., the Supreme Court explained a question of law in this wise:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact.
The arguments raised by Espina and Tadeo in their Petition for Review under Rule 45 are factual
in nature. To note, Espina and Tadeo insist that the evidence against them was insufficient so as
to make them administratively liable for inefficiency in the performance of official duties. Their
assertion clearly entails the review or reevaluation of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties. To repeat, this Court is not a trier of facts and a review is not a matter
of right but of sound judicial discretion It will be granted only under exceptional circumstances

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 21 of 38
on August 13, 2023
which are not present in the instant petition. Civil Service Commission v. Beray, G.R. Nos. 191946
& 191974, [December 10, 2019]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
It is well-settled that appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative

disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
As held by the Court in Fabian v. Desierto:
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be
struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should
be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43. (Emphasis supplied)
Such ruling has been reiterated in many subsequent cases, and has been later on incorporated in
the first paragraph of Section 7, Rule III of the Ombudsman's Rules of Procedure, viz.:
SECTION 7. Finality and Execution of Decision. — Where the respondent is absolved of

the charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under
the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, A.M. No. 99-2-02-SC instructs that any appeal by way of petition for review from a
decision, final resolution, or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases, or by way of special
civil action relative to such decision, resolution, or order, must be denied or dismissed,
respectively. Monterde v. Jacinto, G.R. No. 214102, [February 14, 2022]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 22 of 38
on August 13, 2023
The essence of the requirement of the conduct of a searching inquiry is the ascertainment of
the accused's voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea.
The searching inquiry requirement means more than informing cursorily the accused that he
faces a jail term but also, the exact length of imprisonment under the law and the certainty that
he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal colony. The searching inquiry of the trial
court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea.
Not infrequently indeed, an accused pleads guilty in the hope of lenient treatment, or upon bad
advice, or because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit
guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to see to it that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions.
A searching inquiry likewise compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused
has not been coerced or placed under a state of duress — and that his guilty plea has not
therefore been given improvidently — either by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent
quarters or simply because of his, the judge's, intimidating robes.
Further, a searching inquiry must not only comply with the requirements of Sec. 1, par. (a), of
Rule 116 but must also expound on the events that actually took place during the arraignment,
the words spoken and the warnings given, with special attention to the age of the accused, his
educational attainment and socio-economic status as well as the manner of his arrest and
detention, the provision of counsel in his behalf during the custodial and preliminary
investigations, and the opportunity of his defense counsel to confer with him. These matters are
relevant since they serve as trustworthy indices of his capacity to give a free and informed plea
of guilt. Lastly, the trial court must explain the essential elements of the crime he was charged
with and its respective penalties and civil liabilities, and also direct a series of questions to
defense counsel to determine whether he has conferred with the accused and has completely
explained to him the meaning of a plea of guilty. This formula is mandatory and absent any
showing that it was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken.
Simply, the requirement ensures that the plea of guilty was voluntarily made and that the
accused comprehends the severe consequences of his plea. This means asking a myriad of
questions which would solicit any indication of coercion, misunderstanding, error, or fraud that
may have influenced the decision of the accused to plead guilty to a capital offense.
Thus, in every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially when
he is ignorant with little or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow is to take such
evidence as are available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the information,
including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 23 of 38
on August 13, 2023
himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly
understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance, and consequences of his plea.
People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257, [September 29, 2020]
In particular, trial courts are mandated to conduct the searching inquiry.
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching
inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself
a. how he was brought into the custody of the law;
b. whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and
c. under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the

investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has
been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical
harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's
intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of
his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an
accused pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because
of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or
express remorse. It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor
under these mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the
admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances
attending it, that increase punishment.

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 24 of 38
on August 13, 2023
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to
him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to
do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by
the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty.
The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its
missing details.
Corollary to this duty, a plea of guilty to a capital offense without the benefit of a searching
inquiry or an ineffectual inquiry, as required by Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules,
results to an improvident plea of guilty.
It has even been held that the failure of the court to inquire into whether the accused knows the
crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime constitutes
a violation of the accused's fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process. This requirement is a reminder
that judges must be cautioned against the demands of sheer speed in disposing of cases for their
mission, after all, and as has been time and again put, is to see that justice is done. People v.
Pagal, G.R. No. 241257, [September 29, 2020]
The plea of guilt made by the accused does not relieve the prosecution of the duty to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
It is imperative that the trial court requires the presentation of evidence from the prosecution to
enable itself to determine the precise participation and the degree of culpability of the accused
in the perpetration of the capital offense charged.
The reason behind this requirement is that the plea of guilt alone can never be sufficient to
produce guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It must be remembered that a plea of guilty is only a
supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof being the
evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Once an accused charged with a capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial shall be
conducted just the same as if no such plea was entered. The court cannot, and should not, relieve

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 25 of 38
on August 13, 2023
the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his
culpability by the requisite quantum of evidence. The reason for such rule is to preclude any room
for reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the
possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge to which he
pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime
which may justify or require either a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the
prescribed penalties.
Thus, as it stands, the conviction of the accused no longer depends solely on his plea of guilty but
rather on the strength of the prosecution's evidence. People v. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257,
[September 29, 2020]
The accused must be given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence.
Consistent with the policy of the law, the Court has issued guidelines regarding the waiver of the
accused of his right to present evidence under this rule, thus:
Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital
offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court
comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his client's right to
present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to
observe, as a prerequisite to the validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a "searching
inquiry" as specified in People v. Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty, particularly —
1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with their
respective counsel on the desire or manifestation of the accused to waive the right
to present evidence and be heard.
2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and especially the
accused with their respective counsel in the hearing which must be recorded.
Their presence must be duly entered in the minutes of the proceedings.
3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to —
a. ask the defense counsel a series of question to determine whether he

had conferred with and completely explained to the accused that he had
the right to present evidence and be heard as well as its meaning and
consequences, together with the significance and outcome of the waiver

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 26 of 38
on August 13, 2023
of such right. If the lawyer for the accused has not done so, the trial court
shall give the latter enough time to fulfill this professional obligation.
b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused

whether he wants to present evidence or submit a memorandum
elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution
evidence, if any, or in default theory, file a demurrer to evidence with prior
leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so weak
that it need not even be rebutted. If there is a desire to do so, the trial
court shall give the defense enough time to this purpose.
c. elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as

his age, socio-economic status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed
waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and

understood by the latter, hence, the record must state the language used
for this purpose as well as reflect the corresponding translation thereof in
English.
In passing, trial courts may also abide by the foregoing procedure even when the waiver
of the right to be present and be heard is made in criminal cases involving non-capital
offenses. After all, in whatever action or forum the accused is situated, the waiver that he
makes if it is to be binding and effective must still be exhibited in the case records to have
been validly undertaken, that is, it was done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. As a matter
of good court practice, the trial court would have to rely upon the most convenient, if not
primary, evidence of the validity of the waiver which would amount to the same thing as
showing its adherence to the step-by-step process outlined above.
Clearly, the rationale behind the foregoing requirements is that courts must proceed with
more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the
reason that the execution of such a sentence in irrevocable and experience has shown
that innocent persons have at times thrown caution to the wind and given up defending
themselves out of ignorance or desperation. Moreover, the necessity of taking further
evidence would aid this Court in determining on appellate review the proprietary or
impropriety of the waiver. (emphasis supplied, citations omitted) People v. Pagal, G.R.
No. 241257, [September 29, 2020]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 27 of 38
on August 13, 2023
The role of a deputized counsel in relation to the OSG, and the effect of the lack of approval of
the OSG in a compromise agreement.
The power of the OSG to deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies
and offices to assist it in representing the government is well settled. The Administrative Code of
1987 explicitly states that the OSG shall have the power to "deputize legal officers of government
departments, bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or
represent the Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the courts
and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with respect to such cases." But it is
likewise settled that the OSG's deputized counsel is "no more than the 'surrogate' of the Solicitor
General in any particular proceeding" and the latter remains the principal counsel entitled to be
furnished copies of all court orders, notices, and decisions. . . . The appearance of the deputized
counsel did not divest the OSG of control over the case and did not make the deputized special
attorney the counsel of record. xxx xxx xxx
Nonetheless, despite the lack of the Solicitor General's approval, this Court holds that the
government is still bound by the Compromise Agreement due to laches.
The Solicitor General is assumed to have known of the Compromise Agreement since, as principal
counsel, she was furnished a copy of the trial court's June 27, 2008 Order, which referred the
case to mediation. Even if she did not know that Atty. Lorea signed a Compromise Agreement,
she was later informed of it through the copy of the trial court's October 17, 2008 Order, which
approved the Compromise Agreement. The Solicitor General received the October 17, 2008
Order on November 6, 2008; yet, she filed no appeal or motion to contest the Order or the
Compromise Agreement's validity.
Thus, based on the deputation letter, which stated that "only notices of orders, resolutions, and
decisions served on [the Office of the Solicitor General] will bind the [g]overnment, the entity,
agency[,] and/or official represented[,]" and the Notice of Appearance, which stated that "only
notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served on [the Office of the Solicitor General] will
bind the party represented[,]" the Solicitor General's receipt of the October 17, 2008 Order
bound petitioner to the trial court's judgment. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
High Desert Stop Overs, Inc., G.R. No. 213287, [December 6, 2021]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 28 of 38
on August 13, 2023
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides for the remedy of annulment of judgment with the
appellate court of the judgments, final orders, and resolutions of the RTCs in civil actions for
which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Significantly, Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules limits the ground for the action of annulment of
judgment to either extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction, viz.:
Section 2. Grounds for annulment. — The annulment may be based only on the grounds
of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed
of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
"Lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in rendering the judgment or final order is either
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action, or lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner."
On the other hand, "[t]he overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented the petitioner from having his day in
court." At this juncture, worth reiterating is the rule that extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground
if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.
This means that the remedy of annulment of judgment, albeit a "last remedy," is not an
alternative remedy to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, or a petition for relief. It must
show or allege that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other
appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of petitioner. Notably, we have
held in Jose v. Intra Strata Assurance Corporation that "it is only extrinsic fraud, not lack of
jurisdiction, which is excluded as a valid ground for annulment if it was availed of, or could not
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition for relief." This is because a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction by the trial court is fundamentally void or non-existent, and
therefore, can be "assailed at any time either collaterally or by direct action or by resisting such
judgment or final order in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked." Ancheta v. Cambay,
G.R. No. 204272, [January 18, 2021]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 29 of 38
on August 13, 2023
An action for revival of judgment is an action with the exclusive purpose of enforcing a
judgment which could no longer be enforced by a motion.
The action is best explained in Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory judgment

or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After
the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment
may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within
five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the
statute of limitations. (Emphasis supplied)
The above provision should also be read in relation to Articles 1144 (3) and 1152 of the Civil Code,
to wit:
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues: xxx xxx xxx
(3) Upon a judgment. xxx xxx xxx
Article 1152. The period of prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment of obligation
declared by a judgment commences from the time the judgment became final.
Both the Rules of Court and the Civil Code provisions relating to an action for revival of judgment
are clear. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party has two remedies:
(1) [To have the judgment] executed as a matter of right by mere motion within five years
from the date of entry of judgment; or
(2) If the prevailing party fails to have the judgment enforced by motion after the lapse of
five years, to have the judgment enforced as a right of action by the institution of a
complaint in a regular court within 10 years from the time the judgment became final.
The revival action is a new action altogether; it is different and distinct from the original judgment
sought to be revived or enforced. It is a new and independent action, wherein the cause of action
is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be
enforced is rendered. The Court agrees with the CA in citing Saligumba v. Palanog, especially
when it ruled that revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be
revived, either by motion or by independent action, is already final and executory. Pineda v.
Miranda, G.R. No. 204997, [August 4, 2021]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 30 of 38
on August 13, 2023
The RTC as the judgment court has supervisory control over the execution of its judgment.
It is settled that the court which rendered the judgment has supervisory control over the
execution of its judgment. It does not, however, give the court the power to alter or amend a
final and executory decision in the absence of the recognized exceptions, namely: (a) if there is a
need to correct clerical errors which cause no prejudice to any party, (b) void judgments, and (c)
if circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and
inequitable.
This Court expounded on the supervisory control of the judgment court in Kukan International
Corporation v. Reyes, to wit:
In Carpio v. Doroja, the Court ruled that the deciding court has supervisory control over
the execution of its judgment:
A case in which an execution has been issued is regarded as still pending so that
all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. There is no question
that the court which rendered the judgment has a general supervisory control
over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to determine
every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.
We reiterated the above holding in Javier v. Court of Appeals in this wise: "The said branch
has a general supervisory control over its processes in the execution of its judgment with
a right to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the
execution."
The court's supervisory control does not, however, extend as to authorize the alteration
or amendment of a final and executory decision, save for certain recognized exceptions,
among which is the correction of clerical errors. Else, the court violates the principle of
finality of judgment and its immutability, concepts which the Court, in Tan v. Timbal,
defined:
As we held in Industrial Management International Development Corporation vs.

NLRC:
It is an elementary principle of procedure that the resolution of the court in a given

issue as embodied in the dispositive part of a decision or order is the controlling
factor as to settlement of rights of the parties. Once a decision or order becomes
final and executory, it is removed from the power or jurisdiction of the court which
rendered it to further alter or amend it. It thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable and any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 31 of 38
on August 13, 2023
and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire
proceedings held for that purpose. An order of execution which varies the tenor
of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. (Citations Omitted.)
The judgment court's supervisory control over the case ensures the enforcement of a party's
rights or claims that it has duly recognized. Indeed, a court's mandate to resolve disputes ends
upon its adjudication of the litigation. It is only when the party that has secured favorable
judgment finally relishes the fruits of its legal calvary that justice may be said to have been duly
served. This tenet fortifies a judgment court's so-called supervisory control over decided suits.
Corollarily, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court lays down available remedies and guidelines for the
satisfaction of a judgment, including enforcement of a writ of execution, which the winning party
may avail of before the judgment court. Among the remedies available to such party to fully
enforce the writ of execution is the examination of a judgment obligor. Linden Suites, Inc. v.
Meridien Far East Properties, Inc., G.R. No. 211969, [October 4, 2021]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
A counter-bond is not necessary for the discharge of a writ of preliminary attachment that was
found to be irregularly issued.
Under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, there are two remedies a party can avail of to discharge their
attached property:
(1) Under Section 12, make a cash deposit equal to the claim or give a counter-bond which
will take the place of the attached property; or
(2) Under Section 13, file a motion to discharge the attachment on the following grounds:
(a) that it was improperly or irregularly issued; or

(b) that it was improperly or irregularly enforced; or
(c) that the bond of the plaintiff is insufficient.
For the second remedy to apply, a writ of attachment may be discharged without filing a cash
bond or counter-bond only if the writ of preliminary attachment itself has already been proven
to be improperly or irregularly issued or enforced, or the bond is insufficient. The limitation

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 32 of 38
on August 13, 2023
enunciated in FCY Construction will not apply when a regular trial on the merits of the main
action, not only of the motion to discharge the writ, was conducted.
Here, the CA found that, after reading and hearing the allegations of both parties, Dumaran's
allegations did not meet the requirements of the law regarding fraud. The CA found that the writ
of preliminary attachment had been irregularly issued, thus, a motion to discharge the writ under
Rule 57, Section 13 was the proper remedy. A counter-bond under Section 12 is not necessary.
Dumaran v. Llamedo, G.R. No. 217583, [August 4, 2021]
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
A writ of preliminary injunction is a preservative remedy for the protection of substantial rights
and interests.
It is not a cause of action itself, but a mere provisional remedy adjunct to a main suit. It is granted
at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or
a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts; it may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary
mandatory injunction. It may be granted by the court where the action or proceeding is pending.
The purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to the
parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied, and its sole aim is to preserve the status
quo until the merits of the case are fully heard. The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
governed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
Jurisprudence laid down the requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as
follows: (a) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a right
in esse; (b) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right; (c) there is an urgent need
for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and, (d) no other ordinary, speedy, and
adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. v. Spouses Cereño (Sumifru) discussed the concept of a clear and
unmistakable right that may be protected by a writ of preliminary injunction, to wit:
A writ of preliminary injunction, being an extraordinary event, one deemed as a strong

arm of equity or a transcendent remedy, must be granted only in the face of injury to
actual and existing substantial rights. A right to be protected by injunction means a right
clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. An injunction is

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 33 of 38
on August 13, 2023
not a remedy to protect or enforce contingent, abstract, or future rights; it will not issue
to protect a right not in esse, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does
not give rise to a cause of action. When the complainant's right is doubtful or disputed,
he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, injunction is not proper. While it is not
required that the right claimed by the applicant, as basis for seeking injunctive relief, be
conclusively established, it is still necessary to show, at least tentatively, that the right
exists and is not vitiated by any substantial challenge or contradiction. Bureau of Customs
v. Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro Station, G.R. Nos. 192809, 193588, 193590-91 &
201650, [April 26, 2021]
Before the courts may issue a writ of preliminary injunction, it is essential that the party seeking
its issuance be able to establish the existence of a right to be protected. It must be a right that
is actual, clear, and existing; not a mere contingent, abstract, or future right. Further, the
invasion of that clear and unmistakable right must be material and substantial.
There must also be a showing of urgency to prevent irreparable injury on the part of the party
seeking injunction. Injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which its amount can be
measured with reasonable accuracy.
To satisfy the requisites for the issuance of the writ, mere prima facie evidence is needed to
establish the clear and unmistakable right, and the substantial and material invasion thereof;
complete and conclusive proof is not needed. Injunction should therefore not be issued "if there
is no clear legal right materially and substantially breached from a prima facie evaluation of the
evidence of the complainant."
It is well settled that the aggrieved party may challenge the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction only on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the issuing court. Grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of writs of
preliminary injunction implies "a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion, prejudice or personal aversion amounting to an evasion of [a] positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law." Bureau
of Customs v. Court of Appeals-Cagayan de Oro Station, G.R. Nos. 192809, 193588, 193590-91
& 201650, [April 26, 2021]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 34 of 38
on August 13, 2023
Cases involving the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs, as mere adjuncts to the main
suit, become moot and academic upon disposal of the main action.
TROs and WPIs "constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency of the action"
and are "preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights" of the parties. They are
ancillary because "they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main
action." Ancillary writs are not causes of action in themselves; they are mere adjuncts to the main
suit with the sole object of preserving the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard.
Being ancillary in nature, the existence of a main action or proceeding is a condition sine qua non
before a WPI or TRO may lie:
In our jurisdiction, writs of preliminary injunction and TROs are considered as provisional
injunctive reliefs that are only permitted to be issued in connection with — or as an
ancillary to — a main action or proceeding pending in court. It is settled that the office of
a writ of preliminary injunction is limited only to the preservation of the status quo until
an action or proceeding could be fully decided; whereas a TRO is merely the maintenance
of such status until an application for a writ of preliminary injunction can be heard.
Evidently, the existence of a main action or proceeding is a condition sine qua non before
a writ of preliminary injunction or TRO may lie.
The ancillary character of the writs of preliminary injunction and TROs also finds black
letter support in our rules of procedure. Sections 1, 2 and 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court
— which define and describe the precise circumstances under which a writ of preliminary
injunction and TRO may be granted — all assume the prior existence of a main action or
proceeding before such writ and order may be granted[.]
Thus, any preliminary writ cannot survive the resolution of the main case of which it is an incident
because an ancillary writ "loses its force and effect after the decision in the main petition." When
a main action is dismissed, any provisional remedy in this case is dissolved. It then follows that
once a decision disposing of the main case becomes final and executory, any disposition by a
court on the propriety of a TRO and WPI issued in the case serves no practical purpose and
renders such a disposition moot and academic.
"An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a
determination thereof would be without practical value. In such cases, there is no actual
substantial relief to which petitioner would be entitled to and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition." "It is well-settled that courts will not determine questions that have
become moot and academic because there is no longer any justiciable controversy to speak of.
The judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal effect because, in the
nature of things, it cannot be enforced." Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 200642, [April 26, 2021]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 35 of 38
on August 13, 2023
Criminal Contempt and Civil Contempt, Distinguished
In Oca v. Custodio, the Court distinguished criminal contempt from civil contempt, as follows:
The punishment for contempt is classified into two (2): civil contempt and criminal
contempt.
Civil contempt is committed when a party fails to comply with an order of a court or judge
"for the benefit of the other party." A criminal contempt is committed when a party acts
against the court's authority and dignity or commits a forbidden act tending to disrespect
the court or judge.
This stems from the two (2)-fold aspect of contempt which seeks: (i) to punish the party
for disrespecting the court or its orders; and (ii) to compel the party to do an act or duty
which it refuses to perform.
In Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations:
Due to this two-fold aspect of the exercise of the power to punish them,
contempts are classified as civil or criminal. A civil contempt is the failure to do
something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing
party therein; and a criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the authority
and dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting the
authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act. Where
the punishment imposed, whether against a party to a suit or a stranger, is wholly
or primarily to protect or vindicate the dignity and power of the court, either by
fine payable to the government or by imprisonment, or both, it is deemed a
judgment in a criminal case. Where the punishment is by fine directed to be paid
to a party in the nature of damages for the wrong inflicted, or by imprisonment as
a coercive measure to enforce the performance of some act for the benefit of the
party or in aid of the final judgment or decree rendered in his behalf, the contempt
judgment will, if made before final decree, be treated as in the nature of an
interlocutory order, or, if made after final decree, as remedial in nature, and may
be reviewed only on appeal from the final decree, or in such other mode as is
appropriate to the review of judgments in civil cases. x x x The question of whether
the contempt committed is civil or criminal, does not affect the jurisdiction or the
power of a Court to punish the same.
The difference between civil contempt and criminal contempt was further elaborated in
People v. Godoy:

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 36 of 38
on August 13, 2023
It has been said that the real character of the proceedings is to be determined by
the relief sought, or the dominant purpose, and the proceedings are to be
regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment, and civil when
the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
Criminal contempt proceedings are generally held to be in the nature of criminal

or quasi-criminal actions. They are punitive in nature, and the Government, the
courts, and the people are interested in their prosecution. Their purpose is to
preserve the power and vindicate the authority and dignity of the court, and to
punish for disobedience of its orders. Strictly speaking, however, they are not
criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved
is also a crime. The proceeding has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of
some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really
constituting neither. In general, criminal contempt proceedings should be
conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases,
in so far as such procedure is consistent with the summary nature of contempt
proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal
prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to
be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that
proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However,
criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular from so long as the
substantial rights of the accused are preserved.
Civil contempt proceedings are generally held to be remedial and civil in their
nature; that is, they are proceedings for the enforcement of some duty, and
essentially a remedy for coercing a person to do the thing required. As otherwise
expressed, a proceeding for civil contempt is one instituted to preserve and
enforce the rights of a private party to an action and to compel obedience to a
judgment or decree intended to benefit such a party litigant. So a proceeding is
one for civil contempt, regardless of its form, if the act charged is wholly the
disobedience, by one party to a suit, of a special order made in behalf of the other
party and the disobeyed order may still be obeyed, and the purpose of the
punishment is to aid in an enforcement of obedience. The rules of procedure
governing criminal contempt proceedings, or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are
inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings.
In general, civil contempt proceedings should be instituted by an aggrieved party,

or his successor, or someone who has a pecuniary interest in the right to be
protected. In criminal contempt proceedings, it is generally held that the State is
the real prosecutor.

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 37 of 38
on August 13, 2023
Contempt is not presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant

is presumed innocent and the burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges
beyond reasonable doubt. In proceedings for civil contempt, there is no
presumption, although the burden of proof is on the complainant, and while the
proof need not be beyond reasonable doubt, it must amount to more than a mere
preponderance of evidence. It has been said that the burden of proof in a civil
contempt proceeding lies somewhere between the criminal "reasonable doubt"
burden and the civil "fair preponderance" burden.
Civil contempt proceedings seek to compel the contemnor to obey a court order,
judgment, or decree which he or she refuses to do for the benefit of another party. It is
for the enforcement and the preservation of a right of a private party, who is the real
party in interest in the proceedings. The purpose of the contemnor's punishment is to
compel obedience to the order. Thus, civil contempt is not treated like a criminal
proceeding and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary to prove it. Harbour
Centre Port Terminal, Inc. v. La Filipina Uygongco Corp., G.R. Nos. 240984 & 241120,
[September 27, 2021]

0917 – 894 53 56
Page 38 of 38

2023 FORECAST - Remedial Law - Part 1

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

2023 FORECAST - Remedial Law - Part 1

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

REMEDIAL LAW (Part 1)

based on the doctrines and cases cited

Doctrine of Judicial Stability

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitor

A definitive final judgment, however erroneous, is no longer subject to change or revision.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Balance of substantial justice and procedural rules

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Procedural rules are not to be disdained as mere technicalities that may be

It cannot be overemphasized that procedural rules have their own wholesome

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Our recent ruling in Tanenglian v. Lorenzo is instructive:

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Joinder of Indispensable Parties

A person is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

In S.C. Megaworld v. Parada, this Court ruled that:

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

In Intramuros Administration v. Offshore Construction Development Co. (Intramuros), We

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

"A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of

Additionally, in order for summary judgment to be granted in lieu of a full-blown

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Section 14. (1) x x x

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

objections to the proposed questions in the written interrogatories submitted by the

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

This Court, in Chipongian v. Benitez-Lirio, once more elaborated on the consequence of a

The changes and clarifications recognize that appeal is neither a natural

As the foregoing rules further indicate, a judgment or final order in special

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

A violation of these requirements for the timely perfection of an appeal by

Considering that the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in

In like manner, the perfection of an appeal within the period laid

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

It is well-settled that appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative

As held by the Court in Fabian v. Desierto:

SECTION 7. Finality and Execution of Decision. — Where the respondent is absolved of

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

In particular, trial courts are mandated to conduct the searching inquiry.

1. Ascertain from the accused himself

a. how he was brought into the custody of the law;

c. under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

The accused must be given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence.

3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to —

a. ask the defense counsel a series of question to determine whether he

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused

c. elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as

d. all questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76