2023 FORECAST - Civil Law

CIVIL LAW
based on the doctrines and cases cited during the lecture

of Dean Maria Liza A. Lopez-Rosario on August 19, 2023
and notable cases penned by Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando
The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws
and not to the requirement of publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication. Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with.
lt is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because
of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly,
this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate. Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, No. L-63915
December 29, 1986
For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" refer not only
to those of general application, but also to laws of local application, private laws;
administrative rules enforcing a statute; city charters.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a
law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
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public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only
a portion of the national territory and directy affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but
to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Tañada vs.
Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are not covered by the rule on prior
publication. Also not covered are municipal ordinances which are governed by the Local
Government Code.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the
head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of
office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the
Local Government Code. Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

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Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the
mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the
Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by
the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law. Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Laws must be published as soon as possible.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however,
that we do not need to examine at this time. Tañada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, No. L-63915
December 29, 1986
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Essential elements for a waiver of rights to exist.
The contention of the petitioners that the respondents had waived their right of first refusal is
not supported by the evidence. For a waiver of rights to exist, three elements are essential: (a)
existence of a right; (b) the knowledge of the evidence thereof; and (c) an intention to relinquish
such right. Valderama vs. Macalde, 470 SCRA 168, G.R. No. 165005 September 16, 2005

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Legal Ratification of Marital Cohabitation
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites
must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each
other, 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the
time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together
for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The
solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications
of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. Borja-Manzano vs.
Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001
Legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry,
and this holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long
time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a
decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage
bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much
less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely
de facto, as in the case at bar. Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329
March 8, 2001
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage—marital cohabitation for a long
period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and
Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years.
Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years
does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period
of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a
ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing
marriage. Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez, 354 SCRA 1, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

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The five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of
the marriage.
Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for
five years without the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis
of a cohabitation as “husband and wife” where the only missing factor is the special contract of
marriage to validate the union. In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period,
which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity—meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years
and continuity—that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during
the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived
faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and
its requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law.
The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and
later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage.
There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly
fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is
aware or has knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the
local civil registrar. Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial
companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any
third party as being one as “husband and wife.”
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito
and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.
It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect
only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when
he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other,
Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage
even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot

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make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as “husband and wife.”
Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 133778 March 14, 2000
Void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages
can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which
case the parties and their offspring will be left: as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.
The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage. Voidable and
void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by
the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free
cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be
assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked
collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party
but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death
of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been
perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable
marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but
any proper interested party may attack a void marriage. Niñal vs. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122, G.R.
No. 133778 March 14, 2000
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Meaning of “national law” in Article 16, Civil Code
The “national law” indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to any general
American Law, because there is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in
the United States, each state of the union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only
and in force only within the state. It can therefore refer to no other than the private law of the
state of which the decedent was a citizen. In the case at bar, the State of California prescribes
two sets of laws for its citizens, an internal law for its citizens residing therein and a conflict of
law rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions. Hence, reason demands that the
California con-flict of law rules should be applied in this jurisdiction in the case at bar. Aznar vs.
Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

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Factors considered in determining aliens’ domicile in the Philippines.
An American citizen who was born in New York, migrated to California, resided there for nine
years, came to the Philippines in 1913, and very rarely re-turned to California and only for short
visits, and who appears to have never owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, shall
be considered to have his domicile in the Philippines. Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, No. L-16749
January 31, 1963
Rule of resorting to the law of the domicile in determining matters with foreign element
involved.
The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with
foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the
domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
Application of the renvoi doctrine
The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946 Civil Code, refers back the case, when a decedent
is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The
court of domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to California, as such action would
leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case will then be tossed back and forth
between the two states. If the question has to be decided, the Philippine court must apply its
own law as the Philippines was the domicile of the decedent, as directed in the conflict of law
rule of the state of the decedent, California, and especially because the internal law of California
provides no legitime for natural children, while the Philippine law (Articles 887(4) and 894, Civil
Code of the Philippines makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them). xxx As the domicile of the deceased, who was a citizen of California, was the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child of
the latter’s legacy, should be governed by the Philippine law, pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California. Aznar vs. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95, No. L-16749
January 31, 1963

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The exercise of rights is not without limitations. Having the right should not be confused with
the manner by which such right is to be exercised.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional

law, or recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of a legally enforceable claim of one
person against the other. Concededly, the petitioner, as the owner of the utility providing water
supply to certain consumers including the respondent, had the right to exclude any person from
the enjoyment and disposal thereof. However, the exercise of rights is not without limitations.
Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised.
Article 19 of the Civil Code precisely sets the norms for the exercise of one’s rights: Art. 19. Every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc., 432 SCRA 418, G.R. No. 147076 June 17, 2004
When a right is exercised in a manner which discards the norms set in Article 19 of the Civil
Code, resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held
accountable.
In this case, the petitioner failed to act with justice and give the respondent what is due to it
when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondent’s water service connection.
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc., 432 SCRA 418, G.R. No.
147076 June 17, 2004
Petitioner’s act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the respondent, justifying the award
of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
There is, thus, no reason to deviate from the uniform findings and conclusion of the court a quo
and the appellate court that the petitioner’s act was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the
respondent, justifying the award of damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act Theater, Inc., 432 SCRA 418, G.R. No. 147076 June
17, 2004

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Attorney’s fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to
protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of the other party.
The award of P5,000 as attorney’s fees is reasonable and warranted. Attorney’s fees may be
awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses to protect his interest by reason
of an unjustified act of the other party. Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System vs. Act
Theater, Inc., 432 SCRA 418, G.R. No. 147076 June 17, 2004
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Breach of Promise to Marry, When Actionable Wrong
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably
contrary to good customs, for which the erring promisor must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December
26, 1964, 120 PHIL 1440-1447
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Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well
as the civil liability based solely thereon.
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.” People vs. Bayotas, 236
SCRA 239, G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

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The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may
also be obligation other than delict.
Corollarily, the claim for civil liability predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article
1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law; b) Contracts; c) Quasi-contracts; d) x x
x x x x x x x; e) Quasi-delicts. People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, G.R. No. 102007 September 2,
1994
Private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file the separate civil action by
prescription.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to
its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should
thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. People vs.
Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
Death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely
on the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification. People vs. Bayotas,
236 SCRA 239, G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

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To summarize and for future guidance, the parties are not required to obtain a judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of a void ab initio first and subsequent marriages in order to
raise it as a defense in a bigamy case.
The same rule now applies to all marriages celebrated under the Civil Code and the Family Code.
Article 40 of the Family Code did not amend Article 349 of the RPC, and thus, did not deny the
accused the right to collaterally attack the validity of a void ab initio marriage in the criminal
prosecution for bigamy.
However, if the first marriage is merely voidable, the accused cannot interpose an annulment
decree as a defense in the criminal prosecution for bigamy since the voidable first marriage is
considered valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted. The crime of bigamy,
therefore, is consummated when the second marriage was celebrated during the subsistence of
the voidable first marriage. The same rule applies if the second marriage is merely considered as
voidable.
To our mind, it is time to abandon the earlier precedents and adopt a more liberal view that a
void ab initio marriage can be used as a defense in bigamy even without a separate judicial
declaration of absolute nullity. The accused may present testimonial or documentary evidence
such as the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first subsequent void ab initio marriages
in the criminal prosecution for bigamy. The said view is more in accord with the retroactive
effects of a void ab initio marriage, the purpose of and legislative intent behind Article 40 of the
Family Code, and the rule on statutory construction of penal laws. Therefore, the absence of a
"prior valid marriage" and the subsequent judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage, Pulido is hereby acquitted from the crime of Bigamy charged against him. Pulido v.
People, G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021
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R.A. No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such
errors—Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with
Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as

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clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now
be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of
such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the
civil register. Republic vs. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code; The acts, events or
factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur
after birth.
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of
the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors
contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
Republic vs. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
During the twentieth century, medicine adopted the term “intersexuality” to apply to human
beings who cannot be classified as either male or female—an organism with intersex may have
biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or “inappropriate”
appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too
much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH
usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia
often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female
reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some
features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to
menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH. CAH is one of

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many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted
the term “intersexuality” to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or
female. The term is now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality “is the state
of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary
sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism with
intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.” Republic vs.
Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as
a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself
fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex
individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role. Since the rise
of modern medical science in Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external
genitalia have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.
More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a “disorder” which is
almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking lifetime
medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male
or female. In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. “It has
been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a ‘no-man’s land’ for those
individuals who are neither truly ‘male’ nor truly ‘female.’” The current state of Philippine
statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this
Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification. Republic vs. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender
classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good
reason thinks of his/her sex.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically
female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondent’s body system naturally produces high levels of male
hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic
features of a male. Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual,

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like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels
of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as
being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Republic vs. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
To the person with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health, and to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a
matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not
consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become
or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender
of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him
belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong
the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development
and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of
society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male. Republic vs.
Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72, G.R. No. 166676 September 12, 2008
There is merit in the change of name of a person with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH)
where the same is the consequence of the recognition of his preferred gender.
As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name
is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of
name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering
the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we
find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the
entry in his birth certificate from female to male. Republic vs. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72, G.R.
No. 166676 September 12, 2008

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A change of name is a privilege, not a right.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No
person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. Silverio vs. Republic, 537
SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name, and vests the power and authority to entertain
petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned.
Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless
an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise
lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007
A change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status—RA 9048 does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He
intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into
through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change
his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying
such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as
a result of using his true and official name. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689
October 19, 2007

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A petition in the trial court in so far as it prays for change of first name is not within that court’s
primary jurisdiction as the petition should be filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
namely, where the birth certificate is kept.
The petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name was
not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local
civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because
the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in
the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his
birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official
name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioner’s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned. Silverio vs. Republic,
537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007
No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment.
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a “clerical or typographical error” is: SECTION 2. Definition
of Terms.—As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x x x x x x x (3) “Clerical
or typographical error” refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in
writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and
innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the
eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to
other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change
of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) Under RA 9048, a
correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code. Silverio vs.
Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007
No reasonable interpretation of Art. 407 of the Civil Code can justify the conclusion that it
covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even
those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify
the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply

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means “to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from” while to change means “to
replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute.” The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007
“Status” refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of
capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family
membership.
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less
permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations,
and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce,
and sometimes even succession. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October
19, 2007
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations—it is a part of a person’s
legal capacity and civil status. There is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects.
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All
other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. But
there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is
fatal to petitioner’s cause. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007
The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning
the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and
ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary.
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary
meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words “sex,” “male” and “female” as
used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws)

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should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative
intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as “the sum of peculiarities of structure
and function that distinguish a male from a female” or “the distinction between male and
female.” Female is “the sex that produces ova or bears young” and male is “the sex that has
organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova.” Thus, the words “male” and “female” in
everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment.
Furthermore, “words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning
are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.” Since
the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains
unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term “sex” as used then is something alterable through
surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in
the category “female.” For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition
for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA
373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19, 2007
To grant the changes in name and sex sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations—it will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative
transsexual).
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first
step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred
social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One
of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and
a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly
alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man
who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second,
there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor
Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the
presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among
others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially
affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No.
174689 October 19, 2007

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Article 9 of the Civil Code which mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law” is not a license for
courts to engage in judicial legislation. In our system of government, it is for the legislature,
should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that “[n]o judge or court shall decline to render
judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law.” However, it is not a
license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret
the law, not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it
choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case
where the claims asserted are statute-based. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No.
174689 October 19, 2007
If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. The
Supreme Court cannot enact a law where no law exists.
To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction
or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked,
what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends
to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and
sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in
turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for this Court
to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex.
However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The
Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of
its co-equal branch of government, Congress. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No.
174689 October 19, 2007

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The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly
into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life
is indeed an ordeal, but the remedies involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely
by the legislature, not by the courts.
Petitioner pleads that “[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment
and [the] realization of their dreams.” No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there
are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized
parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However,
the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. Silverio vs. Republic, 537 SCRA 373, G.R. No. 174689 October 19,
2007
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained
in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of
the mother.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be
legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration
contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed
virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from
the odium of illegitimacy. Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao, 378 SCRA 563, G.R. No. 138961 March 7,
2002
The child himself cannot choose his own filiation—if the husband, presumed to be the father
does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter
cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour.
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of
the then minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William
Liyao, Jr, as the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child
born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner

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to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband,
or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid
and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband,
presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the
child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour. On
the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the
paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption. Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao,
378 SCRA 563, G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002
It is settled that the legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for
that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that the heirs of the husband are allowed to
contest the legitimacy of the child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo
has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation
of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was initiated by petitioner himself through his
mother, Corazon Garcia, and not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law. Liyao, Jr. vs. Tanhoti-Liyao, 378 SCRA 563,
G.R. No. 138961 March 7, 2002
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
A child whose parents did not marry each other can inherit from their grandparent by their
right of representation, regardless of the grandparent's marital status at the birth of the child's
parent.
Succession is not only a mode of acquiring ownership: a way for properties to be transferred from
one person to another. Our laws have made succession a fixed point in the life cycle of a family.
To whom a decedent's property is given and how much is our civil laws approximation of familial
love: first descending, then ascending, and finally spreading out. In its own way, an inheritance
may be viewed as recompense, however pitiful and inadequate, for a permanent loss of which
there can never be sufficient satisfaction. The laws on succession have social, cultural, and even
moral dimensions, affecting and affected by ever-evolving norms of family, marriage, and
children.

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While not binding upon our jurisdiction, the changes in legitimacy statutes and successional rights
in other countries may offer alternative perspectives that can help foster an overdue
conversation about our civil laws.
xxx
Our own laws also reflect progress in treating persons, regardless of their birth status, more
equally. The Family Code and its amendments sought to improve the living conditions of
nonmarital children, by conferring upon them the rights and privileges previously unavailable
under the Civil Code and its antecedents. Numerous social welfare laws grant benefits to marital
and nonmarital children alike. Moreover, laws such as Republic Act No. 8972, or the Solo Parents'
Welfare Act, and Republic Act No. 10165, or the Foster Care Act, demonstrate that the family as
a basic autonomous social institution is not restrictively defined by traditional notions of marital
relations, moving toward unshackling the status of a child from the acts of their parents.
All children are deserving of support, care, and attention. They are entitled to an unprejudiced
and nurturing environment free from neglect, abuse, and cruelty. Regardless of the
circumstances of their birth, they are all without distinction entitled to all rights and privileges
due them. The principle of protecting and promoting the best interest of the child applies equally,
and without distinction, to all children. As observed by Justice Gregory Perfecto in Malonda v.
Malonda: All children are entitled to equal protection from their parents. Only a distorted
concept of that parental duty, which springs from and is imposed by nature, may justify
discriminatory measures to the prejudice of those born out of illicit sexual relations. The legal or
moral violations upon which some of our present day legal provisions penalize illegitimate
children with social, economic and financial sanctions, are perpetrated by the parents without
the consent or knowledge of the children. If the erring parents deserve to have their foreheads
branded with the stigma of illegitimacy, it is iniquitous to load the innocent children with the evil
consequences of that stigma. There can be illegitimate parents but there should not be any
illegitimate children.
Nonetheless, the present state of our family laws constrains us to apply the Civil Code and the
Family Code as they are, including the classifications and distinctions embedded in them.
Reshaping policies with a profound effect on the basic framework of Philippine civil law may be
better left to the Filipino people, through their duly elected representatives, empathetic to and
steadfast in our constitutional commitment to our children. Aquino v. Aquino, G.R. Nos. 208912
& 209018, December 7, 2021

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Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage, are of two (2)
types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist: 1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute
divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. 2. Consistent with Articles 15 and 17 of the New Civil
Code, the marital bond between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce
obtained abroad. 3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. 4.
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry. Republic vs. Manalo, 862 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 221029 April
24, 2018
Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse
of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the
children or property relations of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the
dissolution of the marriage. It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce
decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the
case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case. Under the principles of
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but
the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations
of the spouses, must still be determined by our courts. Republic vs. Manalo, 862 SCRA 580, G.R.
No. 221029 April 24, 2018
In 2005, the Supreme Court (SC) concluded that paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case
where, at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but
later on, one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce
proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree.
We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III: The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998
case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when
they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce
in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by

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his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time
of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x If we are to
give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of
paragraph 2 of Article 26. In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: 1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and 2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. Republic vs.
Manalo, 862 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 221029 April 24, 2018
When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation
of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute
divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and
observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
Republic vs. Manalo, 862 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 221029 April 24, 2018
The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated
the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only
requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand
that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree

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was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute;
neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. “The legislature is presumed to know
the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the
use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words
of a statute there should be no departure.” Republic vs. Manalo, 862 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the
same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife.
The purpose of paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a
corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while
the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino
spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage
bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino
spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end
of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction.
In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the
latter’s national law. Republic vs. Manalo, 862 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 221029 April 24, 2018
Blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article
15 of the Civil Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of
paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto.
Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause
unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally
protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the

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Legislature only if they are constitutional. Republic vs. Manalo, 862 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018
The Supreme Court (SC) finds that paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential
requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a
foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial,
arbitrary, and whimsical classification.
Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with
respect to the acts of the President, which have the force and effect of law unless declared
otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the
essential requisites of the equal protection clause. Particularly, the limitation of the provision
only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on
superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is
not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material
and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic, cultural,
and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar,
that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly,
while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a
divorce decree obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in
accordance with the national law of the foreigner. Republic vs. Manalo, 862 SCRA 580, G.R. No.
221029 April 24, 2018
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have
the same rights and obligations in an alien land.
There is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce
proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have
the same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike.
Were it not for paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who
are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely
on the superficial difference of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly
unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the

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other. Further, the differentiation in paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in

treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen
against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to
Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code. In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the
Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that
he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent’s comment that
Manalo should be “reminded that all is not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her
marital ties before the RTC in accordance with the mechanisms now existing under the Family
Code” is anything but comforting. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been
better if the dissent discussed in detail what these “mechanisms” are and how they specifically
apply in Manalo’s case as well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a
petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no
assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is
duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan. Republic vs. Manalo,
862 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 221029 April 24, 2018
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead
to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute
may, therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent. The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this
controversy by granting Manalo’s petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered
by the Japanese court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila. Jurisprudence has set guidelines before Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice. The fact of divorce must still first be
proven. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Republic vs. Manalo, 862 SCRA 580, G.R. No. 221029 April 24, 2018

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Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic

marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit
oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the
essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the
rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must
be tantamount to a psychological abnormality.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. It is not enough to
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibilities and duties as a married person; incapacity
must be so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, that the only result of the
union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage.
Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,

physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. It
must be stressed that an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Time and again, it has been held that the State takes a high stake in the preservation of marriage
rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and preservation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.
Carullo-Padua v. Padua, G.R. No. 208258, April 27, 2022
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
Jurisprudence sets out four requisites for a grant of a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code.
First, the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if
the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down
in Article 391 of the Civil Code; second, the present spouse wishes to remarry; third, the present
spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and fourth, the present spouse files
for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

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The third requirement of a "well-founded belief" proves most difficult to establish in seeking to
declare an absent spouse presumptively dead. While this term enjoys flexible meanings and
depends heavily on the circumstances unique to each particular case, the Court in Republic v.
Orcelino-Villanueva (Orcelino-Villanueva) has highlighted the exercise of "diligent efforts" in
determining whether the present spouse's belief that the absent spouse is already dead was well-
founded or not: The well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the
circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It necessitates exertion of active effort (not a
mere passive one). Mere absence of the spouse (even beyond the period required by law), lack
of any news that the absentee spouse is still alive, mere failure to communicate, or general
presumption of absence under the Civil Code would not suffice. The premise is that Article 41 of
the Family Code places upon the present spouse the burden of complying with the stringent
requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper
and honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse's
whereabouts but, more importantly, whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
A declaration of presumptive death must be predicated upon a well-founded fact of death. The
fact that the absent spouse is merely missing, no matter how certain and undisputed, will never
yield a judicial presumption of the absent spouse's death. Josephine in this case only successfully
established that the whereabouts of Agapito are indeterminable. As circumstances that definitely
suggest Agapito's death remain to be seen, the Court cannot consider Josephine's civil status as
that of a widow. Republic v. Ponce-Pilapil, G.R. No. 219185, November 25, 2020
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
To demand a partition or division of the common property is in accord with Article 494 of the
Civil Code, that is, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership and that each
co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his or
her share is concerned.
Petitioner's contention that the subject property, i.e., 231.5 sqm, would be rendered
unserviceable if it would be divided among the co-owners, is without legal merit. It bears
stressing that petitioner's issue is addressed by the provisions of Article 498 in relation with
Article 495. Thus, petitioner cannot argue that a declaration of nullity of the sale between Isidoro
and the spouses Garcia is warranted or else, a partition of the subject property would render it
unserviceable. Reyes v. Spouses Garcia, G.R. No. 225159, March 21, 2022

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CIVIL LAW
Donation has three indispensable elements: (1) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor;
(2) the increase in the patrimony of the donee; and (3) the intent to do an act of liberality or
animus donandi.
Not all three are present. While Anecito's patrimony may have decreased with the correlative
increase in that of Juan by virtue of the Deed of Sale and Agreement, it does not appear that this
was impelled by liberality on the part of Anecito. Had animus donandi really been the true motive
for the transfer of the subject property, Anecito and Juan would have so stated in the documents
that they executed. However, the Deed of Sale clearly states that the conveyance was for a
consideration of the amount of P15,000.00. Again, petitioner was remiss in her evidentiary duty
to prove otherwise. There was just a dearth of evidence to show that Juan and Anecito actually
intended a donation mortis causa or some contract other than a sale. Bacala v. Heirs of Poliño,
G.R. No. 200608, February 10, 2021
X-----------------------------------------------------------------------X
Lawyers are not disqualified from being witnesses to a will; the subscribing witnesses testified
to the due execution of the will.
Article 820 of the Civil Code provides that, "[a]ny person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen
years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the
execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code." Here, the attesting witnesses to the
will in question are all lawyers equipped with the aforementioned qualifications. In addition, they
are not disqualified from being witnesses under Article 821 of the Civil Code, even if they all
worked at the same law firm at the time. As pointed out by Natividad, these lawyers would not
risk their professional licenses by knowingly signing a document which they knew was forged or
executed under duress; moreover, they did not have anything to gain from the estate when they
signed as witnesses. All the same, petitioners did not present controverting proof to discredit
them or to show that they were disqualified from being witnesses to Consuelo's will at the time
of its execution. xxx The lawyer-witnesses unanimously confirmed that the will was duly executed
by Consuelo who was of sound mind and body at the time of signing. The Tanchancos failed to
dispute the competency and credibility of these witnesses; thus, the Court is disposed to give
credence to their testimonies that Consuelo executed the will in accordance with the formalities
of the law and with full mental faculties and willingness to do so. Tanchanco v. Santos, G.R. No.
204793, June 8, 2020

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2023 FORECAST - Civil Law

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CIVIL LAW

based on the doctrines and cases cited during the lecture

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all.

Laws must be published as soon as possible.

Essential elements for a waiver of rights to exist.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Ratification of Marital Cohabitation

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Meaning of “national law” in Article 16, Civil Code

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Factors considered in determining aliens’ domicile in the Philippines.

Application of the renvoi doctrine

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed under a constitution, statute or decisional

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Breach of Promise to Marry, When Actionable Wrong

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

A change of name is a privilege, not a right.

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

other. Further, the differentiation in paragraph 2 of Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic

Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

Legal Edge Bar Review 0942 – 949 91 76

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