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    etica nicimoahica

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    etica nicimoahica

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    10 views24 pages

    Chapter 8

    Uploaded by

    ema_mirela88
    etica nicimoahica

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
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    of 24
    ~F CHAPTER 8 WEAKNESS OF WILL Contemporary discussions of weak notion that Aquinas rarely uses, refers to weakness of the soul, fc 88 of will. for a soul is akness, weak when the Patios inate reason which should be the stronger pare Concerning Aguinsy, ‘reatment of weakness, Davidson makes Aquinas fail to speak of role in sins of weakness? the passions win, and th Ress focus upon Weakin, veakness” in the me a Agena, Same telgiae se a Tha. 9.08 2..Seeake Bradley, res Aion Waakneg ieee How Is Weakness of Wil Possible” 35 a aanith this citcism (Cho, afc \ en 144) Bonnie Ken and Ashley Des, Willa Wrongagg ei choi entral role in sins of passion can De malo” in Aguinas’s Dispund Ques 38-39), ' ugherty (Cambri get Cambridge University “Aquinas ang Weakness Ma ‘ gpsal cole for sins of passion? She think, ¢ ia Jt oald indeed leave the person a victim 8 nh ecusation would prove eotect the Not. Such f his thelndiva’ Weakness 7 . ition Da ye for his action; rat ; f/66 ble For his a ther his weakness would beeen nt, according to Ke ee g to Kent, grants responsibility enol roe forthe will but excluding a role for "west 8% eakness of will” I.” lity ofthe weak will plays in sins efor his sin, We ei ; ete, we wil focus upon th pis ‘ ee : ne wl st ermine wha poh ga ppaow te person ends up being ee i eran sen Mout attention fo “weakness of wil,” aja coe MINOR ERaMteR Contrary © Davide Pee ‘Thomas does not think that th epeonis derermined by 2 attle between reason and the pets ey esing doesnot force him ro act “eis within the power of jevill cither to consent 0 those things into which his passions incline pimornor co consent and to this extent our appetite is said to be under oor control. Nevertheless, the very consent or dissent of the will is hin- vrsions in the manner described above." A few articles gered by the P: ; jer Thomas indicates hat the passions might sometimes overcome rear nent in whi the person fh case Aquinas concurs with Davidson: isnot’ responsible for his action. “Sometimes passion is so strong that it oily removes ee USE ‘of reason, for example, in chose who go insane on ve or anger.» Then the action becomes entirely involuntary i othe person is encircly “excused from sin.” Such cases do not give 3 ages cof passion, for ehey give rise f0 89 secount of sin at all. Thomas proceeds, «Sometimes the passio 10 si a .n is not so strong that it en- however, to say thats aginally in Jensen, “ror ofthe Pat sg, Portions ofthe next evo #68008 appeared originally in} 08 pier vouneari et cee appestus tn porestate diciear 10% rpaivue per Pasi sins! 6 Aquinas seni vel nom sub nobis esse- ‘Sed ramen nado predict.” 7. Ibid. FIL a maT sieut pareein ologiae VIL 9. 77-2-3,28 5 ee his in quae passio selina’ ane psn dens oe Summa thet . pro santo sus vel dis adogne eet oes ner oc Jirer a peee™™ _ "Passio qu" sum rationisy redditur involuncarivs> De malo, q- 32: 19> 43 of reason, and then reason is able to diy, out dl use ation to some other thoughts, or ar least roi atte! ieee in ilar poine when discussing cog ‘ che jy cakes away ay averting ina sion ert He mal oncupiscence of the flesh overcomes the s der its man, ¢ in negligence a ‘jn the incontinent on account of a certain negligence of the SPiie in 1 by necessity PO patting the texts together, we can Conchide thy not firmly orary insanity) the will need not consene the of tempt and once this judgment has been ejected, tea. ith its own judgment.” As Thomas sys ist failing to Fess side of cases of e assions, dgment ofthe P ses n sometimes recurn nen : son cal the attention of the mind is forcefully ditecteq Be se fd ae sothat reason ails consider in particular os ol in the universal. But to apply the attention to Some. Sone ” yitisin the power ofthe will soit is within the POWer ofthe sees eae peaticim boca Couserucadty tte committed on will 2 ce ising of tearoa proceeds ultimately ona the Gill os ao accoun Reason is bound person snot excused from blame.'? Ais, Somme tele Lg 77 2.7: *Quandoque vero passio non et tana vod roar inecpar sum rations Er cune ratio potest passionem excludere, diver. tendo ad alias cogicationes; vel impedire ne suum consequatur efectum.” $- Ibid, ILI 4.156 2. 3:"Concupiscentia carn ope ‘Brum non ex neessiae sed per quandam negligentias Secalso ibid, THU, 16,2, ad 2, 10.Bowlin asserts, with no argument, im spiritus non resistentisfortiter” ‘bat for Aquinas weakness is simply a matter simply follows the judgments ("Psychology, «above. In contrast, Bradley (“Thoma Aq ‘tory Vice 207) both emphasize thar the will I 62-72) “Rati ligatur evitus sensitiui, unde ay. sali cognoscit, Applicare Actum app, er in uniney a ‘and epieni clause renders the ju ae cactical, res a i action, we might ie sien : s crucial clause, Uni fet uae Ae Until the will oe coe willis i we rencative. All things have been can sents, the jug ad be considered—, lere 5 A ais ed—only when the wil te on can play a role, for we someti 18 satished, “ ks h imes do ca, No eo checking © make sure that we have taken into siderations. We can judge with our reason, thant ll the a the eo ered all the practically relevane factors, Bean ae have fact af ‘ Ever foe hi judgment, however, the will must sillier 8% wi sent intervene, m ing _ 1 ol : : ‘qcrding © Aquinas, when the evidence does not det i er bie ean eft is own devices, reaches dou, eran the a i i SUSpici¢ eo ihe evidence leaves the question entirely inthesms ic i in the air; sus- wy ifthe evidence leans slightly in favor of one conclusion anc eee eam ae epocopiton ifthe evidence leans strongly in ivr of one conchary clusion rate These judgments do not lead to “belief” which invol Fnasentto the evath oF a proposition. At most, they lead vo eis vben someone “thinks that everything has been considered” ae “ely belevng that everything has been considered, soneacts ofthe intellect involve an unformed thought, apart from a firm assent, sir they incline to neither side, as happens in someone who doubts, or they ‘ane to one side more chan the other but by some slight evidence, as happens inane who suspects, or they adhere to one side but with fear that che other side sigh sill be correct, which happens in one who opines. In contrast, the act of “lieing” clings firmly to one side, in which the one who believes is like the person with scientific knowledge or with the grasp of principles; atthe same time his knowledge is not perfect by way of plain vision, in which respect he is like the one who doubrs, suspects, or opines."* ‘Aquinas, Summa tealogiae UK, q- 2» a "Quidam vero acts intellects habene : IL into play, however, does not necessarily make thy Bringing the wi is action. When a person acts rally responsible for his action. P in ign. person = noc blame him for his action. If someone takes an item, ck is his own when in fact it belongs ssh Person, then, he is not responsible for the consequent “theft.” His will is involved, for he does choose ro take the items; nevertheless, he does not have moral responsibilty for the action. ‘The weak person appears to bein precisely this situation. He chooses toact under the judgment of the passions, so that his action does arise from is will Nevertheless, he acts in ignorance. He is not aware of the sinful character of his action." If he commits adultery, WEAKNESS for instance, he ‘4 Aquinas Summa telogice TI, , 221, © who sins from weakness full a feakness fully = ‘Thomas Aquinas and the Problem *M. Penner distinguishes between 146 Wea, Ness OF wy Lt ucla heaton pleaurable, and he ignorant of F arent the adul. P erson knows at tl Moment of “hep of choice, intel pease shold bern rhea mm 1, asuable. More important! t what hos that ini aware atthe moment of choice, that the Action he rs c ake The pasion have die yp ‘Nowled, " rad ¥: Ihe were to thigh hit 'Y COnside, 9 goes it, but only habicuall vee izing that the action is not ocak toed Ecade uat the os, then he re oa oF on feature of Aquinas's account of, Weakness, An gotknow that his action is a sin, op rather, he knows ie only h; 6° Thomas, following Aristotle, even COmpates the weak pas vo gman obo recites Philosophical truths withose Understand. wie Soalso the weak person might say ro himself that he should . doing what he is doing, but he does noe ‘understand what he says, ee drtcation may soften this aching, The person is nop aware at emoment of choice. Nevertheless, he might well be aware ‘immediately ig te choice. He might make the argumnene of Feason, conclud- oa he should avid the action, but the next Moment his passions pigment fom his mind” He might even go eee and forth semen theto judgments in akind of stragule, Arwen, seen, the itheis wondering wheth- «ttre arid adultery o co pursue pleasure. Rathen struggle satheconcretelevel ofthe minor premise. He saya hie Passions drag ia (‘Plato and Davidson: ‘upon Pleasrable but age LENE of reason, and only judg then, is thatthe per apenas and diachronic akras all Wil? Conadian Journal of Philsaply 6 igo} yp loves contary to what one believes is bes at the ‘sce contrary to what one believes in general ‘ry advances diachronic akrasia, while Davie [Batley ismuch concerned show tha Aq ‘rdsu (Thomas Aquinas on Weaken “Assia, Sama tholpise 9.7, a, ad est makes the point that the weak perton maya some rine reach the onl ioteton (Transitory Vice’ 2a1-13) See avo Barony "Aquinas Two Diferene cos 64-65, Parts of the Soul and 74) In the former, one very moment of choice; in the latter, owe not right now) tobe best. Thomas on probably adopts synchronic akrasa, juinas does no endorse a kind of open WEAKNESS OF WILL #147 ” then, reason can fede only a *eMtating jn sorte “belief ypand suspicion or Pinion £0 belies Th o reason move ly to an objection, ‘The Mellece oF th, beh tion in a reply side againgt Mother p ‘his sig determined to one believe: f che will Consequently, assent Means, in d a but by way o MS cy insofar as it is determined £0 one side b wi the intellect a t sufficient, the will muse SteD in ty Push fey the evidence is ae The final “and nothing else” ju f assent, final act of lene, they i through the will. Without the Consent of, complete ee a is not all-out, so action does NOt follow, Delibery ic reached is A : aon id—excepe in cases of | femporary INsanj tinues and—, le cise my which the wil] interacts with Feason in op, : £0 reach the “and y else” minor Premise will be discusseq late; Cexaming free, WEAKNESS any TGNORANCR Bringing the wil] into Ys OWever, doe. ecessarily Person morally Tesponsible i8 action When Petson ace FaNce, we do or hi his action, MONE takes thinking thar it j h 1M fact it be] Mother person e is SPonsible for the Sequent “eh fe.” ill ig involved fy © does the j, * evertheless he does NOE have man) ‘Pi nsibilicy for he ‘ion, «Weak pers, PPears to Precisely ep situation, Hechayes ft under the dgmeng © Passions, HS action does aie ae ll. the! pe acts i '8NOrance, le is ane 4S Action 16 fhe “Ommits adultery, for instance, “tues wept the "gine 1p ES aetsaacs Sli “sed "Atkin td 5 his atvention to the pl sure of the action, the next moment he says, Following Aristotle, Th ning from passion This a This actis adute, ery: Plea, “ homas distinguishes etre Sang First, someone might Make the oc but fail to stick by it when his passions overpower ‘one might be propelled to act on account of his pa makes the inquiry of reason. The fist is sai tobe weak bathe ido be impulsive. Both fit the general description ope above, and both involve ion of oe nal, but in person holds weakly to helene akly co hig g ' Petion n Serene of him. gent some weakness of the se his judgment white in Only the one who holds vacillates between reason and the Passions. The j ‘even considers reason. the judgment of reason, impulsive However we may soften Aquinas's doctrine Concerning the rance—or ignoring — itremains that at hee’ sin, If he does not know that the act is that he should not be doing it, chen how is he ‘Thomas does not directly address this difficulty, is discussing sins of passion. It seems, however, where might be applied to this problem. At times, says Th ner is like a carpenter who makes a i to blame for the resulting crooked « used his rules" Similarly, his straight edge, that is, wit for the consequent evil responsiblez 20. Aquinas, Summa theolgiae TH, 9156, a, , w- Aquinas, De malo g Bs 2. Aguinass sin of wea Beetve akraia” in which "ot choose it c€ Guevae 148 nay not be fally aware that the weak person jaware (at the moment) that thes nage hen cote ter: hema Pont jag rs ag, Neweebe ey fis i eesponatile foe bia shor win To hig eeene M88 of be Segid have Bee aware, but he chose go ahead and 1 Passions Seong Mn, ee HET gurther onsiderations by which he e be Petsiong jn me : 1e might become weak, pe ofin ing ment of Aguinars Posiiot Leaves caasy on tion op ett the Hee tel ewaie co BE "iddressed ata later time, most full oe 1 bat Weaken Ong a wc cause of moral ei in chaps eae 1 bin epee cet jrse peer 1) ‘ter "© fey “akly Be eye the pane weaxnsss OF WILL £0 yet an 8 vealed Pt acy, tke ry discussion cone -rning weakness typically speak: sive. dyn port) ly speaks Persg, Ene enh Jn contrast "aguinas typically speaks of he weak ee Reve jnsofar as ee passions undermine the ruling element of Tine thei oh teas, we bare SeeR ‘chat, for Aquinas, che will plays an by = the mop pains of passion ‘Reason and che passions do indeed battle by are ebet rinner is Passphant ony with te consent of the will Ts 20nsible fe Jeness of will does in Fact underlie sins of passion? ‘Oreven knoy, fnks nor 27 Aquinas, she $275 hhas licele use for the : of will and he certainly does not think that i is a ‘°F When he Thomas never OSS ‘weakness as an explanation for behavior Says ele elt ogc cat the chocoIaS nN because she has weakness of — costing © ne " z 5 the sin. a ie use seals RAS sveak” describes a certain kind Se he is Fin ors cre kind of cause, Concerning ‘muscles, we can say that 'd have oreo wetk Tifea certain object; concerning the will, however, ‘thoue secant that i is 00 weak for self-control. Indeed, if someone were lame his a cpposaice Or from an evil will) more: ‘than weakness, for the person who sins th Eble sins ear headed vvrhapeconemporarywsge of weakest includes such L esis, Uf, ce need not fille Aquinas account ssFweakness; we need recognize oly sage ofrrminolegy: We nigh argue whether Aquinas ust Guevara's pveapeopite the eae arn Corer, when adressing Pe problem of culpability fr sins ofpasson, em phszes he importance of the ignorance consequent UP? the passion remaining volun tay (Aquinas on Raising Cain: Vice, Incontinence and Responsibili Proceedings ofthe Aman Catholic Philosophical Assocation 7) iggn 208-20). See avo Bradley “Thomas Agno» Weakness 98 102-4 Steg “Saint Thomas Aquinas, 123-25 vy. Aquinas, Summa thologiae FIL 77% “Aquinas, De malo, 3°39 ag Kent, “Aquinas and Weakness.” 149 WEAKNESS OF wILL two wea or selfcontol then he woul no sg < responsible for his sin. all For he Ieis tempting, however to se in Aq nence and incontinence a doctrine conta? *achi ern Bon, ME Weay BN, ‘Thomas does say that continence and incontinen | of intact, and f,, wide rem is the wi, for te mason (fo conging hh more, Thomas des) ot Positions can be te referring to well There are she thinks and incontinence. © differegc Se hee the reason eS fo the will, bue the same f° "Beil, Ye diac:, os ina’ distinction between net be For both, the person's reason remaing ave disordered. What distinguishes th person chooses to side either with x. passions (for incontinence). Further as a habit ot disposition?” Since dig ‘one might conclude that Aquinas is Kent rejects this argument as differences between continence which she lays che greatest emph; ‘inence is rightly said to belong. incontinence. Kent uses Aqui from choice (ex electione) and Me stray Dgth, 26 Aquinas, Surtma theologiae IU 4.155). 3, 27 Ibid, TH, g 155, 5 perh: "2. ' 85 pethaps also TL, g 28 Kent "Aquinas and Weakness? mi pene dps in i will oard then ant ee poston nat what prompts on it eosin With he disposition ofhis wil be argument of reason. Nevertheless, ot ai Salant ae Pe reg amily ei Aft {no0siN a osreb © follow the passions or not. d for pide © bey the, ra Us foe fe Che pe lle il #2 diaposcon ofthe will soward he rue “rinence) he ip Me er connenely he acts from this disposition, chat escribey tie sree: The incontinent person 6 the other hand, still teonges Ming 2s ead the eae good otherwise, he would noe trengeg oT ade ie oe icked. Nevertheless ‘when he acts incontinently, he things te wi, i, disposition. At most, then he must be acting eligens. iffeze, any a ne eg ehae continence i i accord with the disposition of the win, Pa ect pantinence is CONEY 1 it. Since incontinence is op- "n0t be go 71 jgposicion of the will, ic cannot belong to the will. She also action dof cen dsposition i= rightly applied to continence but not 8 (igen abst (2 Thomas describes continence as a habitus, which Kent aces ts % ot oso, while he describe incontinence 23 dipasiia 2 at He Kent provides 0 translation); a dispositio may be lose much Oberg habitus. er wor ay gar WEAKNESS OF WILL MIGHT BE as ee makes many valid points: Indeed, she adequately undermines ero she wishes £0 OPPOSE: according to which the will of the con- thoice ja person has something called self-control, while the weak person ation eee ing called self-control, so thar his wll has the opposite dispo- teas ston called “weakness.” Both self-control. and weakness, on this view, are e . : tae ieee eset: aban Oe might find an individual: he igh ese a te Se (ve ill ute the word “icons the atten ve 8 ss! “having vice") The frst theee en incon ae desire for the true good, such thar they retain the aims meng oa differ not in this desire, but in the ©pPosition thar atises to ke Th ‘si aby! The dese ofthe virtuous person ate all in eed: (ora mach mas imperfect at allows), such tha his passions de PPo%e the tn “oes ‘hat he desires. In contrast, both the SOneinent Person and the incon ieasse erson have opposing desires in the passione. their will, foe jee a they desire the tue good of sexual chastity bey with thei sites they ae inclined to various dia. * emotional a” relered pleasures, Then Made these disordered sitio on. The. Vicious jody Person differs from all three of the others because the desire in his wat at fundamentally disordered, He does not desire the "Ue good and ful ig hi this desire; rather, from the beginning he aims at the false good, T Let us consider, then, a Continent individual and an incontinent ing j vidual. The continent person ie not virtuous, i toward the good of sy, then, to stick by tery should be avoided.” a disposition toward pl 800d, and while this disposition is i t else h leasure as an Weaker than his disposi © would be intemperate rather than 156 WEAKNESS OF winy dco tions Ban Trt oF che ea 4 1 fase Gy en? the ‘good indi lea ~ the wonders if e reconsidered? Uleimatel al cay then, hd " pete ialait oreo feeaaeres 8° thay. he wo repeal urges te he has stronger die call, ihe Past nent person) £0 receive the good ie fea US, co, ‘of pleasure as an independent good. Just as the artiteng 4 Jeo receive the fire, so he is more dis Ariseon ‘ re disposed omma*elig,

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