AUP Volume 40 The Copenhagen Interpretation* HENRY PIERCE STAPP Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory University of California Berkeley, California 94720 (Reosived 26 March 1971; revised 20 Febroary 1972) An atiempt is made (0 give a coherent account of the logical essence of the Copenhagen interpretation of ‘quantum theory. The central point ts that quantum theory is fundamentally pragmatic, bul nonetheless complete. The principal dificully in understanding quantum theory lies in the fact that its completeness is incompatible with exlernal existence of the space-time continuum of classical physics, I INTRODUCTION Scientists of the late twenties, led by Bohr and Heisenberg, proposed a conception of nature radieally different from that of their predecessors, ‘The new conception, which grew out of efforts to comprehend the apparently irrational behavior of nature in the realm of quantum effects, was not simply a new catalog of the elementary space- ‘time realities and their modes of operation. It was, essentially a rejection of the presumption that nature could be understood in terms of elementary: space-time realities, According to the new view, the complete description of nature at the atomic level was given by probability functions that referred not to underlying microscopic space-time realities but rather to the macroscopic objects of sense experience. ‘The theoretical structure did not extend down and anchor itself on fundamental ieroscopie space-time realities. Instead it turned back and anchored itself in the concrete sense realities that form the basis of social life. 1008 j August 1972 ‘This radical concept, called the Copenhagen interpretation, was bitterly challenged at first but became during the ’30's the orthodox inter- pretation of quantum theory, nominally accepted by almost all textbooks and practical workers in the field. Recently, perhaps partly in response to the severe technical difficulties now besetting quan tum theory at the fundamental level, there has; been mounting eritieism of the Copenhagen in- terpretation, ‘The changes range from the claim that it is a great illogical muddic to the claim that it is in any ease unnecessary, and hence, in view of its radical nature, to be rejected. Reference 1 contains some stoutly worded attacks on the Copenhagen interpretation, Reference 2 is a more, moderately worded review article that firmly re~ jects the Copenhagen interpretation. Reference 3 isa list of recent articles in the physical literature that espouse a variety of views on the question, ‘The striking thing about these articles is the diversity they reveal in prevailing concep- tions of the Copenhagen interpretation itself, For example, the pieture of the Copenhagen interpre- tation painted in Ref. 1 is quite different from the pictures painted in Refs, 2 and 3 by practicing physicists, And these Iatter pictures themselves are far from uniform, ‘The cause of these divergences is not hard to find. Textbook accounts of the Copenhagen in- terpretation generally gloss over the subtle points. n clarification the readers are directed to the ritings of Bohr and Heisenberg.* Yet clarifiea- tion is difficult to find there. The writings of Bohr are extraordinarily elusive. They rarely seem to say what you want to know. They weave ‘web of words around the Copenhagen interpre- tation but do not say exactly what it is. Heisen- berg’s writings are more direct. But bis way of speaking suggests a subjective interpretation that appears quite contrary to the apparent intentions, of Bohr. The situation is perhaps well summarized by von Weizsiicker, who, after expressing the opinion that the Copenhagen interpretation is correct and indispensable, says he must “add that;the interpretation, in my view, has never been fully clarified. Tt’ needs an interpretation, and that will be its only defense.”* von Weizsicker is surely correct. The writings of Bohr and Heisenberg have, as a matter of historieal fact, not produced a clear and un- ambiguous picture of the basie logical structure of their position, They have left impressions ‘that vary significantly from reader to reader. For this reason a clarification of the Copenhagen interpretation is certainly needed. My aim here is to provide one. More precisely, my aim is to give a clear account of the logical essence of the Copenhagen interpretation, This logieal essence should be distinguished from the inhomogeneous, body of opinions and views that, now constitute the Copenhagen interpretation itself. The logical essence constitutes, T believe, a completely ra- tional and coherent position. "The plan of the work is as follows. First, quantum theory is described from the point of view of actual practice, Then, to provide con- trast, several non-Copenhagen interpretations: are considered. Next, to provide background, some philosophical ideas of William James are introduced. ‘The pragmatic character of the Copenhagen interpretation is then discussed, and the incompatibility of the completeness of quan- tum theory with the external existence of the space-time continuum of classical physies is noted. Finally, the question of the completeness of quantum theory is examined. I A PRACTICAL ACCOUNT OF QUANTUM THEORY Quantum theory is a procedure by which sci- entists predict probabilities that measurements of specified kinds will yield results of specified kinds in situations of specified kinds, It is applied in circumstances that are described by saying that, a certain physical system is first prepared in a specified manner and is later examined in a specified manner. And this examination, called ‘8 measurement, is moreover such that’ it ean yield, or not, yield, various possible specified results, ‘The procedure is this: The specifications A on the manner of preparation of the physical system are first transcribed into a wave function W4(2). ‘The variables x are a sot of variables that are The Copendagen Interpretation characteristie of the physical system being pre- pared. They are called the degrees of freedom of the prepared system. ‘The description of the specifications A is couched in a language that is meaningful to an engineer or laboratory tech- nician, The way in which these operational speci fications A are translated into a corresponding, wave function ¥4(2) is diseussed later. ‘The specifications B on the subsequent measure- ment and its possible result are similarly couched in a language that allows a suitably trained tech- nician to set up a measurement of the specified kind and to determine whether the result that occurs is a result of the specified kind. These specifications B on the measurement and its result are transcribed into a wave function ¥o(y), where y is a set of variables that are called the degrees of freedom of the measured system, Next a transformation function U(x; y) is constructed in accordance with certain theoretical rules, This function depends on the type of system that: was prepared and on the type of system that was measured, but not on the particular wave functions V4(2) and ¥o(y). The “transition amplitude” (A | BY= J ValNU Ce; Motard is computed. The predicted probability that a measurement performed in the manner specified by B will yield a result specified by B, if the preparation is performed in the manner specified, by A, is given by P(A, B)=| (A BY i. ‘The experimental physicist will, T hope, recog nize in this account a deseription of how he uses, quantum theory. First he transforms his informa- tion about the preparation of the system into an initial wave function. Then he applies to it some linear transformation, calculated perhaps from the Schrédinger equation, or perhaps from the '$ matrix, which converts the initial wave fune- tion into a final wave funetion. ‘This final wave funetion, whieh is built-on the degrees of freedom of the measured system, is then folded into the wave function corresponding to a possible result. This gives the transition amplitude, which is AJP Volume {0 / 1099Henry Pier Stapp multiplied by its complex conjugate to give the predicted transition probability. In a more sophisticated calculation one might use density matrices pa(z';2”) and ps(y'; 4) instead of ¥4(z) and p(y) to represent the pre- pared system and the possible result, This would allow for preparations and measurements that correspond to statistical mixtures. But this generalization could be obtained also by simply performing classieal averages over various Wa(z) and Way). ‘The above account deseribes how quantum theory is used in practice. ‘The essential points are that attention is focused on some system that is first prepared in a specified manner and later examined in a specified manner. Quantum theory is a procedure for ealculating the predicted prob- ability that the specified type of examination will yield some specified result. This predicted probability is the predicted limit of the relative frequency of occurrence of the specified result, as the number of systems prepared and examined in accordance with the sperifications goes to infinity. ‘The wave functions used in these calculations, ave functions of a set of variables characteristic of the prepared and measured systems. These systems are often microscopic and not directly observable. No wave functions of the preparing and measuring devices enter into the ealeulation.. These devices are described operationally. They are deseribed in terms of things that can be recognized and/or acted upon by technicians. These descriptions refer to the macroscopic properties of the preparing and measuring devices. ‘The crucial question is how does one determine. the transformations A—¥, and Bow,, These transformations transeribe procedural descrip tions of the manner in which technicians prepare macroscopic objects, and recognize macroscopic responses, into mathematical functions built on ‘the degrees of freedom of the (microscopic) pre~ pared and measured systems. ‘The problem of constructing this mapping is the famous “prob- Jem of measurements” in quantum theory. ‘Phe problem of measurements was studied by von Neumann? He begins with the idea that one should deseribe the combined system composed of the original systems plus the original measuring, deviees in terms of a quantum mechanical wave 1100 { August 1972 function, and use quantum theory itself to ealeu- late the needed mappings. This program has never been carried out in any practical case. One difficulty is that actual macroseopie devices are so complicated that qualitative calculations lie beyond present capabilities. ‘The second problem is that such calculations would, in any ease, pro- vide only connections between the wave functions @ of the proparing and measuring devices and the wave funetions ¥ of the original system, There would remain the problem of finding the mnappings A, and Bors. von Neumann’s approach is not the one that is adopted in actual practice; no one has yet made & qualitatively accurate theoretical description of a measuring device. Thus what experimen- tulists do, in practice, is to calibrate their devices. Notice, in this connection, that if one takes Na different choices of A and Nx different choices, of B, then one has only Na+Ne unknown fune- tions Ya and Vp, but NuXNp experimentally determinable quantities | (4 |B) |. Using this leverage, together with plausible assumptions about smoothness, it is possible to build up = catalog of correspondences hetween what experi- ‘mental physicists do and see, and the wave fune- tions of the prepared and measured systems, tis this body of accumulated empirical knowledge that bridges the gap between the operational specifications A and B and their mathematical images ¥, and Vp, ‘The above description of how quantum theory is used in practice will be used in the account of the Copenhagen interpretation. Before de- scribing that interpretation itself I shall, to pro- vide contrast, describe several other approaches. Ill, SEVERAL OTHER APPROACHES ‘A. The Absolute} Approach von Neumann’s lucid analysis of the process of measurement is the origin of much of the cur- rent worry about the interpretation of quantum theory. The basic worrisome point ean be illus trated by a simple example, Suppose a particle has just passed through one of two slits, And suppose a 100% efficient counter is placed behind each slit, so that by seeing which, counter fires a human observer ean determine through whieh slit the particle passed.Suppose the particle is represented initially by a wave funetion that assigns ecqual probabili- ties to the parts associated with the two slits. And consider a quantum theoretical analysis of the process of measurement in which both the particle and the two counters are represented by wave functions. It follows directly and immediately from the superposition principle (ie., linearity) that. the wave funetion of the complete system after the measurement necessarily will consist of a super- position of two terms. The first term will repre- sent the situation in which (1) the particle has passed through the first counter, (2) the first counter has fired, and (3) the second counter has not fired, ‘The second term will represent. the situation in which (1) the particle has passed through the second counter, (2) the second counter has fired, and (3) the first eounter has not fired. These two terms evolve from the two terms in the wave function of the initial particle, The presence of both terms is # direct and unavoidable consequence of the superposition principle, which ensures that the sum of any two solutions of the equation of motion is another solution. Notice now that the counters are macroscopic objects and that the wave funetion necessarily contains a sum of two terms one of which corre- sponds to the first counter’s having fired but not the second, and the other of which corresponds to the second counter's having fired but not the frst. Thus the wave function necessarily corre- sponds to @ sum of two logically incompatible macroscopic possibilities, To dramatize this situation, suppose the human, observer now looks at the counters and runs upstairs or downstairs depending on which counter he sees firing. ‘Then the wave function of the ‘entire system of particle plus counters plus human observer will consist, eventually, of a sum of two terns. One term will represent the human ob- server running upstairs, and the other term will represent this same human observer running downstairs, Both terms must necessarily be present in the wave function, simply by virtue of the superposition principle. ‘This fact that the wave function necessarily develops into 2 sum of parts that correspond to incompatible macroscopic possibilities must be squared with the empirical facts. The human The Copenhagen Interpretation observer does not run both upstairs and down stairs. He does one or the other, not bath, There- fore the wave function must collapse to a form that is consistent with what actually does happen. But such # collapse is definitely incompatible with the superposition principle, This violation of the superposition principle bothers some thinkers. Wigner! calls the existence of the two modes of change of the wave funetion— ie, the smooth causal evolution and the fitful statistical jumps associated with measurements— a strange dualism, and says that the probabilistic behavior is almost diametrically opposite to what ‘one would expect from ordinary experience. He and Ludwig? speculate that quantumn theory may have to be modified by the addition of nonlinear effect in the macroscopic realm in order to arrive at a consistent theory of measurements. Wigner! even speculates that the nonlinearity may be associated with the action of mind on matter. An even more radical proposal was made by Everett! and supported by Wheeler and Bryce DeWitt.* According to this proposal the human observer actually ru and down- stairs at the same ti server sees the counter fire he breaks into two separate editions of himself, one of which runs upstairs while the other runs down. However, the parts of the wave function corresponding to these two different possibilities move into different regions of the multipartiele configuration space and consequently do not interfere. ‘Therefore the tivo editions will never be aware of each other's tence. Thus appearances are saved without violating the superposition principle. ‘This proposal is, I think, unreasonable. A wave funetion times its complex conjugate, has the mathematical properties of a probability fune- tion, Probability functions for composite systems, are naturally defined on the product of the spaces of the individual component systems; it is this property that allows differont statistical weights to be assigned to tho various Iogieally alternative possibilities. A decomposition of a wave function into parts corresponding to different Togieal al- ternatives is thus completely natural. In the ‘example deseribed—with the initial specification as described there—there is a finite probability that the observer will be running upstairs, and a finite probability that he will be running down- AJP Volume 40 f 1101Henry Pierce Stapp stairs, ‘Thus the wave function necessarily must; have both parts. If it collapsed to one part or the other it would no longer correctly describe the probabilities corresponding to the original specifications. Of course, if the original specifications are re- placed by new ones that include now the specifi- cation that the observer is running upstairs, not downstairs, then the original wave function will naturally be replaced by a new one, just as it would be in classical statistical theory. In short, the mathematical properties of the wave functions are completely in aecord with the idea that they describe the evolution of the probabilities of the actual things, not the actual ‘things themselves. The idea that they deseribe also the evolution of the actual things themselves leads to metaphysical monstrosities. ‘These might perhaps be accepted if they were the necessary consequences of irrefutable logic. But this is hardly the case here. The basis of Everett’s whole proposal is the premise that. the superposition principle eannot suddenly fail, ‘This premise is sound, But the natural and reasonable conclusion to draw from it is that the wave funetions de- seribe the evolution of the probabilities of the actual things, not the evolution of the actual things themselves. For the mathematical form and properties of the wave funetion, including its lawful development in accordance with the superposition prineiple, are completely in accord with the presumption that it is a. probability function, The addition of the metaphysical as- sumption that the wave function represents the evolution of not only the probabilities of the actual things, but of also the actual things them- selves, is unreasonable because its only virtue is to save the superposition principle, which, how- ever, is not in jeopardy unless one introduces ‘this metaphysical assumption, Everett’s proposal, and also those of Wigner and Ludwig, are the outgrowth of a certain tendency to ascribe to the wave function a quality of absoluteness that goes beyond what is normally and naturally attached to a probability function, ‘Phis tendency can perhaps be traced to what Rosenfeld calls “a radical difference in concep- tion (going back to von Newmann)...,” this radical difference being with the ideas of Bohr. von Neumann’s application of quantum theory 1102 / August 1978 to the process of measurement itself, coupled with his parallel treatments of the two very dif- ferent modes of development of the wave func- tion—ie,, the stooth dynamical evolution, and the abrupt changes associated with measure- ment—tend to conjure up the image of some absolute wave funetion developing in time under the influence of two different dynamical mecha- nisins. The living, breathing scientist who changes the wave function he uses as he receives more information is replaced by a new dynamical mechanism, ‘The resulting picture is strange indeed. Tn the Copenhagen interpretation the notion of an absolute wave funetion representing the world itself is unequivocally rejected. Wave fune- tions, like the corresponding probability funetions in classical physies, are associated with the studies by scientists of finite systems. The devices that prepare and later examine such systems are regarded as parts of the ordinary classieal physical world, Their space-time dispositions are interpreted by the scientist as information about the prepared and examined systems. Only these latter systems are represented by wave functions, ‘The probabilities involved are the probabilities of specified responses of the measuring devices ‘under specified conditions. New information available to the scientist ean be used in two different ways. Tt ean be consid- ered to be information about the response of a measuring device to the system being examined, In this ease the probability of this response is the object of interest. On the other hand, the new information ean also be regarded as part of the specification of a new preparation. The wave function that represents this new specification ‘will naturally be different from the wave function ‘that: represented the original specifications. One ‘would not expect the superposition principle to ‘be maintained in the change of the wave function associated with a chango of specifications, ‘This pragmatic description is to be contrasted with descriptions that attempt to peer “behind the scenes” and tell us what is “really happening.” Such superimposed images can be termed meta- physical appendages insofar as they have no, testable consequences, ‘The pragmatie interpre- tation ignores all such metaphysical appendages. ‘The sharp distinetion drawn in this sectionbetween probabilities and the actual things to which they refer should not be construed as an acceptance of the real-particle interpretation whieh is deseribed next, B, The Real-Particle Interpretation ‘The real-particle interpretation affirms that there are real particles, by which is meant. tiny localized objects, o disturbances, or singularities, or other things that stay together like particles should, and do not spread out like waves. Aceord- ing to this interpretation, the probability fane- tions of quantum theory deseribe, typically, the probability that a real particle isin such-and-such a region. This real-particle interpretation is de- fended by Popper in Ref. 1, and by Ballentine in Ref. 2. Confidence in the existence of real particles was restored by Bohm’s! illustration of how nonrelativistic Schrédinger theory can be made compatible with the existence of point particles. ‘Tho price paid for this achievement is this: All the particles in the (model) universe are instantly and forcefully linked together. What happens to any particle in the universe instantly and violently affects every other particle. In such a situation it is not elear that we should continue to use the term “particle.” For the entire collection of “particles” in Bohm’s universe acts as a single complex entity. Our usual idea of a. particle is an abstraction from experience about, macroscopie objects, and it normally carries, as part of tho idea of localization, the idea that the localized entity is an independent entity, in the sense that it depends on other things in the uni- verse only through various “dynamical” effeets. ‘These dynamical effects are characterized by a certain respect for space-time separations, In particular, they are “causal.” If the connections between particles radically transcend our idea of eausal dynamical relationships, then the ap- propriateness of the word “particle” can be ‘questioned. Recently, Bell! has shown that the statistical predictions of quantum theory are definitely in- compatible with the existence of an underlying. reality whose spatially separated parts are inde- pendent realities linked only by causal dynamical relationships. ‘The spatially separated parts of any underlying reality must be linked in ways The Copenhagen Interpretation ‘that completely transcend the realm of causal dynamical connections. The spatially separated parts of any such underlying reality are not, independent realities, in the ordinary sense. Bells theorem does not absolutely rule out the real-particle interpretation, if one is willing to admit these hyperdynamieal connections. But they fortify the opinion that a dynamical theory based on such a real entity would have no testable dynamical consequences. For the strong de- pendence of individual effects here on Earth upon the fine details of what is happening all over the universe apparently rules out any ordinary kind of test of such a theory. IV. THE PRAGMATIC CONCEPTION OF TRUTH ‘To prepare the mind for the Copenhagen in- terprotation it is useful to recall some ideas of William James!" James argued st length for a, certain conception of what it means for an idea to be true. This conception was, in brief, that an idea is true if it works. James's proposal was at first scorned and ridiewled by most philosophers, as might be ex- pected. For most people ean plainly see a big difference between whether an idea is true and whether it works. Yet James stoutly defended his idea, claiming that he was misunderstood by his erities, Ttis worthwhile to try to see things from James’s point of view. James accepts, as a matter of course, that the truth of an idea means its agreement: with reality. The questions are: What is the “reality” with which a true idea agrees? And what is the rela~ tionship “agreement with reality” by virtue of which that idea becomes true? All human ideas lie, by definition, in the realm. of experience. Reality, on the other hand, is usually considered to have parts lying outside this realm. ‘The question thus arises: How can an idea lying inside the realm of experience agree with something that lies outside? How does one conceive of a telationship between an idea, on the one hand, and something of such a fanda- mentally different sort? What is the structural form of that connection between an idea and a transexperiential reality that goes by the name of “agreement’”? How ean such a relationship be AJP Volume 40) 1108Henry Pioree Stapp comprehended by thoughts forever confined to the realm of experience? ‘The contention that underlies James's whole position is, T believe, that a relationship between ‘an idea. and something else can be comprehended only if that something else is also an idea. Ideas aro etemally confined to the realm of ideas They can “know? or “agree” only with other ideas. There is no way for a finite mind to eom- prehend or explain an agreement between an ‘dea and something that lies outside the realm of experience, So if we want to know what it means for an idea to agree with a reality we must first accept that this reality lies in the realm of experience. ‘This viewpoint is not in accord with the usual idea of truth. Certain of our idess are ideas about what lies outside the realm of experience, For ‘example, I may have the idea that the world is nade up of tiny objects ealled particles. Aceord- ing to the usual notion of truth this idea is true or false according to whether or not. the world really is made up of such particles, The truth of the idea depends on whether it agrees with some- thing that lies outside the realm of experience. Now the notion of “agreement” seems to suggest some sort of similarity or congruence of the things that agree. But things that are similar or congruent. are generally things of the same kind, Two triangles can be similar or congruent because they are the same kind of thing: The relationships that inhere in one ean be mapped in a direct and simple way into the relationships that inhere in the other. ‘But ideas and external realities are presumably very different kinds of things. Our ideas are in- timately associated with certain complex, macro- scopic, biological entities—our brains—and the structural forms that ean inhere in our ideas would naturally be expected to depend on the structural forms of our brains. External realities, on the other hand, could be structurally very different from human ideas, Henee there is no @ priori reason to expect that the relationships that constitute or characterize the essence of external reality can be mapped in any simple or direct fashion into the world of human ideas, Yet if no such mapping exists then the whole idea. of “agreement” between ideas and external realities becomes obscure. ‘The only evidence we have on the question 1105 f August 1972 of whether human ideas ean be brought into exact correspondence with the essences of the extemal realities is the success of our ideas in bringing order to our physical experience. Yet: the euecess of ideas in this sphere does not ensure the exact correspondence of our ideas to external reality. On the other hand, the question of whether ‘ideas “agree” with external essences is of no prac~ tical importance. What is important is precisely the success of the ideas—if ideas are successful in bringing order to our experience then they are useful even if they do not “agree,” in some ab- solute sense, with the external essences. Moreover, if they are successful in bringing order into our experience then they do “agree” at least with the aspects of our experience that they successfully order. Furthermore, it is only this agreement with, aspects of our experience that can ever really be comprehended by man, That which is not an idea is intrinsically ineomprehensible, and so are its relationships to other things. This leads to the pragmatic viewpoint that ideas must be judged by their success and utility in the world of ideas and experience, rather than on the basis of some intrinsically incomprehensible “agreement” with nonideas. ‘The significance of this viewpoint for science is its negation of the idea that the aim of science is to construct a mental or mathematical image of the world itself, According to the pragmatic view, the proper goal of seience is to augment and order our experience. A scientific theory should be judged on how well it serves to extend the range of our experience and reduce it to order. It need not provide a mental or mathematical age of the world itself, for the structural form of the world itself may be such that it eannot be placed in simple correspondence with the types of structures that our mental processes ean form, James was accused of subjectivism—of denying the existence of objective reality, In defending himself against this charge, which he termed slanderous, he introduced an interesting ontology consisting of three things: (1) private concepts, (2) sense objects, (8) hypersensible realities. The private concepts are subjective experiences. ‘The sense objects are public sense realities, ie., sense realities that are independent of the individual ‘The hypersensible realities are realities that exist independently of all human thinkers."*OF hypersensible realities James can talk only obliquely, since he recognizes both that our knowledge of such things is forever uncertain and that we can moreover never even think of such things without replacing them by mental substitutes that lack the defining characteristics of that which they replace, namely the property of existing independently of all human thinkers. James's sense objects are curious things. ‘They are sense realities and hence belong to the realm of experience. Yet they are publie: They are in- dependent of the individual. They are, in short, objective experiences. The usual idea about. ex- periences is that they are personal or subjective, not public or objective. ‘This idea of experienced sense objects as public or objective realities runs through James’s writ ings. The experience “tiger” can appear in the mental histories of many different individuals. “That desk” is something that T can grasp and shake, and you also ean grasp and shake, About this desk James says “But you and I are com- mutable here; we can exchange places; and as you go bail for my desk, so I ean go bail for yours. ‘This notion of a reality independent of either of us, taken from ordinary experience, lies at the base of the pragmatic definition of truth.” ‘These words should, I think, be linked with Bohr’s words about classical concepts as the basis of communication between scientists, Tn both cases the focus is on the concretely experienced sense realities—such as the shaking of the desk— as the foundation of social reality. From this point of view the objective world is not built basically out of such airy abstractions as electrons and protons and “space.” It is founded on the concrete senee realities of social experience, such as a block of conerete held in the hand, a sword Forged by a blacksmith, « Geiger counter prepared according to specifications by laboratory tech- nicians and placed in a specified position by experimental physicists ‘This brief excursion into philosophy provides background for the Copenhagen interpretation, which is fundamentally 2 shift to a philosophic perspective resembling that of William James. V. THE PRAGMATIC CHARACTER OF THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION The logical essence of the Copenhagen inter- pretation is summed up in the following two The Copenhagen Interpretation assertions: () The quantum theoretical formalisin is to be interpreted pragmatically. (2) Quantum theory provides for a complete scientific account of atomic phenomena, Point (1) asserts that quantum theory is funda- ‘mentally the procedure described in the practical account of quantum theory given in See. IL, The central problem for the Copenhagen interpreta- tion is to reconcile this assertion with the elaim that it is complete, i.e., to reconcile assertions (W) and (2). This problem is discussed in See. VIT. ‘The aim of the present section is to document, point (1) by the words of Bohr. This fundamental point needs to be definitely settled, for erties often confuse the Copenhagen interpretation, which is basically progmatic, with the din- metrically opposed absolutes¥ interpretation de- seribed in Sec. IIT. In what follows, particular attention will be paid to the possible conflict. of the pragmatic viewpoint with (i) the element of realism in Bohr’s attitude toward the macro- seopic world and (ii) any commitment to afunda- mental stochastic or statistical element in nature itself. ‘The quotations from Bohr that follow are taken from his three major works's (I.) Atomic Theory and the Deseription of Nature; (U1,) Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge; and (LT) Essays 1958-1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. ‘The pragmatic orientation of the Copenhagen interpretation is fixed in the opening words of Bohr’s first book: “The task of science is both to exiend the range of our experience and reduce it to order ...” (L1). “In physies ... our prob- Jem consists in the co-ordination of our experience of the external world...” (L.1). “In our descrip- tion of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of phenomena but only to track down as far as possible relations between the ultifold aspects of our experioneo” (T.18). ‘This commitment to a pragmatic view of science runs through all of Bohr’s works, He later Jinks it to the crucial problem of communieatioi *As the goal of science is to augment. and order our experience every analysis of the conditions of human knowledge must rest: on considerations of the character and scope of our means of com munication” (F1.88). “In this connection it is AJP Volume 40 / 1105Honey Pieros Stapp imperative to realize that in every account of physical experience one must desetibe both ex- perimental conditions and observations by the same means of communication as one used in classical physies” (11.88). “The decisive point is to recognize that the description of the experi- mental arrangement and the recordings of ob- servations must be given in plain language, suit- ably refined by the usual terminology. This is a simple logical demand, since by the word ‘ex- periment’ we ean only mean a procedure regarding which we are able to communicate to others what we have done and what we have learnt?” (IIL3). “<. we must recognize above all that, even when phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical theories, the account of the experi- mental arrangement and the recording of observa- tions must be given in plain language, suitably supplemented by technical physical terminology. ‘This is a clear logical demand, since the very word ‘experiment? refers to a situation where we can tell others what we have done and what we have earned” (11.72). Bohr’s commitment to a pragmatic interpreta tion of the quantum-mechanical formalisin is un- ambiguous: “...the appropriate physical in- terpretation of the symbolic quantum-mechanical formalism amounts only to predictions, of de- terminate or statistical character, pertaining to individual phenomena appearing under conditions defined by classical physical concepts” (II.64). “... the formalism does not allow pictorial repre~ sentation on accustomed lines, but aims directly at establishing relations between observations obtained under well-defined conditions? (11.71). “The sole aim of (the quantum mechanical for malism) is the comprehension of observations obtained under experimental conditions deseribed by simple physical concepts” (1.90). “Strictly speaking, the mathematical formalism of quantuin mechanics and electrodynamics merely offers rules of calculation for the deduetion of expecta- tions about observations obtained under well- defined experimental conditions specified by clas~ sical physical concepts” (111.60). Throughout Bobr’s writings there is a tacit acceptance of the idea that the external world exists, and that our physical experiences are caused, in part, by the course of external events, ‘This is quite in aceord with pragmatism: James 1100 / August 1972 admits the existence of hypersonsible realities But there is no commitment by Bohr to the idea that the macroscopie world really is what we naively imagine it to be. The focus is on the descriptions of our physical experiences and the demand that they secure unambiguous com- munication and objectivity. Referring to the experimental arrangements and observations he says: “The description of atomie phenomena has in these respects a perfectly objective character, in the sense that no explicit reference is made to any individual observer and that therefore, with proper regard to relativistic exigencies, no am- biguity is involved in the communieation of in- formation. As regards all such points, the ob- servation problem of quantum physies in no way differs from the classical physical approach” (1IT.8). Bohr's closest approach to a commitment, to the idea that the macroscopic world actually is what it appears to be is, I think, the statement: “The renunciation of pictorial representation in- volves only the state of atomic objects, while ‘the foundation of the description of the experi- mnental conditions is fully retained” (11.90). ‘The commitment here is, I believe, to the appropriate- ness, in quantum theory, of a classical description of the experimental conditions, rather than to the Jundamental accuracy of classical ideas at the macroscopic level. This position is in complete accord with pragmatism. Tn regard to the irreducible statistical element in quantum theory, Bobr was at first, ambivalent An initial acceptance of the notion of a funda- mental element of randomness or indeterminisin on the part of nature is suggested by the state- ment: ‘...we have been forced...to reckon with a fros choice on the part of nature between various possibilities to which only probability interpretations can be applied” (L4). However, he soon qualifies this idea (1.19) and later on says that at a Solvay conference aan interesting diseussion arose about how to speak of the appearance of phenomena for which only statistical predictions ean be made. The question was whether, as to the occurrence of individual effects, we should adopt the terminology proposed by Dirac, that we were concerned with a choice on the part of “nature,” or as suggested by Heisen-berg, wo should say that we have to do with a. choice on the part of the “observer” con- structing the measuring instruments and reading their recording. Any such terminology would, however, appear dubious since, on the one hand, itis hardly reasonable to endow nature with volition in the ordinary sense, while on the other hand it is certainly not possible for the observer to influence the events which may appear under the condi- tions he has arranged. To my mind there is no other alternative than to admit in field of experience, we are dealing with in dividual phenomena and that our possibil ties of handling the measuring instruments allow us only to make a choice between the different complementary types of phe- nomena that we want to study (I1.51). Later he says "The circumstance that, in general, one and the same experimental arrangement may yield different recordings is sometimes pic turesquely described as a ‘choice of nature’ be- tween such possibilities. Needless to say, such a phrase implies no allusion to a personification of nature, but simply points to the impossibility ‘of ascertaining on accustomed lines directives for the course of a closed indivisible phenomenon, Here, logical approach cannot. go beyond the deduction of the relative probabilities for the appearance of the individual phenomena under’ given conditions” (11.73). “Corresponding to the fact that different individual quantum processes may take place in a given experimental arrange- ment these relations (between observations ob- tained under well-defined conditions) are of an inherently statistical character” (IL71). “The very fact that repetition of the same experiment, defined on the fines deseribed, in general yields different recordings pertaining to the object, immediately implies that a comprehensive ac- ‘count of experience in this field must be exprossod by statistieal laws” (1114). “The fact that in ‘one and the same well-defined experimental r= rangement we generally obtain recordings of different individual processes makes indispensible the recourse to a statistical account of quantum phenomena” (III.25). These statements indicate a turing away by Bohr from pieturesque notions of a inherent random element in nature itself, ‘The Copenhagen Interpretation and the adoption of an essentially pragmatic attitude toward the statistical character of the quantum-mechanieal predictions. It is worth noting that Bohr’s notion of com- plementarity is altogether pragmatic: Ideas should be judged by their utility; physical ideas should be judged by their success in ordering physical experiences, not by the accuracy with which they can be believed to mirror the essence of sternal reality. The use of complementary ideas complementary situations is a natural con comitant of pragimatie thinking. VI. SPACE-TIME AND THE COMPLETENESS OF QUANTUM THEORY In gpite of doubts east on our intuitive notions of space and time by the theory of relativity, the idea lingers on that. persisting physical ob- jects oveupy space-time regions that can be divided into ever finer parts. A basic premise of classical physies is that this classical concept of the space-time contimmm is the appropriate underlying concept for fundamental physical theory. It is important to recognize that quantum theory has nothing in it that can be regarded as a description of qualities or properties of nature that are located at the point or infinitesimal re- ions of the space-time continuum. On one hand, the descriptions of the experimental arrangements and observations are basically operational de- scriptions of what technicians ean see and do. ‘They are not, strictly speaking, descriptions of the external things in themselves, Moreover, they are not deseriptions of microscopic qualities or properties. On the other hand, the wave functions are merely abstract symbolic devices, They do not describe qualities or properties of nature that are located at. points or infinitesimal regions of the space-time continuum. Tho abrupt change of a wave function in one region of space-time when a measurement is performed far away at the same time makes any such interpretation un~ reasonable, The wave functions of quantum theory, are to be interpreted as symbolic devices that, scientists use to make predictions about what. they will observe under specified conditions. As Bohr says it: “In the treatment of atomie prob- Jems, actual calculations are most. conveniently carried out with the help of a Schrodinger state AJP Volume $0 | 1107Henry Pierce Stapp function, from which the statistical laws govern- ing observations attainable under specified condi- tions ean be deduced by definite mathematical operations. It must be recognized, however, that we are here dealing with a purely symbolic procedure the unambiguous physical interpreta~ tion of which in the Inst resort requires a reference to the complete experimental arrangement” (LIL5). “In fact, wave mechsnies, just as the matrix theory, represents on this view 2 symbolic transcription of the problem of motion of classieal mechanies adapted to the requirements of quan- tum theory and only to be interpreted by an explicit use of the quantum postulate” (1.75) ‘The fact that quantum theory contains nothing, that is interpreted as description of qualities located at. points of an externally existing space~ time continuum ean be construed as evidence of its incompleteness. However, all we really know about the space-time continuum is that it is a concept that has been useful for organizing sense experience. Man’s effort to comprehend the world in terms of the idea of an external reality inhering in a space-time continuum reached its eulmina- tion in classical feld theory. That theory, though satisfactory in the domain of macroscopic phe- nomena, failed to provide a satisfactory account of the microscopic sources of the field. ‘The bulk of Einstein’s scientific life was spent in frus- trated effort to make these ideas work at the microscopic level? ‘The rejection of classical theory in favor of quantum theory represents, in essenee, the rejection of the idea that external reality resides in, or inheres in, a space-time continuum. It signalizes the recognition that “space,” like color, lies in the mind of the beholder, If the classical coneept of the space-time eon- tinuum were accepted, then quantum theory could not be considered complete, ie., if it were accepted that the persisting objects of nature literally reside in a space-time continuum, with, their vatious parts definitely located in specific regions, then a complete scientific account of atomic phenomena would, by virtue of the natural and normal meanings of these words, in this framework, be required to deseribe whatever it was that is loeated at the points or infinitesimal 5 of that continuum, Quantum theory does not do this, and hence a claim of completeness would be an abuse of language. 1108 / August 1972 In & pragmatic framework the claim of com- pleteness has a different, natural meaning. The natural meaning of the claim that quantum theory provides for a complete scientific account of atomic phenomena is that no theoretical con- struction ean yield experimentally verifiable pre- dictions about atomic phenomena that cannot be extracted from a quantum thooretieal deseription.. This is the practical or pragmatic meaning of scientific completeness in this context, ‘VI. WHOLENESS AND COMPLETENESS The second essential ingredient. of the Copen- hagen interpretation is the claim that quantum theory provides for the complete scientific ac- count of atomie phenomena. During the more than thirty years spanned by his three bookst Bohr polished and refined his views on this point. His final, and I think best, summary is as follows: The element of wholeness, symbolized by the quantum of action and completely foreign to classical physical principles, has... the consequence that in the study of quantum processes any experimental inquiry implies an interaction between atomic object and the measuring tools which, although essential for the characterization of the phenomena, evades a separate account if the experiment is to serve its purpose of yielding unambigu- ous answers to our questions. Tt is indeed the recognition of this situation which makes recourse to a statistical mode of description imperative as regards to the expectations of the occurrence of individual quantum effects in one and the same experimental arrangement. (IT1.60). ‘This statement is augmented and clarified by an earlier statement: The essentially new feature in the analysis of quantum phenomena is... the intro- duction of a fundamental distinetion be- tween the measuring apparatus and the ob- jects under investigation. This is a direct consequence of the necessity of accounting for the funetions of tho measuring instru- ments in purely classical terms, excluding in principle any regard to the quantum of 2e- tion. On their side, the quantal features of the phenomena are revealed in the informa-tion about the atomic objects derived from the observations. While within the seope of classical physics the interaction between the object and apparatus ean be neglected or, if necessary, compensated for, in quantum physies this interaetion thus forms an in- separable part of the phenomena. Aecord- ingly, the unambiguous aecount of proper quantum phenomena must, in principle, in- clude a deseription of all relevant features of the experimental arrangement (ITT) ‘The basic point here is that well-defined abjec- tive specifications on the entire phenomenon are not restrictive enough to determine uniquely the course of the individual processes, yet no further breakdown is possible because of the inherent wholeness of the process symbolized by the quan- tum of action. ‘This way of tracing the need for a statistical account of atomie phenomena back to the element of wholeness symbolized by the quantum of aetion appears to take one outside the pragmatic framework since it refers to the measuring device, the atomie object, and their interaction. Also, it is not immediately clear how one is to reconcile the separate identification of these three things with the “impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour of the atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomens appear” (11.39), In this conneetion it is important to recognize that the “atomie object” and “measuring instru- ments” are, within the framework of quantum thinking, idealizations used by scientists to bring ‘order into man’s experience in the realm of atomic phenomena, ‘This point is developed by the author in Ref, 21. Bohr’s words emphasize that these separate idealizations are inseparably linked by quantum thinking in a way that is completely foreign to classieal thinking. The idealization “the measuring instrument” is a conceptual entity used in the description of the experimental specifications; the idealization “the atomic object” is a conceptual entity that is represented by the wave function, These are inseparably linked in quantum theory by the fact that the specifica tions described in terms of the measuring strument are mapped onto wave functions asso- ‘The Copenhagen Interpretation ciated with the atomie object: The atomic object represented by the wave function has no meaning ‘quantum theory except via its link to experience formulated in terms of specifications that refer to the measuring instruments. Bohr evidently believed that there is in atomie processes an element of wholeness—associated with the quantuin of action, and completely foreign to classical physical prineiples—that eur- tails the utility of the classical idealizations of the ‘measuring instruments and atomie objects as separate, interacting entities, and that the re- sulting inseparability of the atomie object from the whole phenomenon renders statistical de- seription unavoidable ‘This way of reconciling the pragmatic character ‘of quantum theory with the claim of complete- ness seems rational and coherent. It is, of course, based on quantum thinking itself and is therefore essentially a self-consistency consideration. The validity of quantum-mechanieal thinking as a whole must, of course, be judged on the basis of its success, which ineludes its coherence and self-consisteney. ‘The question of the completeness of quantum theory was debated by Bohr’? and Einstein? Einstein's counter arguments come down on the following points: (1) Tt is not proven that the usual concept of reality is unworkable; (2) quan- tum theory does not make “intelligible” what is sensotily given; and (8) if there is a more com- plete thinkable description of nature, then the formulation of the universal laws should involve their use Bell’s theorem" deals a shattering blow to Fin- stein's position. For it proves that the ordinary concept of reality is incompatible with the sta- tistical predietions of quantum theory. These pre- dictions Einstein was apparently willing to accept. Einstein's whole position rests squarely on the presumption that sense experience ean be under- stood in terms of an iden of some extemal reality whose spatially separated parts are independent realities, in the sense that they depend on each other only via connections that respect. space time separation in the usual way: Instantaneous connections are excluded. But the existence of such a reality lying behind the world of observed phenomena is precisely what Bell’s theorem proves to be impossible. AJP Volume 40 / 1109Henry Pierce Stapp Binstein’s second point, about: whether quan- tum theory makes intelligible what is sensorily iven, is taken up in the next section, Einstein’s third point raises two crucial ques tions. The first is whether a complete deserip- tion of nature is thinkable. Can human ideas, which are probably limited by the structural form of human brains, and which are presumably geared to the problem of human survival, fully know or comprehend the ultimate essences? And even if they can, what is the role in nature of universal laws? Is all nature ruled by some closed set of mathematieal formulas? This might be one possibility. Another, quite eompatible with present knowledge, is that certain aspeets of nature ad- here to closed mathematical forms but. that the fullness of nature transcends any such form. VII. QUANTUM THEORY AND OBJECTIVE REALITY ‘The Copenhagen interpretation is often eri cized on the grounds that it is subjective, ie. that it deals with the observer’s knowledge of ‘things, rather than those things themselves. This charge arises mainly from Heisenberg’s frequent use of the words “knowledge” and “observer.” Since quantum theory is fundamentally a pro- cedure by which scientists make predictions, it is completely appropriate that it refer to the knowledge of the observer. For human observers play a vital role in setting up experiments and in noting their results. Heisenberg’s wording, interpreted in a super- ficial way, can be, and has been, the source of considerable confusion. Tt is therefore perhaps better to speak directly in terms of the conerete social realities, such as dispositions of instru- ments, ete., in terms of which the preparations, measurements, and results are described. This type of terminology was favored by Bohr, who used the phrase “classical concepts” to signify deseriptions in terms of conerote social actualities. On the other hand, Bohr’s terminology, though blatantly objective, raises the question of how quantum theory can be consistently constructed on a foundation that includes concepts that are fundamentally incompatible with the quantum concepts. Perhaps the most satisfactory term is “specifica 1110 jf August 1972 tions.” Specifications are what architects and builders, and mechanies and machinists, use to communicate to one another conditions on the concrete social realities or actuslities that bind their lives together. It is hard to think of a theoretical concept that could have a more ob- jective meaning, Specifications are described in technical jargon that is an extension of everyday Janguage. This language may incorporate con- cepts from classieal physies. But this fact in no way implies that these concepts are valid beyond the realm in which they are used by the technicians. In order to objectify as far as possible our de- seriptions of the specifications on preparations: and measurements we ean express them in terms of the “objective” quantities of classical physics. ‘The meaning of these “objective” quantities for us is tied to the fact that we conceive of them as the qualities of an external world that exists independently of our perceptions of it, The formulation of the specifications in terms of these classical quantities allows the human observer to be eliminated, superficially at least, from the quantum theoretical deseription of nature: The observer need not be explicitly introduced into the description of quantum theory because the conneetion between his knowledge and these classical quantities is then shifted to other do- mains of science, such as classical physics, bi- “ology, psychology, ete. But this elimination of the observer is simply a semantic sleight of hand. Since the conceptual structure of classical physics is recognized as fundamentally an invention of the mind that is useful for organizing and codifying experience, ‘the knowledge of the observer emerges, in the end, as the fundamental reality upon which the whole structure rests. The terms “knowledge of the observer,” or “classical description,” or “specifieations” are just different ways of sum- ming up in s single term this entire arrangement of ideas, which follows from the recognition of the limited domain of validity of classical concepts, Bohr cites certain ideas from biology and psy- chology as other examples of concepts that: work well in certain limited domains. And he notes that there have been repeated attempts to unify all human knowledge of the basis of one or anotherof these conceptual frameworks. Such attempts are the natural outgrowth of the absolutist view- point, which holds that the ideas of man ean, grasp or know the absolute essences. ‘The pragma- tist, regarding human concepts as simply tools for the comprehension of experience, and averting that human ideas, being prisoners in the realm of ‘human experience, ean “know” nothing but other human ideas, would not be optimistic about the prospects of complete success in stich ventures. For him progress in human understanding would more likely consist of the growth of a web of interwoven complementary understandings of various aspects of the fullness of nature, Such a view, though withholding the promise for eventual complete illumination regarding the ultimate essence of nature, does offer the prospect that human inquiry can continue indefinitely to yield important new truths. And these ean be final in the sense that they grasp or illuninate some aspect of nature as it is revealed to human experience. And the hope can persist that man will perceive ever more clearly, through his grow- ing patchwork of complementary views, the general form of a pervading presence. But this pervading presence cannot. be expected or re- quired to be a resident of the three-dimensional space of naive intuition, or to be described funda- ‘mentally in terms of quantities associated with points of a four-dimensional space-time con- tinoum, APPENDIX A: PHILOSOPHICAL ADDENDA Several questions of a philosophic nature have been raised by a critic. ‘This appendix contains my replies ‘Question 1: How does one reconcile the com- ‘mitment of James and Bohr to the public charae- ter of sense objects with the radical empiricist doctrine that ideas ean agree only with other ideas? Rassoll’s Analysis of Matter indicates the difficulty in performing this reconciliation, Reply: Russell's arguments do not confute the ideas of James and Bohr as T have described them. Both of the latter authors would, I think, readily admit that human experiences are prob- ably not the whole of reality but are probably merely a part of the whole that is related to the rest via some sort of eausal-type connection, The ‘The Copenhagen Interpretation critical question, however, is not whether there is in fact a world “out there,” but rather what the connection is between the world “out there” and our ideas about it. Russell argues, essentially, that we ean make plausible inferences, based on the structure of our experiences, and build up a reasonable idea of the outside world. James would insist that: this whole structure is nothing but @ structure of abstract ideas built upon our common exper ences, and that the transexperiential world that may somehow “eause” our common experiences never enters into this structure at all. James evidently believes that his idea of a table is similar to yours and mine. In general, different. people’s ideas about sense objects are not identical, but they are similar enough to form the basis of effective social communication, ‘There exists, in this sense, a realn of publie or shared experiences that form the basis of inter personal communication, This realm constitutes the primary data of science, The aim of science is to construct a framework of ideas that will link these common, or public, or shared, ex- periences together in ways that reflect various aspects of the empirical connections that exist between them. Thus the whole structure of science is, quite obviously, a structure that is wholly confined to the world of ideas. Russell would presumably grant this. But he would argue that we can, nonetheless, make plausible inferences about the world based on the structure of experience. Yet. his commitment to rationality requires him, T think, to admit that our ideas might not be able to fully comprehend the realities that are the causes of our experience. And if the evidence of science indicates that this possibility is the one realized by nature, then I think his rational approach, based on plausible inferences drawn from available evidence, would require him to admit that this possibility has a good “probability” of being correct. Although the arguments of Russell do not confuto the position of James, as I have described it, thore is definitely a basic difference in orienta- tion, Russell embarks on a quest for certainty about the external world, but settles for an ac- count to which he assigns high “probability.” James views the quest for certainty about the AIP Volume 40 / 1114Henry Pierce Stapp external world as totally misdirected. Certainty in such matters is clearly unattainable, The truly rational course of action is to admit at the outset that our aim is to construct a framework of ideas that is useful for the organization of our experi- ‘ence—and for the conduct of our lives—and to put aside the whole vague question about the conneetion of ideas to nonideas, and the equally ‘vague question about the “probability” that a cortain scheme of ideas gives us a true or valid picture of the world itself In any ease, the claim that we ean make valid inferences about the world itself acquires ered- ibility only to the extent that. a truly adequate picture of the world itself ean be constructed. No such picture exists at present. And the difficulties in constructing a scientific view of the world itself are precisely those admitted by Russell himself, namely the incorporation of quantum phenomena and infinitesimal space-time intervals. Tt is precisely those difficulties that foree us to fall back to the position of James. In short, the position of Bohr and James, as T have described it, is not a denial of the causal theory of perception. It is simply « recommenda~ tion that we view science not as a quest for a metaphysical understanding of that which lies outside the world of ideas, but rather as an in- vention of the human mind that man constructs for the purpose of incorporating into the world of human ideas abstract structural forms that eap- ture certain aspects of the empirical structure of ‘man’s experience. In this undertaking an impor- tant class of data are those experiences that are common to different human observers, such as our common or shared experience of the table about which we all sit, The level of experience at which these common experienees are most similar is the level at which a round table is experienced as a round table, not as an oval two-dimensional visual pattern that depends upon where one sits, or a set of tactile sensations that depend on where ‘one’s hand rests. In science we need “objective” descriptions of the experienced world. We need descriptions that do not depend on who it is that has the experience. Operational specifications fill this need. They are deseriptions of possible human experiences that do not refer specifically to any particular individual. They allow us to create a 118 / August 1978 science that is thoroughly objective, yet securely rooted in the realm of ideas and experience. Question 2: In the author's article’ on the S-mattix interpretation of quantum theory it was admitted that the pragmatic interpretation of quantum theory leaves unanswered deep meta~ physical questions about the nature of the world itself, And it was noted that the apparent absence of unanalyzable entities in quantum theory sug- gests a “web” structure of nature that somewhat resembles the structure proposed by Whitehead. ‘Does the absence of similar remarks in the present, work signify a retraction of the earlier views? Reply: The aim of the present work is to de- seribe the Copenhagen interpretation. More pre- cisely, the aim is to describe this author’s under- standing of the essential common ground of Bohr and Heisenberg on the question of the inter- pretation of quantum theory. The author’s own, views are an elaboration upon his understanding, of the Copenhagen interpretation, and are given in the S-matrix article. APPENDIX B: CORRESPONDENCE WITH HEISENBERG AND ROSENFELD ‘The views that have been put forth as repre- sentations of the Copenhagen interpretation differ widely. Thus the question arises whether my de- seription suceeeds in capturing the essence of the Copenhagen interpretation as understood by Bohr and Heisenberg. To shed light on this question T inquired of Heisenborg whether the deseription given in a first version of this paper seemed to him basically in aceord with the views of himself and Bohr, or whether it seemed dif- ferent in any important way. Heisenberg replied: Many thanks for your letter and for your paper on the Copenhagen interpretation. I think that your text is a basically adequate description of the Copenhagen interpreta tion, and you probably know that Niels Bohr was very intrested in the ideas of William James. 1 would, howover, like to mention ‘one point where you seem to describe the Copenhagen interpretation too rigorously. On p. 35 you ask the question “Can any ‘theoretical construction give us testable pre-dictions about physical phenomena that ean- not be extracted from a quantum theoretical description?” and you say that according to ‘the Copenhagen interpretation no such eon- struction is possible. I doubt whether this is correct with respect to, for example, biolog- ical questions, Logically it may be that the difference between the two statements: “The call is alive” or “The eell is dead” cannot be replaced by a quantum theoretical statement about the state (certainly a mixture of many states) of the system. The Copenhagen in- terpretation is independent of the decision of this point. It only states that an addition of parameters in the sense of elassical physies would be useless Besides that it may be a point in the Copenhagen interpretation that its language has certain degree of vagueness, and I doubt whether it ean become clearer by trying to avoid this vagueness. The paper was revised so as to make it ab- solutely clear that the claim of completeness of quantum theory relers specifically to atomic phenomena. Some superfluous material was elim- inated, and the present Sees. V and VII, with their extensive quotations from Bohr, were added. Heisenberg’s comments on the revised version were as follows: ‘Many thanks for sending me the new version ‘of your paper on the Copenhagen interprets tion. It is certainly an improvement that you quote Bohr extensively, and your whole paper has become more compact and more understandable after these changes. ‘There is, ‘one problem which T would like to mention, not in order to eriticize the wording of your paper, but for inducing you to more investi- gation of this special point, which is how- ever a very deep and old philosophical prob- Jem. When you speak about the ideas (especially in Chap. TV), you always speak about the human ideas, and the question arises, do these ideas “exist” outside of the human mind or only in the human mind? In other words: Have these ideas existed at, ‘the time when no human mind existed in the world? The Copenhagen Interpretation I am enclosing the English translation of 1 passage in one of my lectures in which have tried to deseribe the philosophy of Plato with regard to this point. The English translation was done by an American philos~ opher who, as I think, uses the philosophical nomenclature correctly. Perhaps we could connect this Platonic idea with pragmatism by saying: It is “convenient” to consider the dens as existing even outside of the hnman mind because otherwise it would be diffieult to speak about the world before human minds have existed. But you see at these points we always get easily at the limitation of lan~ guage, of concepts like “existing,” “being,” idea,” ete, I feel that you have still too much confidence in the Ianguage, but. that you will probably find out: yourself. T replied: Regarding the question of nonhuman ideas itt seems to me unlikely that human ideas could emerge from a universe devoid of idealike qualities. Thus I am inelined to the view that conseiousness in some form must be afundamental quality of the universe. . [However] It is difficult to extract from Bohr’s writings any commitment on Platonic ideals, Indeed, Bohr seems to take pains to avoid all ontologieal commitment: He focuses rather on the question of how we as scientists are to cope with the limited validity of our classical intuitions. In view of Bohr’s reluctance to speculate (in print at least) on the nature of the ultimate essences it has seemed to me that the consideration of these matters should not be considered a proper part of the Copen- hagen interpretation. If the Copenhagen interpretation is considered to be an over-all world view that coincides with the complete world views of both you and Bohr, then ‘there is danger that the Copenhagen in- terpretation may not exist; for it is not. clear (Grom your respective writings at least) whether you and Bohr are in complete agree- ment. on all ontological and metaphysical questions, Moreover, in your work Physics and Philosophy you discuss many of these AJP Volume 40 / 1113Henry Pierce Stapp deoper philosophical questions, yet have a soparate chapter entitled “The Copenhagen Interpretation.” ‘This suggests that “The Copenhagen Interpretation” should be in- terpreted in a restricted way. T have inter- preted it to be not the complete over-all Joint world view of Bohr and yourself, but rather the essential common ground of you and Bobr on the specific question of how quantum theory should be interpreted. ‘My practical or praginatie account of quantum theory was based on the account given in your chapter “The Copenhagen Interpretation.” This concrete account, jibes completely with the abstract, pronoun ments of Bohr, as the quotations of Bohr in my Sec, V bear witness. Thus I think it correet and proper to regard the pragmatic interpretation of the formalism as an integral part of the Copenhagen interpretation. Sim- ilarly, I drew from our conversations at Munich an understanding of your commit- ment to the position that quantum theory provides for # complete deseription of atomic phenomena, and this position seems com- pletely in accord with that of Bohr. Thus I think it correct and proper to regard also this position as an essential part of the Copenhagen interpretation. But in view of Bohr’s silence on Platonic ideals I would hesitate to include considerations on that question in my account of the “logical essence of the Copenhagen interpretation.” This is not meant to suggest that the Copenhagen interpretation bans further search for a com- prehensive world view. It indicates only that the Copenhagen interpretation is, in my view, not itself a complete over-all world view: It is merely part of an over-all world view; the part that establishes the proper perspective on quantum theory, T empha- sized in the closing passages of my paper that man’s search for a comprehensive world view is not terminated by the Copenhagen interpretation. Rather it is significantly advanced. Heisenberg replied: Many thanks for your letter. May I just briefly answer the relevant questions. I agree 1114 f August 1972 completely with your view that the Copen- hagen interpretation is not itself a complete over-all world view. It was never intended to be such a view. I also agree with you that Bohr and I have probably not looked upon the Platonie ideals in exactly the same way, and therefore there is no reason why you should go more into the problems of the Platonic ideals in your paper. Still there is one reservation which I have to make in connec- tion with your paper and which I mentioned in my last letter. I think that you have too much confidence in the possibilities of lan- guage. I think that the attitude whieh is behind the Copenhagen interpretation is not, compatible with the philosophy of Wittgen- stein in the Tractatus. It may be com- patible with the philosophy contained in the later papers of Wittgenstein. As you probably know, Bertrand Russell liked the Tractatus of Wittgenstein, but disapproved of the later papers and therefore I could never eome to an agreement with Russell on these philosophical ‘questions. I replied: ‘Thank you for your very informative letter. I had not previously fully appreciated the point you were making, which as I now under- stand it, is this: You regard recognition of imperfectability of language to be an im- portant clement of the attitude that Ties behind the Copenhagen interpretation. This point was not brought into my account of the Copenhagen interpretation, and is indeed somewhat at odds with its avowed aim of clarity... [But] scientists must. strive for clarity nd. shared understandings, since without striving even the attainable will not be achioved. ‘Your words on the matters raised in our correspondence would certainly be extremely valuable to readers of my article. And any paraphrasing I might make would diminish this value, Thus, with your approval, I would like to include the full eontont of your letters (apart from personal openings and closings) in an appendix to my paper, along with certain connecting excerpts from my own letters. I have enclosed a copy of the proposedappendix, apart from your reply to the present letter, Heisenberg replied: “Many thanks for your letter. 1 agree with your intention to publish my: letters in the appendix to your paper.”” I required also of Rosenfeld, as the close com- panion and co-worker of Bohr, and prime de- fender of his views, for an opinion of the extent to which my description succeeded in capturing, ‘the essence of the Copenhagen interpretation as it was understood by Bohr. Rosenfeld expressed full agreement with my account, and gave hearty approval. He went on to comment on the relationship of Bohr to James. T include his remarks because of their historieal interest: It may interest you to know that T several times endeavoured to persuade Bohr to make explicit mention of the affinity between his attitude and that of James, but he firmly refused to do £0; not because he disagreed, but because he intensely disliked the idea of having a Jabel stuck onto him, Indeed you may have noticed that some philosophers aro already busy tracing imaginary influences, of various philosophers upon Bohr. With re- gard to William James, Tam quite sure that Bohr only heard of him from his friend, the psychologist Rubin, and from myself in the 30's. He then expressed enthusiastic ap- proval of James’ attitude, which he certainly felt akin to his own; but it is a fact—a very significant one, T think,—that James and Bohr developed s pragmatic epistemology independently of each other. IL might be advisable to add somewhere in your paper a remark to that effeet in order to avoid further misunderstanding. As a matter of fact, I have never myself in the papers T wrote on complementarity brought the pragmatic aspect of Bohr’s thinking in explicit relation with James, precisely in order to avoid such misunderstanding, He went on to say: I notice from your further letters with new title pages that you hesitate about the best, title for your esay. I have no very strong view about this, but I would incline to prefer The Copendagen Interpretation your March 31 title (“Quantum Theory, ‘Pragmatism, and the Nature of Space-time”, the reason being that it does not contain the phrase “Copenhagen interpretation,” which ‘we in Copenhagen do not like at all. Indeed, this expression was invented, and is used by people wishing to suggest that there may be other interpretations of the Sehrédinger equa~ tion, namely their own muddled ones, More~ over, as you yourself point out, the same people apply this designation to the wildest misrepresentations of the situation, Perhaps a way out of this semantic difficulty would be for you to say, after having pointed out what the difficulty is, that you make use of ‘the phrase “Copenhagen interpretation” in the uniquely defined sense in whieh it is understood by all physicists who make a correct use of quantum mechanies. Surely, this is a pragmatie definition. * This work was supported by the U, 8. Atomie Energy Commission. 'K. It Popper and M. Bunge, in Quantwm Theory and Reality, edited by M. Bunge (Springer, New York, 1907) "1. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). ® Quantum Theory and Beyond, edited by B. Bastin (Cam- bridge U. P,, Cambridge, Eng., 1970); L. Roseafeld, Suppl. Progr. Theoret. Phys. (Extra number) 292 (1965); 4M. Jauch, B. P. Wigner, end M. M. Yanase, Nuovo Cimento 488, 144 (1907); L, Rosenfeld, Nuel. Phys. Ai0B, 241 (1968); A. Loinger, Nucl. Phys. A108, 245 (1968); Arthur Fine, Phys. Rev. D2, 2783 (1970). 4 Niels Bohr, Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature (Carabridge U. P., Cambridge, Bog., 1934); Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge (Wiley, New York, 1958); esays 1958/1962 on Atomic Physics and Hunan Knowl edge (Wiley, New York, 1963). 9 W. Heisenberg, The Physical Principles ofthe Quantum Theory (Dover, New York, 1920); in Niele Bohr and the Development of Physic, edited by W. Pauli (MoCraw-Hil, New York, 1955), p. 12; Physies and Philosophy (Harper and Rox, New York, 1958) ; Daedalus 87, 95 (1958). C.F, von Weiszicker in Ref 3 14.von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum. Mechenies (Princeton, U. P., Princeton, N. J, 1955) *E. Wigner, Amer. J. Phys. 31, 6 (1 *G. Ludwig in Werner Heisenberg und der Physik uncorer Zeit (Friedrich Vioweg, Braunschsreig, 1061) ©, Wier in The Scientist Specultes, edited by I. J. Good (Basie Books, New York, 1962), p. 284, Hugh Everett 11, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957), I. A. Wheoler, Rev. Mod. Phys, 28, 463 (1957) Bryce DeWitt, in Phys. Today 23, 30 (Sept. 1970) ML. Rosenfeld, Nucl, Phys, A108, 241 (1968). AJP Volume 40 / 1115AIP Volume 40 D, Bohm, Phys. Rev. 85, 166, 180 (1952). 445, 8. Boll, Physics (N. ¥.) 1, 195 (1964) and Varenna Lectures, Preprint Ref, TH.1220-CERN, Aug. 1970, See ‘also Ref. 21. William James, The Meaning of Truth (Univ. Mic ‘gan, Ann Arbor, Mich,, 1970), This reference to James doos not mean that the idess reviewed in this section are ‘exactly those of James or wholly those of James, Countless philosophers have said similar things. 1 Reference 17, p. 238 © Reference 17, p. 217. On the Doppler Effect B. RAM Physics Department New Mexico State University Los Cruces, New Mezico 88001 (Received 25 October 1971; revised 18 February 1972) Expressions for the Doppler efect are derived without employing any ascunption about the phase of a plane ‘wave. I¢ ie shown that the invariance of this phase under both the Galilean and the Larente transformations is a trivial consequence of the mathematies and is independent of ils association with any physal process. 1116 | August 1978 . Kinstein, in Albert Kinstein, Philosopher-Physiciet, edited by P. A. Sehlipp (Tudor, New York, 1951), p. 675. 11H. P. Stapp, Phys. Rev. D8, 1308 (1971 ®N. Bohr, Phys. Rev. 48, 696 (1935) and in Ref, 20, p. 201. ® A. Einstein, in Ref. 20, p. 605. 2(For an interesting and very readable account, of the four principal conceptual structures that have been advanced as the basis of overall world views see 8. C. Pepper, World Hypothesis (U. of California Press, Berke ley, Calif, 1906). A derivation of the nonrelativistic Doppler effect. as given by Meller! proceeds as follows It is asserted that the phase kr—at of a plane wave expLi(kr—at) Jisinvariant for two observers moving uniformly relative to each other? This assertion is justified by associating the phase with ‘the number of waves passing a point: with co- ordinates (z, t) in the reference frame of the first observer in a time ¢, with the first wave erest to reach there being one which passes the origin at ¢=0, and then stating that this number will, of course, be equal to the number of waves passing over the corresponding point with coordinates (2, 1!) im the reference frame of the second ob- server in the time ¢' =t, the point (2’, t') being such that it coincides with (7, t) at t=¢!. The invariance of the phase is then used to derive the expression for the nonrelativistic Doppler effect, The same derivation is repeated for the relativistic case? with the exception that the Lorentz transforma- tion is used in place of the Galilean transformation to connect the two frames. ‘Three objections can be raised to this deriva- tion. First, the validity of the statement that the number of waves passing the point (x, 1) in the unprimed system in a time ¢ is equal to the number of waves passing over the corre- sponding point (2, (’) in the primed system, up to the time ¢’=t, is not at all obvious. Second, while the association of phase with the physical process of counting may be useful, the invariance of the phase is completely independent of this physical association, ‘Third, Moller’s treatment: