Non Material Sources of Turkish Armed Fo

NON-MATERIAL SOURCES OF
TURKISH ARMED FORCES’ POLITICAL POWER:

A “MILITARY IN SOCIETY” APPROACH
A Master’s Thesis
by
GONCA B LTEK N
Department of
International Relations
Bilkent University
Ankara
September 2007
The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

of
Bilkent University
by
GONCA B LTEK N
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
in
THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
B LKENT UNIVERSITY
ANKARA
September 2007
I certify that I have read this thesis and have found that it is fully adequate, in
scope and in quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Arts in International
Relations.
---------------------------------
Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı (Supervisor)
Relations.
---------------------------------
Asst. Prof. Paul Williams (Examining Committee Member)
Relations.
---------------------------------
Assoc. Prof. Tanel Demirel(Examining Committee Member)
Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences
---------------------------------
Prof. Dr. Erdal Erel (Director)
ABSTRACT
Biltekin, Gonca
MIR, Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Ersel Aydınlı
September 2007
This thesis is an attempt to understand the non-material sources of Turkish

Armed Forces’ political power. For that purpose, the thesis looks at theories of
power and relevant civil-military relations literature and illustrates that the current
civil-military relations literature employs an institution-based formal decision-
making approach to military’s political power, where non-material sources of
armed forces political power is mostly overlooked. Moreover, current literature
presumes the existence of a conflictual relationship between the military and the
society where interests of the society and the military clash. Therefore, there is a
theoretical gap which makes it problematic to study armies like Turkish Armed
Forces, which enjoy a long-term and considerable support from their societies. In
order to provide for an answer to such a gap, the thesis develops a “military in
society” approach and establishes that the political power of the Turkish Armed
Forces emanates from its distinctive relationship with its society which has
historical, cultural, social and discursive dimensions.
Keywords: political power, power sources, civil-military relations, Turkish

Armed Forces, military intervention, military, army, society
iii
ÖZET
TÜRK S LAHLI KUVVETLER ’N N POL T K GÜCÜNÜN

MADD OLMAYAN KAYNAKLARI:
B R “TOPLUM Ç NDE ASKER” YAKLA IMI
Biltekin, Gonca
MIR, Uluslararası li kiler Bölümü
Danı man: Doç. Dr. Ersel Aydınlı
Eylül 2007
Bu tez, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin politik gücünün maddi olmayan

kaynaklarını anlamaya yönelik bir çabanın ürünüdür. Bu amaçla, bu tez güç
teorilerine ve ilgili sivil-asker ili kileri literatürüne bakmakta; mevcut sivil-asker
ili kileri literatürünün askerin politik gücüne kurumsal tabanlı bir resmi karar
alma yakla ımıyla baktı ını göstermektedir. Bu bakı , askerin politik gücünün
maddi olmayan kaynaklarını büyük oranda gözden kaçırmaktadır. Bunun ötesinde
mevcut literatür, toplumun ve de askerin çıkarlarının birbirleriyle çatı tı ı bir
asker- toplum ili kisinin varlı ını farz etmektedir. Bu yüzden, toplumdan uzun
zamanlı ve dikkate de er destek gören Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri gibi ordular
üzerine çalı mayı güçle tiren bir teorik bo luk mevcuttur. Bu bo lu a bir cevap
olu turmak için bu tez bir “toplum içinde asker” yakla ımı geli tirmekte ve Türk
Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin politik gücünün, toplumuyla arasındaki tarihsel, kültürel,
sosyal ve söylemsel boyutları olan ayrıcalıklı ili kisinden kaynaklandı ını ortaya
koymaktadır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: politik güç, güç kaynakları, sivil-asker ili kileri, Türk Silahlı
Kuvvetleri, askeri müdahale, asker, ordu, toplum
iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my special thanks to my supervisor, Associate
Professor Ersel Aydınlı, who (re)offered me his hands in my most troubled times
and revitalized my enthusiasm in academia. Without doubt, his support and belief
in me and my capabilities has changed the course of my life.
I am also thankful to Assistant Professor Paul Williams for reading my
thesis and his encouragement in my graduate and undergraduate years in Bilkent.
I also thank Associate Professor Tanel Demirel for kindly accepting being
in my jury.
Very special thanks go to four S’s: my cousin Saliha, my sister Seval, my
dear friends Seher and Seda for their long-term support and invaluable help
during my study.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………..……….…………iii
ÖZET…………………………………………………………….……………….iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………..…………………...v
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………...…………………vi
1. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION…………………………….……..……………..1
2. CHAPTER 2 POWER…………………………………………...………………..5
2.1. THE PROBLEM OF POWER……………………………………………6
2.2. WHO IS POWERFUL?..............................................................................8
2.3. POWER SOURCES vs. POWER EXERCISE………………….………12
2.3.1. Power Sources……………………………………………………13

2.3.1.1. Material Sources of Power…………………………………..13
2.3.1.2. Ideational Sources of Power …...……………………...……15
2.3.2. Power Exercises………………………………………………….18
2.4. CONSENSUAL vs. CONFLICTUAL THEORIES OF POWER………22
2.4.1. Conflictual View…………………………………………………22

2.4.2. Consensual View………………………………………………...23
3. CHAPTER 3 MILITARY IN SOCIETY………………………………………...28
3.1. CLASSICAL CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY……………30
vi
3.2. SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOL: INCLUSION OF THE SOCIETY...……43
3.3. MILITARY IN SOCIETY APPROACH ………………………………49
4. CHAPTER 4 MATERIAL SOURCES OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES’

POLITICAL POWER……………………………………………………………52
4.1. LEGAL SOURCES……………………………………………………..53
4.1.1. Founding Principles and the Military……………………………56

4.1.2. Functions and Place of TAF……………………………………..57
4.1.3. The Concept of National Security and National Security Council
(NSC)…………………………………………………………….………61
4.2. ECONOMIC SOURCES……………………………………….………66
4.2.1. The Share from the National Budget…………………….………67

4.2.2. Undersecretariat of Defence Industries (USDI) and Defence
Industry Support Fund (DISF)...........................................................70
4.2.3. Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TAFF)…...…………………71
4.2.4. Armed Forces Pension Fund (OYAK)…………...………………72
4.3. JUDICIAL SOURCES …………………………………………………74
4.3.1. The Military Judicial System………………………….…………75

4.3.2. The Extent and the Limits of the Sphere of Military Jurisdiction.77
5. CHAPTER 5 HISTORICAL SOURCES OF THE TURKISH ARMED

FORCES’ POLITICAL POWER………………………………………………..79
5.1. THE OTTOMAN LEGACY………………………………………..…..80
5.1.1. Establishment of First Constitutional Monarchy and Young

Ottomans …………………………………………………………..83
5.1.2. Establishment of Second Constitutional Monarchy and 31 March
Incident………………………………………………………...…...85
5.1.3. Committee of Union and Progress and the First World War…….88
vii
5.2. FOUNDATION OF THE REPUBLIC, TURKISH ARMED FORCES
AND THE ATATURKIST LEGACY……………………………………….91
5.2.1. War of Independence…………………………………………….92

5.2.2. First Republic ……………………………………………………98
5.2.3. Atatürkist Legacy ………………………………………………..99
5.3. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS OF THE REPUBLICAN ERA….….102
5.3.1. 1960 Coup ……………………………………………….……..102

5.3.2. 1971 Memorandum ………………………………….…………107
5.3.3. 1980 Coup ……………………………………………….……..109
6. CHAPTER 6 SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SOURCES OF THE

TURKISH ARMED FORCES’ POLITICAL POWER………….………….….112
6.1. CULTURAL SOURCES………………………………………….…...114
6.1.1.1.A Military Nation …………………………………………..114

6.1.1.2.Mass Conscription and Military Culture in Turkey………...118
6.2. SOCIAL INTERACTION………………………………………….….121
6.2.1. Military and the Civil Society ………………………………….121

6.2.2. Turkish Armed Forces’ Supportive Activities for Social
Development ……………………………………………………….......127
6.3. DISCURSIVE PRACTICES………………………………………..…131
6.3.1. EU Accession Process and the Changing Discourses of the

Military…..………………………………………………………..132
6.3.2. Terrorism and Military Discourses on Cross-border Operation..140
6.3.3. Republican Meetings and e-Coup of 27 April …..……………..145
7. CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION………………………………………………….153
viii
7.1. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS…………………………………....153
7.2. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS……………………………………….155
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY………………..……………………………….156
ix
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In eighty four years of Turkish Republic’s history, Turkish military has
made two outright coup d’états in 1960 and 1980, ousted the government by
sending a memorandum in 1971, and it engineered the removal of an Islamic-
oriented prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in 1997. Most recently, on 27 April
2007, at the pinnacle of presidential elections, Turkish military issued a press
release from its website, which stated that Turkish Armed Forces is ready to
intervene if the secular nature of the Republic is compromised. The statement has
been regarded as a clear warning to the government and called as “e-coup”.
This historical record of military interventions, along with Turkish
military’s prevalence in political discussions, illustrates that the Turkish military
still enjoys a considerable political power despite the recent legal and institutional
changes which aimed at reducing Turkish military’s political power to the level of
its equals in EU countries. This thesis is an attempt to understand the nature and
sources of such political power and tries to answer the following questions: “what
are the sources of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power and where do these
sources originate from?
1
In the next chapter, power as defined and analyzed by different branches
of social sciences, mainly sociology and political science, will be discussed in
order to understand the sources of political power. It will be argued that
consensual power theories, which argue that the main source of a group’s political
power is society, can be useful in understanding the political power of militaries
which enjoy considerable amount of support from the society.
In the third chapter, theories of civil military relations and the studies
which focus on the role of military’s power on politics will be analyzed with an
underlying lens of power approaches they utilize. It will be argued that most
theories of civil-military relations are based on a formal decision-making view of
military’s power exercises. As such, they lay emphasis on institutional and legal
sources of military’s power. The current literature is mostly based on the
competition between the civilian and the military on attaining more control over
these sources.
Due to its institutional focus, the current literature portrays the society as
a secondary player, which may have no influence independently of the political
elite. Since society is presumed to side always with the political elite, they employ
a conflictual view of military’s political power, where interests of the military and
the society constantly clash. Therefore, the literature suffers from a gap, resulting
from disregarding the role of the society in enhancing or curbing the political
power of the military, which makes it problematic to theorize on popular armies
which receive considerable and long-term support from the society, even in their
attempts to undermine civilian authority.
In order to provide a theoretical framework to answer such a gap, a
2
“military in society” approach, which employs a more society-based consensual
understanding of power, with relevant contribution by the civil-military relations
literature will be established. It will be argued that the political power of the
Turkish Armed Forces emanates from the bond that it establishes with the society.
The society, rather than using its power over military through elected politicians,
may establish informal bonds through which it may augment or limit the political
power of the military.
In order to test the dominant “institutional prerogatives” approach, the
thesis will also include a chapter on the material sources of Turkish Armed
Forces’ political power. The fourth chapter will focus on these material sources
which are legal, economic and judicial sources. In the fifth chapter, the historical
sources of Turkish Armed Forces political power will be discussed. And in the
sixth chapter, Turkish Armed forces political power will be analyzed with respect
to its cultural, social and discursive sources. These sources constitute a three-
layered formation. On the basis, there are military motifs embedded in the culture
of Turkish society which enable the establishment of a strong bond of
identification between the military and the society. Secondly, social interaction
between armed forces and the society on various spheres maintain and enhance
this bond. Lastly, through discursive practices the military is able to reflect the
anxieties and expectations of the society.
In the seventh and last chapter, it will be concluded that the bulk of
political power of the Turkish Armed Forces originate from its specific interaction
with the Turkish society which has roots in the culture of the society and society’s
evaluation of future risks and opportunities. This chapter also includes theoretical
3
implications of a society-based approach to civil military relations and practical
implications for the Turkish case.
4
CHAPTER 2
POWER
Power is without doubt the oldest, the most central and disputed concept
of social sciences. Since most of the relations among humans are related to power
of one sort or another, any understanding of social science should have at least an
implicit theory of power. Among them, the studies of civil-military relations try to
find a solution to the paradox of a powerful military that is subordinate to the
civilian control. Therefore, the main question that informs civil-military relations
literature can be reformulated in terms of power as “How to curb military’s
political power while not limiting its force?” In order to give an answer to this
question, one must first investigate the nature of the power that the military has or
exercises. Without such an analysis, all theories of civil-military relations will be
inadequate.
In this chapter, I will look at power as defined and analyzed by different
branches of social sciences, mainly sociology and political science in order to
arrive at some analytical categories. In the subsequent chapters, these categories
will help me to assess the power conceptualizations utilized by different civil-

5
military relations theories in order to understand nature and sources of the
political power of militaries.
In this chapter, I will try to find answers to the following questions: Who
is powerful? Where does the political power of a person, a group, an institution
originate from? Is power a capacity (sources) or an action (exercise)? Why is
power exercised? Is a conflict of interests inevitable in a power relationship?
2.1. THE PROBLEM OF POWER
Although power is one of the most disputed concepts of social sciences, it
is probably the concept least agreed upon. Most scholars use it without definition,
and when they do, it is ambiguous whether they refer to power resources, the
scope of power or exercise of power. Nevertheless, there is a limited common
understanding of the term, for otherwise; it might be of no use. This limited
agreement, according to White, is on the fact that “power is concerned with
affecting”1 of a significant nature. Parsons calls it “a core complex of meaning”2
while Dahl and Polsby refer to same core as they argue that power, influence and
control are “serviceable synonyms.”3 For Russell, power is “the production of
intended effects”.4 Therefore, power is a diffuse concept, which connotes a
general capacity to do things irrespective “of the media employed or of the status
1
D.M. White, “The Problem of Power, ” British Journal of Political Science 2, no. 4 (1972): 481.
2
Talcott Parsons, “On The Concept of Political Power,” Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society 107, no. 3 (1963): 232.
3
A. Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in the American City (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1961) and Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven
and London: Yale University Press, 1963), 3-4.
4
Russell Bertrand , Power: A New Social Analysis (London: Unwin Books, 1960), 25.
6
of authorization to make decisions and impose obligations.”5
Although all scholars may agree on significant affecting as the core
element of power, not surprisingly, what makes any affecting “significant” is
controversial and there is no agreement between the scholars with respect to
definition of power. What is more, the definition of scholars and their own focus
of study can be different from each other. For example, Dahl prefers to define
power per se as a capacity, but his focus of study is on “power as an exercise” as
observed in decision-making arenas.6
In his study to understand what core elements are necessary to include in a
definition of power, Debnam analyzes six definitions and distribution of fifteen
elements among these definitions.7 He concludes that, four core elements are
needed for a definition of power: actor, action, intention and outcome. When it
comes to the question of whether power is a capacity or an exercise, he chooses to
collapse them both under the concept of “action” since power as a potential is
practically undistinguishable from power as a manifest action. While existence of
conflict and sanctions are usual in exercises of power, they are not core elements
for any power exercise can exist without them. Some elements like value,
asymmetry, compliance and decision are all related to the consequence of power
exercise, Debnam regards them as “outcome”. Since “it is not possible to study
power independently” without referring to an outcome, or effect, outcome is a
inevitable element of any power definition.
5
Parsons, “On The Concept of Political Power, ” 232.
6
Dahl, Who Governs?
7
Geoffrey Debnam, The Analysis of Power: Core Elements and Structure (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1984)
7
Despite the difficulties, the main clusters could be identified with regard to
the questions that scholars of power try to answer. In the subsequent sections, we
will try to group theories of power with respect to their answers to questions:
a. Who is powerful?
b. Is power a capacity (sources) or an action (exercise)?
c. Is a conflict of interests is inevitable in any power relationship?
2.2. WHO IS POWERFUL?
The first question that arises when thinking about power is probably the
question of “Who is powerful”. Any student of power is inescapably obliged to
define who is powerful. An early answer to this question is given by Aristotle:
Powerful are those “at whose will that which is moved is moved and that which
changes, changes”8. Yet, in specific circumstances, it is more than hard to
understand what the will is, whose will it is, and whether the outcome is identical
with the initial will.
The answers to the question of “Who is powerful?” can be grouped into
two. The first group of scholars depicts a certain group of people as the powerful.
These social groups can be defined with respect to their material well-being, class,
status, membership to an organization or their position. This first group is known
as elitist theories of power. The second approach, known as the pluralist theories
or community power theories, has a more systemic understanding of power,
where power belies with the whole society, where no permanent power structure
8
Aristotle, Metaphysics (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1998), 74.
8
exists. But, before dwelling on elitist and pluralist conceptions of power, one
should look at Weber’s account of power which inspired them both.
With respect to power, Weber argues that there are three orders which
make up the modern society: the economic order, the legal order and the social
order.9 While the economic order is merely the way in which economic goods and
services are distributed, the legal order is the order established by law through
which a “specific staff of men who use physical or psychical compulsion with the
intention of obtaining conformity with the order or of inflicting sanctions.”10 For
Weber, social order as distinct from economic and legal order is “the way in
which social honor is distributed in a community between typical groups
participating in this distribution”11
In his account of rationalization and bureaucratization of societies, Weber
argues that the structure of legal order influences the distribution of power in
society.12 However, it is an additional factor that enhances the chance to hold
power or honor: but it cannot always secure them.
Based on Weber’s account of three orders, elitist theory argues that power
is concentrated on the decision-making elite within a society. According to Mills,
one of the leading scholars who work within this approach, the most important
question about power is the problem of who is involved in making the big
9
Max Weber, “Class, Status and Power,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. H. H.
Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 180-195.
10
Weber, 180.
11
Weber, 181
12
Weber, 180
9
decisions of national and international life.13 As such, his focus is on the question
of “who”.
Mills states that the there are three broad levels of power in a society. At
the top level there is the power elite composed of the leading men of political,
military and economic institutions, which he depicts as “the high military, the
corporation executives and political directorate”14 The people of the middle and
lower levels of power, according to Mills, play only very minor and limited roles
in decision-making. Therefore, for Mills although the individual members of these
three broad levels of power changes over time, the power structure is rather
stable, enabling the membership only to those who are successfully socialized into
their respective institutions.
Among the three important sectors, Mills thinks, the economic sector has
the largest power for “the growth of executive government…means the
ascendancy of corporate elite into political eminence.”15 Especially after WWII,
the corporate men come to dominate the political directorate. In addition to the
corporate sector the military sector has gained a decisive political and economic
relevance at the expense of the politician: “Not the party politician but the
corporation executive is now more likely to sit with the military to answer the
question: what is to be done?” 16
Other theoreticians of power question Mills’ assumptions of the existence
13
C.Wright Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” The British Journal of
Sociology 9, no.1 (1958): 29.
14
Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” 32-33
15
Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” 33
16
Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” 33-34
10
and rigidity of the power elite. Pluralist (community power) scholars, state that
power is diffused within a society. They criticize the elitist conception that ruling
elite makes key political decisions in a given social group. They argue that
different groups of people have more influence in making key political decisions.
These groups are not always the same. Dahl argues that in any society there are
people more powerful than the others, yet these people do not consequently form
a ruling elite.17 They argue that there is a group of people who have a potential for
control, that is, there is high probability for their decisions to prevail, does not
mean that they have a high potential for unity. When, as Mills argues, leading
military men and business men, agree on a policy, it is highly probable that that
alternative will be chosen. Yet Dahl contends that it is wrong to assume that they
will agree on an alternative, since their interests and preferences are diverse and
hard to coalescence.18 In other words, for Dahl, despite the great extent of power
resources at their hand, these leading men cannot form a permanent power elite,
since they hardly -if ever- have a potential for unity in terms of their preferred
ways and goals about operationalizing those resources.
Dahl’s and other pluralists’ conception of power differs from the Mills’ in
the sense that it does not presume the existence of a single ruling elite. Contrary to
static and bureaucratic analysis of Mills, they think that the power distribution
within a society is not a permanent aspect of the social structure. Rather, the
power that a group successfully exercises is subject to change according to time
and issue areas. Mills argues that the socialization of the elite within institutions is
17
Robert Dahl, “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,” The American Political Science Review
52, no. 2 (1958): 463.
18
Dahl, “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,” 464
11
an important aspect of the elite’s unity and he assumes that every member of the
elite is inescapably indoctrinated through social processes, so that they have
similar if not identical interests. Dahl and Polsby question this assumption and
argue that such unity is challenged from time to time and from one issue to
another. So any permanent power elite which prevails on the key political issues,
is unlikely.19
2.3. POWER SOURCES vs. POWER EXERCISE
The next question about analyzing power is whether to treat power as an
ability/capacity or as an exercise. If one gives priority to the former, the analysis
would necessarily lead to question of “having power”: Who has power? Hence,
the first cluster. Accordingly, if one gives priority to the latter, the research focus
becomes mechanisms of power exercise, whether they are formal or informal.
One major obstacle in answering whether power is a capacity or exercise
is to differentiate between sources of power and power per se without being
entrapped in describing exercise of it. Indeed, White plausibly argues that there is
no power as distinct from exercise of power.20 Foucault shares this view and
argues that power per se does not exist.21 Consequently, those who attempt to
describe power per se indeed define power sources. Others argue that such
sources may or may not be translated into political power, thus one should look at
power exercises, as they are manifestly observed in decision-making arenas.22 For
19
Nelson Polsby, “How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative,” The Journal of
Politics 22, no. 3 (1960): 476.
20
White, 480.
21
Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 777-795.
22
Polsby, Community Power, 121
12
example, a person who is wealthy enough to affect certain political decisions may
not choose do so; therefore focusing on his/her economic assets may be irrelevant
in assessing his/her political power.
In this section, following White and Foucault, I will disregard power per
se and will look at approaches which focus on either power sources or power
exercises.
2.3.1. Power Sources
2.3.1.1. Material Sources of Power
Marx believed that history is and will be determined by class conflict
driven by power derived solely from economic resources.23 Marx has seen the
origins of power in the material substructure and concluded that who has the
means of production has the power. Therefore, for Marx, the sources of power are
inherently material.
Mills also put more emphasis on material sources of power.24 Rather than
the nature of power that decision-makers have, Mills tries to investigate the
sources of power they utilize. For Mills, their power essentially stems from their
position in their respective organizations. The power of these elites rests on the
high bureaucratization and centralization of the modern societies which provides
with them the means of power. Their power emanates from institutional trends by
23
Karl Marx, Selected Writings, ed. David McLellan (Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000)
24
Mills, “The Structure of Power in American Society,” 29
13
which “the men at the top have been selected and formed”.25 Moreover, their
formal and informal ways of cooperation and explicit co-ordination enables them
to realize their converging interests.
The lower level of power, which is merely composed of the public, does
not possess the instruments for decision. Contrary to the classic image of
democracies, where the people are presented with problems, discuss them,
formulate viewpoints, organize, and compete; in modern societies, the public is
politically fragmented, unorganized and thus, unable to make decisions. The
public is “increasingly powerless”26
Mills approach to power is based on institutions and organizations as
“means of power”. He states that “In the modern world,… ideas which justify
rulers no longer seem so necessary to their exercises of power.”27 So power is
not authoritative. Authority, the form of power that is justified by the beliefs of
the voluntarily obedient,
“has less relevance in modern day politics, which

ceases to be an arena in which free and independent
organizations truly connect the lower and middle levels of
society with the top levels of decisions.”28
Mills’ approach has very little reference to ideas and ideational factors, not
because that they are not relevant in analysis of power. Rather, he has a practical
reason: the main channels of communication between organizations and lower
levels of society, which is crucial for authority, have begun to collapse. In other
25
Mills, “The Structure of Power in Amerıcan Society,” 34
26
27
28
14
words, since channels for social interaction cease to function, forms of power like
authority, which originate from ideational sources, have lost their prevalence.
2.3.1.2. Ideational Sources of Power
Weber does not agree with Marxian materialist understanding of power
and argues that the power as such is different from “economically conditioned”
power. Power can be derived from social and cultural sources, as well as from
economic situation. Indeed, he argues that even economic power may be the
consequence of power existing on other grounds.29
Weber states that ‘class’ which is described according to the material well-
being of the group, is not the only phenomena of power distribution within a
community. He introduces the concepts of ‘status groups’ and ‘parties’ as
additional ways to stratify society and to understand the power distribution.30
Parties are groups of people who came together with the aim of
influencing a communal action no matter what its content may be. Rather than
enjoying a similar source of power, parties are groups of people, coming from
different status groups or classes, who strive for power.
In contrast to parties, ‘status groups’ is based on a specific source of
power: in status groups, the power distribution is based on social estimation of
honor. Those who belong to the same status group share a specific style of life. As
such, social honor may be informed by the material condition of the person in
29
Weber, 180
30
Weber, 187
15
question. Yet, Weber states that propertied and propertyless people can belong to
the same status group, who share an equality of social esteem. Therefore, wealth
is not a prerequisite for having social honor. The real source of the power of a
person is the opinion of the other people as to how much social honor that person
deserves. Therefore, in Weber’s account, honor operates as a form of ideational
source of power, which is established during social interaction and rooted in the
perceptions and attributions of others. For Weber, “an occupational group” -like
military for example- is also a status group, since “it successfully claims social
honor only by virtue of the style of life which may be determined by it”31
Another approach, which focuses on the sources of power, is by Hannah
Arendt, who finds the sources of power in ideational phenomena. According to
Arendt, “power cannot be measured in terms of wealth.”32 Nor she thinks that
power arises from other physical phenomena that may be converted into
instrument of violence. Contrary to Marx and Weber who regarded violence as the
ultimate form of power upon which the government rests,33 she states that
violence is the opposite of power. 34 Indeed, she establishes her theory of power as
diametrically opposed to the concept of violence.
For Arendt, the power “can only be actualized but never fully
materialized”35 since it is not “an unchangeable, measurable, and reliable entity.”
Therefore, it has an ideational character, which exists as a potential.
31
Weber, 193
32
Hannah Arendt, On Violence (London: Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, 1970), 11.
33
While Marx regards government as an instrument of oppression, Weber thinks that the form of
violence that government executes is at least “allegedly legitimate” see Arendt, On Violence, 11
34
Arendt, On Violence, 56
35
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 200.
16
For Arendt, power is the capacity of the people to act in agreement. As
such, power is in inherent in the very existence of political communities. While
violence is a means to an end and always requires the justification of it, power is
an end in itself. It is “the condition enabling a group of people to think in terms of
the means-end category”.
The core element of power for Arendt is support of the people. She states
that it is the people’s support and the continuation of the societal consent that
brought the laws into existence that lends power to the institutions of a country.”
For Arendt, a republic is where “the rule of law resting on the power of people,
would put an end to the rule of man over man”. Mills assumption of the obedience
and indifference of the masses is challenged by Arendt’s argument that society is
not simply submissive, on the contrary, due to its active support, it is indeed the
very source of power that the government and its institutions rests on.
As emanating basically from the opinion of society, what power needs is
not justification of an end or promise of a future prospect, but legitimacy: “Power
springs up whenever people get together and act in concert but it derives it
legitimacy from the initial getting together, rather than from any action that then
may follow.” 36 Legitimacy of the power, Arendt argues “bases itself on an appeal
to the past”, that is to say, the history of the political community. Since legitimacy
is sine qua non of power, and legitimacy is tied to the past practices of the society,
power has also a historical source.
36
17
Arendt points to the fact that power in its pure form is hard to find in
practice. She states that “institutionalized power in organized communities often
appears in the guise of authority”, without which modern societies cannot
function.37 Since authority “requires respect for the person or the office.” respect
can be regarded as another ideational source of political power.
2.3.2. Power Exercises
White argues that any definition of power should answer the following
question: “What must be added to affecting someone or something for there to be
an exercise of power?”38 Polsby, define power as “the capacity of one actor to do
something affecting another actor, which changes the probable pattern of
specified future events.”39 While his definition of power refers to power as a
capacity, it is clear that for Polsby, the power holder should do something which
directly or indirectly affects the power yielder, whether the effect is on his/her
ideas, status, behavior, material/physical well-being or something else. Not
surprisingly, Polsby’s own research focus is on decision-making mechanisms.40
Lıke Polsby, Dahl also concentrates on the negotiations and discussions between
parties in a decision-making setting, and argues that the one who is able to
implement his/her initial preferences is the powerful.41
Bachrach and Baratz, tried to make distinctions between the concepts of
power, influence, authority and force, and argued that the interchangeable use of
37
38
White, 482
39
Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, 3-4
40
Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, 113,121
41
Dahl, Who Governs?
18
power and influence on the one hand and neglect of authority and force on the
other handicapped scholars of power, in their studies.42 For the former, they hold
responsible pluralists (Dahl and Polsby) who mostly do not differentiate between
power, influence and control, since they think they are “serviceable synonyms”.
While Polsby and other pluralist scholars focus on observable decision-
making mechanisms, Bachrach and Baratz argue that an analysis of “the exercise
of power” as decision-making is inadequate. They introduce a non-decision-
making approach to power, since “power may be and often is, exercised by
confining the scope of decision-making to relatively ‘safe’ areas.”43 Referring to
Schattschneider’s concept of organization as the “mobilization of bias”44
Bachrach and Baratz proposed to analyze, before dealing with actual decision-
making process, the dominant values and the political myths, rituals that are built
into the political system in question. They claim that these values, myths and
rituals are what give real meaning to those issues which enter the political arena.
This, they call, as the second face of power:
“Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to

creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional
practices that limit the scope of the political process to public
consideration of only those issues which are comparatively
innocuous to A.”45
The approach which argues that power is also exercised when confining
42
Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework,”
The American Political Science Review 57, no.3 (1963): 633.
43
Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Two Faces Of Power,” The American Political Science
Review 56, no. 4 (1962): 947.
44
E.E. Schattschneider, The Semi-sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America.
cited in “Two Faces Of Power,” Bachrach and Baratz, 949.
45
Bachrach and Baratz, “Two Faces Of Power,” 948
19
the scope of the decisions, has taken into account more general aspects of power
relations in a society where not only formal but also informal ways of exercising
power are at play. The power to shape and reconstruct the myths and values of the
society indicate that prior to utilization of material sources or institutional means
of power, which show itself in concrete decision making mechanism, ideational
processes of exercising power define the context of decision-making.
Another approach which focuses on non-behavioral ways of exercising
power is that of Steven Lukes, who criticizes the behavioral assumption of Dahl
and Polsby. He states that Bachrach and Baratz made a positive move in depicting
more subtle ways of exercising power.46 Yet, their approach is bound by their
focus on concrete decision-making situations and the outcomes of the discussions
thereof.
Lukes introduces an interest-based approach according to which not only
behaviors of the power yielder and outcomes of the decisions but also the very
interests of the power yielder are shaped by the power holder through power
exercise. This is, for Lukes, “the supreme exercise of power” which is “to get
another or others to have the desires you want them to have -that is, to secure their
compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires.”47 He argues that the fact
that there is not an overt conflict between the parties will lead to ruling out the
possibility of false or manipulated consensus. As such, his approach to power is
radical one, where interests of the power yielder is harmed even he/she may not
46
Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974)
47
Lukes, 23
20
be aware of it.
Is it not the most insidious exercise of power to prevent

people to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping
their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that
they accept their role in the existing order of things either
because they see no alternative to it or because they see it as
natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely
ordained and beneficial?48
While Lukes’ approach to exercise of power is relatively free of
shortcomings that is related to confinement of power exercise to behavioral
decision-making situations, it is not immune to criticism. For example, Hay
argues that the main problem with Lukes’ formulation of the exercise of power is
…the deeply condescending conception of the social

subject as an ideological dupe that it conjures. Not only is this
wretched individual incapable of perceiving his/her true interest,
pacified as s/he is by the hallucinogenic effects of bourgeois (or
other) indoctrination.49
Despite the methodological problems in identifying where the conflict lies
in a power relationship, most -but not all- theoreticians of power regard it as an
indispensable element of the definition of power. In the next section, I will try to
analyze these two approaches to power.
2.4. CONSENSUAL vs. CONFLICTUAL THEORIES OF POWER
Another question to answer in analyzing power is whether a power
relationship necessarily involves a conflict of interests and preferences. While
conflictual view of power focuses on “power over” and thus structures the power
48
Lukes, 24
49
Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 179.
21
relationship as one that exists between the power holder and power yielder, the
consensual power theories focus on “power to do something” and depicts the
power relationship as one that exists between the .empowered and empowering.
2.4.1. Conflictual View
Most of the theoreticians of power mentioned so far, portray power
relationship as conflictual, where the interests of the parties in question clash. In
contrast to Debnam’s argument that a conflict of interests or preferences is not
inevitable in a power relationship, the conflictual view stresses that when there is
no conflict between the parties, the relationship ceases to be a power relationship.
For example, pluralists like Dahl and Polsby argue that in order to investigate the
differences in influence, there should at least be two groups with different initial
preferences about a key particular issue. In their search for analyzing cases of
significant affecting, they set the criterion as significance of issues for the parties
for selecting the cases. For pluralists the criterion for identifying whether an issue
as significant are as follows: The researcher should be able to demonstrate that the
issue areas are “very important in the life of the community”.50 Dahl contends that
Mills analysis, which depicts a powerful elite and an indifferent mass (whose
interests clash but not in an overt form) is inadequate in the sense that the
existence of an indifferent mass implies that the issue at hand cannot be described
as an important one. Nevertheless, he’s able to foresee a possible criticism of his
position. In the case of so powerful elite (hegemonic) elite that has the ability to
shape the ideas, attitudes and opinions, a kind of “false consensus” could be
50
Dahl, “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,” 463-469
22
established. This can be achieved through manipulated and superficially self
imposed adherence of broad sections of a community to the norms and goals of
the elite. Dahl responds to this possible criticism by arguing that when interest
and goals of the elite are adhered by the mass, it will be impossible to differentiate
the elite and the mass, and consequently a power elite ceases to exist.51
Bachrach and Baratz also identified the power relationship as inherently
conflictual. The conflict between the parties may be overt, which can be
perceivable in their disputes within concrete decision-making settings, but it can
also be veiled, when power holder is able to silence the power yielder, and limit
the agenda to the issues deemed as safe by the power holder.
Like Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes stressed the importance of less overt
forms of confliction, in which even the interests of the power yielder is shaped by
power holder in order to preempt overt confrontation. In the end, grievances by
the power yielder against power holder are eliminated from occurring; there is no
apparent collusion between the parties. Yet, according to Lukes, their “true”
interests clash.
2.4.2. Consensual View
The consensual view focuses on collective action and perceives power as
the capacity to make a communal action. As with the conflictual view, we find
origins of this view in Weber’s writings on power, status and society.
For Weber power is “the chance of a man or of a number of men to realize
51
Dahl, “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model,” 467
23
their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are
participating in the action.” Debnam argues that this definition of power does not
necessarily include a conflict of interest between groups of men who strive for
power.52 On the other hand, scholars like Presthus53 contend that this definition
necessarily implies the existence of a conflict of interests.
Torbert, as opposed to classical understanding of “balance-of-power”,
which eventually rests on competition and conflict between the parties, offers a
“power of balance” theory, where the power of balance refers to capacity “to
create a whole without obliterating differences and to balance wholes of different
kinds.”54
For Torbert, unilateral force, which is simply the power to succeed in
exercising one’s own will, is the least effectual and least legitimate power form of
all, while power of balance, which is based on consent and reason, is self-
legitimizing.
Power of balance can also be regarded as “mutual power” which “can be
exercised to balance oneself in relation to others and to cultivate the capacity for
such mutual self-balancing.”55 Since the power of balance “…invites mutuality
and empowers those who respond to this invitation with initiatives of their own” it
is a consensual power, which ultimately rests on the support of the power yielder.
52
Debnam, The Analysis of Power, 7
53
Robert Presthus, Men at the Top: A Study on Community Power (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1964), 4.
54
Michael Torbert, The Power of Balance: Transforming Self, Society, and Scientific Inquiry
(London: Sage, 1991), 2.
55
Torbert, 5
24
As a sociologist who focuses on the factors which hold society together,
Parsons argues that “power is the ability of a society to do”. He prefers to “treat
power as a specific mechanism, operating to bring about changes in the action of
other units, individual or collective, in the processes of social interaction.”56 As a
product of society the “actorness” of the agent is presumed by society through
enabling him/her with the power it produces. Therefore Parsons’ theory is a
systemic theory of power which assumes that power is socially not only
distributed but also produced. For Parsons, power in polity is analogically
comparable to money in economy, the circulating medium upon which the polity
can be based. Therefore, Parsons’ focus is on the circulation and production of
power, but not necessarily on distribution.
In politically underdeveloped societies the main means of securing the
compliance of others is through force. With the development of a more complex
system the need to ensure effectiveness is greater and deterrence of force becomes
less and less significant compared to the symbolic value of such power. Parsons
even states that “the threat of coercive measures, or of compulsion, without
legitimation or justification, should not properly be called the use of power at
all…”57 This symbolic value of power is based on its productive capacity and the
confidence of the society in the ability of the polity to fulfill certain needs, i.e.
effectively contribute to the attainment of collective goals.58
Arendt, like Parsons, has a consensual view of power and focuses on the
56
Parsons, “On The Concept of Political Power,” 232
57
Talcott Parsons. Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New York: Free Press, 1967): 331
58
Parsons. Sociological Theory and Modern Societ, 318
25
“power to do something” rather than “power over somebody” and argues that
power
…corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to

act in concert. Power is never the property of an
individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence
only so long as the group keeps together. When we say
of somebody that he is 'in power' we actually refer to his
being empowered by a certain number of people to act in
their name. The moment the group from which the
power originated to begin with (potestas in populo,
without a people or group there is no power), disappears,
'his power' also vanishes.59
As such, Arendt’s understanding of power is different from the previous
theories where there is an inevitable clash of interest between the actors in
question, and where the exercise of power involves threatening or damaging
another’s autonomy, and thus domination. Arendt’s formulation of power rejects
any form of relation that includes some sort of domination. So for Arendt, force,
strength, coercion and manipulation are not forms of power, because they all
include relations of domination. She rejects the claims of those who argue that
relations of power essentially rest on a command-obedience relationship and that
it necessarily involves a conflict of interests. In contrast, Arendt’s understanding
of power is based on the principle of equality and the ability of acting and
speaking together. It works through a process of argumentation.60
Power is actualised only where word and deed have not

parted company, where words are not empty and deeds are not
brutal, where words are not to veil intentions but to disclose
realities and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to
59
60
Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority?,” in Between Past and Future (New York: Viking Press,
1968), 92.
26
establish relations and create new realities.61
Arendt, as explained in the previous section, conceptualizes power as
something having inherently social resources, which is based on the support and
cohesion of a group. As such, power is always social and based on social
interaction, since the power of certain people among a group depends on the
relationship between the “empowering” and the “empowered”.
In this chapter I have looked at theories of power and built some
categories of power. In the next chapter, I will look at theories of civil-military
relations in order to understand how they conceptualize power of the military.
61
Arendt, The Human Condition, 200
27
CHAPTER 3
MILITARY IN SOCIETY
The studies of civil-military relations try to find a solution to the paradox
of a powerful military that is subordinate to the civilian control. In other words, it
tries to find the possible ways to curb military’s political power while not limiting
its force. In order to understand these ways, any student of civil military relations
must -at least implicitly- utilize an approach to the nature of the power that the
military has or exercises. Therefore, it is plausible to expect that that the theories
of power presented in the first chapter have a direct connection to theories of
civil-military relations. The answer to the question of where the political power of
a nation’s military (in this thesis, particularly Turkish Armed Forces) originate
from, can be found where these two distinct literatures overlap. In this second
chapter, in order to provide a framework which would enable me to find an
answer to my question, I will look at some leading theories of civil-military
relations with a lens of their underlying approaches to power and try to reveal the
intersection between the two.
The civil-military relations problematic rests on two conflicting principles.
28
The first one is that the military must be strong enough to prevail in the society’s
wars. It exists as a guard against any disaster that the society may face. Thus it
must be always ready and its strength should be proportionate to the threat that
challenges the society. Secondly, the military must conduct its own affairs so as
not to destroy the society it is intended to protect. The necessity that it must have
coercive power to enforce its will on society’s enemies implies that the same
coercive power may also be exercised against the society. The possible ways of
the military’s exercise of its coercive power detrimental to the society are a direct
seizure of political power (coup); depletion of society’s resources in a quest for
more power as a hedge against the enemies of the state; involvement of the
society in unnecessary wars and conflicts by a rogue military or there may be a
simple concern over the matter of obedience, where the military may resist
direction or abuse delegated authority in other ways.62
The civil-military problematic gets complicated, since over time the
military has come to serve multiple purposes, especially man-power intensive
programs like disaster relief and construction. It has the ability to redistribute
wealth through defense budget and coercively change individual attitudes. While
before, the main concern for scholars and practitioners was to avert a possible
direct seizure of power by the military, after the collapse of many military
authoritarian regimes in developing parts of the world, the concern has shifted to
62
Peter Feaver. “Civil Military Relations” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 211-241
29
maintain a reliable military under the democratic control of civilians.
Consequently, less direct ways of military’s exercise of its power has gained more
attention.
3.1. CLASSICAL CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY
Huntington’s much cited work on civil-military relations The Soldier and
the State concentrates on the officer corps and rise of professionalism.63 He
acknowledges the tension between the civilian desire for control over military and
the requirement to retain the military force to ensure the country’s overall
security.
From American experience, Huntington draws two forces, which shape the
distribution of power between civilian and military elites. The first one is
“functional imperatives” which are related to the level of the external security
threat.64 When the level of external threat is high, the military enjoys more power,
due to the increase in their importance in dealing with such a threat.
The second force which affects the amount of power that military enjoys is
societal imperatives, composed of “the social forces, ideologies and institutions
dominant within the society.”65
Societal imperative has two main components: prevailing world-view
(ideology) within the society and the legal-institutional framework. In American
63
Samuel Huntington. The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations. (New York: Vintage Books, 1957)
64
Huntington, 4-5
65
Huntington, 87-88
30
case, where the ideology of the society is liberal individualism, the military does
not enjoy as much societal support as it would enjoy if it were realism.66
Therefore, the ideology of the society is important in determining how much
power a nation’s military may exercise. In other words, societal support, which is
function of society’s ideology, operates as an ideational source of military’s
political power.
The second component of societal imperatives, legal-institutional
framework, also affects the power of the military through determining its place
within the internal hierarchy of state apparatus.67 Thus, in Huntington’s account,
military’s ability to translate its force into political power depends on both
ideational factors and material factors. While legal-institutional framework
operates as the material source of military’s political power, ideology operates as
the ideational source.
Huntington’s answer to the question of how to ensure military obedience
has also two components. First one of them is “subjective control” that is, to
assure that those who share the same political ideology with the civilians hold
important military posts.68 Through aligning the military with the political
ideology of the civilian elite, civilians may ensure that military will obey their
directives. Nevertheless, Huntington does not favor this option, since it may lead
to excessive civilianization of the military, which will reduce the military’s
strength in countering threats, and thus state’s military security.
66
Huntington, 94-95
67
Huntington, 95
68
Huntington, 90
31
The key to Huntington’s favorite option to control military “objective
control”, is to maintain military professionalism. He defines elements of objective
control as civilian recognition of autonomous military professionalism and respect
for independent military actions. When the institutional borders between military
and civilian spheres of expertise are effectively delineated, Huntington predicts
that “a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of
any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state”.69
Huntington’s analysis is rich in both ideational and material factors that
help to understand the sources military’s political power. Moreover, he underlines
the importance of the ideational bond between the society and the military, which
may both enhance and limit military’s political power. Nevertheless, he assumes
that society’s world-view will be shared by the elected politicians, and if
“subjective control” is exercised, he argues that it would have a negative effect on
the civilian-military balance of power which would eventually put the security of
the country in jeopardy due to excessive politicization of the military. As such, he
does not perceive society as an independent actor, who may seriously affect the
political power of military. Rather, his analysis is based on a two-actor model,
where society and its worldview may affect the military’s power only through
elected politicians. As such, in Huntington’s picture, the most powerful actor is
the political elite.
Like Huntington, Alfred Stepan, in his book “Rethinking Military
Politics”, focuses on the military as an institution, its corporate interests and
69
Huntington, 84
32
influence in the Brazilian politics from 1964 to 1985.70
According to Stepan, the military’s political power has two dimensions:
the dimension of military’s articulated contestation to the policies of the civilian
regime and the dimension of military’s institutional prerogatives.71 These
dimensions together portray the relationship between the civilians and the military
in a country.
Inspired by a Dahlian conception of power,72 Stepan argues that the degree
of articulated military contestation is affected by whether or not there is a conflict
of interests between the civilian elite and the military over ‘key political issues’.
Following the pluralist conviction that these ‘key issues’ should be identified
prior to any analysis of power, Stepan defines these key issues as: the policies
over the human rights violations committed by the military, government’s
initiatives over the organizational mission, structure and control of the military
and military budget.73 As such, all ‘key issues’ are military issues, pertaining to
decision-making areas whose immediate and foremost affect is on the interests of
the military as an institution rather than those areas which has a nation-wide
importance, like issues of national security, foreign policy or economic and social
policy. However, in developing part of the world, the military is mostly criticized
because of its interference in purely political matters, which reside under the
civilian sphere of decision-making. Therefore, it is rather unrealistic to presume
70
Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1998) xi
71
Stepan, 98-100
72
Stepan, 98
73
Stepan, 68-69
33
that the army will only contest over policies that are expected to have a direct
effect to military’s corporate interests.
Stepan also notes that when he uses the word “articulated” he does not
mean that military’s contestation is publicly stated.74 Rather, he deems sufficient
that the military clearly and persistently convey its contestation so that it becomes
intelligible to relevant military and civilian political actors. Therefore,
contestations that are delivered in discussions which are held between military
elite and the civilian elite behind the closed doors are also deemed as
“articulated”. This definition disregards the importance of the public/societal
reaction and/or support to the positions of the civilian and military elite in these
discussions and consequently eliminates society as a political actor which may
affect the political power of the military.
The second and most cited dimension of the military’s political power
found in Stepan’s work is the scope and level of military’s institutional
prerogatives in:
…areas where, whether challenged or not, the

military as institution assumes they have an acquired right
or privilege, formal or informal, to exercise effective
control over its internal governance, to play a role in extra
military areas within the state apparatus or even to
structure relationships between the state and political or
civil society.”75
These prerogatives, according to Stepan, constitute the bulk of sources that
the power of the military originates from:
74
Stepan, 68
75
Stepan, 93
34
Are prerogatives power? Yes, if the exercise of these
prerogatives helps to turn potential issues on the political
agenda into non-issues, if their existence sets boundaries to
political conflict in the polity, if their existence facilitates
the appeal to their exercise by civilians who have interests
to protect and thus want the military to remain strong
players in the political system or if the strong defense of
the prerogatives prevents major political initiatives from
being implemented once they have begun.”76
Stepan makes a full fledged definition and he bases his in analysis on both
de juro and de facto prerogatives of the military. He states that the most important
potential military prerogatives are constitutionally sanctioned independent role of
the military in preserving internal law and order, military’s relationship to the
chief executive, coordination of the defense sector, active duty military
participation in the cabinet, role of legislature in military budget, role of the
military in implementing national security policy, in intelligence, policing,
military promotions, state enterprises, and the legal system.77
Although Stepan acknowledges that “A dynamic, contextually sensitive
analysis… entails the assessment of power relationships between three interactive,
but conceptually distinct, arenas of the polity: civil society, political society, and
78
the state” his analysis falls short of entailment. He employs an agent-based
approach to military’s political power, where most of the time military and its
corporate interests are at the focus to the expense of civilian elite and the
76
Stepan, 106
77
Stepan, 94-97
78
Stepan, 12
35
citizenry. At other times, he tries to grasp the nature of the interaction between the
military and the civilian decision-making elite, almost totally disregarding the
wider society. However, as seen in the previous chapter, it is equally probable that
the societal support may be crucial in understanding the nature and level of
military’s political power. .
Following Stepan, Pion-Berlin looks at the military’s prerogatives, yet he
differentiates them according to the outcome that military seeks to attain in
exercising these prerogatives. He acknowledges that the interests and motivations
behind the actions of the military may not always be detrimental to the interests of
the civilian elite and the society. For example, he argues that in Latin America,
military may sometimes be “more interested in carving out a political niche within
democratic order, than overturning it”.79
According to Pion-Berlin, the motivations of the military can range on a
continuum from preserving the integrity of their institution to confronting the
civilian elite for political domination. Within this continuum of motivations, the
autonomy of the military takes different characteristics. On the defensive side,
military has an institutional autonomy where the military’s basic determination is
to protect its boundaries from outsiders and prevent unwanted interferences. On
the other side, there is military’s political autonomy, where military is determined
to “stripe civilians off their political prerogatives and claim these for itself.”80
Both forms of autonomy, which Pion-Berlin defines as “decision-making
79
David Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in Latin America,”
Comparative Politics 25, no.1 (1992): 83
80
Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy” 83
36
authority”, are important dimensions of military’s power.
In order to understand whether a military institution has defensive or
offensive motivations, and thus aims institutional or political autonomy, Pion-
Berlin looks at a number of decision-making areas. The military’s
professional/defensive sphere of power consists of the areas, which include the
core issues of the military: junior level personnel decisions, military doctrine,
military education and military reform. The professional/political gray area
includes issues of arms production/procurement, military budget, defense
organization and senior level personnel decisions. Lastly, political sphere consists
of issues of internal security, intelligence gathering and human rights (judicial
immunities of the military personnel).81
Despite his careful differentiation between prerogatives of the military in
terms of military’s purpose in utilizing them, Pion-Berlin’s analysis suffers from
putting disproportionate emphasis on formal decision-making arenas. Unlike
Stepan, who regards military’s verbal articulation of its contestations as one of the
channels which military can exercise its power, Pion-Berlin employs a uni-
dimensional, formal decision-making view of power, where more subtle forms of
power are disregarded. Indeed, Pion-Berlin points to this lack of scholarly interest
in less overt forms of military’s power. He acknowledges that the civil military
relations discipline is based on explanations that dwell on the effects of corporate
interests of the military institutions on military’s power exercises rather than those
of their ideological beliefs and perceptions. Therefore, he argues that specialists
81
Pion-Berlin, “Military Autonomy” 93
37
on this issue lack a perspective on subjective and thus ideational side of the
military’s power.82
The “institutional prerogatives” approach suffers from a lack of interest on
the part of the society. The material and ideational interests, motivations,
ideological orientations and beliefs of the society and their convergence or
divergence with those of the military is almost totally disregarded. As such, the
various forms of relationship that military may establish with the wider society,
based on the level of such convergence or divergence, and their subsequent effect
on military’s political power is overlooked.
As expressed before, the civil military relations theories are normative
theories, which try to find ways to reach the democratic ideal where military’s
political power is limited while its strength in countering threats is retained. The
second generation in the field recognizes this fact and argues that that the
existence of civilian control of the military may be a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for an ideal. They argue that just “civilian” control is not sufficient
since such control should also be democratic.83 For example, while Soviet Union
could be perceived as a state in which civilian control of the military is firmly
established, yet such was not a democratic control of the military, which requires
the active participation of the citizenry. Therefore, the classical civilian elite vs.
military elite dichotomy is not sufficient to understand the complete picture from
82
David Pion-Berlin, “Review: The Armed Forces and Politics:Gains and Snares in Recent
Scholarship” Latin American Research Review 30, no. 1 (1995):148-149
83
Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmonds, Anthony Forster. “The Second Generation Problematic:
Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations” Armed Forces & Society 29, no.1 (2002):
31-56
38
which the political power of the military originate and in which it is exercised.
Recognizing the necessity to take into account democratic nature of the
relationship, Wendy Hunter criticizes the scholarly focus on the military
institution in civil military relations discipline and argued that the other actor of
the game, the civilian elite and the democratic environment which surround and
shapes civilian elite’s capabilities, their intentions, interests and power is mostly
understudied.84 While previous works focus on the aspects, structure, prerogatives
and/or power of the military as an institution, Hunter focuses her research on
civilian elite and its relationship with the citizenry.
She argues that in democratic or democratizing societies, the political elite
have a strong incentive to curb the political power of the military: to win the
support of the electorate.85 She gives Brazil as an example where politicians under
unrestrained electoral competition, have sought to embrace popular causes and
distribute patronage.
Hunter makes a contribution to the literature not only by focusing more on
the civilian elite, but also by going further than simple civilian elite vs. military
elite dichotomy and including the society -the electorate- to the picture. She
establishes an electoral-dynamic hypothesis and focuses on civilian elite’s interest
in attracting mass support on the one hand and military’s interest in containing
mass mobilization on the other. Therefore, she may be said to establish a three-
actor model at which relative power of the civilian and military elites are shaped
84
Wendy Hunter, “Continuity or Change? Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Argentina,
Chile and Peru” Political Science Quarterly 112, no.3 (1997): 453-475
85
Hunter, 474
39
by their respective relationships with the society. In her analysis she demonstrates
that initial institutional prerogatives of the military is not sufficient to account for
a decrease or increase in the political power of the military, since the maintenance
of these prerogatives is a function of the societal support once the process of
democratization is at play.86 Therefore, any analysis of the military’s political
power, which solely focuses on institutional prerogatives of the military and
disregards the societal dimension, will be insufficient.
Unfortunately, probably due to the selection of countries in her case
studies, Hunter’s electoral-dynamic hypothesis suffers from the presumption that
the relationship between the society and the army has a conflictual nature. While
she adds society into the classical “civilian elite-military elite” dichotomy, and
bases her analysis on the relationship of the society with the civilian elite through
democratic elections; she does not dwell into many dynamics that are at play
between the military and the society. The shortcomings are due to two main
factors. Firstly, her analysis is based on a uniformly conflictual understanding of
power, where the interests of the society and the military are at constant conflict,
making the interplay a zero-sum game. For example, one of the ways that civilian
elite would increase is through cutting the material resources of the military and
bribing the electorate. The electorate in return supports the civilian elite at the
expense of the military. However, this assumption of the mechanistic interplay
between the society, military and civilian elite may not always hold true, since in
other circumstances ideational and/or material interests of the society and the
86
Hunter, 454
40
military may converge. Following her example, the supposed clash of interests
may not occur in a country where the army and constant supply of its
expenditures are deemed crucial for the very existence of the state by the majority
of the electorate.
Although Hunter was able to have a more structure-based approach
through arguing that the relationship of the society with the civilian elite is
important in limiting the institutional prerogatives of the military, she misses the
opportunity to understand how military’s relationship with the society may be
important as well in bolstering military’s political power. Military, like
politicians, may also establish links with society to gain their political support.
Therefore, their relationship is not necessarily shaped by a conflict of interests.
Secondly, Hunter’s analysis suffers from an institutional approach to the
relationship between the society and the military. Contrary to the fact that there is
a direct institutional link between the civilian elite and the society through
democratic elections, there is not such a visible link between the military and the
society.87 Yet, for example, in those states where military service is obligatory for
male citizens, there is such an institutional link, which may even prove to be
stronger than the elections.88 Moreover, more informal types of interaction
between the society and military are possible in various spheres.
87
All these shortcomings are in part due to the underlying understanding of democracy as a set of
institutional checks and balances. A true democracy however, requires an active participating
citizenry, who is able to exert control over civilian and military elite not only through elections
and institutionalized regulations, but also through openly discussing and criticizing political and
military issues.
88
See Morris Janowitz, “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies” Armed Forces
and Society 2, no. 2 (1976):185-187 and 189-204 for a detailed discussion of the effects of the
type of military conscription and recruitment on civil-military relations.
41
Indeed, a formal decision-making approach, based on institutional
channels of interaction is endemic to political scientists who study civil-military
relations.89 Rather than questioning why the military is ascribed to have a voice in
political decisions in the first place, political scientists try to trace the increase and
decreases in the political power of the military through observing the relative
prevalence of military’s preferences concerning formal decisions. They focus on
the issue areas in order to understand whether the military has lost or owned new
prerogatives. Such an approach distracts them from analyzing the power sources
of the military, which may be ideational as well as institutional/material.
Military’s opinion-creating and/or enforcing ability as a source if its political
power is overlooked.
Secondly, current literature on civil-military relations relies on an agent
based model, which misses the more structural dynamics that are at play. Most of
the time, military’s political power is theorized as if it exists and is exercised
independently of the social nexus it originates from. At other times, the civilian
elite and its role in curbing military political power are more emphasized in the
form of a principal-agent model.90 Nevertheless, the society and its relationship to
the military are almost totally neglected.
Thirdly, even when the military’s relationship to the society is considered,
it is assumed to be conflictual, where material interests of the society and the
military clash, dismissing the possibility that the society may be willingly
89
Peter Feaver, 212
90
Feaver, 226 232 232
42
directing its resources to the military, even at times of low external threat.
Therefore, most political scientists who study civil military relations,
employ an agent based, formal decision-making approach that assumes a conflict
of interests when theorizing about military’s political power. This leads to a gap,
which prevents to theorize about popular militaries, like Turkish Armed Forces,
and their long-term influence in politics.
3.2. SOCIOLOGICAL SCHOOL: INLCUSION OF THE SOCIETY
Sociological school, on the other hand, focuses on societal control over the
military rather than the civilian elite’s control over military. The leading scholar
of this school Janowitz rejects Huntington’s claim that the ideal-type division of
labor between civilian and military is essential to professionalization of the
military. He argues that in contemporary world the military is unavoidably
politicized and it became like a constabulary force “when it is continuously
prepared to act, committed to the minimum of force and seeks a viable
international relations, rather than victory.”91 As such, military professionalism
should be dynamic and it should be able to integrate new sociological conditions.
Janowitz regards the main problem concerning civil-military relations as
emanating from military’s material resources of power: “the capacity of the
military to intervene in the domestic politics derives from its distinctive military
format: its control over the instruments of violence.”92 Although bearing in mind
91
Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe: Free Press,
1971) 418
92
Morris Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations (Chicago:
43
the military’s changing role and its diversified functions in the modern era and
their effects on the scope of areas that military engages in, Janowitz claims that
“the significance of force as the basis from which they exercise their political
power” should not be overlooked.93 The technology and organization of the army
is also relevant. For example, an army which is mostly made up infantry
battalions has the maximum potential to intervene in domestic politics since they
can be deployed in urban centers and have direct access to the society. Another
factor that affects the political power of the military is military’s leadership skills
in bargaining and political communication. Especially the increase in number and
importance of the military managers (the professional with effective links to the
society but who is still concerned with the calculus required for organizational
and pragmatic dimensions of war-making) “produces greater capacity in the
profession for involvement in politics”94. These leadership skills are also
intertwined by unique experiences and assignments in political-military issues.95
Since such military leaders are more knowledgeable about politics, they are more
prone to intervene in politics.
Among the ideational sources of military’s political power are the type of
social recruitment (social composition), education, professional and political
ideology, and cohesion of the military. Janowitz claims that the social origin of
the military men is of less importance than education in shaping their political
behavior. For armies that were set up during a national liberation movement, like
University of Chicago Press 1988), 107

93
Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion 108
94
95
44
Turkish Armed Forces, the social composition of the military is heterogeneous,
but mostly from middle or lower-middle class. As being products of national
liberation movements, these armies have strong political inclinations. Although,
social composition itself does not have any substantial impact on the ideology of
the military, it establishes a strong link between the society and the military. This
link serves as an important source of support and thus, is one of the ideational
sources of military’s political power.
In sharp contrast with Huntington’s inclination to separate military from
other spheres, Janowitz’s proposal to control military’s political power is to
integrate military with the society’s common values. This ideational form of
power that society exercises over the military is achieved through a number of
ways. Military education is the most important path through which community
values are inculcated and military is socialized. Through this path, the military is
civilianized: “…the trend in modern society –both in new nations and old- is
toward a greater penetration of military into the civilian”. For Janowitz, once a
more dynamic and strong link is established between the society and the military,
the military as well as the society would be empowered for he argues that
“Civilianization is other side of the growth of power of the military.”96
The empowerment of the military through civilianization should be
distinguished from excessive political empowerment of the military at the expense
of civilian. Due to the disagreements and diversification on the use of the concept
of power, these two types military empowerment which are expected to produce
96
Janowitz, Military Institutions and Coercion xii
45
opposite consequences can easily be confused. For Janowitz, while empowerment
through civilianization supports greater civilian (societal) control of the military,
the second type of empowerment deteriorates it.
Apart from the difference between their preferred ways to control military,
the main distinction between Huntington and Janowitz is about their
conceptualization of the power-holder and the power yielder. Janowitz’s focus of
study is societal rather than civilian control of the military in contrast with
Huntington. While Huntington makes a dichotomy of military versus civilian
elite, Janowitz structures it as military versus society. As such, similar to Arendt’s
conceptualization of power, Janowitz theorizes society as the actual power holder,
who both empowers military and is able to control it, while for Huntington the
main power holder is military since the change he proposes for successful control
of the military is on the side of the civilian elite. It is the civilian elite from whom
the military expects a more respectful stance toward its ideological and
institutional autonomy.
Janowitz’s emphasis on the convergence of the military and the society
found resonance in Schiff’s concordance theory. While classical theories of civil-
military relations propose institutional separation of civilian and military domains
for preventing military intervention, she argues that three actors, the political elite,
the military and the citizenry can agree and act in concordance on a number of
issues, which may or may not involve institutional separation of official civilian
46
and military domains.97 Thus, her theory does not depict any civil-military
relationship as the most desirable, leaving the organization of the relationship on
the agreement of three actors.
The relationship between the military and civilians (both elite and the
mass society) is determined by a set of cultural conditions as well as institutional
ones. As such, concordance theory “takes into account the cultural and historical
conditions that may encourage and discourage civil-military institutional
separation”.98 The centrality of culture and its affect on political and military
institutions as well as on the society informs the concordance theory. These
cultural factors include values, attitudes, and symbols inform both the nation’s
view of its military’s role and the military’s own view of that role.99 Factors like
“the characteristics of the general population may influence” the role and purpose
and thus political power of the military. Through referring to the culture within a
society, concordance theory is able to move beyond classical civilian-military
dichotomy, by pointing to the links between military and the wider society.
...concordance theory... argues that three partners-the

military, the political elites, and the citizenry should aim for
a cooperative relationship that may or may not entail the
separation of political and military institutions.100
Besides,
Concordance theory operationalizes the specific
97
Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," Armed
Forces and Society 22, no.1 (1995): 12
98
Schiff, 9
99
Schiff, 11
100
Schiff, 14
47
institutional and cultural indicators…and explains the
empirical conditions under which the military, the
government, and the society may agree on separate,
integrated, or other forms of civil-military relations in order
to prevent domestic military intervention.101
Rather than assuming and even prescribing a fully professional army
which is institutionally and ideologically isolated from the civilian government
and the society, the decision as how to organize the civil-military relations is left
to the agreement of the military, civilian elite and the society on four issues: the
social composition of the army, the political decision-making process concerning ,
recruitment method and the military style.
Despite the emphasis it puts on non-material factors like culture and
history and its inclusion of the society into the picture as an active partner in civil-
military relations, the concordance theory has also shortcomings. Firstly, the
concordance theory can be criticized due to its focus on its prescribed issues of
agreement: Social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making
process which “involves the institutional organs of the society that determine
important factors for the military,” the recruitment method and military style are
all military issues. What it implies is that when “…agreement occur[s] among the
political elites, the military, and the citizenry over the political process that best
meets the needs and requirements of the armed forces”102 the military is satisfied
and loses its interest in purely political issues so that a military intervention
becomes less likely. While this expectation of satisfaction and subsequent loss of
101
Schiff, 14
102
Schiff, 15
48
interest in politics may be true in the case of predatory militaries, it is less
applicable to those militaries, which are criticized for their involvement in
particularly political issues such as foreign, social and economic development
policies of the states.
Secondly, while concordance theory does not prescribe any specific form
of separation or integration between military and civilian spheres and rejects
superimposition of any values upon a nation;103 it prescribes agreement between
the three actors, in order to avoid a military intervention. Thus, the concordance
theory has an underlying assumption on the part of interests and opinions about
the society: any military intervention should be prevented, it is impossible to be
agreed upon, no matter what the culture, history, risk perceptions, anxieties and
future expectations of the society are. According to concordance theory, the
society may agree on anything about military, but not military intervention, since,
Schiff may seem to think, it is unacceptable and in conflict with the interests of
the society.
3.3. MILITARY IN SOCIETY APPROACH
As illustrated in this chapter, the civil-military relations literature suffers
from a gap: the current literature is mostly on a formal decision-making view of
military’s power. In other words, they emphasize the institutional and legal,
hence, material sources of military’s political power. The current literature is
mostly based on the competition between the civilian and the military on attaining
more control over these sources.
103
Schiff, 17
49
Secondly, the current literature depicts the society as a trivial player,
which may have no influence independently of the political elite, on the political
power of the military. It is depicted as if it can neither empower nor delimit the
military’s political power. This lack of interest with respect to society is
attributable to the institutional focus of the current literature. While the formal
institutional bonds that civilian elite establishes with the society thorough
elections, and with the military in various decision-making processes are overtly
visible as they are overly studied, the role of society in civilian-military balance
and its relationship with the military is mostly left neglected.
However, with no doubt, an army which does not secure its society’s
support is fated to fail and perish. It is rather surprising that while society is
deemed as the ultimate source of political power for the elected civilian
politicians, the possibility that it may as well be main provider of the source of
political power of the military is neglected. Society may indeed establish informal
links with the military.
Based on the theories of consensual power approach, particularly that of
Arendt, it is possible to hypothesize that the political power of the Turkish Armed
Forces originate from the channels it establishes with the wider society. Through
these mostly informal channels, the Turkish society may both attribute power and
ascribe a specific role to the military. This attributive understanding of power
underlies the basis on which “military in society” approach is established. As
such, according to “military in society” approach, the political power of the
military is socially constructed as a result of the social interaction between the
50
military and society through time on various spheres. There are historical,
cultural, social, and discursive dimensions to this interaction.
The historical sources of military’s political power originate from the past
experiences of the society with its army. They are important in terms of the
underlying basis upon which the legitimacy of the military’s political power is
established. The military’s political power has also cultural, social and discursive
sources. These sources constitute a three-layered formation. On the basis, the
existence of military motifs embedded in the culture of the society may enable the
establishment of a strong bond of identification between the military and the
society. Secondly, social interaction between military and the society on various
spheres contributes to maintain and enhance this bond. Lastly, discursive
dimension is where military is able to reflect the anxieties and expectations of the
society.
But before analyzing the sources of Turkish Armed Forces political power
with respect to these dimensions, with the purpose of testing the dominant
“institutional prerogatives” approach, which is based on material sources of
political power, in the next chapter, I will look at legal, economic and judicial
sources of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power.
51
CHAPTER 4
MATERIAL SOURCES OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES’

POLITICAL POWER
The material sources of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power can be
grouped under three headings. First group of material sources are legal-
institutional prerogatives of the army as set in the constitutional system. These are
also the legal sources of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power. The laws and
regulations that determine functions, responsibilities and rights of the Turkish
Armed Forces operate as an almost-material source of political power. These legal
rules determine the borders of Turkish Armed Forces’ autonomy and its
relationship with the executive and the legislative as well as other constitutional
organs.
The second area is the economic sources of Turkish Armed Forces’s
political power. The economic sources are intrinsically related to the legal
sources since coordination of the defense sector, the share from the national
budget, the processes of arms procurement are all regulated by legal rules.
Nevertheless, Turkish Armed Forces’ economic sources also include extra
52
governmental economic sources, like foundations, associations and other non-
governmental establishments that have a role in advancing the economic interests
of either the military as an institution or the military personnel individually. These
economic sources can constitute an important element of the material sources of
the Turkish Armed Forces’ political power as long as their economic activities
have important affects on overall Turkish economy, which can translate into a
political leverage against elected governments.
The third material source of army’s political power refers to the judicial
status of the army. The extent and coverage of military jurisdiction, its level of
penetration to areas of political and civil society and coordination of the military-
court-system constitutes this group of sources. While independent military
judicial systems makes civilian control of the army less effectual and ephemeral,
thus adding to military’s political autonomy, extensive military jurisdiction can
be used as a tool to project military’s power into civilian domains, changing the
military-civilian balance of power.
In this chapter, I will try to group and analyze the above material sources
of political power with a particular emphasis in their respective weight in the
overall calculation of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power. I will also try to
understand the relationship between ideational and material phenomena as to
understand how they interact and help to produce one another.
4.1. LEGAL SOURCES
Most of the work on Turkish Armed Forces and its prominent role in
53
Turkish politics refer to the institutional prerogatives of the army, most of which
stem from its distinguished legal status in the Turkish constitutional system.
The most important document that can supposedly provide the Turkish
Armed Forces with such a legal power base is the constitution. The constitution is
the main legal document, which sets the constitutive principles along which the
state organs are supposed to act. Moreover, it defines the functions, duties and
responsibilities of state organs and their relationship with each other. As such, the
status of Turkish Armed Forces and its relationship with executive, legislative and
the judicial bodies are defined in the constitution.
The constitution of 1982 was drafted and adopted during the period of
military rule following the September 1980 coup. Since the 1982 Constitution of
Turkey was prepared under non-democratic conditions it is widely regarded as a
military constitution. For this reason, it is often stated that the Turkish
Constitution of 1982 grants some extra powers to the military.104 It is argued that
in order to “obtain certain guarantees for a share of power in the upcoming
democratic system,”105 the military has been able to include some guarantees into
the constitution, which supposedly entrust them with a “tutelary” role.106 Since
the limits of these tutelary powers are ill defined, the military can exercise broad
104
Ümit Cizre Sakallio lu, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy”
Comparative Politics 29, no. 2. (1997): 151-166. Ayse Yuruk. Democratization Reforms in The
1982 Constitution of Turkey Paper presented at the annual meeting of the The Law and Society
Association, 4 July 2006 available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p121115_index.html
105
Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation.
(Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 106.
106
Cizre, “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military,” 151-152
54
oversight over the government and its policies.107 Such empowerment can took
place in a number of ways. One way was to incorporate military-cherished values
into the constitution. Özbudun argues that through making references to
substantive values “such as territorial integrity, national sovereignty, law and
order, secularism, nationalism” the military can supervise the elected politicians
and exercise political power.108 Another way is through ambiguous constitutional
references to the role of the Armed Forces in both the constitution and the related
laws, giving the army a supervisory role over the policies of the elected
government with referring to the ambiguously defined national interests. Thirdly,
the establishment of constitutional formal institutions, (like NSC) can endow the
military with supervisory powers.
In this part, I will analyze the place of Turkish Armed Forces in the
constitutional system under three subheadings. Firstly, I will analyze the founding
principles of the state as stated in the constitution and their intermingling with the
above stated “military-cherished values”. Secondly, I will look at functions and
the hierarchical position of the Turkish Armed Forces as set in the constitution
and the related laws, with an emphasis on its relationship with primary executive
and legislative organs of the state. Lastly, I will look at the official national
security conception in Turkey and the National Security Council and assess the
overall weight of NSC in defining the civilian-military balance of power.
107
J. Samuel Valenzuela, “Democratic consolidation in post-transitional settings: notion, process,
and facilitating conditions” Working paper 150, (1990) Avaliable at:
http://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/150.pdf (last accessed on 5 September
2007)
108
Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics, 106.
55
4.1. Founding Principles and the Military
The constitutive principles in Turkish Constitution of 1982 are stated in
the preamble and the first eleven articles. In the preamble, it states that the
constitution has been drawn up according to “the concept of nationalism outlined
and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of the Republic of
Turkey, Ataturk.”109 The preamble also states that the constitution “affirms the
external existence of the Turkish nation, motherland and the indivisible unity of
the Turkish state”. The main principles that is stressed in the preamble is
territorial integrity, secularism, and Ataturkism:
No protection shall be accorded to any activity contrary to

the Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of
the existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish
historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles, reforms
and modernism of Atatürk and that, as required by the principle of
secularism, there shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred
religious feelings in state affairs and politics.110
The values of Ataturkist nationalism, territorial integrity and secularism
are also restated in the first three (irrevocable) articles of the constitution. Article
2 of the 1982 constitution stipulates that the Republic of Turkey is a "democratic,
secular, and social state governed by the rule of law," respecting human rights and
loyal to the nationalism of Kemal Atatürk and it is “based on the fundamental
tenets set forth in the Preamble”. Article 3 states that “the Turkish state, with its
territory and nation, is an indivisible entity”.
109
The Preamble section of The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, available at
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm (last accessed on 12 July 2007)
110
The Preamble section of The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey
56
Because of Ataturk’s primary role in the establishment of the Republic, a
great importance -along with a wide popularity- is attached to Ataturk by the
society. Accordingly, the constitutional references made to him and the principles
like secularism, nationalism, and national sovereignty cannot be solely attributed
to the military. For that reason, the incorporation of Ataturkism into the
constitution cannot be perceived as a separate source, rather it may be perceived
as a clearer illustration of the influence of Atatürk’s legacy not only on the
military but also on the society. Moreover, it should be noted that the
Constitution was approved in a referendum by more than the 90 per cent of the
voters. This affirms that the incorporation of these values into the constitution has
been widely perceived as natural by the mass society.
4.1.2. Functions and Place of Turkish Armed Forces
Another material source of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power, which
can be found in the constitution, is the organization of the relationship between
Turkish Armed Forces and the organs of the state.
The problem of the Turkish Armed Forces’ place in the constitutional
system dates back to 1960 military intervention. Due to insistence from the coup-
makers, the Office of the General of Chief Of Staff was placed under the Prime
Minister with the 1961 constitution, thereby changing the previous practice in
which s/he operated under the Ministry of National Defense. However, the related
provisions of Code on Ministry of National Defense and Code on The General
Staff were still in force, leading to the statements of Constitutional Court, which
abolished the previous Codes in accordance with the constitution. The
57
constitution of 1982 has been prepared in line with the same principles.
The Art 117 of the 1982 Constitution states that Chief of the General Staff
is the commander of the armed forces. The main duty of the General Chief of
Staff is to control and command the armed forces, and to determine and
operationalize the principles and programs regarding the personnel, intelligence,
mobilization, organization, education and logistics of the military. Moreover, the
Office is responsible from managing the military relations with NATO and other
foreign countries. While the office of the commander-in-chief rests with the
spiritual existence of the Grand National Assembly and is represented by the
President of the Republic, at time of war, General Chief of Staff exercises the
duties of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces on behalf of the President.
Therefore, the Office of the General Staff is the main constitutional body, which
represents the Turkish Armed Forces. Consequently, the hierarchical position of
the Chief of General Staff with respect to other constitutional bodies can provide
a clue for the place of Turkish Armed Forces in the Turkey’s constitutional
system.
The position of the President of the Republic has been a special interest for
Turkish Armed Forces. The fact that military interventions of 1960, 1971 an 1980
took place at times of presidential crises is an indicator of the importance of the
position.111 Furthermore, more than half of the former presidents of the Republic
were of military origin. It is argued that since President of Republic is a politically
neutral figure, s/he can establish agreement between the Armed Forces and the
111
Ozturk, 208-210
58
government. Alternatively, it can be stated that the importance attached to the
President of the Republic by the military owes to the fact that the President has
many legal powers and duties concerning the Turkish Armed Forces.
According to article 104, the powers and duties of the President of the
Republic concerning the Turkish Armed Forces are as follows:
“to represent the Supreme Military Command of the Turkish

Armed Forces on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, to
decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces (in
emergency situations where the Assembly is on recess), to appoint
the Chief of the General Staff, to call the National Security Council
to meet, to preside over the National Security Council and to
proclaim martial law or state of emergency”.
Moreover, s/he appoints the members of the Military High Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Military Administrative Court. Although, the President
is apparently the highest authority with most functions about the Turkish Armed
Forces, the main state organ, which is responsible for national security and the
preparation of the Armed Forces for the defense of the country (to the Turkish
Grand National Assembly) is the Council of Ministers.112 The same article also
states that the Chief of General Staff is responsible to the Prime Minister in
exercising his/her powers and duties.
The Office of the General Chief of Staff is supposed to act also in close
collaboration with the Ministry of National Defense. The bulk of the costs of
Turkish Armed Forces are included under the budget of the Ministry of National
112
The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey , Art.117
59
Defense. The Ministry of National Defense supplies conscription, health and
veterinary services, infrastructure, housing, property and financial auditing
services to the military.113 As such, the Ministry operates as a supportive rather
than supervisory organization of Turkish Armed Forces.
Although, as the legislative organ of the state, The Turkish Grand National
Assembly is vested with the authority to decide on the use of Turkish Armed
Forces, declare war and send army troops abroad,114 the constitution sets a very
limited parliamentary oversight over the Turkish Armed Forces, mostly restricted
to the discussions on defense budget.
In conclusion, the Turkish Constitution of 1982 establishes many links
between Turkish Armed Forces and different parts of the constitutional system.
As a result, the place of the Turkish Armed Forces in the constitutional system is
intricate, if not ambiguous. Through ambiguous constitutional regulations, it is
argued that Turkish Armed Forces is given an equal position to any ministry,
which strengthens it politically. However, it is hard to state that Turkish Armed
Forces has formally been given an independent role since it is clear that Turkish
Armed Forces has been put under the control of the executive organs. The overall
weight of the President on provisions concerning Turkish Armed Forces can be
attributed to the desire to keep Turkish Armed Forces, the most organized power
in the country, aloof from political interference in order to prevent its
politicization.
113
1325 Sayılı Milli Savunma Bakanlı ı Görev ve Te kilatı Hakkında Kanun
114
The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Art.92
60
There is no reference as to the functions and duties of the Turkish Armed
Forces in the constitution. Therefore, it is not possible to state that the constitution
gives Turkish Armed Forces a “guardianship” or “tutelary” role. However, an
important legal document which may provide military with a material base for
political power is the Military Internal Service Code. Article 34 of the Code,
which defines the duty of the Turkish Armed Forces, states that the main duty of
the Turkish Armed Forces is to protect the Turkish motherland and maintain the
Republic with its properties stated in the constitution. This article has been put to
the forefront by the coup-makers as the legal basis of military interventions of
1971 and 1980. For that reason, it is argued that the above article should be
changed in order to make any military intervention less likely. Yet, Article 6 of
the constitution states that the ultimate authority belies with the nation and no
organ can use a state power, which is not stated in the constitution. Therefore,
provisions in complementary laws like Internal Service Code, can be used as a
pretext for military intervention, yet the constitutional system does not give any
official political authority to the Armed Forces, despite the common belief in the
society that it does so.
4.1.3. The Concept of National Security and National Security Council

(NSC)
Like other armies, the main function of the Turkish Armed Forces is to
work for maintaining national security and to defend the country against foreign
threats. It often stated that the Turkish constitution of 1982 indirectly empowers
military through its definition of national security. Since it has a broad definition,
it allows for including many areas under the issue of national security, which
61
extends the sphere of military issues. Since an ambiguously and broadly defined
national security concept allows for blurring of the distinctions between national
security and politics, it increases the possibility of military’s interference in
politics with referring to national security. As such, who defines national security
and how it is defined is “crucially relevant for the power distribution between
civil and military equation.”115
In this part, the national security concept will be discussed with respect to
its legal and institutional dimension since it is argued that “it is translation of
national security into laws, decrees and regulations that in fact gives the Turkish
military wide latitude in policy making and law enforcement”.116 Therefore,
public discussions concerning the national security are out of the scope of this
chapter.
As stated before, the constitution assigns the Council of Ministers for the
maintenance of national security. Therefore, the executive branch, not Turkish
Armed Forces, is assigned to deal with the issues concerning security. Under
conditions of war, martial law and general mobilization, Turkish Armed Forces
has been given functions for maintaining the internal security under the control of
the Chief of Staff.
Although the executive branch is the main organ vested with the authority
to define national security, the constitution foresees the establishment of National
Security Council (NSC), an advisory organ to the government for security
115
Ümit, Cizre, “Demythologizing the National Security Concept: The Case of Turkey,” Middle
East Journal 57, no.2 (2003): 215
116
Cizre, “Demythologizing the National Security Concept” 219
62
matters. It is composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff,
Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of Justice, National Defense, Internal Affairs,
and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Forces and the
General Commander of the Gendarmerie, and is chaired by the President of the
Republic.
The NSC has been established after the military intervention of 1960, and
was included in the subsequent constitutions. The role of the NSC was
strengthened as the time passed.117 The phrase that NSC “communicates requisite
fundamental recommendations to the Council of Ministers”118 has been changed
with the 1971 intervention to “recommends”. The 1982 constitution stipulated
that recommendations of the NSC “would be given priority consideration by the
Council of Ministers”. In addition, the number and weight of senior commanders
in NSC increased at the expense of its civilian members.119 Thus, the NSC has
become a major element of Turkey’s national security system, which sets the
national security policy of the state of the Turkish Republic.120
The weight of NSC on Turkish politics has been a major concern in
Turkey’s accession process to EU. The national security is legally defined as “the
protection and maintenance of the constitutional order, national presence,
integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests in international field
117
Ozturk, 185
118
The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey , Art. 111
119
Cizre-Sakallio lu, Ümit “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy”
Comparative Politics 29, no. 2 (1997):157-158
120
Ozturk, 184
63
as well as against any kind of internal and external threats, of the State”.121 It is
argued that due to this broad definition, the NSC operates as a second executive
body which directs a wide range of government polices including agricultural
development projects, education,122 economic plans,123 development of energy
sector,124 TV and radio broadcasts,125 foreign trade126 and development of
National Parks.127
Following the criticisms stated in the annual Progress Reports of the EU
Commission, the government has passed a constitutional reform package in 2001
which aimed at reducing the impact of military on politics though institutional
changes. The composition of NSC has been changed; Deputy Prime Ministers and
the Minister of Justice have become permanent members, thereby increasing the
number of the civilians. By 2003, further reforms were made, which changes the
Law of the NSC and the Secretariat General of the NSC. With these reforms, the
Secretary General of the NSC has become a civilian person. Moreover, the posts
of military members at YOK (High Education Council) and RTUK (Radio
Television High Council) were abolished.
The most effective channel that NSC can influence the policy decisions of
121
Milli Güvenlik Kurulu ve MGK Genel Sekreterli ine li kin Kanun Art.2
122
National Security Council, http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2001/24nisan2001.htm,
http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/22agustos2002.html (accessed June 26, 2007)
123
National Security Council, http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2001/28aralik2001.htm
(last accessed on June 26, 2007)
124
National Security Council http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/28haziran2002.html
125
National Security Council http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/29mart2002.html
126
National Security Council http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2002/29ocak2002.html
127
National Security Council, http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2003/28mayis2003.html
64
the government is the National Security Policy Document (NSPD). The NSPD is
prepared by the General Secretariat of NSC upon proposals by the ministries and
other related government organizations. Following its approval by the NSC, the
document is presented to the Council of Ministers for evaluation. It is the route
map, which includes the general principles to be followed in maintaining the
general welfare of the state and its people.128
The most voiced criticism about the NSPD is that the preparation of the
document is almost exclusively made by the military bureaucracy129 with minimal
or no inclusion from the government. The divergence of views between the
government and the military on the document has been put the forefront by the
national media concerning the preparation of the last NSPD in 2005.130 Due to the
difference of opinion between the government and the Turkish Armed Forces, the
approval of the new NSPD is delayed. In January 2005, the Prime Minister sent a
letter to the Secretary General of the NSC which reminded that the main organ
responsible from national security is the Council of Ministers. The letter also
stated that the new NSPD should include recommendations on general principles
concerning the security policy and should not be prepared as an action plan.131
Furthermore, the Parliament Speaker, Arınç criticized the fact that NSPD is
128
National Security Council FAQ www.mgk.gov.tr/sss.html
129
Ali Bayramoglu, “Milli Güvenlik Siyaset Belgesi Nedir?” (What is National Security Policy
Document?”) Yeni afak, April 29, 2005, Lale Sariibrahimoglu, “Milli Güvenlik Kurulu” 24 in
Almanak Turkiye 2005 -Guvenlik Sektoru ve Demokratik Gozetim (Istanbul: TESEV 2005), EU
Commission Progress Report on Turkey 2005, 14
130
Although it is a secret document, it is sometimes possible to find it on national newspapers.
Cumhuriyet, November 14, 2005
131
Milliyet, “Milli Guvenlikten Hukumet Sorumlu,” (“The goverbment is responsible for national
securty”) January 11, 2005
65
prepared without contribution by the parliament.132 When their views on these
comments asked, Chief of General Staff Özkök and AKP Group Vice President
Kapusuz stated that NSPD is prepared by the Council of Ministers. Speaker of the
Cabinet Çiçek also stated that the NSPD is discussed within the government as
such the government is fully informed about its content. As such, there is ongoing
debate among the political and military elite on preparation process of NSPD.
While NSC is publicly perceived as a remnant of 1960 military
intervention and as the most effective institutional channel though which the
Turkish Armed Forces exercises political power, the recent legal institutional
amendments has changed the picture. The military, even if with some reluctance,
has submitted to the adjustments and acted in accordance with the reforms despite
the fact that “doing so has forced it to let go of power it had felt necessary to build
up and carefully guard for decades”.133 On the other hand, the legal amendments
will connote less meaning if they could not find resonance among the wider
public. The examples like the request of the president of Ankara Chamber of
Industry from the Secretary General of the NSC to include economic matters in
the discussions of the NSC134 imply that its overall weight in Turkish politics will
continue.
4.2. ECONOMIC SOURCES
The economic sources of Turkish Armed Forces’ political power are
132
Radikal, “Kırmızı Kitap tartı ması,” (“Red Book Dispute”) April 25, 2006
133 Ersel Aydinli, Nihat Ali Özcan, and Dogan Akyaz, The Turkish Military's March Toward
Europe, Foreign Affairs 85, no. 1 (2006): 77–90
134
Milliyet, “Ekonomi de MGK’ya Gelmeli” *(“Economy should also ome to NSC”) January 11,
2005
66
twofold. The share it receives from the national budget supplies the bulk of
Army’s economic power. Extra-budgeted governmental payments are the second
source. Thirdly, there are non-governmental economic instruments (channels)
through which Turkish Armed Forces as an institution may exert political
influence.
4.2.1. The Share from the National Budget
It is often stated that developing countries’ large military spending have
a negative impact on their level of economic and social development; it reduces
the share of other government services like education and health sectors.
Moreover, arms and technology export add to the trade deficit and other budget
deficits. For these reasons, the amount of the defense budget is a primary concern
for the civilian governments. As Wendy Hunter states, the civilian governments
may try to make cuts in the defense budget in order to win the electorate. Taking
into account military’s general inclination to expand its economic sources in
terms of arms, logistics, technology and personnel it would not be mistaken to
state that the defense budget may be an important factor in the distribution of
power between the civilians and the military.
Turkey has quantitatively the largest army in Europe and second largest
after USA in NATO. There are approximately 514.000 soldiers.135 Accordingly,
its overall defense spending was 8.9 billion US dollars by the year 2001, which
pertains to approximately 5 % of its Gross Domestic Product. Especially after
135
Sabah, “TSK Avrupa’nın En Büyü ü,” (“Turkish Armed Forces is the greatest of Europe”)
December 22, 2006
67
1988, there is a considerable increase in Turkey’s defense spending. By the year
2000, defense budget amounts to 7 billion dollars 40 % of which is personnel
costs, 41 % oil, food, clothes and the like, and 18 % military equipment.
By the year 2001, the distribution of the defense budget to related
organizations was as follows. National Defense Ministry get 85 %, Gendarmerie
gets 15 % while Coastal Security 0.6 %. National Defense Ministry: Land Forces
get 49.3 %, Air Forces get 21.9 % Navy gets 14.4 %, and Office of the General
Chief of Staff gets 7.1 %.
The primary place the Defense Budget occupies in the National Budget
is determined by the personnel payments and “Extra-personnel Current
Expenditures” (EPCE). The fact that EPCE amounts to a major element of
defense budget requires attention. EPCE covers arms and other military
equipment payments and the army’s needs like food, clothes, oil and the like.
While one third of the EPCE goes to military equipment, two thirds are other
needs of the army. It should be noted that most of these spending go for the
maintenance of Turkey’s largely conscript army, who are not professional
soldiers. Therefore, although the numbers are high enough to assert that military
has the control of many economic resources; it is due to the maintenance of a
large conscript army.
There are not many studies that focus on Turkey’s military spending.
Firstly data is heard to reach due to security reasons. Secondly, politicians and
academicians avoid discussing the issue, in order to avoid being called as non-
68
patriotic. Accordingly, the share the Turkish Armed Forces gets from the national
budget (defense budget) is the least debated and criticized part of the national
budget. Moreover, the few research that was made recently point to the economic
effects of the defense spending with no or minimal references to its effect on
politics.
Although there is lack of discussion about the defense budget in the
parliament which is supported by a lack of interest in the academia, a recent
overall analysis of the defense spending and its share in the budget indicates that
defense costs of Turkey does not preclude other government services.136 In times
of economic crises, the decrease in the defense budget was less than decrease in
other major areas of government spending like education and general services,
implying the “unavoidable” nature of defense spending. Ekinci argues that this
correlation of up and downs of defense budget with other elements is due to the
politicians’ concern for electoral approval which led them to follow the track that
defense spending goes in other areas of government spending. Alternatively, it
can be argued that the defense spending is subject to the economic situation of the
country and is not independently decided. Therefore, in terms of the share of
Turkish Armed Forces from the budget, it would be an exaggeration to state that
its material sources are set independently from the civilian political rule, despite
civilian elite’s disinclination to discuss military budget due to their considerations
on other grounds.
136
Gülay Günlük- enesen, Türkiye’de Savunma Harcamaları ve Ekonomik Etkileri: 1985-2001,
(Istanbul: TESEV, 2002)
69
While Turkish Armed Forces’ share of the national budget can be at best
perceived as an indicator of projection of its political power into material
interests, it would be mistaken to assume that its share constitutes a material
source for its political power. On the other hand, through other economic
channels, Turkish Armed Forces has a potential to affect the economic standing of
the Turkey, which supposedly can enhance the Turkish Armed Forces’ political
power. Government institutions like Undersecretariat of Defence Industries, civil
society organizations like Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, private institutions
like OYAK are the main instruments of such economic influence other than
national budget. They help to advance material sources of Turkish Armed Forces;
operationalization of such material sources in the political process may provide
the military with a political leverage against the government through its potential
to affect Turkey’s economy.
4.2.2. Undersecretariat of Defence Industries (USDI) and Defence

Industry Support Fund (DISF)
The defence costs of Turkey are not only supplied by the share from the
budget. In early 1980s, the Modernization Program was initiated, which aims to
strengthen the national military industry. The expenses of this program are to be
supplied by for Defense Industry Support Fund under the control of for Defence
Industry Development and Support Administration, established in 1985 by law
3238. The Administration was renamed as Undersecretariat of Defense Industry
(SSM) after 1991. The SSM is established under the Ministry of Defense and is
the primary organ, which is responsible from strengthening cooperation with and
technology transfer from international companies by signing agreements, the

70
establishment and supporting of Turkish private military industry according to the
needs of the Turkish Armed Forces. There are three organs under the
Undersecretariat. First one is High Coordination Council, composed of ministers,
Chief of General Staff. The decision-making process for arms procurement in
Turkey is done through the main Executive Committee. The Executive
Committee is composed of the Prime Minister, the Minister of the National
Defense and the General Chief of Staff. The needed assets are determined by the
Turkish General Staff, according to the Strategic Target Plan prepared by the
General Staff.
The main elements of the fund are the transfers from the budget and
other government funds, lottery, shares from the special taxes (like alcohol,
tobacco, and light arms). It is exempted from various taxes. Moreover, it is
exempted from regular fiscal government control through Court of Accounts. A
council of three people from Ministry of Finances, Ministry of National Defense
and the Premiership is responsible from monitoring and auditing of the Fund.
The Fund has amounted to 11 billion US dollars since its inception,
almost 660 million dollars a year. Although significant amount of sources are
devoted to the Fund, as apparent in the composition of its executive body,
government takes active part in controlling the fund.
4.2.3. Turkish Armed Forces Foundation (TAFF)
Turkish Armed Forces Foundation is established in 1987, through
amalgamation of previously formed foundations, which are established for
71
empowering the Land, Naval, and Air Forces. Its mission is stated as “to
contribute to the empowerment of the Turkish Armed Forces and development of
national defense industry with the material and moral support of the Turkish
society.” 137 It has subsidiaries, affiliates and indirect subsidiaries.
4.2.4. Armed Forces Pension Fund (OYAK)
OYAK was established in 3 January 1961 with a special law adopted by
the Committee of National Unity shortly after the military intervention of May
1960.
The legal status of OYAK has a dual nature: it is established as a under
the Ministry of National Defense in order to provide some social security benefits
to the members of Turkish Armed Forces. The Article 37 of the Law states that all
assets of OYAK have the rights and priorities of other state assets. These two
properties give OYAK the status of a state enterprise. Nevertheless, according to
the same law, OYAK has a private financial and administrative status. Due to its
dual nature, OYAK benefits both from the immunities and privileges given to any
state enterprise and a freer hand to operate like private enterprises.
The administrative structure of OYAK consists of three main bodies.
The Council of Representatives, headed by either Minister of National Defense or
General Chief of Staff, is composed of 50 to 100 members, who are appointed by
their respective seniors. The General Council is composed of 40 people, 9
members of which are civilian. The civilian members include Minister of National
137
Tukısh Armed Forces Foundation Website http://www.tskgv.org.tr/
72
Defense, Minister of Finance, Head of Court of Accounts, Head of Supreme
Auditing Commission, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Banks
Association of Turkey, the Chairman of Union of Trade Chambers, Industry
Chambers and Trade Stocks and three other people from the private sector who
are competent in economy and finances. The military members are General Chief
of Staff, Commanders of Air, Naval, Land Forces and Gendarmerie, 6 military
personnel from either Ministry of National Defense or Turkish General Staff and
20 members elected by the Council of Representatives.
The main executive organ of OYAK is the Executive Council, composed
of 3 military and supposedly 4 civilian members. The military members are
proposed by the Ministry of National Defense and Turkish General Staff, and
elected by the General Council, while other 4 members are appointed by a special
committee, composed of 6 of the above-mentioned civilian members of the
General Council. Yet traditionally, at least one of these four members has become
a military person either serving or retired, making majority of the votes military.
By June 2007, five members of the Executive Committee are soldiers.138
OYAK Group is among the first three economic giants of Turkey,139
consisting of 60 firms operating in many sectors including finances, industry and
services. It is the group with most profits. More than 34.000 people are employed
in these firms. OYAK has approximately 230.000 members, both civilian and
138
smet Akça “Ordunun Yüzlerinden Biri: Sanayici, Tüccar, Finansal Yatırımcı”, Gelecek 12,
(2003) and smet Akça “Kolektif Bir Sermayedar Olarak Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri” in Ahmet nsel
ve Ali Bayramo lu (eds), Bir Zümre Bir Parti Türkiye’de Ordu ( stanbul: Birikim Yayınları,
2004)
139
Sabah, “OYAK 'Üçüncü Dev oldu,” (“OYAK became the third giant”) October 06, 2005.
73
military. As such, it has significant economic power.
Although OYAK is publicly perceived as the holding of the military,
since most of its executive members are military origin, it operates as a private
firm. 140 Recently, due to Group’s decision to sell its bank to a foreign company, it
received criticisms from the military circles on the grounds that its sale is contrary
to both national interests, and thus cannot be approved by the members. The
General Manager of the Group, a civilian, stated that OYAK respects the
members’ views, yet, since it does not belong to military, its decisions, like any
other profit-seeking private firm is bound by material considerations
independently of the political views held by its members. Moreover, it is sued by
Turkish Retired Non-commissioned Officer’s Association, which argued OYAK’s
executive cadre is entirely composed of military officers. Despite the widely held
opinion that OYAK is owned by the military, it is not. While its economic
strength may contribute to the individual economic interests of its both military
and civilian members, it is mistaken to assume that it adds up to the material
sources of the military’s political power as an institution.
4.3. JUDICIAL SOURCES
Today, in most countries like Turkey, the establishment of military
courts is recognized in the constitutional systems. In some European countries
like Germany, Sweden, Denmark and Norway, their existence is restricted to only
140
For an example of such perception see Ege Cansen, “OYAK kapatilmalidir” (“OYAK should
be closed”) Hurriyet, September 17, 2005
74
times of war, whereas in Austria they do not exist even in times of war. In other
countries like France, Belgium, Spain, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria civilian
judges take part in the composition of the military courts. With the development
and expansion of values of human rights and freedoms in the last two centuries,
the composition of military courts and the borders of their spheres of authority
have begun to be debated immensely in discussions of fuller democratization.141
In Turkey, the military and civilian judicial systems are based on
different procedures. The judicial independence and immunities of military courts
are subject to divergent levels of regulation. The military judicial system is highly
independent from the civilian system, which adds to the political autonomy and -
thus political power- of the military as an institution. This duality leads to
criticisms about the composition of the military judicial bodies and their sphere of
jurisdiction. Firstly, in Turkey, the military jurisdiction’s sphere of authority
usually extends to civilian domains due to ambiguities in related regulations.
More often than not, the civilians or military personnel who commit ordinary
crimes are tried in military courts. Secondly, the inclusion of non-judge military
personnel in military courts leads to questions about the independence and
objectivity of the overall military judicial system. Since these courts also try
civilians, the problem aggravates.142
4.3.1. The Military Judicial System
141
Ümit Karda , “Askeri Yargı” in Almanak Turkiye 2005 -Guvenlik Sektoru ve Demokratik
Gozetim, (Istanbul: TESEV, 2005)
142
Kemal Gözler, “Askeri Yargı Organlarının Avrupa nsan Hakları Sözle mesine Uygunlu u
Sorunu”, nsan Hakları Yıllı ı, Cilt 21-22, (1999-2000): 77-93
75
In Ottoman times, since every state official belonged to the class of
“askeriye”, their trials were made in special courts, composed of members of
Divan-ı Humayun with Sultan as the head. The Janissaries were tried only in their
own regimens by their own commanding officers. With the establishment of the
Republic, permanent military courts were established. These courts had one
military judge and two officers with another military judge as the public
prosecutor. Article 138 of the Turkish constitution of 1961 stated that majority of
the members of each military court should be judges. Accordingly, military courts
were established for each of the army corps (kolordu), armies (ordu), command
forces (kuvvet komutanlıkları), which are composed of two military judges and a
military officer.143 However, Turkish constitution of 1982 does not have any
authoritative regulations concerning the composition of the military courts.144
While noncommissioned officers or privates are to be tried, one member of the
court is a noncommissioned officer.
The military courts of Discipline are composed of three officers, with no
military judges. The generals and admirals are tried by the Court of the General
Chief of Staff. The court is composed of five members; three military judges and
two generals/admirals. The Military Court of Cassation operates as the high court
of appeals and is composed of five chambers. Their members are appointed by the
President of the Republic from amongst the high-ranking military judges
nominated by the General Council of Military Court of Cassation.
143
Ministry of National Defense, www.msb.gov.tr/birimler/AsAdlsB/AsAdlsB353Kanun.htm (last
accessed on 12 June 2007).
144
The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey
76
4.3.2. The Extent and the Limits of the Sphere of Military Jurisdiction
Article 9 of the Code on Composition, Judgment and Procedure of the
Military Courts states that the military courts are responsible from cases where
military people commit ‘military crimes’ or any crime against military people, or
crimes at ‘military places’ or crimes related to their military services and
obligations. Nevertheless, a single and open definition for ‘military crime’ does
not exist in related laws. Moreover, although ‘military places’ are enumerated in
Military Internal Service Law as the military detachments, military quarters, and
military institutions like military hospitals, factories, schools, and stocks, etc. it
does not have a definition either. These ambiguities lead to extension of spheres
of military jurisdiction. For example, when a military person commits a crime in a
military place, the case is tried by a military court regardless of the nature of the
crime.
There are also cases where civilians are tried in military courts. When
civilian people commit crimes with military accomplices, the military court is
held responsible for trying even the civilian suspects. Recently, the emdinli case,
where two military officers and an ex-terrorist were brought to the court for
bombing a bookstore was to be tried in a military court. After judicial and public
disputes as to where they should all be tried, the problem was resolved by the
statement of the court of appeals which decided to try them in civilian courts.
The Military Criminal Code also allows trial of civilians for certain acts.
The articles of the Law refer to Articles of Turkish Penal Law, making the stated
acts as military crimes.
77
Some amendments were made as to the above Codes as a response to the
criticisms that military and civilian judicial systems are operating as if there are
two separate inconsistent judicial systems. According to the law amending the
relevant provisions of the Military Criminal Code, adopted in June 2006, no
civilian will be tried in military courts in peacetime unless military personnel and
civilians commit an offence together. The new law also allows for retrial in
military courts if there is an ECHR decision in favor of the defendant.
In this chapter, I have looked at the legal, institutional, economic and
judicial factors that may be regarded as the material sources of the Turkish Armed
Forces political power. As has been illustrated, these sources are not directly
convertible into political power. The Turkish constitution does not officially grant
any distinctive prerogatives to the Turkish Armed Forces. Especially with the
recent amendments which reduced the overall influence of NSC on setting the
security agenda of the state, as well as the government’s attempts to claim more
responsibility concerning issues security, and military budget it is rather
unconvincing to argue that the Turkish Armed Forces prevalence in Turkish
politics is the consequence of these material sources. On the other hand, it is
evident that how securely grounded it might be in the constitution and in the
related laws, the distinctive place of Turkish Armed Forces in Turkish politics
cannot be maintained if it is not cherished in the public mind. In order to dwell
into the Turkish society’s mind, next chapter will look at the past experiences of
the Turkish society with its military, which lay the basis for historical sources of
the Turkish Armed Forces political power.
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CHAPTER 5
HISTORICAL SOURCES OF THE TURKISH ARMED

FORCES’ POLITICAL POWER
As seen in the previous chapters, political power, which grows out of
interaction between the empowered and the empowering, should have a legitimate
base. The legitimacy operates as the indispensable source of the societal support.
Such legitimacy springs from the past experiences of the empowered and the
empowering with respect to each other. In other words, the history of the relations
between the empowered and the empowering informs the legitimacy out of which
the political power of the empowered originates. Janowitz also points to the
importance of the history of the interaction between the society and military,
when speaking about the wide societal support of the armies which grew out of
national liberation movements.
The past practices and experiences of the Turkish Armed Forces and the
Turkish society with respect to each other, established a unique fabric out of
which the current pattern of civil-military relations emerges. These historical
precedents, has set the boundaries of what is ‘normal’, probable and legitimate in
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the minds of soldiers, politicians and the citizenry. It is true that each historical
instance of military’s exercise of political power has its own unique causes and
consequences. For example, it is argued that one of the reasons for 1960 military
intervention was degradation in the economic status of professional soldiers,
which is undoubtedly a material/institutional motive. Nevertheless, apart from
their unique causes and consequences, all of these precedents serve a more all the
most important function which has strong implications for the future events; the
function of setting the limits for what is ‘normal’, probable and even expected,
thus legitimate in a given context.
For the sake of parsimony, the arguments related to the historical sources
of the Turkish Armed Forces’ political power will be grouped under three
headings: In the first part, the legacy of the Ottoman period will be analyzed. In
the second part, the role of the Turkish Armed Forces, in the founding of the
Turkish republic, with emphasis on Ataturkist legacy, will be discussed. Thirdly, I
will deal with the military interventions of the Turkish modern political history.
However the account on 1980 coup will be kept in parsimonious limits, since its
consequences has direct effect on contemporary Turkish civil-military relations,
which is the subject of the following two chapters.
5.1. THE OTTOMAN LEGACY
The special place of the military in Turkish society dates back to the very
early years of the Ottoman Empire; exemplified in the titles given to first rulers of
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the nascent Ottoman State: gazi.145 Ottoman Sultans were both military and
political leaders. For most of the period of the empire’s grandeur, professional
soldiers were among the top-raking government officials.146
As such, “military had long enjoyed high prestige in Ottoman society.
Both individual soldiers and armed forces as an organized group played important
roles throughout Ottoman times.”147 Although Harris argues that for the account
of civil-military relations in modern Turkey, “little is to be gained by looking at
Turkish experience before the latter nineteenth century.”148 a quick look to earlier
periods may reveal a number of patterns which underlie society’s perception of
and relationship with the military.
The executive cadre of Ottoman Empire was named as askeriye (which
literally refers to the military), which denotes no differentiation between civil and
military bureaucrats. Such state of mentality was most explicitly at hand in
Ottoman administrative and economic system, which was based on a fusion of
military and civilian officers.149 Timar system, which required that an army
officer, who also acts as a tax collector, raises and holds a number of military men
under service in return for the share of the taxes he collects from the farmers, was
145
The term gazi refers to veteran, which according to Islam, is a very honorable title. The fact
that it is given to the first sultans of the Ottoman state indicates the level of respect that it attached
to being a warrior in Turkish society.
146
Walter F. Weiker, The Modernization of Turkey: From Ataturk to the Present Day. (London:
Holmes&Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981) 100
147
Weiker, 37
148
George S Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decisions-
Makers?” In State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s, edited by Metin Heper and
Ahmet Evin, 180 (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988)
149
William Hale, “Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey: the Military Perspective” In
State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s, edited by Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin,
161 (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988)
81
both the backbone of Ottoman economic system on the one hand and supportive
of military imperialism on the under.150 Apart from his military and economic
duties, the timar holder also had constabulary duties like maintaining law and
order. In other words, in the rural parts of the empire, the most of state’s central
functions –security, administration, and revenue-collection- were performed by
the same people. This fusion underlie the conviction by some scholars that in the
Ottoman Empire, the army and the state was deemed as one and the same both in
capital and the country.151
During the heyday of the Empire, the armed forces, which were under the
strict control of their commanders and the sultan, were the main source of power.
But when the empire began to fall because of unsuccessful military campaigns
and inability to catch on modernity, the Ottoman military, especially Janissaries,
became a source of instability and began to frighten their own sovereigns and
civil population.152 Since Janissaries possessed a virtual monopoly of force at the
centre of government, they were even able to establish a sort of unstable military
dictatorship during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Some details
needed here.
First serious attempts to redress political infringement of the military came
from Selim III, however unsuccessful. After him, Mahmut II was able to disband
the Janissaries, which was praised as Vaka-i Hayriye (the Auspicious Incident)
150
Halil nalcik, Osmanlı mparatorlu unun Ekonomik ve. Sosyal Tarihi, Cilt I ve II, ( stanbul:
Eren Yayıncılık, 2000) 16; Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey,
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977) 112
151
Feroz Ahmad, The Making of Modern Turkey (London: Routledge, 1993) 17
152
Ahmad, 2
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and establish a new in army in 1826.153 In an attempt to modernize this new army,
he opened several military schools, through which children with middle-lower
middle class backgrounds can receive a thorough education and open themselves
up to the winds of enlightenment and advancement. These schools would later
serve as a separate milieu for political discussion and cooperation for the
attainment of political ideals.
Since this new army was comprised of soldiers who came from within the
less wealthy and most populous stratum of the Turkish society, they were familiar
to the lives, habits and troubles of the less advantageous among citizenry, which
make it possible for them to identify with their problems. On the other hand, since
they received modern education which was inspired by Western ideas and
practices, they were eager to bring the benefits of modernization and
enlightenment to the society. Their desire to bring about changes in the lives of
ordinary citizens inevitably led to their politicization and give way to a new era in
the political development of Turkish political system.
5.1.1. Establishment of First Constitutional Monarchy and Young

Ottomans
“The army played a crucial role in the introduction of the First
Constitution and in 1876 and its reimplementation in 1908”.154 The most
influential group which led to the establishment of the constitutional monarchy
was that of Young Ottomans, whose core was established in 1865.155 They were
153
William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military. (New York, London: Routledge, 1994) 18
154
Hale, “Transition to Civilian Governments” 161; Weiker, 37
155
Osman Metin Öztürk, Ordu ve Politika. (Ankara: Fark, 2006) 34
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liberal intellectuals, comprised of civilian and military bureaucrats, who thought
that the sultan’s power should be limited in order to avoid a total collapse of the
empire.
The sultan who was unfavorable of such a move, was overthrown with the
cooperation of the Ottoman fleet surrounding the palace from the waterfront and
the students from War College. The military involvement in the constitutional
movement was so vital that Hale even describes the constitutional revolution of
1876 as a coup d’état.156 The cooperation of military with the educated stratum of
the Turkish society against the absolutism of the sultan indicates that military was
also in close relationship with the higher classes of the Turkish society. They
shared the same political ideal, which was political liberalization on the one hand,
and to stop the degradation and dissolution of the empire on the other.
Despite the progressive ideals of Young Ottomans, the Majlis, which
opened in 1877, lasted for only one year. The major role played by the navy and
the War College in the revolution, had a lasting remark on the new sultan
Abdulhamid. Abdulhamid, trying to preempt a similar overthrow, promoted alayli
officers at the expense of the graduates of War, while ordered the fleet to be
anchored to perish in the Haliç. The army maneuvers were not allowed while the
new military equipment bought from Europe was left unpacked in stocks. Hale
also points to other material losses of the military in these years: “their uniforms
were usually in tatters and their pay (which was miserably low in any case) was
months in arrears. Officers, when they are paid, received government IOUs,
156
Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 198
84
which could be cashed by army contractors or money changers, but only at a big
discount”.157 Though these pre-emptive measures, Abdulhamid thought that
army’s political power could be contained, which proved wrong.
Despite the diminishing material conditions of the military under
Abdulhamid, the military education had gained a new momentum. Colonel von
der Goltz from Prussia was appointed as a military advisor, under whom the
military education system was expanded to a large extent. While economic
hardship had an important impact on the politicization of army, the expansion of
military education increased the number of already politicized military students.
Some argue that the purely professional concerns of the military like
promotions, pays, technical backwardness “had as much accounted for the army’s
open revolt in 1908, as the abstract considerations about the virtues of
democracy” which was mainly ignited by their education system.158 Whether their
motivation was driven by the desire to redress their material standing or by the
desire to obtain the ideal of a united and liberal government is still a matter of
dispute. Nonetheless, it was under these dire straits that they were able to set the
stage for another revolution in 1908.
5.1.2. Establishment of Second Constitutional Monarchy and 31 March

Incident
“The revolution of 1908 and the prominent part played by officers in the
period of the Young Turk rule formed a backdrop for the republican era. The
157
158
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Young Turk experiences established precedents for military activism in politics
that influenced the environment of the Republic to follow.”159
While the 1876 revolution was almost a coup, the military’s role in 1908
was even more immense. The centre of the opposition to Abdulhamid’s regime
was a group of students and young graduates of the military schools. As early as
1889, the initial core of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP),160 was
established by students at the military medical college. After a failed coup attempt
in 1896, Young Turks began to organize in exile. At the same time, the serving
army officers were establishing their own secret organizations in different parts of
the empire. One of them was Fatherland and Freedom Society founded by
Mustafa Kemal and his fellow officers in Damascus. Another one, Ottoman
Freedom Society, was founded in Selanik by Mehmet Talat -who was a civilian,
working as a post office clerk- and later joined by Ahmed Cemal, and Captain
Enver, the so-called Young Turk triumvirate of 1913-1918.
The revolution began in Macedonia when Ahmed Niyazi, adjutant-major
in Resne, with his 200 soldiers took hold of Resne garrison’s arms, ammunition
and treasury and took off to the hills. Their objective was to restore the
constitution of 1876. The revolt could not be suppressed by Istanbul, and
Abdulhamid conceded.
Although it was the young officers who directed the revolution, the army
was by no means united in their attitude to the revolution. The bulk of the army,
159
Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s,” 180
160
86
ordinary soldiers and alayli officers, were loyal to the sultanate, while a
substantial part of it was neutral. Moreover, those who supported the revolution –
educated young officers and upper echelons- were divided in themselves,
paralleling their two aims which were not necessarily complementary: to defend
territorial integrity on the one hand and achieve political liberalization on the
other. Those who value territorial integrity more, the unionists, were in favor of a
strong central government while liberals were supporting a quasi-federal structure
with greater freedom for all social groups. They were also more inclined to
cooperate with civilian bureaucrats.
As with the army, the Ottoman society was divided in their attitude
towards the revolution. A considerable part of the society in Istanbul was “stern if
befuddled Islamic traditionalists who opposed the constitution and the
Westernized professional and intellectuals.”161 Their main concern was to
eradicate any possibility of a diversion from Islamic rule, as well as granting of
more autonomy to non-Muslim minorities.
Like progressive elements in the society, traditionalists also sought army’s
support. The 31 March Incident, the mutiny of ordinary soldiers, backed up by
alayli officers and religious students, was initially successful in replacing the
government. The rebels also demanded that Islamic law is completely
implemented, a demand to which Abdulhamid, almost voluntarily, compromised.
The response to the revolt came also from the army. Third Army in
161
87
Selanik, mobilized to defend the constitutional system with the support of
volunteers from religious minorities of the empire. The first reason was of course
to defend the constitution. The other one was more important in professional
terms: it was revolt by other ranks against the high command, which indicates that
the long-cherished value of hierarchy in the Ottoman army was in jeopardy.
The revolution was repressed and the outcome was imposition of martial
law in Istanbul. The royal prerogatives of the sultan were reduced, which
provided a freer hand to the parliament, was then dominated by members of the
CUP.
The 31 March Incident is significant in terms of understanding the limits
of convergence between the society and the military, as it is illustrative of the
possible areas of collision between them. The clash of two trends, traditionalism
and progressivism, is still a fundamental concern in modern Turkey, which is
exemplified by the Turkish Armed Forces keen interest in protecting the secular
nature of the regime on the one hand, and Turkish society’s strong religious
feelings and attachment to religious customs like headscarf and religious public
figures on the other. The projection of this schism into contemporary Turkish
political life will be analyzed in detail in the Chapter 5.
5.1.3. Committee of Union and Progress and the First World War
Indeed some scholars deem the period after 31 March incident (1909-
1913) as an outright military dictatorship. On the other hand, due to CUP’s inner
struggles and the divergence of views in the military ranks, the Cabinets formed
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one after the other were not as authoritative as such. Military officers who were
liberalists formed many groups oppositional to CUP. The most important was
Halaskar-i Zabitan which managed to force resignation of the Cabinet and
formation of a new one, which was more independent of the CUP.
While the army officers were totally intermingled by politics, there were
also attempts to drive politics out of the army, like prohibition of political
activities by the army officers. Nevertheless, by 1913, thanks to their success in
re-conquering Edirne in the Second Balkan War, the leading three members of the
CUP, Enver Talat and Cemal, has gained Cabinet posts, which would drive the
Empire into WWI.
At the time when Ottoman Empire had entered the First World War, the
state apparatus was apparently controlled by a military dictatorship in the hands of
Enver, Talat and Cemal. Nonetheless, under the surface, it is debatable whether it
was one-man rule of Enver, a single party dictatorship or a straightforward
military regime.162 But since leading figures of CUP were military officers like
Enver, it is true that the military elite had an effective control of the government.
Their political power emanated from basically two sources. Firstly, the
wars fought before WWI, has put the army in the forefront of debates. Especially
the relative success in the Second Balkan War provided with them a source of
prestige both in the eyes of the elite and the public.163 Secondly, the fact that the
army was the “bedrock of state…harbingers of enlightenment and vanguard of
162
163
Ozturk, 41
89
reform” which was a result of their modernized military education, brushed up
their corporate identity and political mission.164 Probably, while the prestige they
had in the eyes of the public provided them with the necessary societal support
which translated itself into a freer hand in the actual takeover of the government
as a power exercise, their ability to remain in the government owes more to the
second source: their political mission to modernize and implement reforms in the
society. This mission was especially supported by the more educated circles in the
cities, who believed that such reforms will enhance the standard of living in the
empire. With the support of them, the government attempted to undertake many
reforms even under the harsh conditions of war.
First reform was, in 1914, the abolishment of the capitulations, a set of
legal and fiscal privileges which foreign merchants resident in the Empire
benefited at the expense of state revenues.165 In 1915, a law which encouraged
domestic industry was enacted and in 1917, the first Turkish owned private bank,
Ottoman National Bank was established. Through these reforms, the government
tried to strengthen empire’s economy as well as economic condition of Ottoman
citizenry.
The government’s attempts to make reforms on the cultural sphere were
also drastic. With an inclination to curb the power of the ulema, the religious
courts were brought under the Ministry of Justice in 1915. While all religious
schools were transferred to the Ministry of Education in the same year, in 1917, a
164
Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 54)
165
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new family law was enacted which made a marriage a secular contract. What is
more, Enver was planning to reform the Arabic script.166
Most of these attempts became unsuccessful because of the fall of the
empire in 1918. Nevertheless, they are important in two ways. Firstly, they are
indicative of the military’s conviction that it is the army who will lead the society
in the modernization path. Secondly, these attempts mark the political direction
that would be taken by the successors of Young Turks in the aftermath of the
War.
5.2. FOUNDATION OF THE REPUBLIC, TURKISH ARMED FORCES

AND THE ATATURKIST LEGACY
The historical factor that has the most impact on the relationship between
Turkish society and the modern Turkish military is the memory of the major role
military played in the establishment of the republic. Although for the military, this
role cannot be separated from the legacy of Atatürk, the Turkish society honors
Turkish military independently of the Kemalist ideology. This is in part due to the
nature of that period. War of Independence was a struggle both against foreign
domination on the one hand, and for the establishment of a democratic republic on
the other. The Turkish military receive credits from the society for its contribution
to both struggles. Therefore, it is not unusual that those who does not have great
sympathy for Atatürk and his understanding of democratic republic, still respects
Turkish military.
166
G.L. Lewis and Landau, 1984: 196 cited in Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military, 53
91
5.2.1. War of Independence
“The importance of military in Turkish politics greatly accentuated in
following the Empire’s defeat in 1918”167 After the defeat of the empire and the
signing of the Mudros Armistice, the allied powers required the demobilization of
the Army. Yet, some commanders like Kazim Karabekir and Ali Fuat Cebesoy,
did not concede to disband their forces. The army preserved its discipline and its
clear chain of command.168 The military as well as the society considered that the
great defeat was the fault of the Sultan and the government. The army by resisting
the order of the Sultan to disband, showed resistance against the failed politicians
and their policies.
According to Rustow, like Turkish military, the Turkish society was also
determined to resist after the first intrusions by allied powers. Several groups and
guerilla movements, known as Kuvay-i Milliye, emerged to resist the invasion, yet
these groups lacked organization. Therefore the army’s and the former military
officers’ involvement as the organizing element of resistance was a direct
outcome of an appeal by the Anatolian masses. Other political forces which might
have answered to this appeal were debarred from offering any effectual initiative.
Consequently, the army and its officer corps were “propelled into action” by the
society.
The CUP was downgraded by first their decision to enter into, then their
defeat in the war. It was widely criticized and disdained by the society. On the
167
Dankward A. Rustow, “The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic”, World Politics
11, (1959): 519
168
Rustow, 519
92
other hand, the political aura that they created after the Revolution of 1908 had
major impact on political life of ordinary citizens. “The Young Turk decade had
created a broadening of the circle of civilian political participation”. There were a
number of newspapers published in Istanbul as well as throughout Anatolia.
Moreover, CUP had centers in major cities.
When Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues decided to organize the already
existing movement of resistance, the remnants of this Young Turk rule was
helpful. Because of the bad reputation CUP leaders had in the eyes of the public,
they refrained from identifying with the CUP. Nevertheless, there was a
”continuation of personnel between the Young Turk and Kemalist periods.”169
Later in 1923, Mustafa Kemal accepted being a CUP member:
We were all members of the Society for Union and

Progress. That transformed itself into the Renovation Party. A
large majority of the members of the aforesaid Society and of the
subsequently established Party joined and participated in the
society for Defense of Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia which
arose from the noble resolve of our nation, and they accepted the
programme of the latter Society.170
The military officers who took part in the nationalist government were
mostly former middle and lower rank members of the CUP. Most of them were
young and they were brought up by an education system “when Young Turk
agitation for liberal and constitutional principles was rife in military schools.”171
A comparison of military personnel who took part in Istanbul and Ankara
169
Rustow, 543
170
171
Rustow, 534
93
governments between 1914 and 1923 reveals that successful commanders of the
World War mostly joined to the Anatolian movement since “Atatürk himself was
careful not to waste talent from the Ottoman regime.”172 These commanders were
mostly Turkish in origin, having born in Istanbul and Macedonia as opposed to
diverse origins of those who took part in the Istanbul Cabinets. As such, their
ethnic background was same with the Anatolian masses, which was an asset in
gaining their support and trust. One may even argue that the society regarded
these officers as the true embodiment of the Turkish society.
At the early phases of the military upsurge the nationalists received much
support from the Unionist officers in the War Office and the General Staff in
Istanbul.173 Especially the officers in the CUP’s underground organization, which
was known as Karakol174 were responsible for arms trafficking from stocks of the
Empire in Istanbul to Ankara.
Although “the initial impetus and grass-roots organization of the
nationalist movement owed much to the former CUP” Ataturk and his comrades
rejected its exiled leaders and their imperialist dreams.175 They set their goals and
methods in a manner that was substantially different from the former CUP
practice. Recognizing that an effective military resistance should be backed up by
organized civilian support, and that “an army with a hostile or indifferent
population it its rear” would not be able to fight the external enemies, the Ankara
movement worked hard to supply itself with a solid civilian base. While CUP,
172
Harris, The Role of Military in Turkey in the 1980s, 179
173
Rustow, 540
174
Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military 66; Rustow, 540
175
94
having long cherished the ideas of constitutionalism and support, gradually
concentrated the political power in the military hands, the nationalist government
looked for a wide representation and open discussion. This attitude of the
nationalists is again an indication of the fact that, during the years of war of
national liberation, there was strong interaction between the Turkish military and
the Turkish society that was based on trust, mutual empowerment and open
discussion. .
In order to provide a solid platform for the interaction of the society with
the military, the representative civilian institutions of government were
established even before full scale military operations were undertaken. In the
Amasya Declaration, it was stated that the decisions taken would be performed by
the army. Nevertheless, most signatures under the document were also of military
commanders. Therefore, the organized movement was initiated by the military.
The congresses held in Sivas and Erzurum were important steps in unifying the
civilian support for the movement. The movement was so effective that their
attempts found resonance in the last Ottoman Majlis, which was mostly
comprised of military officers. The convergence between the Ankara and Last
Ottoman Majlis was evident in their adoption of Misak-ı Milli, “the National
Pact”. After its closure and expulsion of nationalists, most members of it joined
the Grand National Assembly, which opened in 1920 in Ankara.
Ataturk himself resigned from the Ottoman army in July 1919. Some
claim that his resignation is a powerful indicator of his conviction that “a time
might come when political and military functions could not legitimately or
95
effectively be combined in the same person.”176 On the other hand, it was
practically impossible at that time for Ataturk to retain his post and act as the
leader of the movement, since from this time on the movement has taken an
irreversible pace. While nationalist army officers were detaching themselves from
the empire and running to the heart of the society in Ankara, the society was
gradually turning into a Turkish army in order to protect its motherland. At this
time, when the borders between the society and its army were becoming
increasingly blur, there appeared a clear distinction between the Ottoman
government and the imperial army on the one hand, and the Turkish national army
on the other. As such, Ataturk could not maintain its post in the former, while he
began to emerge as the head of the latter.
Soon after the opening of the Grand National Assembly, the General Staff
was organized as separate ministry which was held responsible to the parliament
like other ministries. The General Staff was to be elected by the parliament. In
5.9.1920, a law was enacted which ban the interference of military officers under
the rank of Kolordu Commander. One year later, in the delicate moments of war,
Mustafa Kemal was appointed as Supreme Commander for a period of three
months. The Assembly was very sensitive with this post, and did not easily agree
to prolong it later three more times by three months each time. Therefore, even
under dire war conditions the nationalists in Ankara were very careful to assure
that the army was under the control of the Assembly. Although the organized
movement of resistance was initiated by the military, the society gradually
176
Rustow, 546
96
emerged as the actual power holder, which has been able to control its army
effectively.
Although every effort was made to assure the civilian control of the
military, there were Generals, who had important posts both in the government
and the Assembly, a fact which would change soon after the foundation of the
Republic. The most serious opposition to Mustafa Kemal came also from the
Generals. Very much like the way the military successes of Mustafa Kemal had
brought him fame and support, the same military background were an invaluable
political asset for his rival generals, like Rauf Orbay, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Refet
Bele and Kazim Karabekir. Among them, Rauf Orbay was a liberal nationalist,
who served as a minister of navy in the Ottoman government during WWI.
However, he did not serve as a commander in the War of Independence. The other
three had active military posts in both wars. Especially, Kazim Karabekir was an
able commander and famous for his refusal to disband his army after Mudros
Armistice. As such, he had strong popular support and was a powerful rival
against Mustafa Kemal. While Rauf Orbay was more robust in politics, Kazim
Karabekir enjoyed more popularity both in the Assembly and in the public due to
his military background.
The main concern of this oppositional group was to avert the
establishment of a personal dictatorship of Mustafa Kemal. The dispute between
them was not a military bid for power, yet it is evident that these generals used
their military background as an ideational source of their political power, an asset
which brought them support both in the parliament and in the eyes of the
97
society.177
5.2.2. First Republic
The decisive factor that enabled Mustafa Kemal to take an upper hand
against his rivals was his success in assuring the support of the army as an
institution. There were two reasons behind his attempt to assure such support.,
First of all, before the announcement of the Republic, the military was in
miserable economic condition, even so that “the danger of a revolt by unruly
soldiers” was narrowly averted. In order to prevent that from happening, Mustafa
Kemal demobilized the army and reorganized it as nine territorially based corps.
Secondly, as stated before, his most powerful political rivals were among
the generals, who as successful commanders enjoyed a similar level of popular
support as he enjoys in the eyes of the society as well as among the corps. He
appointed K. Karabekir and Ali F. Cebesoy as inspectors as a precaution against
their opposition and remove them from Ankara shortly before the establishment
of the Republic on 23 October 1923. After Refet Bele’s post was abolished, he
resigned from the army. Through these maneuvers, Mustafa Kemal guaranteed his
election as the President. On the other hand, in order to avert a coup, he was
cautious enough to assure their support on other occasions. Before the abolition of
the Caliphate, he took part in army maneuvers and spent two months with Fevzi
Cakmak and other commanders in order gain their affirmation.
He went on to exclude the generals from taking part in the parliament. On
177
98
19 December 1923, a law passed which stated that serving army officers,
including generals, cannot be elected as deputies. Since Karabekir and Cebesoy
were already deputies at the time, the law did not affect their standing. Later, the
same law was included in the Article 23 of the 1924 Constitution. Moreover, with
the abolition of the Caliphate, Chief of General Staff was made directly
responsible to the president. Moreover, 1924 Constitution, in Article 40, vested
status of the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces to Grand National Assembly
“as represented by the President of the Republic”. Later, with new Military Penal
Code, any member of armed forces was banned from joining a political party,
holding or participating in political meetings, giving a political speech in public or
preparing, signing or sending to the press any declaration of a political nature.178
After these legislations which were supposed to deprive serving military
officers from any political power, the opposing generals were forced to resign
from their posts, while those who were loyal to Mustafa Kemal preferred military
careers. As such, the army’s loyalty to Mustafa Kemal was guaranteed.179 Only
after this assurance, he went on to undertake other reforms.180
5.2.3. Atatürkist Legacy
It is generally argued that the main difference between the Latin-American
armies and the Turkish army is that the Turkish army had never intervened for
personal or institutional gains and has been quick to return to barracks after the
political situation is rectified. The reason for this is given as the Ataturkist legacy,
178
Rustow, 547
179
180
Rustow, 549
99
which encourages the Turkish army to accept the principle of civilian supremacy.
Nevertheless, the military interventions of the Turkish army in 1960, 1971,
1980 and its later political practices indicate that, the Turkish army has never been
aloof from politics. Moreover, it is not unusual that at each instance of political
interference by the armed forces, the military generals justify their action by
referring to Ataturk’s sayings and practices. As George Harris blatantly puts:
…the Atatürkist legacy is an ambiguous one. On the one

hand, it forbids serving army officers to play any part in the
legislature; on the other, it encourages them to think of
themselves as the ultimate guardian of the Atatürk’s
revolution.181
Supposedly from the initial phase of the liberation struggle, Ataturk had a
vision of a modern and unified nation-state which would take its equal place in
the modern world. Rather than relying on his personal charisma and power, his
purpose was to establish a firm structure, which would continue to exist long after
his death.
Within this picture, the role he foresaw for the army was more than
guarding the frontiers of the country. It was to be a forerunner of reforms, “ a
fountainhead of progressive practices” a vital organ for both the spread and
maintenance of the reforms he made.182 The army, very much like in the Ottoman
days, was the backbone of the regime and its ultimate base of power. In 1931, at a
meeting in Konya, Ataturk said:
181
George S Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part I”, The Middler East
Journal, 19, No. 1. (1965): 55
182
Harris The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part I” 59
100
Whenever the Turkish nation has wanted to take a step up it
has always looked to the army…as the leader of movements to
achieve lofty national ideals…when speaking of the army, I am
speaking of the intelligentsia of the Turkish nation who are true
owners of this country. The Turkish nation considers its army the
guardian of its ideals.183
As the forerunner of reforms and the guardian of the regime, the army
could not simply be out of politics. The military in the Kemalist era remained a
key actor in the balance of political power. The Chief of General Staff, although
not a minister, enjoyed a relatively independent status. He was directly attached to
the Presidency on the one hand, and taking part in the Cabinet meetings, which
led to projection of military interests in development programs like for example
road and railroad building. “Most of the Republic’s early development program in
the 1930s was shaped by military considerations.”184
Thus, the Ataturkist legacy of the military has three main components:
1. respect for hierarchy
2. devotion to the broadly secular modernizing reforms set in train by
Atatürk
3. acceptance of the principle of ultimate legitimacy of civilian
rule.185
Although each component had strong impact had strong impact on the
later political deliberations of the military, these components were not always
complementary. The Ataturkist legacy encouraged the military elite to intervene
183
quoted in Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part I” 60
184
Harris“The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part I” 61
185
Harris, The Role of Military in Turkey in the 1980s, 179
101
in politics at times of regime threat on the one hand, and constrain the longevity
of military rule and pushed for a quick civilianization of the regime on the other.
5.3. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS OF THE REPUBLICAN ERA
After the death of Atatürk, nönü, a former general, became the President.
During his time a number of important steps have been made to ensure civilian
control of the military. The Second World War had caught Turkish army
unprepared, organizationally and technically backward. The army’s and the Chief
of General Staff’s independent status were seen as the reason for this defect.186
The Ministry of National Defense was responsible for simply presenting and
defending the military budget and had no role in making policies and determining
the priorities.187 In 1944, Inönü tried to change this picture by making the Chief
of General Staff subordinated and responsible to the Prime Minister, yet allowing
him to deal directly with ministers on matters of mutual concern.188
In 1949, a new enactment was made, which placed the Chief of General
Staff under the Ministry of National Defense, and reorganized the former
territorially-based armed forces, under three separate forces as air, navy and
army.189
5.3.1. 1960 Coup
In 1946, Turkey entered an era of multiparty system with the
establishment of the Democrat Party, which raised questions about the future of
186
Harris, The Role of Military in Turkey in the 1980s, 182-183
187
Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part I”, 62-63
188
Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part I”, 63
189
Ozdemir, 9-10
102
relations between the army and the civilian elite. As the first and the single party
of the Republic, the Republican People’s Party shared a similar world-view with
the military. This similarity was based on the legacy of Ataturk which informed
basic principles on which the military and the party as well as the state were
established. Before, since there was no practical distinction between the state and
the Republican People’s Party, the army’s relations with the government was
substantially smooth.190 Although some new ideologies began to receive support
by a few younger military officers, like pan-Turkism and communism, they had
almost no affect on the civil-military relations of the single party period. With the
establishment of the Democrat Party however, it became clear that such smooth
civil-military relations may not endure.
“The military takeover of the 1960 was deemed as a

point of departure from the previously established patterns of
civil-military relations. Although the takeover was justified
as an action to protect democracy, it was actually designed to
face a threat to RPP, which represented the role model for
civil military relations in Turkey since 1923.”191
The first political groups established in the army were supportive of
Democrat Party, with an intention to prevent dishonest elections.192 A group
organized in Staff College in Istanbul begin to talk about of a military
intervention in as early as 1947. Realizing the need for support form higher ranks,
190
This smooth pattern of relations between the military and the government can be attributed to
the effective use of “subjective control`” as Huntington predicted. On the other hand, it may as
well be the consequence of extensive societal support that the military and the RPP enjoyed at the
same time.
191
H. Kemal Karpat, “Military Interventions: Army Civilian relations in turkey Before and After
1980” In State, Democracy and the Military Turkey in the 1980s, edited by Metin Heper and
Ahmet Evin, 137 (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988)
192
Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part I”, 64
103
they contacted General Fahri Belen but he argued against any action before the
upcoming elections. Although the idea of making a coup was dismissed, upheaval
in military continued.
At the same time, both DP and RPP tried to attract military personalities to
bolster their political appeal, since they often enjoyed a considerable prestige
within the society.193 These political dealings led to increasing politicization of
the army. On the other hand, both parties were eager to ensure that the military
was kept in control of the civilians. The 1949 enactments were indicative of this
attitude.
Soon after the elections in 1950, which brought DP to the power, the
retired generals who were supportive of DP came to important posts, like Chief of
General Staff and Minister of National Defence.194 The overall military
conviction was that their position was strengthened. Within one year, however,
partly because of the disillusionment of former generals from politics and partly
because of DP’s political attitude, no military personality remained in the DP
government.
By the same time, Turkey had entered the NATO and Turkish Armed
Forces began to receive technologically advanced equipment as well as military
education both in the US and the Western Europe. These circumstances bolstered
the professional complaints of younger officers, who began to lose respect for
their traditionally minded superiors. Moreover, military officers were
193
George S. Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part II”, The Middler East
Journal, 19, No.2. (1965): 169
194
Harris, “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part II” 169
104
inadequately paid, a problem so acute which led to resignation of one third of
commissioned officers by 1956.195
Probably, more disturbing than all to the Turkish Armed Forces were the
concessions made by DP to the detriment of the Kemalist reform program. DP
leaders offered special treatment to minority groups; even tribal leaders in the
Kurdish areas were allowed great autonomy in their tribal affairs.196 Secondly,
Democrats relaxed restrictions on religious practices which were blamed for
“giving rise to an upsurge of superstition and even open attacks on Ataturk by
religious fanatics.”197 This was deemed as a serious threat to secularism, one of
the most important reforms of Ataturk that military was envisaged to protect. And
lastly, the DP government’s economic policies, especially lack of planning as well
as the government’s support for newly emerging middle classes of rural origin,
monopolizing wealth and status in the society.
By 1954, new groups in the army were established, this time mostly
critical of the DP government. They had professional concerns, “the primary aim
was…to seek reform in the military.”198 They were also greatly dissatisfied with
many of their senior commanders. But as the political agitation between the
parties reached its peak, the DP government tried to use military for political
purposes (which was a fatal mistake according to Karpat),199 the military officers
became extremely politicized, and a consensus was reached between the
195
Harris “The Role of the Military in Turkish Politics Part II” 170, Karpat 139
196
197
198
199
Karpat 140
105
conspirators to make a coup. While the younger officers sought a period of
military rule in order to implement some social reforms, others were in favour of
returning the government to the civilian rule in a few months. This disagreement
could not be solved until after the coup took place in 27 May 1960.
In the aftermath of coup, the younger officers who preferred a longer
military rule were purged. As such, more radical elements in the military were
prevented to meddle in politics which provided a freer hand to civilian politicians.
Karpat claims that after this moment, there remained
…no military junta installed in power, although there

were military personnel in some important positions… The
military rule was wide open from the beginning to cooperation
and intercourse with civilians and these civilians belonged
overwhelmingly to the RPP.200
Nevertheless, the Committee of National Unity, the group of 38 coup-
makers, was eager to ensure more room for military say in Turkish politics. Its
members were accorded permanent seats in the Senate, provided that they did not
establish political affinity with any political party. The leader of the coup, Cemal
Gürsel, was elected as the President of the Republic. The Committee has also
guaranteed that military officers obtained the right to vote. The Chief of General
Staff was once more subordinated to the President of the Republic, who at the
same time represented the Turkish Armed Forces as the Supreme Commander in
war and peace time. Moreover, the new constitution established the National
Security Council (NSC), an advisory organ to the cabinet, comprised of Force
200
Karpat 198
106
Commanders and the Chief of General Staff with a few civilian ministers.
Having realized the perils of centralization and a strong and relatively
independent government, the constitution of 1961 has pursued a weak
government, constrained by the checks and balances. On the other hand, it gave
more freedom to the public; especially freedom of association was enhanced.
Nevertheless, the formula of a weak government, a stronger military and a freer
public proved detrimental to the political stability and civilian control of the
military.
5.3.2. 1971 Memorandum
The military intervention of 1971 was not a full scale military takeover.
It was a memorandum signed by top commanders of the army and sent to
President Sunay, former Chief of General staff who had been elected as president
after Gürsel’s health deteriorated. The memorandum stated that the government
and the parliament had driven the country into anarchy, a new government should
be set up to implement some reforms and if these measures were not undertaken
the military would directly intervene.
With the 1961 constitution, Turkey had entered a period of pluralism.
The international ideological currents had also affected especially younger
generations in Turkey. Right wing and left wing extremist groups emerged, who
favor armed struggle. Bank robbing and kidnappings became common. As a result
violence spread throughout streets and university campuses. The reluctance of the
government (which was headed by Justice Party) to impose martial law and take
107
steps was the main reason behind the memorandum.
With the 1971 military intervention, the government was forced to
resign and a new government was established under Nihat Erim, a neutral figure.
The parliament was not closed so the state began to be run by two centers of
power: military commanders and the parliament. Because of the parliamentary
opposition, the land and tax reforms demanded by the military could not be made.
On the other hand, military pressure had managed the parliament to implement
martial law, which “unleashed forces beyond government’s control.”201 Under the
martial law, strikes were outlawed, freedom of press was restricted and some
newspapers were suspended. Moreover, instances of torture were reported. On 20
Sep 1971 and 8 Feb 1972, two packages of constitutional amendments passed
which “restricted some personal rights, the freedom of association and the press
and autonomy of the universities and the state broadcasting organization”
established State Security Courts and extended the period of detention.202
To the already existing problems of double-headedness of government,
Presidential election crisis added when by 1973 the duration of service of Sunay
ended. Until that time, election of the former Chief of General Staff as the
president almost became a tradition in the Republic, only exception being Celal
Bayar. While the military openly sought for Faruk Gürler’s (the chief of General
Staff at the time) presidency, the parliament did not comply with this preference,
yet a straightforward military takeover did not take place as threatened. Later,
201
Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military 198
202
Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military 198, 201
108
Fahri Korutürk, a civilian candidate with a military background was elected,
which was seen as a compromise by the military and the parliament alike.
5.3.3. 1980 Coup
The circumstances that led to the 1980 coup were similar to those of 1971
memorandum, yet much more grave. The country was rife with political, sectarian
and ethnic violence and political murders. Although martial law was declared, the
strife could not be stopped. While Demirel has blamed the generals for not fully
implementing the martial law with the purpose of legitimizing the future military
intervention, the military commanders stated that their subordination to civilian
authorities in their decisions203 had left them incapable of dealing with the
problems.204 What is more, another Presidential election crisis took place after
Korutürk’s term has ended in March 1980. The parties were not able to agree on a
candidate.
What differentiated the 1980 coup from 1960 and 1971 interventions was
that this time; there was previous intensive planning and organization by the
military. The goals were set, the methods for a smooth process of civilianization
were already discussed and the coup took place under a clear chain of command.
Unlike previous instances, there were no conspiracies for a coup among the
younger officers. Basic decisions were made within National Security Council, 205
(NSC) which included Chief of General Staff Evren, Commanders of Navy, Air
203
Subordination of martial law commanders to civilian authorities was a precaution by the
government, with an inclination to avert the misconduct occurred in 1971-1973 period.
204
Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military 233 and Karpat, 150
205
The NSC here is different from the constitutional organ stated in the Art. 118 of the
constitution, whose main function is to act as an advisory council to the government in matters
related to security.
109
and Ground Forces and the Secretary General.
According to Karpat, the military did not have support from any one
specific civilian group; rather they succeed in attaining widespread support from
the society, which had been exhausted because of the violence that had broke out.
The level of violence had been such that the society saw the military nearly as a
savior from disaster.
In the aftermath of the coup, Gen. Evren’s attitude was also effective in
attaining and maintaining societal support. He usually spoke on behalf of the
nation; he condemned politicians’ excessive partisan considerations and argued
that such attitude had been to the detriment of the nation’s interest, without
attacking by name the party leaders. In his public speeches, he was able to show
his concern for the society, by informing them about the key developments that
took place.206
The NSC’s closure of itself to any influence from the politicians has
increased the popular respect and trust for the army, which added to their supra-
party image. Meanwhile, the public order was restored and the economy, which
has experienced a crash before the coup, began to revitalize. These were the
circumstances under which NSC established a Consultative Assembly in June
1981 to draft a new constitution. This assembly consisted of 160 members, forty
of whom were appointed directly by the NSC and the remaining 120 selected
from a list of about 10,000 names brought together with the aid of provincial
206
Karpat 150
110
governors. In July 1982, a fifteen-member constitutional committee of the
Consultative Assembly produced a draft that subsequently was amended by the
Consultative Assembly and the NSC. The constitution was submitted to a public
referendum on November 7 and approved by 91.4 percent of the voters; 91.3
percent of the registered electorate cast ballots.
a Consultative Assembly was established through selection of applicants
by the NSC. It prepared the new constitution and after the last checks was made
by the NSC, it was put for public referendum. The constitution of 1982 was
approved by 90 per cent of the votes and Kenan Evren has been elected as the
new President.207
Despite the society’s relief after the coup and subsequent approval of the
constitution by the public, the results of election that took place in 1983 were a
surprise to military leaders, and especially Evren, since the majority of the votes
went to Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party, the party least favored by and relatively
free of compliance to the military.
The 1980 coup and 1982 constitution have important consequences for
contemporary civil-military relations in Turkey, which will be dealt with in
subsequent chapters.
207
Karpat, 155
111
CHAPTER 6
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SOURCES OF THE TURKISH

ARMED FORCES’ POLITICAL POWER
The last group of sources of the Turkish Armed Forces’s political power
consists mainly of its relationship with society, both culturally and in daily life. It
includes identity formation and cultural myths on the one hand and the role that is
ascribed to the military concerning the future expectations of the society on the
other hand. In this chapter it will be argued that the social bonds between the
military and the society may help to understand why military is ascribed such
political power and duties.
In this chapter, in line with consensual power theories particularly that of
Arendt, it will be argued that the Turkish Armed Forces is attributed political
power by the society in order to reflect their anxieties.208 Turkish Armed Forces is
given power by the society. There are basically three dimensions as to this
attribution. Firstly, the society defines itself as a military-nation and establishes
208
Ne e Düzel, “Ordu gücünü korumak için yeni strateji buldu” (“Army found new strategy to
maintain its power”), Radikal, December 18, 2006
112
cultural bonds with the Turkish Armed Forces which evolve around the rituals
concerning military conscription. The convergence of military and civilian
identities leads to the establishment of a strong bond of trust between the two.
Secondly, the military and the society have various points of touch in daily life,
like civil society organizations and social developmental support activities of the
military. These reflect and extend the positive identification of the Turkish Armed
Forces by the wider society. While it helps the Turkish Armed Forces to measure
the tension of and anxieties within the society, they also act as an instrument of
influence by the society. Moreover, they help to protect and strengthen the
positive image of Turkish Armed Forces. And finally, discursive practices by the
military and its convergence with the public opinion constitute another dimension
of the multifaceted relationship between the public and the military. Upon
analyzing military’s public speeches and tracing public opinion on recent political
matters, it will be argued that Turkish Armed Forces acts almost as a political
party, whose policies and activities reflect the hopes and anxieties of the society.
Turkish Armed Forces effectively takes the society’s pulse in political matters
with a consideration to maintain and augment the support that it receives from the
society
In this chapter, these three dimensions of the relationship between the
Turkish Armed Forces and the wider society will be analyzed through allocating a
separate part to each of them. They underlie the social and cultural basis upon
which the Turkish military establishes its self-definition as the “permanent
institution of the state” as opposed to the elected governments and offer an
113
explanation as to why Turkish Armed Forces is described as “the institution
which can best interpret and uphold the general interests of the nation” above
partisan politics.209
6.1. CULTURAL SOURCES
6.1.1. A Military Nation
In 1992, then chief of general staff Gen. Do an Güre proclaimed self-
confidently that Turkey is a military state.210 This assertion is acknowledged not
only by the military people, but also finds resonance on the wider public.
Accordingly, it is often stated that “Turkish people are a military-nation.”211 A
statement by stemihan Talay, then Minister of Culture in 1999 reflects this
convergence:
Turks have been known as a military nation throughout the

history. The Turkish military is synonymous with Turkish national
identity.212
Thus, there is a wide convergence between the self-understandings of the
military and the society. The clues to this convergence can also be found in the
following statements by lhan, a former general and ex-president of the Atatürk
High Council for Culture, Language and History:
Characteristics related to the military are bound to make a

great contribution to the shaping of the culture of a society so unified
209
Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics: Challenges to Democratic Consolidation,
(London: Lynne Rienner, 2000) 110
210
Gencer Özcan, “The Military and the Making of Foreign Policy in Turkey,” in Turkey in World
Politics. An Emerging Multiregional Power, ed. Kemal Kiri ci and Barry Rubin, (Lynne Rienner
Publishers, London, 2001), 16-20
211
Ayse Gül Altınay, The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in
Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Varoglu and Bicaksiz, “Volunteering for Risk:
the Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces,” Armed Forces and Society 31, 4 (2005): 584
212
Hurriyet August 11, 1999
114
with its military as ours. The fact that military has all the cultural
characteristics of the society that it manifests these characteristics and
that it serves as a center of education for most of those cultural values
is inevitable, in fact, necessary consequence.213
The place of military and its values are regarded as so central to the
Turkish culture that without them, the national unity is bound to collapse:
If we think of military culture with its historical achievements

as well as its contemporary impact as separate from the cultural
whole, then our national culture will lose its unity and identity.214
The argument that military values and practices constitute a vital element
in the overall Turkish national identity:
It is not wrong to say that the militarist values constitute an

important component of the collective identity of the Turkish society.
The values that constitute the distinctive color and define the Turkish
society are mostly in relation with the military and conscription.215
The strong identification of the Turkish society with its military finds
resonance in Turkish politics. For example, in 2002, upon questions about the
anti-EU expressions of a general, Foreign Minister Sukru Sina Gurel defended the
role of the military in Turkish political life, saying the armed forces had always
played a positive role. "The position of the military in Turkish political and social
life stems from historical experience, and the importance of the armed forces in
Turkish political and social life cannot be compared with any other armed forces
in Europe." Gurel said.216
213
Suat Ilhan, Jeopolitik Duyarlılık (Ankara: T.T.K. Yay.1989), 361
214
Ilhan, 361
215
Tanel Demirel cited in Securitization, Militarization and Gender in Turkey Yaganoglu,
80, MA Thesis (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2006)
216
“Turkish General Brushes Off EU Criticism,” The Turkish Times, October 11, 2002,
115
The positive identification of the society with the military leads to the
establishment of a popular trust for the military. “The Turkish military has a good
reputation in the country”217 According to a poll made in 1998 by TESEV, the
most trusted government institution was the army (% 94)218. According to a later
research by the same institution, the percentage fell to 77 % in 2002 219, and rose
to 8.2 out of 10 in 2004220. The results are supported with the research by
international institutions like GfK, which depicted the percentage as 91 %221.
According to the Eurobarometer National Report for Turkey, prepared in 2005,
the most trusted institution in Turkey is Turkish Armed Forces, with a percentage
of 86 %. The latest poll, made by Uluslararası Stratejik Ara tırma E itim ve
Danı ma Merkezi Platformu based in zmir, indicates that the professional
credibility of Turkish Armed Forces is approximately 82 %.
The popular trust for Turkish Armed Forces in Turkey is widely shared in
different segments of the society. The Istanbul city-dwellers222, the members of
Ankara Trade Chamber,223 the university professors224 and even supporters of the
225
Justice and Development Party living in rural areas think that the Turkish
http://www.theturkishtimes.com/archive/02/10_15/f_eu.html
217
Heper and Guney, 2000, 635-646
218
Hurriyet, “TESEV'e göre halk en çok orduya güveniyor”(“According to Turkish
Economic and Social Studies Foundation, public trusts in army most”) November 28, 1998
219
Mehmet Ali Birand, ““Subay olsam, ne dü ünürdüm?”(What would I think if I were an
army officer?”), Hurriyet, October 1, 2002
220
Hurriyet, “En önemli sorun i sizlik” (The most important problem is unemployment”),
March 31, 2004
221
Taha Akyol, “Orduya güvenmek” (Trusting in the Army”), Milliyet, October 4, 2006
222
Economicals Charity Board, “Yolsuzlu a bakı : stanbul Örne i Ara tırması”(Looking at
Corruption:Research on stanbul sample”), available at
http://www.iktisatlilar.org/raporsunulari2.htm (last accessed on 21 august 2007)
223
Hurriyet, “TÜS AD'dan Yılmaz'a destek”(“Support to Mr. Yılmaz from Turkish Industrialist
and Businessman Association”), August 9, 2001
224
Taha Akyol “Iste Universite” (“This is the university”), Milliyet, January 3, 2005
225
Milliyet, “En güvenilir kurum, ordu” (“The Most Accredited Institution is theArmy”), January
116
Armed Forces is the most dependable institution in Turkey. While it may be
argued that the popular trust for government has also risen significantly over the
last five years226, and that the armed forces tend to be the most trusted institution
in most countries227 the level of trust among the Turkish society for the army is
high above the levels expected in a country where military took direct control of
government twice before and remained active in the political discussions over a
quarter century of democratic rule.
The level of convergence between the self-understandings of the military
and society on the one side, and popular trust for the Turkish Armed Forces on
the other, are often regarded as a strong indicator of the level of militarization of
society228 According to this argument, the Turkish society has gone through a
militarization process from the establishment of the Republic. During the efforts
for nation-building, the state indoctrinated the public with a special concept of
citizenship, which was generally interwoven with myths of martyrdom and self-
sacrifice, love and responsibility for the motherland, protecting home country
against the enemies, which led to the sanctification of the military in general.
The institution of a “citizen army” usually based on universal

male conscription has defined the nation at birth as a military nation.
Military service provides one of the most important sites where the
nation idea is married to the state idea naturalizing the connection
between the two. A state protected by a national army or citizen
soldiers can be the tip of the iceberg concealing state idea being
19, 2005
226
Hurriyet, “ çinde ordu olmayan soru: En güvenilir hükümettir” (“The question that does not
include the army: The most trusted is the cabinet”), September 9,2005
227
Murat Belge, “Kime güvensem?” (Who shall I trust in?”), Radikal, August 24, 2001
228
Altinay
117
protected by the nation-idea229
Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to state that the militarization process
–if there is any, began with the establishment of the Republic or it was totally
controlled by the state and/or the military elite. Militarization is defined as
…a step by step process by which a person or a thing

gradually comes to be controlled by the military or comes to depend
for its well being on militaristic ideas.230
Therefore, the process of militarization is not just a power exercise by the
military, at the end of which the military is able to control the whole society.
During the process, militaristic ideas and the importance of the military may be
voluntarily internalized by the society, which may lead to the attribution of a
special role to the armed forces by the society. Therefore, militarization may exist
as the outcome of the society’s own necessities and its perception of its own well-
being. Moreover, even if the process had been successfully supervised by the
state and military elite as a one-way indoctrination, the military-related myths,
rituals within Turkish culture, the underlying basis which is proven to be eligible
for “militarization” should be analyzed in order to understand why militarization
has been so successful in the first place. The following part in this chapter
elaborates on these elements.
6.1.2. Mass Conscription and Military Culture in Turkey
It is often stated that the mass conscription is the main reason as to why
the Turkish culture is interwoven with military culture. Kinzer depicts the picture
229
Altinay, 6
230
Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives.
(London: University of California Press, 2000), 3
118
as follows:
All young Turkish men must serve in the army, which means
that virtually every adult male is a veteran and that most families have
had the experience of seeing sons in uniform. Turks do not fear their
army or consider it oppressive the way terrified Africans and Latin
Americans did when cruel military dictatorships dominated their
societies. Most see it as a benevolent force that has successfully
defended Turkey against foreign and domestic enemies and that truly
has the national interest at heart. In much of Turkish society there is a
desire to believe the best about the armed forces and their
commanders.231
Every male Turk over 20 with appropriate health condition is bound to
serve in the military through a period ranging from 5 to 15 months. According to
the Turkish constitution, military service is regarded both as a duty and a right of
the citizen. Although it is hard to deny the enormous influence of mass
conscription on overall Turkish society, it should be noted that the military
service is not regarded as an unpleasant, involuntary service.232 It is called as
vatani görev (duty for the motherland), vatan hizmeti (service for the motherland),
or vatan borcu (debt to the motherland) both in the media and the public.
Military service is regarded as a step for being grown up, a test of
masculinity and indicator of eligibility for marriage. Therefore, before the
conscript departs for his regiment some ceremonies are held with great
celebrations. Mostly, the young males around the same age in the neighborhood
231
Stephen Kinzer “Dreaming in Turkish” World Policy Journal 18, 3 (Fall 2001): 69-80 cited in
Varo lu and Bicaksiz “Volunteering for Risk: the Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces” Armed
Forces and Society 31, 4 (Summer 2005): 583-598
232
Varo lu and Bicaksiz, “Volunteering for Risk: the Culture of the Turkish Armed Forces,”
Armed Forces and Society 31, 4 (Summer 2005):585
119
gather at the homes of relatives or neighbors for the dinner and they chat, sing,
and dance. On the day of departure, friends and relatives accompany the conscript
to the train station or bus station233. They hug, kiss, and make some jokes like
throwing him up in the air and say ‘En büyük asker, bizim asker!’ (the greatest
soldier is ours).
Having completed the military service is regarded so important among the
society that those whose health is not eligible for the military service, may try to
conceal their health condition: “…since in Turkish society, military service is
perceived as a national duty and part of masculine identity, so this perception may
induce many citizens not to disclose their health problems and try to get
234
themselves conscripted as healthy individuals.” For those with disabilities or
serious illnesses, separate symbolic ceremonies are held in the regiments, where
they wear uniforms and make oath. This is called temsili askerlik (figurative
military service). 235
Apart from the military service, the concepts of gazi (veteran) and ehit
(martry) has special connotations in Turkish culture. Gazi originates from the
Arabic word, gaza (war), and refers to those who took part in war, while ehit
originates from ehadet (witness), referring to the one who sees. According to the
Islamic faith, the martyr will directly go to the heaven. It is believed that the
233
Varo lu and Bicaksiz, 585
234
S. Ceylan S. Kılıç M Hasde, T. Kır “Determination of the Reasons for Unfitness for Military
Service in Turkey” cited in Varoglu and Bicaksiz, 586
235
These ceremonies are widely covered in the media. For an example see “They became a
soldier for one day” available at
http://www.kenthaber.com/Arsiv/Haberler/2006/Mayis/11/Haber_137334.aspx (last accessed on
21 August 2007)
120
matrydom is the highest spiritual status, following the prophet, hence the low
level of risk aversion, reflected in the saying: “Ölürsem ehit, kalırsam gazi
olurum.” ( If I die [in the war] I will be a matry, if not I will be a veteran). Beside,
the military is known as peygamber oca ı, (the Prophet’s house)236. As such, the
societal support for the military is grounded also in the religious motifs of the
Turkish culture. Moreover, the memories of stiklal Sava ı, Korean War and
Cyprus Peace Operation are still alive in the society and the veterans head the
official corteges in the national days. Each year, 19th of September is officially
celebrated as Veterans’ Day.
6.2. SOCIAL INTERACTION
6.2.1. Military and the Civil Society
It is often argued that there is direct relationship between the civil society
and the “civic consciousness” of the society as opposed to militaristic and/or
state-centric worldview. Thus, it is expected that there is an inverse relationship
between the number and effectiveness of the civil society organizations and the
political power of the military.
In Turkey, military interventions of 1960, 1971 and 1980 had a disturbing
effect for civil society organizations.237 Nevertheless, by 1990s civil society
gained a new momentum, especially after some amendments were made as to the
provisions of Turkish Penal Code and the Constitution which restricted the
236
Tahsin Gülhan, “Dinamik Bir Çevre Faktörü olarak Manevi Kültürün Ordu-Asker Üzerindeki
Etkisi”(Effects of non-material culture as a dynamic environment factor on Army-Soldier”),
Köprü Güz 1996, no. 56
237
Ferhat Unlu “Non-Governmental Organizations” in Cizre Umit(ed) ALMANAK: TÜRK YE
Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim (Almanac: Turkey’s Security Sector and Democratic
Oversight ”) (Istanbul: TESEV 2005)
121
establishment and activities of civil society organizations. During this period,
although the relationship between security forces, especially military and civil
society organizations (especially those which focus on human rights) retained its
thorny nature, some civil society organizations began to emerge which had a
constructive relationship with the Turkish military. Turkish Armed Forces has
been able to establish institutional connections with non-governmental
organizations, universities and think-tanks.
Currently, there are six foundations which are officially supported by the
Turkish General Staff. The links to these foundations can be found on the opening
page of Turkish General Staff’s website. These are Foundation for Empowerment
of Turkish Armed Forces, Turkish Armed Forces Education Foundation, Turkish
Armed Forces Mehmetçik Foundation, Turkish Armed Forces Hand-in-Hand
Foundation, Turkish Armed Forces Solidarity Foundation, Turkish Armed Forces
Health Foundation. Boards of Trustees and general directors of these foundations
are composed of almost exclusively serving or retired military officers.
Turkish Armed Forces Foundation is established in 1987. Its mission is
stated as to contribute to the empowerment of the Turkish Armed Forces and
development of national defense industry with the material and moral support of
the Turkish society.238 It has a great number of contributors, who donates money
and real estate. It has Honorary Support Councils in 65 cities and 609 districts,
generally headed by governors.
238
Turkish Armed Forces Foundation’s Website available at
http://www.tskgv.org.tr/tr/misyon/index.html (last accessed on 12 June 2007)
122
Established in 1982, the Mehmetçik Foundation is another civil society
organization which enjoys a wide range of support from the society. Mehmetçik is
the general name traditionally given by Turkish society to soldiers. The mission
of the Foundation is stated as “to provide “Death and Disabled Pension” for
Mehmetçiks and their families, to provide “Continuous Education Aid” for their
children, to provide “Continuous Care Aid” for disabled war veterans, to organize
social programs to bring together Mehmetçiks in the Aid Plans, their families and
the donators.”239 The foundation’s main financial sources are donations and
revenues from its subsidiaries. Since 1982, it paid nearly 80 Million USD
assistance to approximately 28.000 people according to the Aid Plans and still
pays 1 Million USD each month to 5.500 people according to the Aid Plan.
Turkish Armed Forces Education foundation is establishes in 1957 with
the aim of supporting education of the children of officers, veterans and martyrs.
It has 17 dormitories in 8 cities and provides scholarships. Besides, it is argued
that it will establish a private university, which will reserve quotas for children of
veterans and martyrs.240
Apart from these foundations, there are four military-originated
associations, which have direct links with the Turkish Armed Forces. These are
Turkey Combatant Veterans Association, Turkey War Veterans, Martyrs, and
Their Widows and Orphans Association, Turkey Retired Officers Association,
and Turkey Retired Non Commissioned Officers Association.
239
Turkish Armed Forces Mehmetçik Foundation,
http://www.mehmetcik.org.tr/index.php?Page=Sayfa&No=13
240
Sabah, “TSK E itim Vakfı özel üniversite açacak” (Turkish Armed Forces Education
Foundation is going to establish a new private university ”), August 24, 2006
123
These foundations and associations help to establish and strengthen the
social links between the Turkish Armed Forces and the society. The amount of
donations they receive and their wide range of activities can be perceived as both
strong indicators of the societal support they receive from the Turkish society and
effective instruments of maintaining such support.
There are other civil society organizations which are allegedly identified
241
with Turkish Armed Forces. Among them, Ataürkçü Dü ünce Derne i
(Atatürkist Thought Association), headed by an ex-general ener Eruygur, has
been on the forefront of recent public discussions on regime and secularism. The
association organized a series of meetings in order to protest the expected
presidential candidacy of Recep Tayyip Erdo an (the prime minister and
President of Justice and Development Party). Hundreds of thousands gathered in
the separate meetings organized in Ankara, stanbul, zmir. These meetings were
widely covered in the national and international media. At the same time with the
meetings, the General Chief of Staff issued a declaration which stated that "It
should not be forgotten that the Turkish armed forces is one of the sides in this
debate and the absolute defender of secularism." The fact that that the head of
ADD is a former general, the parallelism between the ideologies of ADD and
Turkish Armed Forces and the slogans chanted in the meetings in favor of the
military like “Orduya uzanan eller kırılsın.” “Mustafa Kemal’in askerleriyiz” and
“En büyük asker bizim asker”242 lead to the allegations that these meetings were
241
smail Saymaz, “ ‘Vatanseverlik' yarı ındaki örgütler emekli asker dolu” (The organizations
racing on ‘Patriotism’ are full of retired soldiers”), Radikal, February 17, 2007
242
“Cumhuriyet Mitingine yüzbinler akın etti” (“Hundered of thousands flock to Republican
Meetings”) available at http://www.haberx.com/n/1011229/cumhuriyet-mitingine-yuzbinler-akin-
124
organized with the support of or to support the military. Although there is no
direct relationship with these organizations and the Turkish Armed Forces, these
meetings indicate that while the society presents their anxieties about the future of
the country it refers to the military as “the guardian of the regime”243.
Along with the informal bonds as stated above, Turkish Armed Forces has
also established formal institutional links with civilian bureaucracy and wider
public through think-tanks and educational institutions. Among them National
Security Academy plays an important role in developing relations between the
Turkish Armed Forces and different segments of the civilian population.
National Security Academy was established in 1952 as “National Defense
Academy”. Since 1964, it functions, except for a short interval in 1981-82, as
National Security Academy, a govermental institution which provides graduate-
level education to serving or potential high ranking bureaucrats working in
different institutions of state, including Turkish Armed Forces, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Internal Affairs. Its mission is stated as to endow
high level bureaucrats in public institutions and military officers with planning
and information skills in issues concerning national security and to enhance the
spirit of cooperation and coordination between the civilian and military
frequenters (müdavim) of the academy.244 Recently, civilian employees from the
private sector (mostly from media and civil society organizations) began to be
etti.htm (last accessed on 24 September 2007)

243
The parallelism between the discouses of the military and the public will be anaylzed in detail
in the next part “Discursive Practices”
244
For Academy’s website see http://www.harpak.tsk.mil.tr/Icerik/mga.htm and for Alumni
website http://www.ugsad.org.tr/?s=icerikler&b=milliguv
125
accepted to the academy. While the military frequenters are determined by the
General Staff, the civilian frequenters are elected by the State Personnel Office
upon approval by the Prime Ministry. 245 Although the academy operates under
the umbrella of the General Secretariat of NSC, the academy is formally linked to
the Command of the Turkish Staff Officers' School.
Each frequenter takes a five-month long education from distinguished
scholars and military and civilian experts. The curricula consists of issues
concerning global and national security, protection of the national interests,
determination and evaluation of national power, crises management, preparing
criteria for war directives and ministerial plans and total defense of the country.
The academy aims to “bring up disciplined personnel who understand and
embrace main principles of Ataturkist thought and have a forward-looking view
based on Turkish national culture, custom and tradition”246 Especially with the
recent changes in procedures for the accession of civilian people from non-
governmental organizations and the media, the Turkish Armed Forces has been
able to enhance and strengthen the bond it established with the wider society. It
serves a unique platform where civilians and military officers discuss, evaluate
and cooperate on issues concerning national security.
The Turkish Armed Forces has also intense relationship with think-tanks.
It is argued ASAM, the first and one of the most prolific institutions that work on
245
Zaman, “Milli Güvenlik Akademisi'ne katılacak sivilleri Ba bakanlık seçecek”(Office of Prime
Ministry will choose civils who will attend to the Academy of National Security ”), January 21,
2006
246
Turkish Armed Forces Military Academies Command National Security Academy available at
http://www.harpak.tsk.mil.tr/Icerik/mga.htm
126
security has close collaboration with Turkish Armed Forces, as illustrated in its
executive cadre.247 The chief executive of ASAM is Edip Ba er, a former three-
star general, who worked as vice General Chief of Staff. In 2002, Turkish Armed
Forces has inaugurated its own think-tank, Stratejik Ara tırmalar ve Etüd Merkezi
(Study Center for Strategic Research) (SAREM)248 under the auspices of General
Chief of Staff. The institution organizes conferences and works with several
civilian scholars in issues concerning Turkey’s national security needs249. As
such, it establishes channels of communication and understanding as well as a
platform for collaboration between the Turkish Armed Forces and the public.
6.2.2. Turkish Armed Forces’ Supportive Activities for Social

Development
One of the most effective links that establishes a strong bond of trust
between the society and the Turkish Armed Forces is their social development
support activities. The ground for these activities is set as “to provide for the
integration of the society and the Turkish Armed Forces, which comes from the
bosom of the Turkish Republic and is the apple of its eyes; to set clearly that
Turkish Armed Forces is always on the public’s side, to endear the Turkish
Armed Forces and the state and enhance the public trust for them.”250 This
mission is in line with one of the primary duties of the Land Forces, as indicated
247
Ferhat Unlu “Non-Governmental Organizations” in Cizre Umit(ed) Almanak: Türkiye’de
Güvenlik Sektörü ve Demokratik Gözetim (Almanac: Turkey’s Security Sector and Democratic
Oversight), (Istanbul: TESEV, 2005)
248
Güneri Cıvao lu “3. Milenyumda Ordu”( The army in the third millenium”) Milliyet, January
10, 2002
249 249
“ “Genelkurmay bünyesinde ‘Stratejik Ara tırma ve Etüd Merkezi” (Within Turkish General
Staff ‘Strategic Research and Survey Center’), http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/128877.asp
250
Turkish Armed Forces Navy “Support Activities for Societal Development” available at
http://www.dzkk.tsk.mil.tr/guncelduyurular/tgdf/index.asp (last accessed on 29 August 2007)
127
in the website: “to familiarize Land Forces and enhance the bond between the
Land Forces and the public.”251
The support activities of Turkish Armed Forces are carried out by each
segment of the armed forces, including the Gendarmerie and Coastal Guard.
These activities are widely publicized in the local and national media.252 They
include a wide range of areas including education, health, environment, sports and
arts, disaster relief, visits, and infrastructure.
Most of these activities are directed mostly to rural areas in order to
enhance the public services, like health and education. The military officers detect
the problems through speaking to the local people and then plan these
activities253. Usually, the military repairs school buildings and their landscape,
donates books and stationary goods. In 2006, free preparation classes for
university entrance examination are offered for about 2000 students in Mehmetcik
Dershaneleri.254 Foreign language and computing courses are opened. Moreover,
campaigns are organized in order to encourage military officers to undertake the
education expenses of poor children.255 The Turkish Armed Forces regularly
opens literacy courses and professional courses for conscript soldiers. In these
courses, between 2000 and 2007, 142.972 soldiers gained literacy and around
500.000 soldiers acquired professional skills for earning their lives after military
251
Turkish Armed Forces Land Forces Command available at http://www.kkk.tsk.mil.tr/
252
Yalcin Bayer, “Trakya’da ‘Ordu millet el ele’ pankartı” ( The banner as ‘Army and folk are
hand in hand’ at Thrace”), Hurriyet, July 27, 2005
253
“Trakya’da ‘Ordu millet el ele’ pankartı”
254
General Command of Gendarmerie, “Support Activities for Societal Development” available at
http://www.jandarma.tsk.mil.tr/redirect.htm?url=//www.jandarma.gov.tr/halklailiskiler/destek.htm
(last accessed on 29 August 2007)
255
Turkish Armed Forces Navy “Support Activities for Societal Development” available at
http://www.dzkk.tsk.mil.tr/guncelduyurular/tgdf/index.asp (last accessed on 29 August 2007)
128
service.256
Turkish Armed Forces also make sanitary inspections in rural areas where
health services are inadequate. They repair village clinics and lodgments. The
military offers free treatment, medicine and counseling. Moreover, sanitary
measurements are carried out in military laboratories to fight against epidemics
along with food control and water analysis. They organize conferences on birth
control, parenting and other health issues. At times, military equipments are used
for transportation of patients and of organs for transplantation257.
Turkish Armed Forces support activities for social development also
include sports and art competitions, music concerts, conferences on
environmental protection, women’s and human rights, forestation campaigns,
visits to asylums for the aged and orphanages, and reparation of infrastructure like
electricity, roads and water utilities.
Turkish Armed Forces has also duties in disaster relief. They take part in
fire fighting and have relief and recover functions after flood and earthquakes.
Due to its well-organized manpower and efficiency, Turkish Armed Forces is able
to reach to the disaster area with utmost competence. Especially, the services dealt
out by the military after the major Marmara earthquake of 1999, has been quite
appreciated by the society. The Turkish Armed Forces was the first to reach the
seriously affected zones. A poll made by scholars in the Adapazari district in the
256
Turkish Armed Forces General Staff, “Support Activities for Societal Development” available
at http://www.tsk.mil.tr/HABERLER_ve_OLAYLAR/8_Toplumsal_Gelisime_Destek_Faaliyetler
i/konular/er_erbas_kurs.htm (last accessed on 1 September 2007)
257
Turkish Air Forces Command, “Support Activities for Societal Development” available at
http://www.hvkk.tsk.mil.tr/turkce/faaliyetler/tgdffaaliyet.htm(last accessed on 1 September 2007)
129
aftermath of the earthquake indicates that most of the respondents think that the
Turkish Armed Forces has been the second major provider of support after the
relatives and neighbors.258
The planning and efficiency of the Turkish Armed Forces on disasters is
so appreciated that well-known seismologists Ahmet Mete I ıkara259 and Celal
engör260 stated that the Turkish military is fully prepared to any major
earthquake that would take place in stanbul. Following these statements, the
discussions took place in the media where it is argued that full management of
crises, especially earthquakes, should be undertaken by the military rather than
governorship.261
The head of Association in Support of Contemporary Living, Turkan
Saylan: “In Turkey, we do not fight only against PKK. Our army, like a civil
society organization, helps in our activities. When an earthquake or flood takes
place, we look to the army for help. Accordingly, we cannot say [to them] ‘Stand
aside.”262 The contribution of supportive activities by the military to the
establishment and maintenance of the close relationship between the society and
258
M. Cüneyt Birkök, Cemal Ero lu “17 A ustos Marmara Depremi Sonrasında Sosyal Yapı
Problemleri: Bili im Ölçekleriyle Sosyolojik De erlendirmeler” (“Social Structure Problems after
The August 17 Marmara Earthquake: Sociological Evaluations with Information System Scales”)
Uluslararası nsan Bilimleri Dergisil 1, no.1, (2002):13
259
“Askerler Marmara Depremine Hazırlanıyor” (Soldier is preparing to Marmara
Earthquake”),Voice of Anatolia, available at http://www.voanews.com/turkish/archive/2004-06/a-
2004-06-18-15-1.cfm; “TSK'dan deprem taburları” (“Earthquake troops from the Turkish Armed
Forces”), CNNTURK, available at
http://www.cnnturk.com/OZEL_DOSYALAR/haber_detay.asp?pid=1100&haberid=118282 16
(last accessed on 2 September 2007)
260
Hurriyet, “Asker hazır, siviller de il”(Soldier is ready but civilians are not”), August 3, 2004
261
“Deprem Dede bu kez mimberden seslendi” NTVMSNBC (“This time, Deprem Dede
addressed from the pulpit”) August 18, 2007 available at
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/417576.asp (last accessed on 1 September 2007)
262
Tempo, April 26,2007 available at http://www.tempodergisi.com.tr/toplum_politika/13847/
(last accessed on 1 September 2007)
130
the army and the projection of this bond into Turkish civil-military relations, is
well-stated by columnist Can Dündar:
“In the aftermath of the flood disaster where 40 lives

are lost, if the military hums and rescues the water bound
people, while the Prime Minister states that “They exaggerate.
That is natural disaster… when it comes, these things happen.”,
if the general who dispenses food in military tents is applauded,
while the local governor who goes bush for three days is booed,
and if non-uniformed soldiers collect rubbish while the
municipalities have their hand tied by the government, then we
cannot establish trust for the civilian government, neither shall
we be shocked by the fact that the military is the most trusted
institution, nor can we persuade the masses who live with the
hope of a military takeover of the indispensability of the
democracy.”263
6.3. DISCURSIVE PRACTICES
The last argument of this chapter is that the public speeches of the military
in Turkey are formulated as a response to anxieties of the society about the
political and social transformations that take place in the country. Society’s strong
identification with Turkish Armed Forces on the one side and the bond of trust
(whose dynamics are explained above) on the other side makes it possible for
Turkish Armed Forces to respond the anxieties and expectations of the society in
a manner similar to political parties. Turkish Armed Forces acts almost as a
political party, whose policies and activities reflect the hopes and anxieties of the
society with a consideration to maintain and augment the support that it receives
from the society. This cycle is at the core of the Turkish Armed Forces political
263
Can Dundar “Bu Komutana Dikkat” (“Attention to this commander”) Milliyet, November 6,
2006
131
power.
In this part, in order to understand the dynamics how and under what
conditions, the Turkish Armed Forces acts as such, three major areas of dispute in
the society will be analyzed with particular emphasis on the changes of the public
opinion and military discourse. It will be argued that the changes show a
parallelism between public opinion and the military discourse, illustrating that the
military discourse is ultimately responsive to the changes in the public opinion.
As such, the military acts as a political party, which shows a particular concern
for society’s anxieties and expectations.
Three areas of dispute are chosen from among the subjects where military
voices are mostly heard. These are Turkey’s EU membership; terrorism and
Cross-border operations to Northern Iraq and debates on threats to secular regime
and Ataturk’s reforms. I will argue that the military has always been sensitive to
the public opinion and there is a strong parallelism between the two.
6.3.1. EU Accession Process and the Changing Discourses of the

Military
The biggest political challenge that Turkey faces is accession process to
the EU. The accession process brings about redefinitions of certain values like
democracy and Turkish identity, along with some institutional and legal changes.
Whether or not the society supports accession process, discussions are inevitable.
Not infrequently, Turkish Armed Forces, which is supposed to be politically
neutral in such discussions, become parties to them.
132
Turkey was recognized as a candidate state for EU membership during the
European Council Helsinki Summit in 1999. Like every candidate state, Turkey
was supposed to satisfy some several conditions, known as Copenhagen criteria.
One specific EU requirement for Turkey was the removal of the supremacy of the
military over civilian politics and placing civilian control of the military in line
with other EU member states.264 Constitutional amendments have been made
regarding the place of NSC in Turkish political system.265 The Turkish Armed
Forces has accepted loss of power vis-à-vis other political actors without too
much dissent.266 Following the 2004 Regular Report’s confirmation that Turkey
has been able to strengthen civilian control and has reduced the powers of the
military, EU started accession process with Turkey in October 2005.
Sarıgil argues that military finally accepted the reforms which eventually
would curb its political power, because it “has found itself rhetorically entrapped
and could not reject reforms”267. The reason for the military’s entrapment is
Turkish military’s “concern about the negative impact of such an action on the
military’s legitimacy and credibility in the society”.268 As the harbinger of
modernization in the early days of the Republic and the institution which
demonstrates an extensive concern for the Westernization ideal of Atatürk, the
Turkish Armed Forces has always displayed a supportive stance towards Turkey’s
264
Zeki Sarıgil, “Europeanization as Institutional Change: The Case of the Turkish Military”
Mediterrenian Politics 12 no. 1 (2007) 40
265
See Chapter 3 for further detail on institutional and legal changes concerning civil-military
relations in Turkey.
266
Ersel Aydinli, Nihat Ali Özcan, and Dogan Akyaz “The Turkish Military's March Toward
Europe” Foreign Affairs, 85, no. 1 (2006):77–90
267
Sarıgil, 40
268
Sarıgil, 41
133
EU bid.269 In a speech in 2003, General Büyükanıt, then vice general chief of
staff, clearly set the Turkish Armed Forces’ support for EU accession process as
follows:
“I openly express: the Turkish Armed Forces is not and

cannot be anti-EU because EU accession is a geo-strategic and
geopolitical necessity of the modernization goal set by Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk. This necessity fully overlaps with Turkey’s
social, political, economic and security goals. EU cause cannot
click with anachronistic and separatist objectives of those who
have different views on Turkey’s unitary structure and secular
regime.”270
He further added that Turkey is part of Europe and will accede to
European Union.
“Even though what I have said may contradict with the

expectations of some circles, it is a clear expression of Turkey’s
and Turkish Armed Forces’ decisive determination. It is a clear
response to those circles which present Turkish Armed Forces as
the reason of all negative developments on all occasions.”271
Apart from the ideological reasons (Westernization), the military’s
supportive stance has also been backed up by Turkish public whose attitude is
demonstrated in several polls made on Turkey’s EU membership since 1999
Helsinki summit. In a poll made by Piar-Gallup in August 2000, 68.7 % of the
respondents thought that Turkey should accede to EU, while only 9.9 % thought it
should not, with remaining 21.4 % defining themselves as unknowledgeable about
269
Gülnur Aybet, Turkey and EU After the First Year of Negotiations: Reconciling Internal and
External Policy Challenges Security Dialogue 37 2006 529-549 p.543
270
Radikal, “Org. Büyükanıt: TSK, AB'ye kar ı olamaz” (“Gen. Büyükanıt: Amry cannot be
against EU”) May 29, 2003
271
“Org. Büyükanıt: TSK, AB'ye kar ı olamaz”
134
the issue272. Among the reasons as to why Turkey should not accede to EU, the
respondents have thought that it will negatively affect the Islamic and national
identity of Turkey, Turkey’s economy will be too dependent on European
economy, and that the conditions set for Turkey will harm the territorial integrity
of Turkey. Another poll made by TESEV in 2002, confirms these results.273
While 64 % of the respondents approve of Turkey’s accession, 42 % thought that
EU membership will bring positive changes to their lives. Those who did not
favor EU membership stated that religious and national identity of Turkey would
be weakened. The research concluded that public opinion, although highly
sensitive in matters concerning national defense and religious/national values, is
ready for integration with EU in most areas.
These anxieties and expectations, notwithstanding overall positive
tendency for membership, were also shared by some in the military circles. At a
conference at Istanbul’s War Academies Command, NSC Secretary-General Gen.
Tuncer Kılınç stated that the European Union had never supported Turkey on
issues concerning Turkey’s national interest, adding that Turkey should seek out
new alliances other then the EU, such as Iran and Russia. After the remarks, the
Turkish General Staff refrained form making comments on Kılınç’s statements,
which was interpreted as the view expressed had supporters in the military circles.
On the other hand, according to the statements by an anonymous source from the
Turkish General Staff, Kılınç was interpreted as expressing his own personal
272
ükrü Elekda , “Aklimiz Avrupa’da” (“Our mind is busy with Europe”) Milliyet, September
21, 2000
273
Radikal, “TESEV'in anketi: Halkın % 64'ü AB'den yana” (“TESEV’s poll: 64 % of the public
is pro-EU”) June 28, 2002
135
opinion in an academic atmosphere, and his views did not represent official view
of Turkish Armed Forces on EU.274 Later, Kılınç himself stated that he was
speculating on a scenario and certainly not anti-EU.275 Columnist Murat Yetkin,
summarized official view of Turkish Armed Forces on EU as follows:
a. EU should demonstrate adequate understanding to

Turkey national sensitivities and interests.
b. Turkey’s EU membership should be perceived as a

self-respecting togetherness on equal grounds rather than
unconditional submission.
c. Nevertheless, Turkey’s interests are membership to

NATO, OSCE and EU, that is a geopolitical necessity.276
Despite the divergence of views, the Turkish Armed Forces has stood
firmly in its support for Turkey’s EU bid while public support for EU has reached
its peak in 2004. According to transatlantic trends report, there was strong support
in Turkey in for joining the EU in 2004. 73 % of the respondents believed that it
would be a good thing for Turkey to join the EU.277 Another poll, Eurobarometer,
also demonstrated similar results. 71 % of the respondents stated that EU
membership will be good, with only 9 % stating that it will be bad.278 During an
interview to a newspaper, General Chief of Staff, Ozkok, declared that “I am the
274
Murat Yetkin “Askerlerden yanıt var” (“There is response from the military”)Radikal, March
12, 2002
275
Sedat Ergin, “Herkesin merak etti i sorular” (“The questions everbody wonders
about”)Hurriyet, March 13, 2002
276
Murat Yetkin “Askerlerden yanıt var” (“There is response from the military”)Radikal, March
12, 2002
277
Transatlantic Trends 2004 available at
http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/2004_english_key.pdf (last accessed on 23 August
2007)
278
Standard Eurobarometer 61 (Spring 2004) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb61/eb61_en.htm (last accessed on 23 August
2007)
136
head of Turkish Armed Forces and as the one who represents it, I emphasize that
we always support the EU membership and the reforms that were made.” Even,
he argued that the problems over Aegean Sea and the other problems could be
resolved in a week if Turkey takes steps toward membership. He added that they
(Turkish Armed Forces) do not have any pre-conditions concerning the EU
membership, which, Turkish Armed Forces believes, would strengthen social

279
state, hasten economic development, and improve life standard and quality.
Ozkok also acknowledged that “EU membership is a public demand.” 280
The parallelism between the public opinion and the military discourses
has continued as the public support for EU membership has begun to decrease.
Due to the problem over Cyprus, the adoption of laws on “Armenian genocide” in
several European states, along with the alleged support of some EU countries to
PKK and DHKP-C, the support of Turkish public for EU membership has begun
to deteriorate.281 It shrunk to 63 % in 2005282 and to 54 % in 2006283 and to 40 %
with a dramatic decline in 2007.284 This alienation trend has also been confirmed
by Eurobarometer Reports; the percentage of Turkish people who think “EU
membership will be a good thing for Turkey” decreased from 71 % in 2004 to
279
Zaman, “Özkök: AB üyeli i için ön artımız yok” (“Özkök: We do not have preconditions for
EU membership”) October 19, 2003
280
Radikal, “Özkök: AB yolu hata kaldırmaz” (“Özkök: EU path does not tolerate mistakes”)
October 30, 2004
281
Mehmet Ali Birand “AB büyükelçileri, bu mesajları iyi anladılar mı?” Posta, March 20, 2002
282
http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/TTKeyFindings2005.pdf (last accessed on 23
August 2007)
283
http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/2006_TT_Key%20Findings%20TURKISH.pdf (last
accessed on 23 August 2007)
284
Transatlantic Trends 2007 (Turkish version) available at
http://www.transatlantictrends.org/trends/doc/TT07TKKFR_FINAL.pdf (last accessed on 23
August 2007)
137
44% in spring 2006. It reached to 52 % with only a slight increase in spring 2007,
while the percentage of those who think “EU membership is a bad thing” almost
tripled from 2004 (9 %) to 2006 (25 %). Besides, the public trust for EU
institutions has also decreased from to 51 % in autumn 2004285 to 38 % in spring
2007.
Despite the legal and institutional changes and the efforts undertaken by
the government, the society’s attraction towards EU membership has showed a
continuous decrease. According to the polls, the Turkish public’s top anxieties
about EU membership were “less use of Turkish language” (62 %)“ increase in
the use and illegal trafficking of drugs” (62 %) and “Loss of national identity and
culture” (58 %).286
At the same time, Turkish Armed Forces has began to display a cautious
stance towards the developments, usually pronouncing the doubts and anxieties of
the groups in the wider society about the concessions demanded from Turkey by
the EU. These issues included but not confined to rights of minorities and the
Cyprus question. While the top-cadres of the Armed Forces denied any reference
to the Army as being anti-EU, they did not refrain from criticizing the EU
countries and the representatives.287 In 2005, in an interview, former chief of
general staff (retired) General Kıvrıko lu, states that
285
Standard Eurobarometer 62 (Autumn 2004) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62_tr_exec.pdf (last accessed on 13 August
2007)
286
Standard Eurobarometer 63.4 (spring 2005) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_nat_tr.pdf (last accessed on 13 August
2007)
287
“EU, Büyükanıt clash on ethnic identity” Turkish Daily News, November 4, 2006 available at
http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=58249 (last accessed on 18 August
2007)
138
“Turkey’s territorial and national integrity should not be
put in jeopardy...Europe should be sincere about this subject and it
should not have double standards. It appears that EU gives orders
and Turkey obeys. EU’s double standards lead to the impression
that EU would like to direct Turkey towards a position between
Lausanne and Sevres Treaty.”
Furthermore, he points to the gravest concern as “EU’s support for
Kurdish nationalism” referring to the EU demands on giving cultural rights to
Kurdish people. “EU always says ‘Kurd, Kurdish…education in Kurdish’. If
Kurdish becomes the media of education, what shall be the unitary structure, the
national integrity? Turkey’s structure would decompose”.
He further adds that the accession process should be carefully managed
since “there is no end to these demands. When one step is made, another demand
comes… Today they say that Kurds should also be counted as constituent nation
in the Constitution. Then will come autonomy, federative system, etc… What all
these mean is Turkey will fall apart.”288
In November 2006, following the criticisms of Hansjörg Kretschmer, the
EU Commission’s representative to Ankara, about the weight of military on
Turkish politics and in response to his remarks on giving cultural rights to Kurds,
Chief of General Staff, Gen. Büyükanıt criticized the EU and stated that “We
have to be sensitive; they are trying to create minorities.” He also added that “The
army is their [the EU's] target. Why are they picking on the army? Why are they
bothered by the public statements of the military?... Do the statements perturb the
288
Fikret Bila, “Sorun TSK de il AB’nin çifte tutumu” (“The problem is not Turkish Armed
Forces but double-sided attitude”) Milliyet, December 31, 2005
139
goals of their secret agendas?”289 Büyükanıt also urged the EU officials to speak
more carefully: “Every country has its realities. The security situation must be
very well evaluated. Turkey is located in a very sensitive region, in terms of
geopolitics. ... We all have to be careful [in our criticism].”290
During the same speech, delivered in War Academies Command,
Buyukanıt did not refrain from criticizing some European Union countries on
their attitude towards PKK and harshly criticized them for not supporting
Turkey’s fight against terrorism despite the agreements. 291
All these public statements by the military lead to the assessments by
public opinion holders that Turkish military has developed serious doubts and
very deep anxieties about the EU accession process.292 The parallelism between
Turkish public opinion and the military discourse indicates that Turkish military
is responsive to the anxieties of the Turkish public, and formulate their speeches
as a response the general tendencies that impinge on the Turkish society.
6.3.2. Terrorism and Military Discourses on Cross-border Operations
Since 1980s, terrorism has been the major subject of debate and concern
among the Turkish society. The separatist ethnic nationalism of PKK and the
problems regarding the southeast has triggered the traditional anxieties of the
289
“Genel Kurmay Ba kanı Orgeneral Ya ar Büyükanıt’ın Harp Akademileri 2006-2007 E itim
ve Ö retim Yılı Açılı Konu ması” (“Chief Turkish General Staff Gen. Ya ar Büyükanıt’s
Opening Speech on Military Academy‘s 2006-2007 Term”) available at
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar/2006/harp
akademilerikonusmasi_02102006.html (last accessed on 13 September 2007)
290
“EU, Büyükanıt clash on ethnic identity” Turkish Daily News, November 4, 2006
291
“Büyükanıt’s Opening Speech on Military Academy‘s 2006-2007 Term”
292
hsan D. Da ı, “Yararlı ve zor bir tartı ma“ (“Beneficial and Difficult Discussion”) Radikal,
January 14, 2006
140
Turkish society about the territorial and national integrity of the state.
With the arrest and detention of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999,
these anxieties has diminished due to reduced number of terrorist attacks and
casualties. In the meantime, while armed conflict has declined, it became possible
to grant some cultural rights to Kurds without too much dissent. In 2002, as part
of legal and institutional reforms which aimed at integration with EU, some
enactments were made allowing radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish as
well as the option of private Kurdish education.
In these circumstances, the US demanded permission from Turkish
government for the deployment and transfer of US forces through Turkish soil
shortly before the Iraq War. During the negotiations between the Turkish and the
US government, the option of sending Turkish troops to Iraq has also begun to be
debated. The main reason behind the proposal to deploy Turkish troops to Iraq
was to avoid being surprised by the establishment of an independent Kurdish state
next to Turkey’s borders. The government was also planning to prevent the PKK
from exploiting the likely atmosphere of turmoil in the northern Iraq
.According to Turkish constitution; the Turkish government is required to
get permission from the Turkish parliament for both sending Turkish troops to
abroad and allowing foreign troops presence on Turkish territory. Both requests
were formulated in the same bill, and presented to the parliament on 1 March
2003, hence “1 March Resolution”. The resolution bill has received 264 approvals
as opposed to 250 rejecting and 19 abstaining votes. Nevertheless, it could not
141
reach the constitutional majority of 276 and eventually was turned down.
The rejection of the bill was a surprise to ruling AKP, who had 361 chairs.
97 AKP MPs said “no” to the bill along with opposition MPs despite the
government’s attitude. It is argued that these MPs have said “no” due to public
opposition. According to polls, 92 % of the population was against an operation to
Iraq.293 The 91.2 % of the 1819 respondents have answered the question of “To
what degree would you support the US operation to Iraq” as “I would never”,
while those who said “ I would” remained 4.1 %. When respondents are asked “If
a military operation takes place, to what degree would you support Turkey’s
cooperation with the US?” 82.8 % answered “I would not”. The population’s
opposition was also apparent in public protests. Meetings were organized at the
day of balloting with over 50.000 participants in order to protest the US operation
and prevent the approval of the bill.294
The public debates have evolved around three cores. First of all, Turkish
public opinion about the legitimacy of such a war and Turkey’s cooperation with
the US was negative. Secondly, the public was doubtful about the consequences
of the deployment of foreign troops on Turkish soil. And finally, there was strong
opposition to the transfer of Turkish troops.
While most of the public opinion was negative, the military is not involved
in these discussions and remained silent. It is argued that the Prime Minister
293
Yeni afak, “Hükümete 'güven' sava a 'hayır” (“Trust’ for the government, ‘No’ to war”
February 16, 2003
294
Radikal, “Meclis'te tezkere, meydanlarda eylem” (“Resolution at the Assembly, Protests at
Squares,”) March 1, 2003
142
deliberately postponed the day of balloting to 1st of March in order to obtain a
loud approval of the bill by the NSC, which would convene at the end of
February.295 Although NSC made a press release after the meeting, it was not as
supportive as the government demanded.296 Four years later in a TV program, the
Prime Minister Erdo an stated that it was a mistake of the assembly to reject the
bill. Ironically, he criticized the General Chief of Staff and the Force
Commanders for not publicly pronouncing their support for the bill even though
they were fully supportive of it.297 Later, the military circles have also declared
that they were really supporting the bill.298
With the increase in terrorist attacks and casualties in the Turkey’s
southeast, the debates on the necessity of a Cross-border operation in Northern
Iraq has been renewed. In 2003, while only 5% of the population thought that
“PKK and Southeastern issue” as the most serious problem,299 in fall 2004, those
who thought terrorism is one of the top problems of the country was 18 % of the
population.300 In spring 2005 it has risen to 29%.301 By fall 2006, more than half
295
Sedat Ergin, “ 1 Mart tezkeresinde ibretlik sonuç hangisiydi?” (“Which was the examplary
result in 1 March Resolution?” Milliyet, March 03, 2007
296
National Security Council’s Press Release on 28 February 2003 available at
http://www.mgk.gov.tr/Turkce/basinbildiri2003/28subat2003.html (last accessed on 13
September)
297
Nevval Sevindi “Ke ke 1 Mart tezkeresi geçseymi ” (“ If only 1 March Resolution had
passed”) Zaman 6 March 2007
298
Fikret Bila “Kıvrıko lu'nun açıklaması” (“Kıvrıko lu’s Explanation”) Milliyet, November 20,
2003; Murat Yetkin, “De i en üslup de i meyen TSK” (“Changed style, unchained Turkish
Armed Forces” Radikal, May 28, 2003; Radikal, “Özkök: TSK tek vücuttur” (“Özkök: Turkish
Armed Forces is one body”) May 27, 2003; Sabah, “1 Mart tezkeresinin geçmesi lazımdı” (“1
March Resoulution should have passed”) February 22, 2007
299
Yeni afak, “Hükümete 'güven' sava a 'hayır” (“Trust’ for the government, ‘No’ to war”
February 16, 2003
300
Standard Eurobarometer 62 (Fall 2004) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb62_tr_nat.pdf (last accessed on 13 August
2007)
301
Standard Eurobarometer 63 (Spring 2005) available at
143
of the respondents thought that (52%) terrorism is one of the gravest problems.302
Similarly, a recent poll named “Research on Turkish people’s attitude towards
PKK and Terrorism -Crossborder operation and Northern Iraq- made in June
2007, illustrates that 84 % said that they would “support a military intervention in
Iraq by Turkish Armed Forces to prevent PKK terrorism”.303
While the public opinion on a possible cross-border operation have
changed, the top echelons of the military, who refrained from making statements
about the 1 March Resolution, have decided to make open statements about the
emergency of the problem and pointed to the need to make a cross-border
operation to Northern Iraq. In a press conference on 12 April 2007, General Chief
of Staff Gen. Büyükanıt, stated that
“You
may ask me this question: Should an operation
me made in Northern Iraq? Yes, it should be. There are two
dimensions to the issue. First of all, when I look from a military
perspective, yes it should be made. Would it be effective? Yes it
would. Second dimension is political. Political decision is
required for a cross border operation. Turkish Armed Forces has
exceeding power to do that when lawfully assigned such a task.”
304
The parallelism between Turkish public opinion and the military discourse
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb63/eb63_nat_tr.pdf (last accessed on 13 August

2007)
302
Standard Eurobarometer 66 (Fall 2006) available at
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_tr_nat.pdf (last accessed on 13 August
2007)
303
Ba kent Strategic and Social Research Center “Research on Turkish people’s attitude towards
PKK and Terrorism -Crossborder operation and Northern Iraq” available at
http://www.baskentarastirma.com/yeni/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=66 (last
accessed on 9 September 2007)
304
“ Org. Büyükanıt’ın konu masının tam metni” (“The whole text of Gen. Büyükanıt’s Speech”)
NTVMSNBC, available at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/405466.asp (last accessed on 12
September 2007)
144
has also been reflected in public protests against terrorism. On 8 June 2007, The
General Chief of Staff released a 7-article press declaration, which pointed to the
recent increase in the terrorist activities and appealed to the public “to show a
massive opposition reflex” against these terrorist activities.305 Shortly after the
declaration, the Turkey’s most active civil society organizations like Ça da
Ya amı Destekleme Derne i, Ça da E itim Vakfı, Ulusal Sivil Toplum
Kurulu ları Birli i, Türk Kadınlar Birli i and Atatürkçü Dü ünce Derne i
responded to the military’s appeal by organizing simultaneous anti-terrorism
meetings in stanbul, zmir, Ankara and Bursa on 23 June 2007. Several meetings
are also held in other cities with the support of local non-governmental
organizations. 306 It is argued that the declaration by the General Chief of Staff is
the outcome of the pressure by the society about the increase in deaths and it
simply vocalizes public anxieties, rather than an incitement by the military.307
6.3.3. Republican Meetings and e-Coup of 27 April
Another issue which Turkish Armed Forces attaches utmost importance is
the protection and maintenance of secular regime, set according to Ataturkist
principles.308 Especially since 28 February 1998, when pro-Islamist Erbakan
government has been replaced by Çiller government due to pressures form the
305
Turkish Armed Forces Turkish General Staff, Press Release, available at
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_Basin_Aciklamalari/2007/
BA_13.htm (last accessed on 3 September 2007)
306
Teröre Kar ı Mitingler Düzenleniyor (“Protest meetings are held against Terrorism”) available
at http://www.ataturktoday.com/RefBib/TeroreKarsiMitingler.htm (last accessed on 1 September
2007)
307
Tülay Sa lam, “Kitlesel Refleks Yanlı Anla ılır” NTVMSNBC, June 10, 2007 (“Massive
reflex can be misunderstood”) available at http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/410439.asp (last
accessed on 10 September 2007)
308
see Chapter 3 subheading “Ataturkist legacy” for historical sources of such military conviction.
145
military, the regime problem continues. While, between 200 and 2003, where
ANAP DSP MHP government ruled, the regime discussions was not very much.
The silence has remained with the election of 2003, where AKP has been the
single party government. Despite AKP deputies and constituents past record of
anti- regime activities, the relationship between the government and the military
was rather smooth. Once, Hilmi Özkök was reported to describe their relationship
with the government as “like poetry”. Nevertheless, Özkök himself did not refrain
from pointing to the reactionary Islamist threat several times. When Büyükanıt
has been elected as the new General Chief of Staff, he also made remarks on the
issue of threats to the secular character of the regime. On 3 October 2006, he
stated that there is a grave problem of regressive Islamism.309
In May 2007, when the term of former President of Republic, Necdet
Sezer has ended, the regime discussion has acquired a new focus. Since AKP-
dominated parliament would elect a new president, it was more than likely that a
person with an Islamist past will become president. Due to presidency’s critical
position concerning duties about national security and his relationship with
Turkish Armed Forces as the Supreme Command, the Turkish Armed forces has
always placed utmost importance as to who will be elected as the new president.
Prime Minister Erdo an had been eyeing the post himself. But due to
sustained secular opposition, composed of military, opposition party CHP,
President Necdet Sezer and masses organized around Kemalist civil society
309
Hurriyet, “ rtica tehdidi var önlem alın” (“There is a threat of regressive Islamism, take
precautions”) October 3, 2006
146
organizations like Atatürkçü Dü ünce Derne i (Atatürkist Thought Association)
and Ça da Ya amı Destekleme Derne i (Association in Support of
Contemporary Life), he did not openly pronounce AKP’s presidential candidate to
the last moment. On 12 April 2007, President Sezer pointed to the public tension
arousing from perception of reactionary threat:
“The reactionary threat which pursued our Republic since its

establishment like a sinister ghost, leads to anxieties with its
recent breadth. The activities which target Turkey’s secular
regime and modern acquisitions of the Republic and the
endeavors to project religion on political scene aggravate the
public tensions.”310
He also added that Turkish political regime is jeopardy in a level as never
happened before. According to a poll made by newspaper Hurriyet311 57,1 % of
the Turkish people think that president Sezer is right in his statement that
Turkey’s regime is in jeopardy.
After President’s speech, the Turkish General Chief of Staff, Büyükanıt,
although initially reluctant, became parties to the discussion by saying that
“Until this time, I have not spoken to anyone about the

presidential election. The president that will be elected will
also be Supreme Command of the Turkish Armed Forces. As
such, the election is of vital interest for Turkish Armed Forces.
Both as a citizen and as a staff of Turkish Armed Forces, I
310
Hurriyet, “Sezer'in konu masının tam metni” (“The whole text of Mr. Sezer’s Speech”) April
13, 2007 available at
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6329346.asp?gid=0&srid=0&oid=0&l=1 (last accessed on 23
August 2007)
311
Hurriyet, “Cumhurba kanı bu çıkı ı yapmakta haklı mı?” (“Is President right in making such a
statement?”) April 20, 2007 available at
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/6361160.asp?gid=180 (last accessed on 12 September 2007)
147
hope that a person who embraces Republic’s main principles
not in word but in essence, will be elected as president.” 312
Following these speeches, the masses organized around civil society
organizations prepared a huge meeting with thousands of participants in Ankara
Tando an Square on 14 April 2007.313 in order to protect Republican values,
secularism and protest Erdo an’s candidacy. The protesters also chanted some
slogans in favor of the military: “Orduya uzanan eller kırılsın.” (damn with the
hands that encroach on army) “Mustafa Kemal’in askerleriyiz” (We are soldiers
of Mustafa Kemal) and “En büyük asker bizim asker” (Greatest solider is ours).314
The statements and protests forced Prime Minister Erdogan to nominate
his foreign minister Abdullah Gül on April 24, as the official candidate of Justice
and Development Party for the premiership. Gul's candidacy was as controversial
as Erdo an’s because of his past involvement with two banned Islamic political
parties.
On 27 April, with only 353 parliamentarians present, the AKP failed to
achieve a quorum of 367 due to protest of the opposition party deputies. Gül's
candidacy failed at the first round despite a majority of those present voting in
favor. Due to the lack of necessary participation and several alleged violations of
the constitution, the vote was taken to the constitutional court to be discussed over
312
Radikal “Büyükanıt cumhurba kanı adayını tarif etti” (“Mr. Büyükanıt described his
[preferred] presidential candidate”), April 13, 2007
313
Milliyet Online News “Ankara'da miting olaysız sona erdi...”, April 14, 2007 available at
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/04/14/son/sontur07.asp (last accessed on 15 September)
314
“Cumhuriyet Mitingine yüzbinler akın etti” (“Hundered of thousands flock to Republican
Meetings”) available at http://www.haberx.com/n/1011229/cumhuriyet-mitingine-yuzbinler-akin-
etti.htm (last accessed on 24 September 2007)
148
the weekend.315 Later the same day the Turkish Armed Forces released an official
statement in the official website of the General Staff, which would letter be
named as e-coup.
Recently, the problem with the Presidential election

process has been focused on the subject of discussions about
secularism. This situation is monitored by Turkish Armed
Forces with anxiety. It should not be forgotten that the Turkish
Armed Forces is one of the parties to this [secular versus
Islamists] debate and is the absolute defender of secularism.316
The declaration also stressed that when necessary Turkish Armed Forces
would not refrain from displaying their attitudes and actions very clearly.317
The reactions to the General Staff’s statement has been twofold. On the
one side, there were those who stated that General Staff’s declaration has been on
time and reflect the public anxieties. For example, on 28 April, in another
meeting, organized by “Turkey Youth Union” in Ankara, university youth has
chanted slogans like “Army and nation, hand in hand.” Retired General Hur it
Tolon, who took part in the meeting, stated that “Turkish Armed Forces’
declaration has brought up sensitivities of the Turkish society”318
On the other side, there was reluctance concerning military’s warning-like
statement. On 29 April, the second of “Republican Meetings” took place, this
time in Ça layan Square in stanbul.319 320

The organizers of the Ça layan
315
Hurriyet, “Meclis'te 368 ki i var iddiası” (“Allegations that there were 368 people in the
Assembly”) April 27, 2007
316
“Excerpts of Turkish army statement” BBC News, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6602775.stm (last accessed on 10 September 2007)
317
“Excerpts of Turkish army statement” BBC News
318
Hurriyet, “Cumhuriyet sahipsiz de il” (“The Republic is not forlorn”) April 29, 2007
319
Sabah, 'Ne eriat, ne darbe demokratik Türkiye' (“Neither sharia nor coup but democratic
149
meeting stated that in order to avoid being qualified as pro-coup, this time they
would chant slogans like “No to the Coups” and “neither sharia nor coup”321.
Yet, the protesters have been divided on the issue. Some civil society leaders
presented their support for military’s declaration, like Nur Serter, vice president
of the Ataturkist Thought Association, who stated that “As a Turkish citizen, as a
nationalist, I present my gratitude to Turkish Armed Forces”322 while others are
opposed to references to a possible military intervention.323 The meeting has also
been regarded as an anti-EU and anti-US protest hence one of the most popular
slogans “neither EU nor US, but fully independent Turkey”.
After the election surprise of AKP with gaining 47 % of the votes, some
comments have been made that the Turkish society has demonstrated its negative
attitude toward military’s involvement in politics. It may be argued that while 12
April declaration was in line with the public considerations, the e-coup on 27
April has been regarded by the society as an excessive move of the military,
which threatens a more direct intervention. Journalist Metehan Demir points to
this perception when stating that “In this country, the most trusted institution is
the military but when it directly intervenes in politics, society reacts to this.”324 It
appears that the military has understood the message. The first statements by the
military on the election results were: “The views of Turkish Armed Forces do not
Turkey”) April 29, 2007

320
Milliyet, “Dünya stanbul'daki tarihi mitingi konu uyor... te ba lıklar” (“The world speaks
about the historical meeting in stanbul… here is the headlines”), April 30, 2007
321
Radikal, 'Ne eriat ne darbe' mitingi (“Neither sharia nor coup’ meeting,”) April 28, 2007
322
Yıldırım Türker “Ça layan'dan Taksim'e” (“From Ça layan to Taksim”) Radikal, April 30,
2007
323
Vatan, “Tarihi miting dünya medyasında” (“The Historical Meeting is on the World Media,”)
April 30, 2007
324
Radikal, “Askerler CHP’ye çok kızgın” (“Soldiers are very angry with Republican People’s
Party,”) August 20, 2007.
150
change on a daily basis. We are still behind what we said on 12 April.” But Gen.
Buyukanıt did not refer to the e-coup and tried to normalize the situation: “Indeed,
what we said does not include anything abnormal. They were the subjects that
everybody knew about.” When asked about whether the 27 April declaration has
affected the election results, he said, “We do not have a research company. Thus,
without concrete data we cannot say anything. So I cannot answer to this
question. What I think is that it did not. But it is just based on guess”.325 His and
force commanders’ later attitude and statements on Abdullah Gul’s second
nomination and election for presidential post have been relatively cooperative.326
While Turkish Armed Forces retained their position with respect to the ban on
headscarf in public space, in line with the will of the people, they agreed to work
with a lawfully elected president whose legitimacy is unquestionable.327
Despite the high level of synchronization between the Turkish Armed
Forces’ statements and the Turkish public opinion, the power that is ascribed to
military has its limits. The social bond that exists between the Turkish Armed
Forces and the society is multifaceted and has deep rooted historical and cultural
sources. Yet, this bond is also dynamic and is based on up-to-date social
interaction among civilians, military and the society. Turkish society could both
enhance and curb military’s political power as Buyukanıt acknowledges “Turkey
is a fully independent, sovereign country. Who did Ataturk get authorization from
325
Milliyet On-line News “Büyükanıt: Bildirinin seçim sonuçlarını etkiledi ini sanmıyorum”(“Mr.
Büyükanıt: I do not think that the declaration effected the election results,”), available at
http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/07/30/son/sonsiy25.asp (last accessed on 10 September 2007)
326
Murat Yetkin, “Büyükanıt konu unca” (“When Mr.Büyükanıt speaks”) Radikal, August 1,
2007.
327
Fikret Bila, “Büyükanıt’ın tebrik ziyaretindeki mesajlar” (“Mr. Büyükanıt's messages at the
congratulatory visit”) Milliyet, September 11, 2007.
151
and established the Turkish Republic? Turkish people. We also get authorization
from there.”328
328
Turkish Armed Forces Turkish General Staff, “Chief of General Staff’s Washington Speech,”
available at
http://www.tsk.mil.tr/10_ARSIV/10_1_Basin_Yayin_Faaliyetleri/10_1_7_Konusmalar
/2007/gnkurbskwashi ngtonkonusmasi_14022007.htm (last accessed on 10 September 2007)
152
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
In this thesis, an answer is tried to be provided to the question: Where
does the political power of the Turkish Armed Forces emanate from? Based on
the theories of power, I hypothesized that the Turkish Armed Forces’ political
power emanates from its relationship with the Turkish society. Due to the current
lack of interest in ideational sources of political power in current civil-military
relations theory, a new approach named “military in society” is established. Then,
I tried to show that the bulk of the political power of the Turkish Armed Forces
emanates from its relationship with the society, by looking on the historical,
cultural, social and discursive practices which may lead to a convergence of
military and society.
7.1. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
In terms of power theories, I found out that there is wide range of theories
which speculate on political power. What surprised me was that although power is
a central concept which is extensively used in studies of sociology, political
science, civil-military relations, there is not a common definition of what power
153
is, let alone consensus on how it is exercised and its sources of power.
When I look into power conceptualizations of theories of civil-military
relations, I realized that the sources of political power of the militaries are
understudied. Rather, most of these theories focus on struggles of power between
the civilian elite and the military elite in order to dominate each other in formal
decision-making processes. Little reference has been made as to the initial sources
of military’s political power, and when it is made, it was usually about its
coercive nature, that is their monopoly on the use of violent means, their guns and
ballots and the fear-provoking affect of this monopoly on wider society.
It is rather astounding to see that although consent of the citizenry, and
their active support underlies the basis upon which all democratic institutions are
set, society is disregarded in the theories of civil military relations, or at best
portrayed as an inactive, secondary player, which has minimal influence in both
enhancing and curbing the political power, especially of the military. Conversely,
it was mostly portrayed as the victim of military’s power exercises, as the ultimate
power yielder.
Looking from the “military in society” approach leads to a reversal of this
portrayal of the society upside down. The society is theorized as the ultimate
source of power rather than the victim. The society, like it empowers the civilian
politicians through its consent apparent in democratic elections, and ascribes them
a role in realizing its expectations, may also empower the military through
informal bonds.
154
7.1.2. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
For the Turkish case, the thesis had important implications. It is possible
that Turkish society sidesteps the civilian politicians in their relations with the
military. Rather than fully delegating the authority to direct military sector to
civilian politicians, Turkish society prefers to retain its bonds with the military
probably as a guarantee against any possible betrayal by the politicians or against
any other threat which may ruin the country. Recently however, on its path to
becoming a member to EU, society’s jealousy in retaining this bond seems to
lessen. The thesis also reveals that despite the high level of synchronization
between the Turkish Armed Forces’ deeds and statements and the Turkish public
opinion, the power that the Turkish society ascribed to the military has its limits.
The social bond that exists between the Turkish Armed Forces and the society is
multifaceted and has deep rooted historical and cultural sources. Yet, this bond is
also dynamic and is based on up-to-date social interaction among civilians,
military and the society. If more competent politicians succeed in establishing a
bond of trust and identification with the society, and carefully manage the
transformation process the society faces in its quest for EU, society’s fears and
anxieties may be trimmed down. Nevertheless, it is evident that the long-term
pattern of relations between the society and military is hard to change from today
to tomorrow.
155
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NON-MATERIAL SOURCES OF

TURKISH ARMED FORCES’ POLITICAL POWER:

The Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Approval of the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences

This thesis is an attempt to understand the non-material sources of Turkish

Keywords: political power, power sources, civil-military relations, Turkish

TÜRK S LAHLI KUVVETLER ’N N POL T K GÜCÜNÜN

Bu tez, Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri’nin politik gücünün maddi olmayan

I would like to express my special thanks to my supervisor, Associate

in me and my capabilities has changed the course of my life.

I am also thankful to Assistant Professor Paul Williams for reading my

thesis and his encouragement in my graduate and undergraduate years in Bilkent.

Very special thanks go to four S’s: my cousin Saliha, my sister Seval, my

2.1. THE PROBLEM OF POWER……………………………………………6

2.2. WHO IS POWERFUL?..............................................................................8

2.3. POWER SOURCES vs. POWER EXERCISE………………….………12

2.3.1. Power Sources……………………………………………………13

2.4. CONSENSUAL vs. CONFLICTUAL THEORIES OF POWER………22

2.4.1. Conflictual View…………………………………………………22

3. CHAPTER 3 MILITARY IN SOCIETY………………………………………...28

3.1. CLASSICAL CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS THEORY……………30

3.3. MILITARY IN SOCIETY APPROACH ………………………………49

4. CHAPTER 4 MATERIAL SOURCES OF THE TURKISH ARMED FORCES’

4.1. LEGAL SOURCES……………………………………………………..53

4.1.1. Founding Principles and the Military……………………………56

4.2. ECONOMIC SOURCES……………………………………….………66

4.2.1. The Share from the National Budget…………………….………67

4.3. JUDICIAL SOURCES …………………………………………………74

4.3.1. The Military Judicial System………………………….…………75

5. CHAPTER 5 HISTORICAL SOURCES OF THE TURKISH ARMED

5.1. THE OTTOMAN LEGACY………………………………………..…..80

5.1.1. Establishment of First Constitutional Monarchy and Young

5.2.1. War of Independence…………………………………………….92

5.3. MILITARY INTERVENTIONS OF THE REPUBLICAN ERA….….102

5.3.1. 1960 Coup ……………………………………………….……..102

6. CHAPTER 6 SOCIAL AND CULTURAL SOURCES OF THE

6.1. CULTURAL SOURCES………………………………………….…...114

6.1.1.1.A Military Nation …………………………………………..114

6.2. SOCIAL INTERACTION………………………………………….….121

6.2.1. Military and the Civil Society ………………………………….121

6.3. DISCURSIVE PRACTICES………………………………………..…131

6.3.1. EU Accession Process and the Changing Discourses of the

7.2. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS……………………………………….155

In eighty four years of Turkish Republic’s history, Turkish military has

sending a memorandum in 1971, and it engineered the removal of an Islamic-

oriented prime minister, Necmettin Erbakan, in 1997. Most recently, on 27 April

2007, at the pinnacle of presidential elections, Turkish military issued a press

been regarded as a clear warning to the government and called as “e-coup”.

This historical record of military interventions, along with Turkish

military’s prevalence in political discussions, illustrates that the Turkish military

sources originate from?

of social sciences, mainly sociology and political science, will be discussed in

order to understand the sources of political power. It will be argued that

power is society, can be useful in understanding the political power of militaries

which enjoy considerable amount of support from the society.

theories of civil-military relations are based on a formal decision-making view of

sources of military’s power. The current literature is mostly based on the

a secondary player, which may have no influence independently of the political

power of the military, which makes it problematic to theorize on popular armies

attempts to undermine civilian authority.

In order to provide a theoretical framework to answer such a gap, a

understanding of power, with relevant contribution by the civil-military relations

power of the military.