THE DEBATE ON ISLAM AND SECULARISM IN EGYPT

Author(s): Fauzi M. Najjar

Source: Arab Studies Quarterly , Spring 1996, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 1-21
Published by: Pluto Journals

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 THE DEBATE ON ISLAM AND SECULARISM
IN EGYPT

Fauzi M. Najjar

INTRODUCTION

THE INTELLECTUAL CRISIS AGITATING MUSLIM minds today

centers on the relationship between modern Muslims and their past. For the last
two centuries, Muslims have found themselves caught up between authenticity
(attachment to their values and culture) and modernity. They view most Western
ideas, ideologies and institutions as a threat to Islamic law, values and culture.
Among these foreign imports, secularism seems to represent the greatest danger. As
separation of religion and state, secularism was first championed by Christian
writers like Ya'qub Sarruf, Faris Nimr, Nicola Haddad, Salama Musa and others.
Except for Salama Musa and Lewis Awad, these Christian immigrants were
Syrians, who had found refuge from Ottoman rule in British-occupied Egypt. The
first Muslim religious scholar to advocate secularism was Shaykh Ali Abd al-Raziq
(1888-1966) in his al-Islam wa 'Usui al-Hukm , published in 1925. In that famous
and controversial work, Abd al-Raziq asserted that Islam was a religion and not a
state, a message not a government, a spiritual edifice not a political institution, a
proposition that led to his defrocking by the Azharite Committee of Ulema.
Abd Al-Raziq' s book has been the most momentous document in the
crucial intellectual and religious debate of modern Islamic history. This is not the
place to detail the controversy generated by the publication of this work; enough
has been written about it. Suffice it to say that while the debate maintained its
course between secularists and Islamists, modernization and secularization filtered
into Egypt and other Muslim countries, paying a little more than lip service to
Islamic concerns. The recent Islamic resurgence with its call for "return to Islam"
or "Islam is the solution," has rekindled the debate between secularists and
Islamists, giving it an urgency and intensity previously unknown. Capitalizing on

Fauzi M. Najjar is Professor Emeritus in the Center for Integrative Studies,

Michigan State University. He was the first president of the Association of
Arab- American University Graduates.

ASQ Volume 18 Number 2 Spring 1996 1

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 2 Arab Studies Quarterly

the failure of the various political and

problems, Islamists have, one may say, enc
into a struggle between religious and secula
debate arises from the fact that Islamists have converted the terms "secularism" and
"secularist" into slogans of opprobrium, in order to discredit, silence or liquidate
those who oppose their struggle to establish a true Islamic state. Outspoken
secularists have been vilified, threatened, beaten and even murdered by militant
Islamists. To the Islamists in general, secularism is equivalent to jahiliyya
(paganism), a slogan resurrected by the Pakistani scholar, Abu al- A' la Mawdudi,
and propagated by Sayyid Qutb in his book Ma'alim fi al-Tariq , charging modern
society with kufr (unbelief). Equating secularism with kufr has forced some writers
to shun the use of the term "secular," replacing it with "civil," as in civil society or
state.

An acrimonious debate, aptly described as "secular fundamentalism vs.

religious fundamentalism," has been raging between the secularists and the
Islamists. Entrenched in opposite camps, they hurl accusations and charges against
each otherrwith no promise of a constructive dialogue. Secularists have been
accused by the Islamists of being apostates from Islam, and agents of Western
powers and culture. In turn, they accuse the Islamists of being ancestral,
reactionary and obscurantist. The arguments and methods used by both sides are
so contrary, warranting the delineation "two cultures," with hardly any
communication or connection between them.1

AL-' ALMANIYYA (SECULARISM)

The Arabic term for secularism is ' almaniyya . According to the Arabic
Language Academy in Cairo, the term is derived from 'alam (world), and not from
'ilm (science), as some think, thus giving the wrong impression that science is
opposed to religion. Some writers suggest the Arabic term 'a lamaniyya in order to
avoid the confusion. Others prefer dunyawiyya (worldly) in contrast to dini
(religious). In Coptic liturgy, the term 'almaniyyun is used to connote . laymen
(most of the members of the congregation) who do not belong to the clergy class.2
In Egypt, the term 'almani was first used in the latter part of the
Nineteenth Century in the sense of worldly and non-ecclesiastical. When the Wafd
Party was established in 1919, it was called Hizb ' Almani (Secular Party), meaning
that it was based on social, political and national identities, with no reference to
religion. Its slogan was al-din li-Lah wa al-watan li al-jami' (religion belongs to
God, the homeland belongs to all). The party was not opposed to religion; it
simply rejected any ecclesiastical order in Islam, as well as the King's attempt to
use religion to buttress his authority.3
In 1924, Mustafa Kamal Ataturk abolished the Caliphate, and established
in Turkey an anti-religious political system in its place, described as laique
(secular). Thus the term acquired its "bad" connotation in the Muslim world, and
' almaniyya has been associated with irreligion ever since. Nowadays, Islamists
have succeeded in equating it with atheism in the mind of the public, using it as a

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Islam and Secularism in Egypt 3

slogan to intimidate their political adversaries, charging

unbelief, deserving the death punishment.
Most Islamists look upon secularism as a kind o
irtidad (apostasy). Whoever advocates secularism is
according to Muhammad al-Ghazali, a leading Egyptian t
of religion and state, secularism is unadulterated k
Directorate of Ifta ', Preaching and Guidance, has issued
whoever believes that there is a guidance ( huda ) mor
Prophet, or that someone else's rule is better than
number of specific tenets which would be regarded as a
precepts of Islam, punishable according to Islamic
institutions and laws enacted by human beings are supe
has been the cause of the backwardness of Muslims; (3
the 20th Century; (4) Islam is limited to one's relation wi
do with the daily affairs of life; (5) the application of th
decreed by God) is incongruous with the modern age; an
to rule according to what God has revealed. It conclude
God has prohibited is a kafir.5
Muslim liberal thinkers, secularists and Westernize
been looked upon as renegades from Islam. Abd al-Razi
was a high-water mark in the tension between Islamis
contention that the Prophet was only a messenger and no
a religion and not a state, and that the caliphate was not
al-Raziq was vilified and excommunicated. He became a
those who upheld his views invoked vengeance or retributi
Simultaneously, Taha Husayn (1889-1976), Egyp
suffered a somewhat similar fate for his Fi al-Shïir al-J
published in 1926. In that book, Husayn argued tha
contributed to the forging of so-called pre-Islamic poem
stories of Ibrahim and Isma'il were myths. For such uno
branded an apostate by al-Azhar, and al-Manar magazin
from the university. Under pressure, the book was withdr
reissued under a different title, with the reference to Ibr
Husayn did not fare any better with the publicatio
Thaqafa fi Misr (The Future of Culture in Egypt), p
advocacy of separating religion from politics, and of a
research and education, he was vilified as the "livin
Following in the footsteps of Europeans was to him th
recently, Husayn has become an object of abuse, conde
Islamic extremists. He has been called, abusively, "the h
heroes" ( batal abtal al-tanwir).9 Calls for banning his w
removal of his books from libraries come from all
publication, Taha Husayn : Wanted Dead or Alive, the l

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 4 Arab Studies Quarterly

list of accusations hurled at the Dean of Ar

and colors: "atheist," "Masonic," "baptiz
leading communist in Egypt," "a mouthpi
who hates the Arabs," "stupid" and "fickle."
In an article entitled, "To Secondary
Writings of Taha Husayn," published in a
Lay la Bayyumi charges that including
curriculum is intended to "disseminate the
those who always were supporters of the C
leaders in Westernization ^nd secularizatio
which Husayn is condemned is his content
system for the selection of caliphs; neith
novel as a "specimen of the conspiracy to c
Muslim nation, and a proof of Taha Husayn
Islam."11
Taha Husayn' s case has not been unique, but it has proven to be durable.
Other contemporary Egyptian writers have suffered a similar fate. Accused of
advocating secularism (sc. kufr), they have been vilified and threatened. To
mention only the eminent few: Yusuf Idris, Muhammad Khalaf Allah, Fu' ad
Zakariyya, Zaki Najib Mahmud and last but not least, Najib Mahfuz, the winner of
the Nobel Prize for literature.12

THE CASE OF FARAJ FODA

The assassination of Dr. Faraj Foda by two members of Islamic Jihad on 8

June 1992, for having been a secularist and an outspoken critic of Islamic
organizations, underscores the degree of bipolarization in Egyptian society. Foda, a
former university professor and a prominent writer, had published a number of
books and articles in support of freedom of expression, democracy and separation
of religion and politics. While the Islamists described his arguments as mantiq al-
kufr (logic of blasphemy), he accused them of obscurantism, narrow-mindedness
and bigotry, and called them "enemies of democracy and freedom."13
Following in the footsteps of Abd al-Raziq, Foda maintained that the
caliphate was a worldly and not a religious affair, a political and not a divinely-
ruled institution. Islamic history provides sufficient evidence that mixing religion
and politics has been responsible for violence and intolerance in Islamic
movements, he asserted. His most powerful guns were turned against the Islamist
idea of a religious state, which "neither the modern age would accept, nor the
watan (homeland) could embrace without endangering its unity, and destroying
whatever margins of culture it has acquired."14 A religious state, he added, "is
bound to lead to rule by divine right, a kind of rule Islam did not know except at
the time of the Prophet. Rule by divine right cannot be exercised except by
clergymen, either directly or indirectly, which would certainly lead to the collapse
of national unity in Egypt."15

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 Islam and Secularism in Egypt 5

Foda' s debating style, as much as his advocacy o

government, irritated even enlightened and moderate I
a debate on Civil vs Religious State , sponsored by the
during the 1992 Book Fair, in which Foda disputed an
Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, who argued in favo
example, Foda often addressed al-Ghazali, sarcastica
shaykhana al-fadir (our venerable master and eminent
the contemporary Islamic states, Iran or the Sudan, wo
model?"16
While the Egyptian Organization of Human Rights deplored the
assassination of one of its founders, calling him "a martyr of freedom of thought
and belief," and many Egyptians and non-Egyptians expressed outrage and moral
indignation at this senseless act of murder, others regarded Foda' s execution as an
act of divine justice.17 This latter position was forcefully articulated by Al-Ghazali
himself, who despite his expounding of the merciful virtues of Islam, argued that a
secularist must be punished by death. In his testimony before the High Court of
State Security on 22 June 1993, in the murder trial of the Islamic extremists
accused of Foda's assassination, the Muslim scholar stated that a secularist
represented danger to society, and it was the duty of the government to put him to
death. He added that if the government failed to carry out that duty, groups or
individuals were free to do so. In his view, a secularist is an apostate and
secularism as separation of religion and state is an unadulterated kufr . Al-Ghazali
also argued that whoever kills an apostate is guilty only of an act of ' iftiat
(arrogating to oneself an action which the authorities, which have the best right to
do so, have neglected to do) against the authorities. When asked if there is a
punishment for ' ifti'at , al-Ghazali answered: "I do not recall there is any such
punishment in Islam."18
Reactions to Al-Ghazali's statement, which is tantamount to an apologia
for Foda' s assassination, were highly critical. The Egyptian Organization of
Human Rights regarded the fatwa as an act of takfir (excommunication) of a large
section of Muslims, conferring legitimacy on terrorism and armed violence. The
fatwa , the Organization's statement said: . . is a symptom of a new qualitative
deterioration in freedom of opinion, expression, thought and belief, and a warning
of a new unprecedented wave of violence and terrorism."19 The idea that an
individual can with impunity execute a judgment issued outside judicial
proceedings is preposterous. It is a license to kill, and a cause of civil strife and
disintegration in society, the statement implied.
More important, although Islamic jurisprudence has established that
apostasy is a sin, subject to penal sanctions, there is no agreement among jurists as
to what actually constitutes apostasy, and what the legal punishment is. The
Qur'an contains no such provision, and the authenticity of many traditions is highly
questionable. According to the great jurist Abu Hanifa (d. 767), no one can accuse
a Muslim of apostasy unless he himself states that frankly. Moreover, Islam allows

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 6 Arab Studies Quarterly

freedom of belief and disbelief, and warn

blasphemy. On 1 February 1990, Shayk
Committee, issued a fatwa renouncing hadd
alone is not sufficient to enact binding le
there was nothing that Foda had said or
apostasy. On the contrary, Foda considered
that he advocated separation of religion an
name of Islam, a position extreme Islamists
On 30 December 1993, the High Court
first suspect, Abd al-Sharif Ahmad Ibrahim
Abd Rabbu to fifteen years hard labor. In
could not accept the defense argument tha
shar'i judgment that the government had
Sixty of the Egyptian Penal Code could
reasons of ethics or religion, but only in self
and property. In conclusion, the Court sai
kufr and apply the- punishment accordin
misguided and misguiding fatwas by those w
Otherwise, there would be chaos and seditio

THE CASE AGAINST SECULARISM

Not all Islamists countenance the vilification and murder of secularists.

Moderate or enlightened Islamists have advanced serious arguments against
adopting secularism, a peculiarly Western institution. They regard the secularists
as misguided or simply wrong, even though they may be well-intentioned. They
blame them for being so enamored of European culture, and for assuming that
everything Western is superior. They agree with the secularists that there are
certain things that Muslims can adopt from the West, but only selectively.
However, they reject any suggestion that the secular principle of separation of
religion and state could be adopted in Islam without undermining its basic nature as
a religion and a community, a spiritual message and a law.
In the following paragraphs we shall focus on the views of a leading
Egyptian moderate Islamist, who has best articulated the position of this school of
thought. Dr. Muhammad Imara, a prolific writer on Islamic matters, divides the
secularists into two categories: the extremists, a minority, who reject religion
altogether, and the moderates, the majority, who believe in God, have no quarrel
with religion, or who may even observe religious rites and duties, but they advocate
separation between religion and state. As Imara puts it, "They are believers in God
as Creator of the universe, and non-believers in Him as an administrator and ruler
of worldly affairs. They are not absolute infidels, neither are they full believers;
they believe in parts of the Book and disbelieve in others."22 Fahmi Huwaydi, a
columnist for al-Ahram , adds that moderate secularists accept the dogma, albeit
with reservations, but express serious misgivings about SharVa application, lest it
would jeopardize freedom, equality and democracy.23

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Islam and Secularism in Egypt 7

Muslim scholars have always regarded secularism

phenomenon, the outcome of certain conditions related
the hegemony of the Catholic Church. Unlike Christian
law, a Shan a that envisages a religio-political commun
God's rules. Hence, there is no way Islam can be se
spiritual from the worldly. Moreover, Islam does not
order, which can impose its will on the community, or
is a religion and a state" (Islam din wa dawla ), goes the
this very reason secularism would undermine Islam's ba
of Tariq al-Bishri, "secularism and Islam cannot agree
[combining the doctrines of more than one school, i.e.
turning away from its true meaning."24
Of all Western institutions, theories and ideas th
European imperialism, secularism has been regard
challenge to Islam. Compared to the dangers of Western
the Crusades were less threatening, because "they had
was attractive to Muslims. Rather they returned carry
Islamic culture." They were, in the words of 'Usama b
Arab knight and a man of letters, who fought the
befriended them, "animals lacking all virtues except that o
In modern times, the situation is quite different. Un
Muslim world stagnated for centuries, while the West w
progress. Consequently, when the confrontation took
Century, there hardly could have been any resistance
influences, cultural values, lifestyles and modes of thou
Western civilization left little room for those who soug
think of an alternative cultural paradigm. Western
civilization," "world civilization," or "the civilization of
belonged to a bygone heritage, or the dump heap of h
certain Muslim minds have been captivated by We
However, Imara asserts that, "We do not reject secular
imported from the West. We need only examine our cir
Islamic religion and its nature, to find out whether secula
for us in the same way it did for Europe, or whet
inappropriate and harmful" (p. 1 1).
In his effort to demonstrate that secularism is eithe
inappropriate to Islam, Imara, somewhat apologetically
differences between the two ideologies: (1) Whereas Isla
interest, even over a religious text, and sanctions wha
considers good and beneficial in its worldly affair
utilitarian, with self-interest as its primary value. (2) It
stands for change and innovation ( tajdad ), but so does
progress knows no limit. Why then, he wonders,

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 8 Arab Studies Quarterly

secularism for inspiration? (3) Lack of inter

human reason is another distinguishing
partiality to reason and rationality is quite
which is a supernatural miracle, enjoins the
(4) Secular society is indifferent to traditio
Islam, on the other hand, distinguishes betw
to progress and development, and those w
society, rejecting the former and accepting
and traditional. The criterion is the pu
categorically declares that Muslims have no
Muslims (pp. 12-18)!
In contrast to the attitude of the Catholic Church toward science and
scientists, reason and rationality, Islam, says Imara, has made scientific inquiry a
shaťi obligation, not just a human right. It follows that "our historical, cultural and
intellectual development is not only different from Europe, but is also contrary to
it." In Europe, the hegemony of the Church meant oppression, ignorance and ages
of darkness and decline, whereas the rule of Islamic Shari'a was associated with
originality, creativity and prosperity. The difference between Islam's attitude
toward science and that of the Catholic Church precludes the secularist solution for
Muslims. The antagonism between religion and science is a Catholic-European
phenomenon (pp. 22-23).
Imara admits that throughout Islamic history there have been attempts,
"inadvertent and unconscious," by some Muslim ulema to imitate Christianity, and
act as "men of religion," arrogating to themselves the power to permit and forbid
(tahlil wa tahrim ), and posing as official spokesmen of Islam. But, he says, this
was a historical development alien to Islam. Only in Shi'ism is the doctrinal
authority of the clergy an acceptable principle. In Sunni Islam, the ijtihad of the
Mujtahid is not binding except on him alone. Hence to remedy this historical
aberration he suggests turning to true Islam, and not to secularism, which denies
religion. In Islamic thought, seeking knowledge is the religious duty of every
Muslim. It is this fact, and not what the "men of religion" claim that one should
keep in mind, he counsels. 'The Arabic-Islamic civilization, rational in substance
and essence, is based on Islam, as modern European civilization is based on
Christianity." The Mutazilites are cited as having been the founders of Islamic
rationalism (pp. 24-25).
Central to Imara' s argument is the difference in the nature of the two
monotheistic religions. Whereas Christianity is a purely spiritual religion, that
enjoins rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's, and unto God what is God's, Islam
does not separate between the two realms: the spiritual and the mundane.
Christianity has defined for the Church a certain domain, that of the salvation of the
soul, beyond which it should not go. In contrast, Islam legislates for matters of
state and social relations. Although it does not lay down any specific institutions,
theories and laws for the Islamic state, leaving it to reason and experience, Islam
does lay down the philosophy, ideals, criteria, intentions and ends for these
institutions, theories and laws. The public interest is the criterion by which changes

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Islam and Secularism in Egypt 9

in laws and institutions are to be judged. Islam, Imara a

dualism which gave rise to secularism in Europe (pp. 25-
In addition to being a natural reaction to the tyran
the affairs, material and intellectual, of state and socie
excesses, secularism was also the true and natural solutio
Christian civilization. Secularism does not represe
Christianity and its Church; rather it represents a rec
condition of errors and evils, which would direct the Ch
to their true and natural origin (p. 28).
Muslim secularists are rebuked by Imara for holdi
spiritual message and has nothing to do with state, po
us who choose secularism, or those who strive to estab
consciously or unconsciously, imitators of the encroac
They are an offense to the Islamic religion." Secularism
"...our way to progress. . . . Our way to progress lies i
Islam's true position, which rejects secularism as it rejec
authority and state as they were known in the West" (p. 3
Unlike many Islamists, Imara agrees with the secu
not one of the essential elements of Islam. The Qur'an d
constitution ( nizam ) for an Islamic state. Yet this does
relationship between religion and state, as the secularist
Qur'an had not ordained a state for the Muslims, it had p
duties which cannot be fulfilled without the establishme
as levying the zakat , applying the hudud , regulating th
state is unlike any other state. "It is the Islamic state wh
capable of overseeing the performance of the shar'i duti
required by a religious obligation." Most Muslim jurists
an Islamic state, as they agree that it is from th tfuru (b
' Usui (theoretical bases of Islamic law), or one of the ess
It is a "civil obligation required by religion for the well
life. ... To say it is a civil duty implies that it is neither
state separated from religion" (pp. 34-38).
The main thrust of Imara's argument is to pro
characteristic of Islamic civilization is that the Islamic st
and Islamic, without being theocratic or secular. The Is
public interest and social organization, not an article o
Madina, which the Prophet ruled, had come into being a
social contract" (bay' ai al-'aqaba ), an agreement betwe
personalities of the Aws and Khazraj tribes. The consti
community was a political constitution," based on t
important component groups of this state, the Immig
constituted the core of the religious ' Umma , which "is
of mankind." In short, it was a complete state, founded

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 10 Arab Studies Quarterly

contract and a constitution. Muhammad was

and Imam. He was assisted by ministers, adv
(pp. 40-47).
After the Prophet's death, and except for the Shiites who, not unlike the
Catholic Church in the Middle Ages, uphold the rule by divine right, all Muslim
sects agreed that authority in the state is of civil nature, Imara asserts. It is the
community that chooses the ruler, holds him to account, and deposes him, by force
if need be, if he fails to execute the law, which is the product of human shura and
individual opinion ( ijtihad ), so long as they lie within the bounds of the fixed
principles of religion and diyine revelation. The ruler is not more than an executor
of the law; he derives his authority by delegation ( tafweed) from the 'Umma. By
stressing that the ' Umma is the source of powers, and that the law (« qanun ) is the
product of reason, circumstances and public interest-so long as they are consistent
with the "intentions of the Sharia " - Imara implies that Muslims do not need to
look to the West for a liberal, rational and democratic system. Religion has a
function in the state, but this does not mean that the two are united and
indistinguishable. The secularist fear of a theocracy is unjustified (pp. 48-5 1).
The fundamentalist slogan la hukma ilia li-Llah (sovereignty belongs to
God alone) repudiates the notion that the ' Umma is the source of powers, and plays
into the hands of secularists, who see in it a threat to the basic principles of modern
society. The utterance was first used by the Kharijites when they opposed Ali' s
acceptance of submitting his conflict with Muaawiya to arbitration. However, later
jurists, like al-Al-Ghazali (1058-1 1 1 1) and al-'Amidi (1 156-1233), used it to affirm
God's sovereignty.26 In modern times, the notion of hakimiyya was resurrected by
Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi (1903-1979), who rejected democracy as the "sovereignty
of the masses," and later popularized by Sayyid Qutb, a leading spokesman of the
Muslim Brothers, who was executed in 1966.27 Imara accuses the secularists of
exaggerating the implications of hakimiyya for their own purposes. He also
dismisses the extremist Islamist view that a true Islamic state has to be governed by
what God has revealed, and that human beings cannot legislate (pp. 88-95).
Finally, Imara contends that neither in origin, nor in Mawdudi's version,
has hakimiyya had any place in Islamic political theory. It is a slogan foreign to
"our heritage and to modern ijtihad ." It had been abandoned even by those who
invented it, and the essence of Mawdudi's thought is at variance with how his
followers and his enemies understand it. Imara attributes the revival of this notion
to Ayatollah Khomeini's doctrine of wilayat al-faqih , and to the juridical
interpretation of hakimiyya contrary to the true course of political thought in
Islam.28
Imara's position on state and religion, inspired by the teachings of the
reformists Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh, and shared by many
enlightened Islamists, may be summarized as follows: (1) Islamic revival must be
based on fundamental Islamic principles, which constitute the cultural identity of
the 'Umma. The cultural distinctiveness of the ' Umma is a historical reality, an
indispensable condition of reform, and a safeguard against the cultural distortions
that would result from Westernization. (2) Islam, renewed by "rational ijtihad ," is

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 Islam and Secularism in Egypt 1 1

the natural and firm foundation upon which the Arab-Islam

built. "The renewal of our worldly existence is conditional
religion." (3) To build a modern Islamic civilization on th
does not mean casting the present and the future in the m
the experiences of the ancients. But it would mean reinterpr
identity in terms of the requirements of the age. (4) To Is
make it a theocracy in the Western Catholic sense of
religious authority in Islam except that of good couns
entrusted to every Muslim by God, and not only to a calip
Neither does it make ita secular state outside the scope o
Islam is not only a spiritual message, but also a comprehe
ideology for a civil order. The religious order involves th
Consequently, the state is Islamic and civil at the same ti
upper hand in its daily life and in the laws that regulate
source of power in legislation and government, and in th
intentions of the Sharia (pp. 97-100).

COUNTERACTING THE ISLAMIC TIDE

Having been on the defensive, Egyptian secularists and intellectuals have

finally taken certain measures to counteract the Islamic tide. Convinced that the
triumph of the Islamist movement would set Muslim society apart from the rest o
the world, and out of date and out of touch with real life, they argue that Islam
properly understood, is in harmony with the modern age. In their interpretation of
Islamic doctrines, they make the distinction between general principles in the
Qur'an and rulings upon specific and concrete historical issues, which constitut
the bulk of what is called the Shara'a. Shari rules are the product of huma
reasoning, subject to change according to changing circumstances. Islamic history
as well as the demands of the modern age provide sufficient argument in favor o
the use of reason in the management of human affairs. The efforts and activities of
these thinkers and writers have been somewhat timid, sporadic and haphazard. Ye
enough has been written and done to form the core of a promising intellectual and
cultural movement.
Worthy of mention is the New Appeal Society (, Jam'iyyat al-Nida ' al-
Jadid ), established in late 1992, as a "platform for liberal thought." The founders
mostly Muslim Egyptians, university professors, businessmen, media persons and
leading thinkers, stress the need for disseminating and strengthening liberal value
and ideas, as a prerequisite for Egypt's ability to face the 21st Century. They also
believe that Egypt had experienced a great liberal tradition, worthy of revival and
development, and that enlightened and conscious understanding of Islam and Arab
culture would demonstrate that they are in harmony with liberty.
On 20 February 1993, the Society inaugurated its "cultural season" with a
lecture by its president, Dr. Sa' id al-Najjar, an economist and former World Bank

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12 Arab Studies Quarterly

official, on "Egypt and the Challenges of t

outlined the radical changes that have taken
of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp,
totalitarianism, and the trend toward m
democracy and human rights. Stressing tha
becoming a democracy, he called for a re
reform, popular participation, freedom of the
media.

It is such considerations that prompted

described as "a liberal, cultural society," wh
"with a human face." As such, it seeks to
direction of economic freedom, private ent
liberal society in the 19th Century sense of
individual is prior to the state, and that in
development, as it is the basis of cultural p
creativity. To soften the imbalances tha
individualism, the Society stresses social jus
final end of development.
The Society's position regarding the
principles: (1) Recognition of the truism that
without a future. Therefore, the Society affi
culture, and its adherence to that identity. (
reason, and reason dictates change accord
program invokes the shar'i principle " tagha
ahkam " (change in time calls for a change
world's deliverance from underdevelopment,
adoption of the "achievements of reason" in
Enlightened interpretation of the SharV
incompatible with fundamental human righ
bound by a set of human values, which
parliamentary majority.29 Although the
unrelated directly to Islam, it is quite clear th
a challenge to the Islamist tide.

JAM'IYYAT AL-TANWIR (ENLIGHTENM

A more direct and important challenge to

Enlightenment Society. Established in Oc
intellectuals, the Society seeks to coun
interpretations of the Islamists, whom i
reactionary, by disseminating liberal and ra
enlightenment tradition. In addition to holding
Tanwiriyyun , as they are called, publish
propagate their views. The first issue appea

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Islam and Secularism in Egypt 13

articles by the late Faraj Foda, Yunan Labib Rizq, Ri

Ibrahim, and others.30
Of equal importance is a series of books ( kutub al-t
reprinted by the General Egyptian Book Organization. T
Organization is a government institution reveals where th
question of the Islamists. The sixty or so books already p
three categories: (1) Books on enlightenment, rationalism
Most of these are reprints of publications that had challeng
outlook on society, law and culture, such as Taha Husay
fi Misr , Salama Musa' s* Afa Hiya al-Nahda , Farah Antun
Abd al-Raziq's ai-Islam wa 'Usui al-Hukm , and the like.
the tradition of enlightenment, such as Jabir Asfur's al-
Mihnat al-Tanwir , and books by the late positivist
Mahmud. (3) A collection entitled al-Muwajaha , consistin
dealing with extremism, national unity and the application
The event has been hailed as a sign that the Egy
succumbed completely to the forces of darkness. Writin
1993, Abd al-Muati Hijazi, first president of the Society
and dedication of the early pioneers of enlightenment, w
move Egyptians out of darkness into light, de
constitutionalism, condemn backwardness, fanaticism an
separation of religion and state. 'They sought to liberate
and bondage, to save women from ignorance and idleness
the harem-prison, and to open up to different cultu
recognized that culture, throughout history, has been a com
all nations contribute, and that truth is not the preserve
nation to be closed upon itself," he concluded, "
backwardness and inertia."
In a three-day workshop on the enlightenment movem
Century Egypt, sponsored by the Committee on History
Council for Culture, and held under the auspices of the M
Husni, the Tanwiriyyun stressed that Islam and Islamic th
of reason. In his presentation, Dr. Asfur, Secretary-Gene
for Culture, defined tanwir as simply the "use of reason
early Muslim philosophers extolling reason as being the s
knowledge, and that knowledge emanates from reason as
sun. By relating reason to light (nur), he sought to conve
ingrained in the Islamic heritage. Hence, "enlightenment
reason in apprehending existence and the world." The M
the first champions of reason in Islam. In modern times,
Abduh stressed that rational inquiry is one of the principles

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 14 Arab Studies Quarterly

IBN RUSHD AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT MOVEMENT

Of all Muslim authorities summoned by the Tanmriyyun in support of the

use of reason, none has been given greater coverage and importance than the
philosopher Abu al-Walid Ibn Rushd (1 126-1 198), known to the West as Averroe
Dr. Murad Wahba, professor of philosophy at ' Ayn Shams University, was the fir
to call for an Arab enlightenment movement based on the philosophy of Ibn Rush
in particular his theory of ta'wil , allegorical interpretation. According to the
Maghribian philosopher, the religious text has an exoteric and an esoteric meanin
If the exoteric meaning is -at variance with reason, the text must be interpreted
according to reason. His assertion that there is no authority above reason made Ib
Rushd's thought one of the roots of the European Enlightenment, says Wahba. H
recalls that Frederick II (1 194-1250), Emperor of Germany and King of Sicily, ha
ordered Ibn Rushd* s works translated so that he could use them as a stron
argument in his war with the religious authorities. Frederick realized that Ibn
Rushd* s ideas would support his attacks against religious government.
After a brief review of the influence of Averroism on European thought,
Wahba mentions how the great philosopher was persecuted for his ideas, his book
burned, and how he was tried for kufr and zandaqa , and banished to his village. H
theory of ta'wul subordinated religion to reason, and turned it into a collection
representations, as al-Al-Ghazali had put it. In general, Muslim ulema reproach
Ibn Rushd, and insist on the literal meaning of the text. Conservative Muslims hav
always regarded philosophy as an enemy of religion. That is why when Farah
Antun's book, Ibn Rushd wa Falsafatuhu , one of the first reprints by th
Enlightenment Society, was published in 1903, al-Manir magazine accused him o
blaspheming Islam and its ulema. It was Rashid Rida, editor of al-Manar , who
urged Muhammad Abduh to respond to Antun's contentions, accusing him of
atheism, as he later accused Ali Abd al-Raziq for his views in al-Islam wa 'Usui al-
Hukm .33

It is safe to say that the thoroughgoing naturalism and rationalism of

Averroism provided a philosophical justification for the doctrine of separation of
church and state. Secularism in the West may claim Ibn Rushd as one of its
philosophic exponents. It is for this very reason that his teaching has had no
influence in the Muslim East. While Ibn Rushd is alive in the West, says Wahba,
he is dead in the East, and where Averroism is dead, enlightenment is dead.
Muslim conservatives have always been intent on "smothering the seeds of
secularism" in Ibn Rushd's thought, because if these seeds germinate, they would
emancipate reason, whose absence in the Muslim world is at the bottom of its
backwardness, Wahba contends.34
Dr. Wahba is one of the pioneers in the enlightenment movement. In
1975, he edited a "Supplement on Philosophy and Science" for al-Tala'a
magazine, with the first issue appearing in April of that year. It came to an abrupt
end when in March 1977, President Sadat ordered the closing down of the
magazine. At the time, Wahba stressed the need for a cultural revolution based on
the "emancipation of reason, which is the distinctive feature of the Age of

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Islam and Secularism in Egypt 15

Enlightenment." The emancipation of reason, he

commitment to apply reason in addressing the problem
advanced world had done.35
As a contribution to the enlightenment movement
Iraqi, professor of Arabic philosophy at Cairo University
philosophy of Ibn Rushd, edited a volume on the M
contributions from eighteen scholars, among them Dr. Ib
of the Arabic Language Academy, Dr. Murad Wahba, an
Anawati. The book was published by the Committee on
of the High Council of-Culture. In it, as well as in his oth
Ibn Rushd' s rationalism, his impact on European th
rehabilitate his philosophy in the Muslim world.36
Following Aristotle, Ibn Rushd gives priority to d
(burhan), the highest form of certainty, over dialectic
inquiry into things in accordance with the rules of demons
philosophers apply demonstration, theologians use d
arguments. The principles guiding "men of demonst
logical. Demonstration determines that we know things b
true knowledge. The condition for true knowledge is tha
follow from necessary premises or propositions, which a
variable. Among the theologians who deny or belittle the
and the Ash'arites receive the most devastating critique
arguments are dismissed as mere sophistry and contrary to
Iraqi insists that only through reason and the rational
address properly issues like enlightenment, religious ex
modernity. He maintains that Europe progressed because
model. In contrast, the Arabs have regressed because th
thinkers, like al- Al-Ghazali, the Ash'arites and Ibn Taym
teachings augur backwardness and descent into the abyss.
Rushd's call to science and its reasons to heart, they wou
progress in thought and culture. Unfortunately, "we are sti
and legendary beings, and things that elude the imaginat
science with religion, and, according to Iraqi, there is n
philosophy (science) and Islam; all attempts to reconc
drastically. "Woe to the Arab nation when it seeks to d
from Quranic verses. Such an attempt is totally wrong
both religion and science."38
To recover from their "deplorable state," the Arab
traditional and replace it with the rational, elevating reas
man," to a level of sanctity, Iraqi avers. He goes further t
World become "a part of Europe," bringing to mind
1879) famous statement. Iraqi considers Europe to b
advanced cultural way of life. "It is our shame that we ha

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 16 Arab Studies Quarterly

of Ibn Rushd, the doyen of rational philosop

what the fundamentalists and quasi-educa
culture, science, and what they call the cultura
Laudable as its activities have been, the
escaped criticism, even by some of its supp
look upon it as a sinister secularist movemen
culture, and a threat to Islam and its herita
questioned its credibility, and wondered whe
means to confront the obscurantist Islamic t
Society presented? they ask? Its discourse is
social foundation, wandering aimlessly in cir
socialists, nationalists and liberals.40 Dr. Hasa
at Cairo University, has described most of t
Rushd as "rhetorical," and blamed the author
attack religious extremism in the name of
regime against its political enemies.41
Dr. Mustàfa al-Nashshar disputes the Tan
advocate of enlightenment is a secularist, an
enlightenment. Although they were linked t
Western Renaissance, enlightenment and se
Nashshar asserts. The result of this linkage
from the hegemony of the Church, has bee
economics and the arts. But despite this histo
like Oswald Spengler (1880-1936), Arnold
Schweitzer (1875-1965), have lamented t
development has not kept pace with materia
balance between the two is restored, the downfall of Western civilization is
inevitably coming, he contends. Thus Western enlightenment in the Twentieth
Century is no longer tied to secularism; it stresses the role of religion and moral
thought in human life, and the development of religious and spiritual consciousness
has become in the eyes of Western advocates of enlightenment one of the
foundations of modern education 42
Unfortunately, al-Nashshar continues, at a time when Western thinkers
have come to this conclusion, and some of them have converted to Islam, Arab
advocates of enlightenment are mounting a secularist campaign against Islam,
claiming that they are only challenging extremist Islamist ideas. Having "thumbed"
a few issues of the Tanwiriyyun 's magazines, he is appalled to discover how they
have become mouthpieces of Western thought and opinion. He warns against the
possibility of falling victims to Western intellectual and literary hegemony. He is
filled with amazement at Arab-Muslim thinkers mounting a campaign against Islam
and Muslims, simply because some youth have misunderstood, or deviated from,
Islamic teachings.
Lest he be misunderstood, al-Nashshar hastens to add that, as a student of
Western philosophy, he is not against enlightenment or in favor of turning away
from the West. He says he is simply calling for truth and objectivity in dealing

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 Islam and Secularism in Egypt 17

with national issues, and to be faithful to the fundamen

nation. "We ought to be committed to our problems, and
and cultural identity, and not be blinded by Western med
to the implications of the 'clash of civilizations,' which th
i»43
own interest.

CONCLUSION

Muslims have been struggling with the issue of modernity and Islam
heritage for more than, a Century. Regrettably, the recent debate adds litt
illuminate this critical and sensitive issue. The Muslims' concern about living
Islamic life they can call their own is not in question. What is missing, howeve
an agreement on what to retain from the heritage or incorporate of modernity. E
the most sophisticated are unable to define what exactly constitutes Islamicity.
emergence of the militant Islamists who reject everything Western and modern,
resort to random violence and terrorism, has obscured the central issue.
Advocates of a moderate Islamist trend have, partly under pressure fro
extremists, been reluctant to come forth with clear-cut propositions regarding w
kind of Islam they seek to reformulate in the modern age. They seem to be in
quandary: How much of the past is to be admitted as relevant to the present,
how much of Western institutions, practices and values is to be accepted with
jeopardizing what is strictly Islamic? For example, some Islamists reje
democracy as a Western innovation, and call for an Islamic shura. Others arg
that modern democracy is actually the shura , and therefore would fit into
Islamic scheme. There is more agreement on prohibiting usury, but no convinc
explanation as to how a modern economic system would function without it. M
serious is the Islamists' ambiguous position regarding the status and role of wo
in the new Islamic society. The extremists would have women stay at home
take care of the children and other household chores. Moderate Islamists may
go that far, but they are reluctant to allow women complete freedom to choose th
careers or their husbands. In contrast, secularists call for complete freedom an
equality for women.
There is greater disagreement among Islamists over the restoration of th
caliphate and Islamic unity. Some question its feasibility in present wor
conditions. Others set it as a final goal rather than an immediate project. Som
Islamists agree with the secularists that the caliphate is not one of the essen
elements of Islam. As a slogan, the caliphate has a great symbolic and politica
significance. It conjures images of a glorious past, but it also betrays a politi
ambition masquerading as an ideological commitment to establish a true Islam
state. In short, the Islamists are quite ambiguous about what kind of an Islam
state they seek to establish: is it a theocracy ( dawla diniyya) or an Islamic ci
state, as Imara calls it? What most Islamists agree on is that the introduction
secularism into the Muslim world is a deliberate Western plot to undermined Isl

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 1 8 Arab Studies Quarterly

Muslim secularists are regarded as misguid

Western political and cultural imperialism.
allurements of Western culture and way of l
from Islam. Islamists rule out any reconciliatio
Despite the heated debate between Islamist
may be overacted or largely politically motiv
secularists are avowed believers in Islam, and
legacy. If by secularism is meant unbelief, the
Arab-Muslim world. Jacques Berque, the w
Arabist, has characterized the encounter most
in Arabic, he states that the widespread debat
between secularism and the application of Sh
absence of clear definitions." The worldliness
irreligious. "For example," he adds, "I am an
the same time. . . I understand the ulema's an
confuse it with irreligion; they are wrong."45
Along similar lines, Ahmad Abd al-Mu'ti H
not incompatible with the "essence of Islam."
that man is the master of his earthly fate, and
controlling his destiny, and achieving progre
Freedom is the condition of a rational human
mind can apprehend this world, and that know
Hijazi says that a distinction must be made bet
between the work of the clergy or jurists an
between what produces happiness on earth an
hereafter. Consequently, he suggests that
secularism "not only by its indispensability fo
thought and reason, and the assimilation of th
compatibility with the essence of Islam, w
priesthood, encourages ijtihad , and makes the
of investigation and choice.'*46
A more critical view of the Islamist trend
al-'Alim, a leftist Egyptian writer and leading
contradiction between secularism and faith, he
secularism and the Islamist understanding of r
marked by rigidity, literalism, unhistoricalne
condescending sense of superiority." Secularis
one's identity, humanity, spiritual and cultural
an outlook, a process, and a method, embodyi
humanity, and expressing his physical and
obstacles which stand in the way of his advance
Departing from the main stream of the d
thinker and writer, contends that neither in Egy
secularism of any definition. Instead, there are
particular. Yet it cannot become a true civil st

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 Islam and Secularism in Egypt 19

from three flaws, common to all Arab states: (1) Th

autocracy and theocracy, i.e., between the political a
The cognitive structure of learning ( al-nizam al-ma
mind, a system governed by the supernatural and domin
it is governed by reason; (3) Women's status; no matt
in political and legal rights, they remain captive of a cu
shaped largely by the first two flaws out of the
patriarchy and male superiority. With such learning a
secularism and no civil society, because secularism is n
doctrine; it is one of the, concomitants of democracy, a
to be democratic.48
Finally, what can one conclude from all this? Int
and rhetorically, the arguments presented by both si
and views expressed many times in the past. The char
between Muslim secularists and Islamists is a dia
presumptuous or an unfair judgment. If there is no
secularism, or if there is no secularism in the Arab-M
all about? One is bound to find some justification
Islamists have equated secularism with blasphemy and
their adversaries, and undermine regimes under
deprivation, repression and exclusion from political an
Most observers perceive the Islamist trend as an
and hopelessness. Others stress the motivation of lead
popular frustration for their political ends, or fo
Undoubtedly, there are Islamists who advocate a retur
of the Sharia out of deep conviction and commit
opportunists or misguided. However, the violence an
with the Islamist movement have blurred the centra
otherwise could have been a constructive debate into a
the motivations, political, social and economic condit
world are playing into the hands of the militant Islam
the quality of life, political and social instability, an
needed economic and political development.

NOTES

1. Fu'ad Zakariyya, "al-Thaqafatan," al-Ahram , 19 January 1994.

2. Muhammad Nur Farahat, al-Mujtama' wa al-Sharia wa al-Qanun
(Cairo, 1991), 1 14; al-Ahali, No. 567, 19 August 1992.

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 20 Arab Studies Quarterly

3. Muhammad Sa'id al-'Ashmawi, "

Ahram% 23 March 1993.
4. Muhammad Ibrahim Mabruk, al- ' A
5. Ibid., 149.
6. Ahmad Baha' al-Din, Ayyam laha T
222.
7. Pierre Cachia, Taha Husayn: His
Renaissance (London: Luzac & Company,
8. Muhammad al-Bahi, al-Fikr al-Isla
Hadith (Cairo, 1970), 175-184.
9. Jamal al-Banna, al-lslam wa al-'Aq
10. Cited in al-Ahali , no. 646, 23 Febr
1 1 . Al-Ahali , no. 579, 1 1 November
12. Mabruk, op. cit., 120-135.
13. Yahya Hashim Farghal, Haqiqat
316; Faraj Foda, Qabla al-Suqut (Cairo, 1
14: tout.,Ol.
15. Ibid., 52-53.
16. Misr Bayna al-Dawla al-Diniyya wa al-Madaniyya (Cairo, 1992),
37-40; 67-69.
17. Al-Ahali , no. 557, 10 June 1992.
18. Al-Ahali , no. 612, 30 June 1993. See also Mabruk, op. cit., 148. I
owe the elucidation of ifti'at to Dr. Farhat Ziyadeh.
19. Al-Ahali, no. 612, 30 June 1993.
20. Ahmad Subhi Mansur, Hadd al-Ridda : Dirasa Usuliyya Tarikhiyya
(Cairo, 1993), 92, 95-97. For a contrary interpretation, see Abd al-Azim al-
Maťani, Uqubat al-Irtidud ' anal-Din (Cairo, 1993).
21. Al-Ahram , 23 January 1994.
22. From an article in al-Sha'b of 7 January 1994, as quoted in al-Ahram
of 17 January 1994.
23. Fahmi Huwaydi, 'Tahrir al-Mas'ala al-'Almaniyya," ti-Ahram, 1
Sep- tember 1992; Muhammad Imara, Ma'rakat al-lslam wa ' Usui al-Hukm
(Cairo, 1989), 170-171.
24. Al-Ahram, 12 December 1989. See also al-Sha'b , no. 316, 24
December 1985.
25. Muhammad Imara, al-'Almaniyya wa Nahdatuna al-Haditha (Cairo,
1986), 9-10. Henceforth, page references from this work shall appear at the end of
the sentence in the text.
26. Subhi al-Mahmasani, Falsafat al-Tashri' fi al-lslam (Beirut, 1965),
19, note 4.
27. Sayyid Qutb, Ma'alimfi al-Tariq (Cairo, 1964), 9, 29, 31.
28. Muhammad Imara, "Nazariyyat al-Hakimiyya fi Fikr Abi al-'A'la al-
Mawdudi," in Ishkaliyyat al-Fikr al-Islami al-Muasir (Velletta, Malta, 1991),
139-157.

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 Islam and Secularism in Egypt 21

29. The program was summarized in both a l-Ahram

and a l-Ahali, no. 595, 24 February 1993.
30. Al-Ahali , no. 637, 22 December 1993.
31. Al-Ahram , 2 June 1993.
32. Al-Ahram , 17 April 1994.
33. See Murad Wahba, "Ibn Rushd bayna Farah Ant
al-Ahali , no. 607, 26 May 1993.
34. Al-Ahali, no. 581, 25 November 1992.
35. Milaf Abd al-Nasir: Hiwar al-Yasar al-Misri m
(Beirut, 1975), 128-129: See also al-Ahali, no. 586, 30 Dec
36. Atif al-Iraqi, ed. Ibn Rushd Mufakkiran Arabiy
Ittijah al- 'Agli (Cairo, 1993). See also al-Ahali, no. 657, 1
37. Al-Ahram , 12 December 1993 and 15 May 1994
38. Ibid .

39. Ibid.
40. Al-Ahram , 29 May 1994.
41. Al-Ahali , no. 657, 1 1 May 1994.
42. This theme has been propounded by many Islamists, none more
vehemently than Fahmi Huwaydi of al-Ahram. See his "Muraja'at ' Almaniyya ,"
al-Ahram , 21 June 1994; "Hakimiyyat Qanun al-Suq," a commentary on a
conference on "The Downfall of Secularism and the Islamic Challenge to the
West," organized by the Center for Democratic Studies of Westminster University,
al-Ahram , 5 July 1994; "Mukhatabat Allah bi al-Fax," al-Ahram , 12 July 1994.
43. Mustafa al-Nashshar, "al-Tanwiriyyan al-Arab wa Risalatuhum al-
Haqiqiyya," al-Ahram, 16 January 1994.
44. See Jamal al-Banna, al-Da'awat al-Islamiyya (Cairo, 1978), 86;
Muhammad Muru, Tariq al-Bishri: Shahid 'ala Suqut al-' Almaniyya (Cairo,
1980[?]), 9,27-28.
45. Al-Ahali , no. 543, 1 January 1992.
46. Ahmad Abd al-Mu ti Hijazi, "al-' Almaniyya Faridat al-' Ilm wa al-
Hurriyya," a l-Ahram, 26 July 1989.
47. Quoted in al-Ahali , no. 632, 17 November 1993.
48. Ghali Shukri, "Wa Laysat Misr 'Almaniyya," al-Ahram, 18 May
1994.

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