Pisco, Peru, Earthquake of August

Pisco, Peru, Earthquake
of August 15, 2007

Lifeline Performance
EDITED BY
Alex K. Tang, P.E. and Jörgen Johansson
SPONSORED BY
Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering
Monograph No. 32
August 2008
Published by The American Society of Civil Engineers

1801 Alexander Bell Drive
Reston, Virginia 20191–4400
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Pisco, Peru, earthquake of August 15, 2007 : lifeline performance / edited by Alex K. Tang
and Jorgen Johansson ; sponsored by Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake
Engineering.
p. cm. -- (Monograph ; no. 32)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7844-1061-5
1. Lifeline earthquake engineering--Peru. 2. Earthquake damage--Peru--History. 3.
Earthquakes--Peru. 4. Pisco (Peru)--History. I. Tang, Alex. II. Johansson, Jorgen, 1971-
III. American Society of Civil Engineers.
TA654.6.P57 2008
624.1'762985--dc22 2010001589
American Society of Civil Engineers

1801 Alexander Bell Drive
Reston, Virginia, 20191-4400
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Preface
The Earthquake Investigation Committee of the Technical Council of Lifeline Earthquake

Engineering (TCLEE), American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), was established to initiate,
organize, train for, coordinate and evaluate the performance of lifelines following earthquakes.
Members of the committee are employees of lifeline industries, consulting engineers, and
universities from the United States and Canada. Committee members provide services on a
voluntary basis. For some earthquake investigation, companies of participants do not require an
individual to take vacation time for the investigation and may provide some support for expenses.
ASCE also provides support to reimburse expenses. In addition to the time associated with the
reconnaissance trip, the substantial effort by each individual to prepare a short report for the
TCLEE Web page and the full report for the monograph series is all done on a voluntary basis.
The cost of this effort is substantially more than the support provided by ASCE.
Individuals participating in the investigation need not be members of the committee or members
of ASCE, but are expected to follow the Committee’s earthquake investigation practices as
described in the ASCE publication, TCLEE monograph 11, “Guide to Post-Earthquake
Investigation of Lifelines.” Members of the investigation team coordinate with other groups and
may participate in groups organized by other organizations. They gather data relating to both
good and poor performance, from domestic and foreign earthquakes, in order to provide
information for practitioners to improve the performance of the lifeline systems. The foreign
earthquakes that have been investigated include the 1985 Chile, 1988 Soviet Armenia, 1990
Philippines, 1991 Costa Rica, 1992 Kocaeli (Turkey), 1995 Kobe (Japan), 1999 Kocaeli
(Turkey), 1999 Chi-Chi (Taiwan), 2001 Gujarat (India), 2001 Atico (Peru), 2004 Zemmouri
(Algeria), and 2007 Kashiwazaki (Japan) earthquakes.
The Kobe earthquake report is the first foreign earthquake investigation report published by
ASCE as a TCLEE monograph, number 14. The first domestic earthquake investigation report
published by ASCE as TCLEE Monograph, Number 8, was for the Northridge earthquake. Prior
to this time, TCLEE prepared a lifeline report that was published by the Earthquake Engineering
Research Institute (EERI). The Earthquake Investigation Committee continues to cooperate with
EERI to provide an abbreviated version of lifeline performance in Earthquake Spectra (EERI
publication). TCLEE publishes brief preliminary reports on the ASCE/TCLEE Web page.
To provide information on the tectonic and ground motion data, experts in these fields are often
asked to contribute to the reconnaissance report. This information is of value in providing a
perspective to the lifeline damage report.
Alex K. Tang
October 2007
iii
Authors’ Affiliations and Emails
Name Affiliation Email
Tom Cooper T.W. Cooper Inc. twcoopinc@aol.com
Jörgen Johansson University of Tokyo jorgen@iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Paola Mayorca University of Tokyo paola@iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp
Lucero Mesa DOT, SC MesaLE@dot.state.sc.us
Monique Nykamp Shannon & Wilson man@shanwil.com
Jerome O’Connor MCEER jso7@buffalo.edu
Mark Pickett University of Toledo, OH mark.pickett@utoledo.edu
Carl Sepponen Tran Consulting Engineers Sepponen@tran-c-e.com
Michael Salmon Los Alamos National Lab Salmon@lanl.gov
Alex Tang L&T Engineering & Project alexktang@mac.com

Management
iv
TCLEE Monograph Series
These publications may be purchased from ASCE, telephone 1-800-548-ASCE (2723), World
Wide Web http://www.asce.org.
The TCLEE web site is www.asce.org/community/disasterreduction/tclee_home.cfm
and click on publications.
No. 1 Recent Lifeline Seismic Risk Studies, Kiremidjian, Anne S., Editor, 1990.
No. 2 Seismic Lost Estimates for a Hypothetical Water System, A Demonstration Project, Taylor,
Craig E., Editor, August 1991.
No. 3 Guide to Post-Earthquake Investigations of Lifelines, Schiff, Anshel J., Editor, August
1991.
No. 4 Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, Proceedings of the 3rd U.S. Conference on Lifeline
Earthquake Engineering, August 22-23, 1991, Los Angeles, CA, Cassaro, Michael, Editor,
August 1991.
No. 5 Lifeline Earthquake Engineering in the Central and Eastern U.S., Ballantyne, Donald,
Editor, September 1992.
No. 6 Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, Proceeding of the 4th U.S. Conference on Lifeline
Earthquake Engineering, August 10-12, 1995, San Francisco, CA, O'Rourke, Michael J., Editor,
August 1995.
No. 7 Critical Issues and State of the Art on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, Schiff, Anshel J.
and Buckle, Ian, Editors, October 1995.
No. 8 Northridge Earthquake: Lifeline Performance and Post- Earthquake Response, Schiff,
Anshel J., Editor, August 1995.
No. 9 Seismic Design for Natural Gas Distributors, McDonough, Peter W., August 1995.
No. 10 Methods of Achieving Improved Seismic Performance of Communications Systems,

Tang, Alex, and Schiff, Anshel J., Editors, September 1996.
No. 11 Guide to Post-Earthquake Investigation of Lifelines, Schiff, Anshel J., Editor, July 1997.
No. 12 Seismic Guidelines for Ports, Werner, Stuart D., Editor, March 1998.
No. 13 Overcoming Barriers: Lifeline Seismic Improvement Programs, Taylor, Craig E., Mittler,
Elliott, and Lund, Le Val, September 1998.
No. 14 Hyogo-Ken Nambu Earthquake of January 17, 1995-Lifeline Performance, Schiff, Anshel
J. Editor, 1998.
No. 15 Guidelines for the Seismic Evaluation and Upgrade of Water Transmission Facilities,
Eidinger, John M. and Avila, Ernesto A., Editors, January 1999.
v
No. 16 Optimizing Post-Earthquake Lifeline System Reliability (Proceedings of the 5th U.S.
Conference on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, Seattle, Washington, August 12-14, 1999.),
Elliott, William M., and McDonough, Peter W., Editors, August 1999.
No. 17 Ismit (Kocaeli), Turkey Earthquake of August 16, 1999, Including Duzce Earthquake of
November 12, 1999 -Lifeline Performance, Tang, Alex K., Editor, September 2000.
No. 18 Chi-Chi, Taiwan, Earthquake of September 21, 1999—Lifeline Performance, Schiff,

Anshel J., and Tang, Alex K., Editors, October 2000.
No. 19 Gujarat (Kutch) India, M7.7 Earthquake of January 26, 2001 and NAPA M5.2 Earthquake
of September 3, 2000, Eidinger, John M., Editor, June 2001.
No. 20 The Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake of February 2001— Lifeline Performance,

McDonough, Peter W., Editor, February 2002.
No. 21 Acceptable Risk Process—Lifelines and Natural Hazards, Taylor, Craig E., and
VanMarcke, Erik H., Editors, March 2002.
No. 22 Seismic Screening Checklists for Water and Wastewater Facilities, Heubach, William F.,
Editor, September 2002.
No. 23 Atico, Peru Mw 8.4 Earthquake of June 23, 2001, edited by Curtis L. Edwards, October
2002.
No. 24 Lifeline Performance of El Salvador Earthquakes of January 13 and February 13, 2001, Le
Val Lund, Editor and Carl Sepponen, Editor, September 2002.
No. 25 Advancing Mitigation Technologies and Disaster Response for Lifeline System:
Proceedings of the Sixth U.S. Conference and Workshop on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering,
Beavers, J.E., Editor, August 2003.
No. 26 Fire Following Earthquake, Scawthorn, Charles, Eidinger, John M., and Schiff, Anshel J.,
Editors, 2005.
No. 27 Zemmouri, Algeria, Mw 6.8 Earthquake of May 31, 2003, Edwards, Curtis L., Editor, 2004.
No. 28 San Simeon Earthquake of December 22, 2003 and Denali, Alaska, Earthquake of
November 3, 2002, Yashinsky, Mark, Editor, Lund, Le Val, Co Editor, 2004.
No. 29 Hurricane Katrina: Performance of Transportation Systems, DesRoches, Reginald, Editor,

2006.
No. 30 Sumatra-Andaman Islands Earthquake and Tsunami of December 26, 2004 Lifeline
Performance, Strand, Carl and Masek, John, Editors, 2007.
No. 31 Kashiwazaki, Japan Earthquake of July 16, 2007 Lifeline Performance, Tang, Alex K.K.
and Schiff, Anshel J., Editors, 2007.
No. 32 Pisco, Peru Earthquake of August 15, 2007 Lifeline Performance, Tang, Alex K.K. and
Johansson, Jorgen, Editors, 2007.
vi
Other TCLEE Publications
Duke, C. Martin, Editor, The Current State of Knowledge of Lifeline Earthquake Engineering,
Proceedings TCLEE Specialty Conference, August 30-31, 1977, Los Angeles, CA, (Later
designated as the 1st U. S. Conference on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering), August, 1977.
Dowd, Munson, Editor, Annotated Bibliography on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, 1980.
Smith, D. J, Jr., Editor, Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, The Current State of Knowledge 1981,
Proceedings of the Second TCLEE Specialty Conference, August 20-21, 1981, Oakland, CA,
(Later designated as the 2nd U. S. Conference on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering), August 1981.
Hall, William J., Advisory Notes on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, 1983.
Nyman, Douglas, NSF Principal Investigator, Guidelines for the Seismic Design of Oil and Gas
Pipelines Systems, TCLEE Committee on Gas and Liquid Fuels, 1984.
Cooper, James, Editor, Lifeline Earthquake Engineering Performance, Design and Construction,
1984.
Cassaro, Michael and Martinez-Romero, E., Editors, The Mexico Earthquake, 1985, Factors
Involved and Lessons Learned, 1986.
Eguchi, Ronald and Crouse, C. B., Lifeline Seismic Risk Analysis - Case Studies, 1986.
Wang, Leon R. L. and Whitman, Robert, Seismic Evaluation of Lifeline Systems-Case Studies,
1986.
Cassaro, Michael and Cooper, James, Editors, Seismic Design and Construction of Complex
Civil Engineering Systems, 1988.
Werner, Stuart D. and Dickenson, Stephen E., Editors, Hyogo-Ken Nambu (Kobe) Earthquake of
January 17, 1995: A Post-Earthquake Reconnaissance of Port Facilities, TCLEE Ports
Committee, 1996.
ASCE Manual
Schiff, Anshel J., Editor, Guide to Improved Earthquake Performance of Electric Power Systems,
ASCE Manual 96.
TCLEE Earthquake Investigation Reports

TCLEE has also prepared numerous earthquake reports that have appeared in other publications.
References to these reports and ten short reports associated with TCLEE monographs can be
viewed on the ASCE/TCLEE web site address given below. The 10 short reports are each about
five to 15 pages long, contain a summary of main observations and some pictures, and can be
downloaded from www.asce.org/community/disasterreduction/tclee_home.cfm.
vii
Acknowledgements
Most of the contributing authors of this report are members of the Earthquake Investigation
Committee (EIC) of Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE). Lucero
Mesa, Carl Sepponen, Michael Salmon and Alex Tang were fully funded by ASCE, while
Monique Nykamp and Mark Pickett were partially funded by ASCE. Tom Cooper was self-
funded. Jorgen Johansson and Paola Mayorca were partially funded by Japan Society of Civil
Engineers (JSCE) and the Japan Association of Earthquake Engineering (JAEE). ASCE support
was received at the direction of Pat Natale (executive director), with support from John Durrant,
John Segna, Michael Sanio, Stefan Jaeger, Tenzing Bashee, and Katerina Lachinova. Jack Lopez-
Jara and Jack Lopez provided the team with local logistics support, including organizing meetings
with engineering groups and universities, hotel arrangements and vehicle rental. Jack Lopez-
Jara’s extra effort was to accompany the team throughout the field investigation acting as our
interpreter.
In addition to all the individuals acknowledged in the chapters, the investigation team was also
assisted by many groups and individuals in the field. The debriefing session set up by Jack Lopez
with presentations by Prof. Julio Kuroiwa of the National University of Peru proved to be
valuable to the team prior to the field trip. He was also a senior advisor of the Peru Civil Defense.
He was also involved in the recovery efforts after the earthquake. I would like to mention that
Prof. Kuroiwa met us on a Saturday morning, demonstrating his full dedication and commitment
to assist us to reduce earthquake losses and to save lives.
Ing. Gladys Villa Garcia, Prof. Daniel Quiun Wong and Prof. Manuel A. Olcese Franzero of the
Catholic University of Peru, Department of Engineering, provided us with in-depth presentations
of their findings and their research work of strengthening adobe buildings. The information that
they gave us and allowed us to use made this report more complete.
We are also grateful that Bill Fullerton, John C. Kirch Jr., and Luisa Villanueva Brañez of Lima
Airport Partners, who waited for us and provided us with detailed information of the events at the
Jorge Chavez International Airport in Lima during the earthquake.
We are indebted to the field support and the information provided by Raul Torres, Juan Carlos
Paz Cárdenas, and Carlos R. Vallez Velasquez-López of the Ministry of transportation and
Communications (MTC), without which we would not have been able to accomplish so much in
the time we had in the field. MTC, Ica Region, Ing. Juan Pedro Andia Morón provided one of his
staff to accompany us on all our visits to the transportation sites.
We also met with Dr. Ing. Jorge E. Alva Hurtado of National University of Engineering and the
President of Colegio de Ingenieros del Peru (CIP) and his colleagues, who shared their
investigation information with us and allowed us to use their photographs in our report.
Alex Tang, F. ASCE, ASCE/TCLEE Investigation Team Leader
Jorgen Johansson, M. JSCE, JSCE/JAEE Investigation Team Leader
viii
Prof. Julio Kuroiwa prepared a lot of information and shared with the ASCE and JSCE teams.
He also gave a few copies of his book titled Disaster Reduction Living in Harmony with Nature to
us. (Photo courtesy of Jerome O’Connor.)
Prof. Daniel Quiun Wong of Catholic University, Peru, presented his findings and shared the
information collected with the ASCE/TCLEE team members.
ix
Prof. Daniel Quiun Wong of the Catholic University, Peru, presented his photos taken in the
earthquake-impacted areas and shared his opinions with us. Prof. Franzero (2nd row, 1st on the
left) presented a lecture on the geological features of the region and provided photos for the
report. (Photo courtesy of Jerome O’Connor.)
Jack Lopez Sr. received an ASCE plaque for Jack Lopez-Jara received an ASCE plaque for
his local coordination and setting up his efforts to support the ASCE/TCLEE during
meetings for the ASCE/TCLEE team. our investigation.
x
Meeting with Ministry of Transportation & Communications (MTC) set up by Jack Lopez (5th
from the left), attended by Raul Torres (center), Juan Carlos Paz Cardenas (4th from the right),
and Carlos R. Valdez Velasquez-Lopez (1st from the right).
MTC, Ica Region, Ing. Juan Pedro Andic Moron (center) provided the team with a
staff member for the two-day investigation.
xi
Prof. Jorge E. Alva Hurtado provided the ASCE/TCLEE team a geo-tech
presentation on the earthquake area and shared his photos with us.
John C. Kirch Jr. (4th on the left) and his team provided us with the details of events
that occurred at Lima Airport during the earthquake.
xii
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction
Executive Summary 1
Power Systems 3
Communications 3
Water and Wastewater Systems 3
Highways and Bridges 4
Sea Ports and Airports 4
Emergency Power 4
Gas and Tanks 4
Hospitals, Schools, and Churches 5
Emergency Response, Recovery, and Social Impact 5
Organization 6
Chapter 2: Geotechnical Aspects

Tectonic Setting and Seismicity 7
Ground Motions 8
Geographic and Geologic Setting 11
Geotechnical Observations 12
Liquefaction 12
Liquefaction at Bridges 15
Lateral Spreading Along Pan-American Highway 15
Rock Slides 18
Tsunami 19
Acknowledgments 20
References 20
Chapter 3: Performance of Bridges and Highways

Overview of Damage 21
Description of the Highway System 22
Bridges Seismic Design Criteria 24
Summary of Highway Damage 27
Pan-American Highway South 28
Departmental Highway No. 100 Chincha-Huancos 33
Departmental Highway Route 110 Los Molinos-Tambillo 37
Departmental Highway Route 24—Los Libertadores 40
Other Bridges 41
Bridges Inspected in the City of Ica 41
Tambo de Mora and Sunampe 42
Emergency Response 43
xiii
Major Observations and Recommendations 44
Acknowledgment 45
Chapter 4: Electric Power

Executive Summary 47
System Description 49
Overview of System Performance 50
Observed Damage 51
Emergency Response 60
Acknowledgements 60
Chapter 5: Water
Description of Pisco Water System 61
Overview of Pisco Water System Performance 63
Damage to Pisco Infiltration Gallery and Transmission Pipeline 65
Damage to Pisco Water Reservoirs 66
Damage to Pisco Water Distribution 68
Description of the Ica Water System 68
Overview of Ica Water System Performance 69
Damage to Ica Water Reservoirs 70
Acknowledgements 74
Chapter 6: Wastewater
Description of Pisco Wastewater System 75
Overview of Pisco Wastewater System Performance 76
Pump Station Damage 76
Damage to the Pisco Sewage Collection System 77
Description of the Ica Wastewater System 79
Overview of Ica Wastewater System Performance 79
Acknowledgements 81
xiv
Chapter 7: Telecommunications
Description of System 85
Trunk Lines Crossing Huanami Bridge (S13.6877, W76.1581) 87
Nextel Cell Sites (S13.4143, W76.1877 and S13.7089, W76.2028) 91
Telefónica, Pisco, Central Office and Cell Site (S13.7092, W76.2054) 95
Claro, Pisco, Cell Site (S13.7103, W76.2045) 100
Telefónica, Ica City, Central Office and Cell Site (S14.0666, W75.7289) 102
Cell Sites Near Paracas (S13.8214, W76.2443) 103
Telefónica Cell Site Outside of Ica City 105
Acknowledgements 110
Chapter 8: Airport
Description of Jorge Chavez International Airport (S120 01’ 19”, W770 6’ 52”) 111
Overview of Performance 114
Chapter 9: Ports
Introduction 117
Performance of Puerto San Martin (S13.8051, W76.2927) 117
Chapter 10: Tanks—Fish Oil and Liquid Fuel

Introduction 126
Fish Oil Tank Farm (S13.7760, W76.23760) 127
Consorcio Terminales (S13.74740, W76.22730) 130
Pisco Refinery (S13.77270, W76.22980) 133
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Chapter 11: Buildings: Houses, Schools, Hotels, and Churches
Overview of Performance 136
Structural Building Material and Systems 136
Building Codes 140
Residential Buildings 142
Housing Building Material Statistics 142
Housing Damage Statistics 144
Housing Damage Details—Houses, One- and Two-Story 144
Housing Damage Details— Apartment Buildings, Three (or More) Stories 147
Educational Buildings 149
Universidad Nacional “San Luis Gonzaga” de Ica (14.0906S, 75.7334W) 149
Main campus, Ica (14.0906S, 75.7334W) 150
Medical School Campus, Ica (14.0737S, 75.7419W) 154
Dental School Clinic, Local Central, Ica (14.065S, 75.732W) 154
Fisheries and Foods Campus, Pisco Playa (13.7101S, 76.2184W) 157
Pre-College Educational Buildings 158
San Juan Bautista High School, Huaytara 158
Beatita de Humay Elementary and High School, Humay 159
San Luis Gonzaga High School, Ica 159
Los Molinos Elementary School, Ica 161
Hotels 161
Churches 162
Mitigation Initiatives 163
Retrofitting of Existing Adobe Houses 163
Evaluation of Seismic Performance of Retrofitted
Houses (S 13°59.179’ W 75°46.458’) 163
Construction of New Earthquake Resistant Adobe Homes 167
Evaluation of the Seismic Performance of Reinforced
Houses (S 12°51.72’ W 76°03.27’) 169
Final Remarks 171
Chapter 12: Hospitals and Medical Services

Description of System 174
Electrical Power Systems: Commercial and Emergency 179
Automatic Transfer Switches 179
Emergency Power Generators—Stationary Generators, Fuel Pumps,
Fuel Tanks 179
Emergency Power Generators—Portable Generators 180
Water Supply Systems 180
xvi
Wastewater Systems 183
Communication Systems: External and Internal 183
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning Systems 183
Natural Gas Systems 184
Patient Transportation Systems 185
Medical Gas Systems 185
Critical Equipment 185
Fire Suppression Systems 186
Hazardous Material 186
Security Systems 186
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery 187
Conclusions, Observations and Recommendations 191
Chapter 13: Emergency Response, Recovery and Social Impact

Introduction 192
Local and International Support 198
Emergency Shelters 201
Health Impact 202
Observations 202
Acknowledgement 203
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Executive Summary
On August 15, 2007, a Roman Catholic holy day1, at 6:40 P.M. local time, there was a magnitude
(Mw) 8.0 earthquake off the coast of Southern Peru, about 145 km SSE of Lima, Peru. More than
4,500 aftershocks had been registered as of August 30, 2007, 30 of them had MMI (Modified
Mercalli Intensity) between 3 and 5. The social economic impact of the earthquake was
significant with a loss of 519 lives, more than 1,300 injuries, and tens of thousands of collapsed
and damaged houses, churches, schools, and hospitals. The areas affected by the earthquake were
shown in Figure 1.1. The estimated economic losses were about $300 million (U.S.) including
lifeline infrastructure losses. A very small-scale tsunami occurred at the coastal area of Pisco; the
damage was minimal compared to the earthquake damage within two to three blocks north. About
80 percent of the buildings in these few blocks were destroyed. The hardest hit cities were Pisco,
Chincha Alta, Cañete, and Ica. Damage was also observed in Yuayos, Huaytara, and
Castrovirreyna. Severe lateral spreading was observed in Tambo de Mora. There was also severe
lifeline damage.
Fig. 1.1 Areas affected by the August 15 earthquake.

The hardest hit city is Pisco in the Ica Region.
1
To celebrate the occasion when the Virgin Mary passed into heaven.
1
The earthquake occurred at the boundary between the Nazca and South American tectonic plates.
The two plates are converging at a rate of 77 mm per year. This tectonic setting is very similar to
the Juan de Fuca and the North American tectonic plates that extended from North California to
British Columbia. The converging rate of these tectonic plates is about 44 mm per year.
This plate boundary is responsible for a number of significant earthquakes in this region since 1942.
The strong shaking coupled with a very long duration of shaking (more than two minutes) resulted
in destruction of many adobe, brick masonry, and brick in-filled concrete frame buildings as well as
severe damage to lifelines. The recorded maximum peak ground acceleration in Ica was 0.5g.
Four weeks after the earthquake, only a few stores and restaurants were open for business in
Pisco. The restaurants that were open had little to offer because of limited food supply and
potable water. Fortunately, there is no gas supply system in the region; portable gas tanks are still
available for cooking.
The power disruption in the affected areas ranged from a few days to two weeks. After five days
without electric power, one cell site operator had to bring in his own power generator to restore
the cell site to service. The highest transmission voltage in the affected region was 66 KV. The
voltage in the distribution system is 33 KV.
Communications systems—both landline and cellular networks—performed poorly during the

first few days after the earthquake, particularly the cellular system. Cellular phones are more
commonly used in the region. There was damage to the transmission and distribution systems.
Fiber optic trunk lines were disrupted due to the failure of the Huamani Bridge. Collapsed
buildings and fallen utility poles disrupted the telecommunications distribution system. The loss
of power in some locations caused some cell sites to shut down. Access to other locations was
very difficult due to road damage and traffic jams. Although there was no call volume
information during the first few days of the earthquake, the volume of calls was expected to
increase from the norm. The loss of telecommunications immediately after the earthquake
rendered emergency response and rescue efforts more difficult.
The water distribution system sustained severe damage due to liquefaction in Pisco coastal area.
The water system was not fully restored five weeks after the earthquake. Water tankers were used
in Pisco to distribute potable water. The wastewater system suffered minor damage. The
earthquake easily crumbled the uncoated concrete pipes in the collection system, as the gases
generated from the wastewater had corroded the concrete over time.
There was extensive disruption and damage to the Pan-American Highway connecting Lima and
Pisco. Huamani Bridge, at 220 km mark of the Pan-American Highway, sustained damage to a
few piers on the south side of the abutment. Most of the damage observed at the bridge was due
to strong shaking and liquefaction. The Peru Central Highway was blocked by rockslide, making
access to regions east of the earthquake-affected area very difficult.
Both hospitals and schools sustained significant damage to the buildings and loss of lifeline
services. The majority of the backup power generators observed did not have transfer switches for
automatic start up. The power generators were not installed with earthquake protections.
The Peru Civil Defense and the local government set up an air passage to transport the injured
and very sick patients from hospitals to Lima for treatment because of the damage to the Pan-
American Highway and traffic jams, which paralyzed the transportation route. It took the
Peruvian Red Cross three times as long to get to Pisco and Ica to perform their emergency
2
response and rescue effort. Citizens of the region, who lacked training and proper tools, were
helping to clean up the debris. International support poured in to help the victims. In addition
NGOs provided on-site resources to restore normal livelihood; however, the NGO work was
mostly uncoordinated.
Power Systems
The Electroperú Company (EP) is the major electric power supplier in the region. The affected
area is in the 66 KV distribution circuit. Two substations converting 66 KV to 33 KV were visited
in Pisco and in Paracas four weeks after the earthquake. Other than minor cracks in the building
and boundary brick wall, there was no indication of damage to the transformers or the circuit
breakers.
The most severe damage occurred in the distribution system, the cables along with the utility
poles fell into the middle of the streets. The fallen cables piling on each other might have tripped
the circuit breakers in the low-voltage substation. The whole city of Pisco turned dark without
any light after the earthquake.
Communications
Overall the communication system performed poorly during the first 24 hours after the
earthquake. The ASCE/TCLEE team was not allowed to enter any central offices (CO) in the
earthquake-impacted area; therefore, the condition of the equipment in COs was unknown. The
landline network is operated by Telefónica in Pisco and Ica. Residents in the area indicated that
the telephone systems (both landline and wireless) were not functioning during the first day after
the earthquake, particularly the long distance calls to Lima. That underlines the equipment
problems within the COs, which are not only the result of call volume.
The power outage caused major issues for the region’s telecommunication system, especially for
wireless cell sites that were not in COs. From the information collected, the wireless system
seemed to sustain more damage. Antenna support poles on rooftops were broken, and antenna
failure was the major damage to cell sites in Pisco. One cell site had a collapsed boundary wall
that was meant to provide privacy and security for the cellular equipment.
Telecommunications throughout Lima was affected by the earthquake. Lima airport operations
had to use its radio system during the critical hours because neither its landline or cellular phones
were functioning.
Water and Wastewater Systems

The water source for Pisco and the surrounding communities comes from Cabeza de Toro
filtration gallery. Three storage tanks are used for distribution within the city. One of the storage
tanks is elevated, while the other two are on ground level. There was minor damage to the
elevated tank, which was taken out of service during our investigation. There were transmission
pipe and distribution pipe breaks within the system, many of which could not be identified until
water started to flow again.
The water system in Ica did not sustain as much damage as in Pisco. Ica’s water comes from
wells, and water storage tanks, most of which are elevated, are used in the distribution system.
Some of the tanks had minor damage, and several wells had reduced production due to the high
quantity of sand and fine silt in the water.
3
In Pisco and Ica, the wastewater collection system sustained extensive damage. Many uncoated
concrete pipes in the collection system were corroded and collapsed during the earthquake. The
treatment plant’s lagoon system did not suffer any significant damage. In Pisco, a pump fell into
the lagoon and was retrieved and repaired. Potable water rationing was enforced to reduce the
possibility of sewage overflow in the streets. Some sewage over flow was evident in Pisco.
Highways and Bridges

The most serious highway and bridge damage of the earthquake was the result of the landslides,
liquefaction, and ground settlement. Both lateral spreading and liquefaction damaged a few
sections of the Pan-American South Highway.
A number of bridges were damaged by the earthquake. The most seriously damaged was the
Huamani Bridge on the Pan-American Highway crossing the Pisco River. The damage caused
traffic jams in both directions. The bridge was out of service for repair during ASCE/TCLEE
investigation. A detour was possible due to the low water level during the dry season.
Road damage was mainly a result of liquefaction and lateral spreading, particularly the section of
Pan-American Highway close to the coast. The highway was quickly repaired within two weeks
of the earthquake to reduce the economic impact to the communities of Chincha, Pisco, and Ica.
Roads and bridges are an important part in the recovery and rebuilding of the region. The
concession program established a few years ago seems to work effectively.
Sea Ports and Airports

The damage to the port facilities (San Martin) was mainly liquefaction induced, such as quay wall
settlement, lateral deformation of concrete quay wall, and ground deformation behind the quay
wall and berth. As this is not a high volume operation, the port remained functional after the
earthquake. Some of the damage had not been fixed by the time of the ASCE/TCLEE visit.
In the earthquake-affected area there is only one airport, which functions both as a military and
civilian airport. During the early hours after the earthquake, a number of international flights used
the Pisco Airport because of problems at the Lima International Airport.
The long duration shaking caused the Lima International Airport to evacuate its terminal
building; however, there was no reported damage or injuries. The evacuation was reasonably
uneventful, considering the size of the terminal and the time of the day, which is usually quite
busy. Damage to the terminal was non-structural. Although drop ceiling tiles fell, the glass walls
and doors on the front of the terminal were not damaged. Minor damage of the control tower was
reported; however, there were no details.
Emergency Power
Most of the facilities visited that had back up power generators performed poorly. In every case
where electric power was needed, the generator had to be started manually. This caused delay in
getting the facilities up and running and was one of main causes of telecommunication outages.
Gas and Tanks

There is no gas distribution system in the earthquake-impacted areas. The region depends on
bottled gas.
4
The tank farm south of Pisco along the coast had minor damage with buckling along the bottom
of a couple of tanks. There was also damage to connecting pipes due to differential movement.
Hospitals, Schools, and Churches

Both hospitals and schools were reported in previous lifeline investigation monographs. The
focus of this report was on supporting lifelines to these facilities. Hospitals in the earthquake-
affected area suffered significant damage, from partial collapse to total collapse as a result of the
old building stocks. One fatality was reported as a result of the collapses. Temporary medical
facilities were quickly set up to provide the communities with the needed medical care.
As it was a holiday and the earthquake occurred late in the day, there were no students in the
schools. More than 200 schools and universities in the area sustained damage to various degrees.
At the time of the ASCE/TCLEE team investigation, six weeks after the earthquake, the schools
had not yet opened. The government was providing training to 300 school headmasters to handle
psychological impacts when the schools opened.
A JSCE investigation team agreed to provide ASCE with building stock information, which
makes this monograph a more complete record. Although church building performance is a new
item for the lifeline investigation team, because the JSCE investigation team willing to share this
information and there were a number of causalities due to the collapse of churches in the
earthquake, ASCE decided to include it in the report.
Building collapses caused significant damage to the electric power distribution system and the
telecommunication distribution system.
Emergency Response, Recovery, and Social Impact

There were 519 fatalities and more than 1,300 injuries caused by this large magnitude earthquake.
In addition to highway damage leading into the earthquake area, the telecommunications system
failure caused delays in the response and rescue effort.
The Peru Civil Defense, NGOs, and international support were available to provide needed rescue
and clean up services, including building temporary shelters for the victims displaced from
damaged houses. Because most of the victims wanted to stay nearby, tents were put up close to
the damaged or collapsed houses. Despite their efforts, the organizations in charge of disaster
response were overwhelmed by the extent of the damage, resulting in slow debris removal, few
temporary houses and tents, and poor conditions at the refugee camps.
The government also hired a number of people to provide the clean up services; however, most of
these did not have the proper tools.
Due to damage to the water supply system, potable water was delivered by tank truck to victims.
Schools and universities were closed due to damaged buildings. Most of the hospitals in Pisco
had to operate outside of their buildings due to collapses and structural damage, and temporary
medical service depots were set up around the city.
The greatest concern was the failure of the hospitals in Pisco coupled with telecommunications
system and electric power failure. The airlift established by the Peru Civil Defense helped to
5
save lives by transporting patients and serious injuries to Lima.
This earthquake affected the Ica Region, and the hardest hit city was Pisco. Therefore, the
earthquake was referred to either as the Ica earthquake or the Pisco earthquake. In this
monograph, Pisco Earthquake is used.
Organization
This report discusses the following lifeline systems: electric power, communication, water and
wastewater, highways, ports, gas and fuel tanks, and emergency response. Lifeline systems within
hospitals and educational institutions are also discussed. Most lifeline chapters start with an
overview of the system performance, followed by sections that describe the system, its damage,
emergency response, and recovery. Each chapter finishes with a conclusions and
recommendations.
6
Chapter 2: Geotechnical Aspects
The 2007 Pisco, Peru, earthquake occurred on August 15, 2007 at about 6:40 p.m. local time. The
event was a subduction zone earthquake with a moment magnitude (Mw) of 8.0 and the
hypocenter located 40 km west of the coast of Central Peru at a depth about 39 km.1 The
ASCE/TCLEE team visited an area located between 200 to 400 km south of Lima. The team
observed damage to lifelines in the towns of Chincha, Tambo de Mora, Pisco, and Ica, which fall
within the estimated fault rupture zone of the earthquake (Fig. 2.1).
Fig. 2.1. Estimated location of August 15, 2007 Pisco, Peru earthquake rupture zone (modified
from GEER, 2007,2 background image from Google Earth)
The geotechnical observations included liquefaction and lateral spreading along the coast and
rockslides in the Cordillera Occidental Mountains, located east of the coastal plain.
Tectonic Setting and Seismicity

Coastal Peru has a history of large earthquakes generally related to subduction of the Nazca plate
beneath the South American continental plate (Fig. 2.2). The 2007 earthquake occurred as thrust-
faulting on the interface between the two plates, with the South American plate moving over the
Nazca plate at a rate of about 77 mm per year.3
7
Fig. 2.2. The tectonic setting of Peru and estimated fault rupture zones from August 2007 and
historical earthquakes (modified from Degg and Chester [2004] 4 with August 2007 rupture zone
from Ji and Zeng [2007]5 and historical rupture zones from IGP [2007]6)
As shown in Figure 2.2, the fault rupture in the August 2007 earthquake occurred in a previously
identified seismic gap between the rupture areas of the 1974 Lima earthquake (Mw = 8.1) and the
1996 Nazca earthquake (Mw = 7.7).2 Based on the preliminary finite fault solution by Ji and
Zengm,5 the fault rupture plane was estimated to be about 190 km long and 95 km wide (see Fig.
2.1) with a strike of about 324 degrees and a dip of about 27 degrees.
Ground Motions
The earthquake’s ground motions were recorded at about 16 stations in Peru. Most of the strong
motion stations are located in the Lima area about 170 km north of the north end of the fault
rupture zone. Unfortunately two out of the four ground motion recording stations present within
the fault rupture zone did not function properly. Records were obtained at two stations located in
the town of Ica, near the south end of the rupture zone. The horizontal ground motions recorded
at the ICA station are shown in Figure 2.3.
8
Fig. 2.3. Horizontal ground motions (acceleration, velocity, and displacement) at ICA station
(left side is north-south component and right side is east-west component)
Based on the preliminary finite fault solution of Ji and Zeng,5 this station is located about 37 km
from the fault rupture plane.2 The ICA ground motion record indicated a peak ground
acceleration (PGA) of about 0.33 times gravity (0.33g) in the north-south direction. Another
ground motion record, measured at the Parcona station (PCN) near the town of Ica, indicated a
PGA of about 0.49g in the east-west direction and 0.46 in the north-south direction. The PCN
station is about 39 km from the fault rupture plane.2
The ground motion records indicate that the earthquake had a duration greater than 100 seconds.
One reason for this long duration according to the records may be that there were two phases of
strong ground motion (Fig. 2.3).
The seismic design of recent engineered structures in Peru is based on Seismic Code NTE E.30
(2003)7 and the seismic zonation map approved by the Peruvian government in 1997. The fault
rupture zone is located in seismic Zone 3. This zone corresponds to a design PGA of 0.4g. While
the ICA ground motion record indicated a PGA lower than the design value of 0.4g, the nearby
PCN record indicated a PGA significantly higher than the design value. The ICA and PCN
ground motion response spectra were compared to the design spectra based on the NTE E.030
code for two soil types: “Intermediate Soils” (Type S2) and “Flexible Soils or Stratum with Great
Thickness” (Type S3). The results are plotted in Figure 2.4.
9
Fig. 2.4. Response spectra of August 2007 event from ICA and PCN ground motion records
compared to code-based spectra from the National Building Code of Peru (NTE E.030).7
The earthquake was felt the strongest in the towns within the fault rupture zone where soft soils
are present (Pisco and Tambo de Mora). A breakdown of the estimated Modified Mercalli
Intensities (a qualitative measure of the effect of an earthquake on people and natural and man-
made objects) in selected towns is presented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Estimates of Modified Mercalli Intensity8

Town Modified Mercalli
Intensity
Pisco VIII (severe)
Tambo de Mora VIII (severe)
Chincha VII (very strong)
Ica VI (strong)
Lima V (moderate)
The locations of these towns are shown in Figure 2.1. The earthquake was also felt in parts of
Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil.
10
Geographic and Geologic Setting
Peru is typically divided into three geographic regions: the coast, the Andes Mountains, and the
jungle. The study area that was visited by the ASCE/TCLEE team was primarily located within
the coastal area of Peru, south of Lima, inside the fault rupture zone (shown on Figure 2.1). One
group of the ASCE/TCLEE team also traveled through portions of the western part of the
Cordillera Occidental Mountains, east of the fault rupture zone. The coastal area is typically very
arid and is dominated by widespread sand dunes and alluvial and Aeolian deposits. The dry,
desert-like coastal terrain is occasionally split by valleys created by rivers originating from the
eastern Andes mountains. The general geologic conditions at the locations visited by the
ASCE/TCLEE team are divided into three regions for the purposes of discussion.
Fig. 2.5. Study area and geologic region designations.
1. The coastal area north of Chincha and Tambo de Mora: In this area, a marine
terrace extends about 0.5 to 1 km inland from the coast until it butts up against the
steep hillsides of the Cañete formation. The Cañete formation is an older
(Pleistocene) Aeolian sand deposit that is weakly cemented. The marine terrace is
relatively flat, and is generally less than 10 meters above sea level. This marine
terrace was formed by the planning action of the marine erosion and then uplifting by
subduction of the Nazca plate under the South American plate. Marine deposits on
this terrace consist of sand and silt soils laid down by the ocean. Depending on their
density and saturation level, the marine terrace deposits are susceptible to
liquefaction (see Section 2.4).
2. The coastal and inland area between Chincha and Ica: In this area, the surficial
geology is dominated by alluvial and Aeolian deposits. The alluvial deposits are
11
associated with fans and plains of rivers discharging into the ocean and consist of
sand and gravel. The Aeolian deposits are generally composed of coarse- to fine-
grained sand. Sedimentary and volcanic rock outcrops are present at scattered
locations. Most of the Aeolian deposits are located above the groundwater table and
are, therefore, not susceptible to liquefaction. The alluvial deposits are susceptible to
liquefaction depending on the location of the groundwater table and the density of the
alluvial soils. Local people reported that the water level varied between 10 and 20
meters below ground surface in the vicinity of San Luis, San Vicente de Canete,
whereas in Chincha it was at 40 meter depth.
3. The mountain areas of the Cordillera Occidental: This study area was located
mostly east and northeast of Ica (Fig. 2.5). It is characterized by mountains
comprised of igneous rocks separated by river valleys with alluvial deposits. The
rocks of these mountains are generally well indurated, but in many places they are
intensely fractured or exhibit multiple sets of prominent, open joints. These
characteristics make them highly susceptible to seismically generated rock falls and
rockslides.9 The alluvial deposits in the river valleys consist of sand and gravel soils
deposited by normal river flows and El Niño flood events.
Geotechnical Observations
Geotechnical observations were made by the ASCE/TCLEE team along the Pan-American
Highway between Lima and Ica; in the towns of Chincha, Tambo de Mora, Pisco, and Ica; and
along Departmental Routes 100 and 110, and National Route 24A. The geotechnical observations
consisted of evidence of liquefaction and rockslides.
Liquefaction
Liquefaction occurs during ground shaking in loose, saturated, sandy soil causing the water
pressure in the pore spaces to increase and, thereby, reducing the contact forces between the soil
grains, which leads stiffness degradation and to a partial or complete loss of shear strength of the
soil (a quicksand-like condition). Liquefaction can result in ground settlement, lateral spreading,
land sliding, localized ground disruptions from sand boils (ejection of sand and water at the
ground surface, see Figs. 2.6 and 2.7), and reduced vertical and lateral capacity for structure
foundations. Buildings, bridges, and other structures founded on or in the liquefied soils and
without proper foundation design may settle, tilt, move laterally, or collapse. Ground motion may
also experience a shift towards lower frequencies.
Fig. 2.6. Sand boil near Los Molinos Bridge Fig. 2.7. Sand boil adjacent to Huamani Bridge
along Route 24A pier (Courtesy of J. Lopez)
12
The observed liquefaction due to the earthquake was generally associated with artificial fills and
marine, Aeolian and alluvial deposits composed of sands and silty sands. In areas near the coast,
the groundwater table is relatively high, which makes these deposits highly susceptible to
liquefaction, depending on their density.
During the visit of the ASCE/TCLEE team, about six weeks after the earthquake, most of the
evidence of liquefaction (sand boils) had been destroyed by human, animal, and/or natural
activities, such as the tsunami accompanying the earthquake. At one site near Pisco, the team
observed evidence of liquefaction in a trench that had been excavated to repair a damaged water
transmission pipeline (Fig. 2.8). Two geologists (Carlos Costa of Argentina and Patricio
Palderrama of Peru) were evaluating the trench walls for potential evidence of paleo-liquefaction.
In their opinion, the observed liquefaction evidence was recent.
Fig. 2.8. Trench with evidence of liquefaction near road into Pisco.
The thickness of the non-liquefied layer in the trench was about 1 meter. The paths of several
liquefaction ejection streams from the liquefied soil layer to the ground surface
were visible in the sides of the trench (Fig. 2.9).
13
Fig. 2.9. Path of liquefied soil visible in side of trench near Pisco.
There were also several areas in the trench where the contact between the two layers was
extremely mixed (Fig. 2.10). The geologists examining the trench felt that this mixing was
potentially due to liquefaction and ground shaking during the August 2007 earthquake.
Fig. 2.10. Evidence of soil mixing (Argentinean geologist Carlos Costa pictured)
14
Lifelines that were affected by liquefaction and related effects include existing roadways,
portions of the Pan-American Highway South, and the Port of San Martin. The observations made
by the ASCE/TCLEE team for specific lifelines are discussed in subsequent chapters and are
summarized below.
Liquefaction at Bridges
Based on our observations and discussions with Peruvian engineers, liquefaction occurred at
several of the bridge locations. Sand boils were reported at the Cruz Verde Bridge in Tambo de
Mora, although this bridge did not appear to be significantly damaged. Liquefaction was also
observed at and caused damage to the Pan-American Highway Huamani Bridge to the east of
Pisco. The team also observed evidence of liquefaction near the Los Molinos Bridge, which is
about 19 km east of the city of Ica along Route 110. At this location, the alluvial sand soils in the
riverbed liquefied (Fig. 2.6).
Lateral Spreading Along Pan-American Highway

Lateral spreading occurs on gentle slopes as a result of soil liquefaction. When the soil liquefies,
gravity causes the land to move down slope. Lateral spreading can occur on relatively flat
topography as long as it is located near a free face (such as the land near a coastline). This
earthquake caused a very large lateral spread north of the town of Tambo de Mora and west of the
town of Chincha (Chincha Alta). The lateral spread occurred along the marine terrace that butts
up against the hills of the Cañete formation (Fig. 2.11). The estimated length of the lateral spread
is at least 3 km, and the estimated maximum width is about 1 km. This is likely one of the widest
and longest lateral spreads that has been observed.
Fig. 2.11. Large area of lateral spreading along coastline north of Tambo de Mora (background
imagery from Google Earth)
15
The relatively flat area that spread laterally is mostly occupied by agricultural and grazing lands
with small local roadways and a few small houses. Closer to the coast, important facilities of the
fishing industry were heavily affected by lateral spreading and sand boiling. The team observed
numerous cracks along the east side of the lateral spreading zone (Fig. 2.12) adjacent to the
Cañete formation hillsides.
Fig. 2.12. Cracks in marine terrace deposits near east end of lateral spread
At the east edge of the lateral spread, near the south end of the zone that experienced lateral
spreading, a 3- to 4-meter high vertical scarp was visible at the base of the hillside formed by the
Cañete formation (Fig. 2.13). The observed surface cracks were widespread along the lateral
spreading area (Fig. 2.14).
Fig. 2.13. Vertical scarp (3 to 4 m high) at east Fig. 2.14. Surface cracks along east edge of
edge of lateral spread lateral spread
16
Evidence of liquefaction was observed along the west edge of the lateral spread, near the beach.
This evidence included sand boils, leaning walls, displaced ground (Figs. 2.15 and 2.17),
destroyed industrial facilities, and a severely damaged prison.
Fig. 2.15. Evidence of liquefaction along Fig. 2.16. Leaning wall near west edge of lateral
fence line spread
Fig. 2.18. Sand inside prison cell. (Courtesy of Julio

Kuroiwa)
Fig. 2.17. Repair work going on at a Sardine

factory. Lateral spreading cracks filled in
with rubble from collapsed walls. (Courtesy
of Prof. Johansson)
17
The large lateral spread resulted in displacement and damage to the Pan-American Highway
South northwest of Chincha (Fig. 2.1). An interesting phenomenon of this event was the uplift of
the east shoulder pavement (Fig. 2.19). We do not know whether this pavement uplift was caused
by the back and forth movement of the soil against the base of the hill, or whether a portion of the
hillside slid under the road because of liquefaction at the toe under the roadway. It is interesting
to note that the highway does not appear to have shifted in this location (see road striping in
Figure 2.19). South of the uplifted portion of the shoulder pavement, the roadway has shifted
towards the ocean, as shown in Figure 2.20.
Fig. 2.19. Shoulder pavement uplifted along Fig. 2.20. Deflection of roadway south of km
east side of Pan-American Highway near km 188 on Pan-American Highway (looking south)
188 (looking north)
The very large lateral spread near Chincha should be of interest to engineers everywhere. The
width (about 1 km) of lateral spreading is significantly greater than widths previously observed in
the existing lateral spreading case history database. This area should be studied further by
engineers to evaluate what caused the large distance of lateral spreading.
Rock Slides
East of the coastal dune areas in the Cordillera Occidental Mountains, numerous rock slides were
observed along Departmental Routes 100 and 110, east and northeast of the city of Ica, and
National Route 24, east of Pisco. The rock slopes along Route 100 typically exceed 50 m high
and are located immediately adjacent to the roadway. In many locations along the roadway, they
are steeper than 70 degrees.
During the team’s visit, many of the rockslides had been cleared from the roadways. The largest
rock debris that was observed was about 5 m in diameter. A local resident indicated that
continued aftershocks (up to five weeks after the earthquake) were causing additional rockslides.
The team observed numerous locations where fractured, unstable blocks of rock were present
above the roadway that could pose a future hazard (see Fig. 2.21).
18
Fig. 2.21. Typical rock slide along Route 100, near km 30
Tsunami
The earthquake generated a small-scale tsunami along the coast of Central Peru. No tide
recordings were available to the team. The tsunami waves reached the immediate coastal area
within 10 to 20 minutes after the earthquake and caused maximum run-up height of about 10
meters.10 Many of the coastal villages were evacuated based on a tsunami warning issued by the
local authorities. The team did not visit the areas that were significantly impacted by the tsunami
(Paracas). In the town of Pisco, local engineers reported that the tsunami extended about 150
meters inland with a run-up depth of about 1 meter. Based on discussions with Peruvian
engineers, damage caused to lifelines primarily consisted of erosion damage and deposition of
debris on coastal roads (Fig. 2.22).
Fig. 2.22. Boats and debris deposited by tsunami on local streets in Pisco
(Courtesy of J. Alva, Ph.D.)
19
Acknowledgments
We acknowledge several individuals who provided us with important information for this
chapter. Ing. Jorge Alva Hurtado, Ph.D., provided photographs and earthquake information in a
presentation made at the Colegio de Ingenieros del Peru. Professor Julio Kuroiwa provided
information related to hazard mitigation in Peru along with photographs of the earthquake
damage. The Universidad Catolica del Peru provided seismograph measurements to evaluate the
ground motions. Jorgen Johansson and Paola Mayorca of the University of Tokyo, Japan,
performed an earthquake damage reconnaissance prior to arrival of the ASCE/TCLEE team and
willingly shared the information they collected with the team. Other people who provided their
insights and photographs of the earthquake include Ing. Gladys Villa Garcia, Ing. Juan Pedro
Andia Moron, Jack Lopez-Jara Jr., and Manuel Olcese Franzero.
References
1
USGS: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/Quakes/us2007gbcv.php
2
GEER: http://gees.usc.edu/GEER/Peru_2007/Peru_2007_WebPage/index.htm
3
USGS: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/eqinthenews/2007/us2007gbcv/#summary
4
Degg and Chester, 2004
5
Ji and Zeng, 2007:
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/eqinthenews/2007/us2007gbcv/finite_fault.php
6
IGP: Tavera, Bernal and Salas, 2007
7
Peru, Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation, NTE E.30, 2003
8
UNOSAT: http://unosat.web.cern.ch/unosat/asp/prod_free.asp?id=87
9
Keefer and Moseley, 2004: www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/101/30/10878
10
Dr. George Pararas: www.drgeorgepc.com/Earthquake2007Peru.html
20
Chapter 3: Performance of Bridges and Highways
Overview of Damage
Although the August 15, 2007, Pisco, Peru Mw 8.0 earthquake was also felt in the capital of Lima,
there was only slight damage reported there. The Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) was V in
Lima, and there was slight damage to some buildings. There were reports of liquefaction that
resulted in some utility poles tipping. In addition, some rock fell onto roadways, but severe road
and bridge damage was not reported (Figs. 3.1 and 3.2). According to the Ministry of
Transportation and Communications (MTC) Emergency Road Report, ground settlement and
landslides occurred north and north east of Lima, and traffic was restricted but was not
interrupted (MTC 2007). Similar damage was also reported on the Central Highway between 56
km and 57 km, in the zone called San Jeronimo Surco.
The earthquake produced ground motion that caused liquefaction and a lot of shaking damage in
Pisco, Chincha, Huaytara, Canete, Castrovirreyna, Ica, and Yauyos (INDECI, MTC) where the
Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) was VIII. In these areas, houses sustained damage ranging
from small cracks to total collapse. The earthquake was also felt in Chiclayo and Arequipa with a
MMI=II, and, 1,100 km away in the Andes highlands city of Cusco. Time history graphs of the
earthquake show two distinct phases of strong ground motion. The earthquake lasted more than
170 seconds, which is an unusually long duration.
Fig. 3.1. View of a Lima highway that borders Fig. 3.2. Pedestrian bridge in Lima. No
the ocean, and the rock formation at Costa damage was reported.
Verde. Minor rock falls were reported in this
area.
The team mobilized to the Ica Region, the hardest hit area by the earthquake, where lifeline
damage was identified.
Most of the damage to the highway system was due to liquefaction, liquefaction induced lateral
spread, slope instability, settlement, and rockslide.
The ASCE/TCLEE investigation team assigned to inspect bridges and highways covered the Ica
region of Peru. For the three-day investigation, the regional director of transportation and
communications assigned an engineer full time to accompany the team and direct the team to
earthquake affected sites. Routes surveyed include the Pan-American Highway portion south of
21
Lima, regional highways and secondary (vicinal) roads of the Ica Region, most specifically the
National Route 24, Departmental Route 100, Departmental Route 110, and local streets within the
city of Ica and Tambo de Mora.
Description of the Highway System

Peru has about 79,000 km of roadway and more than 1,086 bridges; however, less than 11,000
km of roadway are paved. The MTC estimates that only a quarter of the road system is in good
shape, a percentage they would like to increase to 45 percent (ENR.construction.com).
The Peruvian highway system (network) consists of three categories of roadways:

• National highways,
• Departmental or regional roads, and
• Vicinal or rural roads.
The Pan-American Highway south of Lima, referred to as the “Panamericana Sur” in Peru, is the
backbone of national and international ground freight and passenger transportation (Ica Plan Vial
Departamental Participativo). This primary highway intersects the east-west roads that connect
the Andean territories to the east with the coastal plains in Pisco and Nasca. The Pan-American
Highway is the most important highway because the regional economy depends on it. The other
roads connect small towns and agricultural areas and feed into it. In recent years the MTC, which
is the administrative branch of government with responsibility for the highway system, has de-
centralized the administration of highways.
Approximately 10 percent of the national road network is run by concession; the MTC has a 30-
year concession with a contractor who collects tolls in exchange for inspection, construction, and
maintenance of the Pan-American Highway from Pucusana Bridge in Lima to 291 km marker
known as the Cerro Azul–Ica–Guadalupe concession. In the case of an earthquake, the contractor
has a contractual obligation to repair and/or replace the damaged infrastructure to restore service.
The regional director of transportation and communications—in this case Ica—has the
responsibility of inspecting and maintaining the regional roads. Lack of resources makes this
endeavor extremely challenging. These roads are often unpaved and rock fall can occur at any
time due to the many aftershocks. Evidence of rock fall can be seen in Figure 3.3.
22
Fig. 3.3. Fallen boulders on roadway of Ica Region Highway 100
Ica has two major ports on the Pacific Ocean (Ica Plan Vial Departamental Participativo), Port
General San Martin in Punta Pejerrey in the Paracas province and the San Juan de Marcona Port
in the Nazca province. Because of the economic importance of these ports, it is crucial to have a
reliable highway system.
Rural roads in Ica are often two-way roads with only one lane, with a high volume of large truck
traffic. Figure 3.4 shows that a car has to pull over to allow an opposing vehicle to pass.
Fig. 3.4. View of Departmental Highway 100, showing a car pulling over to allow
an oncoming car to pass
23
The four most important rivers in the Ica Region are the Chincha River (called San Juan at the
river source), the Pisco River, the Ica River, and the Rio Grande River.
Bridge classification according to the regional direction of transportation and communications—

ICA Region, is based on the span length:
• Bridges (Puentes)—spans greater than 10 meters (about 700 meters of bridges);
• Culverts (Pontones)—spans less than 10 meters but more that 1 meter (about 60 meters of
culverts); and
• Pipes (Alcantarillados)—less than 1 meter in diameter.
Bridges Seismic Design Criteria

Seismic design of buildings has been studied and applied extensively in Peru (Kuroiwa 2004).
Although most bridges are designed based on the AASHTO Specifications, not much guidance
was provided on seismic design or seismic performance at the time when the bridges were
constructed, such as Huamani Bridge.
It was observed that bridges typically have good seismic details, such as large seats, and
transverse restraints such as concrete shear keys.
The seismic hazard map that was used before the 2001 Atico, Peru Earthquake (ASCE 2002) is
still current (Fig. 3.5). The acceleration values are based on the probability of 10 percent of
exceedance in 50 years. This seismic zonation map was approved by the Peruvian Government in
1997 (Seismic Code NTE-030-97), and reproduced without any modification in the 2003 updated
Seismic Code (ASCE 2002).
24
Fig. 3.5. Seismic Hazard Zones in Peru’s Design Code. Zone 3 PGA = 0.4g; Zone 2 PGA = 0.3g;
Zone 1 PGA = 0.15g ( Image courtesy of Julio Kuroiwa, Ph.D., Prof. Emeritus, National
University, Peru.)
25
Fig. 3.6. Infrastructure Roadway map of the Ica Region.
Source: Direccion Regional de Transporte y Comunicaciones—Ica
Figure 3.6 shows the infrastructure road map of the Ica Region.
26
Summary of Highway Damage
The following table is a summary of damage to transportation infrastructure found by the
ASCE/TCLEE investigation team.
Table 3-1 Summary of damage to transportation infrastructure.*

Site # /Name Highway Coordinates km Damage Comment
Pan-American S13°19’44” Evidence of cracking in cut
1 182 Lateral spread
Highway W76°14’00” slope parallel to roadway
Pan-American Distortion and cracking of
2 185 Liquefaction, repaired
Highway pavement
Pan-American S13°23’42” Lateral spread / lateral
3 188 Liquefaction
Highway W76°11’52” displacement of roadway
Embankment failure & shear
4 Pan-American S13°24’48”
190 failure of 3-cell concrete box Liquefaction/Lateral spread
Highway W76°11’20”
culvert
Shear cracking in piers; 4”
5 Huamani Bridge is not in service.
Pan-American S13°41’13” lateral movement of
Bridge 224 Under repair. Detour is
Highway W76°09’31” superstructure; tipped
forded.
abutment; wingwall failure
S13°24’13” 3-span timber bridge is
6 Aylloque Route 100 Minor cracking of abutment
W75°57’03” subjected to overloads
Route 100 / Rio S13°23’57” 2-span timber bridge is
7 none
San Juan W75°56’24” subjected to overloads
Steel 1- lane truss bridge;
evidence of previous impact
Severe damage to lower chord
8 Huachinga Route 100 / Rio S13°22’08” damage to bottom chord
39 from boulder impact; cracked
Bridge San Juan W75°50’60” probably from El Niño
welds at gusset plates
debris flow (huayco), severe
erosion at abutment
Pan American
S14°05’25”
9 Ica Bridge Highway /Rio none 3-span CIP; 86’
W75°43’11”
Ica
10 Bridge in
Ave. Cuterbo Data missing none 2-span CIP; 100’
Ica city
11 Grau
Bridge in Ica none 1-span concrete; 80’
city
12 Socorro S14°03’20”
Rio Ica none 3-span CIP; 110’
Bridge W75°43’36”
S13°58’48”
13 Route 110 / canal 110 none 1-span CIP; 40’
W75°41’53”
S13°57’40”
14 Route 110 / canal none 1-span CIP; 33’
W75°41’39”
15 14 Failed retaining wall
Route 110
Highway Ica-Los 3 significant shear cracks in 80.3 m long, 5-span, 1-lane,
16 Los
Molinos / Rio Ica S13°55’29” P/S beams at supports lateral 2-girder P/S;
Molinos
Canal La W75°40’43” displacement, tipped pier from According to ‘Plan Vial’ it
Bridge
Achirana previous scour needs urgent maintenance
Route 24 / Via Deep P/S beam; erosion at

S13°38’27”
17 Los Libertadores 54 none wing-walls; velocity >4 fps;
W75°43’06”
Rio Pisco Posted for 60T max; 120’
300’ Suspension pedestrian
S13°41’42”
18 none bridge built in 2001. Not on
W75°48’38”
highway system.
19 Toro
24 / canal none 2-lane concrete bridge 60’
Bridge
Road to Pisco S13°42’47” Liquefaction resulted in faulted
20 Broken water main
from Pan W76°09’18” pavement & N-S cracking
27
Site # /Name Highway Coordinates km Damage Comment
American
Highway at 233
km
Pan American S13°42’47” Damage to pavement due to
21 218 Pavement has been repaired
Highway W76°09’18” liquefaction; tipped poles
22 Cruz Verde Minor(1 inch) wing-wall
Tambo de Mora Newer bridge (2004)
Bridge displacement
Road to the Road repaired; escarpment,
S13°25’54” Vertical shift as great as 10’
23 beach at sand boils, cracking are
W76°10’56” due to liquefaction
Sunampe evident in the vicinity
A blank cell indicates that the data is not readily available.

fps—units of water velocity in feet/second
P/S—prestressed
T—metric tons
*Table Courtesy of Jerry O’Connor, F ASCE.
Pan-American Highway South

This is the primary highway that goes through the Ica Region. This section is 527.3 km in length,
which represents the 22.27% of the Region’s roadway, and it is totally paved.
The Pan-American South highway suffered severe damage, as shown in the above table. It is
parallel to the coastline, and typically is a two-lane asphalt road. The road is a cut and fill road.
On the east side is the coastal mountainous chain that is formed by metamorphic rocks and runs
along the provinces of Ica, Pisco, and Nasca. The terrain is very dry with large sand dunes and
sparse vegetation. The Pacific Ocean is as close as 100 meters to the west. On the east it is
bounded by large sand dunes and conglomerate rock formations (Ica Plan Vial Departamental
Participativo).
MTC reported no damage from Lima to 177 km marker. From the 177 km marker to about the
178 km marker, surface cracks on the roadway were very evident.
Two of the most affected locations were the Jahuay and the San Clemente sections of the
highway.
Fig. 3.7. Billboard warning motorists about Fig. 3.8. Pan American Highway damage
the “Danger” due to cracks and uneven repair (Courtesy of Jorge Alva, Ph.D., Univ.
pavement Nacional de Ingenieria, Peru)
28
At 179 km marker a landslide occurred. At 190 km to 191 km marker half of the road platform
was lost (~ 200 m of road), between Lima and Pisco. At 188 km marker, a three-cell culvert
(ponton) suffered also severe damage; at the time of the team inspection was already shored
(Figs. 3.7 to 3.10).
Fig. 3.9. Damage to a three-cell culvert, Fig. 3.10. Temporary strengthening of cells at
188 km box culvert by shoring
At 213 km settlement of roadway platform was identified. 20 meters of roadway platform was
lost (Fig. 3.12).
Between 217 km and 218 km markers, cracks on the highway were found. At 222 km marker
settlement was evident with uneven pavement (Fig. 3.11). Most of the damage to the highway
was repaired by the time the team did the inspection, debris, and liquefaction sand boils were
found around the repaired sites.
Fig. 3.11. Cracks and settlement on roadway Fig. 3.12. Roadway platform lost due to
(Courtesy of Ing. Jack Lopez, Peru) landslide. 213 km (Courtesy of Ing.
Jack Lopez, Peru)
At 224 km the Huamani Bridge sustained severe damage. The bridge was closed for repair (Figs.
3.13 and 3.14).
29
Fig. 3.13. Huamani bridge aerial photograph Fig. 3.14. Huamani bridge south abutment and
(Courtesy of Jorge Alva, Ph.D.) approach. (Courtesy of Jorge Alva, Ph.D.)
Built in 1950, the 136 m. (450 ft) long Huamani Bridge is the most important bridge in the Pan-
American South. It consists of three 30 m. (97.2 ft) interior spans and two-23 m. (74.5 ft) end
spans. It was designed for H-15 truckloads. It consists of a reinforced concrete superstructure
supported at both ends by steel roller bearings, and four in-span joints with 0.5 m. (1.6 ft) support.
The abutment bearings consist of a 250 mm diameter roller pin while the interior piers have four
250 mm diameter roller pins each. The in-span joint bearings consist of 85 mm high pot bearings.
Fig. 3.15. The Huamani Bridge over the Pisco River, on the Pan-American Highway,
South, 224 km (Courtesy of Ing. Jack Lopez, Peru)
30
The substructure consists of four interior pier walls supported on 8 m deep caissons, with a cross
section of 3 m x 9.25 m and seat type abutments (Ingenieros). The longitudinal support length
(width of wall) at interior piers is 1.1 m. The concrete mix (aggregate type and proportions) was
done using materials that were prevalent in the area.
Critical water level was considered in the design. The bridge location is close to the Pisco River
mouth, which during the rainy season carries a great volume of water, which could cause severe
scour, too.
Although the bridge did not collapse, it was considered unsafe due to the tilting of the south
abutment, apparent failure of one wing-wall, 100 mm of lateral movement of the superstructure,
and severe shear cracks in one or more of the piers.
The superstructure’s lateral restraining shear blocks did their job even though there was a
minimal amount of vertical reinforcing extended from the pier walls to the shear keys. No loss of
support was detected. This is considered in today’s standard practice in the United States as
acceptable performance, since the bridge ‘suffered severe damage and no-collapse (Figs. 3.15,
3.16 and 3.17).
Fig. 3.16. Damage to interior pier wall (pilar) of

Huamani Bridge (Courtesy of Ing. Jack Lopez,
Peru)
Fig. 3.17. Although apparently under-

reinforced, shear blocks still prevented
excessive lateral movement of Huamani
Bridge superstructure (Courtesy of Ing. Jack
Lopez, Peru)
Figure 3.18 shows a drawing of the bearing at the abutment. The bearing is a movable steel
rolling pin. Figure 3.19 illustrates the south abutment under repair. It is important to mention that
31
the bridge is scheduled to be replaced in the near future, and for that reason, its repair will keep
the original design.
Fig. 3.18. Steel rolling bearing at bridge Fig. 3.19. Steel rolling bearing at bridge
abutment drawing (Bridge construction plans, abutment
courtesy of Ing. Jack Lopez, Peru.)
Liquefaction also occurred at the bridge site (Fig. 3.20). At the time of the team’s visit, the
liquefaction sand boils were no longer there due to the repair activities.
Fig. 3.20. Liquefaction sand boils at the base of the pier wall at the Huamani River Bridge
(Courtesy of Ing. Jack Lopez, Peru)
32
Departmental Highway No. 100 Chincha-Huancos
There are 342.44 km of secondary roads in the departmental road network, from which only
87.72 km are paved (asphalted), 143.97 km are unpaved but compacted, 84.74 km without
compaction and 27 km of paths that could allow some traffic. Figures 3.21 and 3.22 illustrate the
condition of the roadway.
Fig. 3.21. Highway 100 Departmental Huancavelica
The Highway 100, also called the Departmental Huancavelica, has a length of 67 km. This
highway also connects with two vicinal roads and serves as the economic path to transport good
to the markets from the Mountain region to Pisco, Ica, Chincha, and Lima.
33
Fig. 3.22. Highway 100 with boulders on roadway
On one of the mountainous roads, two timber (log) bridges were inspected, one with a single span
and other two-span. They were both supported on concrete/mud/rock abutments, as shown in
Figures 3.23, 3.24, and 3.25.
Fig. 3.23. Single-span timber bridge
While the timber bridges were being inspected, local resident approached the team and reported
that two aftershocks had just occurred that day, and they were also reported on the radio.
34
Fig. 3.24. Two-span timber bridge
Cracks were found in the logs (which are the primary structural members) and the abutment
walls, at both locations (Fig. 3.25). Although the cracks in the abutment may have resulted from
lateral movement of the superstructure, the cracking of the logs was most likely from overloading
by heavy trucks that use the route.
Fig. 3.25. Cracks on timber bridge abutment and on the timber beam
The Huachinga Bridge over the San Juan River is located at 39 km marker. The bridge is a one-
lane truss bridge built in 1966, Figure 3.26.
35
Fig. 3.26. View of the Huachinga Bridge over the San Juan River
The bridge has been subjected to continuous hits from rocks falling from the mountain, as can be
seen, and it has been severely damaged on some of the lower chords. Cracked welds were found
at gusset plates, and severe corrosion was observed (Fig. 3.27).
Fig. 3.27. A fallen boulder is jammed into the lower chord, distorting the steel channels.
The view is looking down over the bridge railing.
36
Along the highway towards Pisco, a collapsed gabion retaining wall supporting the highway was
observed, Figure 3.28.
Fig. 3.28. Collapse of gabion retaining wall
Departmental Highway Route 110 Los Molinos-Tambillo

A 75-km length of Highway Route 110 connects the districts of Parcona, Tinguina, Los Molinos,
and Ayavi. This roadway allows the transport of goods such as agricultural products, cattle, and
mining products. Several small towns rely on this highway, and to re-establish traffic, the debris
was moved to the sides as it was observed by the team, Figure 3.29.
Fig. 3.29. City of Los Molinos
37
In addition to transporting agricultural goods, the Los Molinos bridge crossing the Ica River (Fig.
3.30) also served to transport earthquake rubble and debris to a land fill site on the other side of
the river.
Fig. 3.30. Los Molinos Bridge over the Ica River
The 1932 Los Molinos Bridge is an 80 m (260 ft) long, 5 spans, one lane, and two- concrete
girder bridge. There were signs of liquefaction on the dry riverbed, and very severe signs of scour
on one of the interior piers. The foundation is exposed for more than 2 m (6 ft), as seen in Figure
3.31 to 3.33. Lateral movement was also observed at expansion joint location.
Fig. 3.31. Measuring more than 6 feet of scour at interior pier of Los Molinos Bridge
38
The bridge does not have a redundant superstructure. It has only two concrete girders, showing
shear cracks, at the interior pier where the scour is evident. The damage to this bridge could be
the combination of these two extreme events.
Fig. 3.32. Sand boil at Los Molinos Bridge
Truck traffic was heavy at the time of our investigation due to the rubble cleanup. As no more
than one truck was allowed to use the bridge, trucks have to wait until one crosses.
Fig. 3.33. Shear Crack on girder
La Achirana Canal is used to re-direct the water during the rainy season. That serves two
purposes, to control the amount of water that flows down stream and to collect water for
irrigation, Figures 3.34 and 3.35. The original canal was built hundreds of years ago by the Incas.
39
Fig. 3.34. La Achirana Canal wall damage Fig. 3.35. View of diversion canal at the Los
downstream from Los Molinos Bridge Molinos Bridge
Several single span bridges and culverts cross the La Achirana Canal, such as the Santa Rosa
Bridge, and the Ponton La Isla. Minimum earthquake damage was observed.
Departmental Highway Route 24—Los Libertadores

The Route 24 is another very important transversal highway that integrates the city of Pisco with
Castrovirreina, Ayacucho, extending towards San Francisco for a future connection with the
Rainforest Highway (Carretera Marginal de la Selva).
The La Quinga Bridge is a newer, 38-meter (123.12-foot) long, single-span concrete bridge,
located at the 54 km on the Los Libertadores Route 24. Its maximum allowed load is 60 tons.
Damage was observed at the abutments, where backfill was lost. Note that a rectangular canal
(creek) goes through the west side abutment, and the velocity of the water seemed high. Lots of
abutment backfill was observed at both sides of this abutment as shown in Figure 3.36 (a). Figure
3.36 (b) shows a steep highly fissured rock mass rising behind the abutment. Future potential rock
fall damage to the bridge is high.
Two other bridge locations were checked in this route, and no damage was observed.
40
Fig. 3.36(a). Canal goes through abutment at La Quinga Fig. 3.36(b). Steep highly
Bridge fissured rock mass above
abutment. Future risk for rock
falls (Courtesy Prof
Johansson)
Other Bridges
Bridges Inspected in the City of Ica

The team inspected several bridges in the city of Ica. No major damage was observed other than
damage to the abutment walls and minor lateral movement. See Figures 3.37 and 3.38.
Fig. 3.37. Ica Bridge interior pier walls Fig. 3.38. Cracks at Grau Bridge approach
It was observed that the river is channeled and mostly dry. Different types of retaining walls,
cantilever to gabion walls, were constructed on the borders. The ‘El Nino’ phenomenon causes
tremendous flood (huayco) and damage that the Ica City residents are quite aware of the hazard.
41
Tambo de Mora and Sunampe
In Tambo de Mora, a newer bridge built in 2004, the Cruz Verde Bridge, was inspected. Only
minor damage to wing walls was found.
Geologists Patricio Valderrama from Peru and Carlos Costa from Argentina were studying
evidence of previous liquefaction fixtures on a trench opened to repair a damaged water pipe on
the roadside. Evidence of liquefaction was found on both sides of the road (Figs. 3.39 and 3.40).
Fig. 3.39. Damage on road due to liquefaction
The road to the beach at Sunampe was being repaired; sand boils on the sides of the road, cracks
longitudinal to the roadway, and cracks on the asphalt on the shoulders were still evident.
42
Fig. 3.40. Geologists from Peru and Argentina investigating paleo-liquefaction evidence
Emergency Response
A few hours after the earthquake, MTC reported that the traffic on the Central Highway was
restored after registering damage in the zone called San Jeronimo de Surco.
MTC reported that more than 9,000 personnel were mobilized to clear roads, including
departmental and secondary roads. This work was independent of the one done by the
concessionaries.
MTC also made a request to ask inter-provincial transportation not to over-charge and take
advantage of the situation. The concessionaire in solidarity waived the traffic toll on Pan-
American Highway South.
MTC reported that from Lima to 177 km, no damage was detected; from 177 km to 178 km,
cracks on the Pan-American Highway were found; and at 179 km a landslide occurred. At the 190
km to 191 km half, one lane of the highway platform was lost at around 210 meters. No
information about the rural areas was available. The roadways allowed access only up to Chincha,
making it difficult to get to Ica. It was reported that two bridges collapsed in Paracas, and cracks
were detected in the Pan-American Highway from 181 km through 184 km.
The Huamani Bridge was reported damaged, and traffic was allowed only in one lane while a
detour was made available. To improve traffic flow, trailers were temporarily prohibited. Only
smaller trucks and cars were allowed to use the bridge.
On August 17, MTC released a report (Informe No. 8) informing the population about the
emergency road situation on departmental and rural roads and the measures taken. Most of the
reported damage was due to landslides and failure of road embankments. According to the
October 27, 2007 Ica newspaper, the major problem during the emergency response was the
43
interruption of traffic due to the landslides. Immediately after the earthquake, the local
government hired a private contractor who helped open the roads.
At the same time of our inspection, the Pan-American Highway was open to traffic, except for the
Huamani Bridge. This bridge was still under repair, and traffic was being detoured over the
riverbed. As both the water level and amount of water flow was low, pipes could be used to
channel the water.
Major Observations and Recommendations

According to expert geotechnical engineers in Peru, the earthquake was a geotechnical
earthquake.
Most of the observed damage in highways and bridges was due to liquefaction or liquefaction-
induced lateral spread on the coastal region. The damage to the Pan-American Highway South
was repaired in a timely manner; only the Huamani Bridge over the Pisco River was still under
repair at the time of ASCE/TCLEE investigation six weeks after the earthquake.
Shear blocks were used in several bridges. This is a good practice because it provides lateral
restraint to the superstructure.
The practice of using pier walls allowed for wider superstructure support length. Even though, the
inspected bridges were not seismically designed, this practice of providing wide beam support
avoided the unseating of the superstructure and the collapse of the bridges.
A major concern of the regional transportation agency was to prevent rock-fall damage. Agency
personnel were acutely aware of the situation and were asking for recommendations. They also
asked for technology and expertise transfer to support their agency.
There are several rock-fall protection systems available. They are steel fences, draperies, rock
protection embankments, and a system such as the cortical strengthening to avoid rock
detachment (www.africangabions.co.za). Studies should be performed to identify the most
appropriate protection system for the region from a practical and an economical point of view.
Piles or caissons are not often used in the Ica region due to the lack of equipment. Large pier
walls (pilares) are used instead. Piles, mostly pre-stressed concrete piles, and caissons (drilled
shafts) will be a good alternative. They are standard practice in South Carolina where non-
competent soils are identified. This typically occurs along the coastal plains of the state, were
liquefaction is very likely to occur. Information on South Carolina seismic design of bridges and
seismicity studies can be found at
http://www.scdot.org/doing/bridge/bridgeseismic.shtml
The rivers in the Ica Region seem very dry but during the rainy season, they carry a heavy flow
with a lot of debris collected from the Andes, which is referred to as huayco. This debris causes a
critical condition for the scour on bridges that was observed during the time of the investigation.
Given the scoured pier foundations and the high probability of a major earthquake striking the
region again, this becomes an issue that should be addressed.
44
The seismic zonation map (Seismic Code NTE-030-97) reproduced without any modification in
the 2003 updated Seismic Code should be reviewed to capture the likelihood of higher spectral
acceleration as recorded in this earthquake. However, code compliance is the priority.
A computerized bridge database inventory of the Ica Region will be very useful to track the
maintenance operation information and to maintain a good record. A program, perhaps similar to
the National Bridge Inventory in the United States could be used. Including seismic information
on bridge and road damage data in this database is recommended.
Acknowledgment
The authors of this chapter would also like to thank the people of Peru for their hospitality and the
information provided:
• Jack López Acuña, Ing., and Jack López Jara, Ing. from Jack López Ingenieros
S.A.C. for their time, hospitality, and the invaluable amount of coordination and
materials provided.
z Julio Kuroiwa, Ph.D., who informed us about the seismicity of Peru, the efforts
for improving the hazard mitigation, and who gave every member of the team his
autographed book about natural hazards and hazard mitigation.
y Carlos Valdez Velasquez-López and Juan Carlos Paz Cardenas, and others at the
Ministry of Transportation (MTC) for meeting with the team and sharing on their
experience and information related to the earthquake, during the recovery efforts.
Jorge E. Alva Hurtado, Ph.D., Ing., Dean of the School of Engineering at Peru
National University (Universidad Nacional de Ingenieria) for sharing his
information and for his hospitality.
y Professors Manuel A. Olcese Franzero, director of the Soil Mechanics Laboratory,
and Daniel Quiun Wong and Gladys Villa Garcia, Ing., director of the Laboratory
for Seismic-Resistant Structures at Catholic University of Peru (Pontificia
Universidad Católica del Peru—PUCP) for their time and valuable information.
• Paola Mayorca, Ph.D., and Jorgen Johansson, Ph.D. from the University of Tokyo
for their comments and review of this chapter.
• Juan Pedro Andía Morón, Ing., regional director of transportation and

communication for the Ica regional government, who assigned Niser Macedonio
Quispe Arias, Ing., Ica Region, to accompany the team for several days as we
traveled the region and inspected bridges and highways. Niser’s knowledge and
expertise of the region was much needed.
• Our driver, Milton Córdova Cóndor, from Condorco SRL for his indefatigable
service, providing safe and efficient transportation to our team during the field
investigation.
Unless otherwise specified in the figure captions, all photographs were taken by ASCE/TCLEE
investigation team members.
45
Fig. 3.1. View of a Lima highway that borders the ocean, and the rock formation at Costa Verde.
Minor rock falls were reported in this area.
Fig. 3.2. Pedestrian bridge in Lima. No damage was reported.
Fig. 3.3. Fallen boulders on roadway of Ica Region Highway 100
Fig. 3.4. View of Departmental Highway 100, showing a car pulling over to allow an oncoming
car to pass
Fig. 3.5. Seismic Hazard Zones in Peru’s Design Code. Zone 3 PGA = 0.4g; Zone 2 PGA = 0.3g;
Zone 1 PGA = 0.15g ( Image courtesy of Julio Kuroiwa, Ph.D., Prof. Emeritus, National
University, Peru.)
Fig. 3.6. Infrastructure Roadway map of the Ica Region. Source: Direccion Regional de
Transporte y Comunicaciones—Ica
Fig. 3.7. Billboard warning motorists about the “Danger” due to cracks and uneven pavement
Fig. 3.8. Pan American Highway damage repair (Courtesy of Jorge Alva, Ph.D., Univ. Nacional
de Ingenieria, Peru)
Fig. 3.9. Damage to a three-cell culvert, 188 km
Fig. 3.10. Temporary strengthening of cells at box culvert by shoring
Fig. 3.11. Cracks and settlement on roadway (Courtesy of Ing. Jack Lopez, Peru)
Fig. 3.12. Roadway platform lost due to landslide. 213 km (Courtesy of Ing. Jack Lopez, Peru)
Fig. 3.13. Huamani bridge aerial photograph (Courtesy of Jorge Alva, Ph.D.)
Fig. 3.14. Huamani bridge south abutment and approach. (Courtesy of Jorge Alva, Ph.D.)
Fig. 3.15. The Huamani Bridge over the Pisco River, on the Pan-American Highway, South, 224
km (Courtesy of Ing. Jack Lopez, Peru)
Fig. 3.16. Damage to interior pier wall (pilar) of Huamani Bridge (Courtesy of Ing. Jack Lopez,
Peru)
Fig. 3.17. Although apparently under-reinforced, shear blocks still prevented excessive lateral
movement of Huamani Bridge superstructure (Courtesy of Ing. Jack Lopez, Peru)
Fig. 3.18. Steel rolling bearing at bridge abutment drawing (Bridge construction plans, courtesy
of Ing. Jack Lopez, Peru.)
Fig. 3.19. Steel rolling bearing at bridge abutment
Fig. 3.20. Liquefaction sand boils at the base of the pier wall at the Huamani River Bridge
(Courtesy of Ing. Jack Lopez, Peru)
Fig. 3.21. Highway 100 Departmental Huancavelica
Fig. 3.22. Highway 100 with boulders on roadway
Fig. 3.23. Single-span timber bridge
Fig. 3.24. Two-span timber bridge
Fig. 3.25. Cracks on timber bridge abutment and on the timber beam
Fig. 3.26. View of the Huachinga Bridge over the San Juan River
Fig. 3.27. A fallen boulder is jammed into the lower chord, distorting the steel channels. The
view is looking down over the bridge railing.
Fig. 3.28. Collapse of gabion retaining wall
Fig. 3.29. City of Los Molinos
Fig. 3.34. La Achirana Canal wall damage downstream from Los Molinos Bridge
Fig. 3.35. View of diversion canal at the Los Molinos Bridge
Fig. 3.36(a). Canal goes through abutment at La Quinga Bridge
Fig. 3.36(b). Steep highly fissured rock mass above abutment. Future risk for rock falls (Courtesy
Prof Johansson)
Fig. 3.37. Ica Bridge interior pier walls
Fig. 3.38. Cracks at Grau Bridge approach
46
Chapter 4: Electric Power
Executive Summary
The demand for electric power has been steadily increasing in Peru since the early 1990s. The
privatization program for electric power supply, which was instituted then, seems to have been
effective in handling the demand. Prior to privatization, the electric power companies were state
owned; the biggest companies were Electrolima and Electroperu. Both were broken into three
companies—power generation, transmission and distribution. However, the government is still
the biggest owner of some of these companies, and the process of privatization is ongoing. The
Ministry of Energy and Mines is responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance with laws
about electricity, and two organizations were created as a result. The Committee for the
Economic Operation of the Interconnected System (COES) is in charge of dispatch of the system
to ensure fairness and lowest of cost. The members of this committee are owners of the
generation plants and the transmission companies. The Organismo Supervisor de la Inversion on
Energy and Mines (OSINERG) oversees the legal, technical, and commercial regulatory
framework governing electricity production.
There are two major grids in the country—the Central Northern Interconnected System (SICN)
and the Southern Interconnected System (SIS). The SICN produces three-fourths of the nation’s
electric power generation. Figure 4.1 shows the difference in size of the two interconnected
system. Hydropower generation is more than 80 percent of the total national power produced. The
remaining power generation p lants are thermal, using liquid fuel, gas, or coal. There is no
nuclear power generation in Peru.
The electric power outages in Pisco, Chincha Alta, and Ica city varied from days to weeks, even
within the same city. One of the cellular service providers was out of power for two weeks. With
battery power that can only sustain up to three hours of power to the equipment, one of the nodes
in the network was down.
In general, electric power is the primary lifeline of all the lifelines. Power is required in water
system to pump water as well as in the telecommunications system to operate the equipment.
The main cause of power supply failure to these cities was the damage to the distribution system.
A large number of utility poles were damaged. Circuit fuses were blown automatically protecting
people from the hazard of fallen wires on the street. Figure 4.2 shows the power supply line to a
hospital was still open during the ASCE/TCLEE investigation period, about six weeks after the
earthquake.
47
SICN
SIS
Fig. 4.1. Electric power transmission grid of Peru (Ministry of Energy and Mines)
Fuses
Electric power
going into the
building
Fig. 4.2. The three fuses on the pole, next to the hospital, were in the open position
48
The ASCE/TCLEE team visited two substations—the Paracas substation and the Pisco
substation. There was no equipment damage in these facilities; however, the walls inside the
equipment showed a few fresh cracks from the earthquake.
System Description
There are three high-voltage transmission lines feeding electric power to the Ica Region. All the
transmission lines terminate at a substation in Independencia, a city northeast of the hardest hit
city, Pisco (Fig. 4.3). The high-voltage transmission line (220 kV) from the electric power
generation plant in San Nicolas in the south feeds the grid in the northern part of Ica Region. This
provides redundant electric power supply to the region from three different directs. One 66 kV
line goes to Pisco and Paracas both in Ica Region, while the other 66 kV line goes to Tambo de
Mora in Ica Region and Canete in Lima Region. Local electric power distribution for the Pisco
and Paracas areas is from the substations in Pisco and Paracas. The voltage from these substations
is 10 kV that feeds into the local grid.
220 kV line
66 kV line
Fig. 4.3. The major transmission lines in the earthquake affected area (Ministry of Energy and
Mines, Peru)
The one electric power generation plant in the Ica Region is located in San Nicolas in the south.
The thermal electric power generation plant has a capacity of 105 MW (Mega Watt) and produces
173 GWh (Giga Watt hour) annually.
49
In 2007 nationwide there are 23 thermal power generation plants and 21 hydropower generation
plants. The transmission voltages are 220 kV, 138 kV, 66 kV and 33 kV. The grid within the
earthquake-affected area is low tension, carrying 10 kV.
Overview of System Performance

The distribution system in the earthquake-affected areas—Chincha Alta, Pisco, and Ica—
performed poorly as the result of the damage and collapse of a large number of buildings. Many
poles in the distribution system failed (Fig.4.4).
Fig. 4.4. Damage to the electric power distribution system, note the cables hanging on each other
and the fallen poles (Courtesy of MTC)
Due to damaged roads and debris from the collapsed building, the recovery took much longer
than anticipated.
There was no damage to the substations visited. In the earthquake-affected areas, there is no
electric power generation plant, and the high-voltage transmission lines are to the east of
earthquake-affected area (Fig. 4.5).
50
Fig. 4.5. The 220 kV transmission lines are located to the east of the earthquake area
(Chanchamayo vicinity), and there was no damage.
Observed Damage
The damage to the electric power supply system was unique in this earthquake in that the
distribution system was the only failure observed.
The majority of the poles in the distribution system are reinforced concrete. From the damaged
poles, the reinforcement wires were properly formed and spaced (Fig. 4.6). A few poles were
broken at the top portion (Fig. 4.7).
The low voltage substations are housed inside a building with a high fence/wall providing the
necessary security. A section of the fence at the Pisco substation was damaged (Fig. 4.8). The
ASCE/TCLEE did not have access into the building to determine whether there was any
equipment damage or not. There were no ceramic bone piles observed from the grounds outside
the building within the fence. That led the team to believe that there was no damage to the
equipment inside. At this location there is only one transformer, which was in a compartment
with a locked door (Fig. 4.9). The next compartment was empty, and no doors were installed (Fig.
4.9).
The substation at Paracas had slight cracks inside the plaster walls (Figs. 4.10 to 4.12); however,
the external boundary wall was not damaged. The equipment in the control room did not show
any signs of movement or damage (Fig. 4.13). The ceramic isolators for the busses and the
disconnect switches were not damaged (Fig. 4.14 and 4.15). There were two transformers in this
location; Figure 4.16 shows the two compartments at the rear of the substation building. Each
transformer is separately installed in a walled compartment with open top (Fig. 4.17). The
transforms showed no sign of damage. Both were secured with a welded metal wedge (Figs. 4.18
and 4.19); however, there were no side-to-side restraints except the flanges of the casters. The
space inside the compartment is very tight.
51
The high-voltage (66 kV) cable connections showed no damage. The exiting 10 kV cables are
underground cables from the substation building to the poles outside (Figs. 4.20 and 4.21). One of
the poles was bent; most likely this was the result of the earthquake (Fig. 4.22).
Many poles were damaged in the earthquake; most were tipped over or had fallen. Critical
circuits were repaired quickly to feed power to the communities around the earthquake-affected
areas. Figures 4.23 to 4.29 show the various modes of damage to the poles in the distribution
system in Chincha, Pisco, and Ica.
Fig. 4.6. The reinforcement bar arrangement seems to be well designed and formed. The broken
poles shown are on the side of the substation in Paracas.
52
Fig. 4.7. Broken pole at the top portion; 10 kV distribution system
Pisco 66 kV to 10 kV
substation
Damaged fence
Fig. 4.8. Pisco substation
53
Fig. 4.9. Pisco substation with only one transformer; the other
compartment was empty.
Fig. 4.10. Paracas substation, no sign of damage on the outside
54
Fig. 4.11. Fresh crack along the equipment Fig. 4.12. Fresh crack from the corner of the
room wall window in the equipment room
Fig. 4.13. The control equipment of this substation was well secured;
there were no signs of damage
55
Fig. 4.14. The overhead ceramic buss supports Fig. 4.15. Ceramics supporting the busses and
connecting the sets of circuits were secured on the disconnect switches on the second floor of
the ceiling the two-storey building
Transformers
inside these two
compartments
Fig. 4.16. The rooms (compartments) at the rear Fig. 4.17. The transformer inside the
of the substation building compartment
Fig. 4.18 Welded metal wedge to the metal track Fig. 4.19. A different type welded metal wedge to
secured the transformer; side-to-side restraint secure the transformer, side-to-side restraint
depends on the flanges of the casters depends on the casters’ flanges
56
10 kV exiting to
the distribution
system
Fig. 4.20. Underground 10 kV cables exiting the substation and rise up the poles into the
distribution system
66 kV lines
10 kV cables rising from

the ground up the poles
to the distribution system
Fig. 4.21. The second set of 33 kV cables exiting the substation going south and east
57
Fig. 4.22. A bent pole just outside the Paracas substation
Fig. 4.23. Tilted 10 kV pole along a paved road Fig. 4.24. Damaged power cables within the
city
Fig. 4.25. Damaged poles in Chincha (Courtesy Fig. 4.26. Damaged power poles in Ica
Prof. J. Kuroiwa) (Courtesy Prof. .J Kuroiwa)
58
Fig. 4.27. Damaged pole and the pole mounted Fig. 4.28. Tilted pole on the side of the
transformer (Courtesy Prof. J. Kuroiwa) highway, note the cable lying on the ground
(Courtesy Prof. J. Kuroiwa)
Fig. 4.29. The pole in the center was new; the cables were transferred to this new pole due to
damage of the pole on the opposite side of the river. Photo taken from north side of Huanami
Bridge.
59
Emergency Response
The emergency response in Pisco is quite slow, due mainly to the extent of damage in the city.
Some critical facilities, such as the cellular base station, were without electric power for seven
days. Even six weeks after the earthquake, some of the damaged poles were untouched. A bypass
may have been done for some the distribution system, and the damaged poles may be replaced
after full recovery is completed.

The failure of the distribution system in both Pisco and Ica cities caused the widespread outage of
electric power for days and even weeks in some communities within the earthquake-affected area.
From a disaster damage mitigation point of view, this is a good case study to identify ways to
reduce power outages.
Zoning may be one means to reduce outages to a large area. The more expensive means is to use
an underground cabling system to eliminate pole failures caused by building damage or collapse.
This can be done for new housing developments.
One of the sub-stations visited is situated close to the ocean on poor soil. Although there was no
significant damage to the equipment, the potential for high ground shaking and liquefaction
would damage the equipment and cause outage to a few lifeline facilities close by. A backup
should be considered for this sub-station.
Currently, there is only one transmission circuit going into the Ica Region from the north. The
electric power supply for this region basically depends on this single point. A failure at this point
will black out of the region. Redundancy may be a good means of reducing prolonged outage,
particularly when the area is starting to develop.
Acknowledgements
The early investigation reports and photos provided by both Julio Kuroiwa, Professor emeritus at
the National University of Engineering, Peru, and Jorge Alva, Ph.D., proved very valuable for
this report. The authors thank them for their information and insights into the damage and
permission to use their photos. Both are much appreciated.
Jack Lopez-Jara later provided us with the Peruvian electric power generation and consumption
statistics needed for this report.
Unless otherwise specified in the captions under the figures, all photos are taken by the
ASCE/TCLEE team members.
60
Chapter 5: Water
Executive Summary
The earthquake severely affected the water system in Pisco, and to a lesser extent, the water
system in Ica. Small communities near Pisco were also affected; however, the Pisco and Ica water
systems were the focus of this investigation.
The Pisco water system serves Pisco and several surrounding communities. It consists of a large
infiltration gallery, a 30-km transmission pipeline, three reservoirs, and distribution lines of cast
iron pipe (CIP), Poly Vinyl Chloride (PVC), and asbestos cement pipe (ACP) in sizes ranging
from 75 mm to 450 mm. Ground movement caused the 600 mm diameter transmission pipeline of
reinforced concrete pipe (RCP) and ACP to break or separate in approximately eight locations.
The one elevated tank suffered some moderate damage and was not in use. The two ground-level
reservoirs sustained no damage. The distribution piping had more than 100 breaks, with more
being discovered and repaired every day, six weeks after the earthquake. ACP had the most
breaks, followed by PVC, and CIP had the least number of breaks.
Water tank trucks provided the only source of water for many days immediately after the
earthquake event. At the time of the investigation, tank trucks still delivered water to many
sections of the city. The water tank trucks operated on fixed schedules. Residents were notified of
delivery times via printed flyers that were either hand delivered or were posted at obvious
locations through the city. To obtain water, residents carried containers to delivery points where
the containers were filled. The containers were then transported back to residencies by the
owners.
The wastewater collection system in Pisco was also severely damaged, which had a significant
impact on the water delivery there. The sewage collection pipes collapsed in many locations.
Even after water line breaks were repaired and no additional breaks were discovered, the water
was rationed to about one hour per day to prevent high sewage flows, which could result in
sewage spills and raw sewage in the streets.
The Ica water system consists of 14 separate areas fed by wells. Normally, closed valves connect
most of the areas. Ica is further from the epicenter and sustained less damage than Pisco. One
elevated storage tank sustained moderate damage, and was taken out of service. It remained out
of service at the time of the investigation. Several other elevated tanks had minor to moderate
damage. Several wells sustained damage, and the production at several wells was reduced
because of high quantity of sand and fine material in the water.
Description of Pisco Water System

The agency responsible for the water and wastewater systems in Pisco and some surrounding
communities is Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Pisco S.A.
(EMAPISCO). The Pisco water system was first established in 1940. It consisted of a series of
wells in Ocas Alto, located to the east of Pisco, and a distribution system of cast iron pipes. The
system was expanded in 1960 to serve other areas around Pisco. Major improvements were made
in 1997 to the supply, transmission, storage, and distribution components.
61
In 2006, EMAPISCO had 12,575 customers (accounts), which includes San Andrés and Túpac
Amaru. The total number of connections is approximately 17,000. The number of metered
connections is approximately 7,000. The volume of water produced is approximately 10,000,000
cubic meters per year.
Water delivery is not continuous; the average customer in Pisco receives water approximately 13
hours per day under normal conditions. Most houses and businesses have a small water storage
tank on top of the structure to provide a continuous water supply. Since June 2005 water service
in the city of Pisco was curtailed to approximately four hours per day due to the collapse of two
sewer trunk lines, San Juan de Dios and San Isidro. In San Andrés, water service is restricted due
to the limited sewage pumping capacity and small wet well size.
Presently a filtration gallery, called Cabeza de Toro (Bull’s Head), supplies water to Pisco, San
Andrés, Túpac Amaru, San Clemente, and part of Independencia. The filtration gallery consists of
perforated pipes installed at a depth of 8 meters in the riverbed. The filtration gallery can produce
a minimum of 350 liters per second (lps) to a maximum of 650 lps, depending on water
availability in the river. The minimum of 350 lps is more than sufficient to serve Pisco and the
surrounding communities. According to the general manager, Ing. Alberto Santaria Soto, Pisco
uses 250 lps.
The transmission pipeline is 30 km in length, and the majority of the pipe material is RCP. A
portion of the pipeline near Pisco is ACP. The transmission pipeline delivers water to three
reservoirs.
• R1 is an elevated tank with a capacity of 1400 cubic meters (m3);
• R2 is a ground-level reservoir with a capacity of 4500 m3; and
• R3 is a ground-level reservoir in Túpac Amaru with a capacity of 1000 m3 that serves the
communities to the east of Pisco (Túpac Amaru, Casalla, and San Miguel).
The reservoirs are cleaned and disinfected on a yearly basis.
The water is chlorinated as it leaves each reservoir. Data from the first half of 2006 showed that
the average chlorine residual of 918 samples in the distribution system was 0.77 mg/l (1). The goal
is to be above 0.5 mg/l, and it must never be below 0.3 mg/l. One sample was below 0.3 mg/l.
Forty bacteriological analyses were performed on water samples during this time period, and
none were positive for coliform.
The distribution system has three different pipe materials: cast iron, PVC, and asbestos-cement.
The sizes range from 75 mm to 450 mm. There are approximately 150 km of distribution
pipelines. Approximately 40 percent of the pipes are CIP; 30 percent are ACP, and 30 percent are
PVC. The typical depth of bury is 1.0 to 1.2 meters. In 1999 many of the CIP were cleaned and
lined with a cement-mortar lining.
The average water pressure in the system is 6.1 meters of water column (9 psi), which does not
meet the minimum regulatory requirement of 10 meters of water column (14 psi).
There are 72 fire hydrants (Fig. 5.1) in the EMAPISCO distribution systems, mostly in Pisco.
62
Fig. 5.1. Fire hydrant in Pisco
Overview of Pisco Water System Performance

Pisco has a gravity water system that continued to deliver water after the earthquake, although the
quantity was reduced due to breaks in the transmission pipeline. Numerous breaks in the
distribution system prevented water distribution throughout the city, and water had to be
delivered by tank trucks. As pipeline breaks were repaired, the city was split into sectors that had
water delivery for short periods of an hour or less each day. Water delivery was restricted because
many sanitary sewers had collapsed; too much water would result in sewer spills into the streets.
Some sewage overflows were clearly evident during our investigation, Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2. Apparent sewer overflow
63
The infiltration gallery suffered no significant damage.
The 600 mm diameter RCP transmission line suffered 4 joint separations, which resulted in a loss
of 70 percent of the production. The 600 mm diameter ACP transmission line had 5 joint
separations or union breaks. Although it is closer to Pisco and the epicenter, the water loss was
less than that of the RCP line.
The ground level reservoirs suffered no damage; see Figures 5.3 and 5.4.
Fig. 5.3 Pisco reservoir R2 4500 m3 Fig. 5.4 Pisco reservoir R3 1000 m3 in Túpac
Amaru
The elevated tank sustained damage (Fig. 5.5). But it is unknown if the elevated tank will be able
to be used in the future. A detailed structural investigation and analysis will be needed.
Figure 5.5. Pisco elevated reservoir, R1 1500 m3
64
The chlorination system at each of the three reservoirs was damaged. All the chlorine cylinders
fell over and the chlorinators mounted on them were broken and had to be replaced. All the
chlorination systems were functioning at the time of our investigation.
According to the general manager, the CIP sustained the least amount of breaks and held up
better than the PVC and ACP.
At the time of the investigation there were 22 water tank trucks delivering water throughout the
city and some surrounding areas. The trucks came from many different agencies and companies.
EMAPISCO was still requesting additional trucks to help fill all the needs of the community.
Several potable water treatment facilities were donated or loaned to Pisco and are situated
throughout the city to provide water to displaced persons, who live in tents, and residents without
water.
Damage to Pisco Infiltration Gallery and Transmission Pipeline

After the earthquake EMAPISCO funded a reconnaissance investigation of the Infiltration
Gallery and transmission pipeline by CESEL S.A. The investigation took place on September 21,
22, and 23, 2007, and focused on possible earthquake damage by identifying vulnerable areas.
Many vulnerable areas were recognized, but they were not associated with the Pisco Earthquake.
According to the General Manager the infiltration gallery was functioning normally, although 4
manholes with a diameter of 1.5 meters were cracked.
The transmission pipeline had breaks and/or joint separation in approximately 8 locations. At the
time of our investigation, many breaks in the 600 mm RCP were repaired in the middle portion of
the 30-km length. We observed a number of joint separations in the 600 mm ACP immediately
west of the Pan American Highway in an area that had undergone earthquake induced ground
settlement; see Figure 5.6 (Refer to Chapter 2). There appeared to be three to six lengths of ACP
with joint separation. Workman excavated the pipeline and exposed each joint. The plan was to
push the sections together and use a repair coupling between the last two upstream sections of
ACP. Water was still flowing in the pipeline while the excavation took place. The water leaking
out of the pipe joints quickly infiltrated into the sandy soil.
65
Fig. 5.6. Joint separation in 600 mm diameter ACP transmission line
During the repair of the 600 mm diameter transmission pipeline an older infiltration gallery was
put into temporary service to maintain water for the tank trucks.
Damage to Pisco Water Reservoirs

The elevated storage tank (R1) suffered an unknown amount of damage due to the earthquake.
Many of the beams and columns are cracked. It was unclear as to whether this structural damage
was due to ground shaking (inertial effects) or to permanent ground displacement (differential
settlement). The reservoir site had been converted to a water filling station for the numerous
water tank trucks that deliver water throughout Pisco, see Figure 5.7. The water is chlorinated as
it flows into the tank trucks.
66
Figure 5.7. Water tank truck filling water at R1
The elevated tank support structure has numerous cross beams, which add to the strength and
stiffness of both the tank and the supporting structure. Many beams displayed slight to moderate
cracking, as shown in Figures 5.8 and 5.9.
Fig. 5.8. Damaged beams
67
Fig. 5.9. Damaged column and beam
Damage to Pisco Water Distribution

According to the general manager, at the time of our investigation there were still four new
pipeline breaks in the distribution system reported each day. The majority of the pipe breaks
occurred in 100 mm ACP. Permanent repairs were made with standard repair clamps when
available. Many temporary repairs had to be made because of the lack of repair clamps. The
frequency of line breaks was diminishing with time. Immediately following the earthquake, it was
reported that the rate of pipe breaks were about 100 per day, and had been diminishing since. Pipe
breaks were discovered by evidence of water collecting on the ground surface.
It is reported (October 16, 2007, news article) that EMAPISCO had a shortage of repair material
to handle all the pipeline breaks that continue to appear.
It was reported that thieves took several fire hydrants soon after the earthquake. All types of
metal were being purchased by recyclers who came to Pisco during the cleanup effort, which
might be the reason for the disappearance of the fire hydrants.
Description of the Ica Water System

The agency responsible for the water and wastewater systems in Ica is Empresa Municipal de
Agua Potable y Alcantraillado Ica S.A. (EMAPICA). The Ica water system is supplied by 20
wells. The city is divided into 14 sectors that are usually isolated with normally closed valves.
The wells produce from 14 to 60 liters per second (lps). The total production is 645 lps. The total
yearly water production is approximately 20,000,000 m3.
Water service to residents averages 14.5 hours per day. Some sectors have their own storage
reservoir; others do not and are fed directly by the well pumps. The average water pressure in the
Ica system is 9 meters of water column (13 psi). There are approximately 24,500 active service
connections in Ica plus approximately 5,300 connections in other communities. The number of
water meters that are read is approximately 2,000.
68
The water quality does not always meet the national standards. In the first half of 2006 EMPICA
reported that water characteristics in Ica met standards, except the following:
• 8 percent of samples exceeded hardness standard
• 25 percent of samples exceeded sulfate standard
• 30 percent of samples exceeded manganese standard
All the water is chlorinated, either at the well, or at the reservoir discharge. Iron and manganese
are a problem at some wells. The typical soil is layered alluvium of sands and clays.
There are 13 reservoirs with capacities ranging from 20 to 1500 cubic meters. Eight reservoirs are
elevated tanks, and 5 are ground level tanks. The total reservoir storage capacity is 8,450 m3. The
reservoirs are cleaned about once a year.
The distribution pipes range in size from 75 mm to 300 mm diameter. Approximately 50 percent
are PVC, 40 percent are ACP, and 10 percent are CIP.
Overview of Ica Water System Performance

Four wells were reported damaged. It is not possible to insert a water level gauge, which indicates
the well casing is damaged or collapsed.
The production of several wells was reduced because they were pumping too much sand. Some of
these wells normally pump into reservoirs that are cleaned periodically to remove sand and other
material. But now with some of the reservoirs out of service, portions of the distribution system
piping will have an accumulation of sand.
Reservoir damage cut the total reservoir storage capacity to just one-third of the normal. The
Manzanilla tank, with a capacity of 1,500 m3, serves 30 percent of the Ica population and was
heavily damaged as a result of the earthquake. The tank had been drained and was out of service
at the time of the earthquake investigation. EMAPICA decided to fund a detailed structural
analysis of the tank in its damaged condition, prior to making a decision on returning the tank to
normal service. The Central Tank storage capacity, with a 1,200 m3 capacity, was cut back to 30
percent of normal due to cracks and leaks. It was also awaiting a detailed structural analysis.
Low pressure in the distribution system is a problem due to pipe breaks, some reservoirs out of
service, and low well production.
A news report of August 19, four days after the earthquake said:
• Electric power was on and 12 wells were functioning
• 75 percent of the City had water service (although it might not be the normal pressure or
hours of service).
• 25 percent of the city did not have service and had to be supplied by water trucks.
• Ica supplied water to surrounding communities outside of their service area during the
emergency.
Most, if not all, of the chlorine cylinders were not restrained and suffered damage. The
earthquake damaged at least 5 chlorinators and EMAPICA sent out requests for 3 chlorinators of
0-11 kg/day and 2 chlorinators of 0-22 kg/day.
69
Damage to Ica Water Reservoirs
The Central Tank (14.0587° S, 75.73° W) sustained minor to moderate damage. It was still in
partial service at the time of the investigation, being used up to half of the total capacity. Minor
leaks were present. It was suggested that a sealant might be applied to the inside of the concrete
to stop the leaking.
Figure 5.10. Ica Central Reservoir
The Manzanilla Tank (14.07707° S, 75.72108° W) (Fig. 5.11) sustained damage that may
necessitate demolition, see Figures 5.12 and 5.13. A detailed structural investigation and analysis
will be required to make a determination. Unfortunately, design plans are not available and may
have been lost in a flood.
70
Figure 5.11. Manzanilla Reservoir (looking up) circumferential crack extending around tank
near the base/support structure interface was new and due to the earthquake. This crack was
reportedly through the thickness of the tank shell. The crack is barely visible in this photo from
about 12 o’clock to about 2 o’clock.
71
Figure 5.12. Damage around first horizontal joint
Figure 5.13. Close-up of concrete joint damage, this type of joint damage was typical around the
circumference of the tank
72
The soccer field tank, (14.06670° S, 75.73878° W) sustained relatively minor damage as shown
in Figure 5.14. The type of damage was similar to that of the Manzanilla Tank but much less,
which is not surprising since they both are similar design and size.
Figure 5.14. The soccer field tank with minor damage along horizontal joint
Observations:
1. The Pisco infiltration gallery did not sustain any significant earthquake damage.
2. Water wells in Ica suffered some earthquake damage, possibly due to soil movements.
3. Elevated water tanks did not perform as well as ground level water tanks.
4. Liquefaction of the soil caused many joint separations and breaks in the Pisco water
pipelines, both the transmission and distribution pipelines.
5. Chlorination systems appeared to have failed due to lack of restraints, which caused the
chlorine cylinders and chlorinator to fall and damage the chlorinators.
6. The water system in Pisco with 19 isolated sectors appears to be a reasonable approach to
identifying pipeline breaks and repairing them, while continuing to deliver water.
7. There is a risk of sewage contamination because the losses of water pressure much of the
time.
8. Some pipes in Ica may suffer from an accumulation of sand.
73
Recommendations:
1. The elevated water storage tanks in Pisco and Ica need to have a detailed structural analysis
and evaluation to determine if they can be put back into service.
2. Notification of the risk of contaminated water in the distribution system although it is
chlorinated. The chlorinated water delivered by water tank trucks should be recommended.
3. More testing for bacterial and coliform bacterium contamination should be conducted to
assure high water quality.
4. Maintain a larger stock of repair materials, such as pipe couplings.
5. Flushing may be required to clean distribution system piping of sand.
6. Chlorine cylinders should be tied down or restrained to prevent movement during
earthquakes.
Acknowledgements
The TCLEE team thanks Ing. Alberto Santaria Soto, Gerente General of EMAPISCO and Ing.
Alfonso Loo Anyarin, Genernte Técnico of EMAPICA for their help in the investigation and the
information provided.
Unless otherwise specified in the caption of the figures, all the photographs were taken by
References
1. Informe No 269-2006/SUNASS-120-F Supervision desde la Sede a EMAPISCO S.A. Primer

Semestre 2006.
2. Informe No 02 – Situacion de los Sistemas de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Pisco, by
EMAPISCO S.A., September 25, 2007.
74
Chapter 6: Wastewater
Executive Summary
The Pisco earthquake affected the wastewater collection system in both Pisco and Ica, collapsing
underground concrete pipelines in both cities. In Pisco the collapsed pipelines had a much greater
affect on the residents because many more pipes collapsed, which led to restrict water supply to
control sewage demand and thus prevent sewage spills. In Ica one trunk line collapsed and
approximately 200 meters of pipeline were excavated to keep the sewage flowing in an open
channel.
Pump stations in the Pisco area suffered damage, but the treatment plants (lagoon systems) did
not sustain any significant damage in Pisco or Ica.
Description of Pisco Wastewater System

The Pisco wastewater system consists of mains, mostly running from the south toward the north
to the stabilization lagoons for treatment. There are two sewage pump stations, one in San Andrés
and one near the ocean, to pump the sewage from the western portion of Pisco that cannot flow to
the lagoons by gravity.
The Leticia Pump Station is located at the west end of the city, at the low point in the collection
system. The station consists of a large wet well and three submersible pumps. The wet well is
approximately 4 meters in diameter and 9 meters deep (Fig. 6.1).
Fig. 6.1. Leticia Pump Station, looking west
During the past few years several sewer pipelines have collapsed, which led to restrictions in
water service. Concrete pipes corroded due to attack by hydrogen sulfide. Because the pipes are
unlined, the tops corrode and finally collapse. The sewer mains running south to north are
installed at low slopes, which leads to low velocities with longer detention time in the collection
system and, consequently, more opportunity for the production of hydrogen sulfide.
75
Overview of Pisco Wastewater System Performance
The biggest problem in Pisco and San Andrés was the damage to the wastewater collection
pipelines. Many collapsed and will take a long time to repair and/or replace.
The Leticia pump station, the largest in the Pisco system, sustained damage and was out of
service for several days. The other pump stations also suffered damage.
The Túpac Amaru collection system had minor to moderate damage.
The stabilization lagoons for Pisco, called Boca de Rio, sustained no significant damage. This
was also true for the Túpac Amaru treatment plant.
Pump Station Damage

The Leticia Pump Station was without electricity for five or six days. To prevent sewage from
overflowing into the streets, Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Pisco S.A.
(EMAPISCO) received special government permission to construct an open channel from the last
manhole in the collection system in front of the pump station, out to the ocean (Fig. 6.2). This
was quickly constructed and was still evident at time of the team’s investigation, although not in
use. This emergency measure succeeded in preventing sewage overflowing into the streets.
Fig. 6.2. Temporary open channel to drain sewage and prevent overflow into the streets.
The Leticia wet well settled in the sandy soil due to the shaking. No significant structural damage
to the wet well was observed; however, the discharge piping and valve box were damaged (Fig.
6.3). It appeared that the valve box and discharge piping did not settle as much as the wet well,
and the resulting stress broke a valve flange on two of the three discharge lines. At the time of the
investigation, new valves were installed.
76
Fig. 6.3. Leticia wet well and valve box separation
It was reported that the small pump station of Cooperative Miguel Grau was inundated by
seawater (possibly due to the tsunami) and was functioning at the time of our investigation.
Another small pump station, San Martin, was not functioning at the time of our investigation due
to loss of electrical wiring and equipment.
In addition, it was reported that the San Miguel pump station in Túpac Amaru suffered electrical
damage. It was being repaired at the time of our investigation.
Damage to the Pisco Sewage Collection System

In Pisco and San Andrés collapsed sewer lines are a big problem. It appears that the resumption
of normal water and wastewater service in Pisco will take a long time due to severe damage to the
sewage collection system.
EMAPISCO has not been able to identify all the pipelines in need of repair or replacement. Some
of the collapsed sewer lines were evident prior to the earthquake. Figure 6.4 shows a sewer
bypass construction or a collapsed road over a failed sewer line.
77
Fig. 6.4. Road repair due to collapsed sewer line (Courtesy Prof Kuroiwa)
Twenty-seven sewer line sections have been identified that need rehabilitation or replacement.
The main trunk lines identified as damaged at the time of our investigation were San Juan de
Dios, San Isidro, Las Américas, and Valdelomar. The general manager believes that many more
will be identified as time goes on and a complete evaluation is conducted. The total length of
sewer pipe in the 27 sections is 21,430 meters, with the following breakdown:
• 14,650 meters of 200 mm (8 inches) diameter,
• 832 meters of 355 mm (15 inches) diameter, and
• 868 meters of 450 mm (18 inches) diameter.
During the cleanup operation throughout the city, heavy trucks and equipment probably caused
additional sewer pipeline failures due to the weakened state of the concrete pipe from hydrogen
sulfide corrosion.
In some locations emergency overflow lines were installed to bypass the collapsed pipelines and
divert sewage flow to the Leticia pump station where it is pumped to the treatment plant. Due to
restricted water service in all parts of the city, sewage flows were relatively low.
In Túpac Amaru a 200 mm diameter pipeline of 220 m collapsed.
The theft of manhole covers in Pisco allowed dirt and trash to enter the system. The theft of iron
was probably stimulated by the many material recyclers that came to Pisco after the earthquake.
78
Description of the Ica Wastewater System
Time did not permit an extensive investigation of the Ica wastewater system. Only one major
pipeline collapsed in Ica, in a system with about 260 km of wastewater pipelines. The only
wastewater treatment facility uses a series of ponds.
Overview of Ica Wastewater System Performance

There was no damage to the Ica wastewater oxidation ponds; however, there was one collection
system pipeline failure. A major trunk line of 450 mm (18”) diameter collapsed and sewage
backed up in the collection system. The site is located in Urbanizacion Villa de Valverde
(14.08724° S, 75.71535° W). Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable de Ica (EMAPICA) excavated
more than 200 meters of existing concrete pipe to permit some sewage flow to the oxidation
ponds, as shown below.
Fig. 6.5. Reach of excavated 450 mm diameter RCP trunk sewer, looking toward
the downstream manhole
According to EMAPICA personnel, only part of the normal flow reached the oxidation ponds. A
large portion of the flow was infiltrating into the sandy soil.
The investigation team found evidence that hydrogen sulfide attacked the top of the concrete
pipe. Pieces of concrete pipe with steel reinforcing bars corroded to a sharp point were found in
the excavated earth (Fig. 6.5). There is an orange stain (see arrow in Fig. 6.5) on the inside
surface of the pipe that may be additional evidence of hydrogen sulfide corrosion.
79
Fig. 6.6. Severely corroded reinforcing steel in excavated RCP
This is similar to the type of damage in the Pisco collection system. All the failed sewage
pipelines in Ica and Pisco were made of unlined concrete. The type of concrete used in the pipe
fabrication is not known.
Observations:
1. Unlined concrete sewage pipes failed in numerous locations.
2. The treatment ponds functioned well and sustained no damage.
Recommendations:
1. Do not use unlined concrete pipe for the wastewater collection system.
2. Use PVC, Polyethylene, lined concrete pipe, or other non-corrosive material for the
wastewater collection system.
80
Acknowledgements
The TCLEE team thanks Alberto Santaria Soto, Ing., Gerente General of EMAPISCO and
Alfonso Loo Anyarin, Ing., Genernte Técnico of EMAPICA for their help in the investigation and
the information provided.
Unless otherwise specified in the caption of the figures, all photographs were taken by
81
Chapter 7: Telecommunications
Executive Summary
The telecommunications industry in Peru has been undergoing a period of dramatic change since
Peru passed the Telecom Reform Act in 1991. Main segments of the act included privatizing
state-owned company, Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL), with a specific
schedule and regulatory management process. Privatization of Compañía Peruana de Teléfonos
(CPT) and the Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL) to Telefónica de España was
completed in 1994. From 1994 until 1998 Telefónica de España (later know as Telefónica del
Peru or TdP) benefited from a state-sanctioned monopoly. The telecommunications industry was
legally opened to competition in August 1998. Telefónica invested around US$2.6 billion
between 1994 and 1997 and now dominates the communications industry in Peru in market share.
A common characteristic of state-owned telecommunications is the backlog of basic telephone

service. Prior to 1993, the ratio of penetration was 4 percent—four out of every 100 households
had a telephone. The distribution of telephone lines was concentrated in Lima and in wealthy
households. Table 7-1 shows that since the privatization the density of telephone lines in both
urban and rural areas has increased from about 4 percent to about 6 percent between 1994 and
2007.
Privatization of telecommunications speeds up the introduction of technologies and advanced

services, such as cellular phone service and Internet service. Optical fiber toll cables are being
populated in the fixed-line system to improve line capacity. The major cellular service providers
are Telefónica, Nextel, and Claro. The major fixed-line phone service providers are also Internet
service providers, along with a number of independent service providers. Tables 7.2 and 7.3 show
detail information from Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Peru (MTC) Web site.
82
Table 7-1. Public Telephone Lines and Density (1993–2007)
Year Lines Density
1993 8,032 0.4
1994 13,711 0.6
1995 24,426 1.0
1996 34,181 1.4
1997 40,129 1.6
1998 49,399 2.0
1999 63,508 2.5
2000 84,087 3.2
2001 95,415 3.6
2002 113,834 4.2
2003 129,415 4.7
2004 143,777 5.2
2005 151,704 5.6
2006 158,306 5.7
2007 165,686 6.0
Density = lines per 1,000 people
The number of lines for public use considers rural and urban phones, as well as the public phones installed
under the rural projects funded by FITEL
Source: General Regulation and International Affairs of Communications Director, MTC
83
Table 7-2. Growth of licensed public telecommunications companies (1990–2007)*
Year Total Local Cellular Long Local Cable Trunk Maritime
**
Fixed Phones Distance Carriers Television 2 Lines Satellite
Phones 1 (PCS) Carriers 1 1
Communi-
cations
1991 4 1 2 0 0 1 0 0
1992 4 1 2 0 0 1 0 0
1993 7 1 2 0 0 3 0 0
1994 13 2 2 1 1 3 0 0
1995 24 2 2 1 1 7 6 0
1996 38 2 2 1 3 11 11 0
1997 54 2 2 1 4 25 12 0
1998 75 4 2 1 4 40 14 2
1999 128 7 2 27 7 64 11 2
2000 168 8 3 49 16 76 5 3
2001 198 13 3 45 22 99 5 3
2002 223 14 3 51 23 117 5 2
2003 260 16 3 59 25 142 5 2
2004 277 15 3 53 25 164 4 1
2005 321 15 4 53 22 212 5 1
2006 326 17 3 52 24 215 5 1
2007 380 23 3 65 33 241 4 1
*
* The data correspond to the first semester of 2007
** One franchise may have more than one grant awarded
1
The first franchise for fixed phones, local service and long-distance service was granted in 1994; before, the service
was provided the state through ex-CPT and ex-ENTEL PERU. Local fixed phones consider both subscribers and/or
public phones
2
Refers to the cable broadcasting distribution the first operator obtained its license in 1982 under the denomination of
closed circuit TV
84
Table 7-3 Market Share in Cellular Service by Region: 2007 *
Region Total Telefónica America Nextel
Moviles Movil Peru Del Peru
S.A.
TOTAL 2444 936 1170 338
Lima 1300 428 644 228

La Libertad 132 49 68 15
Arequipa 130 52 66 12
Callao 113 35 50 28
Ancash 85 35 36 14
Piura 84 35 38 11
Cajamarca 67 48 19 0
Lambayeque 66 28 36 2
Cusco 64 29 31 4
Ica 60 24 25 11
Puno 51 30 15 6
Junin 47 25 22 0
Tacna 47 20 23 4
San Martin 30 15 15 0
Ayacucho 24 16 8 0
Loreto 22 9 13 0
Tumbes 22 8 12 2
Moquegua 21 13 7 1
Huanuco 14 7 7 0
Pasco 14 8 6 0
Amazonas 13 7 6 0
Apurimac 13 4 9 0
Ucayali 11 4 7 0
Huancavelica 7 4 3 0
Madre De Dios 7 3 4 0
*Data corresponds to the first semester of 2007
Source: General Regulation and International Affairs of Communications Director, MTC
Description of System
With the influence of AT&T years before the privatization process, the established fixed-line
system is similar to that of North America. Evidence of AT&T existence is quite obvious (Fig.
7.1).
85
Fig. 7.1. Manhole cover in Ica City just outside Teléfonica office
The telecommunication network is based on a hub-and-spoke system; however, the system will
eventually use a ring topography when the optic fiber circuits are fully deployed. In December
1997 Peru had 8,461 trunk lines, all of which were analog. By 1999 the number of analog trunks
actually shrunk, and the number of digital trunks reached nearly 20,000. By September 2000
there were 63,276 trunk lines in Peru, and less than 10,000 were analog. [6].
The basic telecommunications system can be divided into two types of services, viz. voice, and
data. From the statistics provided by MTC, the growth of Internet service was faster than the
voice service. In mid-2005 Peru was among the 10 countries with the highest ADSL growth in
the world. Peru is one of the Latin American leaders in broadband penetration over telephone
lines (12 percent). However, in e-readiness it ranks 50th place worldwide and eighth place in
Latin America. Growth is still hampered by low teledensity and PC penetration. In March 2005,
the government launched a ‘PC Peru Program’ aimed at bridging the digital divide by offering
computers at less than half price. To promote telecom convergence, in June 2005 the government
published a proposed amendment to the Telecom Law, which would allow companies to offer all
telecom services with one single license.
Since 2000, the percentage of Internet users in Peru has grown from approximately 9.7 percent to
21.1 percent. According to Supervising Agency for Telecommunications Private Sector
Investment (OSIPTEL), there are currently more than 6 million Internet users in Peru [6].
Despite privatization, the local fixed-line market remains almost a monopoly, with Telefónica del
Peru still holding around 96 percent of all lines in service. Table 7-2 shows the number of fixed-
lines by company. With a total population last estimated at approximate 26 million people in
1995, this represents a teledensity at about 10 percent.
Telefónica’s main local fixed-line competitor, Comunicaciones Móviles del Perú/BellSouth Peru,
merged with Telefónica Móviles Perú in June 2005 and was renamed Movistar Perú. Long-
distance telephony, on the other hand, is enormously competitive, stimulated by the multicarrier
system introduced in April 2002. There is no limit to the number of long-distance licensees.
86
Besides Telefónica, the main long-distance carriers are IDT Perú, Americatel Perú, Impsat Perú,
and Telmex Perú.
The major government players are the Ministry of Transportation and Communication (MTC),
Ministry of Housing and Construction (MHC), and the Supervising Agency for
Telecommunications Private Sector Investment (OSIPTEL). The MTC represents Peru in
international organizations, grants concessions, approves the national telecommunications plan,
and regulates equipment standards, among other duties. OSIPTEL was created to assure free
competition during and after the privatization of the telecommunications network.
A wave of change began in the Peruvian mobile scenario following the Telefónica de Peru
acquisition in October 2004 of BellSouth Peru, which was renamed Comunicaciones Móviles del
Perú (CMP). Telefónica asked for governmental approval to merge CMP with Telefónica
Móviles Perú. Such a merger raised considerable controversy but was approved in April 2005 and
implemented the following June. The new merged company, Movistar Perú, now controls the
mobile market with around 61 percent market share, although América Móvil market share has
been steadily increasing since about 2004. The other major players in the cellular industry are
Nextel and Claró.

In the earthquake affected areas, both fixed-line and cellular telecommunications were reported to
have failed and were out of service from 24 to 72 hours following the earthquake. In addition to
extensive damage to the distribution system of the fixed-line network in the earthquake-affected
areas, such as Chincha Alta, Pisco, and Ica City, there were reported power outages and damage
to trunk lines, central office buildings, cell towers, and their support structures. The usual high
volume of call traffic immediately after an earthquake resulted in call congestions and network
overload that was interpreted as telephone “not working.” It was reported that the long distance
connection between Lima and the earthquake-affected areas was out of service due to damage to
a toll link. The link was re-established within 24 hours; however, some local calls were still out of
service for as long as 72 hours after the earthquake.
It is not clear whether MTC has established any emergency response procedures for
telecommunication service providers. The outage was a hindrance to rescue efforts in the early
hours after the earthquake.
As there was no information relating Internet performance—both user and network equipment—
this report did not include performance information relating to Internet service.
Trunk Lines Crossing Huanami Bridge (S13.6877, W76.1581)

Failure to the fixed-line service was attributed to the damage of a main trunk line crossing the
Pisco River along the Huanami Bridge (Figs.7.2–7.6). An 8-cm permanent transverse
displacement at the south bridge abutment caused the conduit to break, which may have damaged
the conductors of the cable. When the ASCE TCLEE earthquake investigation team visited the
site on September 24, 2007, the bridge was still under repair, and one of the main trunk lines was
replaced by a temporary aerial line on the west side of the bridge (Fig. 7.5). There were two trunk
lines that co-locate with the Huanami Bridge— the Telmex trunk line on the east side and
Telefónica on the west side.
87
The majority of the network links are copper cables; less than 5 percent of the trunk cables are
fiber optic.
Damaged
abutment
Trunk line
conduits
Fig. 7.2. Damaged abutment (far side), note the conduits on the side of the bridge
under the railing
Fig. 7.3. The inner plastic shield tubes were exposed as one section of the bridge deck was
removed. Some cables may be damaged.
88
Fig. 7.4. The underground part of the conduits was exposed during repair. The cable was
replaced by a temporary aerial cable crossing the river (Fig. 7.5).
89
New power
Old power pole
pole
New pole for optic

fiber cable to
replace the damaged
cable on the bridge
Fig. 7.5. New aerial cable to replace the damaged trunk conduit. Note that the
power cable was also replaced.
90
Telecom trunk cable
conduits co-locate with
the bridge on the east
side
Fig. 7.6. Trunk cable of another telecommunications provider is located on the

east side of the bridge.
Collateral damage due to co-locating has been observed in all earthquakes with various degrees of
severities. In this case, since it was reported that there was only one fiber link between Lima and
Pisco, the loss of long distance calls created a lot of anxiety.
Nextel Cell Sites (S13.4143, W76.1877 and S13.7089, W76.2028)

A Nextel cell site (S13.4143, W76.1877) at 190 km mark of the Pan American Highway on top of
a hill (Fig. 7.7) had electric power failure due to cable damage at the pole (Fig. 7.8). The backup
power generator had to be started manually due to damage to some cables, according to a witness
on site. At the time of the earthquake reconnaissance, repairs were being made. This site is close
to Tambo de Mora where extensive liquefaction occurred.
The in-fill masonry wall showed cracks indicating strong shaking (Fig. 7.9) at this location.
In comparison, the cell site (S13.7089, W76.2028) in Pisco had more severe damage. An antenna
pole on the roof of a five-storey building partially broke at the base and fell (Fig. 7.10) as a result
of a concrete water tank falling next to it (Fig. 7.11). The microwave antenna, however, was not
damaged (Fig. 7.12). When ASCE/TCLEE visited this site, re-building had begun. Figures 7.13
to 7.16 show the preparations and site design.
91
Fig. 7.7. Nextel cell site on top a hill next to the Pan American
Highway around 190 km mark
The cover plate was

not replaced yet,
and the cable was
new.
Fig. 7.8. The damaged power cable, the cover plate was not replaced yet.
92
Fig. 7.9. Note the damaged plaster and the crack on the wall
Fig. 7.10. Roof top antenna toppled (Courtesy of MTC)
93
Fallen concrete
water tank
Fig. 7.11. Water tank that damaged the cell site antenna pole
Fig. 7.12. The microwave antenna was not damaged
94
Fig. 7.13. Steel platform used for securing cell Fig. 7.14. Remain of the water tank support
site equipment, foot print of the area same as frame
before
Fig. 7.1.15 New maintenance free batteries as Fig. 7.16. Design of the guide wire anchor for
backup power the antenna pole
Telefónica, Pisco, Central Office and Cell Site (S13.7092, W76.2054)

Telefónica has one central switching station in Pisco (Fig. 7.17). This central office (CO) links to
seven remote stations. The CO serves approximately 20,000 customers in Pisco and its
surrounding communities. This low density is common in rural areas in Peru. The earthquake
investigation team had limited access to the CO, so physical damage to telecommunications
hardware could not be observed. From the severity of the observed damage on the outside of the
building, it can be assumed that there was some degree of equipment damage. Figures 7.18
through 7.20 show damage to the exterior façade of the CO building and the antenna tower
support structure. Typical x-shape cracks were observed at shear panels between windows in the
upper story of the building, indicating overstress in shear. Repairs were observed at the base of
columns (Fig. 7.18). In addition to the physical damage, it appeared that Telefónica was also
working on the waveguides from the antenna to the cell site equipment room (Fig. 7.18). Figures
95
7.18 and 7.19 also show a bent conduit around the waveguides that drooped down below the
tower support structure and a dislocated radio antenna.
At the time of the investigation, cellular service had not yet been restored to the Telefónica
central office cell site. We observed a large amount of material—cables, light fixtures, and
such—in the CO yard (Figs. 7.21 and 7.22).
Temporary service was being provided by Telefónica, however, to those customers whose fixed-
line service was still down. Figure 7.23 shows the public using the temporary telephone service
made available by Telefónica.
Fig. 7.17. Entrance to the Telefónica CO, Pisco
96
Bent cable
conduit
Fig. 7.18. Damage at the base of the tower support structure was repaired.
Note the massive waveguide that drooped down below the tower support structure
Dislocated
radio
antenna
Bent cable
conduit
Fig. 7.19. Damage viewed from the bottom of the structure in the yard of the CO facility
97
Note the
discontinued
column
Fig. 7.20. Repaired top of the building at the back of the Telefónica CO
Fig. 7.21. Material for repairing damage in the yard of this CO. Note the repaired
cracks on the walls.
98
Fig. 7.22. More repair material in the CO yard, note repair on the column
Fig. 7.23. Free telephone call service provided by Telefónica in Pisco
99
Claro, Pisco, Cell Site (S13.7103, W76.2045)
This cell site is on the roof of the eight-storey Hotel Candelobra building, which was closed due
to extensive damage. There is a public phone in the hotel lobby (Fig. 7. 24), which seems to be a
rare item in Pisco.
Fig. 7.24. Public phone in the lobby of Hotel Candelobra, Pisco

Claro personnel indicated the power outage exceeded five days at this site. Power generators were
brought in to restore service to the cell site, which did not have power until two weeks after the
earthquake. This delay was most likely due to extensive damage to the utility poles and the power
distribution system in this area (Fig. 7.25).
Fig. 7.25. Utility pole damaged in the street next to

Hotel Candelobra, Pisco.
100
This cell site is equipped with 20 channels to support its customer base. The observed damage
was to the base, where the tower is anchored to the roof (Fig. 7.26). The beams were secured to
the roof structure by steel reinforcement rods welded to the reinforcement of the building (Fig.
7.27). At the time of ASCE/TCLEE visit, the damage was not repaired.
Fig. 7.26. The damage at the base of the tower
Fig. 7.27. Details of securing the steel beam to the roof structure
101
Telefónica, Ica City, Central Office and Cell Site (S14.0666, W75.7289)
Ica was one of the hardest hit areas. The major telephone service provider is Telefónica. Cellular
services are provided by Telefónica, Nextel and Claro.
Fig. 7.28. Telefónica central office in Ica City. Surface cracks

on the outside wall were fixed.
The ASCE/TCLEE investigation team met with the central office manager in Pisco; however, he
referred us to the head office in Lima for details.
There are about 45,000 to 50, 000 lines provided by this Telefónica central office for a population
of around 90,000.
This location is also a cell site for Telefónica. Figure 7.28 shows the antenna tower on the back of
the building. Microwave links are used to connect to other cell sites and central office.
The only damage observe at this location was the crack on the building’s outside wall (Fig. 7.28).
There were no signs of damage on the inside where we met the office manager.
102
Cell Sites Near Paracas (S13.8214, W76.2443)
The cell sites of Telefónica, Nextel, and Claro are located very close to each other on the west
side of the highway leading to the Port of San Martin (Fig. 7.29). This location is less than 1 km
from the coast. These cell sites were built on sandy ground. We did not observe any signs of
ground deformation or liquefaction. The only damage observed was the wall above the doorway
of the Telefónica cell site (Fig. 7.30).
The equipment was anchored to a concrete pad. The power equipment was anchored to two steel
beams that were secured to the concrete pad by four U-shape brackets (Fig. 7.31). This
installation method is typical of the other cellular service providers. The only difference is the
design of the antenna towers (Fig. 7.29).
The electric power supply to these cell sites came from a single source (Fig. 7.32). The feed cable
comes down from the pole-mounted transformer along the pole and then feeds the sites via
underground conduits. Although there are three cell sites, there is no redundancy to prevent a
power failure.
Nextel cell site
Telefonica
cell site
Claro cell site
Fig. 7.29. Three cell sites near Paracas along the coast south of Pisco
103
Fig. 7.30. Damaged wall above the door, no other signs of damage observed
Fig. 7.31. Cell site equipment anchored on concrete pads
104
Fig. 7.32. Electric power supply to all three cell sites comes
from this pole. This is an underground feed to the sites.
Telefónica Cell Site Outside of Ica City

At the time when the ASCE/TCLEE investigation team visited this site, the collapsed wall around
the cell-site equipment building has not been rebuilt (Figs. 7.33 and 7.34).
As there were no Telefónica personnel around, the team took a number of photos to evaluate what
had happened at this location. The ground around this location did not show any settlement or
liquefaction. However, strong shaking was evident from the paint chips on the antenna tower base
(Fig. 7.35).
Discarded sectorized antenna casing were found near the fuel tank for emergency power
generator inside the building (Fig. 7.36). This indicated damage to the antenna at this site, and the
antennas were replaced.
The damaged electric power transformer (Fig. 7.37) was chained to the halon cylinder for fire
suppression at this cell site. The transformer was a pole-mounted transformer just outside the
perimeter of the collapsed wall (Fig. 7.34).
This site was mostly back to normal within one week of the earthquake.
105
Fig. 7.33. Telefónica cell site outside of Ica City
Fig. 7.34. Preparation for rebuilding the enclosure wall. Note the utility pole with
a pole mount transformer serving this site.
106
Fig. 7.35. Paint chip shows strong shaking at this location
Power generator
fuel tank
Antenna casings
Fig. 7.36. Discarded antenna casings around the fuel tank
107
Fig. 7.37. Damaged pole mount transformer was chained to the halon gas
cylinder to prevent theft

Opening the telecommunication market sped up the availability of service to the public. It also
provided some degree of redundancy due to competition. The fast paced growth of cellular
networks also renders phone service more accessible to the public. Since it is easier to obtain a
cell phone and it works right after a person steps out of the service provider’s sale booth, it
provides a much more attractive alternative to Peruvians than the long waiting period of getting a
telephone line prior to the privatization.
There are many cellular towers both within and outside of Lima, many of which are installed on
rooftop of buildings. The design and installation practices most likely vary by contractor. The
structural integrity of the building to support additional mass has to be evaluated. In the 1999
Chi-Chi, Taiwan earthquake, the building collapsed taking the cell site down (Fig. 7.38).
108
Fig. 7.38. Collapsed apartment building with roof top cell site installation (ASCE monograph 18)
It is extremely important to have an emergency power backup source in the event of a

commercial electric power outage after an earthquake. The fact that most of the sites visited do
not have adequate reserve power and/or backup power generation is not acceptable as
telecommunication lifeline is a critical lifeline after a disaster. It is most needed tool for rescue
and coordinating emergency services, such as ambulances, fire fighting, and law and order,
among others.
Although there was only one case where two telecommunications service providers were using
the same access to route their toll trunk lines, the need of dispersed redundancy must be evaluated
for the existing networks to ensure basic security is met.
The following recommendations reflect the findings of this earthquake investigation:

1. Evaluate the structural integrity of existing cellular towers, particularly those that are
installed on roof tops of commercial or residential buildings;
2. Build dispersed redundancies within the network of each service providers to ensure that
there is no single point failure that can bring the network down;
3. Consider restrictive network management controls to reduce congestion and large volume
of calls going in and coming out of the earthquake affected area; and
4. Provide emergency power supply for remote cell sites and ensure adequate backup power
generation for central offices as the amount of equipment grows due to demand.
109
Acknowledgements
The authors appreciated the support of Carlos R. Valdez Velasquez-Lopez, ministerio de
transportes & communicaciones, who in addition to his own time, assigned one of his staff
(Miguel Angel Ontiveros Duenas) in Pisco to accompany the team for two days to visit
telecommunication service providers in the earthquake affected area.
Unless otherwise specified in the caption of the figures, all figures in this chapter are taken by
110
Chapter 8.1: Airport
Executive Summary
Pisco Airport, one of Peru’s international airports, is in the earthquake-affected area. It shares the
facility with the Peru Air Force and is also designated as a backup to Lima, Airport, which is also
known as Jorge Chavez International Airport.
In addition to Pisco, the other international airports in Peru are Lima, Arequipa, Chiclayo, Piura,
Pisco, Pucallpa, Iquitos, Cusco, Trujillo, Tacna, Tarapoto and Juliaca. There are 17 airlines
operating international flights and seven airline companies offering domestic flights. The busiest
airport is Lima Airport.
Only minor damage was reported to the boundary wall around the perimeter of the Pisco Airport.
In the early hours after the earthquake, the airport received flights redirected from Jorge Chavez
Airport, which was about 150 km from the epicenter of the earthquake. Due to the long duration
of shaking and fallen ceiling tiles, the airport operator decided to evacuate. After about two hours,
all air traffic and the terminal returned to normal.
There was no significant damage to either the Jorge Chavez or Pisco airports.
Description of Jorge Chavez International Airport (S120 01’ 19”, W770 6’ 52”)
Jorge Chavez International Airport (JCIA) is located in Callao that is about 10 km from
downtown Lima. With a large seaport, Callao is often referred to as the port city.
JCIA was inaugurated in 1960 and named after the Peruvian aviator Jorge Chavez Dartnell. Since
the privatization law of state-owned facilities in 2001, JCIA has been run by Lima Airport
Partners (LAP) for a 30-year concession, which is owned by Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport
Services Worldwide. After the 2005 renovation adding the Peru Plaza Shopping Center and a new
concourse, the airport has 18 gates and seven jetways (passenger boarding bridge). The terminal
increased from 25,000 m2 to 54,000 m2, and there are plans to expand the handle more passengers
and flights. JCIA was awarded the best airport in South America in 2005.
In 2006 there were more than 6 million arriving and departing passengers using the airport and
the total number of flights was more than 70,000, the increases were 5.5 percent and 6.6 percent
more than 2005 respectively. The air cargo was also increased by 11 percent to more than
190,000 metric tons.
LAP is responsible for all operations of this airport including emergency response such as fire
fighting, security, and such. Government functions such as traffic control, immigration, and
customs belong to the government.
Figure 8.1 shows an aerial view of the airport, and Figure 9.2 shows the front of the terminal
building.
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Fig. 8.1. Jorge Chavez International Airport, the runway is 3507 m x 45 m asphalt.
(Credit: Google Earth)
Fig. 8.2. Front of the Jorge Chavez International Airport
The office building and the traffic control tower are to the left of the terminal. It is a 10-story
building with an external access staircase (Figure 8.3). Figure 8.4 shows a corner of the air traffic
control workstations. LAP office is in this building. Access to this building is from inside the
terminal.
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Air Traffic
Control Tower
External Access
Fig. 8.3 JCIA administrative building with the air traffic control tower.
Fig 8.4 Control tower work stations at JCIA (Courtesy of LAP)

For fire suppression, the terminal and the administrative building are installed with a sprinkler
system. A dry system is installed in the computer and telecommunication equipment rooms.
There are also four water tanks in the airport ground, each with a 14,000-liter capacity. There are
four fire-fighting trucks and one truck for handling hazardous material spill. LAP has 50 fire
fighters.
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LAP uses landline, cellular, and UHF/VHF for telecommunication. Landline and cellular are both
for internal and external access. UHF/VHF is for airport grounds use.
There are three backup power generators with 1.5 MW capacity each. These generators can
supply power to the essential equipment during power outage. Within the administrative building
and the passenger terminal, there are battery backup emergency exit lights.
Overview of Performance
There was no structural damage to the terminal or to the administrative building during this
earthquake. The PGA was less than 0.1g; however, the long duration of shaking and the
telecommunication outage (both landline and cellular) resulted in a decision to evacuate the
terminal and the administrative building.
Ceiling tiles fell from the ceiling of the passenger check-in area and the arrival area of the
terminal. It was reported that about 1,000 tiles fell from the ceiling. It was noted that the t-bar
frames were hung without lateral bracing. This could be the reason of tiles dislocated from the t-
bars during shaking. It was also noted that the wires hanging the t-bars had more than 1.5 twists at
the end of the loop (Figure 8.6). Some of the tiles were not replaced six weeks after the
earthquake, due to availability of tiles.
Fig. 8.5. Ceiling tiles fallen off the t-bars.
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Fig. 8.6. T-bar hanger wire with 2 twists
The control tower staff were not evacuated as flights were coming into their air control space.
The security services staff also remained inside the terminal to assist the evacuation process.
Fortunately, the VHF (four channels) was functioning and was used to direct and manage the
evacuation.
The passengers were directed to different rally points within the terminal grounds. Passengers
who cleared both immigrations and customs were separated from those who were not cleared in
an orderly fashion. The total duration of the evacuation was about 2.5 hours. During the
evacuation, one of the key parts of the operation was the order in which operations were
reestablished. First, all airport staff and contractors were restored in order to inspect the area to
ensure that there were no risks to passengers, users, or the public. Second all governmental
employees were restored to prepare for the reception of all of the evacuated passengers. Third, all
concessionaires and functioning airlines were restored to ensure that no products or baggage was
stolen. Finally, all passengers and the public were permitted to return to the area. All functions
returned to normal without any incident. It is important to note that during the earthquake and the
evacuation process neither injuries nor robberies were reported.
During the 2.5 hours, according to LAP, flights were landing safely, including one flight that
landed during the earthquake.
It was reported that there were some minor problems in the traffic control tower, but they did not
affect the functions of the tower.

Telecommunication is a critical lifeline in emergency response for an airport. It is used to control
and manage the safety of the passengers and security of the facility. It is unfortunate that both fix
line and cellular phones were out of service. According to LAP they could not make calls at all
during the earthquake. LAP has three different modes of communication equipment, which
helped in the evacuation.
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As the terminal expands, more UHF/VHF channels will be required. When the radio system
grows with the terminal, zoning will be required to ensure good quality transmission and
reception. Then a plan is needed to ensure inter-zone communication along with backups.
The jetway as shown in Figure 8.7 shall be evaluated of its seismic load capability. The current
design does not have any support at the front end, which is the end where it joins with the aircraft
door.
Fig. 8.7. JCIA jetway (Courtesy of LAP)
Based on the evacuation experience, it is prudent to document the process to evaluate areas for
improvement. Periodic tests of the evacuation procedures using simulation will improve the
process and the roles of the security personnel to ensure a smooth evacuation in the case of a
large earthquake close to the airport in the future.
Acknowledgements
The author is in debt to Bill Fullerton, director of Operations, LAP, for setting up the meeting and
organizing a team of knowledgeable staff to answer questions from the investigation team. The
information provided by John C. Kirch Jr. was valuable, and his quick responses to emailed
requests is also much appreciated.
Unless otherwise stated in the caption of the figures, all figures and photos are provided by the
ASCE/TCLEE Investigation Team members.
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Chapter 9: Ports
Introduction
Peru's largest port is Callao, outside Lima. Other major ports include Paita, Salaverry, Chimbote,
Pisco, Puerto San Martin, Ilo, and Matarani. The port closest to the earthquake-affected area is
Puerto San Martin, which is about 60 km from the epicenter. This facility is shared by civil cargo
shipments and military ship docking. This is a fairly small port for the Pisco region. The main
commercial goods are fish and agricultural products.
Performance of Puerto San Martin (S13.8051, W76.2927)

The only major port damage was at Puerto San Martin (Figs. 9.1 and 9.2). This port is located
south and west of Pisco on a peninsula, about 20 km across the bay from Pisco. One Peruvian
naval vessel and two commercial vessels were docked at the wharf at the time of our visit. The
port was constructed on the cut and fill area, with some structures on the cut part and some on the
fill part.
The main gate is in

front of the hill
Fig. 9.1. Puerto San Martin
The damage was settlement more than lateral movement of a block about 100 m wide by 500 m
long. Here the wharf consisted of a pile supported concrete deck about 30 m wide by 1,000 m
long. Cursory examination of the supporting piles showed no evident damage (Figure 9.3).
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Fig. 9.2 Main entrance gate, photo taken from inside the port
Fig. 9.3. This figure shows the piling pattern that supports a 0.5m-thick wharf deck.
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Joints in the concrete deck showed little differential movement. Between the concrete wharf and
the backlands was a concrete bulkhead, which appeared independent of the wharf and was held
vertically by tiebacks. Many of the tiebacks appeared to be broken or bent (Figure 9.4). At this
junction of the backlands and the bulkhead, there was a maximum vertical displacement of about
1 meter (Figs. 8.2.5 and 8.2.6). From the original construction drawings, there were no batter
piles (Fig. 9.7). This seems to be the trend of new designs. The poor performance of the bulkhead
and tieback was due to poor compaction.
Fig. 9.4. Broken tieback
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Metal frame
warehouse
Fig. 9.5. Bulkhead rotation and backland settlement
Punching of the
piles
Fig. 9.6. This figure illustrates the settlement of the fill, the rotation of the bulkhead
wall, and the punching of the piles.
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Fig. 9.7. Original construction drawing of the wharf, the tieback detail is shown on the right.
Setting on the south portion of this block was a 300 m long rigid-frame metal building
warehouse. This building had an asphalt paving floor, which was highly disturbed and broken
(Fig. 9.8). The appearance of the fill under the broken asphalt would question the quality and
integrity of the fill, both inside and adjacent to the building (Fig. 9.9), which is on piles (Fig.
9.14). The paving and fill north of the warehouse did not present the same level of breaking up
and destruction as that in the south of the warehouse. Port staff indicated that the backfill was not
compacted in the original construction. The guide tower on this portion of the port was damaged
(Fig. 9.10)
121
Fig. 9.8. Asphalt highly disturbed south of the warehouse
Fig. 9.9. This image shows the integrity of the fill around the warehouse.
Note that the building is on piles and did not settle.
122
Fig. 9.10. Guide tower fell
There was a broken trace in the asphalt paving in the area north of the moved block. However, the
vertical or horizontal movement was not apparent as in the southerly block, although some
settlement was evident by piles pushing up the asphalt paving (Fig. 9.9). Nearby adjacent ground
or structures did not show appreciable damage.
Fig. 9.11. Pile pushing up asphalt.
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About 1 kilometer southeast of the port was a 17 m (d) by 8 m (h) water tank (Fig. 9.12). There
appeared to be no damage to this tank or its foundation or piping. Although the anchor bolts were
few and far between (more than 5 m apart) there was no cracked paint at the anchor bolts, chairs,
or nuts, indicating no relative movement (Fig. 9.13). The ground shaking here may have been
quite low.
Fig. 9.12. Water tank Fig. 9.13. Tank Anchoring

The compacting of the filled portion of the port performed poorly. The warehouses were
impacted. Although this port is not utilized to its capacity, restoration of the damaged buildings
shall start from building a better foundation.
Supporting lifelines (such as electric power, water supply, telecommunication, and such) of this
port should also be evaluated and upgraded during the restoration process to avoid failure.
The foundation of the transformer cabinet shall be connected to the warehouse foundation to
prevent the damage (Fig. 9.14) that happened in this earthquake.
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Fig. 9.14. The concrete pad for the power transformer cabinet shall be connected to the
foundation of the warehouse.
Acknowledgements
The authors like to acknowledge Jesus Guerra Munante, operations chief of San Martin Port for
providing us with access to the port and damage information.
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Chapter 10: Tanks—Fish Oil and Liquid Fuel
Introduction
Peru has one major oil refinery located north of Lima, which apparently suffered little if any
damage. Another refinery south of Pisco may have suffered minor damage, which we were
unable to confirm. There is no extensive liquid fuel pipeline system in Peru. Liquid fuels are
transported by truck or barge to distribution terminals.
There is also no gas pipeline distribution system in the country. LPG (Liquid Petroleum Gas,
Butane and Propane) is used for heating, and judging from the number of LPG tanker truck on the
road possibly other commercial uses. New petroleum discoveries in the Amazon region of Peru
have resulted in the construction of two major pipelines—one for natural gas and one for LPG
condensates—from the Amazon Basin to the Pacific coast. A large liquefied natural gas (LNG)
facility is currently under construction north of Pisco; this facility will liquefy and export LNG.
Considering the length and severity of the strong motion there was little significant damage to gas
and liquid fuel facilities. These facilities usually are well engineered and constructed. Although
the earthquake was large (Mw=8), because it was a good distance offshore, there was undoubtedly
some attenuation of ground motion, which would lessen the impacts.
There were several tank farms along the Pisco coast, up to about Paracas. The tank farms on the
east side of the road are fuel tank farms. While the tank farms on the west side (close to the
ocean) are fish tanks.
There was no significant damage to any of these tank farms. The ASCE/TCLEE investigation
team visited one fish oil tank farm and one fuel tank farm in Pisco.
Just outside of Lima along the Pan-American Highway on the east side, we observed a few liquid
fuel tank farms (Fig. 10.1). There was no reported damage at these facilities.
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Fig. 10.1. Liquid fuel tank farms along the Pan-American Highway south of Lima.
Fish Oil Tank Farm (S13.7760, W76.23760)

This tank farm has 13 medium to large size tanks. The size ranges from 10 m (d) by 5 m (h) to 25
m (d) by 10 m (h). It is located within a few meters from the shoreline (Figs. 8.3.2 and 8.3.3).
At the time of the earthquake all tanks were near full awaiting shipment. Although the team was
unable to gain entrance to the facility to thoroughly examine the tanks, discussion with operating
personnel and guards indicated that three tanks had elephant foot (Fig. 10.4) and one tank had
leaked.
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Tank sustained
minor damage
Fig. 10.2. Aerial view of the fish tank farm visited. (Courtesy Google Earth)
Damaged wall
This road to
Pisco
Fig. 10.3. Front of the fish oil tank farm, note the damaged wall.
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This facility was constructed in 1968. From the appearance of the facility, maintenance was not
an item of major concern (Fig. 10.5). The tanks were mostly setting directly on grade without
concrete foundations (Fig. 10.6), although some appeared to have ring-wall foundations. Soils at
the site were course beach sands.
The exterior wall of the facility along the shoreline collapsed (Fig. 10.7).
Fig. 10.4. Fish oil tank “elephant foot”
Fig. 10.5.This facility is not well maintained. Fig. 10.6. Tanks are mostly on grade.
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Fig. 10.7. The exterior wall facing the ocean collapsed.
Consorcio Terminales (S13.74740, W76.22730)

The gasoline distribution terminal is barge supplied from an offshore mono-buoy. The terminal
handles gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. It consists of about 14 tanks ranging in size from 5 m (d) by
5 m (h) to 30 m (d) by 12 m (h). It also has two loading racks as well as offices, operations,
maintenance, and small warehousing buildings. It also has a standby electrical generator. This
terminal facility is about 300 m from the shoreline on the inland side of the highway to Pisco
(Fig. 10.8).
This facility was inundated to a depth of approximately 20 cm by a tsunami (Figs. 8.3.9 and
8.3.10). The tank impounding walls kept the water from entering the tank blocks, and the curbing
at the generator building doorways kept the flooding from the generator room. As the entire
impervious facility is surrounded by a wall, the tsunami flooding entered under the entrance gate
at the main truck entry/exit portal (Fig. 10.11). A security surveillance system at the entry/exit
portal caught the entire flooding episode on tape, and team members were fortunate to view the
tape. The inflow of the tsunami continued for about 20 minutes.
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Fig. 10.8. Consorcio Terminales, Pisco (Google Earth)
Fig. 10.9. Tsunami water depth at the terminal Fig. 10.10 . Tsunami reached a height of 20 cm
building at the terminal
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Entrance gate of
the terminal
Fig. 10.11. The front gate gap along the bottom allowed water to enter the facility during the
tsunami run up.
A fire-water tank with a double bottom had a small elephant foot buckle in the shell portion
between the double bottoms (Fig. 10.12). We were informed that this elephant foot was from a
previous earthquake. Also, a small 50-mm diameter (2-inch) pipeline to the tank was broken
during this earthquake (Fig. 10.13). The fire-water tank was small, about 6 m in diameter and 4 m
high. Because of the flooding of the power cable trenches, there was extensive electrical repair to
bring the facility back in full operation. There also appeared to be some small (3 to 5 cm)
horizontal sliding of the fire-water tank (Fig. 10.14). There was sloshing in other tanks but with
no reported damage.
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Fig. 10.12. Elephant foot at the bottom of the water tank
Fig. 10.13. Connecting pipe damaged Fig. 10.14. The water tank slid about
4 to 5 cm.
Pisco Refinery (S13.77270, W76.22980)

One of the smaller (and newer) refineries in Peru is located about 6 km south of Pisco and about 1
km in from the shoreline (Fig. 10.15). We were unable to confirm that there was minimum
damage at this refinery. There is an offshore loading platform associated with this refinery (Fig.
10.16), which may have had damage to loading arms (unconfirmed).
133
Fig. 10.15. The new refinery plant in Pisco
Fig. 10.16. Off-shore loading platform for the plant in Fig. 10.15
134
The failures observed were minor. Unfortunately, there were no ground shaking records close to
the sites visited to understand the level and strength of shaking. Preparedness resulted in a quick
recovery at these sites. The working backup power generator at the Consorcio Terminales was a
good example.
Many tanks were unanchored. Anchored tanks perform better in large earthquakes; thus,
anchoring is recommended for fuel tanks.
Acknowledgements
The authors appreciate the cooperation of Javier Sanchez Delgado, chief of Terminal Pisco,
Consorcio Terminales. His information was valuable. In the video he showed us, we could see
that tsunami almost inundated the backup power generator, which was needed after the
earthquake.
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Chapter 11: Buildings: Houses, Schools, Hotels, and Churches
Executive Summary
The earthquake caused major structural damage in many educational, residential (houses,
apartment buildings), hotels, and church buildings. In fact, most of the fatalities occurred in one
hotel and one church in Pisco. This chapter is a collaborative effort of the Japan Society of Civil
Engineers (JSCE) and the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE).
Overview of Performance
Table 11.1, taken from a report by the National Institute of Civil Defense, dated October 5, 2007,
details the effects of the earthquake on homes and school buildings.
Table 11.1 Homes and Educational Buildings Affected

Location Homes Homes Homes Families Classrooms Classrooms
Destroyed Uninhabitable Affected Sheltered Destroyed Affected
Region Ica 43,388 35,519 31,966 187 214
Prov. Chincha 17,511 14,349 9,343 1,872 26 87
Prov. Ica 14,032 21,170 12,787 29 41 29
Prov. Pisco 11,707 9,550 3,999 36 56
Prov. Palpa 138 286 53
Prov. Nazca 31 42
Region Lima 3,221 6,950 8,180 396 329
Prov. Canete 2,279 5,465 5,675 1,034 330 290
Prov. Huarochiri 9 394
Prov. Lima 168 33
Prov. Yauyos 730 1,485 1,997 66 39
Prov. Callao 35 81
Region Huancavelica 479 1,683 4,174 22 71
Prov. Castrovirreyna 357 1,055 2,064
Prov. Huancavelica 8 86 73 22 69
Prov. Huaytara 114 542 2,037 2
Region Ayacucho 92 490 38 21
Prov. Cangallo 66 90 25 5
Prov. Humanaga 20 50 2 13
Prov. Huanta 10 11 3
Prov. La Mar 1
Prov. Lucanas 224
Prov. Parinacocha 105
Prov. Paucar Sarasara 6 10
Region Junin 4
Prov. Huancayo 4
Total 47,184 44,152 44,810 6,934 643 635
Structural Building Material and Systems

In the earthquake-affected areas, there are several different types of construction materials and
structural systems including adobe, rammed earth (or tapial), quincha, masonry confined by
136
reinforced concrete, and reinforced concrete with masonry infill. Hybrid systems that are
combinations of any of the above systems also exist.
Adobe is a traditional construction system, which consists of sun-dried bricks laid with mud
mortar. It has been used for houses (Fig. 11.1) and for churches. In the case of houses, walls are
400 mm (16 in.) thick; whereas in churches, walls are taller and thicker, 850 mm (33 in.) or more.
If un-reinforced, adobe structures are weak against earthquakes because they are heavy (and thus
induce large inertial forces) and have almost no tensile strength. The stability of adobe walls
depends strongly on their slenderness ratio. Recently, slender walls (called adobitos) made of
adobe bricks, sized similar to masonry bricks, have become increasingly popular. However, the
large slenderness ratio of adobito walls makes them even more vulnerable to damage by
earthquakes.
Rammed earth (tapial) walls were found in the earthquake-affected areas. They are used mostly
as fences to mark the boundaries in agriculture land (Fig. 11.2). In other parts of the country, they
are also used for dwellings. Similar to adobe, they are made of mud. However, in tapial walls, the
mud is compacted in situ: a wooden formwork is set and the mud is compacted in it. When the
mud has dried enough, the formwork is moved sideward or upwards, depending on the direction
in which the wall will continue.
Fig. 11.1. Two story adobe house, most common Fig. 11.2. Rammed earth or tapial walls. Note
in the high lands (Courtesy Prof. Johansson) the vertical and horizontal cold joints showing
different construction stages. (Courtesy Prof.
Johansson)
Quincha is a construction system that consists of wall panels made of bamboo plastered with mud
(Fig. 11.3). This system is also known as bahareque in other Latin American countries. The
bamboo skeleton makes the system ductile, and thus, it has a good seismic behavior. However,
bamboo deteriorates with time and this affects structural performance.
Masonry confined by reinforced concrete (confined masonry) is currently the most popular
construction system for new houses (Figs. 11.4 and 11.5). As long as people can afford it, it is the
material of choice. It is used as an economic solution in Peru for buildings up to six stories high.
When well designed and well constructed, it performs well in an earthquake. In this construction
system there are two steps. First, walls are constructed with solid masonry bricks; then reinforced
concrete confinements (columns and beams) are cast against the masonry walls. According to the
building code, a solid masonry brick is defined as a brick with a solid surface area equal to or
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more than 70 percent of its gross area. Column reinforcement is anchored in the foundation.
Because the masonry brick walls and reinforced concrete confinements work as a unit, the size of
the columns can be smaller than that of a reinforced concrete building, in which the masonry
walls are only used as partitions.
Reinforced concrete with infill masonry walls is also used in the affected areas, but it is used
mostly for public buildings (Fig. 11.6).
Fig. 11.3. Quincha (Courtesy Prof. Johansson) Fig. 11.4. Completed confined masonry
building (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Fig. 11.5. Confined masonry in process of Fig. 11.6. Reinforced concrete building with
construction (Courtesy Prof. Johansson) infill masonry walls (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Hybrid systems are a combination of some of the previously mentioned construction systems.
Some of them are the result of engineering design, while others are the consequence of
improvisation. For example, it is common to combine confined masonry walls with reinforced
concrete shear walls and columns in buildings. If these elements are well proportioned and
distributed, both systems contribute to each other.
In one type of traditional hybrid system, the first story is made of adobe and the second is made
of quincha. This system is very common in old two-story houses and has had a relatively good
seismic performance (Fig. 11.7). However, due to poor maintenance and aging, these structures
have become vulnerable. Although this system has not been used lately, some experts are trying
to reevaluate it.
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Fig. 11.7. Old traditional structure with the first Fig. 11.8. House with first story made of adobe
story made of adobe and the second story made and second story made of confined masonry. In
of quincha (Courtesy Prof. Johansson) this case, reinforced concrete columns were
cast in the existing adobe walls to support the
second story (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
However, there are bad examples of hybrid systems. In Peru, it is a common practice to construct
dwellings in stages, as the owner’s needs increase and as financial resources become available. It
is not uncommon for a homeowner to start a house with one story and, as the family grows, to
build a second or a third. If the family’s economic situation changes with time, the first story may
be made of adobe, while the upper stories are made of confined masonry (Fig. 11.8). This system
was observed at several locations in the earthquake-affected areas.
There are four main types of roof systems in the affected areas: straw mat with bamboo joists
(Fig. 11.9), light gage steel plate on bamboo joists (Fig. 11.10), reinforced concrete joists with
hollow bricks (Fig. 11.11), and wooden roofs (Fig. 11.12). The first two are very light and are
used in combination with adobe and confined masonry walls. Reinforced concrete joists are used
with confined masonry walls and with reinforced concrete buildings. Wooden roofs were found
mostly in old buildings and are not used in new construction.
The connections between the light roofs (straw mat, light gage steel) and walls are typically
weak, but they are sufficient to restrain the movement of the walls on which they are supported.
Reinforced concrete joists are cast on top of brick walls, together with the confining beams, and
therefore, are typically well connected to the walls.
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Fig. 11.9. Roof made of straw mat and bamboo Fig. 11.10. Light-gage steel roof on bamboo
joists (Courtesy Prof. Johansson) joists (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Fig. 11.11. Reinforced concrete joists with clay Fig. 11.12. Wooden roof, common in old
hollow bricks (Courtesy Prof. Johansson) buildings (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Building Codes
The National Service for Training for the Construction Industry (SENCICO) is responsible for
the development of regulations for building design and construction technologies. It is also in
charge of training and certifying construction workers. SENCICO has enacted the following
building codes:
• NTE E.010 Wooden structures (latest revision 2003)
• NTE.E.020 Loads (latest revision 1985)
• NTE E.030 Seismic design code (latest revision 2003)
• NTE.E.040 Glass
• NTE E.050 Soils and foundations (latest revision 1997)
• NTE.E.060 Reinforced concrete (latest revision 1989)
• NTE.E.070 Masonry (latest revision 2006)
• NTE E.080 Adobe (latest revision 1999)
• NTE E.080 Metallic Structures
According to the seismic design code, Peru is divided in three regions as shown in Figure 11.13.
The ground accelerations for design are 0.40g, 0.30g, and 0.15g for Zone 3, 2, and 1,
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respectively. These are accelerations with a 10 percent probability of exceedance in 50 years
(NTE.030, 2003).
Fig. 11.13. Seismic zonation of Peru
The codes mentioned above keep up to date with the international developments in design and
construction technologies and, thus, are a valuable source of information. However, in practice,
most of buildings do not comply with them; codes are enacted but not enforced. There is no
statistic showing how many buildings do not comply with the codes. However, experts suggest
that between 50 percent and 80 percent of the buildings in Lima do not comply with code.
One of the main reasons that building codes are not enforced is that obtaining the license for
construction, the first step of code enforcement, is a lengthy and costly process. It requires
submitting a set of drawings (architecture, structure, utilities) with the signatures of an architect
or civil engineer, a sanitation engineer, and an electrical engineer. It also requires a land property
certificate and a fee payment. However, many people do not have a land property certificate and,
therefore, cannot complete the required documentation. Obtaining the land property certificate is
another lengthy procedure.
141
Another reason that building codes are not enforced is that municipalities, which are in charge of
granting the licenses and supervising the construction, are understaffed. Based on a field survey,
it was found that in Pisco, a city of almost 55,000 inhabitants, only four civil engineers were
working at the municipality on a regular basis.
In September 2007, a law to ease the process of obtaining construction licenses was enacted. For
some construction, the project reviewing process has been simplified and for some small projects,
even eliminated. Although this may result in many more construction licenses, there is fear that
this will worsen the problem of code enforcement.
Self-construction, an extended practice in Peru, also hinders code enforcement. Self-construction

is defined as the construction by the dweller himself or by an untrained mason. This is a common
practice in the Peruvian society, due to the large housing deficit and inadequate governmental
policies to address the issue.
Residential Buildings
Housing Building Material Statistics

The data in Table 11.2, taken from the Peruvian National Institute of Statistics and Information
(INEI, 2005), presents information about the material in the walls and roofs of houses in the
earthquake affected region. The predominant wall construction material is adobe (50 percent of
the total), followed by masonry (39 percent of the total); whereas the predominant roof material is
straw mats with bamboo joists (59 percent of the total), see Figure 11.14.
Table 11.2 Number of houses with various wall and roof materials,
in the earthquake affected areas (INEI 2005)
Wall Material Masonry Adobe Quincha Other Total
Roof Material
Reinforced Concrete 52,950 718 0 30 53,698
Light gage steel 1,742 16,568 118 1,141 19,569
Straw mat and bamboo 19,778 79,004 5,581 9,187 113,550
Other 740 3,811 331 2,350 7,232
Total 75,210 100,101 6,030 12,708 194,049
Figure 11.15 shows the evolution of the use of various wall and roof materials in houses in the
earthquake affected areas. Note that adobe use has declined, while masonry use has grown. If this
trend continues, it may be expected that masonry will become the predominant wall material by
2020, as it has already become in other regions of Peru. It may be expected that straw mat with
bamboo roofs will still be preferred in the coming years.
142
50% 40.71%
Percentage of houses
40%
27.29%
30%
10.19%
20%
8.54% 2.88% 4.73%

10% 0.37%
0.90%
0.00% Straw mat / bamboo (59%)
0.38% 0.02%
0% 1.96% 0.06% RC joist (28%)
0.59%
Light gage steel (10%)
%)
0.17%
(39 ) 1.21%
o nr y
(5 2% ) Others (3%)
s
Ma obe (3% Roof material
Ad c ha %)
Qu
i n
er s (6
Oth
Wall material
Fig. 11.14. Distribution of houses with various wall and roof materials,
in the earthquake affected areas (INEI, 2005)
It is worth noting that more than 70 percent of the adobe houses are more than 25 years old. It is
not a common practice in Peru to invest in house maintenance. Therefore, it may be expected that
the vulnerability inherent to un-reinforced adobe construction is worsened by aging. Specifically,
adobe walls absorb moisture and become weaker with age.
12 12
Adobe Brick/Block Quincha Bamboo RC Light gage steel plate
Number of houses (in 10,000 units)
Number of houses (in 10,000 units)
9 9
6 6
3 3
0 0
1980 1990 2000 2010 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year Year
(a) Predominant material of walls (b) Predominant material of roofs

Fig. 11.15. Evolution of material use in the earthquake affected regions (INEI, 2005)
143
Housing Damage Statistics
The INEI carried out a census to estimate the number of people and houses affected by the Pisco
Earthquake. According to this census, in the earthquake-affected areas, 77 percent of the housing
units were affected in some way, and 23 percent did not suffer any damage. Of the damaged
houses, approximately 9.5 percent are suitable for living because they were only slightly affected,
suffering just minor damage or cracking. The hardest hit provinces were Chincha, Ica, and Pisco,
where 33.7 percent, 24.4 percent, and 22.4 percent of the houses collapsed. Data from the INEI
census is presented Figure 11.16, which shows the percentages of houses damaged in the
earthquake affected regions.
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
a ra
ayt yna
Hu irre ica
stro
v
a vel s Uncertain
Ca an c uyo
Hu Ya net
e Not suitable for living
Ca c o
Pis h a Suitable for living
inc
Ch Ica
Fig. 11.16. Percentages of houses damaged in the earthquake affected regions

(National Institute of Civil Defense, Emergency Report No. 344)
It is worth noting that a large number of the houses in Chincha and Pisco provinces are not
suitable for living. Also, the provinces with the highest percentages of uncertainty about the
conditions of houses are the mountainous provinces of Huaytara, Castrovirreyna, Huancavelica,
and Yauyos, where adobe is the predominant wall material.
Housing Damage Details—Houses, One- and Two-Story

Damage to adobe houses may be categorized, in order of severity as:
• plaster spalling (Fig. 11.17),
• wall separation (Fig. 11.18),
• corner collapse (Fig. 11.19),
• partial collapse of walls (Fig. 11.20),
• total collapse of walls (Fig. 11.21).
144
Important factors increasing the vulnerability of adobe structures were:
• wall slenderness,
• construction age, and
• roof layout.
In the affected region, walls typically supported light roofs. The roofs provided some restraint to
the top of the walls, which helped prevent wall collapse in the out-of-the-plane direction (Fig.
11.20).
Adobe walls with plaster on their surfaces seemed stronger than those without plaster. For
example, the plastered front walls of houses did not exhibit damage whereas the inner walls,
apparently without plaster, did suffer damage.
Fig. 11.17. Adobe house with plaster spalling Fig. 11.18. Adobe house with cracks at wall
(San Luis, Canete) (Courtesy Prof. Johansson) intersections (Huaytara, Huancavelica)
(Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Fig. 11.19. Corner collapse in adobe house Fig. 11.20. Wall partial collapse. Note, walls
(San Luis, Canete) (Courtesy Prof. Johansson) restrained by the roof are standing. (Ica)
145
Fig. 11.21. Collapsed adobe house (Nuevo Fig. 11.22. Lack of a foundation caused
Monterrico, Canete) (Courtesy Prof. corrosion of column reinforcement (Courtesy
Johansson) Prof. Johansson)
It was observed that many houses did not have any foundation. This contributed to the moistening
of the adobe walls with the consequent strength reduction, and corrosion of any reinforcement, in
locations where the water table was high (Fig. 11.22).
Confined masonry houses, designed and built according to the building code, did not suffer major
damage. The confined masonry houses that did suffer damage had some type of deficiency. The
most common deficiencies were:
• use of pandereta bricks for load bearing walls (Fig. 11.23). These bricks have horizontal
alveolus (sockets). The code prohibits the use of these bricks for load bearing walls.
• lack of confinement of parapets and facade walls (Figs. 11.24 and 11.25),
• insufficient wall density,
• badly distributed stiffness (irregularities in plan and elevation),
• improper construction procedure,
• lack of confining beam or reinforcement in the confining beam (Fig. 11.26).
Fig. 11.23. Load bearing wall made of Fig. 11.24. Adobe wall confined by reinforced
pandereta bricks, with insufficient steel concrete (in the back), survived the quake, but
reinforcement in the confinement (Pisco, Ica) the unconfined adobe wall (front) failed out-of-
(Courtesy Prof. Johansson) plane. (San Luis, Canete) (Courtesy Prof.
Johansson)
146
Fig. 11.25. Facade wall collapsed due to lack of Fig. 11.26. Lack of confining beam (Tambo de
confinement. (Sunampe, Chincha) (Courtesy Mora, Chincha) (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Prof. Johansson)
Housing Damage Details— Apartment Buildings, Three (or More) Stories

A few apartment buildings made of reinforced concrete were found in the affected areas and in
some of the cases, the structures were a mixture of confined masonry and reinforced concrete.
The assumption that masonry wall and reinforced concrete confinement work together is
accurate, only if the masonry walls are constructed first, and then the steel reinforced columns
and beams are poured around the walls. If the reinforced concrete elements are constructed first,
then they become the main structural elements, and the size and quantity of steel reinforcement
must be larger than that required if the masonry walls were the main structural elements and the
reinforced concrete columns were used only to confine the masonry walls. Figure 11.27 shows an
apartment building in which the confining reinforced concrete elements had insufficient steel
reinforcement. A few walls, which survived out-of-plane collapse, developed in-plane shear
cracks (Fig. 11.28).
Fig. 11.27. Detail of a five-story building. Note, Fig. 11.28. Shear failure of masonry wall due to
the small amount of reinforcement in the excessive interstory drift. (Courtesy Prof.
columns. The failure pattern suggests that the Johansson)
columns were built first and then the brick
wall.(Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
The apartment building shown in Figure 11.29 was constructed with a first story that was open to
accommodate parking spaces for residents’ vehicles. The rear of the first story of the structure
147
contained a masonry infill wall (Fig. 11.30). As a result, the structure had a stiffness irregularity
and the first story was a soft story, compared to the stories above. This created a large ductility
demand on the first story. As shown in Figure 11.31, there was insufficient confining steel
reinforcement in the beam-column joints in the first story. Consequently, all of the columns failed
in the first story.
Another apartment building suffered damage due to a soft second story (Fig. 11.32). The short
column effect of infill masonry walls caused the failure shown in Figure 11.33. The formation of
a cold joint during the pouring of the beam-column joint caused the failure shown in Figure
11.34.
Fig. 11.29. Apartment building with soft story Fig. 11.30. Back view of the building shown in
and irregular stiffness distribution (Pisco, Ica) Fig. 11.29. (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Fig. 11.31. Beam-column joint detail of building Fig. 11.32. Soft-story failure due to insufficient
in Error! Reference source not found.9.29 stiffness in one direction (Pisco, Ica) (Courtesy
(Courtesy Prof. Johansson) Prof. Johansson)
148
Fig. 11.33. Column failure due to short column Fig. 11.34. Weak cold joint between column and
effect of masonry walls (Parcona, Ica)(Courtesy beam/slab (Parcona, Ica) (Courtesy Prof.
Prof. Johansson) Johansson)
Educational Buildings
Many pre-college schools were observed to be damaged throughout the effected region. The
National University “San Luis Gonzaga” was heavily damaged at its main campus in Ica and at
its other campuses.
Universidad Nacional “San Luis Gonzaga” de Ica (14.0906S, 75.7334W)

The Universidad Nacional “San Luis Gonzaga” de Ica (UNICA) has a main campus, called “City
University,” in a residential area of Ica (Fig. 11.35) UNICA has several branch campuses in Ica
and in other cities. Damage occurred that disrupted functions on the main campus and on several
of the branch campuses. An internal UNICA group had prepared a report on the damage. A copy
of this report was provided to the ASCE investigation team.
Fig. 11.35. Front gate of main campus, Universidad National

San Luis Gonzaga de Ica (UNICA)
149
Main Campus, Ica (14.0906S, 75.7334W)
On the main campus of UNICA, an accelerometer had been installed by the CISMID program
(Centro Peruano Japones de Investigaciones Sismicas y Mitigacion de Desastres) of the National
University of Engineering, Lima. This accelerometer recorded a PGA = 0.33g.
Numerous structures on the main campus of UNICA were significantly damaged. The Pharmacy
and Biochemistry building had damage in numerous reinforced concrete columns, caused by the
short column effect of the infill masonry walls (Fig. 11.36). In one of these columns, the #5
vertical reinforcement bars were restrained by #4 lateral ties at spacing as large as 84 mm (33”)
(Fig. 11.37).
At another location on the main campus, 2 identical buildings were adjacent to each other. One
performed well, because it had been retrofitted in 2003 with shear walls at each end, transverse to
the building’s longitudinal axis, and with 2 interior transverse shear walls. The adjacent identical
building without shear walls had significant damage.
Fig. 11.36. Column failure due short column effect, Fig. 11.37. Column tie spacing,
UNICA, Ica 84 mm (33”), UNICA, Ica
Some reinforced concrete structures built around 1995-1997 had minor, repairable damage. On
some of these newer structures, it was noted that pounding was minimized by the placement of
crushable material (1 to 2 cm thick) between the infill masonry walls and the columns (Fig.
11.38).
150
Fig. 11.38. Crushable material in wall-column joint, UNICA, Ica
At one of these 1995-1997 structures, it was noted that there was no damage at locations where
the stairwell-building gaps were sufficient, but that there was pounding damage at locations
where the stairwell-building gaps were insufficient, Figures 11.39 and 11.40.
The main campus was without electrical power for two days. For several days, the security guards
had no communications by landlines, cell phones, radiophones, or walkie-talkies. The inability to
recharge batteries was most likely the cause of the walkie-talkie failures.
Uncontrolled pharmaceuticals were observed on the grounds of the campus, near the pharmacy
and biochemistry building (Fig. 11.41).
One recording instrument belonging to CISMID (Centro Peruano Japones de Investigaciones

sismicas y Mitigacion de Desastres of the National University of Engineering, Lima) was located
in the first floor of the soil mechanics laboratory building of UNICA. To assess the possible
effect of the structural response on the record, micro-tremor measurements were made to evaluate
the dynamic properties of the building in which the instrument was located. Additionally,
concrete strength was estimated with a Schmidt hammer.
151
Fig. 11.39. No pounding damage, UNICA, Ica Fig. 11.40. Pounding damage, UNICA, Ica
Fig. 11.41. Uncontrolled pharmaceuticals on the ground close to damaged buildings, UNICA, Ica
152
The instrument was located in a reinforced concrete frame structure (Fig. 11.42) that was built in
two stages: the first floor in 1998 and the second floor in 2002. The structure did not suffer major
damage, but some of the brick partitions cracked and needed repairing. The partitions in the first
story suffered damage because the joints between the partition walls and the structural frame
either were not wide enough or were filled with mortar (Fig. 11.43). This limited the freedom of
the structure to deform. Partition damage was less on the second floor because the joints in the
second floor were wider.
Fig. 11.42. Soil mechanics laboratory building Fig. 11.43. Joint between brick partition and
(Courtesy Prof. Johansson) reinforced concrete structure filled with
mortar (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Fig. 11.44. Micro-tremor measurement Fig. 11.45. Micro-tremor measurement

analysis results (Transverse direction) analysis results (Longitudinal direction)
(Courtesy Prof. Johansson) (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Micro-tremors were measured in free field, on the first-story floor slab, on the first-story roof, and
on the second-story roof. To determine the fundamental period of the structure, the ratio of the
Fourier spectra of the records at the second-story roof and free field were calculated. The analysis
suggests that the fundamental period in the transverse direction is 0.30 sec (Fig. 11.44) and in the
longitudinal direction is 0.22 sec (Fig. 11.45). These frequencies do not coincide with the
predominant frequencies observed in the acceleration record (PGA = 0.33g), suggesting that the
structure did not affect the measurements. However, further analysis is necessary to confirm this
idea.
The Schmidt Hammer tests suggested that the quality of the concrete was good with compression
strengths approximately 36 MPa (5,200 psi) and 31 MPa (4,500 psi), in the first and second floor,
respectively.
153
Medical School Campus, Ica (14.0737S, 75.7419W)
The UNICA medical school was located on a separate campus in Ica. This school was non-
functional due to severe damage, such as the beam-column failure (Fig. 11.46).
Fig. 11.46. Beam-column joint failure, medical school, UNICA, Ica
Dental School Clinic, Local Central, Ica (14.065S, 75.732W)

The UNICA dental school operated a clinic in downtown Ica. The building, referred to as the
Local Central building, was a four-story reinforced concrete structure with masonry infill walls.
The clinic was not functioning, six weeks after the earthquake. In numerous locations, large
cracks were observed in beam-column joints and in the walls (Figs. 11.47 and 11.48). Because of
this damage, some second-level floors were supported by shoring (Fig. 11.49). Two unrestrained
portable X-ray lead shields showed no evidence that they had toppled over (Fig. 11.50).
154
Fig. 11.47. Typical cracks in wall and beam-column joints of dental school clinic, UNCA, Local
Central, Ica
Fig. 11.48. Cracks in masonry walls and a beam-column joint supporting cantilevered walkway,
dental school clinic, UNICA, Local Central, Ica
155
Fig. 11.49. Temporary shoring, dental school clinic (note that the dental chairs were removed at
the white round marks on the floor) UNICA, Local Central, Ica
Fig. 11.50. Lead shields around X-ray machine, dental school, UNICA, Local Central, Ica
156
Fisheries and Foods Campus, Pisco Playa (13.7101S, 76.2184W)
The UNICA fisheries and foods campus, located within 100 m of the ocean, in Pisco Playa,
(Pisco, MMI VII-VIII), suffered severe damage. Its debris had been completely removed, six
weeks after the event.
Table 11.3 presents a summary of the effect of the earthquake on structures at the various
campuses of the Universidad Nacional “San Luis Gonzaga” de Ica. This data was obtained from
the internal reports by UNICA.
Table 11.3 Universidad Nacional “San Luis Gonzaga” de Ica Buildings Affected
Campus Location Classrooms Classrooms Offices Offices Laboratories Laboratories
Building Name Operative Inoperative Operative Inoperative Operative Inoperative
Main Campus
City University
Chemistry 9 9 1 15
Science 6 5 8 6 15
Mechanical &
Electrical 19 29 1 9
Engineering
Education 21 5
Nursing 10 12 10 10
Pharmacy &
Biochemistry 6 1 2 18 3
Civil Engineering 8 2 19 3 2
Dentistry 5 14 3 13 2
Others 4 11 13 3
Subtotal 74 33 94 27 57 47
Local Central 18 25 21 17 6
Medical School 2 12 13 2 2
Agronomy 12 5 7 5
Veterinary
Medicine and 3 7 5 8 9 1
Zoology
Fishery and Foods 7 17 6
Total 109 84 138 76 73 62
Percent Damaged 56.5 43.5 65.5 35.5 54 percent 46 percent

percent percent percent percent
157
Pre-College Educational Buildings
In general, the design and construction quality of the schools buildings visited varied from good
to poor. Some school buildings were constructed of reinforced concrete, while many classrooms
buildings were constructed of un-reinforced adobe. Many schools were built in places unsuitable
for construction due to poor soil conditions, such as on Tambo de Mora marine deposits. The
sections below describe some of the observations.
It should be noted that the Ministry of Education reported that it would provide “psychological
support to 330 headmasters of schools affected by the earthquake to prepare them for the start of
classes.”
San Juan Bautista High School, Huaytara

This school served approximately 210 students. Several of its buildings were constructed in 1992
with reinforced concrete frames and concrete block walls. One confined masonry building was
constructed in 2006. There was one adobe building.
No major structural damage was observed. However, the masonry partition walls (Fig. 11.51),
which were correctly separated from the main reinforced concrete columns by crushable material
(Fig. 11.52) to prevent short column effects, were connected to the beams underneath by
unreinforced cement mortar. As a result, the connection between walls and beams failed.
Although the walls did not collapse, they were very unstable and posed a risk to occupants. The
classrooms that had this condition were not operational. The adobe building that was used as a
hall was not significantly damaged (Fig. 11.53). A confined masonry building did not suffer any
damage (Fig. 11.54). Classes were re-started on August 22, 2007. Parts of the school had been
used by the Peruvian Army for disaster response activities.
Fig. 11.51. Masonry panels in the second floor were Fig. 11.52. Crushable material
damaged, San Juan Bautista School, Huaytara.(Courtesy in wall-column joint, San Juan
Prof. Johansson) Bautista School, Huaytara
158
Fig. 11.53. Non-reinforced adobe building, Fig. 11.54. Confined masonry building did not
normally used as a hall, San Juan Bautista suffer any damage, San Juan Bautista School,
School, Huaytara (Courtesy Prof. Johansson) Huaytara. (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Beatita de Humay Elementary and High School, Humay

This school served approximately 460 students. Several older classrooms were constructed with
adobe, while several newer classrooms were constructed with reinforced concrete columns and
masonry infill walls. The walls and the straw mat roofs collapsed in the adobe classrooms (Fig.
11.55), but no injuries occurred because the classrooms were unoccupied at the time of the event.
There were some shear cracks in the columns of the reinforced concrete buildings (Fig. 11.56).
As of September 11, 2007, classes had not re-started and no debris had been removed.
Fig. 11.55. Adobe classrooms were heavily Fig. 11.56. Reinforced concrete buildings with
damaged, Beatita de Humay School, Humay. masonry panels suffered slight shear damage,
(Courtesy Prof. Johansson) Beatita de Humay School, Humay. (Courtesy
Prof. Johansson)
San Luis Gonzaga High School, Ica

This school served approximately 3,000 students. This school’s reinforced concrete buildings
were constructed in the 1950’s. Several of these buildings suffered pounding damage, due to
insufficient expansion joints between structural units (Fig. 11.57). Damage due to insufficient
159
clearance and lack of crushable material between columns and masonry walls was observed (Fig.
11.58). Several columns lacked confinement and shear reinforcement (Fig. 11.59). Some un-
reinforced masonry parapets overturned (Fig. 11.60). As of September 18, 2007, classes had not
restarted, although 32 temporary classrooms had been set up; 12 made of prefabricated wood and
20 made of straw mating.
Fig. 11.57. Pounding between buildings, San Fig. 11.58. Insufficient clearance between
Luis Gonzaga High School, Ica (Courtesy masonry panels and concrete columns, San
Prof. Johansson) Luis Gonzaga High School, Ica (Courtesy
Prof. Johansson)
Fig. 11.59. Lack of confinement and shear Fig. 11.60. Parapet overturning, San Luis
reinforcement in columns, San Luis Gonzaga Gonzaga High School, Ica (Courtesy Prof.
High School, Ica (Courtesy Prof. Johansson) Johansson)
160
Los Molinos Elementary School, Ica
At the Los Molinos School in Ica, a very new and well constructed building (Fig. 11.61), was
adjacent to a poorly constructed school building. The poorly constructed building (Fig. 11.62)
had a column between the first and second stories that was not aligned and a column that was
discontinuous in a masonry wall.
Fig. 11.61. Well constructed reinforced Fig. 11.62. Poorly constructed reinforced
concrete building, Los Molinos Elementary concrete building, Los Molinos Elementary
School, Ica (Courtesy Prof. Johansson) School, Ica (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Hotels
Extensive damage to hotels in the affected areas provided evidence of the lack of control the
authorities have over the security of these public facilities. For example, the Hotel Embassy in
Pisco had a construction license for two stories. However, the structure was built with five stories.
The first and second stories of the hotel completely collapsed, resulting in fatalities (Fig. 11.63).
The Libertador Hotel, located along the ocean coastline south of Pisco on the Paracas National
Reserve, was badly damaged by the earthquake and subsequent tsunami.
Figure 11.64 shows one small hotel that was damaged due to insufficient shear reinforcement in
the columns and lack of confinement to the masonry walls.
Fig. 11.63. The collapsed first two stories of Fig. 11.64. Insufficient column shear
Hotel Embassy (Pisco) reinforcement in a hotel (Courtesy Prof.
Johansson)
161
Churches
This survey did not focus on churches to the level of detail of other structures in this
investigation. However, it was obvious that these structures performed very poorly. It has been
reported that more than 30 percent of the fatalities caused by this earthquake were the result of
the collapse of the San Clemente Church in Pisco (Fig. 11.65). In this church, only the recently
rebuilt sections did not collapse (Fig. 11.66). The Compania de Jesus Church, located one block
from San Clemente Church, was also heavily damaged. Only two of the 850 mm-thick adobe
walls of the church were left standing (Fig. 11.67). A portion of the roof collapsed in the Jesus de
Luren Church in Ica (Fig. 11.68).
Many of the churches in Peru were built before any seismic design code was enacted. There is no
regulation requiring these structures to be upgraded to comply with the latest codes. These
facilities belong to the Catholic Church, and therefore, it is under their responsibility to improve
their seismic performance. Additionally, many of these buildings are considered “cultural
patrimony,” and thus, the National Cultural Center (INC) is also a stakeholder. There is always
controversy about which is the best way to seismically retrofit these monuments without altering
their cultural heritage.
Fig. 11.65. San Clemente Church (Pisco) Fig. 11.66. Retrofit portion of San Clemente
Church (Pisco)
Fig. 11.67. Compania de Jesus Church (Pisco) Fig. 11.68. Jesus de Luren Church (Ica)
162
Mitigation Initiatives
Because of the vulnerability of traditional adobe houses, two international assistance projects had
been implemented in the affected area to improve the seismic performance of adobe houses.
These projects, which were initiated before this earthquake, are described below.
Retrofitting of Existing Adobe Houses

The project “Retrofitting of Existing Adobe Houses” carried out by the Pontifical Catholic
University of Peru (PUCP) was initiated in 1996 to improve the seismic strength of existing
adobe house. The main purpose was to provide some ductility to the houses to allow safe
evacuation. The project retrofitted 12 prototype houses located in the seismically active regions of
Ancash, Cusco, Tacna, Moquegua, Ica, and La Libertad.
The retrofitting system, devised at the PUCP (Blondet, 2007), consists of placing welded wire
steel mesh strips at the wall intersections to create columns and also on top of the walls to create
collar beams, as shown in Figure 11.69. The wire mesh is made of 1 mm wires spaced at about 20
mm. The mesh strips are attached to both sides of the adobe walls using nails and connected with
wire connectors passing through the wall. A cement mortar cover is laid on the steel mesh.
Fig. 11.69. Wire mesh reinforcement. After Blondet 2007
The construction procedure followed for a prototype adobe wire steel mesh retrofitted house is
shown in Figure 11.70.
Evaluation of Seismic Performance of Retrofitted Houses (S 13º 59.179’ W 75º46.458’)

One of the retrofitted houses was located in Guadalupe, at Callao Street #304, near km Post 193
on the Pan-American Highway. The house was located in a flat area near a small canal and
surrounded by several adobe houses and two unpaved streets (Fig. 11.71).
163
Step 1. Remove the existing gypsum or mud Step 2. Open 5-cm (2-inch) square holes, every
plaster. 50 cm (20 inches), at the intersection of
vertical mesh strips. Insert small steel
connectors into each hole, moisten the holes
and fill with 1:4 cement:sand mortar.
Step 3. Fasten the vertical mesh strips to the Step 4. Moisten the area and plaster it with
adobe wall with nails, and then fasten the cement sand mortar applied in two layers.
horizontal strips. The usual width of mesh strip
was 45 cm (18 inches). Bend the ends of the
connectors 90° and nail them to the adobe
wall.
Fig. 11.70. Construction procedure (Step 1 to Step 4) for adobe wire steel mesh retrofitted houses
(Quiun 2007)
The fairly symmetric house was a one-story building with a shared wall, two façade walls aligned
with Callao Street and Rimac Street, and three internal walls. The roof was made of straw mat
with bamboo joists. There was no evidence of a foundation; however, based on an interview
survey, it was found that it is common in this region to dig a 60 cm deep trench, place thick adobe
blocks in the trench, and then build walls on top of the blocks. It may be possible that this
“foundation” was used when the house was originally constructed.
164
Front Side
Fig. 11.71. Front and side of retrofitted adobe house in Guadalupe. (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
The house was retrofitted based on the guide shown in Figure 11.70, and the details of the
construction for the wire steel mesh are shown in Figure 11.72. The mesh was set in all corners of
the house, and in the intersections of internal and external walls. In the internal walls, additional
mesh was installed beside the doors. The backyard wall was not retrofitted due to budgetary
constraints. No mesh was installed on the main entrance wall.
Fig. 11.72. Layout of retrofitted adobe house, Guadalupe. (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
The inspection of the house showed that it suffered almost no damage due to the earthquake,
although the damage rate of adobe houses in Guadalupe was more than 80 percent. A few vertical
cracks were observed in the mortar cover of the collar beams inside the house (Fig. 11.73). It is
believed that they just affected the cover and did not pass through the walls. It is important to
mention that the backyard wall, which was not retrofitted, collapsed due to shaking. A small
portion of the steel wire mesh, without any signs of corrosion, was exposed, as shown in Figure
11.73.
165
Backyard wall
Interior wall
Fig. 11.73. Retrofitted adobe house after the earthquake, Guadalupe (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
To identify the dynamic properties of the structure, micro-tremors were measured on the house
roof and at the ground (Fig. 11.74). Two 300 sec long measurements, sampled at 100 Hz, were
taken. The spectral ratios were calculated and are shown in Figure 11.74. A clear peak at 0.08 sec
was observed. This predominant period was similar to those measured in un-reinforced adobe
structures with similar characteristics. This suggests that the retrofitting procedure did not affect
the natural period of the structure.
(c) Measurement
arrangement
(a) X-Axis
(b) Y-Axis
Fig. 11.74. Ratio of Fourier spectra of micro-tremor measurement in retrofitted adobe house,
Guadalupe. (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
166
Construction of New Earthquake Resistant Adobe Houses
The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Peruvian NGO Alternativa, and the
National Service for Training for the Construction Industry (SENCICO) worked together between
2004 and 2006 on the pilot project “Training and Diffusion of Improved Adobe Technology for
the Construction of Healthy and Secure Houses.” The main purposes were to train and motivate
local people to construct adobe houses using an improved technology. During the project, seven
model houses were constructed. All were located in three seismically active, rural areas of the
Lima Region—Lunahuana, Pacaran, and Vinac.
The construction technique for the model houses followed the adobe standard NTE E.80 for cane
reinforcement. It incorporated improvements in adobe fabrication and reinforced construction
processes. The cane reinforcement consisted of a grid of vertical and horizontal canes (Fig. 11.75)
tied-up in the crossing points of the walls, foundation, and ring beams. This type of reinforcement
improved the seismic resistance of the adobe walls. The vertical reinforcement restrained out-of-
plane bending and in-plane shear, while the horizontal reinforcement transmitted the out-of-plane
forces in the transverse walls to the supporting shear walls and restrained the shear stresses
between adjoining walls. As an additional reinforcement, a wooden ring beam tied the walls into
a box-like structure and supported the roof. The procedure for this kind of reinforced adobe house
construction is shown in Figure 11.76.
Fig. 11.75. Vertical and horizontal adobe reinforcement, (NTE E.80)
167
Step 1. Un-reinforced foundation beam Step 2. Vertical reinforcement canes are placed
(W=55cm H=80cm). Vertical reinforcement is in the center of the wall, every 80 cm, and
fixed to the beam. buried 10 cm.
Step 3. Horizontal reinforcement. Crushed Step 4. Ring beam. Wooden beams (7.5x7.5cm)
canes are placed every four layers and are fixed to the top of the adobe wall.
connected to vertical canes with nylon strings.
Step 5. Roof. Timber beams (5x20 cm) are Step 6. Finishing.

placed every 60 cm.
Fig. 11.76. Construction procedure (Step 1 to Step 6) for adobe cane reinforced house, (Narafu,
2007)
168
Evaluation of the Seismic Performance of Reinforced Houses (S 1251.72’ W 7603.27’)
Three reinforced adobe houses, located in the affected area, were visited. Two houses (evaluated
in detail Fig. 11.77) were located near Pacaran city, in a flat area with a small hill at the backside.
(a) One-story house (b) Two-story house

Fig. 11.77. Reinforced adobe houses, Pacaran (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
The plan view of both houses is shown in Figure 11.78. Both of the reinforced houses were
constructed following the procedure shown in Figure 11.76. The roofs were light and well
connected to the walls and the foundations were made of un-reinforced concrete. The second
floor of the two-story house was made of light prefabricated quincha panels.
(a) One-story house (b)Two- story house

Fig. 11.78. Reinforced adobe houses layout, Pacaran (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
After the earthquake, the houses were in good condition, although some cracks in the plastering
of the quincha panels on the second floor were observed. It is important to mention that the
169
number of damaged houses in Pacaran was not as large as other cities inside of the affected area.
However, some nearby public buildings made of adobe collapsed due to the earthquake.
The dynamic properties of the structure were evaluated using micro-tremor measurements. The
arrangement used for the reinforced houses is shown in Figure 11.79. In this case, one sensor was
located in open field, another close to houses’ foundation, and the other sensors were located on
the roof of each floor.
(a) One-story house (b) Two-story house

Fig. 11.79. Reinforced adobe houses’ micro-tremor arrangement, Pacaran
Three measurements were taken at 100 Hz during 300 sec. The spectral ratio was calculated, and it is
shown in Figure 11.80 for the one-story house. A clear peak at approximately 0.07 sec is observed in
both X- and Y-directions. Compared to the house measured at Guadalupe, this structure was stiffer. This
may be due to the buttresses, which were used in this structure and the stiffer roof.
(a) X-Axis
(b) Y-Axis.
Fig. 11.80. Ratio of Fourier spectra of micro-tremor measurement in reinforced one-story

adobe house (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
For the two-story house, spectral ratios first floor roof/free field and second floor roof/free field
were calculated and are shown in Figure 11.81. Although the response at the first floor roof
170
shows one clear peak at 0.06 sec in X- and Y- directions, the response at the second floor roof is
more complex and shows multi peaks. The lowest period corresponding to one of these peaks is
0.06 sec, in both X- and Y-directions, which coincides with the natural period of the first floor
roof response. This may suggest that it is the effect of the first floor on the second floor. The
remaining peaks may indicate additional vibration modes active for the second floor, which are
not transmitted to the first floor, because the mass of the second floor is very small, compared to
that of the first floor. Further analysis is necessary to confirm these interpretations.
(a) First-Floor Roof / Free field—X-Axis
(b) First-Floor Roof / Free field—Y-Axis
(c) Second-Floor Roof / Free field—X-Axis
(d) Second-Floor Roof / Free field—Y-Axis
Fig. 11.81. Ratio of Fourier spectra of micro-tremor measurement in

reinforced two-story adobe house (Courtesy Prof. Johansson)
Final Remarks
The predominant construction systems in the areas affected by the earthquake are adobe and
confined masonry, combined with light roofs made of either straw mat or light gage steel plates.
Although the relatively small death toll during this earthquake was mostly due to the time of
171
occurrence, 18:40, the predominance of light roofs may have also contributed to keep the number
of fatalities low.
The structures that were designed and built according to the construction codes performed well.
Design and construction deficiencies caused most of the observed structural damage.
Many public facilities, including schools, churches, and hotels, performed badly. More than 30
percent of the casualties in this earthquake were caused by the collapse of San Clemente Church
in Pisco.
A few reinforced adobe houses were located in the affected area and performed well during the
event. They demonstrate that adobe can have a good seismic performance, if adequately
reinforced. Reinforcement with bamboo is adequate for new construction as long as there is
enough bamboo. The reconstruction experience after the 2001 El Salvador Earthquake showed
that in some cases, when the number of houses to be reconstructed is too large, there may not be
enough material available and the use of industrial material is required.
For retrofitting existing structures, the steel wire mesh showed good performance. However, there
is controversy among engineers who argue that instead of increasing strength, as with this
method, it is more important to increase ductility. In addition, this system is still expensive for the
majority of the Peruvian population. Other cheaper solutions, which address the ductility issue,
are presently available, such as external coatings with polymer meshes and PP-band meshes
(Mayorca 2003).
Acknowledgements
Blondet M., et al. Adobe Construcción. Universidad Católica del Perú. Lima.
http://www.pucp.edu.pe/facultad/ingenieria/seccion/civil/publicaciones.php
as retrieved on October 23, 2007.
Blondet, M., Torrealva, D., Vargas, J., Velasquez, J., and Tarque, N. (2006) “Seismic
Reinforcement of Adobe Houses Using External Polymer Mesh,” Proc. of the first European
Conference on Earthquake Engineering and Seismology, Geneva, Switzerland (CD-ROM).
EXPOSICION EVALUACION TECNIA UNICA 2007 Final.ppt,

as obtained on 9/12/2007
INEI, Population and Housing census 1981.
Ing. Mg. Hamilton Wilson Humanchumo.
Ing. Paul Olivares Medina.
172
Johansson, J.; Mayorca, P.; 2007; “A Reconnaissance Report on the Pisco, Peru Earthquake of
August 15, 2007,” Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Japan Association for Earthquake
Engineering, Institute of Industrial Science, University of Tokyo,
http://shake.iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp/Peru2007/JSCE_JAEE_Report/Index.htm , 11/12/2007.
Mayorca, P. Strengthening of Unreinforced Masonry Structures in Earthquake Prone Regions,

Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Tokyo, Japan, 2003
Meguro, K., Mayorca, P., Sathiparan, N., Guragain, R., and Nesheli, N. Shaking table tests of
small scaled masonry models retrofitted with PP-band meshes Proc. of the 4th International
Symposium on New Technologies for Urban Safety of Megacities in Asia, Singapore, 2004.
Narafu T. Bulletin Information on Damages to Adobe Houses by Peru earthquake August 15,
2007 and Activities after the Earthquake. Building Research Institute (BRI), Japan. September 4,
2007.
National Institute of Civil Defense, Emergency Report No. 344, 24/10/2007 / COEN-SINADECI
/ 18:00 (Report No. 62) and annexes.
NTE.030 Seismic Design Code, SENCICO, 2003.
NTE E.080 Adobe Building Code.
OCHA, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Situation Report 12,
Peru Earthquake, 29 August 2007.
Quiun D. et al. Adobe reforzado con mallas de alambre: Ensayos de simulación sísmica y
aplicación a construcciones reales. Universidad Católica del Perú. Lima.
http://www.pucp.edu.pe/facultad/ingenieria/seccion/civil/publicaciones.php as retrieved on
October 23, 2007
RESUMEN TOTAL UNICA SISMO final.pdf, as obtained on 9/12/2007.
Some of the information for this chapter was retrieved from the following Web sites:
www.cismid-uni.org/descargas/accelerogramas.zip
http://sinadeci.indeci.gob.pe/UploadPortalSINPAD/COEN_Noticia/Situaci percentF3n
percent20actual.pdf , as retrieved on 05 October 2007.
www.paho.org/english/dd/ped/EQPeru_807.htm , as retrieved on 9/12/2007.
www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EKOI-76K2KYY?OpenDocuments&RS, as retrieved on
9/12/2007.
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com_contentant/task,view/id,174250/Itemid,0
/, as retrieved on October 30th, 2007.
http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com_contentant/task,view/id,173198/Itemid,0/
as retrieved on October 2third, 2007.
173
Chapter 12: Hospitals and Medical Services
Executive Summary
The earthquake caused major structural damage in numerous health care facilities. This resulted
in the closure of several hospitals and in the reduction of services in numerous other hospitals. All
facilities lost electrical power for various periods of time, which caused significant disruption of
hospital functions. In many facilities interior and exterior communications were drastically
reduced or non-existent for several days.
Description of System
The health care system in Peru has three basic parts:
1. the Es Salud, or social security system, which provides health care for people through pay
check deductions;
2. the Ministry of Health system, which provides health care for people who do not pay for
health care through payroll deductions; and
3. the system of military hospitals.
According to the Ministry of Health, 48 percent of medical services at health centers in Ica,
Pisco, Chincha, Canete, and Yauyos, are for patients under 15 years old, and most of these are
women.

The National Institute of Civil Defense reported that 14 health care facilities were destroyed and
112 were affected (Table 12.1).
The Ministry of Health stated the affected population would receive free medical assistance. It
sent a team of 10 specialists (ophthalmologists) on August 27 to the emergency areas. On August
29, it sent a 16-specialist-brigade to improve the provision of medical assistance in areas of
Huancavelica region affected by the earthquake, while reinforcing deployment in the southern
region of Ica with a new brigade of 80 professionals.
The facilities investigated included:
The 120 bed, San Juan de Dios Hospital, a Ministry of Health facility, in Pisco (13.708S,
76.202W), (Pisco, MMI VII-VIII), consisted of several one-story structures (constructed in the
30’s) and a two-story structure (completed 2/2007). The one-story structures consisted of
concrete columns with un-reinforced masonry infill walls (Fig. 12.1). In examining one damaged
concrete column, no reinforcement was found (Fig. 12.2. Most of the one-story structures were
evacuated because of significant structural damage. But the one-story structure containing the
emergency generator, boilers, and water pumps and filters was not heavily damaged; it contained
concrete shear walls in each direction. The new two-story structure performed well and was
functioning with 12 over-night patients, 6 weeks after the event.
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Table 12.1 Health Care Facilities Affected
Location Destroyed Affected
Region Ica 9 13
Prov. Chincha 4 10
Prov. Ica 4
Prov. Pisco 1
Prov. Palpa 3
Region Lima 4 35
Prov. Canete 2
Prov. Huarochiri 2 15
Prov. Lima 3
Prov. Yauyos 2 8
Prov. Callao 7
Region Huancavelica 1 8
Prov. Castrovirreyna 4
Prov. Huancavelica
Prov. Huaytara 1 4
Region Ayacucho 56
Prov. Humanaga 1
Prov. Huanta 2
Prov. Huancasancos 5
Prov. Lucanas 20
Prov. Parinacocha 26
Prov. Paucar Sarasara 2
Total 14 112
Fig. 12.1. Typical one story structure in the San Juan de Dios Hospital, Pisco
175
Fig. 12.2. No reinforcement in concrete column of one-story structure in San Juan de Dios
Hospital, Pisco
The Central Receiving Hospital, an Es Salud facility in Pisco (13.7096S, 76.2007W), (Pisco,
MMI VII-VIII) consisted of a two-story structure constructed in 1944, with a four-story structure
and a one-story structure, both constructed in 1993. This facility treated approximately 5,000
patients per month before the earthquake. At the time of the earthquake, 35 patients were in the
hospital. This facility was heavily damaged, and non-functional, six weeks after the event. The
loss of stucco at large shear cracks in the walls revealed that the older, two-story structure had no
columns, just un-reinforced masonry walls (Fig. 12.3). A corner of the wall from the rear portion
of the second story of the 1944 structure fell into an alley, resulting in one fatality. This corner
was an intersection of two un-reinforced masonry walls, with no column (Fig. 12.4). The newer
structures were not heavily damaged, but they were not functioning. Six weeks after the
earthquake, all patient care was provided in tents across the street from the facility.
The 80 bed, Felix Torre Alva Hospital, an Es Salud facility in Ica, built in 1994, consisted of a
four-story reinforced concrete structure (Ica, PGA = 0.33g). This is a Class 3 trauma facility. This
facility had some repairable structural damage. Additionally, breaks in the interior water pipes
caused the evacuation of approximately 20 patients from each of the three upper floors. Most
patients went to the Manzanilla Es Salud hospital, mentioned below but some patients returned
home. Additionally, the emergency room, surgery, maternity, and infant care functions were
transferred to the Manzanilla facility.
176
Fig. 12.3. Un-reinforced masonry two-story structure, Central Receiving Es Salud Hospital,
Pisco
Fig. 12.4. Un-reinforced masonry wall fell into alley, causing one fatality, Central Receiving Es
Salud Hospital, Pisco.
177
The Jose Matias Manzanilla Hospital, an Es Salud facility in Ica (14.067S, 75.738W), built in
1952, consisted of a two-story un-reinforced masonry structure with no structural columns (Ica,
PGA = 0.33g). This facility normally treats patients and provides laboratory services from 8:00
AM to 8:00 PM. Before the earthquake, patients needing over-night care were taken to the Alva
Es Salud hospital. Since the earthquake caused relatively minor damage to the Manzanilla
facility, it received approximately 40 to 60 patients from the Alva hospital. The Manzanilla
facility began functioning 24 hours per day from the time of the earthquake and was still
functioning 24 hours per day, six weeks later, at the time of the investigation. Additionally, since
the earthquake it had served all patients, not just Es Salud members. In the immediate aftermath
of the earthquake, the Manzanilla facility performed the emergency room, surgery, maternity, and
infant care functions of the Alva hospital. The emergency room and surgery functions were
returned to the Alva facility 10 days after the earthquake. However, the Manzanilla facility
retained the maternity and infant care functions six weeks after the event.
The 280 bed, Regional Reference Hospital, a Ministry of Health facility in Ica (14.0733S,
75.7428W), (Ica, PGA = 0.33g), constructed in 1963, consisted of several
one-story structures and one four-story reinforced concrete structure with un-reinforced masonry
infill walls. The four-story structure was non-functional and unoccupied due to significant
pounding damage at joints and at the intersection of wings. At least three columns failed in the
one-story utility building, due to a short column effect caused by the infill masonry walls (Fig.
12.5). This facility typically receives patients from outside the Province of Ica. This hospital
provided services only in the emergency room for the first five days after the earthquake. The
emergency room typically treats approximately 200 patients per day. Six weeks after the
earthquake, only the emergency room was functioning in its original structure. All other patient
care was provided in tents and mobile trailers on the campus of the facility.
Fig. 12.5. Reinforced concrete columns failed in the utility building of the Regional Reference
Hospital, Ica.
A clinic in downtown Ica (14.065S, 75.732W), Servico Asistencial de Analysis Bioquimicos

Universidad National “San Luis Gonzaga”de Ica (UNICA), provided outpatient laboratory
178
services to approximately 50 to 60 patients per day before the earthquake. It returned to normal
functioning one week after the earthquake.
Electrical Power Systems: Commercial and Emergency

All facilities investigated reported that the loss of commercial electrical power occurred
immediately after the earthquake, at approximately 6:40 p.m. local time.
Automatic Transfer Switches

None of the facilities investigated had any automatic transfer switches (ATS). The switch from
normal to emergency power was accomplished by manual switching. Consequently, these
facilities were without electrical power for various periods of time.
Emergency Power Generators—Stationary Generators, Fuel Pumps, Fuel Tanks

The San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pisco reported that it was without power for approximately 5
hours, until it manually started its emergency generator. No problems were reported with the fuel
pumps, day tank, or in-ground fuel tank.
The Central Receiving Es Salud Hospitalin Picso reported that it started its emergency generator
manually. However, the generator only supplied enough power (88 kW) for the emergency room.
It was reported that the Alva Es Salud Hospital in Ica had emergency power by approximately
10:00 p.m. (approximately 3 hours after the earthquake). This power was sufficient only for
normal functions on its first floor. Commercial electrical power was restored after five days.
The Manzanilla Es Salud Hospital in Ica reported that by approximately 8:00 p.m. (approximately
1 hour after the earthquake), its emergency generator was providing sufficient power for all of its
normal and emergency functions. Commercial electrical power was restored after five days.
The Ministry of Health Regional Reference Hospital in Ica reported that emergency power was
provided only to the emergency room for the first five days. The 140 kVA emergency generator
ran for about one day (Fig. 12.6). Then it was shut down for 2 hours to check for electrical
grounds, possibly caused by leaks from nearby water piping, and to repair the water piping. No
grounds were found. It was restarted, but only ran for about 2 hours before the fuel line broke. A
smaller emergency generator subsequently ran for about one day. Then the electric power
company brought an additional small generator on a truck. These generators were located in the
one-story utility building that had three columns fail due to a short column effect of adjacent
masonry infill walls (Fig. 12.5).
The UNICA outpatient laboratory clinic in downtown Ica reported that it was unable to function
for one week after the earthquake because it had no emergency power generator.
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Fig. 12.6. Emergency generator (140 kVA) in utility building of Regional Reference Hospital, Ica
Emergency Power Generators—Portable Generators

None of the facilities reported the use of portable hand-carried generators.
Water Supply Systems

In Pisco the normal municipal water supply was not operational six weeks after the earthquake.
Consequently, the Central Receiving Es Salud Hospital reported that it had been using portable
tanks that were brought by truck, since the fourth day after the event.
The San Juan de Dios hospital also reported that it was still without its normal water supply six
weeks after the earthquake. Figure 12.7 shows two temporary water tanks at the San Juan de Dios
hospital. Cracks were observed at several locations in the tower supporting the reinforced
concrete water tank at San Juan de Dios hospital (Fig. 12.8).
It was reported that the Alva Es Salud Hospital in Ica had breaks at three locations in its interior
water system. These breaks caused the evacuation of patients from the fourth, third, and second
floors to the Manzanilla facility.
The Manzanilla Es Salud Hospital in Ica reported that the pressure in the domestic water supply
from Ica was reduced for a period of time. The water was tested and no contamination was found.
Cracks at beam column joints were observed in several legs of the tower supporting the
reinforced concrete elevated water tank (Fig. 12.9).
The Ministry of Health Regional Reference Hospital in Ica reported that it never lost water
supply. The water softening and filtration systems remained functional, even though a secondary
softener cylinder had toppled over due to lack of restraint (Fig. 12.10). The softening and
filtration systems were located in the one-story utility building in which three columns failed
(Fig. 12.5).
180
Fig. 12.7. Temporary water tanks, San Juan de Dios Hospital, Pisco
Fig. 12.8. Cracks in beam of tower supporting water tank, San Juan de Dios Hospital, Pisco
181
Fig. 12.9. Cracks in beam-column joints of tower supporting water tank,
Manzanilla Hospital, Ica
Fig. 12.10. Water softener cylinder toppled over due to lack of restraint,
Regional Reference Hospital, Ica
182
Wastewater Systems
Problems with interior wastewater systems were reported in only one facility, the Alva Es Salud
Hospital in Ica. These breaks were being repaired six weeks after the event.
Communication Systems: External and Internal

All facilities reported that all land-line and cellular phone communications were lost immediately
after the earthquake.
The San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pisco reported that it had no batteries for its walkie-talkie units.
The Central Receiving Es Salud Hospitalin Picso reported that it had no communications, by any
means, immediately after the event. Temporary communication equipment was observed in the
temporary patient treatment area of the Central Receiving Hospital (Fig. 12.11).
Fig. 12.11. A part of the temporary communications system, Central

Receiving Es Salud Hospital, Pisco.
In Ica both the Alva and Manzanilla Es Salud facilities were able to maintain some
in-house communications because 12 people in each facility had walkie-talkie units, and the
batteries were recharged. The Ministry of Health Regional Reference Hospital reported its
walkie-talkie units did not function; however, a few AM/FM radio phones did work
intermittently.
Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning Systems

The facilities investigated reported that they had no HVAC systems. However, boilers were
observed in two Ministry of Health facilities; two boilers in the San Juan de Dios Hospital, Pisco,
one of which is shown in Figure 12.12, and three boilers in the Regional Reference Hospital, Ica
(Fig. 12.13). No problems were reported or observed with any of these boilers or with the steam
183
piping system. However, the boilers in the Ica Regional Reference Hospital were located in the
utility building in which three columns failed.
Fig. 12.12. A boiler in the San Juan de Dios Hospital, Pisco
Failed columns
Fig. 12.13. Boilers in the utility building (failed columns circled),

Regional Reference Hospital, Ica
Natural Gas Systems

No facility reported the use of natural gas for heating, cooking, or sterilization. Electrical power
or bottled gas cylinders were used for cooking in the kitchens of the facilities investigated. There
is no natural gas system in the region.
184
Patient Transportation Systems
The Central Receiving Es Salud Hospitalin Picso reported that it had an elevator in the four-story
structure, but it was inoperable because the emergency generator supplied power only to the
emergency room.
In Ica the Alva Es Salud Hospital had well equipped ambulances that transported patients from
Alva to Manzanilla. But the motor vehicles at the Manzanilla Es Salud Hospital had very little
equipment inside, except for a gurney and a restrained oxygen cylinder (Fig. 12.14).
The Ministry of Health Regional Reference Hospital in Ica reported that some patients were
transferred to Lima via trucks and helicopters.
Fig. 12.14. Patient transport vehicle at Manzanilla Hospital, Ica
Medical Gas Systems

In all of the facilities investigated, the medical gases were supplied to patients via cylinders on
portable carts. No problems, such as overturning, were reported.
Critical Equipment
The San Juan de Dios Hospitalin Picso reported that all critical equipment was inoperable due to
the lack of electrical power for approximately 5 hours. In the one-story structure containing the
blood bank, no structural damage and only a few broken windows were observed. But the loss of
electrical power to the refrigeration system may have resulted in the loss of the blood bank.
In Ica it was reported that the Alva Es Salud Hospital lost its blood bank because electrical power
was lost to the refrigeration system for approximately 3 hours. But the Manzanilla Es Salud
Hospital reported that it had very little critical equipment before the earthquake. Since it regained
185
electrical power within about 1 hour, it was able to use equipment brought with various patients
evacuated from the Alva facility.
The Ministry of Health Regional Reference Hospital in Ica had emergency power supplied only
to the emergency room. Consequently, equipment outside of the emergency room was inoperable
after the earthquake and remained inoperable six weeks after the event.
The UNICA outpatient laboratory clinic in downtown Ica reported that it lost the blood samples
because of the loss of electrical power.
Fire Suppression Systems

It was reported that the Alva Es Salud Hospital in Ica had fire sprinkler systems on the fourth and
third floors, and in parts of the second floor. No problems were reported with the system. No
other facilities had any fire sprinkler systems. Several facilities reported the existence of wall
mounted fire extinguishers.
The Ministry of Health Regional Reference Hospital in Ica reported that it had standpipes on all
floors. However, in the kitchen area, a fire hose standpipe box was observed, with no fire hose
(Fig. 12.15). The facility had three fire-water pressure pumps that were inoperable before the
earthquake. The pumps were located in the one-story utility building, which had three columns
fail.
Hazardous Material
Some small problems were reported with the control of pharmaceuticals, but no problems were
reported with radiological hazardous material. One facility admitted that it simply put hazardous
material into a dump pile.
Security Systems
Only one security problem was mentioned. The Manzanilla Es Salud Hospital in Ica reported that
one oxygen manometer was stolen.
Fig. 12.15. Empty fire hose standpipe box, Regional Reference Hospital, Ica
186
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery
The San Juan de Dios Hospitalin Picso reported that 86 patients were in the facility at the time of
the earthquake. Immediately after the event, these patients and those injured as a result of the
earthquake were treated in open areas between its buildings. It should be noted that this facility
was only a few blocks from the collapsed San Clemente church, in which many injuries and more
than 200 fatalities occurred. Many coffins also were temporarily located in the open areas
between the buildings within this facility. This facility had a capacity for 120 patients before the
event. It started admitting patients five days after the earthquake. Six weeks after the event, it had
12 over-night patients in its undamaged two-story structure that the ASCE team visited. The two-
story structure had wall mounted emergency egress lights (with battery backup) (Fig. 12.16).
The Central Receiving Es Salud Hospitalin Picso reported that 35 patients were in the facility at
the time of the earthquake. Immediately after the event, staff from this facility treated patients
with earthquake-related injuries in the plaza area next to the collapsed San Clemente church. On
the second day after the earthquake, patients were treated in tents that were set up across the street
from this facility (Fig. 12.17). Patients were still being treated in these tents six weeks after the
event.
The Manzanilla Es Salud Hospital in Ica reported that staff members had taken emergency planning
courses and that it had a written emergency response plan. It was reported that the plan worked
well. Clinical and administrative personnel came into the facility as planned. They were able to
change the functional mode of the Manzanilla facility from providing outpatient clinical services 12
hours per day to providing services 24 hours per day. This included receiving the evacuated patients
from the Alva Es Salud Hospital and treating any and all patients, regardless of membership in the
Es Salud system. Additionally, for the first 10 days after the earthquake, the Manzanilla facility
performed the emergency room, surgery, maternity, and infant care functions of the Alva
Fig. 12.16. Wall mounted egress light with battery backup, San Juan de Dios Hospital, Pisco
187
Fig. 12.17. Patient care in tents, across the street from the Central Receiving
Es Salud Hospital, Pisco
Hospital. The emergency room and surgery functions were returned to the Alva facility 10 days
after the earthquake. However, six weeks after the event, the Manzanilla facility still retained the
maternity and infant care functions and was still functioning 24 hours per day. Six weeks after the
event, the Alva Hospital had resumed normal functions on the first, second, and third floors. The
normal functioning of the fourth floor was delayed until repairs were completed on the fourth
floor water and wastewater piping systems.
The Ministry of Health Regional Reference Hospital in Ica reported that it had an emergency
plan, but that it did not work because of significant structural damage making its buildings unsafe
and emergency electrical power was provided only to the emergency room. The facility provided
services only in the emergency room for the first five days after the earthquake. The emergency
room typically treated approximately 200 patients per day. Six weeks after the earthquake, only
the emergency room was functioning in its original structure. All other patient care was provided
in tents and mobile trailers on the campus of the facility (Fig. 12.18).
188
Fig. 12.18. Patient care in tents and mobile trailers, Regional Reference Hospital, Ica
The UNICA outpatient laboratory clinic in downtown Ica reported that it resumed normal
operations one week after the earthquake.
It was reported that the Peruvian Air Force used airplanes and helicopters to transport
approximately 400 patients with earthquake related injuries from Pisco to Lima because of the
significant damage to hospitals in Pisco.
A group of portable trailers and tents from Lima, bearing the sign “Municipalidad de Lima,
Hospital de la Solidaridad,” were observed in front of the Ministry of Health Regional Reference
Hospital in Ica (Fig. 12.18) and near the km post 230 south (13.744S, 76.1617W) on the Pan
American Highway (Fig. 12.19).
Health care was also provided on a smaller scale throughout residential neighborhoods in Pisco.
Several tents were observed bearing the “Red Cross, Red Crescent” symbols (Fig. 12.20).
189
Fig. 12.19. Patient treatment mobile trailers near km post 230 of the Pan American Highway
Fig. 12.20. Typical patient treatment tents in a residential area
It was reported that the Alva Es Salud Hospital in Ica had plans to repair the structural damage
and repair the fourth floor water and wastewater line damage so that the fourth floor could return
to normal functioning. The date for the Manzanilla Es Salud Hospital in Ica to return to 12 hours
service per day was not determined six weeks after the earthquake.
190
Conclusions, Observations and Recommendations
The National Institute of Civil Defense reported that 14 health care facilities were destroyed and
112 were affected (Table 12.1). In general, newer facilities performed better than older facilities,
presumably because of ductile detailing.
Older health care facilities in earthquake prone regions need to be retrofitted to provide ductile
beam-column joints and shear walls, so that the health care functions can be performed in the
aftermath of an earthquake.
Hospitals need to have automatic transfer switches, so that emergency power can be immediately
provided to critical equipment and systems, when an earthquake causes the loss of normal electric
power. Health care facilities must ensure that their emergency generator(s) remain operational
and can supply electrical power that is sufficient for the normal functioning of the hospital and to
provide adequate treatment of injured patients.
Landline and cellular systems often fail in the first few days of a disaster. Therefore, health care
facilities must have redundant communication systems. Interior and exterior communications
need to be provided by walkie-talkies and radiotelephones. These devices must have rechargeable
batteries and chargers that are connected to the emergency power system.
Acknowledgements
OCHA, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Situation Report 12,
Peru Earthquake, 29 August 2007.
Some of the information for this chapter was retrieved from the following Web sites:
http://sinadeci.indeci.gob.pe/UploadPortalSINPAD/COEN_Noticia/Situaci%F3n%20actual.pdf,
as retrieved on 05 October 2007.
www.paho.org/english/dd/ped/EQPeru_807.htm, as retrieved on 10/12/2007.
www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EKOI-76K2KYY?OpenDocuments&RS, as retrieved on
9/12/2007.
The author is indebted to Fausto Felipe Nieto Mendoza, Ing.; Isabel Massironi Palomino, Ph.D.;
Jose Renteros, Ph.D.; and Walter Bellozo Rosales, Ing., who took time to provide valuable
information making it possible to reduce losses in future earthquakes.
Unless otherwise specified in the caption of the figures, all photos were taken by the
ASCE/TCLEE Investigation Team Members.
191
Chapter 13: Emergency Response, Recovery and Social Impact
Introduction
The August 16, Pisco Earthquake was a large earthquake that hit cities south of Lima, the capital
of Peru. Chincha Alta, Pisco, and Ica City were the hardest hit cities, with Pisco being the worst.
More than 80 percent of the buildings were either damaged or collapsed, leaving a large number
homeless residences and a large amount of debris to deal with by the government (Fig. 13.1).
Unfortunately, many hospitals in these cities were also damaged with various degrees of severity.
The local government does not have the resources and the capacity to deal with a large disaster
like this. In addition, critical lifelines such as telecommunications and electric power suffered
significant setbacks that created anxiety during the first few hours after the earthquake.
Fig. 13.1. The houses that were standing had damage (Courtesy of Prof. Kuroiwa)
When long distance telephone service between the earthquake affected areas and Lima was
eventually established, the Peru Central Government organized civil military support to handle
the emergency response and rescue. An air passage was established by the military to transport
the patients from damaged hospitals to hospitals in Lima. Civil military services were also sent to
the earthquake-affected cities to maintain law and order (Fig. 13.2). The government also hired
some local people to clean up the debris; however, most of these people did not have any tools
other than a shovel and brooms (Fig. 13.3). During ASCE/TCLEE investigation six weeks after
the earthquake, there were still piles of debris from damaged and collapsed houses.
192
Fig. 13.2. Civil Defense Force of Peru taking up the responsibility of law enforcement
Fig. 13.3. Locals hired to clean up the debris, almost bare hand (Courtesy Prof. Kuroiwa)
In some communities outside the city, residents did not want to return to their houses and chose
to stay on the street next to their houses (see Figure 13.4.) It was very cool at night. Various relief
groups, local companies, and international institutes built many temporary shelters. The shelters
varied from tents to wood panel houses. Figures 13.5 to 13.8 show the different style of
temporary shelters.
193
Fig. 13.4. Residents chose to stay in the open (Courtesy Prof. Kuroiwa)
Fig. 13.5. Coleman Tents provided by a Fig. 13.6. Wood panel house with corrugated
company metal roof
Fig. 13.7. Another type of tent as temporary Fig. 13.8. Wood panel temporary housing
shelters under the shade is a potable water bladder.
194
The government and local charity groups joined to provide and distribute supplies to the
earthquake victims (Fig. 13.9). International non-government organizations (NGO) and relief
groups also distribute supplies collected from their respective local donations (Fig. 13.10).
Fig. 13.9. Local church providing support for distributing necessities for the victims
(Courtesy Prof. Kuroiwa)
195
Fig. 13.10. Foreign country donated materials were ready for delivering to the victims.
Most of the businesses in the earthquake-affected areas were not open or partially open. A few
small family style restaurants were opened with limited menu due to lack of supply and water.
The hotels were not opened. The cellular service providers were setting up temporary sales
booths on the side of streets to sell phones and services (Fig. 13.11). The banks were still closed
due to building damage, and the clean up was still in progress. Figure 13.12 shows one of the
banks in Pisco was closed due to building damage.
Fortunately, there was only one reported fire in Pisco after the earthquake. The fire was put out
within a couple of hours (Fig. 13.13). Because there is no gas system in the earthquake-affected
areas, the chances of fire following earthquake is minimized.
The total casualties were 519 and total injuries were more than 1,300. Most of the casualties
happened at the San Clemente Church in Pisco. The second largest casualties occurred at the
Hotel Embassy, Pisco. These two locations together accounted for more than 30 percent of the
casualties.
From a lifeline perspective, the transportation, electric power and telecommunications lifelines
were almost back to normal, while water and wastewater lifelines were about 85 percent of
normal six weeks after the earthquake.
196
Fig. 13.11. Temporary sales booths were set up; this shows a cellular sales booth.
Fig. 13.12. The banks in Pisco were still closed six weeks after the earthquake.
197
Fig. 13.13. Fire following the earthquake in Pisco (Courtesy of MTC).
Local and International Support

Soon after the news of the Pisco earthquake was announced to world, support of search and
rescue, financial support, and donation of necessities were pouring in from many countries. Local
government also immediately organized resources to deal with the damage of this disaster. The
Civil Defense Force was called in to support the immediate need for logistics and law and order
in the earthquake-affected areas. An air path was established between Lima and the earthquake-
affected areas to transport the patients from damaged hospitals and critically injured to hospitals
in Lima. The need for this air path was a result of damage to Pan-America Highway.
The Civil Defense also set up relief centers around the earthquake-affected areas. Figure 13.14
shows one of the operations established by the Civil Defense. Military helicopters were used to
quickly transport necessities to the victims.
Local residents also helped cleaning up debris on the streets. When the ASCE/TCLEE team was
in Pisco, mechanical tools were used to clean up large and heavy debris at building collapse sites
(Fig. 13.15). The re-building is a long road but will surely be done. The central government was
also drafting plans and relief supports to the affected families. Funding was available to re-build
houses or provide new ones for qualified families.
Foreign support included search and rescue (such as the Spanish team arriving with trained search
dogs) (Fig. 13.16), medical supplies, financial, and relief materials. Many non-government
organizations (NGOs) around the world also provided their share of relief support. People around
the world donated many necessities for the victims. They came in on their own financial support
and helped to distribute the supplies.
198
Fig. 13.14. Local relief center, Civil Defense helicopters were used to deliver materials.
Fig. 13.15. Large front-end loaders were used to clean up large and heavy debris.
199
Fig. 13.16. Foreign search and rescue team arrived to provide rescue support
(Courtesy Prof. Kuroiwa)
ASCE/TCLEE Investigation Team members also did their share to help while traveling through
earthquake-damaged areas (Fig. 13.17).
Fig. 13.17. ASCE/TCLEE members brought necessities for the victims.
200
Emergency Shelters
As donations of tents and temporary shelters came from different countries, groups, and
companies; there were no uniform shelters for the displaced residents of the earthquake-affected
areas. Because the residents preferred to stay close to their homes, many tents or shelters were
built on empty space close by the damaged building (Fig. 13.18).
It was reported that Peru government raised funds for assisting the victims to rebuild their houses
or new ones depending on the condition of the original house. The amount was reported to be
around $2,000 to $3,000 USD per family. The victims had the option of either taking the money
to build a house or having the government build a house for them.
Many refugee camps were set up (Table 13.1). The number of tents distributed is shown in Table
13.2.
Table 13.1 Refugee camps in the earthquake affected areas
Province Installed camps No. of families No. of people
Pisco 22 2628 9282
Chincha 49 1872 8621
Ica 1 29 98
Canete 19 5170 5170
Total 91 9699 23171
Fig. 13.18. A tent on the lot of the victims’ damaged house was a very common scene in the
earthquake-affected areas.
201
Table 13.2 Number of Tents Distributed
Province # of Tents
Pisco 3443
Chincha 2500
Ica 2000
Canete 390
Total 8333
Fig. 13.19 Another type of temporary houses for the victims in Pisco
Health Impact
Although most of the hospitals in Pisco and Ica City were damaged and offered limited services
two weeks after the earthquake, there were no out breaks of disease in the area. The cool winter
weather helped to reduce the risk.
Most hospitals immediately set up outdoor facilities to provide medical services to the public. See
Chapter 10 for a detailed report of the hospitals and services. Mobile clinics were also set up in
the communities around the earthquake-affected areas.
Observations
It appeared that there was no emergency response plan set up for a large disaster like this.
However, the cooperation between various organizations, both government and private, helped to
reduce chaos. The clean up was slow; six weeks after the earthquake, re-building had not yet
started.
202
Rebuilding the distribution systems of electric power and telecommunication will take a long
time.
Acknowledgement
The information and material provided by Prof. Julio Kuroiwa helped to make this investigation
possible. His insights were also valuable to the ASCE/TCLEE Team.
Unless otherwise specified in the caption of the figures, all photographs are taken by the
ASCE/TCLEE Investigation Team Members.
203
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Index
accelerometer readings, UNICA, 150, 151, and, 22--24, 23f; emergency
153, 153f response and recovery, 43--44;
ACP (asbestos cement pipe), 61, 62, 65, Grau Bridge, 41f; Huachinga
66f, 68 Bridge, 35, 36f; Ica, bridges in, 41,
adobe, 136--38, 137f, 139f; in churches, 41f; La Quinga Bridge, 40, 40f;
162; in educational buildings, 158-- landslides affecting, 29, 44; Lima,
59, 159f; new reinforced adobe pedestrian bridge, 21f; liquefaction
houses, constructing, 167--71, 167- and lateral spreading at, 12f, 15, 21,
-71f; in residential buildings, 142-- 32, 32f; Los Molinos Bridge, 38--
43t, 142--45, 145--46f; retrofitting 40, 38--40f; Paracas, bridge
adobe houses, 163--66, 163--66f; collapses in, 43; Ponton La Isla,
thin adobe walls (adobitos), 137 40; rockslide damage, 21, 21f, 22,
airlifting medical patients, 189, 192, 198 23f, 44; Santa Rosa Bridge, 40;
airports, 4, 111--16, 112--16f seismic design criteria, 24. See also
alluvial soils, 11--12 Huamani Bridge
Alternativa, 167 buildings, 5, 136--73; building codes, 140--
Alva Hospital. See Felix Torre Alva 42, 141f; churches, 5, 162, 162f,
Hospital, Ica 187, 196; conclusions regarding,
ambulances, 185, 185f 171--72; construction materials and
América Móvil, 87 systems, 136--39, 137--40t, 142--
American Society of Civil Engineers 43, 142--43t, 143f (See also adobe;
(ASCE), 5, 200, 200f masonry; reinforced concrete as
Americatel Perú, 87 building material);
anchoring tanks, 135 damages/performance assessment,
apartment buildings, 147--48, 147--49f 2, 136, 136t; electrical distribution
Arequipa, 21, 111 systems damaged by, 50, 50f, 60;
asbestos cement pipe (ACP), 61, 62, 65, electrical substations, 49, 50, 51,
66f, 68 55f, 60; emergency response and
ASCE (American Society of Civil recovery, 192, 193f; hotels, 100--
Engineers), 5, 200, 200f 101, 100--101f, 161, 161f, 192;
Atico earthquake (2002), 24 Lima International Airport, 114,
ATS (automatic transfer switches), 179 114f; Pisco telecommunications
AT&T, 85, 86f CO, 95--96, 96--99f; Puerto San
automatic transfer switches (ATS), 179 Martin warehouses, 121, 122f, 124;
quincha, 136, 137, 138, 138f, 139f,
bahareque, 137. See also quincha 142--43t; rammed earth
banks, 196, 197f construction (tapial), 136, 137,
Beatita de Humay Elementary and High 137f; roof types, 139, 140f, 142--
School, Humay, 159, 159f 43t; seismic design criteria, 9, 140-
Bellsouth Peru, 87 -41, 141f, 162; soft stories, 148,
bridges, 4, 21--46; classification of, 24; 148f; telecommunications systems
conclusions regarding, 44--45; affected by damage to, 108--9,
Cruz Verde Bridge, 42; 109f. See also educational
damages/assessment of buildings; hospitals and medical
performance, 2, 21--22, 27--28t; services; mitigation of building
Departmental Highway 100, damage; residential buildings
timber/log bridges on, 34--35, 34--
35f; description of highway system
205
Cabeza de Toro filtration gallery, 3, 62, 64, Chiclayo, 21, 111
65 Chimbote, 117
Callao, 111, 117 Chincha/Chincha Alta, 1, 21; electrical
Cañete, 1, 12; electrical power system, 49; power system, 47, 50, 52, 58f;
hospitals and medical services, geotechnical observations made in,
174; residential building damage in, 12; groundwater levels, 12;
144f, 145f, 146f highways and roads, 4, 43;
Cañete formation, 11, 15f hospitals and medical services,
cast iron pipe (CIP), 61, 62 174; Modified Mercalli Intensities,
Castrovirreyna, 1, 21, 144f 10f; residential building damage in,
casualties, 1, 5, 196 144, 144f; telecommunications
cellular phone sites and systems, 3; building systems, 87
damage affecting, 108--9, 109f; chlorination systems, 65, 69
Claro cell sites, 100--101, 100-- church buildings, 5, 162, 162f, 187, 196
101f, 103--5f; electrical power, loss churches, emergency efforts by, 195, 195f
of, 47, 60.103, 100, 105f; CIP (cast iron pipe), 61, 62
emergency response and recovery, CISMID (Centro Peruano Japones de
196.197f; Ica, Telefónica cell site Investigaciones Sismicas y
in, 102, 102f; Ica, Telefónica cell Mitigacion de Desastres), 150, 151
site outside of, 105, 106--8f; Civil Defense forces, 2, 5, 192, 193f, 198,
licensed public telecommunications 199f
companies, 84t; at Lima Claro, 82, 87, 100--101, 100--101f, 103,
International Airport, 114, 115; 103f
major companies, 82, 87; Nextel CMP (Comunicaciones Móviles del Perú),
cell sites, 82, 87, 91, 92--95f, 103-- 87
5f; Paracas, cell sites near, 103--5f; coastal region, 11--12, 11f
Pisco (city), cell sites in, 91, 95-- COES (Committee for the Economic
96, 100--101, 100--101f; Operation of the Interconnected
transformers, 105, 108f System), 47
Central Highway, 2, 21, 43 collection pipes, wastewater systems, 62,
Central Northern Interconnected System 75--80, 78f, 80f
(SICN), 47, 48f Committee for the Economic Operation of
central offices (COs), telecommunications the Interconnected System (COES),
systems, 3, 95, 96--99f, 102, 102f 47
Central Receiving Hospital, Pisco, 176; communications. See telecommunications
damages/performance assessment, systems
176, 177f; electrical power system, Compania de Jesus, Pisco, 162, 162f
179; emergency response and Compañia Peruana de Teléfonos (CPT), 82
recovery, 187, 188f; patient Comunicaciones Móviles del Perú (CMP),
transportation, 185; 87
telecommunications system, 180, Comunicaciones Móviles Perú (now
183, 183f; water system, 180 Movistar Perú), 86, 87
Central water tank, Ica system, 69, 70, 70f concrete, reinforced. See entries at
Centro Peruano Japones de Investigaciones reinforced concrete
Sismicas y Mitigacion de Desastres confined masonry, 136--38, 138f, 146, 147f,
(CISMID), 150, 151 158, 159f
ceramic buss supports, electrical power Consorcio Terminales, 130--32, 131--33
system, 51, 56f construction. See buildings
CESEL S.A., 65 Cooperative Miguel Grau pump station,
Chi-Chi (Taiwan) earthquake (1999), 108 Pisco wastewater system, 77
Chica River, 24
206
Cordillera Occidental Mountains, 11, 11f, 179--80, 180f, 185--86; Paracas
12, 18 substation, 3, 49, 51--52, 52f, 54--
COs (central offices), telecommunications 59f; Pisco substation, 3, 49, 51, 53-
systems, 3, 95, 96--99f, 102, 102f -54f; privatization of, 47;
Costa Verde rock formation, 21f transformers, 51, 56f, 105, 108f,
CPT (Compañia Peruana de Teléfonos), 82 124, 125f; transmission lines, 48f,
Cruz Verde Bridge, 42 49, 49f, 50, 51f, 60; UNICA, power
Cusco, 21, 111 failure at, 151
Electrolima, 47
deaths, 1, 5, 196 Electroperú (EP), 3, 47
dental school clinic, UNICA, 154, 155--56f elephant foot damage to tanks, 127, 129f,
Departmental Highway Route 100, 12, 18, 132, 133f
23f, 33--37, 33--37f elevators, hospital, 185
Departmental Highway Route 110, 12, 18, EMAPICA (Empresa Municipal de Agua
37--40, 37--40f Potable y Alcantarillado Ica S.A.),
distribution services, water systems, 62, 63, 68, 69, 79
68, 69 EMAPISCO (Empresa Municipal de Agua
distribution systems, electrical power, 47, Potable y Alcantarillado de Pisco
48f, 50, 50f, 51--52, 52--53f, 57-- S.A.), 61--62, 65, 68, 76
59f, 60 emergency power, 4, 114, 179--80, 180f
distribution systems, oil and gas, 2, 4, 126. emergency response and recovery, 2--3, 5--
See also oil and gas 6, 192--203; banks, 196, 197f;
distribution systems, telecommunications, building damage, 192, 193f; Civil
100, 100f Defense forces, 2, 5, 192, 193f,
drinking water. See water systems 198, 199f; conclusions regarding,
202--3; electrical power system,
Earthquake Investigations Committee of the 60, 192, 196; fires, 196; health
Technical Council of Lifeline impact of earthquake, 202;
Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE), highways and bridges, 43--44;
ASCE, 200, 200f hospitals and medical services,
educational buildings, 5, 149--60; 187--90, 187--90f, 192, 202;
damages/performance assessment, international support, 195, 196f,
2; pre-college, 158--61, 158--61f. 198, 200f; local support, 192, 193f,
See also Universidad Nacional San 195, 195f, 198, 199f; NGO support,
Luis Gonzaga de Ica 3, 5, 195, 198; restaurants and
electrical power system, 3, 47--60; ATS, businesses, 196; supplies,
179; building damage affecting distributing, 195, 196f, 198;
distribution system, 50, 50f, 60; telecommunications systems, 87,
building damage to substations, 49, 192, 196, 197f; temporary shelters,
50, 51, 55f, 60; cell sites, loss of 193, 194f, 201--2f, 201--2t;
power at, 47, 60.103, 100, 105f; transportation systems, 196; water
ceramic buss supports, 51, 56f; and wastewater systems, 196
conclusions regarding, 60; Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable y
damages/performance assessment, Alcantarillado de Pisco S.A.
2, 50--52, 50--59f; description of, (EMAPISCO), 61--62, 65, 68, 76
49--50, 49f; distribution system, Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable y
47, 48f, 50, 50f, 51--52, 52--53f, 57- Alcantarillado Ica S.A.
-59f, 60; emergency power, 4, 114, (EMAPICA), 68, 69, 79
179--80, 180f; emergency response Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones
and recovery, 60, 192, 196; (ENTEL), 82
hospitals and medical services, EP (Electroperú), 3, 47
207
Es Salud, 174, 176. See also Central 12, 18, 23f, 33--37, 33--37f;
Receiving Hospital, Pisco; Felix Departmental Highway Route 110,
Torre Alva Hospital, Ica; Jose 12, 18, 37--40, 37--40f; description
Matias Manzanilla Hospital, Ica of highway system, 22--24, 23f;
emergency response and recovery,
fatalities, 1, 5, 196 43--44; infrastructure roadway map,
fault rupture, 8, 8f, 9, 10 Ica region, 26f; landslides
Felix Torre Alva Hospital, Ica, 176; critical affecting, 29, 44; liquefaction and
equipment, 185; emergency lateral spreading along, 15--18, 15-
response and recovery, 187--88, -18f, 21, 42, 42f; National Route 24,
190; fire suppression system, 186; 12, 18, 40, 40f; rockslide damage,
patient transportation, 185; 21, 21f, 22, 23f, 44; Sunampe beach
telecommunications systems, 183; road, 42; surface roads, 22, 23. See
water system, 180 also Pan American Highway South
fire, 196; Consorcio Terminales fire-water historic structures, retrofitting, 162
tank, 132, 133f; hospital fire homes. See residential buildings
suppression systems, 186, 186f; hospitals and medical services, 5, 174--91;
hydrants, 62, 63f; Lima airlifting medical patients, 189,
International Airport fire 192, 198; conclusions regarding,
suppression system, 112; in Pisco, 191; critical equipment, 185--86;
196, 197f damages/performance assessment,
fish oil tank farms, 126, 127--29, 128--30f 2, 174--79, 175--78f, 175t; dental
fisheries and foods campus, UNICA, 157 school clinic, UNICA, 154, 155--
56f; description of system, 174;
gabion retaining walls, 37, 37f earthquake, health impact of, 202;
gas and oil. See oil and gas electrical power systems, 179--80,
geotechnical aspects, 7--20; fault rupture, 180f, 185--86; emergency response
8, 8f, 9, 10; ground motions and recovery, 187--90, 187--90f,
recorded, 8--10, 9--10f, 10t; 192, 202; fire suppression systems,
landslides, 29, 44; plate tectonics, 186, 186f; hazardous materials,
2, 7--8, 8f; setting, 186; HVAC systems, 183--84,
geographical/geological, 11--12, 184f; institutions surveyed, 174--79
11f. See also liquefaction and lateral (See also Central Receiving
spreading; rockslides; tsunami Hospital, Pisco; Felix Torre Alva
Grau Bridge, 41f Hospital, Ica; Jose Matias
ground motions recorded, 8--10, 9--10f, 10t Manzanilla Hospital, Ica; Regional
groundwater levels, 12 Reference Hospital, Ica; San Juan
Guadalupe, 163--66, 164--66f de Dios Hospital, Pisco); medical
gas, 185; medical school campus,
hazardous materials in hospitals, 186 UNICA, 154, 154f; natural gas, no
health care. See hospitals and medical use of, 184; patient transportation,
services 185, 185f; pharmaceuticals,
heating, ventilating, and air conditioning uncontrolled, 151, 152f, 186;
(HVAC) systems, hospitals, 183-- telecommunications systems, 183,
84, 184f 183f, 191; UNICA outpatient clinic,
highways and roads, 4, 21--46; Central 178--79, 186, 189; wastewater
Highway, 2, 21, 43; conclusions systems, 183; water systems, 180,
regarding, 44--45; 181--82f
damages/assessment of hotels, 100--101, 100--101f, 161, 161f, 196
performance, 2, 21--22, 27--28t; houses. See residential buildings
Departmental Highway Route 100, Huachinga Bridge, 35, 36f
208
Huamani Bridge: structure and road surface, international support for emergency
2, 4, 29--32, 30--32f, 43, 44; response and recovery, 195, 196f,
telecommunications trunk lines, 198, 200f
87--91, 88--91f Internet service, 82, 86, 87
Huancavelica, 144f, 145f Iquitos, 111
Huaytara, 1, 21; residential buildings, 144,
144f, 145f; San Juan Bautista High Japan Society of Civil Engineers (JSCE), 5
School, 158--59f Japanese International Cooperation Agency
Humay, 159, 159f (JICA), 167
HVAC (heating, ventilating, and air JCIA (Jorge Chavez International Airport,
conditioning) systems, hospitals, Callao; also called Lima
183--84, 184f International Airport), 4, 111--16,
hydrogen sulfide erosion of wastewater 112--16f
pipes, 75, 79--80, 80f Jesus de Luren Church, Ica, 162, 162f
hydropower generation, 47 jetway, JCIA, 112f, 116, 116f
JICA (Japanese International Cooperation
Ica, 1, 2, 6, 21; bridges, 41, 41f; electrical Agency), 167
power system, 47, 50, 52, 58f, 60; Jorge Chavez International Airport, Callao
geotechnical observations made in, (JCIA; also called Lima
12; highways and roads, 4, 43; International Airport), 4, 111--16,
hospitals and medical services, 112--16f
174, 176, 178 (See also Felix Torre Jose Matias Manzanilla Hospital, Ica, 178;
Alva Hospital, Ica; Jose Matias critical equipment, 185--86;
Manzanilla Hospital, Ica; Regional electrical power system, 179, 185--
Reference Hospital, Ica); Jesus de 86; emergency response and
Luren Church, 162, 162f; Los recovery, 187--88, 190; patient
Molinos Elementary School, 161, transportation, 185, 185f; security
161f; Modified Mercalli Intensities, system, 186; telecommunications
10f, 21; residential building damage systems, 183; water system, 180,
in, 144, 144f, 145f; San Luis 182f
Gonzaga High School, 159--60, JSCE (Japan Society of Civil Engineers), 5
160f; surface roads in, 22, 23; Juan de Fuca plate, 2
telecommunications systems in, 3, Juliaca, 111
87, 102, 102f; UNICA buildings
(See Universidad Nacional San Luis La Achirana Canal, 39--40, 40f
Gonzaga de Ica); wastewater La Quinga Bridge, 40, 40f
systems, 4; water system, 3, 61, land property certificates, 141
68--73, 70--73f landslides, 29, 44
ICA ground motion recording station, 8--9, LAP (Lima Airport Partners), 111, 112, 114
9--10f lateral spreading. See liquefaction and lateral
Ica region infrastructure roadway map, 26f spreading
Ica River, 24, 38, 38f, 40 law and order. See security
Ica wastewater system, 79--80, 80f Leticia Pump Station, Pisco wastewater
IDT Perú, 87 system, 75--77, 75--77f
Ilo, 117 Lima, 21; airlifting medical patients to,
Impsat Perú, 87 189, 192, 198; building code
INC (National Cultural Center), 162 compliance, lack of, 141; damages
Independencia, 62 in, 21, 21f; International Airport,
injuries, 1, 5, 196 4, 111--16, 112--16f; Modified
Mercalli Intensities, 10f, 21;
telecommunications systems, 3, 91
209
Lima Airport Partners (LAP), 111, 112, 114 Ministry of Education, 158
liquefaction and lateral spreading, 12--18; Ministry of Health, 174. See also Regional
at bridges, 12f, 15, 21, 32, 32f; Reference Hospital, Ica
cellular phone sites affected by, 91; Ministry of Housing and Construction
defined, 12; electrical substation on (MHC), 87
poor soil, 60; along highways and Ministry of Transportation and
roads, 15--18, 15--18f, 21, 42, 42f; Communications (MTC), 21, 22,
Ica River, dry riverbed of, 38; 43, 82, 87
previous and current evidence of, mitigation of building damage, 163--72;
42--43f; TCLEE observation of, adobe houses, retrofitting, 163--66,
13--14f, 13--15. See also sand boils 163--66f; churches and other
liquid fuel. See oil and gas historic structures, retrofitting, 162;
local support for emergency response and new reinforced adobe houses,
recovery, 192, 193f, 195, 195f, 198, constructing, 167--71, 167--71f;
199f seismic performance of new
log bridges on Departmental Highway 100, reinforced houses, 169--71, 169--
34--35, 34--35f 71f; seismic performance of
Los Libertadores. See National Route 24 retrofitted houses, 163--66, 164--
Los Molinos, 37, 37f 66f; UNICA, retrofitted buildings
Los Molinos Bridge, 38--40, 38--40f at, 150
Los Molinos Elementary School, Ica, 161, Modified Mercalli Intensities, 10, 10t, 21
161f Movistar Perú (formerly Comunicaciones
Lunahuana, 167 Móviles Perú), 86, 87
MTC (Ministry of Transportation and
manholes, 76, 78, 86f Communications), 21, 22, 43, 82,
Manzanilla Hospital. See Jose Matias 87
Manzanilla Hospital, Ica
Manzanilla water tank, Ica system, 69, 70, National Cultural Center (INC), 162
71--72f National Institute of Civil Defense, 174,
masonry, 136--38, 138f; apartment 191
buildings, 147--48, 147--49f; National Route 24, 12, 18, 40, 40f
confined masonry, 136--38, 138f, National Service for Training for the
146, 147f, 158, 159f; educational Construction Industry (SENCICO),
buildings, 150, 150f, 155f, 158-- 140, 167
59f; hospitals, 174, 176, 177f, 178; natural gas, 2, 4, 126, 184
hotels, 161, 161f; houses, one- and Nazca plate, 2, 7
two- story, 146--47f; pandereta Nextel, 82, 87, 91, 92--95f, 103, 103f
bricks, 146, 146f; as residential nongovernmental organizations (NGOs):
construction material, 142--43t; emergency response, 3, 5, 195,
short column effect, 148, 149f, 150, 198; reinforced adobe construction
150f. See also reinforced concrete project, 167
as building material North American plate, 2
Matarini, 117 nuclear power in Peru, lack of, 47
medical services. See hospitals and medical Nuevo Monterrico, 146f
services
MHC (Ministry of Housing and oil and gas, 2, 4, 126; Consorcio
Construction), 87 Terminales, 130--32, 131--33;
micro-tremor measurements: new reinforced distribution systems, 2, 4, 126;
adobe houses, 170--71, 170--71f; medical gas, 185; natural gas, 2, 4,
retrofitted adobe houses, 151, 153, 126, 184; Pisco Refinery, 133,
153f; at UNICA, 166, 166f 134f; tank farms, coastal, 126,
210
127f; tsunami flooding, 130, 131-- 87, 91, 95--96, 96--101f, 100--101;
32f tsunami, 19, 19f; wastewater
Organismo Supervisor de la Inversion on system, 4, 61, 75--78, 75--78f;
Energy and Mines (OSINERG), 47 water system, 3, 61--68, 63--64f,
OSIPTEL (Supervising Agency for 66--68f, 180
Telecommunications Private Sector Pisco Airport, 4, 111
Investment), 86, 87 Pisco earthquake (2007), 1--6; areas
oxidation ponds, Ica wastewater system, 79, affected by, 1, 1f; date, time, and
79f magnitude, 1 (See also
geotechnical aspects); health impact
Pacaran, 167, 169--71, 169--71f of, 202; injuries and fatalities, ii, 1,
Paita, 117 5, 196; systems, services, and
Pan American Highway South, 28--32; fixtures affected by, 2--6 (See also
damages/performance assessment, buildings; electrical power system;
2, 4, 28--32, 28--32f; emergency tanks and tank farms;
medical trailers posted along, 189, telecommunications systems;
190f; emergency response and transportation systems; wastewater
recovery, 43, 44; geotechnical systems; water systems); tsunami
observations made along, 12; following, 1, 19, 19f, 130, 131f. See
highway system, description of, 22; also emergency response and
liquefaction and lateral spreading recovery
along, 15--18, 15--18f; liquid fuel Pisco electrical substation, 3, 49, 51, 53--
tank farms, 126, 127f; Nextel cell 54f
site damage, 91 Pisco Playa, UNICA fisheries and foods
pandereta bricks, 146, 146f campus at, 157
Paracas, 43, 49, 103--5f Pisco Refinery, 133, 134f
Paracas electrical substation, 3, 49, 51--52, Pisco River, 24, 30f, 31
52f, 54--59f Piura, 111
Parcona ground motion recording station plate tectonics, 2, 7--8, 8f
(PCA), 9, 10f police. See security
peak ground acceleration (PGA), 9 Poly Vinyl Chloride (PVC) pipe, 61, 62
PGA (peak ground acceleration), 9 Pontifical Catholic University of Peru
pharmaceuticals, uncontrolled, 151, 152f, (PUCP), 163
186 Ponton La Isla, 40
Pisco: building code compliance, lack of, port facilities, 4, 117--25; Callao, 111, 117;
142; churches, 162, 162f, 187, 196; fill, performance of, 117, 119, 120f,
damages suffered by, 1, 2, 6, 21; 121, 122f, 124; Pisco Refinery
electrical power system, 47, 49, 50, offshore loading platform, 133,
52, 60; fire following earthquake in, 134f; Puerto San Martin, 15, 23,
196, 197f; geotechnical 117--25, 117--25f; San Juan de
observations made in, 12; ground Marcona, 23; transformer damage,
conditions in, 10; highways, 4; 124, 125f; water tanks, 124, 124f
hospitals and medical services, privatization of airports, 111
174, 176, 189 (See also Central privatization of electrical power system, 47
Receiving Hospital, Pisco; San Juan privatization of telecommunications
de Dios Hospital, Pisco); hotels, systems, 82, 108
100--101, 100--101f, 161, 161f; Pucallpa, 111
Modified Mercalli Intensities, 10f; PUCP (Pontifical Catholic University of
port facilities at, 117; residential Peru), 163
building damage in, 144, 144f; Puerto San Martin, 15, 23, 117--25, 117--
telecommunications systems in, 3, 25f
211
PVC (Poly Vinyl Chloride) pipe, 61, 62 temporary shelters, 193, 194f, 201-
-2f, 201--2t
quincha, 136, 137, 138, 138f, 139f, 142--43t retrofitting. See mitigation of building
damage
radiological hazardous materials in Rio Grande River, 24
hospitals, 186 roads. See highways and roads
rammed earth construction (tapial), 136, rockslides: defined and described, 18, 19f;
137, 137f highway and bridge damage from,
RCP (reinforced concrete pipe), 61, 62, 64 21, 21f, 22, 23f, 44; protection
Red Cross, 2, 189, 190f systems, 44
refugee camps, 201, 201t roof types, 139, 140f, 142--43t
Regional Reference Hospital, Ica, 178; runway, JCIA, 112f, 116, 116f
critical equipment, 186;
damages/performance assessment, Salaverry, 117
178, 178f; electrical power system, San Andrés, 62, 75, 76, 77
179, 180f; emergency response and San Clemente, 62
recovery, 188, 189, 189f; fire San Clemente Church, Pisco, 162, 162f,
suppression system, 186, 186f; 187, 196
HVAC system, 183--84, 184f; San Jeronimo Surco zone, 21, 43
patient transportation, 185; San Juan Bautista High School, Huaytara,
telecommunications systems, 183; 158--59f
water system, 180, 180f, 182f San Juan de Dios Hospital, Pisco, 174;
reinforced concrete as building material, critical equipment, 185;
137--38, 138f; apartment buildings, damages/performance assessment,
147, 147f; educational buildings, 174, 175--76f; electrical power
150, 153, 153f, 154, 155f, 159--60, system, 179, 185; emergency
159--61f; hospitals, 176, 178, 178f; response and recovery, 187, 187f;
houses, one- and two-story, 146f; HVAC system, 183, 184f;
as residential construction material, telecommunications systems, 183;
142--43t water system, 180, 181f
reinforced concrete pipe (RCP), 61, 62, 64 San Juan de Marcona Port, 23
reservoirs and water tanks, 64, 69, 70; San Juan River, 24, 35, 36f
Central tank, Ica system, 69, 70, San Luis, 12, 145f, 146f
70f; Consorcio Terminales fire- San Luis Gonzaga High School, Ica, 159--
water tank, 132, 133f; elevated 60, 160f
tank, Pisco system, 64, 64f, 66--67, San Martin (port), 15, 23, 117--25, 117--25f
67--68f; ground-level reservoirs, San Nicholas electric power generation
Pisco system, 64--65, 64f; plant, 49
hospitals, 180, 181--82f; San Vicente de Canete, 12
Manzanilla tank, Ica system, 69, sand boils, 12; defined and described, 12,
70, 71--72f; Puerto San Martin 12f; Huamani Bridge, 32, 32f; Los
water tank, 124, 124f; soccer field Molinos bridge, 39f; relationship to
tank, Ica system, 73, 73f liquefaction, 12, 12f, 13, 16, 17;
residential buildings, 142--48; apartment Sunampe beach road, 42
buildings, three or more stories, sanitation. See wastewater systems
147--48, 147--49f; construction Santa Rosa Bridge, 40
materials, 142--43, 142--43t, 143f; Schmidt Hammer tests, 151, 153
damage/performance assessment, schools. See educational buildings
144, 144f; one- and two- story scour, 38, 44
houses, 144--46, 145--47f;
retrofitting, 163--66, 163--66f;
212
security: Civil Defense forces, 192, 193f; Council of Lifeline Earthquake
Jose Matias Manzanilla Hospital, Engineering), ASCE, 200, 200f
Ica, 186 TdP (Telefónica del Peru; formerly
seismic design criteria: bridges, 24; Telefónica de España), 3, 82, 86--
buildings, 9, 140--41, 141f, 162; 87, 95, 96--99f, 102, 102f, 103--5f
churches, 162. See also mitigation Telecom Reform Act (1991), 82
of building damage telecommunications systems, 3, 82--110;
seismic hazard zones in Peru, 24, 25f, 45 building damage affecting, 108--9,
SENCICO (National Service for Training 109f; conclusions regarding, 108--
for the Construction Industry), 140, 9; COs, 3, 95, 96--99f, 102, 102f;
167 damages/performance assessment,
sewage. See wastewater systems 2, 87; description of, 85--87, 86f;
shelters, temporary, 193, 194f, 201--2f, 201- distribution systems, 100, 100f;
-2t emergency response and recovery,
short column effect, 148, 149f, 150, 150f 87, 192, 196, 197f; fixed telephone
SICN (Central Northern Interconnected lines and density, 83t, 86; hospitals
System), 47, 48f and medical services, 183, 183f,
SIS (Southern Interconnected System), 47, 191; Huamani bridge trunk lines,
48f 87--91, 88--91f; in Ica, 3, 87, 102,
soccer field water tank, Ica system, 73, 73f 102f; Internet service, 82, 86, 87;
soft stories, buildings with, 148, 148f licensed public telecommunications
South American plate, 2, 7 companies, 84t; at Lima
South Carolina, bridge construction in, 44 International Airport, 114, 115--16;
Southern Interconnected System (SIS), 47, in Pisco, 3, 87, 91, 95--96, 96--
48f 101f, 100--101; privatization of,
streets. See highways and roads 82, 108; redundancy in system,
Sunampe, 42 importance of, 108--9; transmission
Supervising Agency for towers, 91, 92f, 96, 97f, 101--3,
Telecommunications Private Sector 101--3f, 105, 106f. See also cellular
Investment (OSIPTEL), 86, 87 phone sites and systems
Telefónica del Peru (TdP; formerly
Tacna, 111 Telefónica de España), 3, 82, 86--
Tambo de Mora, 1; bridge damage, 42; 87, 95, 96--99f, 102, 102f, 103--5f
electrical power system, 49; Telmex Perú, 87
extensive liquefaction at, 91; temporary shelters, 193, 194f, 201--2f, 201-
geotechnical observations made in, -2t
12; ground conditions in, 10; tertiary education. See Universidad Nacional
Modified Mercalli Intensities, 10f; San Luis Gonzaga de Ica
surface road damage in, 22 timber bridges on Departmental Highway
tanks and tank farms, 5, 126--35; anchoring, 100, 34--35, 34--35f
135; conclusions regarding, 135; transformers, electrical, 51, 56f, 105, 108f,
elephant foot damage, 127, 129f, 124, 125f
132, 133f; fish oil, 126, 127--29, transmission lines (electrical), 48f, 49, 49f,
128--30f. See also oil and gas; 50, 51f, 60
reservoirs and water tanks transmission pipelines (water), 62, 64, 65--
tapial (rammed earth construction), 136, 66, 66f
137, 137f transmission towers, telecommunications
Tarapoto, 111 systems, 91, 92f, 96, 97f, 101--3,
TCLEE (Earthquake Investigations 101--3f, 105, 106f
Committee of the Technical transportation systems, 4; airports, 4, 111--
16, 112--16f; emergency response
213
and recovery, 196; hospital water systems, 2, 3, 61--74; Cabeza de Toro
patients, 185, 185f. See also filtration gallery, 3, 62, 64, 65;
bridges; highways and roads; port chlorination systems, 65, 69;
facilities conclusions regarding, 73--74;
Trujillo, 111 damages/performance assessment,
tsunami, 1, 19, 19f, 130, 131--32f 63--64f, 63--65, 69; descriptions of,
Túpac Amaru, 62, 64f, 76, 78 61--62, 68--69; distribution
services, 62, 63, 68, 69; emergency
Universidad Nacional San Luis Gonzaga de response and recovery, 196; fire
Ica (UNICA), 149--57; hydrants, 62, 63f; groundwater
damages/performance assessment, levels, 12; hospitals and medical
157t; dental school clinic, 154, services, 180, 181--82f; Ica water
155--56f; electrical power, loss of, system, 3, 61, 68--73, 70--73f;
151; fisheries and foods campus, Pisco water system, 3, 61--68, 63--
157; main campus ("City 64f, 66--68f, 180; transmission
University"), 149--53f, 150--53; pipelines, 62, 64, 65--66, 66f; types
medical school campus, 154, 154f; of piping used, 61, 62; water tank
outpatient clinic, 178--79, 186, 189 trucks, use of, 61, 65, 66, 67f, 180;
uplift, 18 wells, 68, 69. See also reservoirs
Urbanizacion Villa de Valverde, 79 and water tanks
wells, 68, 69
Vinac, 167
Yauyos, 1, 21, 144f, 174
wastewater systems, 3--4, 75--81; collection
pipes, 62, 75--80, 78f, 80f;
conclusions regarding, 80;
damages/performance assessment,
2, 76; emergency response and
recovery, 196; hospitals and
medical services, 183; Ica system,
79--80, 80f; manholes, 76, 78;
overflows, 63, 63f; oxidation
ponds, 79, 79f; Pisco system, 4,
61, 75--78, 75--78f; pump stations,
75--77, 75--77f
214

Pisco, Peru, Earthquake of August

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Pisco, Peru, Earthquake of August

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Pisco, Peru, Earthquake

of August 15, 2007

Published by The American Society of Civil Engineers

American Society of Civil Engineers

Photocopies and reprints.

Copyright © 2010 by the American Society of Civil Engineers.

The Earthquake Investigation Committee of the Technical Council of Lifeline Earthquake

Name Affiliation Email

Tom Cooper T.W. Cooper Inc. twcoopinc@aol.com

Jörgen Johansson University of Tokyo jorgen@iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Paola Mayorca University of Tokyo paola@iis.u-tokyo.ac.jp

Lucero Mesa DOT, SC MesaLE@dot.state.sc.us

Monique Nykamp Shannon & Wilson man@shanwil.com

Jerome O’Connor MCEER jso7@buffalo.edu

Mark Pickett University of Toledo, OH mark.pickett@utoledo.edu

Carl Sepponen Tran Consulting Engineers Sepponen@tran-c-e.com

Michael Salmon Los Alamos National Lab Salmon@lanl.gov

Alex Tang L&T Engineering & Project alexktang@mac.com

No. 10 Methods of Achieving Improved Seismic Performance of Communications Systems,

No. 18 Chi-Chi, Taiwan, Earthquake of September 21, 1999—Lifeline Performance, Schiff,

No. 20 The Nisqually, Washington, Earthquake of February 2001— Lifeline Performance,

No. 29 Hurricane Katrina: Performance of Transportation Systems, DesRoches, Reginald, Editor,

Dowd, Munson, Editor, Annotated Bibliography on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, 1980.

Hall, William J., Advisory Notes on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, 1983.

TCLEE Earthquake Investigation Reports

Alex Tang, F. ASCE, ASCE/TCLEE Investigation Team Leader

Jorgen Johansson, M. JSCE, JSCE/JAEE Investigation Team Leader

Chapter 2: Geotechnical Aspects

Chapter 3: Performance of Bridges and Highways

Chapter 4: Electric Power

Chapter 10: Tanks—Fish Oil and Liquid Fuel

Chapter 12: Hospitals and Medical Services

Chapter 13: Emergency Response, Recovery and Social Impact

Fig. 1.1 Areas affected by the August 15 earthquake.

Communications systems—both landline and cellular networks—performed poorly during the

Water and Wastewater Systems

Highways and Bridges

Sea Ports and Airports

Gas and Tanks

Hospitals, Schools, and Churches

Emergency Response, Recovery, and Social Impact

Tectonic Setting and Seismicity

Table 2.1 Estimates of Modified Mercalli Intensity8

Fig. 2.5. Study area and geologic region designations.

Lateral Spreading Along Pan-American Highway

Fig. 2.18. Sand inside prison cell. (Courtesy of Julio

Fig. 2.17. Repair work going on at a Sardine

Description of the Highway System

The Peruvian highway system (network) consists of three categories of roadways:

Bridge classification according to the regional direction of transportation and communications—

Bridges Seismic Design Criteria

Table 3-1 Summary of damage to transportation infrastructure.*

Route 24 / Via Deep P/S beam; erosion at

A blank cell indicates that the data is not readily available.

*Table Courtesy of Jerry O’Connor, F ASCE.

Pan-American Highway South

Fig. 3.16. Damage to interior pier wall (pilar) of

Fig. 3.17. Although apparently under-

Fig. 3.21. Highway 100 Departmental Huancavelica

Fig. 3.23. Single-span timber bridge

Fig. 3.28. Collapse of gabion retaining wall

Departmental Highway Route 110 Los Molinos-Tambillo

Fig. 3.29. City of Los Molinos