Baser Swain 2008

Diasporas as Peacemakers:
Third Party Mediation in

Homeland Conflicts
Bahar Baser and Department of Peace and Conflict Research

Uppsala University
Ashok Swain
Uppsala
Sweden
Bahar Baser is a visiting researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research in
Uppsala University, thanks to the research grant she has received from the Swedish Institute.
She has a Master’s degree in International Studies from Uppsala University and holds a
BA in Political Science and International Relations from Bogazici University, Istanbul. Her
research areas include third party mediation, negotiations, and diaspora studies.
Ashok Swain is a Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden.
He serves as the Director of Uppsala University’s Master’s Program in Peace and Conflict
Studies and the Coordinator of the Swedish Research Network of Peace, Conflict and
Development Studies. His research area focuses on the analysis of newly emerging threats
to global security.
Most recent violent conflicts are Introduction

intrastate conflicts, and a majority
are deterritorialized through the In today’s world, mediation offers a
involvement of diaspora groups.
decent feasible method of managing
Much existing research criticizes
diaspora communities for financing conflicts and building peace. It is con-
war efforts, promoting extremism, sidered as a rather low-cost and respect-
and holding uncompromising able option for a third party compared
political views. However,
diasporas have also contributed to not intervening at all or engaging
to peacemaking efforts in their in a costly military involvement. That
homelands’ conflicts. Through is why many scholars and practitioners
lobbying governments and
international organizations and
from various disciplines have attempted
aiding transition and post-conflict to further our understanding of how
reconstruction, diasporas are mediation works and under what
increasingly playing an important conditions it becomes successful. 1
role in mediation and peacebuilding.
This paper explores and analyzes the Regularly, new research emerges on
potential positive contributions of various aspects of mediation, its com-
diasporas to resolving conflicts in position, timing, and impact, etc. One
their homelands.
of the genres of this research describes
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

VOL. XXV NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2008 7
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Diasporas as Peacemakers
simultaneous involvement of several actors in mediating a conflict to bring

a peaceful settlement. In this paper, an exploration has taken place to map
out whether diaspora can possibly contribute as an external actor to third
party mediation efforts in their homeland conflicts.
Studying the attitude and behavior of diasporas is not an easy task.
The concept of “diaspora” itself is a controversial issue since there is no
commonly accepted definition of what a diaspora is. Moreover, there is no
doubt that diasporas are not alike and their different histories, generations
of exit, their cultures and trajectories mark them out as somewhat unique.2
Shain and Barth make an attempt to define diaspora as “a people with a
common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the
borders of their ethnic or religious homeland.”3 Tötölian also combines
the term diaspora within the transnational
community by describing diaspora as “the
The era of global exemplary communities of the transna-
interconnectedness has tional moment.”4 In the past, the term
transformed itself into “diaspora” applied primarily to Jews, and
a global environment, occasionally to Greeks, Armenians and
which has facilitated Africans. However, recently, at least thirty
a range of non-state ethnic groups declare themselves or are
actors’ involvement as described by others as diaspora.5
parties in a conflict. It does not matter whether the
diasporas concept of homeland is an actual
homeland or just a symbolic attribution.
In today’s world, it is evident that the diaspora members have a tendency
to keep their attachments to the homeland one way or another. As Vertovec
argues, “Belonging to a diaspora entails a consciousness of, or emotional
attachment to, commonly claimed origins and cultural attributes associated
with them.” 6 These origins and attributes may represent ethnic, religious,
linguistic, regional, national, or other traits. Their empathy for economic
development of the homeland, and support to the other members of their
group living in other parts of the world, originate from their emotional
connection. Nevertheless, due to this sentimental attachment, diasporas
are gradually becoming crucial links between immigrant receiving countries
and political developments in countries of origin.
Numerous researches on diaspora establish that its members may

8 VOL. XXV NO. 3 SEPTEMBER 2008

actively contribute to violent conflicts in their homelands. They primarily

are blamed for financing war efforts and promoting extremist and uncom-
promising political views. Periodically they participate in the conflict as
armed combatants. Concurrently, there are several cases where diasporas
have purposefully contributed to peacemaking endeavors in their homeland
conflicts as well.
Diasporas and their role in

Homeland Conflicts
The era of global interconnectedness has transformed itself into a global
environment, which has facilitated a range of non-state actors’ involvement
as parties in a conflict. Most of the violent conflicts fought after the Cold
War are intrastate in character and many of these armed struggles are deter-
ritorialised through the involvement of diaspora groups.7 According to the
Heidelberg Institute on International Conflict Research, there were 249
political conflicts in the world in 2005.8 In 2006, the number of conflicts
increased to 278. Six of these were wars, and 29 severe crises, amounting
to a total of 35 conflicts carried out with a massive amount of violence.
Eighty-three conflicts were classified as crises, meaning violence was used
only occasionally. Altogether, 118 conflicts were carried out violently.9 Many
of these intra-state violent conflicts, both major and minor ones, mainly
in Asia and Africa, have forced large numbers of people to migrate either
regionally or internationally.10 Conflicts force people to migrate. Other fac-
tors such as ecological crisis, natural disaster, poverty, underdevelopment
at home and economic opportunity abroad, together account for increas-
ing global trend in population migration. Thus, the strength of diaspora
communities is gradually growing, and that has helped them take further
interest in the political developments of their countries of origin.11
Current research on diaspora is primarily focused on examining its role
as a spoiler of peace negotiations in homeland conflicts. The reason behind
this is the acceptance of the fact that the diaspora may play an important, but
mostly controversial role in conflicts and political unrest in their country of
origin.12 To many, diaspora groups are obstacles to conflict resolution and
peacebuilding. They do not hesitate to describe diaspora as an extremist,
long distance nationalist community that pursues radical agendas taking


advantage of the freedom and economic upliftment that the host land
provides them.13 The importance and influence of diaspora remittances
and support for promotion of conflicts in the homelands have been well-
documented. It is perceived that the diaspora members, by sending large
remittances as well as channeling huge funds through welfare organizations
close to insurgent or terrorist groups, contribute to the conflict escalation
rather than supporting constructive conflict transformation.14 As Cochrene
illustrates “when diasporas are mentioned within the context of violent
conflicts, the focus frequently tends to be on their tendency to fund the
continuation of warfare and their propensity to destabilize negotiations
and peace building efforts.”15
Disproportionally, existing studies concentrate on the activities of
the militant and hard-line diaspora groups. Among them, the frequently
cited cases are the Irish, Tamil, Sikhs and
Studies concentrate Kurdish diasporas.16 The strong Irish
on the activities of the diaspora community in the United States
was considered to be one of the most
militant and hard-line
classic cases of diaspora’s involvement in
diaspora groups. Among
homeland conflicts. Growing evidence is
them, the frequently emerging that during the violent conflict
cited cases are the Irish, period in the 1980s and 1990s, the Irish
Tamil, Sikh and Kurdish Republican Army (IRA) had regularly
Diasporas. received significant financial support from
the Irish diaspora.17 The sudden upsurge
in strength of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the summer of
1998 has been partially attributed to the spectacular fundraising efforts by
the Albanian diaspora in the West. In addition, a substantial number of
Kosovar Albanians in the diaspora returned to Kosovo in the late 1990s
to directly take part in the conflict.18 Eritrean diaspora are another pro-
nounced example of conflict promoting diaspora groups. As Fiona Lortan
estimates, during its tense conflict period with Ethiopia, Eritrea’s economy
was kept afloat by remittances from the Eritrean diaspora that contributed
an estimated 400 million US dollars by May 2000. After May 2000, with
increasing Ethiopian offensive and subsequent Eritrean military reverses,
diaspora remittances rose sharply as well.19
Another observable group is Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora. Most of the


Tamils in the diaspora perceive the guerrilla group LTTE (Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Elam) as an organization that represents hope and aspiration for all
Sri Lankan Tamils.20 Large numbers of Tamil organizations and individuals,
through substantial transfer of remittances, support the Tamil population
in need in the northeastern part of Sri Lanka, as well as the organizations
affiliated with the separatist movement.21 LTTE’s networks for funding are
extremely efficient and most Tamils, willingly or unwillingly, contribute
regularly to the “freedom fight” in Sri Lanka.22 The Kurdish diaspora in
Europe also substantially contributes to conflicts in the homeland by pro-
viding financial support to the rebel groups. The Kurdish diaspora raises
large sums of money in Europe to financially support the violent activi-
ties in Turkey and most of these contributions appear to be voluntary.23
Equally diaspora groups, who support peace processes at home, may cause
problems by sending remittances. As a World Bank Report claims, diaspo-
ras took part in efforts to resolve conflict and supported peace building
projects, particularly in Eritrea and Sri Lanka, with their remittances; but
they naively helped to renew conflicts in their home countries following
political upheavals.24 Not only financial support and remittances but also
recruitment of guerrillas to fight the struggle in the homeland is a regular
phenomenon within the diaspora groups. Examples on this front are many
and that is why mostly, in the conflict situation, diasporas are seen as part
of the problem, not as part of the solution.25
On the other hand, an emerging set of research finds diasporas to be
critical agents of social, political and cultural change in more constructive
and less confrontational ways as well.26 Authors such as Cochrene emphasize
the fact that although the capacity of diaspora groups to contribute to vio-
lence in their countries of origin and their reluctance to accept the political
pragmatism required for peace processes are acknowledged by the research-
ers and practitioners, insufficient attention has been given to their more
positive contributions.27 There are many evidences of diaspora communities
significantly contributing to promotion of peace in their homelands. They
have been highly or partially effective in assisting conflict transformation
processes and actively engaged in post-conflict reconstruction activities.
There is an increasing belief that through lobbying governments, particu-
larly of the host nations, and international organizations and aiding the
process of transition and reconstruction, diasporas are increasingly playing


an important role in achieving political compromise and peaceful conflict

resolution in their homelands.28
The current globalization process has mitigated the long-distance
involvement of various diaspora groups, and that has enabled them to build
up vast transnational networks contributing to peace, reconciliation and
development. Examining the critical role that diaspora groupings can and
have played in promoting peace in their homelands, Abdullah A. Moham-
oud concludes that diasporas provide noteworthy contributions to fostering
conflict transformation, post conflict reconstruction and socioeconomic
development.29 In Sudan, diaspora groups support several private radio
stations, which are dedicated to transmit programs about the prospects
of peace, and help to mobilize Sudanese
population for the challenges that need to
Diasporas are be addressed in the post-conflict period.
increasingly building Similarly in Afghanistan, diaspora groups
bridges between their assumed significant political roles after the
home and host societies. US military intervention in 2001-2002 to
They often play a role ensure a smooth power transition. Mem-
as a distinct third level bers of the Afghan diaspora played a criti-
between interstate and cal role during the negotiations among
domestic peacemaking. various tribal groups in the formation of
the post-Taliban government. The case of
Somalia is noteworthy as remittances are
of very high economic importance domestically and much of the expertise
and resources for sustaining the ongoing peace process come from the
diaspora communities in the West.30
As it can be seen, the concept of diaspora has so much to offer for
analysis and research in various dimensions. However, the primary purpose
in this paper is to explore and analyze the potential positive elements of
diaspora involvement in third party mediation efforts in homeland conflicts.
Diasporas are increasingly building bridges between their home and host
societies. They often play a role as a distinct third level between interstate
and domestic peacemaking, and “this third level can have a significant
impact on the sovereign decision-making of states with respect to questions
of peace and war.”31


Importance of the Diaspora

In today’s world, violent conflicts are no longer fought only in definite war
terrains. Due to the increasing number of immigrants and war refugees,
the conflicts also seem to be dispersed and delocalized. Many cases of
conflicts have been exposed to diaspora influence, such as conflicts in the
Middle East, Caucuses, and South Asia. Increasing in numbers and grow-
ing economic strength makes diaspora groups stronger. Due to improved
information and communication, diaspora have greater potential to inter-
act between the homeland and the hostland, as well. Consequently, it is
particularly important to understand the dynamics of diaspora groups in
today’s world conflicts.
As the nature of external support for contemporary conflict has become
gradually more transnational, diaspora communities have become the agents
to mobilize the support needed by the conflicting groups. Secondly, since
most of the contemporary conflicts are internal ones, there is an expected
rise in the number of refugees, which leads to the increased number of
diaspora groups. Additionally, the benefits of globalization have made com-
munication much easier and the diaspora communities may stay engaged
with their homeland’s politics and evolve a long-distance nationalist stance
towards the developments in their homeland. Last but not least, as it has
become increasingly hard to settle and assimilate in the hostland, diasporas
are more likely to continue to focus on their erstwhile homeland.32 Many
states, frightened by the extent of international migration in the face of their
inability to construct a stable, pluralist social order, are moving away from
the idea of assimilating or integrating their ethnic minorities. At the same
time, minority diaspora groups no longer desire to abandon their pasts.33
Diaspora communities have the potential to play a significant role in
homeland and hostland politics and political decision-making processes.
Most of the diaspora groups act similarly to other interest or lobby groups.
In the host countries, they have influence with the policymakers since they
constitute an influential electorate base or they are part of the political and
economic elite. With regards to homeland politics, diasporas matter as they
use political and financial means, such as economic investments, remittances
or political contributions, and controlling and manipulating the media to
play an important role in influencing decision-making processes.


Diasporas invariably get involved in the internal conflicts of the home-

land. The reason behind diaspora involvement in the homeland affairs
could be their incentive to maintain the memory of their homeland and
keep the emotional attachments of solidarity and kinship.34 This is true
especially for the diasporas that surface as the result of a civil conflict in
the homeland. The diaspora groups are also committed to preserve or
restore their “nation.” Their consciousness and solidarity are primarily
defined by this continuing relationship with the homeland.35 Particularly,
conflict-generated diasporas characteristically develop networks based on
solidarity that emphasize identity and work to keep nationalist hopes alive
from abroad. Diaspora communities have distinctive attitudes toward the
homeland, especially in terms of highly valuable symbolic attachment.36 The
idea of a potential return to the homeland
Different diaspora-based is always there and that affords them a
associations lobby host legitimate stake in the way they interfere
governments to shape with homeland policies. The notion of
policies in favor of or a “secure homeland,” a place to return
in time plays a very important role in
against a homeland
diaspora behavior. Demmers describes the
government.
long distance interaction of the diaspora
groups in homeland conflicts, as they are
engaged in a sort of “virtual conflict: they live their conflicts through the
internet, email, television, and telephone without direct (physical) suffer-
ing, risks or accountability.”37
Different diaspora-based associations lobby host governments to shape
policies in favor of or against a homeland government. They also influence
their homeland’s policies through their support or opposition to the gov-
ernments, and by providing financial and other support to political par-
ties, social movements, and civil society organizations, or even sometimes
sponsoring terrorism.38 Moreover, diasporas have a strong tendency to
perceive the foreign policy of their homeland as favoring a specific com-
munity. Shain and Bath claim, diaspora organizations may try to alter the
homeland’s policy to suit their own priorities.39 Intermittently, the diaspora
community adopts a foreign policy of its own and puts pressure on the
homeland policymakers for the support. There have been many instances
where the diaspora groups and the homeland policymakers disagreed on


certain issues. There is a clear lack of consensus among Jewish Americans

and Israelis regarding the concession on Jerusalem.40 Similarly several Jew-
ish diaspora groups in the US did not welcome the Oslo Peace Process.
Another famous example could be the Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan’s
resignation. It is believed that diaspora money was instrumental in mobiliz-
ing Armenian public opinion against Ter Petrosyan and his peace efforts
with Azerbaijan and Turkey, ultimately forcing his resignation.41
Diaspora groups not only act as spoilers of peace processes, they also
have the capacity to positively affect conflict resolution processes in their
homelands. Diaspora can have positive political impacts on peacemaking
through human rights advocacy, raising consciousness among the hostland
public and decision-makers. They can also potentially provide direct politi-
cal support to pro-peace actors in the homeland, as well as participate in
the homeland peacemaking initiatives as advisors. Members of the diaspora
may also act as facilitator and communicator between the homeland officials
and hostland peacemakers.
Diaspora leaders may return to their home country and accept leader-
ship positions, which could be highly influential of the peace process. The
Armenian diaspora is generally blamed for Armenia’s hostile relations with
Azerbaijan. However in some cases the political parties that are founded
by diaspora members in Armenia tend to have a more liberal agenda than
the other political parties. The regular political parties such as the Arme-
nian Democratic Liberal Party, Social Democratic Hunchakian Party or
Armenian Revolutionary Federation, adopts a very rigid stance on the
recognition of genocide and independence of Nagorno Karabakh from
Azerbaijan. On the other hand, the Heritage Party in Armenia, founded
by a US born Armenian politician Hovhannisyan, is considered to be one
of the major centrist opposition parties, and it has a more liberal posture
compared to others especially on sensitive issues such as Armenia’s relation
with Turkey and Azerbaijan. The party pursues a more peaceful solution
with regards to problems with Turkey and declares that the two states have
to come together and to engage in honest discussions about the past and
the future.42
Iraq and Afghanistan serve as further examples of the powerful influ-
ence of diaspora leaders, particularly when there is a concurrence of interest
between them and ruling elites. In the aftermath of regime change in these


two countries, the diaspora leaders have assumed important positions in

new administrations, possibly the ultimate form of political influence any
diaspora can possess. Nearly three-quarters of Hamid Karzai’s 30-strong
cabinet in the post-Taliban administration were members of the Afghan
diaspora.43 Moreover, Iraqi formal politics has been dominated similarly
with diasporans filling most Governing Council posts and many of the
Interim Government cabinet posts. In contrast, it is not always easy for the
diaspora members to form political parties of their own or to be involved
in the politics of their homelands. Serbia provides a prime example of this.
A network of politically active Serbians living in Germany wanted to play
an active role in Serbian politics. Those activists were members of political
parties in Serbia. However, the party functionaries in the homeland did
not permit any competition from abroad
so none of the party members from the
Economic support from diaspora were elected to the Serbian
the diaspora to the Parliament.44
political parties, civil Economic support from the diaspora
society organizations, to the political parties, civil society orga-
or popular campaigns nizations, or popular campaigns support-
supporting peace in the ing peace in the homeland is also quite
homeland is also quite effective. Remittance is a major influenc-
effective. ing factor through which diasporas may
potentially influence the behavior of
conflicting parties. The sum is too big to
ignore. Officially recorded remittances received by developing countries
exceeded 93 billion US Dollars in 2003. The actual size of remittances
including both officially recorded and unrecorded transfers through
informal channels is even larger. In some developing countries such as El
Salvador, remittances are larger than all capital flows, public and private.45
Remittances also constitute alternatives to the war economy; helping to
erase the roots of the conflict such as lack of opportunities, and uneven
development.46
Many of the diaspora groups have substantial potential to positively
influence negotiations and mediation efforts in their homeland conflicts.
Originating from the country of conflict, they understand the nature of
the conflict better than the outside mediators. In addition, diasporas could


provide better insights on how to maintain a dialog process between con-

flicting parties and differentiate between needs and demands of the actors.
As Cochrane highlights, “Being from outside the conflict zone but having
a connection to it, might provide diaspora groups with specific abilities as
third party actors in pre-negotiations or even in formal talks over a political
settlement.”47 The diaspora is emerging as a very important political factor
providing expertise to all groups and factions and functioning as a bridge
to the international actors supporting the peace process.48
Diaspora and Conflict Mediation

Territorial disputes, internal conflicts, and militarized ethnic problems are
some of the main conflict areas which receive attention from the interna-
tional community. There is an abundance of literature on international
community intervention, how their methods affects the peace process,
and the modes of developing sustainable settlement plans, etc. All of those
aspects of third party intervention and mediation have importance of their
own. However, here the aim is to explore diaspora’s possible contributions
to third party mediation efforts in general.
Once a conflict becomes open to mediation, many actors may aspire to
play a role in that initiative. However, one critical point is whether or not
the warring parties agree on who will have the responsibility to manage the
conflict. In order to start negotiations a mediator needs to be accepted by
both parties. Who will be accepted as the mediator by the warring parties
depends on the many different variables in a conflict. Nevertheless, the
basic requirements of an acceptable mediator is the possession of an ability
to offer a resolution that is more favorable than the ongoing conflict situ-
ation and potential of finding an mutually acceptable solution.49 Besides
noble intentions of ending violence, finding a way to resettle the refugees,
stabilize the region and humanitarian concern, the mediators in most cases
have a stake in the conflict they try to resolve and act as much out of self
interest as they do altruism.50 Although the debate on impartiality is ongo-
ing, experience proves that there is no doubt mediators bring their benefit
and motives to the conflict resolution process.
Occasionally, self-interests prevent the mediator from resolving a con-
flict. There is a possibility that resolution of a dispute might not benefit the


mediating third party. In that case, the mediator may inhibit or undercut
the opportunities for a settlement. A third party may also obstruct paths
to the successful mediation because it prefers the status quo to an outcome
that would require a friend or an ally to make significant concessions in a
negotiation.51 Thus, as long as mediators act according to their own interests
and do not give priority to ending the conflict, intractability increases.
Mediator bias is traditionally considered to be one of the most common
obstacles to conflict resolution. However, the notion of a disinterested,
impartial mediator becomes difficult to uphold in an increasingly interde-
pendent world.52 The frequency of instances in which biased mediators have
been accepted and considered successful is increasing. There are more initia-
tives nowadays for the mediators to have
strong ties or alliances with one of the
It is increasingly parties. It is increasingly accepted that the
accepted that the mediator’s resources and ability to impose
mediator’s resources a change in the conflict situation, rather
and ability to impose a than neutrality, affect their acceptability or
change in the conflict effectiveness. Zartman and Touval argue
situation, rather than that biased mediators who have close ties
neutrality, affect with one of the disputants could be more
their acceptability or effective as they are more motivated than
effectiveness. other mediation actors.53
The discussion on impartiality is usu-
ally intertwined with the issue of accept-
ability. For the conflicting parties, a biased mediator may be a desirable
preference as long as the mediator has robust connections to the party with
strong control over the result of the dispute. The mediator’s larger capability
to persuade that party compensates its partiality handicap. The party who
lacks good relations with the mediator accepts its service in expectation
of its capability to influence the adversary.54 Svensson argues further that
primarily with interested and biased intermediaries, there is an increased
likelihood of a settlement.55
Diaspora’s role as a contributor and/or facilitator to the third party
mediation efforts, particularly by the hostland government or organizations,
completely ignores the traditional definition of the mediators as neutral,
non-partisan actors without an interest in the conflict. Nevertheless, diaspo-


ras’ involvement may provide much needed trust and assurance to both
the warring parties and also to the third party mediators to engage in the
peace process. Giving insights to the local issues, historical complexities
and personal characteristics of the group leaders, diaspora can really pro-
vide assistance to the mediators in making correct and appropriate moves
before and during the negotiations.56 It is common these days to notice
that diasporas are already involved in supporting and influencing third party
mediation, as in the case of Irish diaspora. It greatly influenced the settle-
ment of the conflict in Northern Ireland since the lobbying was successful
in the mid-1990s and the diaspora got the support of then President Bill
Clinton, who managed to achieve the Good Friday Agreement.57
Somalia has also witnessed a diaspora-supported mediation effort.
Composition of the Somali groups in the peace talks, which started in 2002
in Nairobi, demonstrates diasporas’ contribution to third party mediation.
All the major internal parties to the Somali conflict participated in several
rounds of deliberations. The international community supported these
meetings. In attendance were Somali participants from Western diaspora
communities in Australia, Canada, England, Italy and the USA.58 Substantial
involvement of the Afghan diaspora in the Petersburg talks on a peaceful
transition in post war Afghanistan in 2002 is another example. Under the
UN initiative, a pluralistic spectrum of Afghans from major factional groups,
both from Afghanistan and from different Afghan diaspora communities
were present at the talks and the series of meetings resulted in the forma-
tion of a trans-national government.59
The responsibility of the mediator during the negotiations is sustaining
communication, reducing mistrust, and moreover changing the perceptions
of the warring parties from perceiving the negotiations as a zero-sum game
to win-win solutions and convincing them for conflict resolution. Diasporas
as an empowered group, and a powerful force in the home country affairs,
could strongly influence the course of the conflict targeted by the third party
mediator. They can be important as agents of pressure or as an advocacy
group for conflict resolution. Lastly, they could be highly useful in assisting
mediators to bring the parties to the negotiation table and enhance the
communication between the conflicting parties. Diaspora groups can help
the international mediators to establish contact with the warring group
leaders in order to start the peace process.


Collier argues that diasporas are much richer than the people in their
country of origin and so can afford to finance vengeance and they do not
have to suffer any of the awful consequences of renewed conflict because
they are not living in the country.60 However, others disagree. As Purdy
suggests, diasporas might have a wider and more objective perspective, and
they are less influenced by simple emotions and anger.61 Since the diaspora
members are usually not at the forefront of the conflict, they have the
luxury to be more objective with their views of the occurrences in their
homeland. In availing the opportunities of free information flow in the
hostlands, diasporas may change their perceptions about the conflict and
acquire different and more positive perspectives. The new situation may
encourage diasporas to act as communicators between the conflicting parties
and facilitators of the peace process. In the case of Uganda, the members
of the Acholi diaspora in London have
successfully worked to bring together
Diasporas, due to their representatives from the government of
close ties with the Uganda, the Government of Sudan and
conflicting parties, could the main rebel group (the Lords Resis-
be more serious about tance Army).62
conflict resolution than If diaspora members do not partici-
the third part mediators. pate directly as the facilitators between
the conflicting parties, they might try to
influence the perceptions of the political
elites in both home and host countries. As in the Eritrea case, in the after-
math of the liberation struggle, a group of diaspora intellectuals wrote to
the President of Eritrea in criticizing the government’s unlawful practices
and demanded democratic reforms.63 Those kinds of instances are many
such as the Greek lobby in the US House of Representatives, which has
actively lobbied the American government to be proactive in its stance
towards conflict resolution in Cyprus, and the German-Cypriot Forum
which has lobbied both the German and the EU Parliament to continue
the momentum of recent resolution efforts.64
Diasporas, due to their close ties with the conflicting parties, could be
more serious about conflict resolution than the third part mediators. Global
networks of diaspora associations sometimes engage in mass protest to raise
consciousness about homeland-related issues. Their motivation may also


push the third party mediators to expedite the peace process. The ability
to move a conflicting party in an intended direction is often referred to as
“leverage” in mediation.65 However, leverage as a concept is elusive and
fuzzy and leads to ambiguous interpretations. There is no common defini-
tion of it, though there are some broadly accepted explanations. Stedman
defines leverage as “…the ability of the mediator to alter the objective
environment of the disputants, in particular the capacity of the parties to
prosecute the war, the tangible rewards of choosing peace, and the provi-
sion of personnel and service to reduce the risks of settlement.”66
Sometimes mediators use various means to apply leverage to one of
the parties in order to make the conflict end earlier than it would have to
overcome a stalled situation during the peace process. As Zartman and
Touval mention, leverage could be derived from the following sources:
“First, persuasion, the ability to portray an alternative future as more favor-
able than the continuing conflict; second, extraction, the ability to produce
an attractive position from each party; third, termination, the ability to
withdraw from the mediation; fourth, deprivation, the ability to withhold
resources from one side or to shift them to the other; and fifth, gratifica-
tion, the ability to add resources to the outcome.”67 Leverages give the
mediators power to manipulate conflicting situations whenever necessary.
Among the possibilities, persuasion is considered to be the most impor-
tant by Zartman, since it has a lot to do with the ability of the mediator to
reorient the parties’ perceptions.68
The ability to persuade the conflicting parties in an intended direc-
tion is not easy, but one can argue that in many cases it may be easier for
the diaspora rather than any other external actor to achieve this objective.
Diasporas potentially possess the leverage to manipulate the conflicting
situation to pave the way towards a peaceful resolution. Besides playing
the roles of a communicator or facilitator, diasporas have the possibility
to get involved in the persuasion process as well. Threat of withdrawal of
diaspora support from the homeland politics or economy sometimes gives
the diaspora more leverage than any third party mediator could have.
Especially if the homeland country and the regime suffer politically from
lack of legitimacy, the governments then need outside support to survive
and the support they seek usually comes from the diaspora. Withdrawal
of remittances and investment is another strong card diaspora groups can


play. Diaspora’s financial support is extremely important for the homeland

country’s economy, particularly if the country is a developing one. The
power of pressure on political and economic fronts provides a strong hand
to the diaspora in the negotiation process.
In many instances, political elites at home go a long distance to keep
the diaspora politically and financially interested in home country matters.
Particularly when a country faces difficult situation, they make various efforts
to call upon solidarity among the diaspora members. Former Irish President
Mary Robinson’s proclaiming herself as the leader of the extended Irish
family abroad, is a good example of how leaders try to strengthen the rela-
tions with the diaspora.69 The present Afghan government makes repeated
overtures to the Afghan diaspora all around the world. Opening a seminar
on trade and investment in July 2002, President Hamid Karzai appealed to
Afghans who are living abroad and invest-
Diasporas’ positive ing in other countries to invest rather in
influence can also come Afghanistan.70
It is true that there are more examples
from their decision to
of diasporas utilizing leverage for exactly
support the pro-peace
opposite purposes such as conflict pro-
political parties in the motion and escalation. The Armenian
homeland. diaspora is one of these groups. Armenia is
extremely dependent on diasporic support
and thus more permeable to the preferences of overseas Armenians.71 Since
Armenia’s economy experienced a rapid collapse after the independence,
Armenian diaspora’s financial and political support became crucial for
Armenia’s survival. The policymakers in Armenia tend to follow a foreign
and domestic policy line drawn by the diaspora Armenians since they cannot
afford to do the opposite. If one observes the party agendas of Armenian
political parties, it is noteworthy that “strengthening relations with the
diaspora” hits the top three aims of the party agenda.72 In the Armenian
case, the diaspora has used its leverage to move the political parties towards
perpetuating the conflict. This form of diaspora’s use of leverage could be
also used to move the parties towards a more positive approach in search
of conflict resolution. Diaspora, in using the threat of withdrawal of sup-
port can potentially move the hard liners in the homeland to soften their
views and opt for a negotiated settlement. The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora


used its leverage to convince LTTE to participate in the negotiation with

the government in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
Diasporas’ positive influence can also come from their decision to
support the pro-peace political parties in the homeland. There are many
examples of diasporas’ intervention in homeland politics by providing sup-
port to their favorite political organizations. In Armenia there are various
political parties, which are imported from the diaspora or founded by the
diaspora members. The Croatian diaspora had provided a huge financial
support (4 million US Dollars) to Franjo Tudjman for his electoral cam-
paign. In return, they were rewarded with representation in parliament:
12 of 120 seats were allotted to the diaspora Croats, more than allotted to
Croatia’s own ethnic minorities.73 Diaspora support has a significant influ-
ence on the action and agenda of major political parties in many countries.
If the diaspora channels support to the political parties supporting peace
rather than conflict, only then will the dynamic of the conflicts shift in a
democratic country to a large extent.
Concluding Discussion
Not all diasporas might be analyzed with the same policy tools since their
reasons to become refugees or immigrants vary depending on the each
case. All the members of a particular diaspora community do not have the
same level of attachments or emotions or share the same opinions about
the homeland. The anti-Castro émigrés in Miami do not share the same
points of view with the pre-1962 “children of revolution.”74 Similarly, not
all the Kurdish or the Sri Lankan Tamil diasporas support PKK (Partiya
Karkerên Kurdistan) or LTTE and their armed struggle for separation. It is
thus difficult to make generalizations about a diaspora community as there
might be different factions with agendas of their own inside a particular
diaspora group. Moreover, the diasporas could have emerged as a result of a
civil conflict in the homeland, escaping war between rival states or searching
for better economic opportunities. Therefore all these categories require
different analysis, which complicates diaspora studies further.
While auditing a diaspora’s contribution to their homeland’s peace-
making efforts, it should be kept in mind that the level of influence of the


diaspora is highly dependent on various factors that have to do with its

size, motivation, power and its influence in the homeland. Furthermore,
the political environment both in the homeland and the hostland matters
significantly since they both have an effect on the organizational structure
and influencing power of the diaspora.
Diasporan behavior has a certain hostland dimension as well. The nature
of the hostland regime determines the way diaspora community organizes
and interacts. The way the receiving state allows the community to exert
influence on itself affects the worth of the diaspora as a foreign policy
asset in the eyes of the homeland.75 As Eva Ostergaard Nielsen highlights,
diasporas are not just midwives but also gatekeepers as they lay down rules
and constraints for diaspora political attempts to influence conflicts in their
countries of origin.76
Diaspora’s influencing power in Saudi Arabia is not the same as the one
in the USA. The rules and regulations of the hostland seriously determine
the diaspora’s potential to act internationally. The so-called “war on terror”
in the post-9/11 period has brought new laws and regulations that have
greatly constrained diasporas’ sphere of influence. Many diasporas may
have the potential to play a part, but they are still bound to many different
variables to be influential in homeland and hostland politics.
Many hostland states and their institutions are involved in mediating
conflicts for various reasons. Besides humanitarian intervention, it also
helps to confront the on-going global war on terror and reduces refugee
migration. Encouraging diaspora to take part in peacemaking efforts, host
states impart on them self respect and increase their importance in the
hostland. Their involvement in peace processes reduces the likelihood of
them playing the role of spoiler subsequently. Thus, it is important for the
hostland to differentiate between hardliner and moderate groups among the
diasporas. Hostland’s active encouragement and support to the moderate
factions can possibly alter the diaspora community from one of conflict-
promoting to peacemaking.


Notes
1. Jacob Bercovitch, ed., Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and

Practice of Mediation (Bouder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), p.2.
2. Joanna Spear, The Potential Diaspora Groups to Contribute to Peace
Building: A Scoping Paper (University of Bradford, Transformation of War
Economies Project’s Working Paper, 2006).
3. Yossi Shain & Aharon Barth, “Diasporas and International Relations
Theory,” International Organization, 57, 3 (2003), p. 452.
4. Khachig Tötölian, “The Nation State and Others: In Lieu of a Preface,”
Diaspora, 1, 1 (1991), pp. 3-7.
5. Robin Cohen, “Diasporas and the Nation State: From Victims to Chal-
lengers,” International Affairs, 72, 3 (1996), pp. 507.
6. Steven Vertovec, “The Political Importance of Diasporas,” Migration
Information Source, June 2005.
7. Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globaliza-
tion (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
8. Conflict Barometer 2005 (Heidelberg: Heidelberg Institute for Internati-
onal Conflict Research, 2006).
9. Conflict Barometer 2006 (Heidelberg: Heidelberg Institute for Internati-
onal Conflict Research, 2007).
10. Wolfram Zunzer, Diaspora Communities and Civil Conflict Transforma-
tion (Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management: Berghof
Occasional Paper No. 26, 2004).
11. Feargal Cochrane, “Civil Society beyond the State: The Impact of
Diaspora Communities on Peace Building,” Global Media Journal: Mediterra-
nean Edition, 2, 2 (2007), p. 21.
12. Eva Ostergaard Nielsen, Diasporas and Conflict Resolution-Part of the
Problem or Part of the Solution? (Copenhagen: DIIS Brief, March 2006), p. 1.
13. Spear, The Potential, p. 2.
14. Zunzer, Diaspora Communities, p. 27.
15. Cochrane, “Civil Society,” p. 69.
16. Abdullah A. Mohamoud, “Untapped Potential for Peace Building in the
Homelands” in Paul van Tongeren, Malin Brenk, Marte Hellema, and Juliette
Verhoeven, eds., People Building Peace II (Utrecht: ECCP, 2005).
17. Cindy Horst, The Role of Diasporas in Civil War, Working paper pre-
sented at the CSCW workshop on the transnational facets of civil war (Oslo: PRIO,
2007), p. 4.
18. Joell Demmers, “Diaspora and Conflict: Locality, Long Distance Nation-
alism and Delocalization of conflict Dynamics,” The Public, 9, 1 (2001), pp.
85-96.


19. Fiona Lortan. “Africa Watch: The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict: A Fragile

Peace,” African Security Review, 9, 4 (2000), p. 2.
20. Camilla Orjuela, “Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple
Diaspora Roles in Sri Lanka’s Violent Conflict,” Background paper of the High
Level Expert Forum on “Capacity Building for Peace and Development: Roles
of Diaspora” (Toronto: University for Peace, 19-20 October 2006).
21. Zunzer, Diaspora Communities. p. 27.
22. Orjuela, Distant Warriors, p. 8.
23. Martin Van Bruinessen, “Shifting National and Ethnic Identities: the
Kurds in Turkey and the European Diaspora,” Journal of Muslim Minority
Affairs, 18, 1 (1998), pp. 39-52.
24. Vertovec, The Political, p. 5.
25. Joell Demmers, “New Wars and Diasporas: Suggestions for Research and
Policy,” Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development, 11 (2007).
26. Horst, The Role, p. 6.
27. Cochrane, “Civil society,” p. 23.
28. Jonathan Hall and Ashok Swain, “Catapulting Conflicts or Propelling
Peace: Diasporas and Civil Wars,” Ashok Swain, Ramses Amer & Joakim Öjen-
dal, eds., Globalization and Challenges to Building Peace (London: Anthem Press,
2007).
29. Mohamoud, “Untapped Potential,” p. 2.
30. Khalid Koser and Nicolas Van Hear, Asylum Migration and Implications
for Countries of Origin, (Helsinki: United Nations University/WIDER Discus-
sion Paper no. 2003/20), p. 9.
31. Yossi Shain, “The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolu-
tion,” SAIS Review, 22, 2 (2002), p. 137.
32. Demmers, Diaspora and, p. 88.
33. Cohen, Diaspora and, p. 507.
34. Shain and Barth, Diaspora and, p. 457.
35. William Safran, “Diasporas in modern societies: Myths of homeland and
return,” Diaspora, 1, 1 (1991), pp. 83-99; and Kate Gillespie, Liesl Riddle,
Edward Sayre, David Sturges. “Diaspora Interest in Homeland Investment”
Journal of International Business Studies, 30, 3 (1999), pp. 623-634.
36. Terrence Lyons “Engaging Diasporas to Promote Conflict Resolution:
Transforming Hawks into Doves,” Working Paper presented at the Institute for
Global Conflict and Cooperation Washington Policy Seminar, May 2004.
37. Demmers, Diaspora and, p. 94.
39. As example, Jewish diaspora in the US successfully pressured Israel
to sever its ties with the Apartheid regime in South Africa. Shain and Barth,
Diaspora and, pp. 454-456.
40. Shain, The Role, p. 135.


41. Shain, The Role, p.126.

42. Bahar Baser, “Armenian Political Parties” in Encyclopaedia of Armenians,
History, Politics, Economics and Culture (Ankara: TUBITAK, forthcoming Janu-
ary 2009).
43. L. Jazayery, “The Migration-Development Nexus: Afghanistan Case
Study,” International Migration 40, 5 (2002), pp. 232-254.
44. Tatjana Baraluina, Michael Bommes, Tanja El-Cherkeh, Heike Daume,
Florin Vadean, Egyptian Afghan and Serbian Diaspora Communities in Ger-
many: How do they contribute to their country of origin? (Hamburg: Hamburg
Institute of International Economics, 2007), p. 45.
45. Dilip Rath, “Workers Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of
External Development Finance,” in World Bank, Global Development Finance
(Washington DC: 2003).
46. Kennerh D. Bush “Diasporas as Peacebuilders: Considerations for Analy-
sis, Policy and Practice” in Ashok Swain, ed., Diasporas, Armed Conflicts and
Peacebuilding in their Homelands (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict
Research Report No. 79, 2007), pp. 22-23.
48. Zunzer, Diaspora communities, p. 33.
49. Saaida Touval and I. William Zartman, “Mediation in International
Conflicts,” in Kenneth Kressel, Dean G. Pruitt, and Associates, eds., Mediation
Research (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989), p. 117.
50. Christer Jonsson. “Bargaining, Negotiation and Diplomacy: A Research
Overview” in Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons, eds, Handbook
of International Relations (London: Sage, 2000), p. 23.
51. Chester A. Crocker, Fen O. Hampson & Pamela Aall. Taming Intrac-
table Conflicts: Mediation in the Hardest Cases (Washington D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace, 2004). P. 25.
52. Jonsson, “Bargaining, Negotiation,” p. 23.
53. Saaida Touval and I. William Zartman, “International Mediation in the
Post-Cold War Era” in Chester A.Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson & Pamela Aall,
eds., Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict (Wash-
ington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 440.
54. Marieke Kleiboer. The Multiple Realities of International Mediation
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 370.
55. Isaac Svensson. Elusive Peacemakers: A Bargaining Perspective on Media-
tion in Internal Armed Conflicts (Uppsala University: Department of Peace and
Conflict Research Report No. 75, 2006), p. 20.
56. Hall and Swain, “Catapulting Conflicts.”
58. Zunzer, Diaspora Communities, p. 33.
59 Zunzer, Diaspora Communities, p. 34.


60. Paul Collier, “Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications
for policy” in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall, eds.,
Leashing the Dogs of War: conflict management in a divided world (Washington
DC: USIP Press 2007).
61. Margaret Purdy, “Targeting Diasporas: The Canadian Counter-Terror-
ism Experience,” Draft working paper for the Centre of International Relations,
University of British Columbia, 2003.
62. Spear, The Potential, p.7.
63. Spear, The Potential, p. 7.
64. Zunzer, Diaspora Communities, p. 30-32.
65. Touval & Zartman, International Mediation, p. 436.
66. Stephen J. Stedman, “Negotiation and Mediation in Internal Conflict”
in Michael E. Brown, ed., The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), pp.359.
67. Touval & Zartman. International Mediation, p. 436.
68. Touval & Zartman, International Mediation, p. 439.
69 Vertovec, The Political, p.4.
70. Nicholas Van Hear, “Refugee Diasporas, Remittances, Development,
and Conflict,” Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute, June 2003, p. 2.
71. Shain and Barth, Diaspora and, p. 471.
72. Baser, Armenian Political.
73. Ivana Djuric, “The Croatian Diaspora in North America: Identity, Eth-
nic Solidarity, and the Formation of a “ Transnational National Community’,”
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society,17,1 (2003), pp. 113-130.
75. Shain &Barth, Diaspora and, p. 463.
76. Nielsen, Diasporas and, p. 8.


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Diasporas as Peacemakers:

Third Party Mediation in

Bahar Baser and Department of Peace and Conflict Research

Most recent violent conflicts are Introduction

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON WORLD PEACE

Diasporas.indd 7 7/11/2008 1:53:13 PM

simultaneous involvement of several actors in mediating a conflict to bring

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Diasporas.indd 8 7/11/2008 1:53:13 PM

actively contribute to violent conflicts in their homelands. They primarily

Diasporas and their role in

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an important role in achieving political compromise and peaceful conflict

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Importance of the Diaspora

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Diasporas invariably get involved in the internal conflicts of the home-

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certain issues. There is a clear lack of consensus among Jewish Americans

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two countries, the diaspora leaders have assumed important positions in

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provide better insights on how to maintain a dialog process between con-

Diaspora and Conflict Mediation

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Diasporas.indd 20 7/11/2008 1:53:14 PM

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play. Diaspora’s financial support is extremely important for the homeland

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Diasporas.indd 22 7/11/2008 1:53:14 PM

used its leverage to convince LTTE to participate in the negotiation with

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diaspora is highly dependent on various factors that have to do with its

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1. Jacob Bercovitch, ed., Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and

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Diasporas.indd 25 7/11/2008 1:53:14 PM

19. Fiona Lortan. “Africa Watch: The Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict: A Fragile

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Diasporas.indd 26 7/11/2008 1:53:14 PM

41. Shain, The Role, p.126.

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