Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties

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Cicero and the Opinion of the People: The Nature,

Role and Power of Public Opinion in the Late
Roman Republic

Nikolaus Jackob

To cite this article: Nikolaus Jackob (2007) Cicero and the Opinion of the People: The Nature,
Role and Power of Public Opinion in the Late Roman Republic, Journal of Elections, Public
Opinion and Parties, 17:3, 293-311, DOI: 10.1080/17457280701617128

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Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties
Vol. 17, No. 3, 293–311, October 2007

Cicero and the Opinion of the People:

The Nature, Role and Power of Public
Opinion in the Late Roman Republic
NIKOLAUS JACKOB
Department of Communications Research, Johannes Gutenberg – University of Mainz, Germany
NikolausJackob
30Taylor
17
nikolaus.jackob@uni-mainz.de
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10.1080/17457280701617128
FBEP_A_261563.sgm
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2007 and Francis
ofArticle 2007Public Opinion
Elections,
(print)/1745-7297
Francis (online)and Parties

ABSTRACT This article deals with the concept of public opinion in the life and works of the
Roman orator, philosopher and politician Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC). It is concep-
tualized as a contribution to the historiography of public opinion theory. The basis for the
analysis of Cicero’s body of thought is his complete oeuvre: almost 800 letters, about
60 speeches and more than 20 treatises. After an introduction to the concepts of public
opinion, the article is subdivided into four sections. First, Cicero’s terms and definitions of
public opinion are excerpted from his speeches and philosophical treatises. Second, the text
depicts which role and qualities Cicero attributed to public opinion. Third, it is described
how public opinion influenced politics and society in ancient Rome. Fourth, the article shows
how public opinion became manifest and expressed itself publicly. In summary, the text
demonstrates that Cicero regarded public opinion as a powerful social force which affected
everyday life in Rome and virtually every aspect of politics in the ancient republic.

Locating Cicero: The Different Concepts in the Intellectual History of

Public Opinion
Everyone who investigates how historical authors theorized about public opinion
has to be aware of the historical evolution of public opinion as a phenomenon, as a
term and as a concept. The study of public opinion is not a new interest in the
humanities: For centuries, philosophers, politicians and scholars from many scien-
tific disciplines have been concerned with the nature of public opinion, its formation
and its effects. “Beginning with Plato and Aristotle, hundreds of writers and philos-
ophers have focused their attention on the nature and importance of the popular
will” (Herbst, 1993: 175; see also Palmer, 1934; Davison, 1958; Childs, 1965;
Benson, 1967/68). Facing the long spaces of time since the antiquities it is not
surprising that different concepts of public opinion have evolved over different
periods of time and that “public opinion has different meanings during different
periods” (Herbst, 1993: 46).

Correspondence Address: Nikolaus Jackob, Department of Communications Research, Johannes Gutenberg

– University of Mainz, Colonel-Kleinmann-Weg 2, 55099 Mainz, Germany. Email: nikolaus.jackob@uni-
mainz.de

ISSN 1745-7289 Print/1745-7297 Online/07/030293-19 © 2007 Elections, Public Opinion & Parties
DOI: 10.1080/17457280701617128
294 N. Jackob

Several scholars have tried to identify these different meanings and historical
periods – Paul F. Lazarsfeld (1957: 39), for example, differentiated between what he
perceived to be the modern empirical tradition of public opinion research and the
“classical”, more normative political approach which appeared at the beginning of
the eighteenth century. In a re-evaluation of Lazarsfeld’s approach, Noelle-
Neumann (1979: 143–150), however, argued that public opinion as a thoughtful and
critical institution with the function of political deliberation – as promoted by think-
ers of the “classical tradition” (e.g. Habermas, 1962/63) – was a comparatively
young concept of public opinion. Based on a synopsis by Harwood Childs (1965),
Noelle-Neumann (1993: 220–234) established another classification of historical
concepts of public opinion: a normative “elite concept” – Lazarsfeld’s “classical
tradition” – and a social-psychological “concept of social integration”, which is not
found in Lazarsfeld’s classification. The social-psychological concept promotes an
understanding of public opinion as an instrument of social control that provides
social stability and integration. In this concept, public opinion derives its power in
society from the fact that individuals usually tend to behave in a way that conforms
to their perception of what the majority in a specific social collective is thinking
(Noelle-Neumann, 1979; 1993). Public opinion is characterized as a pan-cultural
phenomenon representing “unwritten law” since the very beginnings of human
history (Noelle-Neumann, 1993: 64, 190). According to the deliberative elite
concept, on the other hand, the term public opinion stands for raisonnement and
intellectual criticism. This concept refers only to well-informed participants who
are able to contribute to public discussion with reasoned arguments (Lazarsfeld,
1957: 50).
However, this dichotomy also does not suffice to describe the development of
the intellectual history of public opinion: In the nineteenth century another concept
of public opinion emerged, inspired by “crowd psychology” or the “psychology of
the masses”, which was promoted by European sociologists (in summary see Nye,
1975; Barrows, 1981). And finally, as depicted by Lazarsfeld, a fourth tradition
appeared with the development of empirical survey research: the empirical
concept, characterized by a close relationship between survey research and public
opinion theory. This empirical understanding was sometimes equated with an
operationalist view (Herbst, 1993: 172) which defined public opinion as “whatever
it is that opinion polls measured” (Converse, 1987: S14; see also Noelle-Neumann,
1993: 225).
In sum there are at least four different historical concepts of public opinion which
emerged in different periods of human history. The first concept in the intellectual
history of public opinion – from the ancient times until the Age of Enlightenment –
can be characterized as the “traditional” concept of public opinion. For more than
2000 years it had been the only one. The second “classical” or “elite” concept
emerged on the eve of the development of the modern democracies in the eighteenth
century. The third “mass” or “crowd” concept was an outcome of the industrial
revolution in the nineteenth century. And the fourth “empirical” concept came along
with the invention of modern empirical survey methodology (see Figure 1).
 Public Opinion in the Late Roman Republic 295

Figure 1. Different concepts in the intellectual history of public opinion

Source: Figure based on Erich Lamp’s classification (2005: 64); slightly modified by the
author.

Lazarsfeld argued that the thinkers of the “classical tradition” had been the first to
Source
Figure: 1.
Figure
Different
based on
concepts
Erich Lamp’s
in the intellectual
classification
history
(2005:
of public
64); slightly
opinionmodified by the author.

concentrate on the scientific and explicit analysis of public opinion; they had
introduced the term public opinion to common parlance and had brought about a
steadily increasing amount of specialized literature predominantly or exclusively
focusing on the issue (Lazarsfeld, 1957: 39). Before that, however, most authors
relevant to the intellectual history of public opinion had described the phenomenon
without actually using the term public opinion. They had mentioned public opinion
casually or had alluded to it rather implicitly, using metaphorical language or
circumscriptions. Therefore, if an author does not speak the language of modern
public opinion research, researchers have to fathom the very meaning of the
statements. They have to learn how to interpret historical sources such as letters,
reports, memoirs, treatises and other writings – the task is to “interrogate their
authors” (Benson, 1967/68: 525).
Like many authors before the “classical tradition”, the special object of the
following analysis, the Roman politician, orator and philosopher Marcus Tullius
Cicero (106–43 BC), did not concern himself systematically with public opinion. He
dealt with it mostly in the context of other issues, e.g. when he reported on rumors
spreading in Rome and the empire, when he described how the Roman people
reacted to certain politicians and their actions or when he expressed his smarting
under a hostile climate of opinion. And, like many other “pre-classical” authors,
Cicero mostly mentioned the phenomenon implicitly, using terms like the “opin-
ion”, “estimation” or “judgment” of “the Roman people”.
Consequently, the intention of this paper is to interrogate Cicero, to analyze his
concept of public opinion and to determine the significance of his thoughts. After a
296 N. Jackob

brief historical contextualization, the article identifies the terms Cicero used for
public opinion and examines their meaning. Then it investigates which character
public opinion had according to Cicero. After that, it will discuss what role and
power Cicero attributed to public opinion in Roman society. Finally, the article
describes Cicero’s notions on the question of how public opinion expressed itself
and how the political elites gathered information about the public sentiment. In the
conclusion the essence of this analysis is summarized. Cicero’s location within the
traditions of public opinion theory is determined and how his understanding of
public opinion was influenced by historical events and the particular epoch in which
he lived is investigated.

Cicero and the Roman Republic

There are three reasons why Marcus Tullius Cicero is an interesting object of analy-
sis in the context of public opinion. First, Cicero was an active politician. He held
the most important offices in the Roman Republic including the consulship (63 BC),
was a high-ranking member of the senate and one of its most prominent leaders.1 As
an able politician he constantly tried to get in contact with public opinion, to feel it
and to anticipate it in order to influence it to benefit his political intentions. Accord-
ing to his biographer Anthony Everitt, Cicero “could swing opinion; and he was the
ablest politician on the right” (Everitt, 2002: 127). As a representative of the repub-
lican ideal he rose to fame because of his permanent opposition to those who strove
for revolution and monarchy (e.g. Catiline, Caesar and Marc Anthony; Kennedy,
1994: 128). Second, Cicero was “the pre-eminent orator of his age, if not of any
age” (Everitt, 2002: 312) – and most of his speeches are documents of his fight for
public support. Furthermore, he became one of the most important authors in the
field of rhetorical theory: for almost 2000 years his rhetorical treatises – e.g. De
oratore, Orator, Brutus and Partitiones oratoriae – are the most insightful works on
the effects of communication on the formation of public opinion (Kennedy, 1994).2
Cicero’s books are rooted in his practical experience as well as in contemporary
Greek and Roman rhetorical theory. In both practical oratory and rhetorical theory,
Cicero became the only relevant benchmark for centuries. Third, Cicero had an
extrovert personality always striving for approval and, according to his own words,
driven by his “love of glory, – too eager perhaps, but still honourable” (For Archias,
§ 28; see also Everitt, 2002: 312). Cicero sought public reputation and fame –
believing that this was the only suitable way for him to become influential in Roman
society.
His strategy to achieve power and glory completely differed from his competi-
tors’ strategies: Caesar, Pompey, Crassus or Marc Anthony tried to accumulate
armies and capital and to gain fame, recognition and political influence by becom-
ing generals and millionaires.3 Cicero’s greatest asset was his eloquence and many
of his speeches can be read “as testimony to the power of words alone” (Bell, 1997:
1). Cicero knew that he had to constantly get in contact with the public if he wanted
to show this strength. He confessed that he “took care that they [the Roman people,
 Public Opinion in the Late Roman Republic 297

author’s note] should every day see me in their presence: I lived in their sight; I
stuck to the forum” (For Plancius, § 66). According to Everitt (2002: xi), Cicero
“led the most public of all lives”, he “committed himself to a life of action”. He
became an expert in public relations, as noted by Edward L. Bernays (1952: 15).
Cicero’s strategy was promising because of two factors: the constitution of the
Roman Republic and the traditional rituals of politics, political communication and
social interaction. From the fifth century BC until Cicero’s death in 43 BC, Rome
had a republican constitution. The central political catchwords were libertas of the
people and auctoritas of the senate which incorporated the governing aristocratic
class (Syme, 2002: 152). Liberty and liberal rights – for example freedom of speech
– were an integral part of Roman collective consciousness. The Romans were
governed by predominantly aristocratic magistrates who were commissioned by the
people through free elections (see Wood, 1988: 22–29). Therefore the tasks for
Roman politicians were on some points quite similar to those of modern politicians:
They had to campaign for their political intentions and for their own person, they
had to win the favor of public opinion and therefore to design strategies of persua-
sive communication. The Roman people were the sovereign power and, as Ronald
Syme (2002: 13) stated, the sovereign people of the free republic “conferred its
favors on whom it pleased. Popularity with the plebs was therefore essential”.
The political system of the late Roman republic was formally founded on the
principle of “promissory representation” (see e.g. Mansbridge, 2003): the people, or
more specifically the electorate, delegated authority to their leaders.4 In return, the
leaders tried to satisfy the requirements of the people and to conform to general
Roman values. However, this rather cooperative principle was overarched by the
latent conflict between the ruling aristocratic class and their proletarian opponents.
Informally, the aristocrats with their class consciousness and their strong networks
of kinship, loyalty and power were the substratum of Roman politics. But despite
those subtleties the Roman populus and its opinion was the most potent power, it
influenced the politicians, the political process and its outcome by conferring politi-
cal authority to single aristocrats and exerting public pressure on them “in order to
maintain control” (Mansbridge, 2003: 518) over the elite’s actions. Therefore, the
scope of the political elite in the Roman Republic and the individual social progress
of every single aristocrat with political ambitions depended on successful and
persuasive communication with the people. It was vital to demonstrate congruence
with the people’s norms and opinions, to show empathy, and to present political
outcomes which satisfied the needs of the masses. The degree of congruence
between a politician and the people was an important source for his personal
authority and for the legitimacy of his action.5
The interaction between the political elite and the Roman masses was not inter-
mediated by any elaborate technological device comparable to modern mass media.
Communication between those who governed and those who were governed had to
take place through direct contact between the politicians and the people – Roman
society was a face-to-face society (May, 2002: 56). Elections were one possible way
for the Roman masses to express their opinion. Assemblies of the people where
298 N. Jackob

political concepts were discussed and where legislation took place were another
occasion to get in touch with the public. It was a dominant assignment of the politi-
cal business to observe public discussion and the sentiments of the masses, to adjust
public statements and political behavior to perceived public opinion and to influence
it strategically. Roman politicians had to show public presence (e.g. at the theater),
to address the assemblies and to visit the forum. They had to promote their ideas and
to defend their political actions through public speeches and published orations,
letters, political pamphlets and other publications such as biographical commentar-
ies (McDermott, 1972; Ferguson, 1979; Kennedy, 1994; Everitt, 2002: 171). The
political process in Rome was a parlor game characterized by the symbolic bow of
the political leaders to the Roman masses and the permanent praise of the power of
the populus Romanus and its opinion (Bell, 1997: 2).6
Cicero’s concept of public opinion is – like every other concept – “an outcome of
the structure of the society in which it is stated … Yet because the place of public
opinion is different in different kinds of societies, its perception will be different as
well” (Back, 1988: 278). In the case of Rome, several aspects have to be considered:
(a) the absence of any kind of mass media, (b) information diffusion by rumors and
gossip, (c) the rule of social control represented by unwritten laws and traditional
habits,7 and (d) the rituals of oratory and symbolic politics on the squares of the
ancient metropolis (Flaig, 2003). In the dense atmosphere of a face-to-face society,
where rumors and gossip were the carriers of information and the source of good
and bad reputation, everyone had to comply with the social norms regarded as
sacred and honored by time and tradition.

Terms and Metaphors of Public Opinion

The first research questions are: did Cicero use certain terms to express public opin-
ion? And: which meaning is connoted with his use of terms? Most frequently Cicero
uses the term opinio. It can be translated literally as “opinion” and usually occurs in
different combinations in Cicero’s texts: opinio omnium, which means “general
opinion”; opinio populi Romani, which means “the opinion of the Roman people”;
opinio hominum, which means “the opinion of men”.8

(1) The term opinio omnium occurs in Cicero’s prosecution of Caius Verres (70
BC), the former governor of Sicily, who was accused of corruption and severe
crimes against the Sicilian population. Cicero argued in his speech that Verres
was condemned consensually by the public opinion (“omnium opinione”)
(Against Verres, book 1, § 2) – well in advance of the actual lawsuit. Cicero
hereby alluded to Verres’ bad reputation which was the consequence of his
frequent abuse of power.
(2) In another paragraph of the Verrine Orations Cicero used the second term
opinio populi Romani to bring up the Romans’ hostile attitude towards the
senatorial courts which were judged by public opinion as partisan and
corrupt. Cicero argued that it would cause serious damage to the political
 Public Opinion in the Late Roman Republic 299

system if the Roman population predominantly doubted that senators

appointed to the tribunals acted honorably, assiduously and duteously
(Against Verres, book 1, § 2).
(3) The combination opinio hominum is documented in Cicero’s defense of Sestius
(56 BC). It is used there to express the public reputation an individual enjoys
because of his publicly acknowledged merits (For Sestius, § 21).

In all three cases public opinion acts as a public tribunal judging the behavior of
individuals, social subgroups or institutions, commending positive contributions to
society and condemning offences against collective norms of social behavior.

(4) The speech for Murena (63 BC) contains an insightful paragraph about the
impact of rumors on the dynamics of public opinion – and another variation of
the term opinio: “The interval of one day, – the lapse of one night – often
throws everything into confusion. The slightest breeze of rumour sometimes
changes the entire opinions of people” (totam opinionem; For Murena, § 35).
The impact of rumors and gossip on the formation of public opinion indicates
an irrational element in the process of public opinion which contradicts the
more rational “classical” approach.
(5) This interpretation is also supported by his Philippic Orations (44/43 BC),
Cicero argued that “[t]he most important events … are often determined by
very trivial moving influences in every circumstance that can happen in the
republic, and also in war, and especially in civil war, which is usually governed
a great deal by men’s opinions and by reports” (Fifth Philippic Oration, § 26).
Public opinion, which he regarded to be suggestible and sensitive to communi-
cation, gossip and rumors, seems to have an influence on political events such
as (civil) wars. Here Cicero brings up both sides of public opinion: its influence
and its suggestibility.

Another term, existimatio, usually stands for “opinion”, “estimation” or “public

reputation” – it “was the concept mainly used by the Romans in treating what we
now call public opinion” (Noelle-Neumann, 1993: 187). Customarily, this term also
appears in different combinations in Cicero’s texts:

(6) In his Verrine Orations Cicero wrote that “the opinion of the Roman people”
(existimatio populi Romani) has the power “to hold a man in check” (Against
Verres, book 2, oration 5, § 143). This term paraphrases the controlling
function of public opinion in human society.
(7) In other paragraphs of the Verrine Orations there is further evidence for this
interpretation. In the fourth speech he addressed the case of the minor Asian
king Antioch who refused to cooperate with Verres because of his “regard for
the opinion of men” (hominum existimatione; Against Verres, book 2, oration 4,
§ 66). Antioch obviously feared public protests and therefore adapted to what
he perceived as the predominant attitude in public opinion.
300 N. Jackob

(8) Another very instructive application of the term existimatio is documented in

the fifth oration. Cicero referred to the Roman magistrates, “who are restrained
by fear of the laws and of public opinion” (Against Verres, book 2, oration 5, §
167). This sentence shows that Cicero was well aware of the difference between
the two major instances of social control in human society: the codes of law
(institutionalized social control) and the unwritten law of public opinion (non-
institutionalized social control).

The third term is iudicium which can be translated as “judgment” or “opinion” – it

also been handed down in several different forms:

(9) In his second speech against the Agrarian Law (63 BC) Cicero referred to his
election as consul in 64 BC, proudly announcing that he “was made consul” by
the “judgment of the Roman people” (universi populi Romani iudicio; Second
Oration against the Agrarian Law, § 7).
(10) In his treatise Brutus (46 BC), which deals with the history of oratory in Greece
and Rome, Cicero dwelled on the nature of honor, defining it as the reward of
virtue, conferred by the judgment of the fellow citizens (Brutus, § 327). Both
examples show that public opinion not only punishes violations of social norms
but also rewards compliance with the common codes of social behavior.

Besides the terms opinio, existimatio and iudicium, Cicero’s vocabulary contains
several metaphors, synonyms and paraphrases to express public opinion:9

(11) In the defense of Flaccus (59 BC) and in the second speech against the Agrar-
ian Law Cicero paraphrased public opinion with vox populi – the voice of the
people (For Flaccus, § 103; Second Oration against the Agrarian Law, § 4).
Cicero used the phrase una vox (universi) populi Romani for the same purpose
as the phrase universi populi Romani iudicio: he wanted to demonstrate that his
political ambitions and his governmental actions during his consulship in
63 BC were supported by public opinion. In his interpretation of the events it
had been the unanimous voice of the Roman people yearning for Cicero
becoming consul and publicly declaring its support of his policies.
(12) In his speech for Plancius (54 BC) Cicero vividly pictured the character of
public opinion using images from the language of meteorology: “For this is the
inalienable privilege of a free people, and especially of this the chief people of
the world …, to be able by their votes to give or to take away what they please
to or from any one. And it is our duty, ours, I say, who are driven about by the
winds and waves of this people, to hear the whims of the people with modera-
tion, to strive to win over their affections when alienated from us, to retain
them when we have won them, to tranquilize them when in a state of agitation.
If we do not think honours of any great consequence, we are not bound to be
subservient to the people; if we do strive for them, then we must be unwearied
in soliciting them” (For Plancius, § 11).
 Public Opinion in the Late Roman Republic 301

Public opinion as a powerful and volatile force of nature, compels every politician
to become “weatherproof”, to develop a sense for coming changes and the skills of a
shaman to influence these “winds” and “waves”. Only those not willing to play an
important role in politics and society and to take part in public activities can evade
the “whims” and “affections” of public opinion. This metaphorical usage of weather
images to circumscribe public opinion is based upon the apparent similarities
between both phenomena: “One of the characteristics of public opinion that has
been noticed since early times is that it is a transitory phenomenon. It seems to arise
spontaneously and to disappear imperceptibly” (Davison, 1958: 103). The meta-
phorical tertium comparationis rests on the volatility and convertibility of weather
and public opinion.10

The Character of Public Opinion

The foregoing paragraphs already shed some light on Cicero’s understanding of
public opinion. First of all, public opinion appears to be a powerful social force. It
influences individuals and institutions, especially in the sphere of politics: Cicero
described several situations in which politicians and members of the social elite
feared sanctions imposed by public opinion. Individuals tried to avoid negative
reactions such as public criticism which could lead to a bad reputation and nega-
tive consequences for their social and political advancement. In the face-to-face
society of the ancient metropolis of Rome, politicians lived a public life,
“surrounded by crowds and under the gaze of the citizens”, as Cicero stated (“in
maxima celebritate” and “in oculis civium”; On Duties, book 3, § 3). Their behav-
ior and their statements were monitored by the Roman people and became a topic
of public opinion quite easily. According to Cicero, a Roman celebrity always had
to be considerate of public opinion, as “the eyes of all are cast on him. They exam-
ine whatever he does, the very way in which he lives; he is, as it were, bathed in
so brilliant light that no single word or deed of his can be hidden” (On Duties,
book 2, § 44).
Cicero believed that it was essential to be on good terms with the Roman people
and therefore to enjoy a good reputation. However, it was a quite challenging task to
win the favor of public opinion. Cicero’s thoughts about the character of public
opinion demonstrate that the public mood was quite volatile and sometimes even
choleric. He reported on cases when public opinion reacted to him and others in an
unjust and cruel way (e.g. For Sestius, § 68; The Republic, book 3, § 27; For Cluen-
tius, § 4–8). Nevertheless, it was inevitable to adapt to the perceived attitudes of the
people, to take criticism and rumors seriously, to respect the social norms mediated
by public opinion and to cultivate one’s personal reputation. Paying attention to
public opinion and influencing it for one’s own purposes was the most important
business of a Roman politician – and perhaps the most exhausting one. In his
Philippic Orations Cicero complained: “O ye immortal gods! How great an
enterprise is it to uphold the character of a leader in the republic; for it requires one
to be influenced not merely by the thoughts but also by the eyes of the citizens”
302 N. Jackob

(Eighth Philippic Oration, § 29). Again, the eyes of the citizens stand as a symbol
for the monitoring function of public opinion as a tribunal.11
Although there is no explicit definition of the term “public opinion” in Cicero’s
works, his implicit descriptions of the effects of public opinion allow speculation
about the role and function Cicero attributed to public opinion. In his speeches,
letters and treatises public opinion acts as a public tribunal. It is the “estimation of
the people”, “everyone’s opinion” or the “common opinion” that judges the behav-
ior and the statements of individuals, rewards compliance with social norms and
common values and punishes deviance. To avoid punishment and to enhance pres-
tige, most people try to meet the standards of this tribunal. In his rhetorical treatise
Topica (44 BC) Cicero wrote: “For people think that men of talent or wealth, or
those whom time has tested, are worthy of credit; perhaps this is not right, but the
opinion of the many can hardly be changed, and those who judge as well as those
who make assessments form all their views with reference to it” (Topica, § 73). The
opinion of the many (vulgi opinio) – the antipode of elite opinion – constitutes a
benchmark for social prestige and the general criterion for everyone’s behavior and
expression of opinion, regardless of birth and class.
Public opinion as tribunal remunerates good conduct with reputation, honor and
glory and disciplines by social isolation and dishonor in cases of bad conduct. Further
evidence for this social-psychological interpretation of Cicero’s words can be found
in the treatise Brutus (46 BC) where he argued that honor is a reward for good conduct,
conferred by the people’s “judgment and affection” (Brutus, § 281), or in his polemic
pamphlet against Piso (55 BC) where he stated that the social status and reputation
of every person depended “on the opinions and judgments of all the citizens” (Against
Piso, § 98). In his Verrine Orations Cicero said that “the eyes of all men are directed
on each individual among us” and that “if any one of us turns aside ever so little from
the right path, there will follow … a severe and fearless judgment of the Roman
people” (“populi Romani iudicium”; Against Verres, book 2, oration 5, § 175).
There is an apparent similarity between this far-seeing statement and a compara-
ble one by John Locke, which became a cornerstone of Noelle-Neumann’s theory
(Noelle-Neumann, 1979: 145). In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Locke (1961: 301) stated that “no man escapes the punishment of their censure and
dislike who offends against the fashion and opinion of the company he keeps and
would himself recommend to”. Both Locke and his ancestor Cicero thought of
public opinion as a social-psychological tribunal. Locke believed that social control,
what he called “the law of opinion”, is the most powerful social force: “Those who
flout accepted manners or opinion risk becoming outcasts within their own
communities” (Herbst, 1993: 45). Public opinion as tribunal not only judges politi-
cal actions of the elite but also every single individual’s behavior. Therefore its
function in the first instance is not only to criticize and to control the political elite
by rational argument – the opinion of the Roman population worked as a general
mechanism of social control.
Once again the differences between the historical understanding of public opinion
and the “classical tradition” become obvious: Fred Cutler, who wrote an insightful
 Public Opinion in the Late Roman Republic 303

analysis of Jeremy Bentham’s concept of public opinion, pointed out that Bentham
also defined public opinion as a tribunal constantly observing and judging the
government (Cutler, 1999: 321). However, this tribunal is completely different from
Cicero’s tribunal: Bentham’s jury consists of intellectuals, well-educated “elite
judges”, who are able and willing to perform political deliberation. Cicero’s tribunal
has another jury: it is everyone, the Roman people (populus Romanus), even the
crowd or the mob (vulgus/plebs urbana) (Topica, § 73). And it is not only the
government or the political leader who go on trial – it is every single individual
belonging to a certain social collective. Furthermore, the objects of this “lawsuit”
are not only political matters of general import; the behavior and utterances of
everyone can appear before this court.

The Power of Public Opinion

One fundamental aspect of every theory of public opinion is (and always has been)
“the aspect that relates public opinion to the political process, to political forms of
society” (Hyman, 1957: 59). One of the most important questions with regard to
public opinion is: “What effect does it have on statesmen and on the legislative
process in general?” (Lazarsfeld, 1957: 43)
Most of the authors concerned with the nature of public opinion from the ancient
times until today agreed that public opinion “is a consensus among a large number
of people, and that this consensus somehow exercises force” (Davison, 1958: 91).12
It is commonly accepted that public opinion exerts pressure on politicians and on the
political process, that “force is always on the side of the governed” and that
“the governors have nothing to support them but opinion”, as David Hume (1963:
29) stated. However, there is a tenacious stereotype in historiography that the
eighteenth century bred the idea of the “mutual influence between the population
and the actions of the leaders” (Back, 1988: 284). In contrast, Cicero’s thoughts
indicate that this idea of mutual influence is much older: Cicero knew that the “opin-
ion of the Roman people” had the power “to hold a man in check” and that its
authority and dignity had to be respected by anyone (Against Verres, book 2, oration
5, §143–144). He referred to the power of public opinion when he stated that both
the “noblemen” and “all other men must obey the authority of the universal Roman
people” (On Pompey’s Command, § 64). Furthermore, Cicero argued: “For a citizen
to be dear to his fellow-citizens, to deserve well of the republic, to be praised, to be
respected, to be loved, is glorious; but to be feared, and to be an object of hatred, is
odious, detestable; and moreover, pregnant with weakness and decay” (First
Philippic Oration, § 33). Cicero was convinced that striving for goodwill and
public reputation claimed the highest priority in a politician’s everyday life (For
Plancius, § 11).
In his treatise On Duties, Cicero advised on how to win the favor of public opin-
ion: the key is to achieve “glory”: “The peak and perfection of glory lies in the
following three things: if the masses love you, if they have faith in you, if they think
you worthy of some honour combined with admiration” (On Duties, book 2, § 31).
304 N. Jackob

In Cicero’s opinion, it was necessary to demonstrate virtues such as generosity,

reliability, trustworthiness and wisdom in order to achieve glory and goodwill. For
Cicero the tool for creating the impression of such a virtuous character is rhetoric.
Those who want to achieve and obtain political power will have to sense the mood
of the people and to follow the opinio populari. Every action and statement in public
has to suit the opinionem communem: “One degree of precision is required … when
speech is entirely adapted to common opinion. For when we discuss popular opinion
we must use popular and familiar words” (On Duties, book 2, § 35).
Cicero expected a politician to have intuition, to be able to empathize with the
people, to feel public opinion and to anticipate changes in the climate of opinion.
For Cicero this ability seemed to be most important in times of elections, “when the
day of contest for the greatest distinction of the state, and the day of the comitia [the
voters’ assembly, author’s note], was at hand”, Cicero noted:

At which time, (for I know what a nervous thing ambition is, how vehement
and how anxious is the desire for the consulship,) we are afraid of everything,
not only of those things which can be openly found fault with, but even of
whatever can be secretly thought; we shudder at every rumour, at every idle
and empty story; we look anxiously at every one’s countenance, at every one’s
eye. For there is nothing so soft, so tender, so frail, so flexible, as the inclina-
tions and feelings of our fellow-citizens towards us; for they are not only angry
at any impropriety in the conduct of candidates, but they often even take a
disgust at our virtuous actions. (For Milo, § 42)

Cicero’s circumscriptions again give valuable information about both the character
of public opinion and its power in the sphere of politics: public opinion in Cicero’s
imagination is suggestible, sensitive to rumors, irrational and changeful, but at the
same time powerful and awesome. This is the very reason why Cicero regarded the
political business to be “miserable and unfair a condition of life”. He lamented that
“many offices are imposed on this our order, many toils, many dangers, not only
from the laws and courts of justice, but also from vague reports, and from the critical
character of the times; so that this order is, as it were, exposed to view, and set on an
eminence, in order, as it seems, to be the more easily caught by every blast of envy”
(Against Verres, book 2, oration 3, § 98).

The Expression of Public Opinion

Cicero was not the only author who articulated the importance of being aware of
public opinion; most thinkers in the field of public opinion theory agree that “(…)
successful and popular leaders are supposed to have some direct knowledge of
general public opinion” (Back, 1988: 283). Walter Lippmann argued that a political
leader has to consider “his decision … in its effect on any part of his following
whose continued support he requires” (Lippmann, 1997: 153).13 “A great statesman
is familiar with public opinion”, as Noelle-Neumann (1993: 185) stated – and if he
 Public Opinion in the Late Roman Republic 305

is not perfectly aware of public opinion, he makes it his business to find out (Back,
1988: 283). However, a “good” politician not only explores the will of the people
because he wants to be able to assimilate and to show congruence between his
values and political actions and the values and needs of the people (see e.g. Page and
Shapiro, 1992; Wlezien, 2004); he tries to anticipate public opinion because he
wants to overcome the trend, to prompt the majority to accept his position, to turn
the tide, “in short, by using all the means which the ancient world called rhetoric”
(Noelle-Neumann, 1979: 155). This is the very core of Cicero’s argumentation, and
in most of his rhetorical works he intends nothing else than to teach his readers how
to influence public opinion by persuasive communication.14
Biasing public opinion by whatever means usually requires some knowledge of it:
There is a relationship between the “distribution of opinion, the perception of
opinion by government officials, and the decisions made by government officials”
(Benson, 1967/68: 545). The question is: how can those who are in a position to
decide find out the distribution of opinion? How do they perceive public opinion
when they do not have the instruments of survey research at their disposal? These
questions are closely related to another central question: how are opinions commu-
nicated? (Lazarsfeld, 1957: 43).
In his oration for Sestius Cicero gave an answer to these questions: “In truth, there
are three places in which the opinion and inclination of the Roman people may be
ascertained in the greatest degree; the assembly, the comitia, and the meetings at the
games and at exhibitions of gladiators” (For Sestius, § 106). In all places, where great
numbers of people gathered, manifestations of public opinion could take place. These
expressions were interpreted by the elite as indicators of public opinion. Respective
descriptions can be found everywhere in Cicero’s texts. The “real feelings of the
Roman people” became manifest for example when “universal applause was given
to the proposer of the law and to the senate as a body”, in “loud clapping of hands”
when an individual senator entered the theater, or “when the consul himself, who was
attending the games, took his seat” and the “people stood undertaking him with
extended hands, and with tears of joy declared their good will” (For Sestius, § 117).
Negative reactions are also reported in Cicero’s texts, for example when an unpopu-
lar person appeared in public: “Words indeed, and menacing gestures of the hands
and loud outcries in the war of abuse and of curses on him were universal” (For
Sestius 117). In his Philippic Orations he enumerated similar manifestations: “the
shouts of the innumerable crowd of citizens collected at the gladiatorial games…, the
verses made by the people”, extraordinary applause or clamor at the sight of statues,
symbols, individuals, etc. (First Philippic Oration, § 36).
Public reactions as described by Cicero were a commonly accepted yardstick, a
barometer indicating popularity and public approval concerning political actions
and statements of single individuals, groups or social classes (Flaig, 2003: 238;
Petersen, 2005: 135). They are functional equivalents to modern polls – an “indica-
tive of public opinion” (Herbst, 1993: 145). Facing the public at the forum, at
assemblies or at the theater, the elite were able to catch up on the mood of the
Roman people. As exemplified by Cicero, the elite believed that they attended the
306 N. Jackob

true manifestations of the opinion and the will of the Roman people – its “real
feelings”. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether they de facto observed emotional
eruptions of the crowds which cannot necessarily be equated with public opinion.
Politicians of course can misperceive public opinion – but in this context that does
not matter: “What does matter is that the reality, not the accuracy, of their percep-
tions influences their actions – to the extent that they consciously allow public
opinion to influence their actions” (Benson, 1967/68: 548). To get back to Cicero:
The Roman elite had no other concept or understanding of public opinion and did
not differentiate between the sentiments of a large number of people and what more
sophisticated modern theories sometimes define as public opinion. Their perception
of what they assumed to be public opinion was crucial for themselves and their poli-
tics. Furthermore, the mere anticipation of the people’s reaction had a controlling
effect on the political elite: already the thought of what others would think or how
they would react, influences politicians as well as individuals in general (Noelle-
Neumann, 1993: 211). The opinion of the Roman people, the common consensus
and the traditional social norms were internalized. Consequently, people “do not
dare to say what they think”, Cicero stated, “however excellent it may be, through
fear of unpopularity” (On Duties, book 1, § 84). It should be amended that this “fear
of unpopularity” does – of course – not only affect the statements of individuals but
also their behavior.

Summary and Conclusion

In Numbered Voices Susan Herbst supposes a new approach for investigating how
concepts of public opinion have evolved historically: This approach “might involve
the analysis of significant texts during periods of great political upheaval or
ideological transformation” (Herbst, 1993: 174). According to Herbst, it should be
investigated how phrases like public opinion or public sentiment are used in these
historical texts, “and at which historical moments do these usages begin to change?”
The article at hand adopts Herbst’s research proposal by interrogating Cicero’s clas-
sical writings from a time of “great political upheaval”. For Cicero lived “in an age
of change; he was a temperamental conservative caught in the nets of a revolution”
(Everitt, 2002: 312). His comprehension of public opinion is a result of the terms of
living in his age as well as of the political condition of the commonwealth, of the
cultural developments as well as of the events of contemporary history. It is
catalyzed by his individual experience as a politician and orator facing the Roman
people on the forum and in the theater: He felt how it was to be hated and to be
loved by the masses, he could experience the consequences of public approval and
disapproval, he saw how public opinion was manipulated by demagogues and he
learnt how to manipulate public opinion himself.
Four main findings should be stressed. First, public opinion as the opinion of the
Roman people was widely respected. The social and political elite bowed low to the
opinion of the Romans because they knew that their personal social advancement
and their political career depended on the goodwill of the populus. To some extent,
 Public Opinion in the Late Roman Republic 307

the Romans regarded their aristocratic politicians as their representatives. There was
indeed a deep rift between the poor masses and the noblemen, but as long as the
political elite demonstrated conformity with the public’s values, needs and opinions,
it enjoyed public confidence. In consequence, the aristocratic leaders perpetually
were delegated to rule in the name of the Roman populus. And those who were
loved by the masses and embodied congruence between their own values and opin-
ions and those of the Roman masses had the best prospects.15 This power of public
opinion on politics as well as on everyday life was well known. Public opinion was
not only a sovereign voice but also a warden of the common consensus, a carrier of
social norms, and a tribunal that supervised the social adaptation of every Roman
citizen.
Second, this sovereign was not only regarded as powerful and awesome but also
capricious and sometimes dangerous. Both its power and its volatility forced those
who wanted to play a role in politics and society to observe the public mood, to
anticipate changes in the climate of opinion and to influence public opinion. One
possible explanation for Cicero’s conception of an unstable and sometimes choleric
public opinion can be found in the fact that the Romans to some extent regarded
public reactions of crowds as manifestations of the general public opinion. Indeed,
the dynamics of crowds may be different from the dynamics of public opinion. But
in the end, the effect was the same: in Cicero’s world of thought public opinion was
the opinion of the Roman people. It could become manifest in the Romans’ votes, in
their reactions in public places or in rumors and gossip. He regarded it as a social
force that exerted pressure and called for subjection.
Third, Roman politicians were always directly confronted with the Roman public,
they lived under the continuous observation of the Roman population, in maxima
celebritate and in oculis civium, as Cicero stated. The omnipresence of the tribunal
of public opinion is due to the disposition of Roman society which was character-
ized by (a) face-to-face interaction between the elite and the population, (b) a strong
rule of unwritten laws, moral habits and traditions, and (c) the significance of
reputation and public approval for the social status of every single Roman. If the
perceived character of public opinion is an outcome of the structure of a given
society (Back, 1988: 278), Cicero’s concept of public opinion can be interpreted as a
result of the characteristics of Roman society and its traditions as well as of the
political climate during Cicero’s lifetime. The present analysis demonstrates that
“[d]uring any period the methods used to measure popular sentiment, the ways
attitudes are expressed, and the meaning of public opinion itself are all tightly inter-
woven. In fact, behind every technique for articulating or measuring public opinion
is a statement about the nature of the opinion communication process” (Herbst,
1993: 43).
Fourth, based on his individual experiences it seems apparent why Cicero did
not develop a rational understanding of public opinion comparable to the rational
concept favored by the “classical tradition”. The rational and deliberative discourse
is completely different from the awesome, powerful, volatile and choleric public
opinion as depicted by Cicero – it “does not explain the pressure that public
308 N. Jackob

opinion must exert if it is to have any influence on the government and the
citizens” (Noelle-Neumann, 1993: 227).

Acknowledgments
The author wishes to thank Erich Lamp, Uwe Hartung, Justin Fisher, Christopher
Wlezien, and the anonymous JEPOP reviewers for their insightful comments and
suggestions.

Notes
1. See Cicero’s curriculum vitae in Wood (1988: 42–55).
2. Cicero never wrote a systematic treatise on public opinion. Nevertheless, many of his writings are
fundamental to the discussion of these subjects. The most important books are The Republic, On
Duties, On Laws and his books on rhetoric mentioned above. Most of his rhetorical and political trea-
tises contain relevant information about his concept of public opinion – these passages will be
discussed in the following sections. Due to the scope of this article it is not possible to give a detailed
review of his works. For more information see Wood (1988).
3. Cicero was not the only Roman intellectual who was aware of public opinion and its role in politics
and society: important Roman authors such as Livy knew that government has to be founded on
public opinion and the affection of the citizens – not on fear (Petersen, 2005: 32–33). Julius Caesar
knew the importance of public opinion as well, he tried to become popular in order to obtain political
offices. He combined his military campaigns with propaganda campaigns (Petersen, 2005: 55–60).
Another important figure was Marc Anthony who tried to benefit from Ceasar’s popularity and fame
after the ides of March (Petersen, 2005: 69). Octavian finally manipulated public opinion most
sophistically: his propaganda war against Marc Anthony is a good example of his virtuous manipula-
tion of the public sentiment (Petersen, 2005: 26–27). Hence, many other prominent Romans were
well aware of public opinion and tried to influence it for their purposes. However, nobody concen-
trated as profoundly on investigating and describing the nature of public opinion. There is no œuvre
from the Roman times which can be compared to Cicero’s works: Cicero is the only relevant source
that gives a detailed picture of what public opinion was and how it was perceived in Rome (Jackob,
2005).
4. Carman (2007) discusses the different concepts of representation and presents a comprehensive
summary of relevant literature in this field.
5. See Page and Shapiro (1992), Wlezien (1995; 2004), Mansbridge (2003) and Carman (2007) for a
more detailed discussion of representation, delegation and congruence.
6. In fact, the Roman elite differentiated between what they regarded to be the people, a rather
abstract concept, and the crowd as an everyday manifestation of popular moods in the ancient
metropolis. Many Roman writers condemned the vulgus and worshipped the populus. However,
the expressions of masses and crowds were observed carefully in order to find out the sentiments
of public opinion. The conceptual differences between the people, the masses, and the crowds had
no real implications for political management. “It seems that public opinion had become an impor-
tant and identifiable quantity during that time” (Herbst, 1993: 50). Because of its importance in
modern public opinion theory this issue will be discussed in the last paragraphs of this article. (For
more information about these differences see Nye, 1975; Barrows, 1981; Herbst, 1993; Lippmann,
1997: 141–149.)
7. It is important to note that Roman authors (including Cicero) did not theorize about social control
explicitly, nor did they have a clearly contoured concept of the phenomenon. However, ancient
literature – from Greece as well as from Rome – is full of reports of social control becoming manifest
in everyday life. In addition, the modern understanding of social control was represented in classical
 Public Opinion in the Late Roman Republic 309

rhetorical figures and metaphors such as unwritten law, the voice of the people, as well as in
traditions, customs, manners, and fashions. All these circumscriptions referred to a broad consensus
among a population which everybody has to follow (see Petersen, 2005).
8. For all Latin–English translations see Costa and Herberg (1966) and Kidd (2004). A letter Cicero
sent to his fried Atticus in 50 BC contains the most frequently quoted remark about opinio – it is the
first known reference of the combination opinio publica (Letters to Atticus, book 6, letter 1, § 18).
However, the term does not exactly express Cicero’s understanding of public opinion (see Palmer,
1934: 13; Jackob, 2005).
9. Kurt Back (1988: 279) argued that literary phenomena like these can act as indicators of the particu-
lar understanding of public opinion.
10. Joseph Glanvill, who introduced the phrase “climate of opinion” to the English language in 1661
(Noelle-Neumann, 1993: 78–79), also saw parallels between the two phenomena.
11. Edmund Burke (1975: 66) used a quite similar metaphor to describe this monitoring function of the
public: “censorial inspection of the public eye”.
12. Machiavelli for example (1950: 56–67) advised the prince to avoid everything that might undermine
the people’s goodwill and their support for his reign (see also Herbst, 1993: 50). Machiavelli’s
contemporary Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam (1963: 209) argued that the “consensus populi” is a
powerful confederate and warned the prince not to gamble with it. But not only the monarch depends
on a well-meaning public opinion: Alexis de Tocqueville (1948: 138) for example discussed the
submissiveness of the US president towards public opinion.
13. On leadership and public opinion see Lippmann (1997: 150–158).
14. The relationship between the public, the formation of public opinion, and persuasive communication
by rhetoric in Cicero’s works is broadly discussed in Jackob’s (2005) dissertation.
15. This relationship has been discussed in prior sections of this article and is analyzed profoundly by
Page and Shapiro (1992), Mansbridge (2003), Wlezien (2004) and Carman (2007).

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