Perspective

Budapest

Rethinking the Far Right

in Hungary:
Defeating Orbán is Impossible
without Jobbik’s Votes
Péter Krekó
December 2017

hile the general view in Hungarian progressive and liberal circles, as well as in other
W
European countries has generally been that Viktor Orbán is a guarantee against the
Hungarian Far Right, in this paper I will argue that it is no longer the case.

I will underline this argument on the basis of three points:

Viktor Orbán and Fidesz have become more radical than the far-right Jobbik party on
n 
numerous issues.

n Fidesz
 is more of a threat to democracy and the integrity of the EU these days than
Jobbik, and 2018 might be the last chance to defeat Orbán.

n The Hungarian Left is mathematically unable to defeat Fidesz alone – Jobbik’s votes
and mandates are needed to deny Fidesz the majority of seats in the National As-
sembly. Of course, Jobbik still keeps large chunks of its former radicalism, so argu
ments about the price of coordinating or cooperating with Jobbik in any forms are
valid.

1. Fidesz has become more radical than
the far-right Jobbik on numerous issues
Since the second Orbán government was elected
in 2010, the political landscape in Hungary has
been characterized by the permanent presence of
a populist right-wing party (Fidesz) and an ex-
treme right-wing party (Jobbik). But times are
changing. Jobbik and Fidesz have practically trad-
ed places. This is the consequence of two parallel
tendencies: Fidesz’s shift to the right and Jobbik’s
turn towards the centre.
First, Fidesz has been gradually shifting to an in-
creasingly authoritarian, illiberal right-wing posi-
tion, which accelerated in 2015 at the beginning
of the refugee crisis. Viktor Orbán is the only po-
litical leader in Central and Eastern Europe who is
not just constructing an illiberal regime, using
Russia as a model, but also proudly labels it ‘illib-
eral’. Domestically, Fidesz implemented most of
the measures proposed by Jobbik between 2010
and 2014.
However, a number of things changed after Or-
bán’s re-election in 2014. First, Orbán decided to
launch his personal ‘freedom fight’, getting rid of
the oligarchic structures that constrained him and
replacing them with structures more loyal to him.
Viktor Orbán’s war with his previously favoured
oligarch, Lajos Simicska, began in 2015, when the
prime minister tried to sideline previously the
most then on, Simicska started to support Jobbik,
then the strongest opposition party. Fidesz, feel-
ing threatened, turned against the far-right party.
Coincidentally, soon after that the refugee crisis
broke out, and Hungary became one of the front-
line states on the Balkans Route. The increasingly
unpopular Orbán grasped his big opportunity to
take back political control and regain popularity by
playing the role of the crusader, keeping Muslims
away from Hungary and Europe. Consequently,
Fidesz became a genuine far-right party as it put
xenophobia at the heart of its politics – even ac-
cording to some most notable scholars of the Far
Right, including Cas Mudde.
At the same time, Jobbik has gradually been
moving towards the centre since 2013. The lead-
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Péter Krekó | Rethinking the Far Right in Hungary
er of the party since 2006, Gábor Vona – who
gave the party momentum by expressing hatred
against Roma and politicians, and formed the
party’s paramilitary wing, the Hungarian Guard –
decided to bring his party closer to the political
mainstream, hoping to be able to replace Fidesz
after the 2018 general election. The party, follow-
ing the examples of the French far-right leader
Marine Le Pen and Serbian President Alexander
Vucic, was successfully and substantially re-
branded in a few years.
Before 2013, Jobbik was the most rejected party,
according to polls. Today, the Socialist Party is
subject to far more hostility from voters than
Jobbik. This ‘centrist shift’ is far from being com-
pletely consistent. Although some extremist pol-
iticians (Előd Novák, former vice president) have
been sidelined, others are still in leading positions
(for example, László Toroczkai, mayor of Ásot-
thalom). Vona’s intention to occupy the centre of
the political spectrum that Fidesz has abandoned
seems to be genuine. His motivations are, beyond
doubt, rational and self-interested: to gain gov-
ernment power. Nevertheless, his efforts have
brought about a substantial change in the parties’
politics and policies: Jobbik has turned down the
volume of hate speech and has transformed itself
into a pro-European party from a party that was
burning EU flags just a few years ago. Its main
topics are no longer refugees or Roma anymore,
but corruption, education and health care. Re-
cently Jobbik even defended the Central Europe-
an University (CEU) and voted against the law
that aims to restrict it, criticized the Hungarian
government’s anti-Soros campaign and also vot-
ed against the NGO law, which is pretty similar to
the Russian legislation on ‘foreign agents’ – even
though it had drafted a similar bill quite recently.
On most issues, Jobbik takes a softer approach
than Fidesz these days.
The real moments of truth lie in parliamentary de-
bates. In the National Assembly, Orbán has re-
peatedly attacked Vona for being too soft, and
has also suggested he is gay, a view Orbán’s pro-
paganda machine is trying to spread in order to
discredit Vona in the eyes of his supporters.

There are practically too far-right parties in Hun-
gary today: a genuine one and a softer version.
Fidesz and Jobbik. Jobbik is only ‘Fidesz light’
these days – but that makes it far less dangerous
to democracy than Fidesz.
2. Fidesz is more of a threat to democra-
cy than Jobbik nowadays
In recent years, Fidesz has built up a highly effi-
cient, nepotistic corruption machine. Furthermore,
with the help of EU funds, it has built up an unprec-
edentedly powerful business empire in Hungary –
a structure that would remain in place even after a
change of government.
On top of that, Orbán weeded out practically all
institutional elements hostile to him, as well as the
consensual approach of the German political sys-
tem that had previously characterized Hungarian
politics to a certain extent since the democratic
transition. The Constitutional Court has almost
become a puppet of the government and the
mixed electoral system has been shifted towards
a majoritarian one. His measures have led to an
unprecedented concentration of the media in
Hungary; he has made the Chief Prosecutor’s Of-
fice his extended hand; and he makes every effort
to suppress civil society. The harm Fidesz has
done to Hungarian democracy is worse than that
of any government since the transition. Further-
more, a destructive campaign is ongoing against
the European Union, blaming ‘Brussels’ as the
puppet of George Soros for every ill in the world
and making it the centre of conspiracy theories.
Jobbik, even on government, would have no tools
to further erode democracy. They have no eco-
nomic background and no external and political
support comparable to that of Fidesz. Further-
more, while Fidesz is a member of the European
People’s Party, Jobbik is at the margins of Europe-
an politics – even the far-right EP group Europe of
Nations and Freedom refused to include them.
This means that they should do everything they
can to calm the nerves of the international com-
munity by demonstrating they are no longer ex-
tremist and generally ‘being a good boy’ in the
eyes of the world. The lack of an institutional po-
3
Péter Krekó | Rethinking the Far Right in Hungary
litical umbrella provided by a mainstream Europe-
an party group can, paradoxically, serve as a mod-
erating factor.
Also, Jobbik, when in power, would not intend to
erode democratic institutions further. While some
assume that Jobbik’s hidden agenda is to imple-
ment its ‘original’ racist programme, once in gov-
ernment, it would be too much of a risk. More like-
ly, they would follow a more moderate, more
predictable centrist political line to secure the sup-
port of the mainstream.
But what is important to underline: a coordination
with Jobbik does not necessarily means giving
them the executive power.
3. The Hungarian Left is mathematically
unable to defeat Fidesz alone
As Orbán’s illiberal state continues to be built at an
increasing pace, 2018 might be the last chance to
defeat it. The 2014 elections were highly unfair, al-
beit still ‘free’, but the 2018 general election will be
even more unfair and its degree of freedom highly
questionable. Due to regulations introduced by Fi-
desz, opposition parties are unable to reach the
electorate through political advertisements via
television, while the government is pushing its
narrative frantically, on every front. Opposition
parties are singled out by the Prosecutor’s Office
and by the State Audit Office as well. Jobbik is not
an exception but the rule – one Hungarian govern-
ment-organized think tank raised the issue of
banning the party, as they think Jobbik’s party fi-
nances are not transparent enough. Also, Jobbik
received the biggest fine from the State Audit Of-
fice- more than 2 million euros, for highly ques-
tionable reasons.
There is an even larger problem. Fidesz’s support-
ers easily outnumber the supporters of Hungarian
left-wing and liberal parties. According to a recent
poll by Závecz Research Institute, Fidesz has 50
per cent of the votes among certain voters with a
preferred party. The Hungarian Left has close to
35 per cent – and leftist forces are more divided
than ever, with questionable willingness for step-
ping back. Jobbik is favoured by almost 15 per
cent of voters. It means that Jobbik and the
left-liberal opposition together could have more

votes than Fidesz alone. It can be a huge asset in
the individual constituencies. It was already the
case in 2014: only in 26 out of 106 (!) single-mem-
ber constituencies was Fidesz able to win an ab-
solute majority; in 80 individual constituencies,
opposition voters simply outnumbered Fidesz
voters.
Given the divisions among and general ineptitude
of the Hungarian Left, however, it seems highly
unlikely that they can close the huge gap in the
polls to defeat Fidesz alone. Therefore, if a change
of government is the goal, the only possible way to
defeat Fidesz would be for opposition parties to
compete with separate lists but coordinate with
each other in single-member constituencies. The
results of previous by-elections and recent polls
also show that there is an increasing willingness
among voters of the Left to vote tactically for a
Jobbik candidate if they feel this is the way to de-
feat Fidesz. This is a trend observed among Job-
bik voters as well, albeit to a smaller extent. How-
ever, generally, we can say that the psychological
barriers that divide the two camps are becoming
lower.
Taking into consideration the 5 per cent parliamen-
tary threshold in Hungarian elections and the di-
vided opposition, the presence of over three party
lists would be problematic, as it would lead to too
many lost votes. Two opposition lists on the Left
(one forming around LMP, the green party, and one
around MSZP, the socialist party), and that of Job-
bik, though, could coordinate activities efficiently in
single-member constituencies – otherwise they
will knock each other out and Fidesz can win once
again even if they gain only a minority of the vote.
Given that only 27 individual candidates are need-
ed to have a national party list, the coordination
would be even possible with more party lists.
The minimal degree of cooperation would be that
(a) left-wing opposition parties do not field individ-
ual candidates against each other, and (b) they do
not field strong candidates with a lot of financial
resources in constituencies where the chance for
Jobbik to win is high – and vice versa. This kind of
cooperation does not even necessarily need any
background discussion – the parties already know
4
Péter Krekó | Rethinking the Far Right in Hungary
who would have a better chance to win and where.
A higher level of cooperation – although it seems
unlikely at the moment – would involve Jobbik
and left-wing parties not fielding individual candi-
dates against each other in the constituencies
where the other has a better chance to win.
But if all this is so easy, what is stopping the polit-
ical parties from doing it? First, they are afraid of
political attacks from Fidesz for cooperating with
the other side. But they will be attacked anyway. In
fact, they are already subject to attacks. Second,
they are afraid of the political repercussions: los-
ing voters who cannot accept such cooperation.
This might happen, but still there would be more
chance to defeat Fidesz. And third, there is a
strong disincentive for political parties to step
back in favour of each other. The Hungarian elec-
toral system, tailor-made to fit Orbán’s goals,
gives considerably more money to parties that
field more individual candidates. Besides receiv-
ing HUF 1 million (approximately 3200 EUR) for
every individual candidate, the parties that field
only the 27 individual candidates required to have
a national party list receive only HUF 150 million,
while they receive four times as much – HUF 600
million – if they field candidates in every sin-
gle-member constituency. This makes a big dif-
ference for opposition forces that are not doing
well financially, therefore the system pushes op-
position forces to maximize the number of their
individual candidates.
Conclusions and recommendations
Some argue that if Fidesz lost its parliamentary
majority, it could result in a chaotic and unpredict-
able situation in which opposition forces are un-
able to cooperate, and thus they would have a very
difficult time governing the country. And they are
right: this is a possible scenario. Also, Jobbik, even
today, is far from being an ideal coordination or
cooperation partner for progressive forces, even if
it does not lead to governance.
But even in its worst case, a weak and slightly
chaotic government can be a far better option for
the country than an extremely strong government
with authoritarian tendencies that is actively de-
 Péter Krekó | Rethinking the Far Right in Hungary

stroying the remnants of a fragile Hungarian de-

mocracy – and which serves as a model for other
countries in the region, such as Poland. Coordina-
tion with Jobbik is not an ideal approach – but it
much more fits the realities than the notion of the
left is defeating Fidesz alone.

The Hungarian case is in some ways similar to

Ukraine in the times of the Maidan. To replace and
to oust Yanukovich’s corrupt regime, the demo-
cratic opposition clearly needed the support of the
forces of the nationalist right such as Svoboda. In
the course of the next few years, the political far
right has practically been sidelined. Is the current
Ukranian situation perfect? Very far from it, even if
we do not consider Russia’s aggressive moves.
But still better than the Yanukovich regime.
German foreign policy, and even German Social
Democrats should change their approach when it
comes to the far right in Hungary. Jobbik is no lon-
ger a genuine, hardcore far right party – but Fidesz
is. Jobbik is no longer a real threat to democracy
– but Fidesz is. Jobbik, abandoning its anti-gipsy
and anti-semitic rhetoric endangers much less
ethnic relations than Fidesz, fuelling hatred against
refugees. Jobbik is not the party that poses a real
threat to EU membership, while Fidesz is the major
party in a government that aims to destroy the Eu-
ropean Union (and with the aid of EU funds). Fi-
desz is no longer a guarantee against the Far Right
– it now is the Far Right. Thus when we consider
strategies to repulse the Far Right, we should pri-
marily think about strategies to repulse Fidesz.

5
About the author
Péter Krekó PhD is Director of the Political Capital Institute in
Budapest. He is also an associate professor at ELTE Univer-
sity, Budapest.
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