BSRV 33.

1-2 (2016) 271–280 Buddhist Studies Review ISSN (print) 0256-2897

doi: 10.1558/bsrv.31649 Buddhist Studies Review ISSN (online) 1747-9681

On the Supposedly Liberating Function of the

First Absorption

Bhikkhu AnālAyo

Numata CeNter for Buddhist studies, uNiversity of hamBurg

AbstrAct
This article offers a critical reply to the proposal by Arbel (in Bud-
dhist Studies Review 32(2), 2015) that the attainment of the first ab-
sorption has in itself a liberating function in the early Buddhist path
to awakening.

Keywords
absorption, awakening, early Buddhism, concentration, insight, liberation

Introduction
The last issue of the Buddhist Studies Review carries an article by Keren Arbel
entitled ‘The Liberative Role of Jhānic Joy (Pīti) and Pleasure (Sukha) in the Early
Buddhist Path to Awakening’. Alongside stimulating observations, it seems to
me that the article also contains several inaccuracies. In what follows I intend to
point these out in order to clear the ground for the continuing discussion regard-
ing the role and function of absorption in the early Buddhist scheme of mental
training. The thesis I intend to put into question is the conclusion by Arbel (2015,
181) that ‘the entrance into the first jhāna (and consequently, the progression
from one jhāna to the next) is the actualization and embodiment of insight and
the development of the seven “awakening factors”.’1
This thesis rests on several planks, central among which seem to me to be
Arbel’s interpretations of the terms viveka and vossagga, her assumption that
absorption is in itself a condition of wisdom, her suggestion that with the joy and
happiness experienced during absorption the underlying tendencies (anusaya)
are overcome, and her supposition that there is no textual evidence to the effect
that absorption attainment was known before the advent of Buddhism and thus
1. Harvey 2015, 177 comments that ‘one can see the article as a vipassanā-centric re-appreciation
of the jhānas. Arguably, though, it is unclear what role that leaves for samatha as a practice,
and its mindful cultivation of concentrated states.’

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272 Bhikkhu Anālayo

could not be considered a specifically Buddhist discovery. I will take up each of

these topics in turn.2

Seclusion or discernment?
Arbel (2015, 190) notes that ‘according to the Sanskrit dictionary, the first mean-
ing of viveka is “discrimination”.’ She then suggests this meaning to be relevant
to understanding the standard description of the first absorption. This descrip-
tion specifies attainment to take place based on being vivicc’ eva kāmehi vivicca
akusalehi dhammehi, translated by Ñāṇamoli (1995/2005, 104) as ‘secluded from
sensual pleasure, secluded from unwholesome states’.
Given that vivicca is the gerund of the verb viviccati, it would be more natural
to look for a related Sanskrit term in the dictionary quoted by Arbel by consult-
ing the entry on vi-√vic instead of viveka.3 The dictionary by Monier-Williams
(1899/1999, 987) begins the relevant entry by listing the following meanings for
vi-√vic: ‘to sift (esp. grain by tossing or blowing), divide asunder, separate from
(instr. or abl.).’4 Only later does this dictionary also give ‘to discern’ as another
alternative, and this alternative is moreover not related to the use of the instru-
mental. Since in the case of the Pāli phrase in question the terms kāmehi and
vivicca akusalehi dhammehi are in the instrumental, the proper conclusion to be
drawn from consulting this dictionary would rather be that the relevant sense
of the Sanskrit term is about being ‘separate from’ the object or condition that
comes in the instrumental case.
The indication in the Sanskrit dictionary concords with the understanding of
vivicca in Pāli dictionaries.5 The same position is taken in the Pāli commentarial
tradition, which understands the expression vivicc’ eva kāmehi to convey a sense of
separation.6 This also corresponds to the understanding reflected in translations
of this phrase in the four Chinese Āgamas and in the Abhidharmakośopāyika-ṭīkā, a
compendium of discourse quotations extant in Tibetan.7 Moreover, the sense of
2. Two other topics of discussion taken up by Arbel 2015 are the ability to hear sound in the first
absorption and the Buddha’s recollecting of such attainment from his youth. I have discussed
these topics in Anālayo 2016, 40–46 and Anālayo 2014b, 29–31 and will not repeat the same
arguments here.
3. Arbel 2015, 191 refers to vi-√vic in her discussion, but apparently did not consult the relevant
entry in the Sanskrit dictionary.
4. Cf. also Turner 1966/1989, 680f, who for √vic gives ‘sift’ and for *vicyatē ‘is winnowed, is sepa-
rated’.
5. Under the entry for vivicca, Childers 1875/1993, 589 has ‘separating oneself from’, Rhys Davids
and Stede 1921/1993, 638 give ‘separating oneself from (instr.), aloof from’, and Mylius 1997,
322 ‘(mit Instr) sich trennend (von), sich abseits haltend’; cf. also Bloch 1951, 48: ‘ayant séparé’.
6. The commentary Ps I 124,22 on an occurrence of the phrase in MN 4 at MN I 21,34 refers to
the Visuddhimagga for a full explanation; Vism 139,13 then explains vivicc’ eva kāmehī ti kāmehi
viviccitvā, vinā hutvā, apakkamitvā, translated by Ñāṇamoli 1975/1991, 137 as ‘quite secluded
from sense desires means having secluded himself from, having become without, having gone
away from, sense desires.’
7. The parallel to the occurrence of the phrase in MN 4 (mentioned in the previous note), EĀ
31.1. at T II 666b12, reads 無貪欲想, which I translated in Anālayo 2011b, 215 as ‘free from
perceptions of sensual desire’. In discourses in the Madhyama-āgama and Saṃyukta-āgama one
can find the expression 離欲, 離惡不善法, ‘separated from sensual pleasures, separated from
evil and unwholesome qualities’; cf. e.g. MĀ 2 at T I 422b11 (parallel to AN 7.65 at AN IV 118,22)
or SĀ 483 at T II 123a29 (parallel to SN 36.29 at SN IV 236,2). An example from the Dīrgha-

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On the Supposedly Liberating Function of the First Absorption 273

a ‘separation’ or ‘seclusion’ is what the term viveka itself stands for in so-called
Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit usage.8
Considering all these indications really leaves no room to interpret the Pāli
expression vivicca in the phrase vivicc’ eva kāmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi other
than as an indicator of being ‘secluded’ or ‘separate’ from sensual pleasures and
from unwholesome states. The sense of a discrimination or discernment is not
relevant to this context.

Relinquishment and concentration

Arbel (2015, 186f) takes up a discourse in the Saṃyutta-nikāya which describes
the faculty of concentration with the help of the phrase ‘having made release
the object’, vossaggārammaṇam karitvā,9 followed by the standard description of
the four absorptions. Since the same vossagga occurs regularly in descriptions of
the awakening factors, Arbel (2015, 187) concludes that the first absorption ‘is
attained by releasing and letting go of unwholesomeness. This is achieved by the
cultivation of the seven factors of awakening to some extent.’
Although the idea of releasing and letting go of unwholesomeness is indeed
pertinent to the attainment of the first absorption (which supports the conclu-
sion proposed above regarding the significance of vivicca), from the viewpoint
of the early discourses such letting go need not require a cultivation of the set
of the seven awakening factors.10 Apart from the fact that the description given
in this Pāli discourse is not found in its Saṃyukta-āgama parallels, in other Pāli
discourses the term vossagga can convey various meanings. Two examples are
when a householder hands over responsibilities to his wife and thereby engages
in ‘relinquishment of authority’, issariya-vossagga, or when a householder at the
right time grants his workers ‘leave’, vossagga.11 Such forms of relinquishment
hardly require the cultivation of the seven awakening factors.
This goes to show that occurrences of the term vossagga do not necessarily
carry a relationship to the awakening factors. In the standard descriptions of
the awakening factors where vossagga does carry such a relationship, it comes

āgama would be DĀ 21 at T I 93b20 (parallel to DN 1 at DN I 37,1): 去欲, 惡不善法, which con-

veys the sense of ‘being apart from sensual pleasures, from evil and unwholesome qualities’.
A discourse quotation in the Abhidharmakośopāyika-ṭīkā, D 4094 ju 10a2 or Q 5595 tu 11a4 (paral-
lel to MN 44 at MN I 303,30), reads: ’dod pa las dben pa, sdig pa mi dge ba’i chos las dben pa, which
I translated in Anālayo 2011a, 17 as ‘being free from sensual desire and free from evil and
unwholesome states’.
8. Edgerton 1953/1998, 500 lists in his entry on viveka the following two meanings: ‘separation,
aloofness (from sin)’ and ‘solitude, seclusion’. Arbel 2015, 191 quotes in support of her interpre-
tation SN 52.8 at SN V 301,8, where the mind of a monk who practises satipaṭṭhāna is qualified
with a set of terms beginning with vivekaninna to explain why he will not disrobe. According
to Arbel this suggests ‘a quality connected to clear seeing, to discernment of the nature of
experience.’ Yet the set of terms beginning with vivekaninna recurs in AN 8.30 at AN IV 233,33,
where it stands in contrast to delighting in company. This makes it clear that the sense of
vivekaninna etc. is rather to be inclined to seclusion, which makes it in turn safe to conclude
that the same sense also holds for SN 52.8.
9. SN 48.10 at SN V 198,24; translation by Bodhi 2000, 1672.
10. A relation of the awakening factors to absorption attainment is envisaged in Vism 130,25, but
this involves a conception of absorption that is quite different from what Arbel proposes.
11. DN 31 at DN III 190,6 and 191,4; for a survey of meanings of the term vossagga cf. Anālayo 2009.

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274 Bhikkhu Anālayo

combined with the term pariṇāmin, ‘ripening in’ or ‘maturing in’ or ‘resulting in’.
Moreover, such pariṇāmin is preceded by a reference to depending on seclusion,
dispassion, and cessation, vivekanissita, virāganissita, and nirodhanissita. The whole
phrase appears to describe a progressive series, where in dependence on seclu-
sion, dispassion, and cessation the cultivation of the awakening factors ripens
or matures in relinquishment, vossagga.12 Given that the standard description of
entry into the first absorption or the passage mentioned by Arbel do not use the
three terms vivekanissita, virāganissita, and nirodhanissita, there is little basis for
assuming that this intends the type of vossagga that comes about through culti-
vating the awakening factors. Therefore to take the term vossagga in the descrip-
tion of the faculty of concentration as implying that absorption attainment is to
be ‘achieved by the cultivation of the seven factors of awakening’ is as unconvinc-
ing as if the same cultivation were proposed to be required when a householder
grants authority to his wife and leave to his workers.

Absorption and wisdom

Arbel (2015, 190) proposes that ‘it is quite justified to suggest that the jhānas
are states where wisdom is strong (Dhp 372).’13 This is not quite what the verse
referred to from the Dhammapada conveys. Here is the PTS edition and its trans-
lation by Norman (1997/2004, 54):
n’atthi jhānaṃ apaññassa
paññā n’atthi ajhāyato
yamhi jhānañ ca paññā ca
sa ve nibbānasantike.
‘There is no meditation for one who is without wisdom,
no wisdom for one who is not meditating.
He, in whom there are meditation and wisdom,
is indeed close to Nibbāna.’
The expression ajhāyato in the second line makes it indeed unavoidable that
this line is translated as ‘not meditating’, although the noun jhāna in the first line
could alternatively be translated as ‘absorption’ instead of ‘meditation’. The par-
allels in the Gāndhārī Dharmapada, the Patna Dharmapada, and the Udāna(varga)
involve a similar shift from a noun in the first line to a verb in the second.14
Now taking jhāna in the first line as a referent to ‘absorption’ (instead of ‘medi-
tation’ in general), the implication would be that one needs to have cultivated a
minimum of wisdom in order to be able to attain absorption. The acquisition of
12. Cf. Gethin 1992, 166.
13. In the discussion that leads up to this statement, Arbel 2015, 190 refers to SN 46.40 at SN V
97,13, which qualifies the hindrances as states that weaken wisdom. She then concludes that
‘in other words, when the mind is wholesome and pure, it is a “state of wisdom”’. Yet the
presentation in SN 46.40 does not mean that any mental condition temporarily free from the
hindrances is automatically a state of wisdom of the type reckoned as liberating in early Bud-
dhist thought. SN 46.40 at SN V 97,26 in fact continues by contrasting the hindrances to the
awakening factors, and it is these which are qualified as productive of wisdom. The point of
this discourse is rather that to cultivate wisdom one needs to overcome the hindrances and
cultivate the awakening factors. The absence of the hindrances is only a precondition, rather
than being on its own self-sufficient for the cultivation of wisdom.
14. Brough 1962/2001, 127 (no. 58), Cone 1989, 119 (no. 62), and Bernhard 1965, 439 (no. 32.25).

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On the Supposedly Liberating Function of the First Absorption 275

wisdom here has a preparatory role for absorption attainment. But it does not
follow that absorption itself is productive of wisdom, which line two rather pre-
sents as the outcome of meditating in general. In fact had absorption and wisdom
been considered equivalents, the stipulation in line three that both are needed
for progress to the final goal should not have come into being in the first place.
If absorption attainment were in itself considered as productive of strong
wisdom, one would be at a loss to understand why in the Brahmajāla-sutta and
its parallels the attainment of the first absorption features as a source for misin-
terpretations resulting in deluded views.15 The Brahmajāla-sutta is one of the few
discourses quoted by name in another Pāli discourse, which suggests its relative
antiquity.16 The parallel versions of the Brahmajāla-sutta exhibit substantial dif-
ferences in their exposition of morality and thus clearly reflect distinct transla-
tion lineages.17 For them to agree in presenting the first absorption as a source
for deluded views is fairly strong testimony to the early Buddhist assessment of
the nature of this experience.
That absorption attainment does not in itself equal liberating wisdom is also
implicit in early Buddhist cosmology. According to a discourse in the Aṅguttara-
nikāya and its Madhyama-āgama parallel, regular practice of the first absorption
will lead to rebirth in the Brahmā realm.18 This falls short of being the freedom
from rebirth aspired to in early Buddhist soteriology and considered to be the
result of developing liberating wisdom.

Absorption and the underlying tendencies

The position taken in the Brahmajāla-sutta and its parallels also puts into per-
spective a passage in the Cūḷavedalla-sutta and its parallels, which relate the first
absorption to an overcoming of the underlying tendency to sensuality. According
to Arbel (2015, 203), in this discourse ‘the nun Dhammadinnā explains to Visākha
that entering the jhānas is the way to abandon the underlying tendencies (anusaya;
M I 303–304).’ Similar to the Dhammapada verse discussed above, this is not quite
what the discourse implies.
Whereas the Pāli and Chinese versions of this discourse do relate the first
absorption to the underlying tendency to sensuality, the Tibetan parallel uses
different terminology. Instead of bag la nyal or phra rgyas as possible renderings
of anusaya, this version speaks of rgyas pa, which stands for an ‘increase’, ‘spread’,
or ‘advance’.19 Thus at least in this version the issue at stake is simply prevent-
ing an increase of sensuality, rather than the underlying tendency to the same.
15. DN 1 at DN I 37,1 and its parallels DĀ 21 at T I 93b20, a Tibetan discourse parallel in Weller 1934,
58,3 (§191), and discourse quotations in the *Śāriputrābhidharma, T 1548 at T XXVIII 660b24,
and in the Abhidharmakośopāyika-ṭīkā, D 4094 ju 152a4 or Q 5595 tu 175a8.
16. In SN 41.3 at SN IV 287,12 Isidatta refers to the sixty-two goings into views spoken of in the
Brahmajāla-sutta; the parallel SĀ 570 at T II 151a19 only refers to the different views without
giving the discourse’s title.
17. Cf. Anālayo 2014a, 47–50.
18. AN 4.123 at AN II 126,16 and MĀ 168 at T I 700c2. AN 4.123 stands alone in introducing a distinc-
tion between the worldling and the noble disciple, according to which the worldling will later
be reborn again in lower realms, unlike the noble disciple. This distinction also implies that
attainment of the first absorption as such is not productive of wisdom.
19. D 4094 ju 10a5 or Q 5595 tu 11a8 (which makes such a statement not only for the first, but also

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276 Bhikkhu Anālayo

Even in the Pāli and Chinese versions the point made is not that the underly-
ing tendency to sensuality itself is abandoned just by attaining the first absorp-
tion. Instead, these two versions only indicate that the underlying tendency to
sensuality does not underlie the experience of the first absorption, which thereby
functions as a way of abandoning sensuality.20 This clearly does not intend an
abandoning of the underlying tendency, but only a temporary abandoning of
sensuality. The passage in the Cūḷavedalla-sutta thus appears to be making a point
similar to a discourse in the Dīgha-nikāya and its parallels, according to which
with the first absorption all previous perceptions of sensuality are abandoned.21
That the issue at stake is not just absorption attainment on its own can be
seen with the case of the underlying tendency to aversion in the Cūḷavedalla-
sutta. According to Arbel (2015, 203), after having covered the first absorption,
Dhammadinnā ‘further states that in the next two jhānas one will abandon aver-
sion.’ This is not correct. Neither the Pāli version nor its parallels relate the sec-
ond or the third absorption to aversion, in fact the Pāli and Chinese versions do
not even mention the second and third absorption. These are mentioned in the
Tibetan version, but the two are treated in the same way as the first absorption,
in that the happiness experienced is not related to sensual desire. This is in fact
what one would expect, since the second and third absorption share with the first
absorption the experience of non-sensual happiness (sukha).
The issue of the underlying tendency to aversion rather comes up in the
Cūḷavedalla-sutta in relation to yearning for liberation. This takes the form of a
reflection, translated by Ñāṇamoli (1995/2005, 402) as ‘when shall I enter upon
and abide in that base that the nobles ones now enter upon and abide in?’ As
a result of such reflection sadness (domanassa) arises. This is indubitably not
describing a condition of being in the second or third absorption, making it in
turn clear that the position taken by Arbel is based on a misinterpretation of the
Cūḷavedalla-sutta.
Had absorption been considered capable of removing the underlying ten-
dencies on its own, it would be difficult to understand why a discourse in the
Aṅguttara-nikāya and its Saṃyukta-āgama parallel illustrate the limitations of deep
concentration attainments, if these lack a sustained resolve for liberation, with
the example of taking hold of gum with one’s hand, whereupon the gum sticks to
the hands.22 The problem described is that someone has become attached to the
concentration experience to such an extent that the mind is no longer inspired
to progress to liberation. The two discourses conclude that such a one will not
for the second and third absorptions): ’di ni bde ba’i tshor ba la ’dod chags rgyas par mi ’gyur zhing
spong bar ’gyur ba zhes bya’o, which I translated in Anālayo 2011a, 17 as ‘such pleasant feelings
do not increase desire, but [instead] abandon it.’
20. MN 44 at MN I 303,32: paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati, rāgan tena pajahati, na tattha
rāgānusayo anuseti, translated by Ñāṇamoli 1995/2005, 402 as ‘[he] enters upon and abides in
the first jhāna … with that he abandons lust, and the underlying tendency to lust does not
underlie that.’ MĀ 210 at T I 789c12: 得初禪成就遊, 是謂樂覺非欲使也. 所以者何? 此斷欲故,
‘he dwells having attained and accomplished the first absorption. This is reckoned a pleasant
feeling that does not have the underlying tendency to sensual desire. Why is that? Because
this abandons sensual desire.’
21. DN 9 at DN I 182,18 and its parallels in a Sanskrit fragment, Melzer 2006, 254 (417v1), and DĀ 28
at T I 110a25.
22. AN 4.178 at AN II 165,23 and its parallel SĀ 492 at T II 128b5.

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On the Supposedly Liberating Function of the First Absorption 277

progress to liberation, unlike someone who has no such attachment. This clearly
implies that the concentration experience cannot have a liberating potential in
and of itself.
According to yet another discourse in the Aṅguttara-nikāya and its Madhyama-
āgama parallel, a monk who has experienced the first absorption can subse-
quently still become so overwhelmed by passionate desire that he will disrobe
and revert to lay life.23 This confirms the point made with the previous passage,
in that early Buddhist thought does not consider absorption attainment as auto-
matically ensuring that one becomes free from sensual desire, otherwise the
monk described would hardly have succumbed to sensual desire to the extent
of disrobing.
Thus although the experience of absorption certainly weakens the mind’s
proneness to sensuality, the above passages clearly counter the assumption by
Arbel (2015, 193) that ‘it is the very attainment of jhānic pīti and sukha which allows
the mind to abandon completely the desire for sense pleasures (kāmacchanda),
and the latent tendency (anusaya) to seek this type of pleasure.’

The absorptions as a pre-Buddhist practice

Arbel (2015, 186) comments on absorption attainment that ‘there is also no tex-
tual evidence for arguing that this attainment is not originally Buddhist.’ This is
not quite the case, as several early Buddhist discourses do seem to consider the
attainment of absorption to be a pre-Buddhist forms of practice.24 A point in case
is the Brahmajāla-sutta and its parallels, already mentioned above, which show
how a whole range of views can arise from absorption attainment. One would
have to assume that all these views came into being only when outsiders had cop-
ied the lore of absorption attainment from the Buddhists in order to make this
exposition fit the notion that jhāna is a Buddhist discovery. From the viewpoint
of the thesis by Arbel, one would also have to assume that in so doing these out-
siders somehow lost the supposedly liberating quality of absorption attainment
and were left with a type of absorption that leads to mistaken views. This seems
hardly convincing.
An even more unequivocal indication can be found in the Aggañña-sutta and
its parallels, which refer to jhāna as something undertaken by ancient brahmins
during an early stage in the evolution of human society. According to their report,
some brahmins in the distant past were engaged in jhāna practice. Other brah-
mins, who were unable to attain jhāna, abandoned the secluded lifestyle required
for such practice and instead went to live in villages and taught recitation.25 It is

23. AN 6.60 at AN III 394,11 and its parallel MĀ 82 at T I 558b18.

24. As already pointed out by Rhys Davids 1899, 51 note 1 more than a century ago, ‘the four
Ghânas were regarded by the early Buddhists as older than Buddhism’; cf. also de La Vallée
Poussin 1928, 223, who approvingly repeats the same statement: ‘the four famous ecstasies
(dhyāna) … were regarded by the early Buddhists as older than Buddhism.’ My discussion in
what follows incorporates an extract from Anālayo 2015.
25. DN 27 at DN III 94,17 reports that these brahmins were unable to attain such jhāna, taṃ jhānaṃ
abhisambhuṇamānā. The parallel DĀ 5 at T I 38c9 refers to brahmins ‘who did not delight in sit-
ting in seclusion and giving attention to jhāna’, 不樂閑靜坐禪思惟者. According to another
parallel, T 10 at T I 221a6, these brahmins decided to return to the village after (presumably
unsuccessfully) ‘having first cultivated jhāna’, 初修禪已. Another parallel, MĀ 154 at T I 676b1,

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278 Bhikkhu Anālayo

hard to imagine such a depiction coming into existence in a Buddhist discourse

if absorption attainment itself had been considered a discovery of the Buddha.
Not only jhāna attainment in general, but in the Cūlasakuludāyi-sutta and its
Madhyama-āgama parallel even a specific level of absorption appears to be attrib-
uted to pre-Buddhist practitioners. The two discourses feature contemporaries
of the Buddha apparently familiar with an ancient practice related to the attain-
ment of the third absorption. By the time of their meeting with the Buddha,
however, knowledge of the actual practice to be undertaken to reach that goal
had seemingly fallen into oblivion.26 As far as internal evidence from the early
Buddhist sources is concerned, this much suffices to draw the conclusion that
the early discourses do appear to consider absorption practice to have predated
the advent of the Buddha.
This in turn puts into perspective the supposition by Arbel (2015, 203) that the
‘jhānas cannot originate from lust, aversion and ignorance; they do not create
any new tendencies. Thus, it is plausible to argue that these attainments are the
actual fulfilment of the path of purification.’ This would imply that the actual ful-
filment of the path to purification was already known in ancient India before the
advent of the Buddha. Instead, the early discourses rather consider the Buddha
as having discovered the path of purification ‘among things unheard of before’,
as he reportedly claimed in his first sermon.27
That deep concentration was not considered to be the ‘actual fulfilment of
the path to purification’ emerges also from a discourse in the Majjhima-nikāya
and its Ekottarika-āgama parallel. The two versions agree in describing different
accomplishments that fall short of being the final goal, such as material gains,
fame, moral conduct, and becoming accomplished in concentration. To mistake
such accomplishment in concentration for being the final goal is according to
these discourses comparable to someone in need of heartwood who takes the
inner bark or the roots of a tree, mistakenly believing to have found heartwood.28

Conclusion
The above considerations make it in my view clear that several of the supposi-
tions by Arbel (2015) lack support in the textual sources at our disposition, being
either based on doubtful interpretations or oversight of contradictory evidence.
Although I think the assumption that the first absorption in itself is ‘the actual-
ization and embodiment of insight’ should be dismissed as misconceived, with
this I do not intend to propose that absorption does not have an important role
in support of progress to liberation. Nevertheless, the understandable attempt to
draw attention to this role should not go overboard to such an extent that the
cultivation of insight is lost out of sight.

describes that these brahmins ‘trained in jhāna, but did not attain jhāna’, 學禪, 不得禪. Gethin
2014: 69 comments on the passage in DN 27 that ‘by a play on the word ajjhāyaka, the Aggañña-
sutta suggests that study of the Vedas is in fact the occupation of those brahmins who failed in
precisely the way of life that Buddhist monks now successfully pursue.’
26. MN 79 at MN II 37,16 and MĀ 208 at T I 786a24; cf. in more detail Anālayo 2014b, 32.
27. For a comparative study of the Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta cf. Anālayo 2012 and 2013.
28. MN 29 at MN I 194,25 and its parallel EĀ 43.4 at T II 759b26.

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On the Supposedly Liberating Function of the First Absorption 279

Abbreviations
AN Aṅguttara-nikāya
D Derge edition
DĀ Dīrgha-āgama
Dhp Dhammapada
DN Dīgha-nikāya
EĀ Ekottarika-āgama
MĀ Madhyama-āgama
MN Majjhima-nikāya
Ps Papañcasūdanī
Q Qian-long (Peking) edition
SĀ Saṃyukta-āgama
SN Saṃyutta-nikāya
T Taishō edition
Vism Visuddhimagga

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