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Special drawing rights (SDRs) are an internationally recognized unit of account and reserve
assets issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and allocated to IMF member countries
in proportion to their quotas at the IMF. According to the IMF (2006a), the SDR is ‘‘a potential
claim on the freely usable currencies of IMF members.’’ SDRs can be exchanged for other
currencies in two ways: first, through voluntary exchanges between members; and second, by
an IMF directive, designating members with strong external positions to purchase these SDRs.
SDRs were initially created in 1969 to increase the availability of easily convertible reserve
assets. Before 1969, reserve assets those assets held by central banks to clear international
transactions were held mostly in U.S. dollars and gold. The economists Peter Clark and Jacques
Polak (2004) note that, at the time, issuing SDRs was seen as a way of preventing official dollar
holdings from undermining the stability of the system. Reserve accumulation was perceived as
destabilizing since many central banks converted their dollar reserves into gold, thereby
drawing down the limited U.S. gold stocks. SDRs are also used as units of account by the IMF in
all of its transactions. The IMF conditional loans are denominated in SDRs, while the interest
rate on these loans is calculated on the basis of the SDR interest rate (in addition to an interest
surcharge that varies with the different lending facilities). Amended every five years, the value
of an SDR unit is the sum of the values of the following as of January 2006: 0.632 U.S. dollars,
0.410 euros, 18.4 Japanese yen, and 0.0903 British pounds. As of February 1, 2007,
1.496137U.S. dollars were worth one SDR unit. The SDR interest rate is calculated as the
weighted average of interest rates on short-term instruments in the financial markets of the
four currencies included in the SDR valuation basket; it is posted on the IMF Web site once a
week. On the week of February 1, 2007, for example, the SDR interest rate was 4.20—the
weighted average of the interest rates of a three-month U.S. Treasury bill, a three-month
Europe rate, the Japanese government’s 13-week financing bill, and a three-month UK Treasury
bill.
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) is the monetary unit of the reserve assets of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The unit was created in 1969 in support of the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates to alleviate the shortage of U.S. dollar and gold reserves
in the expansion of international trade.
The SDR unit is defined as a weighted sum of contributions of four major currencies, re-
evaluated and adjusted every five years, and computed daily in terms of USD.
Special Drawing Rights are not a currency, but they represent potential claims on the
currencies of the IMF members, i.e. the SDR system is backed by the ‘good faith’ of the
member countries. SDRs obtain their reserve asset power from the commitments of the IMF
member states to hold and honour them for payment of balances. The IMF uses SDRs for its
monetary unit of account.
Special Drawing Rights are allocated to member states as a low cost alternative to debt
financing for building reserves. Such allocations provide an unconditional liquidity for the
SDRs.
Special Drawing Rights carry an interest rate that is computed weekly by the IMF. It is
paid or received quarterly by the members for deviations of their SDR holdings from their SDR
allocations.
The Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are basically a combination (weighted average) of
multiple currencies. This means that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has its own reserve
which has multiple currencies. Based on the value of these reserves, the IMF creates and
distributes Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).
The current value of the total IMF SDRs is 204.1billion which is allocated to member countries
in proportion to their standings in the organization which is largely based on their share of the
global economy.
Each unit of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) consists of 4 major currencies. The Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs) derives 44% of its value from the United States Dollar, 34% from the Euro, 11%
from the Japanese Yen and 11% from the Pound Sterling.
Since the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) is nothing but a weighted average of multiple
currencies, the interest rate due on the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) is also nothing but a
weighted average of all the currencies.
One possible reason could be the fact that countries like China are fully aware of the fragile
economic condition on which the United States economy stands. Also, China is forced to buy
more and more United States treasury debt if it wants to keep its own economy afloat.
Hence, if an Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) based system was implemented, China and many
other countries could exchange the excess dollars that they have with a basket of currencies.
True, they would still end up with 44% dollars again! However, that would still be a better
scenario than being 100% dependent on the United States economy as being a store of value.
SDRs are used as a unit of account by the IMF and several other international
organizations. A few countries peg their currencies against SDRs, and it is also used to
denominate some private international financial instruments (e.g., the Warsaw convention, which
regulates liability for international carriage of persons, luggage or goods by air, uses SDRs to
value the maximum liability of the carrier).
In the Euro zone, the Euro is displacing the SDR as a basis to set values of various
currencies, including Latvian Lats. This is a result of the ERM II convergence criteria.
SDRs were originally created to replace gold and silver in large international transactions
and provide a cost-free alternative to member states for building reserves. Under the Bretton
Woods system, the reserves of gold and U.S. dollars proved too limited to support the growth
of international trade and exchange. Thus SDRs are credits that nations with balance of trade
surpluses can draw upon from nations with deficits.
It has also been suggested that having holders of US Dollars convert those dollars into
SDRs would allow diversification away from the dollar without accelerating the decline of the
value of the dollar.
IMF is responsible for all transactions, i.e. the IMF acts as a broker
Types of Allocations
If a country has more SDRs than allocated by the IMF it receives SDR interest from the IMF and
vice versa (when a country has less SDRs than allocated it has to pay SDR interest to the IMF):
a) No bid/offer spread
b) IMF calculates SDR interest rates on a weekly basis. For the week of March 8, 2010 to
March 14, 2010 the SDR interest rate = 0.25 %
c) The SDR interest rate is calculated on the basis of the 3 month Eurepo, 3 month Japanese
Treasury Discount bills, 3 month UK Treasury bills and 3 month US
d) Treasury bills
ROLE OF SDRs
The new type of reserve asset which was created to help improve the functioning of the
international payments system was the Special Drawing Right which came into existence in 1965
SDRs. Where created as bookkeeping entries and were essentially given to all IMF member
countries electing to receive them. These bookkeeping entries were designed to be transferred
directly between central banks in settlement of balance-of-payments deficits, with the IMF
guaranteeing their value its terms of a fixed amount of gold. Actual holders of SDRs have
included only the central banks and Treasuries of IMF member countries which have agreed to
accept them, and the IMF itself, Private institutions (such as commercial banks) and individuals
(such as importers and exporters) cannot hold SDRs.
With changes in the supply of SDRs requiring the approval of 85 percent of asset all IMF
member countries voting power, the supply of reserves could be placed under multinational
control. Since the total supply of reserves would he largely independent of any one country’s
policy decisions, excessive increases in reserves and the resultant inflationary pressures could, it
was hoped, be avoided.
The accomplishment of these objectives depended upon the SDR significantly reducing the
importance of both gold and the U.S. dollar as reserve assets. If, on the other hand, central banks’
holdings of SDRs did not comprise the bulk of reserve assets, significant changes its total
reserves could not be accomplished by changing the supply of SDRs.
The large U.S. balance-of-paynsents deficits in the early 1970s, however. rendered the purposes
for which SDRs were created irrelevant. The huge amounts of dollars accumulated by foreign
central banks resulted in a significant reduction in confidence in the ability of the U.S. to
maintain the fixed value of the dollar.
As central banks’ willingness to hold dollars as reserve assets declined, they attempted to
purchases other currencies and gold with dollars. The resulting large increases in the supply of
dollars in foreign exchange markets brought the entire structure of fixed exchange rates under
increasing pressure and eventually became a major factor in the movement toward a systems of
relatively flexible exchange rates.
SDRs were allocated, to those IMF member countries which elected to receive them, in
proportion to the size of each country’s quota. Upon becoming a member of the IMF, a country
must agree upon the size of its quota. Twenty-five percent of the quota is deposited in the form
of an international reserve asset (usually gold or U.S. dollars).The remaining 75 percent is
deposited in, the form of the country’s domestic currency. These quotas then form a pool of
borrow another member's currency. These quotas then form a pool of borrow another member's
currency. The specific SDR allocation were: SDR 3.41 billion on January 1, 1970 (each
Participant received 16.8 percent of its quota), SDR2.95
SDRs have been made since 1972, the total amount of SDRs in existence has remained at 9.31
billion, as total international reserves have rises continuously. Since 1972, the proportion
accounted for b SDRs has progressively declined, representing only about 4 percent of the total
during 1976.
The value of the SDR in terms of any one currency has normally fluctuated less than the
exchange rate between specific currencies. During the two years ending November 1977, for
example. month-to-month changes in the dollar valise of tlse SDR remained within a band of 2
percentage points. In contrast, the U.S. dollar values of the Canadian dollar, German mark,
Japanese yen, and pound sterling fluctuated within a band of about 5.5 percent, 5 percent, 6
percent, and 8 percent, respectively. This relative stability of the value of the SDR, as compared
to the dollar, makes it an attractive alternative to the dollar as a basis for pricing internationally
traded goods and services during periods in which the relative value of the dollar is falling (or is
volatile).
Pricing basic commodities in terms of SDRs, rather than in terms of the U.S. dollar, can be one
way for countries exporting such commodities to reduce fluctuations in the over-all value of their
export earnings.
Denominating the prices of exported commodities (such as oil) in terms of SDRs rather than
dollars would restrain, the decline in the value of export revenues in terms of a currency other
than the dollar when the dollar’s value ins foreign exchange markets is declining. (On the other
hand, a link between the
SDR’s dollar value and the prices of exported commodities would also moderate a rise in the
value of export revenues in terms of a currency other than the dollar during periods in which the
dollar’s foreign exchange value is rising.) However, since SDRs cannot be used as a means of
payment between traders, Conversions of a price denominated its SDRs into a currency-
equivalent price would be necessary before payment could be made.
A) SDR Basket
When the SDR was redefined as a basket of currencies in 1974, it comprised the 16 IMF
members representing at least 1 percent of world trade. At the same time, the interest rate on the
SDR was raised to 5 percent, consistent with a new policy under which the rate was set
semiannually at about half the level of a combined market interest rate that
was defined as a weighted average of interest rates on short-term market instruments in France,
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 16-currency SDR basket was
challenging to manage as a unit of account because it was difficult and costly to replicate and
because it included some currencies that were not widely traded. It was also a poor store of value
because it had a lower yield than substitute reserve assets. To address these shortcomings, in
1981 the valuation of the SDR was simplified: it would be valued using the same five-currency
basket that determined the SDR interest rate, and the interest rate itself would be equal to market
rates. The valuation basket was formally defined as the currencies of the five member countries
with the largest exports of goods and services over the previous 5 years. As a result of these
changes, both the SDR valuation and SDR interest rate baskets were composed of the five freely
usable currencies recognized by the IMF at the time: U.S. dollar, Japanese yen, Deutsche
mark, French franc, and pound sterling.
The five-currency basket was simple enough to be readily replicable by financial markets while
still ensuring a fairly stable SDR value in the face of wide swings in exchange rates. With the
introduction of the euro in 1999, the Deutsche mark and French franc were replaced in the SDR
basket with an equivalent amount of euros, but the relative weight of the continental European
currencies in the basket was unchanged.
The SDR interest rate provides the basis for calculating the interest charged to members on
nonconcessional IMF loans from the IMF’s general resources, the interest paid to IMF members
on their remunerated creditor positions in the IMF (reserve tranche positions and claims under
borrowing agreements), and the interest paid to members on their SDR holdings and charged on
their SDR allocation.
The SDR interest rate is determined weekly and is based on a weighted average of representative
interest rates onshort-term financial debt instruments in the money markets
of the SDR basket currencies.
The quinquennial reviews of the valuation method for the SDR also include a review of the
financial instruments used to determine the SDR interest rate. The Executive Board has
agreed on two broad criteria:
A The financial instruments in the interest rate basket should be broadly representative of the
range of financial instruments that are actually available to investors in a particular currency, and
the interest rate on the instruments should be responsive to changes in underlying credit
conditions in the corresponding money market.
The financial instruments in the interest rate basket should have characteristics similar to the
official standing of the SDR itself—that is, they should have a credit risk profile of the highest
quality and be fully comparable to that of government paper available in the market or, in the
absence of appropriate official paper, comparable to the credit risk on prime financial
instruments. Instruments should also reflect the actual reserve asset choice of reserve managers
for example, regarding the form of the financial instrument, its liquidity, and its maturity.
General SDR allocations have been made only three times. The first allocation was distributed in
1970–72 and totaled SDR 9.3 billion; the second was distributed in 1979–81 and totaled SDR
12.1 billion. After these two allocations, cumulative SDR allocations totaled SDR 21.4 billion.
The third general SDR allocation was made on August 28, 2009, to meet a long-term global need
for reserves while helping mitigate the effects of the global financial crisis. It was a sizable
allocation, totaling SDR 161.2 billion, to help liquidity-constrained
countries address the fallout from the global crisis by limiting the need for adjustment through
contractionary policies and by allowing greater scope for countercyclical policies in the face of
deflation risks. The use of additional SDR reserves, rather than borrowed reserves, was
considered to be more conducive to systemic stability over the longer term.
In addition, the Fourth Amendment to the Articles of Agreement became effective August 10,
2009, and provided for a special one-time allocation of SDR 21.5 billion which
took place on September 9, 2009.9 The purpose of the special allocation was to enable all
members of the IMF SDR Department to participate in the SDR system on an equitable basis and
to correct for the fact that countries that joined the IMF after 1981—more than one-fifth of the
current IMF membership and notably many of the economies in transition—had never received
an SDR allocation at the time. The 2009 general and special SDR allocations together raised total
cumulative SDR allocations to about SDR 204.1 billion.
The 2009 SDR allocations were relatively large and resulted in a more than tenfold increase in
SDR holdings worldwide. The 2009 allocations contributed to a significant increase in reserve
coverage for all member countries. Given their larger quota sizes, advanced economies received
most of the SDR allocation, 62 percent of the total. In contrast, when measured against economic
size, the allocation was proportionally largest for low-income countries, followed by emerging
market economies. The allocations had an important impact on the currency composition of
countries’ reserves and on their reserve management decisions. After the 2009 allocations,
almost 30 percent of low-income countries and emerging market economies opted either to sell
some of the SDRs against currencies of other members or to use them for repayment to the IMF
between September and December 2009.
SDRs are allocated only to IMF members that elect to be participants in the SDR Department
and agree to observe the obligations of participants. Since April 7, 1980, all members of the IMF
have been participants in the SDR Department. SDRs may be used by IMF members and the
IMF itself in accordance with the Articles of Agreement and decisions adopted by the IMF
Executive Board and the Board of Governors. SDRs cannot be held by private entities or
individuals. Other holders of SDRs include the IMF, through the General Resources Account
(GRA) within the General Department, and international organizations and monetary institutions
prescribed by the IMF.
The IMF has the authority to prescribe, as other holders of SDRs, nonmembers, member
countries that are not SDR Department participants, institutions that perform the functions of a
central bank for more than one member, and other official entities. As of April 30, 2014, there
were 15 organizations approved as “prescribed holders. These entities may acquire and use SDRs
in transactions by agreement and in operations with participants and other holders. They may
not, however, receive allocations of SDRs or use SDRs in “transactions with designation.” There
is no general provision for prescribed holders to initiate transactions in SDRs with the General
Resources Account.
The Articles of Agreement authorize the exchange of SDRs for currency among participants, and
the Executive Board has the power to authorize other operations. In exercising this power, the
IMF has adopted a number of decisions that authorize a broad range of operations among SDR
Department participants and prescribed holders, including loans, pledges, donations, swaps, and
forward operations. The Articles of Agreement allow the exchange of SDRs for currency among
participants. When used in such operations, the SDR is a potential claim on the freely usable
currencies of IMF members; however, it is not a claim on the IMF. It serves as the unit of
account for the IMF and a number of international organizations.
The SDR Department is self-financed, and its basic structure is relatively simple: it charges
interest on members’ SDR allocations at the same rate as the interest paid on their SDR holdings.
It is a closed system, with the interest payments and receipts in the SDR Department canceling
out overall. The IMF determines the SDR interest rate weekly based on a weighted average of
representative interest rates on 3-monthdebt in the money markets of the SDR basket currencies.
The SDR is used extensively in transactions and operations between IMF members and the
General Resources Account, which plays a significant role in the circulation of SDRs. Inflows of
SDRs in the General Resources Account include (1) payments of charges on GRA credit, (2)
interest earned on the GRA’s own SDR holdings and assessments for the cost of conducting
business with the SDR Department, (3) repurchases by members in SDRs, and (4) payment of
the reserve asset portion (25 percent) of quota increases.
Outflows of SDRs from the General Resources Account include (1) purchases under
arrangements, (2) remuneration payments on members’ reserve tranche positions, (3) repayments
of GRA borrowing (bilateral loan claims or claims under the New Arrangements to Borrow), (4)
interest on IMF borrowing, and (5) sale of SDRs to members to pay charges and assessments.
The IMF generally offers SDRs as an alternative to currencies in lending operations and
transactions with members. In practice, the majority of purchases, repurchases, and loan
drawings and repayments tend to be made in currencies, whereas charges, remuneration, interest
on loans, and to some extent the reserve asset portion of quota payments tend to be paid in SDRs.
Members are not obliged to accept SDRs in any transaction except replenishment, which is a
special procedure that the IMF could use to rebuild its holdings of the currency of a participant in
the SDR Department. Members who obtain SDRs from the Fund may request to convert these to
a freely usable currency in transactions by agreement with other members.
The IMF generally offers SDRs as an alternative to currencies in lending operations and
transactions with members. In practice, the majority of purchases, repurchases, and loan
drawings and repayments tend to be made in currencies, whereas charges, remuneration, interest
on loans, and to some extent the reserve asset portion of quota payments tend to be paid in SDRs.
Members are not obliged to accept SDRs in any transaction except replenishment, which is a
special procedure that the IMF could use to rebuild its holdings of the currency of a participant in
the SDR Department. Members who obtain SDRs from the Fund may request to convert these to
a freely usable currency in transactions by agreement with other members.
The main flows of SDRs into and out of the General Resources Account, which shows the
relative proportions of these flows since 2004 and compares them with the level of transactions
among participants and prescribed holders.
The IMF recycles the stock of SDRs held in the General Resources Account in two main ways.
First, SDRs are channeled directly to debtor members who are making purchases from the IMF.
Second, SDRs are channeled indirectly from the holders of SDRs to other members who need to
acquire SDRs to make payments to the IMF (charges and repurchases).
The IMF may also assist members in buying or selling SDRs for reserve-management purposes.
Such transactions are carried out through the voluntary SDR trading arrangements.
C) IMF SDR Holdings
The General Resources Account provides one of the mechanisms for the circulation of SDRs,
both to debtor members in connection with their purchases from the IMF and to creditor
members through the payment of interest on IMF borrowing and payment on remunerated
reserve tranche positions in the GRA. The GRA’s holdings of SDRs tend to rise in the wake of
reserve asset payments of quota increases. The GRA rebalances its SDR holdings mainly through
transfers of SDRs for purchases under its quarterly Financial Transactions Plan.
Participants may conduct such transactions bilaterally with any participant or prescribed holder.
However, in practice, such transactions are made through a market in SDRs coordinated by the
IMF through voluntary trading arrangements to buy and sell SDRs with a group of participants
and one prescribed holder (so-called market makers). The role of the IMF in transactions by
agreement is to act as an intermediary, matching participants in this managed market in a manner
that meets, to the greatest extent possible, the requirements and preferences of buyers and sellers
of SDRs. The voluntary trading arrangements allow the IMF to facilitate purchases and sales of
SDRs on behalf of any participant or prescribed holder in the SDR Department against freely
usable currencies, subject to the constraint that all transactions take place at the official SDR
exchange rate for the currency involved.SD
Since the 2009 SDR allocations, the voluntary SDR market has been substantially expanded and
has absorbed all sales requests. The number of participants in two-way arrangements has
expanded and now stands at 32, including 19 new arrangements since the 2009 SDR allocations
and includes both advanced economies and a number of large emerging market economies.
The IMF staff allocates requests for SDR sales and acquisitions using informal modalities
developed to produce equitable burden sharing over time. Since the 2009 SDR allocations, sales
of SDRs have been allocated among most market makers spanning four major geographical
regions. SDR holdings of some market makers are also affected by operations unrelated to their
participation in voluntary trading arrangements, including the receipt of remuneration, SDR
interest payments, the use of SDRs for Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) lending and
subsidy contributions, and the use of SDRs to pay quota increases.13 In general, market makers
with relatively low SDR holdings compared with cumulative allocations have
been used more extensively in SDR sales transactions. (Conversely, market makers with higher
SDR holdings compared with allocations have been used more in SDR acquisitions.) Consistent
with these informal burden-sharing modalities, the IMF staff continues to seek the utilization of
all arrangements over time.
SDR Rates
(as of April 30, 2014)
2. More Stable System: Since essential commodities such as gold, oil and food grains will no
longer be exclusively traded in dollars, the United States government will not be able to exert
an undue influence on their prices by increasing and decreasing the money supply of dollars. A
weighted average of multiple currencies would make the system more stable.
3. Balance of Payment Issues: If the world were to go off a dollar based system it would resolve
a lot of balance of payment issues that are being faced. The United States is running a perpetual
trade deficit with countries like China. They can sustain such a budget deficit because the world
depends on the dollar for its day to day functioning. However, if the world goes off the dollar
standard, the United States would lose this privilege.
4. It is used for accounting purposes by the IMF and even some multinational corporations.
5. Commercial banks accept deposits and make loans in SDRs.
6. It is used to price some international transactions.
2. Abstract Nature: The Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are an abstract weighted average. They
are not an actual currency that can be used by people. As such, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)
will be extremely difficult to implement and manage, if they are ever introduced at the micro-
economic level.
3. No Gold Backing: Lastly, only backing by a tangible commodity like gold makes a currency
stable. Hence, replacing dollars with Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) would be like replacing one
unstable system with another slightly less unstable system.
Critics are of the opinion that it is highly unlikely that the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) may
ever replace the dollar. However, as a student of Foreign Exchange, it is essential that one
knows that such a concept exists!.
Reference
Clark, Peter B., and Jacques J. Polak. 2004. ‘‘International Liquidity and the Role of the SDR in
the International Monetary System.’’ IMF Staff Papers 51 (1): 49–71. A
Goldstein, Henry N. 1969. ‘‘Gresham’s Law and the Demand for NRUs and SDRs.’’ The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 83 (1): 163–66. A contemporary argument supporting the introduction of
SDRs.
International Monetary Fund. 2006a. ‘‘A Factsheet Special Drawing Rights (SDRs).’’
Downloadable from http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm (accessed August 15,
2006).Contains updated information about the current status and history of SDRs.
fin/rates/rms_sdrv.cfm (accessed August 17, 2006). Contains daily updates on the value of
SDRs.
International Monetary Fund. 2006c. SDR Interest Rate Calculation. Downloadable from
http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/rates/sdr_ir.cfm (accessed August 17, 2006). Contains
details on the current SDR interest rate.
Lissakers, Karin. 2006. ‘‘Is theSDRaMonetaryDodo? This Bird May Still Fly.’’ In Reforming the
IMF for the 21st
Century, edited by Edwin M. Truman. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics,
Special Report#19. Written by a former U.S. executive director at the IMF, the paper advocates
the allocation of SDRs in the case of a U.S. dollar crash. The book includes other useful
discussions on various aspects of IMF reform proposals.
IMF Executive Board Completes the 2010 Review of SDR Valuation, Public Information Notice
No. 10/149, November 17, 2010: www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn10149 .htm