Sample of academic writing / excerpts from a bachelor thesis

“A non-naturalistic interpretation of supervenience as one possible

response to problems of Moore’s moral realism”

Excerpt 1

Introduction (Part I)

Metaethics is a philosophical discipline that investigates the fundamental principles and

presuppositions underlying ethical theories. Any assertion of an ethical position, its defense,
refutation, or even the recognition of its impossibility, implicitly assumes a metaethical
position. However, advocating for an ethical theory that implicitly contains a metaethical
position is not the same as engaging in metaethics. In order to engage in metaethics, we must
first clearly ask about its subject matter to determine the scope of its activities. The first
philosopher to do this was G.E. Moore, who clearly distinguished the metaethical question
"What is good in itself?" from the ethical question "What things are good?".

Moore did not only pose the question clearly, but also established the foundations of metaethics,
against which every metaethical approach is indirectly or directly positioned. Therefore, if we
wish to engage in ethics thoroughly, it is important to have a closer understanding of Moore's
metaethical position. Since such a wish exists , we have chosen the topic "The Non-Naturalistic
Interpretation of Supervenience as a Possible Response to the Problems of Moore's Moral
Realism". To provide one possible answer to the problems of Moore's moral realism, we first
need to highlight what those problems are. Moreover, to do so, we need to understand Moore's
metaethical position, which we will do by presenting it in the first part of this paper.

Accordingly, this paper will be divided into two main parts. In the first part, we will present
Moore's position and highlight some of the problems it carries. More precisely, the first part
will be further divided into two sections. The first section, "A", will rely on Moore's position
from "Principia Ethica"1 (PE), while the second section, "B", will largely rely on Moore's
position from the essay "The Concept of Intrinsic Value" 2 and "A Reply to My Critics"3.

In the second part, we will offer one possible solution to the problems we encounter at the end
of the first part. This part will also have two sections, in which we will highlight two different
positions of metaethical supervenience. Within both sections, we will position Moore's
viewpoint and, in the end, provide an assessment of the compatibility of that viewpoint with
both positions.

1
Henceforth, I shall employ the acronym 'PE' to refer to this work, rather than the full title 'Principles of Ethics.'
This is done for the sake of brevity and clarity, as well as to ensure consistency in subsequent references.
2
Henceforth, I will refer to this piece as 'Concept' instead of 'Concept of Intrinsic value
3
I will use the shortened reference 'Reply' instead of the full title 'A Reply to My Critics'
Excerpt 2

PE

Initially, we will outline G. E. Moore's fundamental position on intrinsic goodness and then
provide a closer definition of the concepts of natural and non-natural properties. We will then
present Moore's arguments of the naturalistic fallacy and the open question argument.

A.1.) Goodness, Natural Property versus Non-Natural Property

For Moore, the primary task of ethics is not to determine whether an individual thing X is good
or what kind of thing is good. The primary task of ethics is to determine what is good, that is,
what property it is to be good. In other words, what is good in itself, or more familiarly, what
is intrinsically good. Moore (1998, p.55) offers the following definition: "If I am asked, 'What
is good?' my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter."

At first glance, one may rightly accuse Moore of being uninformative and circular. But what
does Moore actually want to convey with this kind of definition? As he emphasizes, he wanted
to indicate that goodness is a non-natural, indefinable, and irreducible property. We must not
lose sight of this claim since every argument Moore subsequently presents is aimed at justifying
this claim. How does Moore defend this proposition? Moore arrives at the conclusion that
goodness is a non-natural property by the method of elimination, showing us what goodness is
not, by presenting the problems of the naturalistic fallacy and the open question argument.
These arguments implicitly assume Moore's stipulative definition of natural properties. Bearing
this in mind, we will first present a preliminary definition of natural and non-natural properties
before discussing these two arguments.

Whether it is a natural object or a natural property, Moore (1998, p.84) encompasses everything
that is the "object of natural sciences and psychology." The object of these sciences is
everything that exists in time, has existed, or will exist. For example, a natural object could be
a book that we immediately perceive with our senses or the star Aldebaran that we observe with
a telescope. On the other hand, something more abstract, like the thought X that a person Y had
yesterday, would be the object of psychology and therefore a natural property. All of this falls
within the definition provided above. However, how does Moore further distinguish between
natural and non-natural properties?

The best way to understand this distinction is through the relationship between the object and
the property. We have emphasized that a natural object or natural property is everything that
exists, has existed, or will exist in time. Moore (1998, p.84) further stipulates that natural
properties such as roundness or yellowness can exist in time independently of natural objects,
whereas non-natural properties like goodness cannot exist independently of natural objects, that
is, they always depend on them. Let us examine both of these claims.

As far as the first claim goes, which speaks of natural properties, we can say that natural
properties are actually parts of natural objects. Let us imagine that we remove one property at
a time (y, z, w) from the natural object X, and by the end of this activity, when we remove the
last property w, we are left with nothing. Moore's explanation aims to demonstrate that natural
properties exist independently in time and that the natural object is, in fact, only a set (bundle)
of those properties. On the other hand, when it comes to explaining non-natural properties,
Moore simply relies on the argument of the naturalistic fallacy and the argument of the open
question to justify their existence. We will say more about these arguments shortly, based on
which Moore concludes that goodness cannot be a natural property.

Moreover, Moore's claim, that non-natural properties exist in time only when we find them on
natural objects (Moore 1998, p. 84), has no further justification and seems to arise only from
the need to define goodness as a property that stands in opposition to natural properties. Despite
his caution and meticulousness in presenting arguments, Moore leaves himself unclear and us
confused. More will be said in the next section ("B") about the relationship between natural and
non-natural properties, which we can find in Moore's discussions "Concepts" and "Reply" In
the meantime, we must answer the question: how does Moore justify the claim that goodness is
a non-natural property within metaethics? Therefore, we will offer a justification for the
existence of non-natural properties by presenting the naturalistic fallacy and the open question
argument.
Excerpt 3
Introduction (Part II)
Moore's moral realism is the starting point of contemporary metaethics. However, due to
various inconsistencies, Moore's moral realism has served as a foundation for the further
development of opposing metaethical positions, both within realism and some positions within
anti-realism. In the following, we will track the development of one of the several directions
within the sphere of moral realism. Specifically, we will examine Moore's moral realism
through the lens of supervenience. Firstly, we have chosen to present the development of
Moore's position towards moral realism because this direction remains in the spirit of Moore's
original intention from PE that is, the claim that moral properties exist in some way. On the
other hand, we have chosen to present moral realism through the lens of supervenience because
it seems that supervenience is directly related to the problem that was the focus of the first part
of the paper, namely the relationship between natural and non-natural properties.
As we noted in the first part of our investigation, Broad has challenged Moore's criteria for
distinguishing non-natural from natural properties. This leaves us with an opportunity to
evaluate Moore's position through both non-naturalistic and naturalistic lenses. Initially, we will
provide an overview of naturalistically-interpreted supervenience. Afterwards, we will present
supervenience as it is interpreted through a non-naturalistic lens. Finally, we will examine the
compatibility of these theories with Moore's metaethical project. Prior to delving into these
positions, however, we will provide preliminary terminological clarifications to ensure
precision, clarity, and to prevent misunderstandings
Excerpt 4
Shafer-Landau non-naturalistic supervenience

To better understand how non-naturalism and supervenience can be reconciled, Shafer-Landau

draws an analogy with a modification of supervenience in the philosophy of mind. McPherson
(2012, p.224) identifies and highlights three positions within the philosophy of mind regarding
the relationship between the physical and the mental:

1. Reductive physicalism - the claim that mental properties are identical to some physical
properties;
2. Non-reductive physicalism - the claim that mental properties supervene with metaphysical
necessity on physical properties, but mental properties are not physical properties (e.g., because
they can be realized in multiple ways);
3. Physical and mental dualism - the denial that the mental supervenes with metaphysical
necessity on the physical.

Shafer-Landau (2003, p.73) adopts a position on supervenience that he regards as analogous to

supervenience in non-reductive physicalism (2.). He emphasizes three characteristics of this
type of physicalism that he considers analogous to his moral non-naturalism: A. non-identity of
the physical and the mental (natural and moral properties); B. ontologically non-extravagant
position; C. supervenience between the physical and the mental (moral always supervenes on
natural properties). Let us examine these three characteristics.

A. Shafer-Landau sharply rejects the naturalist view that regards moral properties as somehow
identical to natural properties. For instance, a naturalist may take the maximization of happiness
as identical to the moral property, but this is unacceptable to a non-naturalist for three reasons.
First, although in one case maximizing happiness may be a sufficient condition for yielding
intrinsic goodness, in other cases it may not be a sufficient condition. Second, even if it is
always a sufficient condition for yielding intrinsic goodness, intrinsic goodness may be yielded
in other ways as well. Finally, if maximizing happiness is the only sufficient condition for
yielding intrinsic goodness, it is not identical to goodness but merely co-extensive with it.

B. Ontological non-extravagance comes from the fact that like the non-reductive physicalist,
the metaethical non-naturalist is not a metaphysical dualist. Rather, instead of doubling the
substance, the non-naturalist claims that there are (at least) two kinds of properties (not
substances), natural properties and moral properties. In addition, unlike the naturalist, the non-
naturalist could allow for the exemplification of moral properties in the natural world. However,
in this regard, Shafer-Landau remains neutral. This is also the point that is criticized for its
implications, namely pluralism and doubling through exemplification. However, we will not
present these criticisms here; our intention was only to point out the place to which these
objections are directed.

C. According to Shafer-Landau's non-naturalism, the moral property supervenes on a series of

natural properties. This supervenience is not a relation of equality but an asymmetric relation.
By asymmetry, we mean that a group, a network of interconnected natural properties leads to
the realization of a certain moral property. This relation is one-way and not reversible. Finally,
this type of supervenience is metaphysically necessary, and not just contingent. In other words,
the fact that moral property A is instantiated does not mean that the same set or group of natural
properties is always present. In this sense, moral properties are an outcome of natural properties,
but these sequence of properties cannot be identified in any way, nor can it be claimed that these
natural properties, or this type of natural properties, are the only way to instantiate those moral
properties. To further clarify what is meant by this, we will present Shafer-Landau's (2003, p.
73) example.

In beings like ourselves, pain arises due to the activity of neuronal C-fibers (C-fibres).
According to Shafer-Landau, a naturalist would have to commit to two claims. First, pain arises
only if the activity of C-fibers is instantiated. Second, whenever C-fibers are instantiated, pain
always arises. Shafer-Landau considers this to be too restrictive. Why? Firstly, we can imagine 4
beings that do not have a neurophysiological basis like us, yet still have the experience of pain.
In other words, if the activity of C-fibers is not instantiated, pain can still be realized. Secondly,
Shafer-Landau emphasizes that we can imagine a world in which beings in whom the activity
of C-fibers is instantiated do not experience pain. Therefore, pain is qualitatively different from
the activity of C-fibers. Consequently, pain is sui generis. Non-naturalists believe that the same
is true in the case of moral properties

B.3: Evaluation of Compatibility

As we have seen, even independently of the open question argument, classical naturalism falls
into one-sidedness and rigidity. Shafer-Landau continues where "constitutional naturalism" left
off. However, how does Shafer-Landau's non-naturalism differ from "constitutional
naturalism"? At first glance, they seem to have so much in common. What is most important
for us is that, on the one hand both positions make a compromise between the claim that moral
properties are sui generis and that they supervene on natural properties. On the other hand, the
difference lies in the fact that the constitutional naturalist establishes a supervenience relation
between two groups of natural properties. On the other hand, Shafer-Landau as a non-naturalist
has a more ambitious task and that is to explain how non-natural properties supervene on natural
ones. Here, in explaining supervenience, the advantage is clearly on the side of the naturalist.
However, according to our strong intuition, moral properties differ from natural properties in a
deeper way, and in that sense, the advantage is on the side of the non-naturalist.

The direction in which this debate further develops, that is, on what grounds we adopt non-
naturalism as opposed to naturalism would certainly be an interesting subject of research.
However, our task was to point out one possible continuation of Moore's moral realism, and we
have done so. In this case it was the former one. We have opted for a non-naturalistic
interpretation of supervenience because, by highlighting the compatibility of Moore's position
with this view, we, on the one hand, point to theoretical consistency, and on the other hand,
remain in the spirit of Moore's, although unrealized, intention to point out that moral properties
are not natural properties.

4
It is desirable to adopt such a position because it is not logically contradictory. In other words, non-naturalism
is more acceptable because physical necessity does not imply logical necessity.
Conclusion

In the first part of this paper (Part I), we focused on G. E. Moore's metaethical position, with a
particular emphasis on his seminal work, "Principia Ethica." Therein, Moore attempts to
establish the primary task of ethics as a theoretical discipline. He asserts that this task is to
investigate intrinsic goodness, which he endeavors to clarify by employing the naturalistic
fallacy and the open-question argument. Through these means, Moore posits that intrinsic
goodness is not a natural property, as had previously been believed. However, Moore's
conclusion was premature, leading to various inconsistencies and criticisms. Recognizing these
issues, Moore attempts to modify his position in "The Concept of Intrinsic Value," but even
after revision, his position remains subject to objections. Broad's critique of Moore's criterion
for distinguishing natural from non-natural properties, for example, renders his position
unsustainable.

In the second part of this paper, we explore the question: Where do we go from here? More
specifically, what are the possible continuations of Moore's position? We have chosen to
examine the development of Moore's position within the tradition of moral realism, inspecting
it through the lens of supervenience. There are two forms of supervenience within moral
realism: naturalistic supervenience and non-naturalistic supervenience. We ultimately leave
aside naturalistic supervenience because it conflicts with Moore's intention (good is non-
natural) provided in "Principia Ethica." This leads us to Shafer-Landau's interpretation of
supervenience, which we show to be compatible with Moore's original intent in two ways: first,
by following strong intuitions that moral properties differ from natural properties, and second,
by providing an explanation for supervenience. However, this presentation of supervenience
entails a weighty and, for some, an unacceptable metaphysical baggage. Our analysis
demonstrates that there exists a contemporary metaethical position that revitalizes Moore's
original project from "Principia Ethica" and that, through it, the conversation initiated in 1903
can continue to advance.
 Bibliography:

• Alexander Miller (2003), An introdution to contemporary metaethics, Polity Press in association with
Blackwell Publishing Ltd

• Broad, C.D. (1942a), Certain features in Moore’s ethical doctrines. In: Schlipp, P.A(edit.) (1942):
Philosophy of G.E. Moore (pg. 41-69), Northwestern University, in.ernet.dli.2015.46303

• Цекић, Н. (2013), Метаетика проблеми и традиције, Београд: Академска књига

• Dreier, J., 2019. “Is there a supervenience problem for robust moral realism?” Philosophical Studies,
176 (6):1391–1408 (2019)

• Enoch David, Non-Naturalistic Realism in Metaethics, Edited by Tristram McPherson and David
Plunkett, The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics (29-43) Edited byTristram McPherson and David
Plunkett

• Hurka, Thomas, "Moore’s Moral Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer
2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta(ed), url =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/mooremoral/>.
• Irwin, T. (2009), The development of ethics; A historical and critical study, Volume III: From Kant to
Rawls, Oxford University press.

• McPherson Tristram (2012), Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience, Russ
Shafer Landau (edit), Oxford studies in metaethics (pg. 205-235), Oxford University Press

• McPherson, Tristram, "Supervenience in Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer

2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/supervenience-ethics/>

• Мекинтајер, А. (2000), Кратка историја етике: Савремена филозофија морала, (В. Тодоровић,
прев.). Београд: Плато.

• McLaughlin, Brian and Karen Bennett, "Supervenience", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Summer 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/supervenience/>

• Moore, G.E. (1993), Principia Ethica: The conception of intrinsic value, Cambridge university press
• Moore, G.E. (1942b), Reply to my Critics. In: Schlipp, P.A. (edit) (1942): Philosophy of G.E. Moore
(pg. 581-592), Northwestern University, in.ernet.dli.2015.46303

• Мур, Џ.Е. (1998), Принципи етике, (Ж.Симић, прев). Београд: Плато.

• Пигден, Ч.Р. (1991), Натурализам. У: П. Сингер (уред.) (2004), Увод у етику (стр.600-615), Нови
Сад: Издавачка књижарница Зорана Стојановића.

• Ridge, Michael, "Moral Non-Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/moral-
nonnaturalism/

• Roojen, Mark Van (2015), Metaethics A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge

• Shafer-Landau, R., (2003) Moral Realism: A Defence (pg. 55-114), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Стојановић, С. (1991), Савремена мета-етика, Београд: Завод за уџбенике и наставна средства