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    POWER IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE - MICHAEL BARNETT

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    4 views14 pages

    Power in Global Governance - Michael Barnett

    Uploaded by

    Sashquash Felobelos

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
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    LATA raketa een te STi ne nen ay LonEacre nmr neeany Cerra eye Thetth HESS Ont Ronee cin Tomas invites scholars to reconsider tis Riera Sete nner eeu cere eam Comin ee ece CRT neni! Minera anna ksneen es CM eeu ROOM Ue TeterG) Vicente Prine 9 Restrnt Races cnn Eset SIT CC eer eaten Tara UIT A reresesee Cergm ay Ree Rayrnond Duvall s Morse-Alurini Distinguish ed Techn, eie eaten) en coir en Tener CSc ake nett Uns cS ene Ceremonies fret nearer Produttlon of Banger (1999), co-edited with Jutta Wel Hugh Gusterson, Power in Global Governance Edited by Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall Hower geval the WTOP ss Section 3, however, shows why an assessment of pow tion witht a syle in since Polley analy snus uutertntng there bassin cata isang aerate inating the HTD wa litre ie ence of The power of liberal international power Rather, power will simply he manifested in other ways. la somal ea tases, attempting to reduce biag in Uhe WTO may reduce opportuniti organizations for weaker ‘use the power of the United States, EU, andl i vt wil nn el ose the WTO hsional comes MicTel Burnet anal Marta Finmenre in. more biased ways. In social contexts involving, high numbers argl complexity institutional alternatives often suffer from similar binge {Koesay, 195: 23). Yel even where there are parallel bins, they wf nol be uniform, verticizing haw power operates in any institution, icy analysts need to view il countei relation to nonideali2g institutional alternatives, fijpnternational organizations are at the hub of most theoretical and histor= Bical ci of global governance. Politicians, publics, and theoris ke believe that a globalizing world requires mechanisms to manage {hie growing complexity of crossnational interactions, and international id more international organizations (IOs) io perform an increasingly varied array of tasks, IOs nove manage con ets, both international and civil. They promote economic growth aul Usey work to avert environmental disasters, and they are actively involved in protecting human rights around the globe. ‘The reasonsstates urn tolOsand delegate critical tasks tothemare not [mysterious or controversial in most ofthe scholarly literature. The con- Gf ventional wisclom is that states create and delegate to IOs because they provide public goods, collect intor- lish credible commitments, monitor agreentents, and gen overcome problems associated with collective action ual and collective welfare. This perspective gener Pales imporiant insights, but the statism and functionalism of this view FP also obscures important features of !Os, making it difficult to see the power they exercise in global yovernanee. First, the fanetionalist teat ment of 10s reduces thetn to technical accomplishments, slighting, their political character and the political work they do, It also presumes that {he only interesting or important functions that 1Os might perform are {those that facilitate cooperation and resolve problems of interdependent ci ke to thank ihe participants atthe evfenoace gn "WV eat the University of WsconsincAlolison ty April 20 te rt He p24 oh tad stern one ations Fost much nore. 1Os alse constraet in which cooper ion andl choice take place. They help define the thal states and either actors cone ty hell and, we will m 2 Jn ways compatible with liberalisny ancl a liberal hese are important mvercises of paver thal the fume neglects, Second, the statism of many contemparar them as mere tals of states andl has difficulty seeing the Aulmumous actors wha might exercise power. Despite all th {lan te international iastitetions, there is @ tendency among, many treat 10s the way pluralists treat the stale. 1s are mochanisis or ge as theough which others (usually slates) nel. The regimes literature Hicwlarly clear on this point, Regimes are “principles, and dec Horms, niles ave thus peesive atrctures; slates are the agents that excrcne pow in this view. Yet 10s ean, indeed, be autonom us actors wi influence work events. 10s have autonomy because they have autos iy When scholar using neoliberal insttaonaism and principal peg sweets think about authority, ‘evs authority isa community over whic slates have property right tan Ne transferred to (or withdrawn from) an 10. This ea highly view of authority, both conceptually and substantivel a commodity but an attribute pone cannot havea provtic ated from social relations. Ain actor ‘ty ina vacuuny actors have authority because ofthe relationsthey have sveangue is that the rationalization processes of modernily ing global liberalism constitute the bothers. 1Osare bureaueracies, and Weber recognized that bureaucrne 2 wiquely authoritative tand powerful) social form in modern socielies hecatseat ts rational-teyal te, impersonal, technocratic character Bul Kc atealsu cunferred authority because they purste liberal social goals that ave widely viewed as desitable and legitimate, IOs are thus pow. eri both because of theit form (as rational-logal bureaucracies) nnd beens of their (liberal goals. This authority gives them a sphere of autonomy and a resutuce they ean use lo shape the behavior of others ins booth dineet and indie ways Inv this essay we utteran id spread in particular kinds of relations to alternative framework for understanting the nal organiza ve, ne that pr tical basis for expecting, autonomous action by IOs, 8 new ways af understandings the varias forms of 10 pave in global govern he social wonlg 44 highlights the connections of 10s to + develops the argument thal rationa as articular kinuls of actors, ones that areable to help organize, regulate Fe here, lobal oncler salments of 10s treats Kin, prucealures.” They are not purposive actors, IO * shape behaviorat a distance (institutional power constitution of global governance (productive power). We conclude by ith pose they imagine delegated! authority. ts this Authority is not} h others. The reason IOshaveauthorty, ) be Alife Barnett ana Mara Eason lobal liberal tion ane 1 brietly stitute Os and guile transnational interactions in ways that promote cooperation, and liberal values. Section 2 argues that [Os can be usefully character- «las bureaucracies and are conferred authority for reasons owing \ional-tegal standing, their delegated tasks, thelr moral posis tion, and their expertise. A focus on theautharity of IOs generates three impo his: (1) it shows how authority provides the basis of 10 } autonomy; (2) iL highlights how (often liberal) vatwes and social purpose |p) stond behind 1s’ techneeratie appen H shows ho thority provides. resource that IOs use to exercise power in ways that directly shape behavior (compulsory powen), indirectly: y pUlsOry pK nd contribute to the considering several normative issues raised by our argument regarding J0s and global governance. Liberal international organizations ; Our contemporary architecture of IOs ean be understood as an expres- sion of two central components of global culture ~ rationalization and Jiberalism. Max Weber introduced the conceptof rationalization in order to describe the process whereby moxles of action structured in terms of meansand ends, often using impersonal rules and procedures, increas- ingly clominate the world. Weber clearly satv rationalization as a histor- ical process that was increasingly defining all spheres of life, including the economy, culture, and the state, Liberal ideas have seen a similar, Pethaps related, expansion across the globe. Liberal political ideas about the sanetity and autonomy of the individual and about democracy as the most desirable and “just” form of government have spread widely, as have liberal economic notions about the virtues of markets ancl cap italism as the best (and perhaps the only) means to “progress.” These ‘vo cultural strands have constituted 10s in particular ways. Rational- ization has given 1s their basic form (as bureaucracies) and lilveralism has provided the social goals which {Os all now pursue (democracy, Jnumnan rights, sn material progress via free markels). We take up each ‘oF these in tan hissy daw badly f Barnett and nemo 20 163 ud He psy of heal ear ationd og ations bic Bact wal Aarti Finnenere W tsae ban eaueracies an thy rexlern bureatensey ds, in ns empha of the rationalization peacess, His elefines! by fo Waites (Beetlam, 1%: 9-12), Mader bur for each official Ina a cle Nationalist, theocratic, and authoritarian regimes of various kinds have all made use of bureaucracy and! provisled il with purposes of different Kinds James Scull, 1998), But, internationally, liberalism has colored * our altitudes loward the role of international organizations in global governance, : Liberals has dominated th ways, 8 ‘ental nvcracies exhibit hierarchy dlofined sphere of competence withing division of labor and is answerable to superiors; coutbuily, where th office constitutes a full-time salary structure that offers the prosped of reputar advancement; inypersonnlily, where the work is conducted accoring to prescribed! rules and operating procedures that eliminates atbitrary and politicized influences; and expertise, wher selected acennling te meri bout 10s, both theoretically ant international organizations as policy mie of the most fundamental the- sical liberalism: a belief in progress and in the Heapacity of technological change and markels lo lransform the charactor 30 global politics in positive ways by creating ever-expanding material neliorate social conflicts. IOs, in the liberal view, {ue both promoters and managers ofthese changes. They bring the ber Felts of progress to those in need and at the same time manage cor picts that may accompany these changes in a nonviolent, impartial, and onal way (see Keohane, 1999; Zacher and Matthews, 1995; Doyle, 999). They also are valued because of the view that they help to bring bout progress, nurturing development, security, justice, and indivice ial autonomy (oli and Thomas, 1999). Given these virtues, itis hardly prising Urat liberals have been the most ardent ancl longstanding, nthuusiasmn f ions Cows clirectly fro officials are gigi) oretical tenets of el rv trained for their function, and control gM cess to novvledge stored in files, The modem bureaucratic form i heal by the breaking down of problems into manageable ar sks that are the domain of a particular office, and then doidinated under a hierarchical command, ul These are the very qualities and traits that led Max Weber (19760) ‘characterize modem bureaucracies as more efficient than other syste of administration or organization and reflective of the rationalizat processes thal were unfolding Tunesneracy exemple “eatiosality*.., because it involved on fo the basi of knowlege: beenune it clenely lined spheres, svmnpetence Beane i operated acanting ty itllecualy ali ain cau the calli fie operation Awehnically if was enpable of the highest level of achievement. 2 (ecto, 15856 lencvor lls Nenvrksof an unrealistic one 1 lenlepelonce 197% enpencests to es linking prone, role of 10s to that en force! in recent yenes by rows om microeconomics (vont Bistisisaneptinistictwok, tho Bureaucracies, in Weber's view, are a grand achievement in that th tera succinct atone Uepoliticize ane depersonatize decision-making, ancl subject decision lo well-established rules. Decisinns, therefore, are made on the basig of technical knowledge and the possession af info making, procedures informed by these qualities di organization, one that ew deliver prec that enable states ber of nssumnptions well aeration arly surprising tt fontempevary loro scholars dre heavy em econ nals apps the study af organizations. These approaclice conte out of exonumnice deporte bs ‘ole in 2esuptions of iestrumentalsaionality ad Ue I Nicurtical problors for this grou, I! ul fst son, fey te have bans Heme WR slabilily, cliscipling, a scracy anel empower simply because t ahureaucracy. Wedlefer becauscbuireateracies serve valued social goa These rationalization processes are always linked a broader collective purpose = ton Saf “progress,” development, justic recurity, and the antonany to eevee sellin (Boi and Thomas, 1958 295 Historically, bureaucracy has heen Hinked! to a variety Conn wens particularly adept al calling bureaucracy inte serv nonganizationsaselcientsolaions i conteacting prolens, markt pesestins Wd 165 Vr yuuten ef eral raveastnaal onze tens ‘Asa historical miatiey, the creation of most international organizations hasbeen part ofa larger liberal project ensanating, from tive Wes. In view, international oan sme pUVEYOrS UF projres, MmoKl and peace. The lirst publicintern lef the ni ly, in themid ih century with an eye Cospurting greater commercial ties and interdependence. The desire to introduce standardized weights 3 and meastresand (o coordinate various commntinication ana i nisportne on Tines were justified on the grounds thal they would promote greater commerce ant interdependence belwoen states (Murphy, 1994), These functional associations would not only provide the technical and bureaucratic means to further econainic liberalis tions were also hypoth rs the growing in ed to lead to more pacifie relations between states (Russett and O'Neal, 2001; Milrany, 1966). Bul 10s were evalu ated not only on the grounds thal they woul promote greaterand more NA profitable and peaceful interactions between states. There wasalsoa lib ‘eal assumption that 1s would champion basic liberal values such aa freedom, autonomy, and liberty against the linge day (rive, 2002: 13). In other words, these “techn werd hardly apolitical and value-veutral andl instead were serving cultural tends (Murphy, 1994; Boli and Thomas, 1999. : The next big, push of 1O-building came after World War Land is most closely associates! with the iberal internationalism of Woodrow Wilson, Ue and other advocates of 10s saw them as able to sustain and pro“ mote basic lib aN al values such as national self-delermination, groupand tag Ininorily rights, free trade, and democracy. These general ilens were f clothed in notions of progress and order. As Martti Koskenniem (2002) Lwilliontly chronictes, those who gathered at Versailles believed that the LLeojue of Nations nox! other international associations not only might S488 a return to war but also could help civilize nations and bring ee ess In their view, the ereation of more liberal states would helppto produce a morestableinternational order. operated at two eo liberal inte a liberal domestic under (hiye, 2002: hap. 2). This transnational liberal onder would proucestaility an p stich asthe Leagueof Nati about pr ned not only to more rationally 2 steer the world but al te prualuice a more liber sell-eguating in more desirable ways. Despite Colel War tensions, the period after Worlel War I saw an explosion of international ¢ Joe : Mictawt Barnet! aad Martha Eienenore character anal missions Many of those who wereinvelyed inthe creation, of these 10s were sell-identified liberals, bat realists, tow, valued these international organizations as valuable tools for projecting US pawer and constructing, a liberal international order (Murphy, 1994; Burley, 1998). The half-century of international organization activity between 1945 and 1989 reflects this conscious effort and was largely successful at achieving ils yoals, ‘The economic instilutions set up at Bretton Woods were heavily involved in promoting and sustaining, an “embedded lib cralisin,” atlenpting to guide the international economy away from the mercantilistic practices of the interwar period and toward a regulated bul increasingly open international trade regime (Ruggie, 1982). The UN, vas pivotal to the epochal change from the era of empires to the era of sovercign states, helping to engineer a relatively peaceful decoloniza- tion process. The UN also assisted the birth of the human rights reginye period, laying the groundwork for its extraordinary expansion since the end of the Cold War. 1Os thus regulated the postwar world and ‘helped to constitute a largely liberal world order. activities, 10s revealed a liberal self-understanding and a liberal jon of the role they could and should play in the world. As they have WF for a century, advocates and staff of 10s hold that the world is being, transformed by modernization processes, and that IOs are essential to & manage the worst aud guise the best of these processes. They also for- ward human rights ane democracy as important principles for shaping, ® and defining not only international but also domestic politics. While the {, slate remains thecornerstone of international politics, many 1Os attempt {o promote the sanctity of the individual and give greater voice to vari ilentity-based associations and collectivities. The liberal template is particularly noticeable when IOs attempt to “save failed states.” Draw ing from liberal moclels of the state, the architects and administrators of these rebuilding tasks nurture liberal practices. Good states have the rule of law and elections that result in changing governments and mar- et economies, and international organizations of all kinds work hard * to promote this model (Barnett, 1997). Through their activities and pro- grams, many 1s articulate a notion of progress thal by liberal prin Yel liberalism is nol of a piece and, as 1Os have attempted to spreacl and stabilize liberal values, they have confronted contradictions i lib- 167 He poueve oles wnteveatenna organ ations : ittacks tram apponents, Contradictions Foms in the fiberal vi well known, Markel Proxhuce equal distibutions of wealth, thereby nu! possibly hum and prob. tL econoniies tol not Uunclermvising e lie buweaueracies, atten calle tral polities to ameliorate the worst effects of marie ‘YF accountability (Finnemore, 1996; 1a tnderstood as majority rule atid campetitive elections lash with tiberal tenets of the rule wf law and indivi they fail (o elect uphollers of either libernlisnn or dk ine liberal demwrcracies” (Zakovia, 2003), Passible contra ions such Tenet Within liberalism produce much of the polities we an Western states, and as it spreads aro ine! the globe, exported in siguif cant part by 10s, they have created sinilar tension Among non-Western slates as well One of the most consequential ten bers quality «lin by lib both withiny and sions i the Western (now gl twvdel thot is currenly fueling conflict around inerneig ations is the tension between free-markel capita ibe; the er ale uloromy tibeal seldeernaion orn (toga “ee eral compromise as deserbd by ong (1982), states were understood to have a legitimate role in protectiigiy Frere (rom the harshest features of free-whecling eapilaion, anid ‘were accorded substantia! autenon tect their people from un tional insttations even celebrated, th ny in devising social policies to pre ‘leone features of global markels, Interns 2 they operated in the postwar peri respected f role of slates as part of the rightful role rartcularly since the 1980, hnwever, this buffering role for slots hee conte ander altack by pro-inarket forces of global ae organizations have often been on the frontlines of this dee Hing of the embeded liberal compromise. The national Monetary: Fn, World Hank, and the Workd Trace Organization have atone Fe: tently pushed forgreater integration i b world markt evenat the ast oof domestic social compacts a the only wad lo eon growth and mrespesity (Stiglitz, 20020). Although imternaional wrganten et lone in pushing the pena from regutation to dlerepulation (oor {hex wen the must consequential actors), they are cently among. {he awe vite proponents. They have beet ental in egiimeine ne dae atlas 2 commence have beccme lighting ros fr politcal oMponents of tas events in Seattle, Prague, and Wachinglan show. iat lemocraey, produce AE * should! playin the globat order. Overtime, and Mr tet Bars nad Martha Pinncmen ie re responsible for establishing them and delegating to them, St ng jst ees 10s os particular kinds of subjects. [Os take the modern bureaucratic fe Mesuncef medery4y CULT Mal ete See rsp ais oy vem te ra TOsare value bene ofthe ral ktonet peer meses [ Becotioinie cera oot tte BS suing valued goals, 1O become authorities in modern life and are abl : i Ip create a liberal world that they are then particularly well suited fio regulate. BE inogect ie ackng agency and stony eve though they sree i jon through different theoretical channels. Utilitarian, scams andrgineappreais deny agency orutonony by ing 10s only as arenas for etion by other, wile more structural i utionalists in sociology treat 10s as ene accretions of lola culture been constituted! in very particular ways such that they are ena wih utority, ergo autonomy, precisely becnuse they are rationalize Fibra co y authority we mean the ability of one actor to deploy discursive ancl stan tas erro thr rn le ag ft (nn, 199, Autry ns seer porate Sie eer eeeneeceeinieties tne soil elton that sonstitte al eitimate Seco ame of suthriys ane print Ketan ste cheater 168 The poorer of Hibevat tate ation onsen tive sovial relations it entaits; authority requires samme fom other actors. An actor may be powerful 1 think, but she is only authoritative if others re lovers of porver may be ferred. Third, when mdyement, they conferred cred level of eo ‘garless uf what others reognize heros stich. Other ed oF token, but authority must be Actors confer authority and defer to the grant a right to speak and to have ly. There cone authority's those statements always a range of opinions about Contentious political problem, but not all views receive equal weipheee, SEAL , all views receive equal weight or Ne {ual hearing, Authority helpsan actor's voicebeheattl,weeonniney, el ae iyhely beheatd,recognized,and with, this right to speak credibly is central to the Produces effects, Because individ uals def conferred authority, they are likely to are consistent with the directions li involves more than the abil would nol; autho way authori judgement io those who are alter their behavior in ways that dl out by that authority. Authority & ity t Bel people todo what they otherwise often consists of telling people what is the right {hing to do There sn persuasive aid normative clement in ace that i Lightly linked to is legitimacy. The exercise of authority in ree fonable and wormatively acceplable ways bolsters its oy versely, iis because we believe in the legitimacy of aulle ‘olten follow their directives and think those directiver a cesar, ever when we do ot ike the. pliance is automatic, however: Actors might recognize an suthosion Hulgement a inate bt ail alow anaernateeconeieat for some other set of reasons. Indeed, sometimes there are alternates ‘wices, each viewed asan authority, that are giving different judgements ava instctions actors NEB w hferentjulgement 1Osareconferred authority because they embouy tational-legal prine nls thal exert alu ove Menied wit ibe ae are sieweul as legitimate and progressive. Bureaucracies, international aft othersise, contain authority that derives from thei rtional-legal character This argument is mest closely associated with Weber's ccm

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