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Prop Grane ESSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW TIMOTEO B. AQUINO Professor of Law and PreBar Reviewer Author, Torts and Damages Notes and Cases on Banking Law and ‘Negotiable Instruments Law, Vole. and I Philippine Corporate Law Compendium Essentials of Insurance Law Co-Author, Reviewer on Commercial Law Handbook on Summary and Small Claims Procedure, and Bouncing Checks Law Rovised Rules on Summary Procedure: Revisited Fundamentals of Obligations and Contracts Fundamentals of Negotiable Instruments Law RAMON PAUL L. HERNANDO ‘Associate Justice Court of Appeals Professor of Law, Kavior University-Ateneo de Cagayan Schoo! of Law, Angeles University tion College of Law Boda Colleye of Law, ‘Tomas Faculty of Civil Law versity Inatitute of Law of Par Eastern Us Universi Ses Pubished & sted by REX Book Store Nleanoe Bayes, oe Meter SE Stas UP COLLEGE oF Law Litany wae (NN raises ‘eT SNe rene Philippine Copyright, 2011 by, Loitje, ASE rima ISBN 978-971-23-5898-2 No portion of this book may be copied or reproduced in books, pamphlets, outlines oF notes, whether printed, mimeographed, typewritten, copied indifferent electronic devices orn any other form, for distribution orsale, without the written permission of the authors except brief passages in books, articles, reviews, legal papers, and judicial or other official proceedings with proper citation. Any copy of this book withoutthe correspond- ing number and the signature of the authors on this page either proceeds from an illegitimate source or is in possession of one who has no authority to dispose of the same. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED BY THE AUTHOR Ne 1684 ll ll (05-CM-00035 Print by Rex printing company, inc. oc 8 echne cea et P Prne tcszecy Toe 12a T2488 For my wife, Bernadette and our children Leona Isabelle, Lean Carlo, and Lauren Margaret, my parents Bernabe C. Aquino Sr. and Obdulia B. Aquino, and my aunt Felisa C. Aquino. ‘TIMOTEO B. AQUINO For my wife Cherry Chiara and my parents Judge Teodoro Hernando Sr. and Prescilla L. Hernando. RAMON PAUL L. HERNANDO 6.02. Contract of Adhesion.. 6.08. Parol Evidence Rule... 6.04. Bill of Lading as Evidence... c 6.05. Bill of Lading as Actionable Document... 6.06. Shipment Terms... Basie Stipulations 7.01. Overland Transportation 7.02. Maritime Commerce. 7.08. Electronic Documents... Prohibited and Limiting Stipulations... 8.01. Purpose of Limiting Stipulations 8.02, Stipulation Limiting Diligence ....... 8.03. Stipulations Fixing the Limit of Recovery. 8.04. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act... Bill of Lading as Receipt Bill of Lading as Document of Title... 10.01. Negotiabitity 2 10,02. How Negotiated... 10.08. Effects of Nogotiation. CHAPTER 5 - ACTIONS AND DAMAGES IN CASE OF BREACH Distinetions.. 1.01. Distinctions Between Culpa Contractual ‘and Culpa Aquilina... : Concurrent Causes of Action . 201. Concurrence with Third Persons... 2.02, Solidary Liability 2.03. Alternative Compensation Scheme . Notice of Claim and Prescriptive Period ....m 3.01. Claim in Overland Transportation and Coastwise Shipping... : 3.02, Prescription in Overland Transporation and Coastvrixe Shipping. 3.03. Claim in International Carriage ‘of Goods By Sea 8.04, Preseription in Internation of Goods. . Recoverable Damages 4.01, Extent of Recovery. 4.02, Kinds of Damages. 229 229 230 230 281 231 232 233 238 240 241 246 247 4.09. Actual or Gompenantory Damages 4.04, Attorney's Feet 4.05. Interests... 4.96, Moral Damage 4.07. Nominal Damages 4.08. ‘Temperate or Moderate Damages. 4,09. Liquidated Damages 4.10. Exemplary or Corrective Damages.. PART Il- MARITIME LAW. CHAPTER 6 - GENERAL CONCEPTS Maritime Law Defined... Real and Hypothecary Nature. 2.01. Statutory Provisions.. 2.02. Coverage of Limited Liability. 2.03, Exceptions to Limited Liability. 2.04. Negligence of Shipowner und Agent.. 2.05. Not Applicable to Insurance Claims.. 2.06, Workmen's Compensation 2.07. Abandonment 2.08, Procedure for Enforcement. Protests Admiralty Jurisdiction. Forfeiture Due to Smuggling Maritime Pollution 6.01. Prohibited Act. 6.02. Definitions. ‘Marine Insurance... CHAPTER 7 - VESSELS Definitions... 1.01. 1.02. Construction, Equipment and Manning. Vessel as Personal Property. Acquisition 4.01. Prescription.. 4.02. Sale... 4.03. Co-owner's Right .. 248, 251 252 258 258 260 261 261 266 267 271 272 274 275 217 278 279 280 285 286 287 288 288 289 290 Nationality of Vessels 304 5.01. Rights Under the Tariff and Customs Code...... 306 5.02, Flags of Convenience. eat 207) . Registration of Vessel: 307 6.01. Register of Philippine Vessels. 309 6.02. Registrations of Chartered Vessels Bu Ship's Manifest. 313 Logbook. 313 Safety Regulations 314 CHAPTER 8 - SHIP MORTGAGE AND MARITIME LIENS. Applicable Laws and Rules 316 1.01. The Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978. 316 1.02. Code of Commerce Provisions.. 1.03. History of Ship Mortgage Decree ... 08. Waiver of Lien . 2.04. Prescription and Lach 2.05. Maritime Liens for Necessaries. 2.08. Maritime Tort 2.07. Salvage Lien .. 2.08, Subrogation, 2.09. When Proceeds not Sufficient. . 2.10, Tests to Determine the Presence of Lien wun. 340 Who May Constitute Preferred Ship Mortgage... 345 3.01. Purpose 345 3.02, Formal Requirements . 346 3.03, Marina Rules.. 346 |. Mortgage of Vessel with Other Properties... 348 4.01 Mortgage with Non-maritime Property 348 4.02, Fleet mortgage... 348 Arrest and Foreclosure... 349 CHAPTER 9 - PERSONS WHO TAKE PART IN MARITIME COMMERCE Liability of Ship Owners and Ship Agents... 350 LOL. Ship Agent Defined 351 1.02, Extent of Liability 1.08. When Captain Acts in Excess of Authority... 1.04. Liability for Extra-contractual Obligations BRA Part Owners.. Ship Agent 3.01. Powers of Ship Agent . Captains and Masters of Vessels. 4.01. Qualifications. 4,02. Powers and Functions. 4.03, Discretion of Captain Or Master. 4.04, Liability of Captains and Masters. Pilotage... 5.01. Master and Pilet.. 5.02. Ship owner and Pil 5.03, Pilot and His Association... Other Code of Commerce Provisions on Captains. 381 Officers and Crew of Vessels.. 388 7.01. Regulation of Merchant Marine Profession. 390 Minimum Safe Manning 395 Security of Tenure 396 Other Officers and Crew under the Code seo of Commerce. : 10.01. Salling Mates. 399 40.02, Second Mate and Marine Engincer.. 401 10.03, Cro 408 10.04. Supereargoes. 411 CHAPTER 10 ~ CHARTER PARTIES 412 413 413 4u4 Effect of Charter on Character of Carrier. 415 Persons Who May Make Charter = 416 4.01. Charterer 47 4.02. Part Owners. 417 4.03, Ship Agent 417 4.04, Captain or au fequisites ofa Valid Charter Paty. 118 Requi is Freight 10. coe Port of Unloading... 420 Demurrage: 421 8.01. Computation of Lay Days 421 8.02. Deadfreight. 422 Rights and Obligations of the Charter Parties, 422 9.01. Shipowner or Captain 7 9.02. Charterer Bifect of Bill of Lading . Code of Commerce Provisious.. CHAPTER 11 - LOANS ON BOTTOMRY "AND RESPONDENTIA, Definitions and Concep\ 442 Distinguished From Simple Loan. 443 2.01. When Simple Loan Applies. rr Authority to Constitute Loan on Bottomry... 445 3.01. Authority to Constitute Loan on Respondentia = 445 Form of the Loans... 445 ‘Consequences of Loss of Effects of the Loans. 446 Code of Commerce Provisions... 447 CHAPTER 12- AVERAGES “Averages in General... Simple Average. 2.01. By Whom Borne. 2.02. Examples of Simple Averages. 484 General Average.. o 456 Requisites of General Average. 456 4.01. Common Danger. 458 4.02, Deliberate Sacrifice... 461 4.08. Successful Sacrifice . : 463 4.04. Compliance with Legal Steps 464 4.05, Examples of General Average 465 Who Bears General Average. 466 5.01. Insurers... 487 5.02. Lenders on Bottomry and Respondent. 468 5.08. Who is Entitled to Indemnity. 468 Eifect of Negligence. 468 Apportionment, : 468 Proof and Liquidation of Aver of Commerce. at ‘York-Antwerp Rules... 481 CHAPTER 13 - CCLLISIONS Definition. 493 Zones in Collision 493 2.01. Error in Bxtremis 494 Applicable Law... 495 8.01. Colregs.... 496 Rules on Liability 497 Contributory Negligence and Last Clear Chance Not Applicable, Specific Rules Under the Code of Commerce 6.01. One Vessel at Fault..nns 6.02. Both Vessels at Fault. 6.03. Party At Fault Cannot Be Determin« 6.04, Cause is Fortuitous Event 6.05. Third Person At Fault. Sinking on the Way to Port. Presence of Pilots. Extent Of Liability . Collision In Foreign Waters. Protest... 11,01. Protest Mandatory Limited Liability Rule. CHAPTER 14 ARRIVAL UNDER STRESS AND SHIPWRECKS Arrival Under Stress 513, 1.01. Determination of Propriety. 513, 1.02. When Arrival Under Stress is Improper. 51d 1.03. Expenses 515 1.04. Unloading of Cargoes to N : 515 1.05. Custody of Cargo 515 1.06. Liability of Captain... 516 Shipwrecks... 516 2.01. Code of Commerce Provisions. 516 CHAPTER 15 - SALVAGE Governing Law Definition Rationale Kinds of Salvage Services Claim for Valid Salvage 5.01. Persons Not Entitled to Saivage Compensation. 5.02. Requisites of Compensation 5.03. Derelict Required 5.04. Jetsam and Flotsam... Basis of Entitlement to Salvage Reward... 6.01. Quantum Meruit not Applicable .. 6.02. Circumstances to Consider Rights and Obligations of Salvor and Owners. 7.01. Maritime Lien... : ‘The Salvage Law CHAPTER 16 - CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA History Applicable Inverational Shipping fo the Philippines : Parties. Duties of Carrier. Document of Title Required. Notice of Claim and Prescriptive Perio Defenses and Immunities .. Waiver nnn Limiting Provision. Right to Discharge Dengerous Cargo.. PART Ill - AVIATION LAW CHAPTER 17 ~ THE AIRCRAFT AND CIVIL AVIATION Applicable Laws 1.01. Regulatory Perspectives. Civil Aviation sn Registration of Aireraft.. Recording of Conveyance. Marine Insurance. 519 519 520 520 522 523 523 525 582 532 533, 533 535 537 537 557 557 558 B58, 561 563 Air Transportation in General. Persons Involved in Marine Transportation. Charter of Aircraft. Sovereignty and Freedoms. 9.01, Freedoms of the Air : 9.02. Cancellation of Commercial Agreement.. CHAPTER 18 - OBLIGATIONS OF CARRIER IN AIR TRANSPORATION Extraordinary Diligence in Air Traneportation 101. Airworthiness. Care of Baggage. Duty of Passenger. 3.01. Denied Boarding Passengers... 3.02 Travel Documents . Inspection of Aireraft and Cargo... Warsaw Convention. 5.01. Meaning of International Transportation 5.02. Period Covered by International ‘Transportation... 5.03. When International Carrier is Liable . 5.04. Limit of Liability 5.05. Tort Liability 5.06. Venue of Action. 5.07, Successive Carrier 5.08. Formalities.. PUBLIC UTILITIES - IV CHAPTER 19 - PUBLIC SERVICE REGULATIONS: Concept Constitutional Provision: Regulatory Agencies Bases of Regulation of Public Utilities. Ownership of Public Utilities. 501, Ownership of Facilities. Regulation of Rates. 6.01. Non-delegation.. 6.02. Deregulation of Domestic Shipping. 6.03. Prohibition Against Discrimination em. B71 572 572 575. 580 581 587 591 591 591 B92 592 593 595 597 606 el 613 614 614 eid 619 6.04. Standard in Fixing Rates. 627 9. National Telecommuniecations Commission. 691 6.05. Fixing Rates for Electric Companies... 628 01. Powers of NTC. 693 6.06. LTFRB.. he 629 9.02, ‘Telecommunications Policies 694 6.07. Provisional Increase.. 629 9.08. Broadcast Industry. 700 6.08. Provisional Rate Increase Under Epira. 630 9.04. Cable Television industry 702 . Authority to Operate as Public Utility. 622 10. Energy regulatory Commission.. 702 7.01. Franchise and Certificate of Public 10.01. Franchise 708 Convenience soon 684 10.02. Power Generator... : 708 Wahoo Legislative Erenctiloe te Neceneaey cea 00) 11, Local Water Utilities Administration 708 Issuance Of Certificate of Public Convenience... 638 1LOL, Metropolitan Waterworks And Basic Requirements 640 Sewerage System. m1 Public Interest is Overriding Principle. 640 Other Rules and Policies. 641 4 A Free Competition. 643 pce eaeaate " m Nature Of Certificate of Publie Conveniencs 645 Appendix 2... 717 Instances When CPC Is Not Required . 646 Appendix 8... 724 ‘Transfer of Cextificate 647 Appendix 4... 48 Revocation of Certificate... 648 endint a 9.01. When NTC has no Power to Cancel 649 poe had Due Process. 651 Appendix 6... m7 10.01. When no Heering is Required. 658 Appendix 7. 782 20-0 rear Appendix 8... 7192 CHAPTER 20 ~ POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE ecuees Appendix 9. 805 Appendix 10 810 Department of Transportation and Communications... 661 Appendix 11 835 LIFRB... 664 oe F Land Transportation Office 666 pence 376 Civil Aeronautics Board. 667 Appendix 13... 883 401. li 667 Appendix 14. 887 4.02. Powers and Duties of CAB.. 668 4.08. Summary of CAB Powers. 613 ae oe Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines... 674 eed 5.01. Declared Policy... 674 Appendix 17. 917 5.02. Powers of the CAAP Board... 675 Maritime Industry Authority 678 Philippine Coast Guard. 679 7.01. Power : 680 7.02. Delineation of Fanctions.. 682 Philippine Ports Authority. 686 8.01. Powers of the PPA.. 689 P mart tp 10. uw 12, TABLE OF CONTENTS PART | COMMON CARRIERS CHAPTER 1 - GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Definition of Contract of Transportation Parties.. 201, Carriage of Passenger 2.02. Carriage of Goods Perfection... 3.01. Airer 3.02, Buses, Jeepneys, and Street cars. 3.03. Trains. Common Cartier nnn 4.01, Public Service . Characteristics. 6.01. Broader Concept.. 6.02, Ancilliary Business. 6.03, Limited Clientele. 6.04. Means of Transportation... Eifect af Charter Party.. Common Carrier Distinguished from Private Carrier... Common Carrier Distinguished from Other Distinguished from Arrastre, 9.03. Distinguished from Stevedoring. 9.04. Distinguished from Travel Agency. ‘Tramp Service and Line Service. Governing Laws... 11.01. Summary of Ri Nature of Business 18 21 a1 22 23 25 25 27 28, 18, M4, Registered Owner Rule and Kabit System 18.01. Registration Laws. 13,02. Registered Owner Rule. 18.03. Kabit System ...... 13.04, Pari Delicto Rule .. 18.05. Aircrafts and Vessel. Boundary System CHAPTER 2~ OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES Obligation of the Carrier. 1.01. Duty to Accept 1.02, Valid Grounds for Non-acceptance 1.03. Duty to Deliver the Goods. 1.04. Consequences of Delay... 1.05. Rights of Passengers in Case of Delay . 1.06. Place of Delivery. 1.07. To Whom Delivered nn 1.08. Delay to Transport Passengers. Duty to Exercise Extraordinary Diligence. 2.01. Code of Commerce Provision: 2.02. Presumption of Negligence... 2.08. Duration of Duty in Carriage of Goods 2.04. Commencement of Duty in Carriage of Pasaengets.. Defenses of Common Carriers. Proximate Causation. New Civil Code Provisions Defense in Carriage of Passengers. Fortuitous Event Public Enemy. Improper Packing. Order of Public Authority Defenses of Carriage of Passengers. Acts of Employees... 3.10. Act of Other Passengers and Third Persons. Passenger’s Baggages... 4.01, “Baggage Defined 4.02, Checked.in Baggage... 4.03. Hand Carried Luggage. Obligations of Shipper, Consignee and Passenger 5.01. Negligence of Shipper or Passenger... 7 118 123 126 128 131 136 137 187 137 140 140 5.02. Payment of Freight... 5.08. Who Will Pay the Freight. 5.04. Time to Pay the Freight. 5.05. Carriers Lien, 5.06. Payment of Demurrage. CHAPTER 3 — EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE Rationale How Duty is Complied With 2.01. Duty to Third Person: Effet of Stipulation on Uxtraordinary Diligence Extraordinary Diligence in Carriage by Sea, 4.01. Seaworthiness 4.02, Meaning of Seaworthiness.. 4.08. Cargoworthiness.. 4.04. Proper Manning. 4.05. Adequate Equipment 4.08. Overloading... 4.07. Proper Storage 4.08. Negligence of Captain and Crew... 4.09. Rules on Passenger Safety.. 410. Deviation 4.11, Transshipment Extraordinary Diligence in Carriage by Land. 5.01. Condition of Vehicle 5.02. Pratiie Rate: 5.03. Duty to Inspec. Duty to Inapect in Carriage By Sea. CHAPTER 4 BILL OF LADING AND OTHER FORMALITIES Concepts, Definition Kinds of ill of Lading . Nature of Bll of Lading. When Bifective. Bill of Lading as Contract. 6.01. Parties: wi 154 155 155 197 157 158 159 160 161 161 161 163 163 166 168 169 470 1 11 174 175: 178 179 181 181 182 183, 187 189 189 190 191 191 192 PARTI - COMMON CARRIERS Long-distance trade is said to be both a symptom and motor of change.' Quijano De Manila commented that: “historians say that, ‘yuman civilization began with the invention of the wheel. And it can be argued that only when we entered wheel cultare did Philippine Civilization begin. This does not mean that we were uncivilized before; we had a fine culture but it was a pre-wheel culture, With the introduction of the wheel we took a giant step into tool culture, into technology, into urban civilization.” However, as Historian Benito J. Legarda, Jr. observed, the principal mode of transportation for the most part of the Spanish period was by water.‘ For almost the entire period of their colonial, rule, Spanish authorities in the Philippines were not able “to develop the insular transportation system beyond the trails, paths and river routes used by the natives.™ It was only late in the Spanish period when “balance began to tilt toward land transportation with the inauguration of the Manila-Dagupan railroad.” More than a hundred years after the Spanish colonizers left this country, different means of transportation proliferate. We travel by land, water and air. Long-distance trade, through different ‘means of transportation, is commonplace. But as one of the authors noted in an earlier work, every offering of technology brings about ‘causes of discontent and the development of new or improved means of transportation is inevitably coupled with the bane of hazards. It “EM Robert A Short History ofthe Wor, 1998 Ea, p. 79, *Quijano de Manila, A Question of Identity: Bringing Out the Yaviaible Filipino in History, 1996, ‘Benito J. Legarda, Jr, Expanded Research Horizon in Philippine Beonomic History, fom Encuentro, 2008 Ba, p. 18, Ma. Luisa T. Camagay, editor. ‘Arturo G. Corpus, The Colonial Iron Hore, 1999 Bd, p. 14, “Legarda, Jr, oupre 2 [ESSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW is precisely for this reason that special rules are provided for in the ‘New Civil Code. The imposition of a higher degree of care on common carriers “was calculated to protect the passengers from the tragic mishaps that frequently occur in connection with rapid modern transporiation. This high standard of care is imperatively demanded by the preciousness of human life and by the consideration that every person must in every way be safeguarded against all injury.” Part I of this work consists of general concepts and basic rules that apply to all types of transportation. Unless otherwise indicated, these concepts and rules apply to transportation by land, water and air. Tho New Civil Code provisions on Common Carriers take center-stage so to speak. Special rules that apply to maritime transportation and transportation by air are separately discussed in Parts II and III. respectively. The duties of common carriers are discussed and analyzed and extended discussions on the duty to exercise extraordinary diligence can be found in Chapter 3. The formalities of the contract of carriage, including the Code of Commerce provisionson bills oflading and New Civil Code provisions on documents of title, were also extensively discussed in Chapter 4. Rules on formalities that apply specifically to transportation by air are discussed in Part III, The last chapter ofthe first part, Chapter 5, discusses matters relating to causes action, conditions precedent in filing cases, statute of limitations, and damages that may recovered {in cases filed against common carriers. Report of the Code Commission, reproduced in Civil Code Reader, 2008, Bd, 682, Carmele V. Sion, Editor CHAPTER 1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 1. DEFINITION OF CONTRACT OF TRANSPORTA- ‘TION. There is a contract of transportation when a person obligates hhimaself to transport persons or property from one place to another fora consideration, Phe eo rac ay inl carriage of paeenge passengers ‘or carriage of goods. The person who obligates himself to transport the goods or passengers may be a common carrier or a private ca?- ier, 2. PARTIES. The parties to a contract of transportation ‘would depend on whether itis for carriage of passengers or carriage of goods. 2.01, CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS, The parties in a contract of carriage of passengers are the common carrier and the passenger. A passenger is defined as one who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of contract, express or impliad, with the carrier as to the payment of fare or that which is accopted as an equivalent thereof: a. Gratuitous or reduced fare. It should be noted in this connection, however, that a_passenger-is still considered as such (passenger) even if he is being carried gratuitously or under a reduced fare. This is subject to the rale in Article 1758 of the Civil Code which provides that when a passenger is carried gratuitously, a stipulation limiting the common Suan tree e for negligence is valid b. In Baliwag Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeal,’ a complaint for damages against the petitioner bus company was filed by the injured party (a person of legal age) and his "Jonuaa Vda, De Nucca, tal. v. The Manila Ratiroad Company, No. 31731-R, “anuary 40, 1868, 18 CAR2s 49, 5, ‘S00 Chapter 3. °G.R No. 80447, January 31, 1989, 169 SORA 549. 2 ‘ ESSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PURLIC UTILITIES LAW parents for the injuries that the said injured party sustained in a vehicular accident when he was a passenger in one of the buses of the petitioner. Later, the injured party received payment from the petitioner's insurer and executed a Release of Claim. In due course, the complaint was dismissed because the trial court believed that the execution of the Release of Claim discharged the petitioner and its insurance. Only the parents of the injured passenger appealed. However, the Supreme Court sustained the dismissal, ruling that since the suit was for breach of contract of carriage, the real party-in-interest the injured passenger because the latter is the contract an ate caandt matatats os acter betaie Fin are not rea satire ntereat ‘in an action Tor Breach “of contract of earrage. Every action Based on contract must be brought By the person whose contractual right has been invaded. 2.02. CARRIAGE OF GOODS. 'The parties are the shipper and the carrier when the contract is for carriage of ‘goods. The shipper is the person who delivers the goods to the Exrrer for transportation. The shipper is the pera WE pay the consideration or on whose behalf payment is made. Consignee. The consignee is the person to whom the goods are a Be delivered. The consignee may be the shipper himself as in the ease where the goods will be delivered to one or — wranch offices of the shipper. However, the consignee may ‘be a third person who is not actually a party to the contract. b. _ When Consignee is bound by Contract. Never- theless, there are instances when the third-party consignee is e agreement between the shipper and the carrier. Pee isnen core, the Supretie- Court Filed Tat consignee may be deemed to be bound by the terms and the bounc conditions of the bill of lading where it was established that he ‘accepted the same and is trying to enforce the agreement.* 3. PERFECTION. The Supreme Court has adopted in one case the view that there are tw of contracts of carriage ‘of passengers." The first type is the contrac! to carry, that is, an “vorott Steamhip Corporation v, Court of Appeals ta, No, 122494, Octobor 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 496, 505. "Butish Airways ¥. Court of Appeals, No, 92288, February 8, 1998, 218 SCRA 600, citing Paras, Civil Code Annotated, Vol. Vp. 428. PART I — COMMON PROVISIONS: 5 (Chapter 1 — General Considerations Greal contract} t are awthe carrier be said t have already assumed. ka a. Perfection of Contract.of Carriage of Goods. With respect to carriage of goods, Tere may be a consensial contract to carry goods whereby the carrier agrees to accept and transport, gods at some future date, However, by the act of delivery of the is, that is, “when the goods (are) uneondition® eer in the possession and control of the carrier, and upon their receipt by the carrier for transportation, the contract of carriage [is] perfected” b. In British Airways, Inc. v. The Hon. Court of Appeals' the Supreme Court ruled tht action for damages may be sustained for breach of eontroct to carey isi Ian etata ate asta 8 Gerrronnter IM one nr rsonmeat cence Te the said case, the petitioner repeatedly failed to transport contract workers bowed for eAda- EauaT ATaDIe elueh Miso oT Tae tickets were already paid to the petitioner. Confirmed bookings were ‘vancelled Without prior notice. Hence, The petitioner was made liable for its breach of to transport the contract workers. 3.01(AIRCRAFT) There is a perfected contract_to garry pas: if no tickets have been issued to said assengers so long as there was already a meeting of minds with respect fo the subject matter and the consideration 2. On the other hand, there is a perfected contract of carriage between a passenger and an airine if can Be Sauna ae sarong td hed ra is dapartre counter, passed throt ‘customs and immigration, boarded the shuttle bus az roceeded to the ramy ie aircraft and ‘hat his baggage had already been loaded in the airraf to be flown with the passenger to his destination." “rb. "Meuro Ganzon v, Court of Appeals, ea, No. L-48767, May 80,1988, 161 SCRA 646, 650. "GR. No, 92288, February 9, 1998, bi. ‘Korean Airlines Co, Lid. v. Court of Appeals, No. 124061, August 3, 1994, 254 SCRA T7I7, 728, 6 ESSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW respect to buses, jeepneys, the Supreme Court explained in one case" that once a public utility bus (or jeepney) stops, it is in effect making a continuous offer to bus riders Henee, it is the duty of the drivers to stop their conveyances for a reasonable length of time in order to afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting from the sudden ing up of the carrier. Liability of the carrier is already based on contract Tr fellows that the passenger is deemed to be accepting the offer if he is already attempting to board the conveyances ‘and the contract of carriage is perfected from that we ema ne a ralleay st (ust purchase a ticket and must present sit oe eS SARE eS a Ee anne, ust pate us ay one ae which to pay for his passage, and present himself to the carrier for transportation in the place and manner provided. Ifhe docs not.de.so, he will not be considered a passenger.* eC eeennieecentnentct Sete encanta Marjorie Navidad, et al. when a certain Nicanor Navidad died after he fell on the LRT tracks and was struck by a moving train which was coming in at the exact moment that Mr. Navidad fell from the platform. Mr. Navidad was treated as a passenger hecause he entered the TERT station after having purehased ¢ “token” and he fell while he was on the platform waiting for ‘cient Ths, Mr Navidad was Ur the place designated Tor boarding the train with the intention of riding the oncoming train, Dangwa Transportation Co, Ine v. Court of Appeals ea, No, 95582, October 7 1991, 202 SCRA 574,580 ‘MJosusa Vda. de Nuoca, foi. v. The Manilar Railroad Company, CA-GR. No, 31781, January 80, 1968, 18 CAR2s 49. "No, 145804, Fabruary 6, 2003, PART I - COMMON PROVISIONS (Chapter 1 — General Considerations PROBLEM: 1. X>brought seven (7) sacks of palay to the PNR. He paid its freight charges and was issued Way Bill no. 1. The cargo ‘was lotded on the freight wagon of the train. Without any permission, X boarded the freight wagon and not the passenger coach. Shortly after the train started, it was derailed, The freight wagon fell on its side, killing X. ‘There is no evidence that X brought a ticket or paid his fare at the same time that he paid the freight charges for his cargo. Is X a passenger of PNR? A: No, X was not a “passenger.” X, who was a “stowaway,” was a mere trespasser. Hence, the carrier assumes no duty of eare in favor of X. (1989) 2. City Railways, Ine. (CRD provides train serviee, for a fee, to commuters from Manila to Calamba, Laguna. Commuters are required to purchase tickets and then proceed to designated loading and unloading facilities to hoard the train, Ricardo Santos purchased a ticket for Calamba and entered the station. While waiting, he had ‘an altercation with the security guards of CRI leading to a fistfight. Ricardo Santos fell on the railway just as a train ‘was entering the station. Ricardo Santos was run over by the train, He died In the action for damages filed by the heirs of Ricardo ‘Santos, CRI interposed luck of eause of action, contending, that the mishap occurred before Ricardo Santos boarded the train and that it was not guilty of negligence. Decide. A; ‘The contention of CRI that the heirs have nocause of action is untenable, There was already a perfected contract to cearry Ricardo Santos and the carrier already owed him extraordinary diligence. The obligation of the carrier to cearry Ricardo Santos to his destination was breached, hhenee, CRI is liable for-culpa-contractual. (2008) 4, COMMON CARRIER. Article 1732 of the Civil Code provides the definition of common carriers, viz.: ARTICLE 1732. Common carriers are persons, cor- orations, firms or associations engaged in the busi- ‘ness of carrying or transporting passengers or goods Srbethby land water orale. for Sompeneation,ofering Sra eervices i tna pa 5 ESSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW a. It has also been defined as “one that holds itself out as ready to engage in the transportation of goods for hire az a public ‘employment and not as a casual occupation.”* 401. PUBLIC SERVICE. The concept of ‘common cariox” under Article 1732 may be seen to colnelde neal Sith the notion of spublie servico” under the Public Service Act (Commonwealth ActNo- THT ap amended) which atleast partially supplements the law on common carriers set forth in the Civil Code."" Under Section 13, paragraph (b) of the Public Service Act, “public service” includes: «every person that now or hereafter may own, ‘operate, manage, or control In the Philippines, for hire oF compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any common carrier, rallroad, street rallway, traction rallway, subway motor ‘lther for frelght or passenger, or both, with or without fixed route and whatever may be its classifica tion, freight or carrier service of any class, express ser- vico, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries and water craft, engaged in the transportation of passengers ‘or freight or both, shipyard, marine repair shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply ‘and power petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wire- loss communications systems, wire or wireless broad- casting stations and other simitar public services...” ‘ESL, In First Philippine Industrial Corporation Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court reiterated that the tests for determining whether a party is a common carrier of goods are: (1) He must be engaged in the business of carrying goods for others on a public Soployment sid maEhGlT Lima Pot “ean ease sans Teady to engagé in the station of goods for person (2) He must undertake to carry goods of the kind to “De Gurmrt v. Court of Appeal, No, 47822, December 22, 198, 168 SCRA “De Guzman v. Court of Appeals bi. 300 SCRA 66 1296}; 1098 Bs PART I ~ COMMON PROVISIONS 9 (Chapter 1 — General Considerations (3) He must undertake to canny by the method by which ‘his business is conducted and over his established roads; anc (4) The transportation must be for hire. ‘a, In National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,” the Supreme Court reiterated the ruling that the true test of a common carrier is the carriage of goods or passengers, provided it has space for all who opt to avail themselves of its transportation for a fe. b. In Bascos v. Court of Appeals" the Supreme Court explained that the test to determine a common carrier is whether the given undertaking is part of the business engaged in by the career whlch he haa held out fo he general UBC as IE OPENID rather than the quantity or extent of the business transacte ¢. TheSupreme Court ruled in Spouses Cruz v. Sun Holidays, Ine.» that the operator of beach resart that accepts clients by virtue ofa tour package-contracts that included transportation to and from Fe aaa iy pola of departure in Batangas is considered common carrier. The Court observed that its ferry services are 80 intertwined with its main business as to be properly considered ancillary thereto, The constancy of respondents ferry services in its resort operations is underscored hy its having its own boats. And the tour packages it offers, which include the ferry services, may be availed of by anyone who can afford to pay the same. "These services fare thus available i the public. - contemplated wiider-é 59 of the Civil Code and the fact that the said concept corresponds to the concept af “public service” under the Public Service Act results in the application of the following rales or principles: (1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal busines vi ods ‘or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local Idiom, as “a sideline”)” (2). Article 1732 also carefully avaids making anv dis- tinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation lo 119087, December 12,1097, 28 SCRA 45,61 GR. No, 101080, Apel 7, 1099, 221 SCRA 318. 8GLR. No. 186312, June 29,2010. De Guaman ¥. Court of Appeals, eupra., at pp. 617-018, "De Gu December 29, 1988, 00 SCRA 681 ‘August 18, 2008. BSSBNTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such Sear een ceded eis (8) Article 1782 dose not distinguish betwenn a enrriar offering its services to the “general public,” i.e, the general commun or popultCR I ORETTES" ofr sactoas or sols busines cn from a HIFPOW WERE OF Us general (4) A person or entity iva common carrer and haa the obligations ofthe com carTer under the Gil Code even if he did not secure a Certificate of Public Convenience.” (8) The Civil Code makes no distinction a othe means of transporting, as long as it is by land, water or air." (6) The Civil Code doesnot provide _that_the transportation should be by molor vahele™ (DA person or entity may be a common carrer even ithe has no fixed and publiely Knows Foute, Maintalas Do. ‘icine end wuss eke (8) A person or_entity need not be engaged in the busines of ble transportation for the provisions of tie Cf Code on common carriers to apply to them.” 601.BROADER CONCEPT. ‘The aboveenumerated characteristics of common carriers derived from case law indi- cate an expanding concot of common carriers, Carier which are considered common carriers in a number of decisions do not fal nantly into the concept ofecramon carrier contemplated in the tet announeed in National Stel Corporation w- Court of Appeats= 6.02. ANCILLIARY BUSINESS. Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity nv. Court of Appeats ld De Guzman v. Court of Appesls, bid. De Guzman v. Cour of Appeals bid. ‘Piet Philippine Industrial Corporetion v. Court of Appeals eta, No, 125948, “First Philippine Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeal Asin Lighterage and Shipping, Inc. v. Court of Appeal ibid, GR No. 147246, “Pare dour of Appel, No, 11197, Sly 2, 196, 259 SCRA 45,5 ura, 2002. PART I — COMMON PROVISIONS a Chapter 1 — General Considerations is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity (in local idiom, fas “a sideline”). Hence, in De Guzman v. Court of Appeals,” private respondent Cendafia was considered a common carrior although his principal business was as a junk dealer. Said respondent was engaged in buying used bottles and scrap metal in Pangasinan. Upon gathering sufficient quantities of such scrap material, respondent would bring such material to Manila for resale. He utilized two (2) six-wheeler trucks which jhe owned for hauling the material to Manila. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent would load his vehicles with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered to establishments in Pangasinan. For that servico, respondent charged Frei rates which were commonly lower than Tegular commercial rates. Thus, even if the transportation of goods was ancillary to the main business of buying and selling used bottles and scrap sme Court considered the private respondent 08-LIMITED CLIENTELE. Although the clientele is limited, the regularity of the activities of a carrier may indicate, ‘that the same carrier is a common carrier. ‘a, _In'one case, the petitioner, a er and declared a common carrier although she ‘does not indiscriminately hold her services out to the public but offers the same to select parties with whom she may contract ‘a the conduct of her business. In the said case, petitioner entered into a contract with SMC to transfer paper and kraft board from the Port Area in Manila to SMC’s warchouse in Ermita, Manila, As a common carrier, she is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence in transporting the goods and is presumed to be negligent when she failed to deliver the same.” b. In Phil. American General Insurance Company, et al. v. PKS Shipping Company," respondent PKS Shipping Corporation transported the 78,000 bags of cement of poti- tioner DUMC in a barge. The bags of cement sank together with the barge when the latter was being towed by a tug boat. ‘The Supreme Court declared that PKS was a common carrier Supra ‘eVifeines Calvo v. UCPR General Insurance Co,,G.R, No. 148496, March 19, “iG.R, No, 149058, Apsi 9, 2008, ESSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW because it was engaged in the business of carrying goods for others for a fee. “The regularity of its activities in the a indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Neither " Rs trons of the carrier.” PKS was declared a common carris Slthough iad limited clientele. = ©. In Asia Lighterage and Shipping, Inc. v. Court of carrying goods through its barges. It has no fixed and publicly known route, maintains no terminals, and issues no tickets. ‘The Supreme Court still ruled that the petitioner is a common carrier pointing out that the principal business ofthe petitioner age and it offers its b Pelioner wer considered & common carrier whether its iness of carrying of goods is done on an irregular basi rather than scheduled manner and wih a lnited clientele A common cartier need not have a fixed and publicly known route nor does it have to maintain terminals or issue tickets. £04, MEANS OF TRANSPORATION. The Supreme Court ruled in First Philippine Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals» that pipeline operators are common carriers that ere subject to business taxes on common carriers. Such operators ‘are common carriers even if the oil or petroleum products are being transported not through motor vehicles but through siplftes The Court used the (ests to determine The eiatence Wie carriers entmerntedentisrand observed that: “Based on the above deitions and requirement thore iso dou tat petitioner isa common carrie Tes tanga ee snc eansortig ar nye Boo It undertakes to carry forall persons indifferently, that {atoll porns who choot emply ta serze, and transporta the goods ty land and for compensation. The BEE aE ance To RTED SRO Ts tnclude it fron the defaton of commen carver, Supra Supra PARTI — COMMON PROVISIONS 13 Chapter 1 — General Considerations ‘As correctly pointed out by petitioner, the definition ofeoinmon carriers" in the Civil Code makes no distinction Gs to the means of transporting, at long as it i by land, ‘Water or air. It does not provide that the transportation Br the passengers or goods should be by motor vehicle In fact in the United States, oil pipe Hine operators are considered common carriers, Under the Petroleum Act of the Philippines (Republic Act 387), petitioner is considered a “common farrier” Thus, Article 86 thereof provides that: “Art. 86, Pipeline concessionaire as common carrier. — A pipe line shall have the preferential right to utilize installations forthe transportation of petroleum owned by him, but itis obliged to utilize the remaining transporta- Hon capacity pro rata forthe transportation of such other Petroleum asvmay be offered by others for transport and Pe Shange without discrimination such rates as may have Yesn approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natu- ral Resources.” 7, EFFECT OF CHARTER PARTY. A charter party may transform a common carrier into & srivate carrier. However, it must, ransfors a comot ge charler where the chariarer mans the vessel with his own people and becomes, in effect, the owner for, ‘the voyage or service puta = Me common carrer isnot transformed es * wate carrer ifthe charter party is contract of affreightment ike Grrayage charter ora time charter.* In voyage charter, the carrier is answerable (o the loss of the goods received for transportation” ‘The Supreme Court gave this ‘explanation in Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, et al.” “Alchartor-pavty is defined aga contract by which an entire shy a eats loby the owner tanner or Aipal par thereof, is letby the owner to another St Canara afro fora specifed Hime or use; iment by which 6 owner of ship or other Heel ea her toa imurchant or other person forthe conveyance of goods, ra eer paper sr Voyage cone doation of the payment of Teg —TGaltex (Phin) v, Supleto Lines, 315 SCRA 709 (2980), ‘Landstar Shipping Co, Ine. . Bloneer Asia Insurance Corp Jenvary 2006. . ia a (Phils) v. Sulpicio Lines, ibid; Constwise Lighterage Corporation v- coun sh Apoule, 248 SCRA 707 (1006), Cebu Salvage Corporation ¥. Philippine flout Assurance Corp, O.R, No. 160408, Janaary 25, 2007 can No, 101808, September 16,1889, 226 SCRA 476, 49-486 GR. No, 187481, “ ESSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW 3s: (a) contract of affreightment Charter nastics are of ts types which involves the use of shipping space on vessels leased by the ovner in part Pee WE OU EET py shatter by demise or bareboat eharterby he terms of which ‘the whole vessel is lt to the charterer with a transfer to him of its entire command and possession and consequent control over its navigation, Incding the nusler and the crv who are servants. Contract of affreightment may either be time chartat, Sno wg wher th tine re time, or yovage charter, wherein the, isi le syayage. In both eates, the charter-party provides for th hizs 0 the veal only, either fora determinate period of ime or for @ Single or consecutive voyage, the shipowner to aupply the sh ores, pay fr the wayos of the master and the crew, and defray ‘he expenses for the maintenance ofthe ship. Upon the other hand, the tarm ‘common or public carrier” is defined in Art. 1732 of the Civil Code, The definition extends tocarsersetherby land airor water whshld thamaelves out as ready to engage in carrying goods or transporting passengers or both for compensation as a public employment and not as a casual occupation, The distinction between a ‘common or public ‘ari’ and a ‘private or special earrier’ lies in the character of the business, such that if the undertaking is_a single -ansaction, tof the general business oF occupation, although involving the earrlago of goods fora fee, the person ot Teas RE eae private carrier Article 1733. of the New Civil Code mandates that common carriers, by reason of the nature of their business, ‘Soul aoe oi sald cbserve extraordinasy diligence in the vigilance over Oar er er eager aaa yin carter aor, the exercise of ordinary diligouce in the carriage of goods will sulfce. Moreover if Gib oP Toss, destruction or deteionion of the goods, common carters are presumed to have been at faull-oF to Rave acted negligently, and tho burden of proving Seren ene ets conn, wer ‘applies to private carers, for whosoever alleges damage t oF deterioration of the goods caried has the onus of proving that the cause was the negligence the are. It is not disputed that respondent carrier, in the ordinary course of business, operates as a common carrier, transporting goods indiscriminately for all persons. When petitioner chartered the vessel M/V “Sun Plum,” the ship captain, its officers and compliment were under the employ ofthe ehipowner rand therefere continued to be under its direct supervision and control. Hardly then can we charge the chartorer, a stranger to the crew and to the ship, with the duty of earing for his cargo PARTI ~ COMMON PROVISIONS 15 ‘Chapter 1 — General Considerstions when the charterer did not have any control of the means in doing so, This is evident in the present ease considering that te steoring of the ship, the manning ofthe decks, the determination of the course of the voyage and other technical incidents of Shasitime navigation were all consigned to the officers and crew ‘who were screened, chosen and hired by the shipowner. Itis therefore imperative that a publi carrier shall remain tas such, notwithstanding the charter bf the whole or portion of @ ‘Vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, asin the case of a time-charter or vayage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its crew, as ina bareboat oF demise that a common carrier becomes private, at leaet insofar as the particular voyage covering the Sharter-party is concerned, Sndubitably, a shipowner in a time fr voyage charter retains possession and control of the ship, flthough her holds may, for the moment, be the property of the charterer. We quote with approval the observations of Raoul Colinvaui, the learned barrister-at-law — ‘As a matter of principle, it is diffieuit to find a valid distinction between cases in which a chip is used to convey the {goods of one and of several persons, Where the ship herself is let toa charterer, so that he takes over the charge and control of her, the case is different; the shipovner is not then a carrier. But where her services only are let, the some grounds for imposing 2 strict responsibiiity exist, whether he is employed by One oF any. The mastet and the crew are in each case his servants, the freighter in each case is usually without any representative tn board the ship; the same opportunities for fraud or collusion ‘occur; and the same diffcalty in discovering the truth as to what thas taken place arises...” ‘a. A-case usually relied upon in support of the argument that a carrier that is chartered is eonverted into a private carrier ‘Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc* ‘Although the charter party involved in the said case was a contract of affreightment, the Court still ruled that it was a private carrier. However, the ruling in the said case has no doctrinal force because it was explained in the above-quoted Planters Products, Inc. case that the earrier’s heavy reliance on the case of Home Insurance Co. v, American Steamship Agencies, is misplaced for the reason that Wie: 1-25699, April 4, 1968, 28 SCRA 24. 16 the meat of the controversy therein was the validity of a stipulation arty exempting the shipowner from liability for loss due to the negligence of its agent, and not the effects of a special charter on common carriers. Moreover, it was pointed out that the rrule in the United States that a ship chartered by a single shipper to carry special cargo is not a common carrier, does not find application in our jurisdiction, for it was observed that the growing concern for safety in the transportation of passengers and/or carriage of goods by sea requires a more exacting interpretation of admiralty laws, in the charter. ESSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW more particularly, the rules governing common carriers. CASES: 1 ‘AM ‘Trucking, a small company, operates two trucks for hire on selective basia, It caters to only a few customers, ‘and its irucks do not make regular or scheduled trips. It does not even have a certificate of public convenience. On ‘one occasion, Reynaldo contracted AM to transport, for a ‘ee, 100 sacks of rice from Manila to Tarlac, However, AM failed to deliver the cargo, because its truck was hijacked when the driver stopped in Bulacan to visit his girlfriend May Reynaldo bold AM as 2 comman carrier? Yes. Reynaldo may be held liable as common carrier Article 1782 of the Civil Code makes no distinction ‘between one whose principal business activity is the ‘carrying of persons or goods or both and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732 does not make any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on sn occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither doos Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the ‘general public, £2. the general community or population, ‘and one who offers services or solicits business only from, 1 narrow segment of the general population. This is also consistent with the definition of publie service under the Public Service Act (De Guzman v. CA, 168 SCRA 612 1988p. On November 12, 1984, Cebu Salvage Corporation (C80) and Maria Cristina Chemicals Industries, Ine. {MCCII) (as charterer) entered into a voyage charter wherein Petitioner was to load 800 to 1,100 metric tons of silica quartz on board the MT Espiritu Santo at Ayungon, Negros Occidental for transport to and discharge at ‘Tagoloan, Misamis Orientai to conshgnee Ferrochrome Phils., Ine, Pursuant to the contract, on December 23, PARTI — COMMON PROVISIONS Chepter 1 — General Considerations sioner retived and loaded 1100 metre tons sae reraen on boed the M/T Expt Santo wish sien tear Togaton the nextday. The shipment to Avungon ( entination, however, beenuse the MT Sere reer sa in the afternoon of December 2, rar the beac of Opal, Migaria Oriental sling oe oi haa erg. MCCIT Sled a claim forthe loss eel lomnt ith ts inure, respondent Pipe of the shipment orportion Respondent pad the cam aoe earereer BETL 200 and was subrogated to the sae SE MCCD Thereafter, fed a ease inthe RTC eee ecTy pambareement of the amount it paid aint CSG cease tat swt able ialtng that the eee ar meray contrat of hire wherein MCT fermen wes te owner, ALS Timber Enterprises (ALS). Not being the owner of the M/T Espiritu Santo, ae neat nat ve contol and superision over the reer ater anderen, Ths it euld not allegedly Tees Meter to oe ofthe tipmentenused by the aaa we up ta nt evn Wil the action prosper? Yes the action wl proaer. Teresa contract of carriage Fen eae CSC tad MCI; the crgo was Todd on ord even on ot nn-lery there s on boar the Vegan fated to prove that i exerci Prove nary diligence to prevent such toe or that it was due to some casualty or force majeure. The voyage Charter here being a contract of affreightment, the carrier hart ere fn th Tos of the goods recived for Tanaporation CHC was th one wish embraced with MOOI a tetpor a the cargo Thad contol over what ve Fal througout its dealings with MCI, 1 trad ital na atcommon cari. ‘The fact that it repre ayn) tdaled to ue toconnamamate the a ced not gate ts character and duties seamen cer, MCL Cerpnaent bE? ‘could not be reasonably expected to inquire about the onli ofthe woul which ptidone enrir ered to aaa actic matter, is very difieult an often te ete th general pole to enforce ta rights of impos fr tec of enriage it ould be ruled acto er ee etal owner othe vse. In fact 1e Gicauethe voyage charter. tal? denominated the petitioner as the “owner/operator” of the vessel. "Te bl of lading was merely a recsptinued by ‘aus cidane tho fo det te gods had bon roclved tee een wos not signed by MCC, a Infact ra 18 [BSSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW it was simply signed by the supercargo of ALS. This is consistent with the fact that MCCII did not coatract directly with ALS, While it is true that a bill of lading may serve as the contract of earriage between the parties, it cannot prevail over the express provision of the voyage charter that MCCII and petitioner executed. Finally, petitioner cannot argue that MCI should be held liable for its own loss since the voyage charter stipulated that cargo insurance was for the charterer’s account, This deserves seant consideration. This simply ‘meant that the charierer would talc care of having the goods insured, It could not exculpate the carrier from liability for the breach of its contract of carriage. The law, in fac, prohibits it and condemns it as unjust and contrary +o publie policy. ‘The idea proposed by petitioner is not only preposterous, itis also dangerous. It says that a carrier ‘that enters into a contract of carriage is not liable to the charterer or shipper ifi does not own the vessel it chooses to use, MCCTI never dealt with ALS and yet petitioner insists that MCCH should sue ALS for reimbursement for its loss, Certainly, to permit a common carrier to escape its responsibilty for the goods it agreed to transport (by the expedient of alleging non-ownership of the vessel it employed) would radically derogate from the carrier's duty of extraordinary diligence. It would also open the door to collusion between the earrier and the supposed owner and to the possible shifting of liability from the carrier to one without any financial eapability to answer for the resulting damages (Cebu Salvage Corporation v. Philippine Home Assurance Corp., G.R. No. 150408, January 25, 2007). 8 COMMON CARRIER DISTINGUISHED FROM PRI- VATE CARRIER. The distinction between 2 “common or public carrier” and a “private oF special carrier” lies in the character of ‘the business, such that if the undertaking is a single transaction, nota part of a general business or occupation, although involvin, the carriage of the goods for a fee, the person or corporation offerin, Fe bao wra-pervateCOPrIge™ For kurbanca IFT poor eran to camry a person to the airport using his privately-owned car that is Haar personal Use, he Wil be instar a petvate carrer. ‘SPlantore Product, Ine. v. Court of Appeals, supra.; Philippine American General Insurance Company v. PKS Shipping Company, G.R. Nv. 149098, Apel 9, 2008, 01 SCRA 222,295. PART I ~— COMMON PROVISIONS 19 CChepter 1 — General Considerations a. In National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals the vessel involved, the MV Viasons I, rendered tramping services and, as such, does not transport cargo or shipment for the general public. Its services are available only to specific persons who enter into fa special contract of charter party with its owner. Consequently, the earrier was considered a private carrier by the Supreme Court explaining that: “Article 1782 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier ‘as “persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.” It has been held that the true test.of a common. f pas ‘of good: space, forall who opt to avail themselves of its transportation Service foro for “hearer whIGh does not qualify under the above test iF deemed a private carrier. vate lertaken by gpecial agreement and the carrier ‘The most-typieal, although not the only form of private carriage, ith a maritime contract by which the charterer, ‘a party other than the shipowner, obtains the use and service ‘of all or some part of a ship far a period cf time or a voyage or voyages.” In the instant case, it is undisputed that VSI did not offer its services tothe general public. As found by the Regional Trial | sengers or goods only for those itehose under 1 “special contract of charter party.” As correctly concluded by ‘the Court of Appeals the MV Viasons Iwas not a common but a Dprivats carrion? Consequently, the rights and obligations of VS tnd NSC, tir reopective ability Tor damage to the carey ations in their contract of private carriage or charter party Resenly, in Valensiala Hardwood and Industrial Supply, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and ‘Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation, the Cour rae ‘na vate caringe, the parties may f stigulaie their dutics_and oblicatons, which perforce would fe binding on Them: Unilin a contract involving a eosin ‘artier, private Carriage does not invelve the general public. once, the stringent provisions of the Civil Code on common Corners, proectieg tho general public cannot justifiably be applied ta ship transporting commercial goods a8 2 private arse. Consequently, the publie policy embodied. therein fs nut contravened by stipulations in a charter party that lessen tr remove the protection given by law in contracts involving TGR No. 112287, December 12, 1907, 289 SCRA 4S. 20 ESSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW b,__It follows that while a common carrier is bound to exercise wrivate carrier owes only diligence of a good father of &Tamily. Moreover, while a common carrier cannot stipulate that it is exempt from liability for the negligence of its agents or employees, a private carrier may validly enter into such GA star Ti pala on VOTVIng ORO TIS VOT TS being contrary to public policy. There is no presumption on the part, of the private carrier. He who alleges negligence must prove such negligence. PROBLEM! 1. Titso Molina charters a vessel owned and operated by Star Shipping Co., a common carrier, for the purpose of transporting two tractors to his logging concession. ‘The erane operator of the shipping company somehow negligently puts the tractors in a place where they would tilt each other. During the trip, a strong wind hits the causing severe damage to the tractors. Tirso ‘Molina sues the shipping company for damages. The latter cites a stipulation in the charter agreement exempting the company from liability for loss or damage arising from the negligence ofits agents. Tirso Molina countered by stating that the aforementioned stipulation is against. public policy and therefore, null and void. Is the stipulation valid? Would you hold the shipping company liable? Yes. The stipulation is valid if there was bareboat charter. Acommon carrier that undertakes to carry a special cargo ‘or charter to a special porson only, becomes a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the ‘owner from liability forthe negligence of its agent is valid, being not against publie policy. Hence, Star Shipping Company is not liable 2. During the elections Iast May, AB, a congressional can- didate in Marinduque, chartered the helicopter owned by Lobe Mining Corporation (LMC) for use in the election campaign. AB paid LMC the same rate normally charged by companies regularly engaged in the plane chartering business, In the charter agreement between LMC and AB, LMC expressly disclaimed any responsibility for the ‘act8 or omissions of its pilot or for the defective condition of the plane's engine. The helicopter erashed iilling AB. Investigations disclose that the pilot's error was the cause of the accident. LMC now consults you on its possible liability for AB's death in the light of the above findings. How would you reply to LMC’s query? i PARTI — COMMON PROVISIONS a Chapter 1 — General Considerations ‘A: would reply to LMC that it may not be held Hable for the death of AB. A stipulation with private carrier that would diselaim’ responsibility for simple negligence of the carzier’s employees is a valid stipulation, Such stipulation, however, will nct held in case of liability for trons negligence or bad faith. 3. C00, shipped 20,000 baga of soy beans through 8 Melon, owned and operated by X Shipping Lines, consigned to the Toyo Factory aud insured by the Surety Tasurance Co, against all risks. C Co. hired the entire vessel, with the option to go north or south, loading, stowing and discharging at its risks and expense. The owner and the shipper agree on a stipulation exempting the owmer from liability for the negligence of its agents When the cargo as delivered tothe consignee, there were shortages amounting to 10,500.00. The insurance company paid forthe damage and sought reimbursement from the X Shipping Lines as carrier. Is the carver liable? A: X Shipping Lines is not liable if there was bareboat charter. X Shipping Lines agreed to carry a special cargo fr chartered to a special person only, becomes a private carrier. Honce, the New Civil Code provisions on common carriers cannot be applied where the carrier is not acting ‘as such but as a private carrier. As a private carrier, a stipulation exempting the ship owner from liability for the negligence ofits agents is not against policy and is deemed valid 9. COMMON CARRIAGE DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER CONTRACTS. Common carriers that carry or transport ‘goods by sea should be distinguished from those who are engaged in towage and from arrastre operators. 9.01. DISTINGUISHED FROM TOWAGE. In towage, one vessel is hired to bring another vessel to another place. Tr oat i ired by a common cartier to bring a ‘barge to.a port. In this case, the operator of the tugboat eannot bbe considered a common carrier. In maritime law, it refers to a service rendered to a vessel by towing for the mere purpose of expediting her voyage without reference to any circumstances of danger. It is usually confined to vessels that have received no injury or damage. “Blass Law Dietionary, 6th Ba, p. 1287. 2 SSSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW a. The party that provides the service in a contract of towage is required to observe the que diligence of a good father ofthe family. The negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligation renders him liable for damages for the resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to exercise due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as the nature of the obligation s0 demands.* b. For instance, the exercise of ordinary prudence by the operator includes the duty to ensure that its tugboat is free of mechanical problems. While adverse weather has always been a real threat to maritime commerce, the least that the operator of a tug boat should do is to ensure that the tugboat would be able to secure the vessel being towed at all times during the engagement. 9.02. DISTINGUISHED FROM ARRASTRE. Arrastre, a Spanish word which refers to hauling of cargo, comprehends the handling of eargo on the wharf or between the establish- tment of the consignee or shipper and the ship's tackle. The respor of the arrastre operator lasts until the delivery Bf the cargo tothe consignee. The serlce We Usually performed 7a a. The functions ofan arrastve operator usually include the following: (1) to rece've, handle, care for, and deliver all merchandise imported and exported, upon or passing over Government-owned wharves and piers in the port; (2) to record or check all merchandise which may be delivered to said port at shipside, and in general and; (8) to furnish light, and water services and other incidental services in order to undertake its arrastre service." b, Hence, the functions of an arrastre operator have nothing to do with the trade and business of navigation, nor to the use or operation of vessels. Both as to the nature of the Gargoift Shipping, Ine. v. 1. Actuario Marketing Corp. and Skyland Brokerage, ae, GRNo. 145425, June 2, 2006 ‘SCargolif Shipping, nev, Actuorio Marketing Corp. and Skyland Brokerage, Ine, Ii ‘“Mindanco ‘Terminal and Brokerage Servico, Ine. v. Phoonix Assurance Company of Naw YorkiMegoe Co, Tne, .R. No. 162467, May 8, 2008 “eDelgado Brothors, Ine. v. Home Insurance, Ine, No. T-16667, March 27, 196, SCRA 8 “titi Am Jur 564, 568, PARTI — COMMON PROVISIONS 28 Chapter 1 — General Considerations functions and the place of their performance (upon wharves and piers shipside), the arrastre operator's services are clearly not maritime. They are, in fact, no different from those of a depositary or warchouseman. Even if the arrastre service depends on, assists, or furthers maritime transportation, it may bbe deemed merely incidental to its aforementioned functions as arrastre operator and does not, thereby, make the service maritime in character.” The operation of an arrastre operator starts on and its responsibility for the merchandise and goods begins from the time they are placed upon the wharves or piers or delivered along sides of ships ©. In Summa Insurance Corporation v. CA and Port Service Inc. the Supreme Court imposed a higher degree of diligence on the arrastre operator explaining that: “x x x The relationship therefore between the con- signee and the arrastre operator must be examined ‘This relationship is much akin to that existing between the consignee or owner of shipped goods and the common car: tier, or that between a dopositor and a warehouseman. In the performance fits obligations, mn arrastre operator ib ind a warehouseman. Se are orks cat Cas at Section 3(b) of the Warehouse Receipts Law, respectively. Being the custodian of tno goods discharged fron 1, an arrastre operator's duty is to take good ‘care of the goods and to turn them over to the party entitled to their possession. (Emphasis supplied)" 9.03, DISTINGUISHED FROM STEVEDORING. Note further that the common carriers and arrastre operators should be distinguished from persons or entities engaged in stevedoring, The function of stevedores involves the loading and unloading of coastwise vessels calling atthe por” ‘a. ‘The word stevedoring originated from the Latin word “stipare,” meaning “to stuff. Stevedoring was derived bid 49329 Phil 214 (1996). “Tia, citing Malayan Insurance Co, Ine. v. Manila Port Services, 138 Phil 69 (3960 "Cebu Arvastre Service v, Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R, No. L-7444, May 30,1956, J Thannapan, Marine Lave, 2007 Raition, p. 185, hereinafter citod as “Than epan.” Pa [ESSENTIALS OF TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC UTILITIES LAW directly from Spain and Portugal. It started as a phonetic spelling of Spanish escribador or Portugese estivador which literally means a man who stuffs in the sense of a man who Toads ships." Stevedoring refers to the handling of the cargo in the holds of the vessel or between the ship's tackle and the holds of the vessel. The responsibility of the stevedore ends upon the Toading and stosting of the cargo in the vessel. b. _‘Thediligence required of a stovedore is the diligence ofa good father afatanlly K slovadors waste cattan carior for it doos not transport goods or passongers; itis not akin to a warehouseman for it does not store goods for profit. The loading and stowing of cargoes would not have a far reaching public ramification as that of a common carrier and a warehouseman; the public is adequately protected by our laws on eontract and on quasi-delict, ‘The public policy considerations in legally imposing upon a common earrier or a warchouseman a higher degree of diligence ic not present in a stovodoring outtit which tainly provides borin loading and stowing of eangoe for its dlionts.* 9.04. DISTINGUISHED FROM TRAVEL AGENCY. ‘A travel agency is not a common earrier. In many cases, he Seer of contents peaton_ oF petiin who purchases a ticket through a travel agency is only the agency's service of arranging and facilitating the booking, ticketing and accommodation in @ package tour. In contrast, the object of the contract with a common carrier is transportation, The contract, between the travel agency is a contract of service and not a contract of carriage.* The diligence required of a travel agency hat extrndin ‘aordinary diligence but that of a good father of a Fenner, p16. "Mindanao ‘Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix Asturance ‘Company of New Yorkfegee & Co. Inc, supra. “Mfindanac Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Phoenix Assurance Company of New Yori3Segue & Co, Ine, supra | "Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Servis, Tne v. Phosnix Assurance Company of New Yorke 8 Co In sup ‘MCreoatomo v, The Court of A ‘a, G.R. No, 198834, August 25, 2003, one: es 1. No, 198884, August 25, 2008, bia PARTI — COMMON PROVISIONS 28 Chapter 1 — General Coneiderations 10. TRAMP SERVICE AND LINE SERVICE. Corso operation may be classified into two types, namely, line service and tramp service. ‘a. Republic Act (RA) No. 9515 defines “Line servieo” as the operation ofa common carrier which publicly offers services without discrimination to any user, has regular ports of calldestination, fixed sailing schedules and frequencies and published freight rates and attendant charges and usually carries multiple consignments. Liners carry “general cargoes,” meaning whatever is offered is aceepted for shipment. b. On the other hand, RA No. 9515 defines “Tramp service” ‘as the operation of a contract carrier which has no regular and fixed routes and schedules but accepts cargo wherever and whenever the shipper desires, is hired on a contractual basis, or chartered by any one or few shippers under mutually agreed terms and usually carries bulk or break bulk cargoes. Tramps “offer their capacity for the carriage of bulk eargoos as desired by the shipper, who ordinarily ‘engages the whole of the ship; cach voyage is thus a matter of special arrangement between the shipowner and shipper."* The tramp seeks and usually gets a full cargo loaded by a single shipper and uch eargoes are most often in bulk or in standard packages and typically consist of raw materials, fuels and uaprocessed foods s0 vital to the world economy." c. Noticeably, while RA No, 9516 refers to anentity engage in ine Service” as a common carrier, an entity that provides “Tramp Service” is only referred to as a “contract carrier.” Nevertheless, those engaged in “Tramp Service” may also be considered common carriers depending on the circumstances. 11, GOVERNING LAWS, Article 1766 of the Civil Code expresses the primacy of the said Code over the laws that were is foreo prior to its enactment. Article 1766 provides: ARTICLE 1766. In all matters not requlated by this Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers ogee governed by the Code of Commerce and by specblaws, TSoction HTeh R.A. Act No, 9516. ‘Scrant Gilmore end Chesles L, Black, Jt, The Law of Admiralty, 2nd Baition, 1976 Batten 9. 13, hereinafter refered to ax “Gilmore and Black” “

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