Quantitative Risk analysis

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

What is QRA?

Reason for performing QRA

Objectives of QRA?.........................................................................................................

Activities involved in QRA

Techniques of QRA

What does QRA tell you (Results)?

Legislations in QRA

II.

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 I. Introduction

What is QRA?
Quantitative Risk Assessment is a systematic approach to identify ,accessing , evaluate or
analyzing the risk in order to precisely predict in a quantifiable way how risks will affect
further proceedings of work flow and incorporate appropriate measures to manage and
mitigate risk for any work process activity, it also helps in cost effective decisions and
manages the potential risks to be occurred in a project. Risk Management helps in identifying
and introducing preventive measures which prevent or reduce mishap affecting the company
and its employees.

further defining a QRA, the first distinction that must be made is between quantitative and
qualitative types of studies. Quantitative work necessarily involves specific numerical quan-
tities of consequence and probability. Qualitative studies simply define the quality, or type, of
either the consequence or probability associated with an accident, instead of assigning a
numerical value to it. If the consequences of an event are addressed qualitatively, they are
simply categorized. For example, the categories may be assigned descriptions such as
negligible, minimal, significant, and major. To quantify acute hazards, some type of
modelling must predict their consequences. The parameters of each accidental release must
be input into a model (usually computerized) for the consequences to be numerically
described. This obviously requires much more effort than a qualitative assignment

A risk analysis is then a separation of all the parts of the risk into identifiable pieces. These
pieces consist of each potential hazard source, its associated consequence, and its specific
probability of occurrence. The risk assessment is performed at the end of the analysis, when
all the pieces have been defined and then compiled into a picture of the risk. Risk assessment
can not be done without some type of risk analysis preceding it. An assessment of risk
without any analysis is not an assessment at all—it is a guess or, at best, an estimate.

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Reasons for Risk Analysis?
Quantitative risk analysis is a data base measure to make the decisions where the results or
the outcomes ate uncertain and undetermined, highlighting the accident scenarios.
Quantitative Risk Analysis helps us understand the uncertainty providing a better way to
make precise decisions or analyzing current safety methods are adequate and effective upto
appropriate levels and a regulatory criterion. It helps in assessment of determining the extent
of any potential dangers associated with a certain activity using numerical equations.
Further it is useful for figuring out how likely it is that the project will succeed and for
planning for the unexpected. The procedure is often used to estimate project costs and
timelines.
Considering an example for best understanding:
Two same products sold in market, while from outside the products resemble in shapes, sizes
and quantity yet on further analysis over a period of time it is found that the second product
that of the first product seems to be less uncertain more effectiveness and efficiency reducing
or eliminating the undesired results.

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Objectives of QRA?

Quantitative risk analysis as mentioned earlier is an assessment technique which allows to

determine and identify the overall risks and hazards associated with activity conducted in a
work flow environment, besides it helps in determining the frequencies and consequences of
the identified hazards, therefore providing insights on solving the potential risk and hazard. It
also acts as a cost reducing technique by identifying the alternative options available with
more relative safety and reasonably practicable. Overall assists in estimating likelihood and
consequences of hazardous events in specific quantity.

Activities involved in QRA

The idea of calculating potential risk on a project involves several steps including
1. Identify areas for uncertainty
In order to generate accurate assessment , it is mandatory to identify all the relevant
activities for risk assessment. The best method for this involves sub-selection as the
installation size in an establishment can be very large, sub selection method which acts a
a simplified screening tool services by ranking the risks. It leads to significant on-site
risks disregarding the effects of off-site consequences
Project outline or a management plan is also an excellent way to manage and identify and
search for areas where there is risk or uncertainty as it divides the project into smaller
sections
2. Evaluate the Cost of every risk
The identified risk within the project , the relative cost of each risk is computed. To
determine to expected cost of each potential risk, first divide the risks into basic and
complicated risks.
The basic risks simply record the expected cost of remedying the risk. On the other hand
for complicated risks with variable costs determine the average cost for every potential
risks that exists. This is more accurate as it involves breaking down the variable risks
into different items.
3. Determine the probability of each risk occurring
Determining the likelihood of every risk occurring to understand the risk associate with a
project. When computing probabilities, the two most crucial elements are experience and
research. The more individuals know about the scenario, the more accurately they can
project the likelihood of an issue occurring at the time of execution. With the
hypothetical construction project mentioned above. There are certain methods involved
like
a. Monte Carlo analysis
Monte Carlo gives a range of possible outcomes and probabilities to allow you to
consider the likelihood of different scenarios. It computes overall project costs and
determine the completion dates.
b. Scenario Analysis
Computes multiple project outcomes likelihood and possible range. This method is
extremely useful to determine if a company can achieve its desired result without
exceeding its risk tolerance level. In addition it can help businesses figure out how
many resources they might require and when.
c. Decision Tree analysis

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 Decision tree analysis technique helps organizations evaluate the risks associated
with one or multiple choices. Every tree represents a choice and its associated costs.
First, individuals must assign costs and probabilities at every point. Then, they must
follow a chain and add up every cost. Once done, they can determine which choice
has the lowest risk

Techniques of QRA
1. Probability and Impact Assessment: This technique entails determining the likelihood of
an event happening and its potential effects on project goals. While impact is typically
evaluated in terms of cost, time, or other pertinent metrics, probability is frequently given
as a percentage or a qualitative assessment (e.g., low, medium, high).

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2. The expected monetary value (EMV) analysis method multiplies the likelihood of
occurrence by the financial impact to determine the average result of a risk event. It aids
in determining a risk's total value and comparing various hazards according to their
anticipated financial impact.

3. Sensitivity analysis is the process of changing the input variables (such as the project
cost, timeline, and resource availability) in order to determine how they will affect the
results of the project. It aids in determining the most important variables and ranks risks
accordingly.

4. Monte Carlo simulation is a potent method that models and quantifies the influence of
uncertainty in project variables using random sampling and statistical analysis. A better
understanding of the total project risk profile is made possible by the generation of a
variety of potential outcomes and their probability.

5. Decision Trees: Decision trees are visual aids that assist in assessing the potential effects
of various risks and actions. They offer a visual framework for evaluating various
options, figuring out their expected values, and choosing the best options to take.

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6. Cost-Benefit Analysis: This method is used to assess the financial costs and benefits of
various risk response strategies. It weighs the potential advantages of decreasing or
eliminating risks against the expenses related to implementing risk mitigation measures.

Quantitative risk scoring entails putting numbers on risks based on standards like likelihood
and effect scales that have been established in advance. Risks can be sorted and prioritized to
concentrate on those with the greatest potential impact by combining these scores.

What does QRA tell you (Results)?

The most obvious products of a QRA are the two ingredients of risk: consequence and prob-
ability. For every accident scenario identified, there will be a specific hazard zone (as defined
by the hazard endpoints) and a corresponding probability of occurrence. As separate pieces,
the consequence modelling results are often more useful than the probability values. A QRA
generates a large amount of consequence information, allowing extensive comparison
between the effects of hole size, weather conditions, and many other variables. Although
rarely used explicitly, each individual accident outcome has an associated probability of
occurrence.
The most common and oftentimes most useful items provided by a QRA are individual risk
contours. Individual risk contours provide a graphical representation of the combination of
consequence and probability around a facility. A risk contour is the locus of points that
geographically describes the location of a specific risk level. This risk will be defined by a
pre-determined type of harm (e.g., fatality) at a specific frequency
One risk study can contain multiple QRA evaluations. To determine whether alternative
provides the smaller risk to an offsite population, the findings of the two assessments can be
contrasted with one another or with pre-expansion QRA data. There is far less emphasis on
the absolute measure of risk reported when comparing two or three QRA studies that were all
conducted using the same technique and degree of information. The impact of modelling bias
or uncertainty in probability is significantly minimized by shifting the emphasis away from
the absolute risk value and comparing relative measures of risk.
The risk definition may be limited to risks from a single process unit, a single class of
chemicals, or a single specific hazard, depending on the scope of the analysis. In these
situations, the risk presentation must be unambiguous with regard to the analytical
constraints. In general, only the risk resulting from the failures of the process, storage,
transportation, or transfer equipment taken into account in the analysis may be predicted by a
QRA for a facility. A risk analysis can be adjusted to forecast risks to buildings, equipment,
and the general public (offsite). These are accomplished by changing the modelling
assumptions, the risks modelled, and the hazard endpoints. Because plant employees are by
nature mobile and have received training to handle hazardous situations, estimating the risk
of onsite staff presents a number of challenges. However, these kinds of analysis are feasible
and can offer useful information.
The analysis can be broken down into sections or areas when determining the risk posed by a
big facility or operation. It is possible to identify which particular elements of the procedure
or facility dominate the risk by examining the risk contribution from each individual region
inside the QRA. This strategy might emphasize particular process components, material
storage locations, transportation infrastructure, or even specific accident scenarios as
significant risk elements. The higher risk areas can then be targeted with mitigation measures,

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if necessary. These actions are a part of a thorough risk assessment inside the risk
management process of a facility.

Legislations in QRA
Even if there may not be any law specifically designated "QRA," many nations and
regulatory organizations implement quantitative risk assessment concepts into their legal
frameworks and regulations to guarantee the security and welfare of people and the
environment. Depending on the jurisdiction, different rules and restrictions may apply to
QRA.

1. Occupational Health and Safety: There are many nations with laws and rules
requiring firms to carry out risk assessments to find workplace hazards and put in
place the right controls to reduce those risks. These evaluations frequently include a
quantitative study of potential risks to the health and safety of the workforce.
2. Environmental Regulations: The evaluation of potential risks connected with planned
projects or activities is frequently required as part of the environmental impact
assessments and permitting processes. The incidence and effects of environmental
mishaps or accidents can be assessed using quantitative risk assessment
methodologies.
3. Process Safety standards: Specific process safety standards apply to sectors like oil
and gas, chemical industry, and nuclear power. To detect and reduce potential
hazards related to the handling and storage of hazardous items or the operation of
complex systems, these regulations frequently require the use of quantitative risk
assessment approaches.

II. Process Description

Daily Activities in QRA

1. Data Collection: The system or process being evaluated by QRA must have pertinent
data collected about it. This might entail gathering data from sources such as
equipment, materials, operational circumstances, previous incidences, and other
pertinent data sources. An accurate depiction of the system is acquired for study
thanks to the data collecting method.

2. Risk Identification: A critical phase in QRA is the identification of possible risks and
hazards. It entails methodically identifying and compiling all risks and hazards
connected to a certain system or activity. To discover probable scenarios that can
result in unpleasant results, this stage may involve brainstorming sessions, a review of
pertinent documents, and the knowledge of specialists.

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 3. Risk study: The identified hazards and risks are subjected to a quantitative study at
this step. To evaluate the likelihood and effects of various risk scenarios, statistical
techniques and mathematical models are generally used. The study may take into
account variables including the frequency of occurrences, effects on human health or
the environment, and potential monetary implications.

4. Risk Evaluation: After the risk analysis is finished, the findings are assessed to
determine the importance of the hazards that were found. In this stage, the predicted
risks are compared to predetermined standards or risk tolerance levels. It aids in
categorizing risks according to their seriousness and probable consequences, enabling
decision-makers to concentrate on the most important risks.

5. Risk mitigation is the process of developing and putting into action suitable actions to
lessen or mitigate the risks that have been identified and assessed. Engineering
controls, procedural modifications, safety training, emergency response plans, and
other risk mitigation techniques are some examples of these approaches. The
objective is to reduce the possibility or effects of probable mishaps or accidents.

6. Risk Communication: It's crucial to effectively communicate the outcomes and

conclusions of the QRA process. This entails explaining the risks, their importance,
and the suggested mitigation actions to the appropriate parties, including
management, staff, regulators, and the general public. All parties involved should
have a thorough grasp of the risks and the measures being taken to mitigate them,
which is made possible through clear and accurate communication.

7. Continuous Monitoring and Review: The management of risks is a continuous process

that requires continuing monitoring and review. This entails reviewing risks on a
regular basis, keeping an eye out for modifications to the system or operational
environment, and upgrading risk mitigation strategies as necessary.

III. Process Assumptions

1. Identify the assumptions: Start by identifying the assumptions underlying the risk
analysis. These may include assumptions about the system being analyzed, the data
used, the models used, and any other factors relevant to the analysis.

2. Document assumptions: Clearly document all assumptions to ensure transparency and

traceability throughout the risk analysis process. Be sure to include information about
the rationale for each assumption.

3. Evaluate Assumptions: Evaluate the reasonableness and validity of each assumption.

Consider available evidence, expertise, historical data and any other relevant sources
of information. Identify any uncertainties or limitations related to the assumptions.

4. Quantify uncertainties: If an assumption introduces uncertainty into the analysis,

quantify it using probabilistic methods. Assign probability distributions or ranges to
the uncertain assumptions, reflecting the level of confidence or uncertainty associated
with each assumption. Sensitivity Analysis: Perform a sensitivity analysis to assess

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 the impact of different assumptions on the overall results. Change assumptions within
acceptable limits and track corresponding changes in risk analysis results. This
analysis helps identify critical assumptions that have a significant impact on results.
5. Validation of assumptions: Seek validation of assumptions through external audits or
peer reviews. Engage relevant stakeholders to ensure assumptions are consistent with
their expertise and knowledge of the analyzed system.

6. Document the impacts of assumptions: Record the impact of each assumption on the
results of the risk analysis. Note the magnitude of the effect as well as any associated
uncertainties or limitations.

7. Update Assumptions: Periodically review and update assumptions as new information

becomes available or circumstances change. Re-examine assumptions during various
stages of the risk analysis process to account for any newly emerging data or insights.

8. Communicate assumptions and uncertainties: Clearly communicate assumptions and

related uncertainties to stakeholders, decision makers, and other relevant parties.
Transparently communicate the potential limitations and risks associated with the
assumptions used in the analysis Review and Iterate: Continuously review and iterate
the assumptions as part of the ongoing risk management process. Track system
changes, new data sources, and knowledge advances to refine and improve
assumptions over time.

Question: 01
Examine potential failure mode analysis of the operating system using Failure Mode
Effect Analysis (FMEA)
When conducting a failure modes analysis, it is imperative to consider the multifarious stages
of the process. Path I development and Path II development, as illustrated, exemplify two
plausible routes that significantly contribute to ascertaining the level of peril (Quality-One,
2021). The former route is predicated on discerning crucial information gleaned from severity
rankings (RPN = Occurrence x Severity x Detection). Conversely, the latter empowers us to
proactively avert such occurrences by identifying their probable causal factors and taking
requisite measures. The Fault Mode and Discovery Path serve as invaluable tools in
establishing these parameters.
The provided diagram reveals several potential failure modes pertaining to the underlying
operating system:
4. Failure of flow trips (represented by items 1 and 2 in the diagram) may precipitate
uncontrolled leakage of fuel or oxidant into the reactor vessel, thereby instigating a
potentially hazardous combination of the two elements, resulting in an explosive
scenario.
5. Malfunctioning sensors (numbered 3 and 4 in the diagram) can lead to erroneous
estimation of fuel or oxidant flow rates. This, in turn, may engender incorrect settings for
the flow rate controllers (items 5 and 6 in the diagram). The subsequent erroneous
combination of fuel and oxidant may pose a grave danger, as it possesses the potential
for explosion.
6. In the event of flow rate controller failure (items 5 and 6 in the diagram), inadequate
regulation of fuel or oxidant flow rates may occur, thereby creating a precarious situation
characterized by an explosive combination of fuel and oxidant.

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 7. A potential failure mode involves the malfunction of trip valves (items 7 and 8 in the
diagram). In the event of such failure, uncontrolled discharge of fuel or oxidant into the
reactor vessel may transpire, consequently leading to the formation of an explosive fuel-
oxidant mixture.
8. Transmitter failure (items 9 and 10 in the diagram) represents another critical concern.
Should the transmitters fail to provide accurate information regarding fuel or oxidant
flow rates, erroneous data may be relayed to the control room. The resulting erroneous
inputs may compromise decision-making processes and impede effective control.
These identified failure modes necessitate diligent attention and remediation measures to
ensure the robust operation and safety of the underlying operating system.

Figure 09: Chances of failures plotted

Stage 1: Contextualizing the FMEA data. Using the task's historical log, this stage involves
identifying the items and carrying out the associated action.
Stage 2: After the chamber's subsystems as well as systems have been defined, you may start
looking for probable points of failure.
Stage 3: the failure report, which may include erroneous information, subpar services, or
even a lack of maintenance, is described together with its possible implications inside the
nodes where they occurred.
Failure modes Occurrence Severity Detection RPN
Higher 6 4 10 240

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 Lower 8 3 5 120

Question: 02
Construct a fault tree (FTA) starting with the top event "explosion"

A fault tree serves as a logical and visual representation of potential failure modes of
individual parts within a system. To perform the operation effectively, we can refer to the
Reliability Blocks Diagram and apply fault tree analysis to each created block. The fault tree
assessment follows a standard format, involving system definition, fault tree analysis, fault
cause identification, root cause analysis, event probability calculation, and fault tree analysis
patterns. In this particular case, one can observe flaws in the transmitting elements due to
significant pressure drops indicated in the process flow diagram. The pressure monitoring
devices are susceptible to malfunction in both the fuel system and oxidant supplies.

In a fault tree, the "explosion" event is represented at the topmost level. Intermediate events
represent the factors contributing to the occurrence and are connected to the main event using
logical AND gates. These intermediate events represent potential triggers for an explosion.

The fundamental events, which are the most vulnerable components or occurrences with the
highest failure probability, are further analyzed from the intermediate events. Logical
recurrence gates are used to link the primary events to the secondary ones.

For instance, the intermediate event of "excessive fuel feed" can be broken down into
constituent parts such as "failure of flow trips," "failure of alarms," "power failure," and
"failure of flow rate transmitters." Any of these events has the potential to increase the fuel
feed, thus contributing to the explosion.

Similarly, the basic events comprising the intermediate event "low oxidant feed" include
"failure of flow trips," "failure of alarms," "power failure," "failure of flow rate transmitters,"
"pipe rupture," "failure of flow rate controller sensors," "failure of flow rate controllers,"
"failure of flow rate transmitters," "failure of flow rate controllers," "vessel defects," and
"wind from the southwest." Each of these scenarios increases the likelihood of low oxidant
input, which in turn could have contributed to the explosion.

The fault tree represents different failure mechanisms and potential contributing factors to the
explosion in the reactor vessel. By analyzing the fault tree, we can identify critical
components of the system and the events that may compromise its safety. This analysis
enables us to focus our efforts on preventing or mitigating the effects of these failures.

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 Figure 10: Fault Tree

Question: 03
Use the reliability data to calculate the expected frequency of explosion
When dealing with a procedure involving violent explosions, it's important to consider the
expansion of fluids as they move through the fluid and oxidant flow channel. Quantitative
risk analysis is conducted to assess the risks involved, and efforts are made to minimize these
identified risks (Wang et al., 2017). However, risk assessment goes beyond mere numerical
calculations.
To estimate the frequency of explosion using fault tree analysis, we need to calculate the
probabilities of each intermediate event in the tree, starting from the bottom and working our
way up. This information helps us determine the likelihood of an explosion occurring.
For instance, to calculate the probability of the intermediate event "boosted fuel feed," we
add the probabilities of the two contributing events, namely pipe rupture and power failure.
By summing up these probabilities, we can determine the overall likelihood of the event. If
the probability of a pipe rupture is 0.05 and the probability of a power failure is 0.01, then the
total probability of overusing fuel would be 0.06.
Similarly, we can calculate the probability of the intermediate event "devastating oxidation
feed" by adding the probabilities of its two contributing paths, vessel defects and wind
coming from the southwest. Combining these probabilities gives us the total likelihood of this
event. If the probability of vessel defects is 0.15 and the probability of wind from the
southwest is 0.9, then the probability of inadequate oxidation input would be 1.05.
In conclusion, by aggregating the probabilities of both intermediate events, heavy fuel supply
and inadequate oxidation feed, we can determine the probability of the ultimate event, which
is an explosion. These preceding events set the stage for the main event. The probability of an

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explosion is 1.11, which is the sum of the probabilities of inadequate oxidation intake (1.05)
and high fuel input (0.06).
Based on the provided probabilities and the fault tree diagrams, we can deduce that the
expected frequency of this explosion is 1.11.

Question: 04
Using Event Tree Analysis (ETA) identify the consequences of the top event.

When it comes to analyzing potential accidents and their causes, event tree assessment is a
valuable method. In the context of an explosion within the reactor vessel, it becomes crucial
to consider this primary event while constructing an event tree analysis. This analysis helps
us understand the potential damages to the building and equipment, the release of dangerous
chemicals or radiation, the number of casualties, the evacuation distance, environmental
pollution, and financial losses (Meng et al., 2019). Such information enables us to assess the
overall impact of the event.
The next step is to evaluate not only the severity but also the likelihood of each outcome. For
instance, there is a high probability of damage to the premises and equipment, which will
determine the extent of the impact, ranging from mild to severe. Additionally, there might be
a medium to high risk of injuries or fatalities, which would significantly worsen the effects.
To address the risks associated with each outcome, it is important to implement risk reduction
strategies based on the probability and consequences of each consequence (Meng et al.,
2019). This allows us to identify potential safeguards for each outcome and implement them
accordingly. Measures such as additional safety precautions, emergency drills, training
programs, and alternative response plans can all be part of these strategies, specifically
designed to prepare for a potential explosion (see Appendix 2).
The provided diagram represents one possible depiction of an event tree analysis, visually
representing the potential outcomes and their interconnections.

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Question: 05
Comment on the acceptability of the risk and recommend corrective measures
When evaluating risks, it is important to consider whether the acceptance standards used for
decision-making are reasonable (riskengineering.org, 2021). We compare risks with
established standards to determine if they are acceptable. Factors such as vessel development
and maintenance, operational conditions, and safety procedures can affect the likelihood of an
accident. To mitigate the risk of explosion, it is necessary to identify and address the factors
that increase the potential for such an event (Meng et al., 2019).

An explosion can have wide-ranging effects, including physical injuries, structural damage,
environmental contamination, and financial losses. To evaluate the appropriateness of the
threat, it is necessary to examine the potential impact of each outcome and assess existing
procedures for minimizing or managing the associated hazards (Meng et al., 2019). The
acceptance of a risk may also be influenced by societal norms, regulations, or industry
standards.

Stakeholder input, including workers, the public, and regulatory agencies, should be included
in the risk evaluation process to ensure a comprehensive understanding of whether the risk is
tolerable. This helps ensure thorough risk assessments and the effectiveness of mitigation
measures.

Recommended preventive and corrective measures based on the risk analysis may include:
1. Implementing additional precautions and standard operating procedures, such as flow
tripping and sirens, to detect and prevent abnormal events. Emergency shutdown measures
should also be in place to safely shut down the reactor in case of a catastrophe. Training
employees on emergency response procedures enhances their readiness to effectively respond
to crises.
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2. Regular maintenance and inspections of the reactor and equipment to identify and address
issues before they escalate, reducing the likelihood of an explosion (Brown et al., 2010).
3. Implementing preventive measures such as barriers and encapsulation systems to minimize
the impact of an explosion on people and the environment. These measures can reduce the
release of hazardous chemicals and mitigate the damage caused by the explosion (Meng et
al., 2019).
4. Conducting emergency drills and providing training to improve employee readiness in
handling disasters. This helps mitigate the risk of harm or death.
5. Developing backup plans to mitigate the consequences of an explosion and enable prompt
and effective responses. Evacuation procedures, containment of hazardous substances,
cleanup operations, and medical treatment should be part of the backup plan.

Additional measures such as enhanced surveillance systems, redesigning equipment for

improved safety, and reducing human errors through strict operating procedures and safety
training should also be considered (Muriana & Vizzini, 2017). These are just a few examples
of potential actions to address the identified risks.

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