RICARDO T. GLORIA v. CA, GR No.

119903, 2000-08-15
Facts:
petitioner [private respondent herein] was appointed Schools Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon
City, by the then President Corazon C. Aquino.
respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the Philippines that the petitioner be reassigned as
Superintendent of the MIST [Marikina Institute of Science and Technology], to fill up the vacuum created by the retirement
of its
Superintendent,... President approved the recommendation... copy of the recommendation for petitioner's reassignment,
as approved by the President, was transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for implementation.
On October 14, 1994, Director Rosas, informed the petitioner of his reassignment, effective October 17, 1994.
Petitioner requested respondent Secretary Gloria to reconsider the reassignment, but the latter denied the request. The
petitioner prepared a letter dated October 18, 1994 to the President of the Philippines, asking for a reconsideration of his
reassignment,... he subsequently changed his mind and refrained from filing the letter... petitioner filed the instant
petition.
Court of Appeals denied private respondent's prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).[3]
On November 22, 1994, it set aside its earlier resolution denying the prayer for the issuance of a TRO; and thereafter,
restrained the petitioners "from implementing the re-assignment of the petitioner [private respondent herein] from
incumbent Schools Division Superintendent... of Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the Marikina
Institute of Science and Technology."... hereby declared to be violative of petitioner's right to security of tenure, and the
respondents are hereby prohibited from implementing the... same.
Petitioners are now before the Court seeking relief from the decision of the appellate court,

Issues:
FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS BUT ACTUALLY QUESTIONING AN ACT
OF THE PRESIDENT.
whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational School
Superintendent of MIST is violative of his security of tenure? Petitioners maintain that there is no violation of... security
of tenure involved.

Ruling:
Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper because the same attacks an act of the President,
in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The questioned acts are those of petitioners and not
of the President. Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the... courts where there is grave abuse
of discretion or that the President acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.[
Private respondent has clearly averred that the petitioners acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and/or excess of jurisdiction in reassigning the... private respondent in a way that infringed upon his security
of tenure. And petitioners themselves admitted that their questioned act constituted a ministerial duty, such that they
could be subject to charges of insubordination if they did not comply with the presidential order.
doctrine enunciated in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals[10] -- that "a reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction
in rank, status and salary, is in effect, a constructive removal from the service"
After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST
"appears to be indefinite".
there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of private respondent is temporary or would
only last until a permanent replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact... evinces an intention on
the part of petitioners to reassign private respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the reassignment
in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of the private respondent.
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed feature of our civil service.
petition is hereby DENIED.
Estrada v. Desierto
JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO, et.al.
G.R. No. 146710-15, 02 March 2001 Puno, J.

DOCTRINE
In a resignation, there must be an intent to resign, and that intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity
of a resignation is not government by any formal requirements as to form since it can be oral or written, expressed or
implied. So long as the resignation is clear, the same act must be given legal effect.

FACTS
After the people’s clamor in EDSA for him to resign from his position, Petitioner Joseph Estrada issued a statement that
he will be leaving the Malacañang Palace in order to have a peaceful transition of power and start the healing of the nation
warped by confusion due to his impeachment trial. Nevertheless, he sent a letter to the Senate President and the Speaker
of the House stating that he is temporarily unable to perform the duties of the office of the President and let then Vice-
President Respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assume the position of Acting President.
Later, the Office of the Ombudsman filed plunder and perjury charges against the Petitioner. A special panel of prosecutors
were assigned to investigate the charges against the Petitioner. Thus, the Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition before
the Supreme Court. He alleged that he cannot be criminally charged by the Ombudsman on the ground of immunity from
suit. He claimed that he is still the President of the Philippines, and that Respondent is merely holding the position in an
acting capacity. Further, he claimed that he cannot be considered as to have resigned because he is prohibited by law
from resigning since he was under an investigation, i.e. an impeachment trial.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the Petitioner resigned as President.
2. Whether or not the Petitioner was temporarily incapable of exercising the Presidency.
3. Whether or not the Petitioner is immune from suit, and if so, up to what extent.

RULING
1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled that in a resignation, there must be an intent to resign, and that intent must be coupled
by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirements as to form since it
can be oral or written, expressed or implied. So long as the resignation is clear, the same act must be given legal effect.
In the present case, it was established the Petitioner resigned from his position as President of the Philippines. According
to the Angara Diary, which serialized the final days of the Petitioner in Malacañang Palace, the Petitioner made
pronouncements which was interpreted as intention of giving up the position such as when he proposed a snap election
where he would not be a candidate; non-defiance to the request of a peaceful and orderly transfer of power; prior
agreement to the transfer of power with conditions as to the state of the Petitioner and his family; and the issuance of a
statement wherein the Petitioner leaves the palace, the seat of the Presidency, for the sake and peace and order. Hence,
the resignation of the Petitioner was implied by his actions to leave the Presidency.
2. NO. The Court ruled that it is not within its jurisdiction to review whether the Petitioner was temporarily incapable of
exercising the Presidency for being political in nature, and addressed solely to Congress, as provided in the Constitution.
Even if the Petitioner can prove that he did not resign, the Petitioner cannot successfully claim that he was merely on
leave because Congress recognized the Respondent as the de jure president, which cannot be reviewed by the Court
without violating the principle of separation of powers.
In the present case, both Houses of Congress recognized the Respondent as the President when they issued Resolutions
to the said effect. Further, both Houses issued a Resolution approving the selection and appoint of Sen. Teofisto Guingona
as Vice-President. Further, finally, both Houses started sending bills to be signed into law by the Respondent. Hence, the
Petitioner was not temporarily incapable to exercise the Presidency because he resigned as President, and Houses of
Congress already recognized the legitimacy of the Respondent.
3. NO. The Court held that presidential immunity was granted only during the term of the President In order to prevent
delay in actions on important matters by the Chief Executive due to litigations that may be lodged against him. The said
immunity does not apply beyond the term of the President.
In the present case, the Petitioner cannot claim that he cannot be sued before the Ombudsman because he was immune
from suit. In fact, the Petitioner cannot cite any decision that the President has post-tenure immunity from liability.
Further, the Petitioner cannot claim that he is immune from suit because he was not convicted by the Impeachment Court.
To allow such situation will put a perpetual bar against his prosecution, which were criminal in nature. Hence, the
Petitioner is not immune from suit.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petitions are DISMISSED.

CASE DIGEST: CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. NO. 83896, February 22, 1991

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

It is quite notable that in all these provisions on disqualifications to hold other office or employment, the prohibition
pertains to an office or employment in the government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which states that “(T)he President, Vice-President,
the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold
any other office or employment during their tenure.” In the latter provision, the disqualification is absolute, not being
qualified by the phrase “in the Government.” The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is therefore
all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold their office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other
words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials
and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

FACTS:
In July 1987, the President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition to their primary
positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such law is
unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal submission that it adds
exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall
strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”

CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding
any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may
be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.

HELD:
No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-President, members
of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held
without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples during the debate and deliberation on
the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.

In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284
is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2 positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express
mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.

ESTRADA vs ARROYO
G.R. NO. 146710 – 15, March 2, 2001

Estrada Vs Arroyo Case Digest

On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President
on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important
enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on the parties’ dispute. While the significant
issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.

FACTS:
The impeachment court decided not to open the controversial envelope. The prosecutors tendered their resignation. The
Senate postponed the impeachment proceeding indefinitely. People started marching towards EDSA to call for Estrada’s
resignation. AFP and PNP declared that they are withdrawing their support of the Estrada administration. Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo took oath as the New President of the Republic of the Philippines. Then Estrada and his family hurriedly
left Malacañang.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Estrada resigned officially as a president

RULING:

By virtue of his letter, Estrada has officially resigned and has in effect, relinquished his power as president. The Congress
had also expressed support to the new administration and that decision made by co-equal branch of government cannot
be reviewed by the Supreme Court

Petition is dismissed.

[CASE DIGEST] Marcos v. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211)

October 27, 1989 | 177 SCRA 668

Ferdinand Marcos, et al., petitioners

Hon. Raul Manglapus, in his capacity as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, et al., respondents
FACTS:

On September 15, 1989, the SC voted 8-7 to dismiss the petition of the Marcos family to allow the return of former
President Ferdinand Marcos from Honolulu, Hawaii to the Philippines. The Court held that President Corazon Aquino did
not act arbitrarily with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family
at the present time and under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare.

The decision affirmed the constitutionality of President Corazon Aquino's prior refusal, fearing the instability and security
issues that may arise once the remains of former President Marcos were to be brought back to the country. In a statement,
she said:

"In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways,
and for the tranquility of the state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be allowed to be
brought to our country until such time as the government, be it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall
otherwise decide."
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not President Aquino has the power to deny the return of Marcos' remains.
2. Whether or not President Aquino's refusal to allow the return of Marcos' remains is tantamount to dictatorship.

HELD:

1. Yes. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply
with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in
the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.

This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the
powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of
specific power of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the
general grant of executive power. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance with his (or
her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the
Marcoses and subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under present circumstances is in
compliance with this bounden duty.

2. No, the residual powers of the President under the Constitution should not be confused with the power of the President
under the 1973 Constitution to legislate pursuant to Amendment No. 6. Whereas the residual powers of the President
under the 1987 Constitution are implied, Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution refers to an express grant of power.

Aquino vs Enrile Case Digest – G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974

FACTS:
The cases are all habeas corpus petitions, with the petitioners arrested and held by the military under Proclamation 1081.
In pursuant of the General Order No.2 of the President, the petitioners were arrested and detained "for being participants
to take over the Government by force."
Enrile, the former Minister of National Defense, carried out Marcos' order and ordered the arrest of a number of people,
including Benigno Aquino Jr, despite the fact that no charges had been filed against them. As a result, Aquino and others
filed a habeas corpus petition against Juan Ponce Enrile. According to Enrile, the arrest is legal because of Marcos'
proclamation of martial law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the detention of the petitioners is legal in accordance with the declaration of Martial law.

HELD:
In the case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or an immediate danger to the state, the President may suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declare martial law in the Philippines or any part of it, according to the
Constitution. In the issue at hand, the Supreme Court decided that the country's condition of rebellion had not yet
vanished, posing a clear and impending threat to the state.

Five (5) Justices ruled that the matter is a political question that should not be investigated by the courts. The
other four (4) Justices, on the other hand, believed the matter was justiciable.

However, any Supreme Court inquiry into the constitutional adequacy of the factual basis for the declaration of martial
law in the current instances has become irrelevant and academic.

The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the
basic objective of the proclamation, which is to suppress invasion, insurgency, or rebellion, or to protect public safety from
imminent danger thereof, is implicit in the state of martial law.

The issue is justiciable, according to the court.

Terms: implicit - implied though not plainly expressed.

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMELEC, GR No. 206666, 2015-01-21

Facts:
Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime
of plunder in Criminal Case No. 26558, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al."
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of PLUNDER
The penalty imposable for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is
Reclusion Perpetua to Death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, however, the lesser penalty shall
be applied in accordance with Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended
executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada.
He is hereby restored to his civil... and political rights.
On October 26, 2007, at 3:35 p.m., former President Estrada "received and accepted"[6] the pardon by affixing his
signature beside his handwritten notation thereon.
Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the
COMELEC.
Risos-Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "[Former President
Estrada] is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 26558 entitled 'People of the Philippines vs. Joseph Ejercito Estrada' Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua with
Perpetual Absolute Disqualification."
Issues:
whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of... jurisdiction in ruling
that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to
him by former President Arroyo.
the issue of whether or not the pardon extended to [former President Estrada] restored his right to run for public office
Ruling:
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy.
The wording of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.