Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Before
IN THE MATTER OF
Versus
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS...................................................................................................III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.........................................................................................................IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION............................................................................................XII
STATEMENT OF FACTS........................................................................................................XIII
STATEMENT OF ISSUES........................................................................................................XIV
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS..................................................................................................XV
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...........................................................................................................1
ARGUMENT [1]: THAT THE GOVERNMENT NOTIFICATION, DATED 1-1-2016, UNDER THE
[1.1] The gazette notification under the EC Act, 1923 is a social welfare legislation for the
[1.2] Amendments that confer a benefit upon individuals must be given retrospective
application..............................................................................................................................2
[1.3] Since no indication is there under Section 4A(1) of the EC Act, 1923 as to when the
compensation becomes due, it has to be taken to be the date of adjudication of the claim.. .4
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ARGUMENT [2]: THAT THE CLAIMS UNDER THE EMPLOYEE’S COMPENSATION ACT,
1923 AND THE RULES FOR COMMERCIAL DRONE, 2016 ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE......6
ARGUMENT [3]: THAT THE ‘THE RULES FOR COMMERCIAL DRONE, 2016” IS
[3.1] Restrictions imposed by the Drone Rules, 2016 are reasonable and valid under Article
[3.2] The Drone Rules, 2016 are not arbitrary or excessive in nature and do not violate
[3.3] There is no excessive delegation of power under the Drone Rules, 2016...................13
[3.4] The Drone Rules, 2016 do not suffer from the vice of vagueness..............................14
[3.5] The Drone Rules, 2016 are not violative of the Fundamental Right to Privacy.........15
PRAYER.................................................................................................................................XVI
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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
ABBREVIATIONS FULL-FORM
¶ Paragraph
& And
§ Section
AIR All India Reporter
All ER All England Law Reports
Anr. Another
Art./Arts. Article/Articles
Co. Company
Corpn. Corporation
DC Deputy Commissioner for Employee’s Compensation
EC Act, 1923 Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923
ed. Edition
Hastinapur Union of Hastinapur
HC High Court
Hon’ble Honourable
Ltd. Limited
MV Act The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
Ors. Others
PIL Public Interest Litigation
Pvt. Private
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
Sec. Section
SLP Special Leave Petition
U.S. United States
v. Versus
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
The Aircraft Act, 1934, No. 22, Acts of Parliament, 1934 (Hastinapur).....................13, 14
(Hastinapur)......................................................................................................................4, 5
The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, § 4A(1), No. 8, Acts of Parliament, 1923
(Hastinapur)......................................................................................................................4, 5
The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, § 4A(2), No. 8, Acts of Parliament, 1923
(Hastinapur)..........................................................................................................................5
The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, § 4A(3), No. 8, Acts of Parliament, 1923
(Hastinapur)......................................................................................................................4, 5
The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, No. 8, Acts of Parliament, 1923 (Hastinapur).1
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The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, § 167, No. 59, Acts of Parliament, 1988 (Hastinapur)......6
The Railways Act, 1989, No. 24, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (Hastinapur)...........................3
INDIAN CASES
Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1982 SC 33..............12
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1...................3
Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI and Anr, (2010) 10 SCC 331.........................13
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Dr. Y.P. Singh and Ors., Etc. v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1982 All 439......................11
Employees State Insurance Corporation, Bombay v. Sayeeda Khatoon Danawalla & Ors.,
Gulamrasul Rehman Malek v. Gujarat State Transport Corporation, 2015 ACJ 20............7
Karnataka Live Band Restaurants Association v. State of Karnataka and Other. 2018 4
SCC 374.............................................................................................................................12
Kore Laxmi v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 2003 (6) ACD 182 (DB)...............7
National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Smt. Dev Mani & Ors 2016 SCC OnLine HP 3924............7
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National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan & Anr. (2006) 2 SCC 641......................................9
New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Neelakandan, Civil Appeal No. 16904-09 of
1996...................................................................................................................................1,4
Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corp. v. Diamond & Gem
Ramlila Maidan Incident v Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 1.................15
Ramlila Maidan Incident v Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 1.................15
Sharad Ganpat Deshmukh v. Kunda Ashoka Polade, 2002 SCC OnLine Bom 1086.........8
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State of A.P. & Ors v. McDowell & Co. & Ors, (1996) 3 SCC 709.................................13
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, Union of India & State of Travancore-Cochin, 1952 AIR
SC 196................................................................................................................................12
State of Maharashtra v. Indian Hotel and Restaurant Assn., (2013) 8 SCC 519.........12
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, 2014 SCC OnLine SC 232....................8
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1278..........................9
United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Anthony Selvam & Ors., (2017) SCC OnLine Mad
3506......................................................................................................................................9
United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Vasudevan & Ors., 1988 SC OnLine Ker 346..............8
United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Vasudevan & Ors., 1988 SC OnLine Ker 346..............8
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lalitha Ratham, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 1554............7
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Anthony Selvam, (2014) (2) TN MAC 227.................7
United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Saraswati & Ors., 1997 SCC OnLine Mad 286.7
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V. M. Shah v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr., 1995 SCC (5) 767..............................10
INTERNATIONAL CASES
Leli Chaka Ndoro v. Maree Ahmad and Anr., (2017) eKLR : (2017) SCC OnLine Ken
956........................................................................................................................................9
ed. 2020).............................................................................................................................11
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K.M. PILLAI, LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL LAWS (Allahabad Law Agency 2016)....5
MEENU PAUL, LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL LAWS (Allahabad Law Agency 2016).
..............................................................................................................................................4
2019)..................................................................................................................................11
2006)....................................................................................................................................2
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2022)..................................................................................................................................14
HeinOnline
JSTOR
LexisNexis
Manupatra
SCC Online
Westlaw India
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
With regard to the circumstances that have been presented in the instant case, the
Respondents humbly submit to the jurisdiction in response to the appeal filed by the
Appellant before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Hastinapur under Article 136 of the
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of Hastinapur.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order
passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the
Armed Forces”.
THE PRESENT MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS SETS FORTH THE FACTS,
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
State of Angapradesh is a federal unit of Hastinapur which is encouraging manufacturing
activities to increase production & become self-reliant. Angapradesh started policies that
incentivized entrepreneurs. Mr. Ramesh set up manufacturing unit for cardboard wraps called
Wraps Private Ltd. A business unit for delivery of wraps was added for this. Lorries were
brought & drivers were employed.
APPEAL
Wraps Pvt. Ltd. decided to appeal this case before the SC of Hastinapur under Art. 136 of the
Constitution going against the HC Order and also against the Order of the DC. SC clubbed
the SLPs and decided to hear them together. A notice has been issued to Central Government,
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
~ ISSUE 1 ~
~ ISSUE 2 ~
WHETHER CLAIMS UNDER THE EMPLOYEE’S COMPENSATION ACT, 1923 AND THE
~ ISSUE 3 ~
HASTINAPUR.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT [1]: That the Government notification, dated 1-1-2016, under the
Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, is applicable to accidents that took place prior to
the gazette notification.
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Government notification,
dated 1-1-2016, under the EC Act, 1923, is applicable to accidents that took place prior to the
gazette notification because the EC Act, 1923 is social welfare legislation for the benefit of
the employees and amendments thereto must be interpreted in a manner so as to not deprive
the employees of the benefit of the legislation. Furthermore, the Court has held in several
cases that where a case is pending final adjudication and an amendment is enacted increasing
the amount of compensation payable, the enhanced amount would be applicable in the
determination of the quantum of compensation payable. Hence, the amendments that confer a
benefit upon employees must be given retrospective application.
ARGUMENT [2]: That the claims under the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 and the
Rules for Commercial Drone, 2016 are mutually exclusive.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the claims under the EC Act, 1923 &
‘The Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016’ are mutually exclusive because as per the
provisions of Sec. 167 of MV Act, the claimant has to elect only one remedy and he cannot
take undue advantage of both. This means the Doctrine of election will be applicable in the
present case. Furthermore, the claims under both may lead to double compensation & will
also result in a multiplicity of Litigation which will add to the already existing burden on the
court.
ARGUMENT [3]: That ‘The Rules for Commercial Drone, 2016’ is constitutional and
valid.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016
are not violative of the Constitution of Hastinapur. The restrictions imposed under these rules
on freedom of trade are reasonable and valid under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution. Also, these
rules are not arbitrary or excessive in nature. Furthermore, there is no excessive delegation of
power. The Drone Rules does not suffer from the vice of vagueness. Moreover, these rules
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are not violative of the Right to Privacy guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution of
Hastinapur.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ARGUMENT [1]: THAT THE GOVERNMENT NOTIFICATION, DATED 1-1-2016, UNDER THE
EMPLOYEE’S COMPENSATION ACT, 1923, IS APPLICABLE TO ACCIDENTS THAT TOOK
PLACE PRIOR TO THE GAZETTE NOTIFICATION.
[¶1.] It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Government notification,
dated 1-1-2016, under the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, (hereinafter referred to
as the EC Act, 1923) is applicable to accidents that took place prior to the gazette
notification. The contentions in this regard have been present by way of a three-fold
argument: -
[1.1] The gazette notification under the EC Act, 1923 is a social welfare legislation for
the benefit of the employees.
[1.2] Amendments that confer a benefit upon individuals must be given retrospective
application.
[1.3] Since no indication is there under Section 4-A(1) of the EC Act, 1923 as to when
the compensation becomes due, it has to be taken to be the date of adjudication of
the claim.
[1.1] The gazette notification under the EC Act, 1923 is a social welfare legislation for
the benefit of the employees.
[¶2.] It is submitted that the EC Act, 19231, is social welfare legislation for the benefit of the
employees. Therefore, taking into consideration the main purpose of the EC Act, 1923,
the court must adopt an interpretation that extends a benefit to the employee on the date
of the final adjudication of the claim. Furthermore, the court has held in several cases 2
that where a matter is pending final adjudication and an amendment is enacted increasing
the amount of compensation payable, the enhanced amount would be applicable in the
determination of the amount of compensation payable.3
[¶3.] In the case New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Neelakandan4, the court determining
1
The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, No. 8, Acts of Parliament, 1923 (Hastinapur).
2
National Insurance Co Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed, (2007) 2 SCC 349.
3
New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Neelakandan, Civil Appeal No. 16904-09 of 1996.
4
Id.
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the right of workmen held that the EC Act, 1923 is a special legislation for the benefit of
the labour and keeping in view the scheme of the Act, the only interpretation which can
be given to the amendment is that if any benefit is conferred on the workmen and the said
benefit is available on the date when the case is finally adjudicated, the said benefit
should be extended to the workmen. In this case, the accident had taken place prior to the
coming into force of an amendment to the EC Act, 1923 where under the deemed income
had been increased from Rs.1000 to Rs.2000. The question before the Court was whether
the benefit of the amendment would extend to accidents that took place prior to its
coming into force and where the final adjudication of the amount payable was pending.
The Court held that though the accident in question took place in 1981, the benefit of the
amendment would apply to accidents that took place prior to the coming into force of the
amendment.5
[¶4.] Thus, it is humbly contended that the the EC Act, 1923 is a social beneficial legislation
and its provisions and amendments thereto must be interpreted in a manner so as to not
deprive the employees of the benefit of the legislation.6 The objective of enacting the EC
Act, 1923 is to ameliorate the hardship of economically poor employees 7 who were
exposed to risks in work, or occupational hazards by providing cheaper and quicker
machinery for compensating them with pecuniary benefits. 8 The amendments to the EC
Act, 1923 have been enacted to stimulate this salient purpose by either streamlining the
compensation process or enhancing the amount of compensation payable to the employee.
[¶5.] Therefore, in the instant case although the accident of Shri. Aparshakti happened on
August 3, 20149, the claim for compensation was filed on 10 April, 2018 10, which is after
the date of coming into force of the gazette notification dated 1-1-2016 11, thus, the
decision of the High Court in doubling the amount of the compensation is valid keeping
in view the welfare of the employee associated with the amendment.
[1.2] Amendments that confer a benefit upon individuals must be given retrospective
application.
5
New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Neelakandan, Civil Appeal No. 16904-09 of 1996.
6
V.V. GIRI, LABOUR PROBLEMS IN INDIAN INDUSTRY (Asia Publishing House 2006).
7
S.C. SRIVASTAVA, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND LABOUR LAWS (Vikas Publishing House 2020).
8
S. N. MISRA, LABOUR & INDUSTRIAL LAWS (Central Law Publication 2014).
9
Moot Proposition, p. 2, ¶5.
10
Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶11.
11
Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶13.
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[¶6.] This Hon’ble Court in the case of Govt. of India v. Indian Tobacco Assn.12, the doctrine of
fairness13 was held to be relevant factor to construe a statute conferring a benefit, in the
context of it to be given a retrospective 14 operation. The same doctrine of fairness, to hold
that a statute was retrospective in nature, was applied in Vijay v. State of Maharashtra15.
In this case, the court held that where a law is enacted for the benefit of community as a
whole, even in the absence of a provision the statute may be held to be retrospective in
nature.16
[¶7.] Furthermore, in the case of Rathi Menon v. Union of India17, the question before a two
judge Bench of this Court was whether the benefit of an amendment enhancing the rate of
compensation can be extended to accidents that took place prior to the coming into force
of the amendment. The Court assessed the scheme of the the Railways Act, 1989 18 and
held that the date relevant for the determination of compensation payable shall be the date
of adjudication. Consequently, the benefit of an amendment enhancing compensation
would be extended to accidents that took place prior to the coming into force of the
amendment.
[¶8.] This Hon’ble court has also held that if the amount of compensation so calculated is less
than the amount prescribed as on the date of the award of the Tribunal, the claimant will
be entitled to higher of the two amounts.19 This order will not affect the awards which
have already become final and where limitation for challenging such awards has expired,
this order will not by itself be a ground for condonation of delay.20
[¶9.] Moreover, in the case of P.A. Naravanan v. Union of India21, a writ petition filed for
compensation in respect of the death of claimants wife in a railway accident which
happened on 3.1.1981. A plea was made that compensation could be granted in
accordance with the rates prescribed by the rules under Railways Act, 1989. The counsel
for the Railway Administration disputed the said contention on the ground that the said
12
Govt. of India v. Indian Tobacco Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 396.
13
Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 251.
14
Commissioner of Income Tax Central II v. Suresh N. Gupta, (2008) 4 SCC 362.
15
Vijay v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 6 SCC 289.
16
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vatika Township Pvt. Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1.
17
Rathi Menon v. Union of India, (2001) 3 SCC 714.
18
The Railways Act, 1989, No. 24, Acts of Parliament, 1989 (Hastinapur)
19
Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh, 1998 (9) SCC 134.
20
Union of India v. Radha Yadav, (2019) 3 SCC 410.
21
P.A. Naravanan v. Union of India, (1998) 3 SCC 67.
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Act cannot have any retrospective operation 22. A two-Judge Bench of this Court acceded
to the said plea and granted a sum of Rs.2 lakhs as compensation, which is the sum
prescribed in the Rules then in force, despite the fact that the Act itself came into force
only in 1990.23
[¶10.] In the instant case, the Deputy Commissioner allowed the total claim of Rs. 11,06,850/-
on 15 May, 2018 to the legal respondents of Shri. Aparshakti. 24 The claim was filed on 10
April, 2018 and the Government came out with a Notification dated 1-1-2016 whereby,
acting in pursuant to the power endowed upon it under S.4, the EC Act, 1923 changed the
ceiling of Rs.5000 monthly wages to Rs.10, 000.25 Therefore, the amount of award for the
legal respondents of Shri. Aparshakti should have been double the amount as to what was
awarded by the Dy. Commissioner. After the unchanged award by the remanded Dy.
Commissioner, the matter was filed again in the High Court of Angapradesh. Keeping in
mind the Notification of the government and the welfare of the employee associated with
it, the High Court doubled the amount of the award that had been granted by Dy.
Commissioner on 15 May, 2018.26
[¶11.] Furthermore, as this Hon’ble Court has held that the EC Act, 1923 is a social welfare
legislation for the benefit of employees, therefore, taking into account the scheme of the
Act, the court must adopt an interpretation which extends a benefit to the employee on the
date of the final adjudication of the claim.27 Where a case is pending final adjudication
and an amendment is enacted increasing the amount of compensation payable, the
enhanced amount would be applicable28 in the determination of the quantum of
compensation payable.29 Therefore, it is humbly submitted that the legal respondents of
Shri. Aparshakti will be entitled to higher of the two amounts and thus, the gazette
notification dated 1-1-2016, under the Employee Compensation Act, 1923, will have a
retrospective effect.
[1.3] Since no indication is there under Section 4A(1) of the EC Act, 1923 as to when the
22
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Majeed 1996 (2) KLT 1022.
23
P.A. Naravanan v. Union of India, (1998) 3 SCC 67.
24
Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶11.
25
Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶13.
26
Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶14.
27
New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Neelakandan, Civil Appeal No. 16904-09 of 1996.
28
Union of India v. Radha Yadav, (2019) 3 SCC 410.
29
New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Neelakandan, Civil Appeal No. 16904-09 of 1996.
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compensation becomes due, it has to be taken to be the date of adjudication of the claim.
[¶12.] It is humbly submitted that Section 4-A(1) of the EC Act, 1923 30 stipulates that
compensation under Section 431 shall be paid as soon as it falls due 32 and since no
indication is there as to when it becomes due, it has to be taken to be the date of
adjudication of the claim. Furthermore, interest is payable under Section 4-A(3) 33 if there
is a default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the
date it fell due.34 The question of liability under Section 4-A was dealt with by this Court
in Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh35.
[¶13.] Furthermore, in National Insurance Co Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed 36, the court held that the
adjudication under Section 437 in some cases involves the assessment of loss of earning
capacity by a qualified medical practitioner. Unless adjudication is done, question of
compensation becoming due does not arise. The position becomes clearer on a reading of
sub-section (2) of Section 4-A38. It provides that provisional payment to the extent of
admitted liability has to be made when the employer does not accept the liability for
compensation to the extent claimed.39 The crucial expression under Section 4A(1) of the
EC Act, 192340 is “falls due”. Significantly, the legislature has not used the expression
“from the date of accident”. Therefore, it is submitted that unless there is an adjudication,
the question of an amount falling due does not arise.41
[¶14.] In the instant case, the accident took place before the amendment and the starting point is
on completion of one month from the date on which it fell due. Obviously, it cannot be
the date of the accident. Since no indication is there as to when it becomes due, it has to
be taken to be the date of adjudication of the claim. 42 This appears to be so because
Section 4-A(1) prescribes that compensation under Section 4 43 shall be paid as soon as it
30
The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, § 4A(1), No. 8, Acts of Parliament, 1923 (Hastinapur).
31
Id. § 4.
32
MEENU PAUL, LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL LAWS (Allahabad Law Agency 2016).
33
The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, § 4A(3), No. 8, Acts of Parliament, 1923 (Hastinapur).
34
DR. S.R. MYNENI, LABOUR LAWS (Asia Law House 2012).
35
Maghar Singh v. Jashwant Singh, 1998 (9) SCC 134.
36
National Insurance Co Ltd. v Mubasir Ahmed, (2007) 2 SCC 349.
37
The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, § 4, No. 8, Acts of Parliament, 1923 (Hastinapur).
38
The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, § 4A(2), No. 8, Acts of Parliament, 1923 (Hastinapur).
39
K.M. PILLAI, LABOUR AND INDUSTRIAL LAWS (Allahabad Law Agency 2016).
40
The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, § 4A(1), No. 8, Acts of Parliament, 1923 (Hastinapur).
41
National Insurance Co Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed, (2007) 2 SCC 349.
42
Id.
43
The Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923, § 4, No. 8, Acts of Parliament, 1923 (Hastinapur).
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falls due.44 Thus, the compensation becomes due on the basis of adjudication of the claim
made.
CONCLUSION TO ARGUMENT 1
The Government notification, dated 1-1-2016, under the EC Act, 1923, is a social
welfare legislation for the benefit of the employees and thus, is applicable to accidents
that took place prior to the gazette notification. Moreover, Section 4A(1) of the EC Act,
1923 prescribes that compensation under Section 4 shall be paid as soon as it falls due
and since no indication is there as when it becomes due, it has to be taken to be the date
of adjudication of the claim.
ARGUMENT [2]: THAT THE CLAIMS UNDER THE EMPLOYEE’S COMPENSATION ACT,
1923 AND THE RULES FOR COMMERCIAL DRONE, 2016 ARE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE.
[¶15.] It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the claims under the Employee’s
Compensation Act, 1923 and the Rules for Commercial Drone, 2016 are mutually
exclusive. The submissions in this regard are four-fold in structure: -
[2.1] Choice of one remedy excludes the other.
[2.2] The doctrine of election will be applicable here.
[2.3] Claims under both may lead to double compensation.
[2.4] Claims under both will result in the multiplicity of litigation.
[¶16.] It is submitted that under The Rules for commercial Drones, 2016, part X, Rule no. 28
provides that “The provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and rules made thereunder
shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to third party insurance of drone and compensation in case
of damage to life and/or property caused by such a drone. Notwithstanding anything
contained in this rule, a nano drone may operate without third party insurance.” 45 This
implies if there is any loss to life or injury to person or property by drones the claim for
compensation will be brought under M. V. Act.
[¶17.] Furthermore, Sec. 167 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides – “Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923) where the
44
Id. § 4A(1).
45
The Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016 (Hastinapur).
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death of, or bodily injury to, any person gives rise to a claim for compensation under this
Act and also under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, the person entitled to
compensation may without prejudice to the provisions of Chapter X claim such
compensation under either of those Acts but not under both”.46
[¶18.] On 16 Jan 2018, while goods were being loaded to the drone system, it could not hold the
weight being attached to it. It fell on the heads of two of wrap’s employees Sushri
Krishma Devi & Shri Chatur Kumar leading to their death on the spot. 47 Legal
representatives of Sushri Krishma Devi & Shri Chatur Kumar also filed for compensation
under the employee compensation Act, 1923 which was approved by the commissioner.48
[¶19.] As per the situation in the present case, the legal representatives of both the employees
have exercised their right of claim under the EC Act, 1923 hence, no further claim for
indemnification by employer arise. Also, there was no clause in the purchase agreement
for drones on accident caused by drones. 49 Section 167 of the MV Act contains a non-
obstante clause providing for such an option notwithstanding anything contained in the
1923 Act.50
[¶20.] The claimants are not allowed to avail dual benefit under the above said two enactments. 51
Both enactment operate in different field & there is no overlapping b/w the two. If the
claim is made under the Employees' s Compensation Act, 1923 and it is allowed by the
Commissioner, then the claimants cannot make a claim under the Motor vehicles Act
1988.52 A careful reading of Sec. 167 of the Motor Vehicles Act would show that the
option regarding claims for compensation has to be exercised at the time of filing the
petition.53
[¶21.] A perusal of the aforesaid Section makes it evidently clear that the same gives an option
to claimant for claiming a compensation either before the Commissioner or before the
Tribunal, but obviously both the remedies are not available at the same time.54 As per sec
167 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the claimant has an option to choose either of the
46
The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, § 167, No. 59, Acts of Parliament, 1988 (Hastinapur).
47
Moot Proposition, p. 2, ¶10.
48
Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶15.
49
Moot Proposition, p. 3, ¶15.
50
Gomti Bai v. Dushyant Kumar, 2012 ACT 2069.
51
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lalitha Ratham, 2017 SCC OnLine Kar 1554.
52
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Anthony Selvam, (2014) (2) TN MAC 227.
53
United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Saraswati & Ors., 1997 SCC OnLine Mad 286.
54
National Insurance Co. Ltd v. Smt. Dev Mani & Ors 2016 SCC OnLine HP 3924.
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[¶25.] It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Doctrine of election is applicable in
the present case. The doctrine of election is based on rule of estopple, the principle that
55
Kore Laxmi v. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 2003 (6) ACD 182 (DB).
56
R v. Evans, (1854) 3 E & B 363.
57
R. K. BANGIA, LAW OF TORTS 79 (Allahabad Law Agency 2017).
58
Gulamrasul Rehman Malek v. Gujarat State Transport Corporation, 2015 ACJ 20.
59
25 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 558 (1964).
60
Padda Ranganna v. Zaleka Bee, AIR 1970 A.P. 124.
61
United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Vasudevan & Ors., 1988 SC OnLine Ker 346.
62
Sharad Ganpat Deshmukh v. Kunda Ashoka Polade, 2002 SCC OnLine Bom 1086.
63
Maeker v. Ross, 219 N. J. 565 (2014).
64
State v. Fuqua, 234 N. J. 583,591 (2018).
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one cannot approbate & reprobate is inherent in it.65 It is a rule of equity. 66A party cannot
be permitted to “ blow hot & cold” “ fast & loose” or “approbate or reprobate”.67
[¶26.] It is humbly submitted that the legal representative of deceased employees had already
exercised their right to claim under EC Act. Therefore, there can be no further claim.
Also, it is to be noted that If a person has chosen a particular remedy & has intentionally
relinquished another remedy, he is debarred by the doctrine of election to persue the
remedy he has intentionally given up.68 After choosing one particular remedy the person
cannot avail the other remedy as well in respect of the same relief founded on same cause
of action.69
[¶27.] By confining the claim to the authority or the Tribunal under either of the Acts, the
legislature has incorporated the concept of election of remedies, insofar as the claimant is
concerned. In other words, the claimant has to elect whether to make his claim under the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or under the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923. The
emphasis in the section that a claim cannot be made under both the enactments, is a
further reiteration of the doctrine of election incorporated in the scheme for claiming
compensation.70
[¶28.] If claims are allowed in both the enactments, it will lead to double compensation & that
will result in abuse of the procedure of law. The said section (Sec. 167 of Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988) in terms provides that if the workman is entitled to recover Compensation
under both the Acts, the workman shall not resort to double recovery and the workman or
his dependants shall have to exercise an option in this behalf for making a claim for
compensation either under the Motor Vehicles Act or under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, 1923.71
65
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, 2014 SCC OnLine SC 232.
66
P. R Deshpande v. Maruti Balarom Haibatti, (1998) 6 SCC 507.
67
Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corp. v. Diamond & Gem Development Corp. Ltd.
(2013) 5 SCC 470.
68
Transcore v. Union of India & Anr., (2008) 1 SCC 125.
69
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1278.
70
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mastan & Anr. (2006) 2 SCC 641.
71
Employees State Insurance Corporation, Bombay v. Sayeeda Khatoon Danawalla & Ors., (1994) SCC OnLine
Bom 263.
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[¶29.] It is submitted that the said principles (under sec 167 M V Act) ensure prevention of the
Claimants enjoying double benefit.72 It operates to overcome the inequity of double
recovery.73 It is contended that If claims under both laws are allowed then appellant
would be double compensated.74
[¶30.] It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that if claims can be brought under both
enactments that will only result in a multiplicity of litigation adding to the already
existing burden on the Hon’ble court. The multiplicity of litigation is not in the interest of
the parties nor should public time be allowed to be wasted over meaningless litigation. 75
Unnecessary multiplicity of litigation has to be prevented.76
[¶31.] In the long run, every unnecessary litigation that is avoided by appropriate preventive
action, confers a benefit not only by saving money, but also by advancing the public
welfare.77 Allowing the workers’ compensation carrier here to sue the tortfeasors or their
automobile insurance carrier in a subrogation action permits the very outcome the
Legislature intended to foreclose through the adoption of no-fault insurance more
litigation78 and greater financial burdens on the automobile insurance system. 79 Therefore,
it is humbly submitted that the Hon’ble HC was correct in dismissing the appeal
observing that nothing is mentioned in drone rules for indemnification. 80 Hence, this
appeal deserves to be dismissed.
CONCLUSION TO ARGUMENT 2
The claims under the EC Act, 1923 and the Drone Rules, 2016 are mutually exclusive as the
claim in one bar the remedy in other. Also, the doctrine of election is applicable and the
claimant has to elect from the two, he cannot take unjust benefit of both. Furthermore, if
72
United India Insurance Co. Ltd v. Anthony Selvam & Ors., (2017) SCC OnLine Mad 3506.
73
Frazier v. N. J. Mfrs . Ins. Co., 142 N.J. 590, 596-97 (1995).
74
Leli Chaka Ndoro v. Maree Ahmad and Anr., (2017) eKLR : (2017) SCC OnLine Ken 956.
75
Ram Sumer Puri Mohant v. State of U.P., (1985) 1 SCC 429.
76
V. M. Shah v. The State of Maharashtra and Anr., 1995 SCC (5) 767.
77
P. M. Bakshi, Public sector & fruitless Litigation, 37 JILI 557 (1995).
78
NEW JERSEY COURTS, https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/supreme.html?lang=eng (last visited March 20,
2022).
79
New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Sanchez, 237 N. J. 423 (2019).
80
Moot Proposition, p. 4, ¶16.
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claims are allowed under both, it might lead to double compensation and it will also result in
the multiplicity of litigation.
ARGUMENT [3]: THAT THE ‘THE RULES FOR COMMERCIAL DRONE, 2016” IS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID.
[¶32.] It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the ‘Rules for Commercial Drones,
2016’ (hereinafter referred to as the Drone Rules, 2016) issued by the Civil Aviation
Ministry of the Union of Hastinapur are not violative of Part III of the Constitution of
Hastinapur. Therefore, the Drone Rules, 2016 must be declared constitutional and valid.
The submissions in this regard are five-fold in structure: -
[3.1] Restrictions imposed by the Drone Rules, 2016 are reasonable and valid under
Article 19(6) of the Constitution of Hastinapur.
[3.2] The Drone Rules, 2016 are not arbitrary or excessive in nature and do not violate
Article 14 of the Constitution.
[3.3] There is no excessive delegation of power under the Drone Rules, 2016.
[3.4] The Drone Rules, 2016 do not suffer from the vice of vagueness.
[3.5] The Drone Rules, 2016 are not violative of the Fundamental Right to Privacy under
Article 21 of the Constitution.
[3.1] Restrictions imposed by the Drone Rules, 2016 are reasonable and valid under
Article 19(6) of the Constitution of Hastinapur.
[¶33.] It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Drone Rules, 2016 does not
violate the fundamental right to freedom of trade guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the
Constitution of Hastinapur. The fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) are
subject to the power of the State to impose restrictions on the exercise thereof. 81 In the
case of Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U. P 82, the Court held that the fundamental rights
enshrined in Part III of the Constitution are neither absolute nor unlimited but are subject
to reasonable restrictions which may be imposed by the State in the public interest under
Clauses (2) to (6) of Art. 19 of the Constitution.83
81
Dr. Y.P. Singh and Ors., Etc. v. State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1982 All 439.
82
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of U. P., (1981) 2 SCC 600.
83
Id.
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[¶34.] The test of reasonableness is subjective in nature and should be applied to each individual
statute impugned and no abstract standard or general pattern of reasonableness 84 can be
laid down as applicable to all cases. 85. While evaluating reasonableness of a legislation it
should be beneficial in the interests of general public and not from the standpoint of the
interests of the persons upon whom the restrictions are imposed. 86 A restriction cannot be
said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case, it operates harshly87
[¶35.] The Supreme Court has laid down the criteria to evaluate the reasonableness of a
restriction under Art. 19(6)88. The Court has to take into account such factors as, nature of
the right enshrined, the underlying purpose of the restriction imposed, evil sought to be
remedied by the law, its extent and urgency, how far the restriction is or is not
proportionate to the evil and the prevailing conditions at the time. 89 Legislation that
arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of
reasonableness90 and unless it strikes a proper balance between the freedom guaranteed in
Art. 19(1)(g) and the social control91 permitted by clause (6) of Art. 19.92
[¶36.] It is humbly submitted that restrictions imposed on the movement of drones under the
Drone Rules, 2016 are reasonable as the fixation of the restricted and prohibited zone 93 is
necessary to ensure the safety and interest of the public. When a restriction is tested on
the anvil of reasonableness and rationality, the underlying purpose of the restrictions and
prevailing conditions must be considered.94 The underlying purpose of these restrictions
imposed is public safety and hence within the ambit of Article 19(6).95
[¶37.] The restrictions are based on the Latin maxim Salus populi supremo lex which means the
safety of the people is the supreme law. 96 The recent terrorist and criminal activities with
the use of drones clearly depict the need for stringent Drone Rules in order to ensure
public safety. Therefore, it is a valid restriction permitted by clause (6) of Article 19 and
84
P. M. BAXI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Universal Law Publishing, 14th ed. 2019).
85
State of Madras v. V. G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196.
86
DR. J. N. PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (Central Law Agency, 57th ed. 2020).
87
Krishnan Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 128.
88
HASTINAPUR CONST. art. 19, § 6.
89
Sivani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1995 SC 1770.
90
M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (LexisNexis 8th ed. 2014).
91
Bishambhar Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1982 SC 33.
92
P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1016.
93
The Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016, § 3-L (Hastinapur).
94
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, Union of India & State of Travancore-Cochin, 1952 AIR SC 196.
95
HASTINAPUR CONST. art. 19, § 6, cl. g.
96
Karnataka Live Band Restaurants Association v. State of Karnataka and Other. 2018 4 SCC 374.
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[3.2] The Drone Rules, 2016 are not arbitrary or excessive in nature and do not violate
Article 14 of the Constitution.
[¶38.] In order to ascertain the scope of Article 14 let us discuss the landmark case of
Budhan Cahudhary v. State of Bihar97 in which the constitution bench of seven judges
of this Hon’ble court discussed the true meaning of Article 14. It laid down two tests
for permissible classification namely, a) the classification must be founded on
intelligible differentia that distinguishes persons or things grouped together from
those who are left out, b) that intelligible differentia must have a rational nexus with
the objective that the legislation has sought to achieve.98
[¶39.] This Hon’ble court reiterated these principles in many of its judgments such as Shakti
Kant Laxman Kale v. UOI99 and more recently in State of Maharashtra v. Indian Hotel
and Restaurant Assn.100 Arbitrariness means an act done “capriciously, irrationally and/or
without adequate determining principles.”101 The word “arbitrary” cannot be just used in
isolation to strike down a law, 102 there must be some other constitutional infirmity
proven.103 Furthermore, to adjudicate whether a law is arbitrary, the surrounding
circumstances must be taken into account as well if they prove that the government’s
actions were based on certain principles that are not irrational or unreasonable. 104
[¶40.] It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Drone Rules, 2016 has been
implemented keeping in mind valid principles and in the larger interest of the public.
These rules are not arbitrary as the restrictions are rationally imposed in the view of
public safety. Moreover, these regulations are reasonable in nature and proportionate to
the objective that the legislature has sought to achieve. Furthermore, the regulations
regarding prior permission before every drone flight 105 are not excessive in nature as the
97
Budhan Cahudhary v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191.
98
DURGA DAS BASU, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Lexis Nexis, 24th ed.
2020).
99
Shakti Kant Laxman Kale v. Union of India, 1990 4 SCC 366.
100
State of Maharashtra v. Indian Hotel and Restaurant Assn., (2013) 8 SCC 519.
101
Shayara Bano v. Union of India & Ors, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
102
State of A.P. & Ors v. McDowell & Co. & Ors, (1996) 3 SCC 709.
103
State of M.P v. Rakesh Kohli & Anr., (2012) 6 SCC 312.
104
Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Director, CBI and Anr, (2010) 10 SCC 331
105
The Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016, § 22 (Hastinapur).
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management of air traffic is necessary to avoid any mishap. The airspace map 106 issued by
Civil Aviation Ministry clearly demarcates green zones in which no prior permission is
required for operation of drones. Therefore, it is submitted that the Drone Rules, 2016 are
by no means arbitrary or excessive in nature.
[3.3] There is no excessive delegation of power under the Drone Rules, 2016.
[¶41.] In India, the invalidity of delegated legislation may arise from any of the following
reasons: (1) The enabling Act or delegating statute being unconstitutional. (2) The
subordinate legislation violating the Constitution. (3) The subordinate legislation being
ultra vires the delegating Act.
[¶42.] Firstly, In re Delhi Laws Act case 107, the majority of the Judges held the exercise of
delegated law-making power invalid because the enabling Act exceeded the constitutional
limits in permitting the Executive to repeal a law existing in the area. In the present case
the enabling act for the Drone rules,2016 is the Aircraft Act, 1934 108 which conferred
constitutionally valid power upon the executive to frame laws by the virtue section 5,
sub-section (2) of section 10 and sections 10A, 10B and 12A of the act.109
[¶43.] Secondly, the subordinate legislation is invalid if it is violative of the constitution. As
held in Lakshman v. State of M.P110 the Supreme Court struck down a notification issued
under the M.P. Grazing Rules made under the Forest Act, 1927. The Notification was
held to be bad as being violative of Arts. 14 111, 19(l)(e)112, 19(l)(g)113, and Art. 301114 of
the Constitution. But in the present case the Drone Rules, 2016 115 are in no way violative
of any rights conferred under the constitution of Hastinapur 116, and hence, delegation of
power is valid.
[¶44.] Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that in exercise of the powers
conferred by section 5, sub-section (2) of section 10 and sections 10A, 10B and 12A of
106
The Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016, § 19 (Hastinapur).
107
In Re The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 Case, AIR 1951 SC 332.
108
The Aircraft Act, 1934, No. 22, Acts of Parliament, 1934 (Hastinapur).
109
Id.
110
Lakshman v. State of M.P, (1983) 3 SCC 275.
111
HASTINAPUR CONST., art. 14.
112
Id. art. 19, § 1, cl. e.
113
HASTINAPUR CONST., art. 19, § 1, cl. g.
114
HASTINAPUR CONST., art. 301.
115
The Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016 (Hastinapur).
116
HASTINAPUR CONST.
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the Aircraft Act, 1934 (22 of 1934)117, the Central Government has created the Drone
Rules, 2016.118 Therefore, it is within the scope of the parent act and a valid delegation of
power.
[3.4] The Drone Rules, 2016 do not suffer from the vice of vagueness.
[¶45.] The test applied to check for vagueness has been adopted from U.S. jurisprudence, where
it has been held that men of common intelligence must be able to decipher 119 whether they
fall under a particular category or not. 120 Secondly, it has also been held that if arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards
for those who apply them.121
[¶46.] It is humbly submitted that the Drone Rules, 2016 122 are not vague as there is no scope
left for the arbitrary action of the executive. Under section 24 123 the power of the
executive is defined to declare red zones124 which is clearly not arbitrary as it prescribes
the time limit for the same. Additionally, clause 2 of section 24 125 clearly defines the
power of the executive to declare red zones which is not excessive in nature. Therefore,
we can prudently say that the Drone Rules, 2016 have clearly defined powers and
procedures for the smooth operation of drones in Hastinapur.
[3.5] The Drone Rules, 2016 are not violative of the Fundamental Right to Privacy.
[¶47.] Like the Right to life and liberty, the Right to privacy is not absolute. The limitations
which operate on the right to life and personal liberty would operate on the right to
privacy. Any curtailment or deprivation of that right would have to take place under a
regime of law. The procedure established by law must be fair, just, and reasonable.126
[¶48.] The right to privacy, in any event, will necessarily have to go through a process of case-
by-case development. Therefore, even assuming that the right to personal liberty, the right
to move freely throughout the territory of India, and the freedom of speech create an
117
The Aircraft Act, 1934, No. 22, Acts of Parliament, 1934 (Hastinapur).
118
The Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016 (Hastinapur).
119
Connally v. General Constr. Co, 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
120
State of M.P. v. Baldeo Prasad, AIR 1961 SC 293.
121
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, (1974).
122
The Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016 (Hastinapur).
123
The Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016, § 24 (Hastinapur).
124
DIGITAL SKY, https://digitalsky.dgca.gov.in/airspace-map/#/app (last visited March 20, 2022).
125
The Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016, § 24 cl-2 (Hastinapur).
126
Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
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independent right of privacy as an emanation from them which one can characterize as a
fundamental right127, we do not think that the right is absolute.128
[¶49.] The right of privacy may not be absolute and in exceptional circumstance, particularly
surveillance in consonance with the statutory provisions may not violate such a right.” 129
Hence, it is humbly contended that the Drone Rules, 2016 are by no means a violation of
the right to privacy guaranteed under Art. 21 130 of the Constitution. The provisions
regarding location tracking131 of the drones are meant only for the safety of the public.
Hence, it is a valid regulation as right to privacy is not absolute and subject to public
safety.
CONCLUSION TO ARGUMENT 3
The Drone Rules, 2016 is constitutional and valid. It does not violate any provisions of
the Constitution of Hastinapur. The restrictions imposed under the drone rules are
reasonable and valid under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the drone rules
are not arbitrary and a check is imposed on the power of the officers concerned.
Moreover, these rules are not excessive in nature and are not violative of the right to
privacy. Therefore, the drone rules are reasonable, and not violative of rights envisaged
in the Constitution of Hastinapur..
127
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, (1965).
128
Jane Roe v. Henry Wade, 410 US 113, (1973).
129
Ramlila Maidan Incident v Home Secretary, Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
130
HASTINAPUR CONST., art. 21.
131
The Rules for Commercial Drones, 2016, § 12, cl. B (Hastinapur).
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PRAYER
1. To declare that the Government Notification, dated 1-1-2016, under the Employee
Compensation Act, 1923, is applicable to accidents that took place prior to the Gazette
Notification.
2. To declare that claims under the Employee’s Compensation Act, 1923 and the Rules for
3. To uphold that ‘The Rules for Commercial Drone, 2016” is constitutional and does not
And/Or
Pass any other order, direction, or relief that it may deem fit in the interest of justice, fairness,
And for this act of kindness, the Respondents as in duty bound shall forever pray.
Sd/-
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