Felicitas Quiambao vs. Atty.

Nestor Bamba
Adm. Case No. 6708, August 25, 2005

Facts:

Felicitas Quiambao was the president and managing director of Allied Investigation
Bureau, Inc (AIB). Quiambao procured the legal services of Atty. Nestor Bamba for
the corporate affairs of AIB. Atty. Bamba was also the official legal counsel of an
ejectment case filed by Quiambao against spouses Santiago and Florito Torroba.

When Quiambao resigned from AIB, Atty. Bamba, without withdrawing as counsel
from the ejectment case, represented AIB in a complaint case for replevin and
damages against her. Quiambao filed charges against Atty. Bamba for representing
conflicting interests and violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

For his part, Atty. Bamba denies that he was a personal lawyer of Quiambao, and
he believes that it is part of his duty to pursue cases in behalf of employees at the
time Quiambao was working in AIB. Even then, Atty. Bamba contends that the
ejectment case and replevin case are completely unrelated.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Bamba is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting

interests in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Yes, Atty. Bamba is representing conflicting interests. Despite Atty. Bamba’s
contention that his legals services extend to AIB’s employees, this should not cover
the personal cases filed by its officers.

Even though the replevin and ejectment case are unrelated, representing opposing
clients therein gives rise to suspicions of double-dealing, and would thus result to a
conflict of interest.

Furthermore, Atty. Bamba failed to show that he disclosed or procured the approval
of Quiambao before pursuing the replevin case against her. Atty. Bamba was found
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from
practicing for one (1) year.

Nakpil vs Valdes [A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]

Ponente: PUNO, J.

FACTS:

Jose Nakpil, husband of the complainant, became interested in purchasing a

summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. For lack of funds, he requested
respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent
would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back.
Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank which
he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in
respondent’s name.

The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings
when Jose Nakpil died. Respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his
widow. Respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose’s estate
and transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty
Corporation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty. Valdes
and the complainant.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.

RATIO:

[T]here is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its creditors are
adverse to each other. Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the list of assets and
liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors
of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which
stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.

[R]espondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his
client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondent’s law
firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were
prepared by respondent’s accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not
prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether
there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of
conflict. It was respondent’s duty to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings
to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.

Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and
improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his
conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the
standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship
between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost
fidelity and good faith. In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity
to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions
with his clients.

Regino B. Aro v. The Hon. Arsenio Nañawa

 G.R. No. L-24163, April 28, 1969

FACTS:

There appears to be no dispute as to the following facts alleged in the petition:

1. That the services of herein petitioner was engaged by respondents for the
prosecution of their claim, as heirs, in the estate of their deceased uncle
Lucio Magtibay.
2. That there was a conversation which took place between herein petitioner
and the attorney of the defendants, Atty. Rustico de los Reyes, Jr., in the
civil case and one who was then acting as a sort of spokesman for the
defendants for the amicable settlement of the case between the plaintiffs and
the defendants to the effect that a certain property of the spouses Lucio
Magtibay (deceased) and respondent Aurelia Martinez, worth P3,000.00,
would be given to the plaintiffs in full settlement of their claim, as share in
the properties left by their uncle Lucio Magtibay.
3. That it was only on October 28, 1964, when herein petitioner received a copy
of the order dated October 24, 1964 and to his surprise he also received on
the said day a second motion to dismiss dated October 26, 1964; together
with Annex "A" of said motion, which is entitled KASULATAN NG
PAGHAHATIAN NA LABAS SA HUKUMAN AT PAGPAPALABI, signed by the
plaintiffs and defendant Aurelia Martinez, it having been made to appear in
said Annex "A" of the second motion to dismiss, among others, that the
plaintiffs and defendant Aurelia Martinez had made an extrajudicial partition
of the properties of the deceased Lucio Magtibay and the said Aurelia
Martinez adjudicating to the plaintiffs one-fourth (¼) share in the properties
of the spouses and three-fourth (3/4) share of the defendant Aurelia
Martinez, but making it appear also that said plaintiffs waived their share in
favor of Aurelia Martinez, ..., thru which fraudulent waiver, herein petitioner
was deprived of his contingent fees, agreed upon, as evidenced by Annex "A"
of this petition.
4. That petitioner filed by registered mail, on November 4, 1964, his
"Opposition To The Second Motion To Dismiss And Counter-Motion Or Petition
To Set Aside Deed Of Extrajudicial Partition And Waiver Dated October 23,
1964 And To Record Attorney's Lien".
5. That petitioner found this in American jurisprudence: Though a party may
without the consent of his attorney money make a bona fide adjustment with
the adverse party and dismiss an action or suit before a judgment or a
decree has been rendered thereon, if it appears, however, that such
settlement was collosive and consummated pursuant to the intent of both
parties to defraud the attorney, the court in which the action was pending
may interfere to protect him as one of its officers, by setting aside the order
of dismissal, .... (Jackson vs. Stearns, 48 Ore. 25, 84 Pac. 798).... the
respondent Judge, instead of denying the second motion to dismiss and
fixing his attorney's fees in the said case and recording the same as lien, ...
dismissed the case.
ISSUE:

Whether petitioner-lawyer is entitled to attorney’s fees.

RULING:

YES. On the same considerations of equity, and for the better protection of lawyers,
who, trusting in the good faith of their clients, render professional services on
contingent basis, and so that it may not be said that this Court, sanctions in any
way the questionable practice of clients of compromising their cases at the back of
their counsel with the consequence that the stipulated contingent fees of the lawyer
are either unreasonably reduced or even completely rendered without basis, as in
this case —wherein the clients waived the whole of their rights in favor of their
opponent after the latter had acknowledged, in effect, the correctness of said
clients' contention —We have decided to grant the herein petition, in so far as the
rights of petitioner have been prejudiced by the questioned compromise agreement.
While We here reaffirm the rule that "the client has an undoubted right to
compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer",We hold that when such
compromise is entered into in fraud of the lawyer, with intent to deprive him of the
fees justly due him, the compromise must be subject to the said fees, and that
when it is evident that the said fraud is committed in confabulation with the
adverse party who had knowledge of the lawyer's contingent interest or such
interest appears of record and who would benefit under such compromise, the
better practice is to settle the matter of the attorney's fees in the same proceeding,
after hearing all the affected parties and without prejudice to the finality of the
compromise in so far as it does not adversely affect the rights of the lawyer.True it
is also that "a client may, at anytime, dismiss his attorney or substitute another in
his place", (Sec. 26, Rule 138) but it must be emphasized that the same provision,
which is an incorporation of Republic Act 636 into the Rules of Court, also provides
that "if the contract between client and attorney had been reduced to writing and
the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to
recover from the client full compensation ..." In the case at bar, by entering into
the compromise agreement in question and even inserting therein a prayer to the
court to dismiss their case filed by petitioner, petitioner's clients impliedly dismissed
him. Such implied dismissal appears to Us to have been made without justifiable
cause, none is urged anywhere in the record, and so, the above-quoted provision of
Section 26, Rule 138 applies here.

ATTY. JUAN PAULO VILLONCO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROMEO G. ROXAS,

Respondent.

Facts:

Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC), with complainant Atty. Juan Paolo T.
Villonco as its president, hired respondent Atty. Romeo G. Roxas as its counsel on a
contingent basis in its case against the Republic of the Philippines with respect to a
reclaimed land which is now the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) complex.
Subsequently, RREC was awarded around P10,926,071.29 representing the sum
spent in the reclamation of the CCP complex.

The Republic then filed a Petition for Certiorari against the Writ of Execution
eventually issued by the trial court. The CA then grants the said petition and
declared the Writ of Execution null and void. Aggrieved, Atty. Roxas, without first
securing RREC 's consent and authority, filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a
Motion for Inhibition with the CA.

Without authorization from RREC’s, he filed a complaint for serious misconduct

against CA Justices Sesinando E. Villon, Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Jose Catral
Mendoza, and a petition assailing the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No.
774, both on RREC's behalf. When Atty. Roxas won’t withdraw his complaint, RREC
terminated its retainer agreement with Atty. Roxas and engaged the services of
another lawyer to replace him in the representation of the company. However,
despite this Atty. Roxas still appeared for RREC and continued to argue for the
corporation in the case. He also threatened to sue the members of the RREC Board
unless they reinstated him as counsel. Thus, Atty. Villonco was compelled to file the
instant administrative complaint against Atty. Roxas. IBP recommended the
Penalty of Censure. However, the IBP Governors raise the penalty to 6 months
suspension to the POL.

Issue:

WON the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. (YES)

Ruling:

He violated Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. RREC's Board of
Directors specifically instructed Atty. Roxas to postpone the filing of the
motion for the issuance of a Writ of Execution until further notice, but he
defied the same and still filed the motion. He then filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and a Motion for Inhibition with the CA without first securing RREC's consent and
authority. Again, without being authorized, he likewise filed an administrative
complaint against several CA Justices and a petition assailing the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 774, both on RREC's behalf. Said unauthorized acts caused
RREC's Board to request Atty. Roxas to voluntarily withdraw as counsel for the
corporation and to finally terminate its retainer agreement with him when he
refused. Even after he was terminated, Atty. Roxas still continued to appear and
argue for RREC. Worse, he also threatened to sue the members of the RREC Board
unless they reinstated him as the company's counsel.

Atty. Roxas's defiant attitude ultimately caused his client to lose its trust in him. He
intentionally denied his client's requests on how to proceed with the case and
insisted on doing it his own way. He could not possibly use the supposed blanket
authority given to him as a valid justification, especially on non-procedural matters,
as in the case at bar, if he would be contradicting his client's trust and confidence in
the process. Atty. Roxas clearly disregarded the express commands of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), specifically Canon 17.

Atty. Roxas has fallen short of the high standard of morality, honesty,
integrity, and fair dealing expected of him. Thus, RREC's termination of his
retainer is proper and justified. A client may absolutely discharge his lawyer at any
time, with or without cause, and without need of the lawyer's consent or the court's
approval. He may, at any time, dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his
stead. Such right, however, is subject to the lawyer's right to be compensated. In
the discretion of the court, the attorney may intervene in the case to protect his
rights and he shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case where his
services had been retained by the client, for the payment of his compensation.

Hence, The Court SUSPENDS Atty. Romeo G. Roxas from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year and WARNS him that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

EDGARDO AREOLA vs. ATTY. MARIA VILMA MENDOZA

A.C. No. 10135 January 15, 2014

Facts:

Areola stated that he was filing a complaint in behalf of his co-detainees Allan
Seronda, Aaron Arca, Joselito Mirador, Spouses Danilo Perez and Elizabeth Perez.
He alleged that on October 23, 2006, during Prisoners Week, Atty. Mendoza, visited
the Antipolo City Jail and called all detainees with pending cases before the RTC
where she was assigned, to attend her speech/lecture. Areola claimed that Atty.
Mendoza stated the following during her speech:

"O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang- areglo ay maging
praktikal sana kayo kung gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na
hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo
ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui; at
kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang
ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon."

Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all
detainees should prepare and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that
she may know the facts of their cases and their defenses and also to give her the
necessary payment for their transcript of stenographic notes.

Areola furthermore stated that when he helped his co-inmates in drafting their
pleadings and filing motions before the RTC Atty. Mendoza undermined his
capability, to wit:
(1) Atty. Mendoza purportedly scolded detainee Seronda when she learned that the
latter was assisted by Areola in filing a Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Speedy
Trial Act in the latter’s criminal case for rape. She got angrier when Seronda
retorted that he allowed Areola to file the motion for him since there was nobody to
help him.
(2) Areola assisted Spouses Danilo and Elizabeth Perez in filing their Joint Motion
for Consolidation of Trial of Consolidated Offenses and Joint Motion to Plead Guilty
to a Lesser Offense. The spouses were likewise scolded for relying on the
Complainant and alleged that the respondent asked for ₱2,000.00 to represent
them.
(3) Areola helped another co-detainee, Mirador in filing an "Ex-parte Motion to
Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense". When Atty. Mendoza learned of it, she allegedly
scolded Mirador and discredited Areola.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Areola is the proper complainant
2. Whether or not Areola is allowed to give legal advice and file pleadings
3. Whether or notAtty. Mendoza violated Canon 1 and Canon 15 of the CPR

Ruling:

First Issue:

The Court agrees with the IBP that Areola is not the proper party to file the
Complaint against Atty. Mendoza. He is not even a client of Atty. Mendoza. He
claims that he filed the Complaint on behalf of his co-detainees Seronda, Arca,
Mirador and Spouses Perez, but it is apparent that no document was submitted
which would show that they authorized Areola to file a Complaint.

The Court agrees with the observations of the Investigating Commissioner that
Areola initiated this complaint when he felt insulted because Atty. Mendoza refused
to acknowledge the pleadings and motions he prepared for his co-detainees who
are PAO clients of Atty. Mendoza.

Second Issue:

It appears that Areola is quite knowledgeable with Philippine laws. However, no

matter how good he thinks he is, he is still not a lawyer. He is not authorized to
give legal advice and file pleadings by himself before the courts. His familiarity with
Philippine laws should be put to good use by cooperating with the PAO instead of
filing baseless complaints against lawyers and other government authorities. It
seems to the Court that Areola thinks of himself as more intelligent and better than
Atty. Mendoza, based on his criticisms against her.

Third Issue:

Interestingly, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the
judge and plead for compassion so that their motions would be granted. This
admission corresponds to one of Areola’s charges against Atty. Mendoza—that she
told her clients " Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at palalayain na kayo.
Malambot ang puso noon." Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily
moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for
their cases to be dismissed.

As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza
made irresponsible advices to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the mandate of Rule 1.02 that "a
lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system." Rule 15.07 states that "a lawyer shall
impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness."

Atty. Mendoza’s improper advice only lessens the confidence of the public in our
legal system. Judges must be free to judge, without pressure or influence from
external forces or factors according to the merits of a case. Atty. Mendoza’s
careless remark is uncalled for.

It must be remembered that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even
in the pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.

Penalty: REPRIMAND, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar act will be dealt with more severely.

ALMIRA C. FORONDA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE L. ALVAREZ, JR.,

Respondent.

Facts:

The complainant is an overseas Filipino worker in Dubai. In May 2008, she returned
to the Philippines to institute a case for the nullification of her marriage. The
respondent was referred to her and the complainant agreed to engage his services
for a fee of ₱195,000.00 to be paid as follows: 50% or ₱100,000.00 upon the
signing of the contract; 25% or ₱50,000.00 on or before June 10, 2008;
and 25% or ₱45,000.00 before the filing of the case. The complainant paid the
amounts as agreed. The amount of ₱45,000.00 was even paid on June 10, 2008,
after being informed by the respondent that the petition for the annulment of
marriage was ready for filing.

The complainant averred that the respondent promised to file the petition after he
received the full payment of his attorney’s fee. The Complainant then inquired
about the status of her case and was allegedly told by the respondent that her
petition was pending in court; and in another time, she was told that a decision by
the court was already forthcoming. However, when she came back to the country
the respondent told her that her petition was still pending in court and apologized
for the delay. Eventually, the complainant was able to get a copy of her petition and
found out that it was filed only on July 16, 2009.

The complainant further alleged in her complaint that the week after she signed the
contract of service with the respondent, the latter requested for a meeting.
Thinking that they were going to discuss her case, she agreed. But during the
meeting, the respondent invited her to be an investor in the lending business
allegedly ran by the respondent’s sister-in-law. The respondent encouraged her to
invest ₱200,000.00 which he said can earn five percent (5%) interest per month.

The complainant finally agreed on the condition that the respondent shall issue
personal and post-dated checks in her favor dated the 10th of each month starting
July 2008 until June 10,2009, representing the five percent (5%) interest that the
complainant’s money shall earn. Thus, the complainant gave ₱200,000.00 to the
respondent upon the security of thirteen (13) United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
checks. Eleven (11) of said checks were for ₱8,000.00 each. The other two (2)
checks dated June 8, 2009 and June 10, 2009 were for ₱100,000.00 and
₱108,000.00, respectively.

According to the complainant, upon presentment of these checks, the drawee-bank

honored the first two (2) checks, but the rest were dishonored for being drawn
against a closed account. In his defense, the respondent admitted that he filed the
petition for annulment only in July 2009 but this was not due to his own fault.
The delay was caused by the complainant herself who allegedly instructed him to
hold the filing of the said petition as she and her husband were discussing a
possible reconciliation. He further claimed that he filed the petition on July 16, 2009
after negotiations with the complainant’s husband apparently failed.

The IBP recommended two years suspension from the practice of law with a
warning that a repetition of the offenses shall merit a
heavier penalty. However, the IBP Governors changed it for one year with a
warning that repetition of similar conduct shall be dealt
with more severely

Issue:

WON the Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.(YES)

Ruling:

He violated Canons 1, 15, 17, Rule 18.04, and Rule 16.04, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

It was established that the complainant engaged the professional services of the
respondent. She expected the immediate filing of the petition for the nullity of her
marriage after the full payment of attorney’s fees on June 10, 2008. However, the
respondent filed the said petition only on July 16, 2009. The respondent gave out
different reasons for the delay in an attempt to exculpate himself. At the end,
the respondent admitted the delay and apologized for it. It cannot be gainsaid that
the complainant through her agent was diligent in following up the petition. The
different excuses proffered by the respondent also show his lack of candor in his
dealings with the complainant.

"Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to
such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in
him." "[H]e is required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake
the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion." "A lawyer who performs his duty
with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client, he also serves
the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession."

The respondent’s act of issuing worthless checks is a violation of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It cannot be denied that the
respondent’s unfulfilled promise to settle his obligation and the issuance of
worthless checks have seriously breached the complainant’s trust. She went so far
as to file multiple criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against him. "The
relationship of an attorney to his client is highly fiduciary.

The Court very well takes note of the fact that the criminal charges filed against the
respondent have been dismissed upon an affidavit of desistance executed by the
complainant. The Court also acknowledges that he dutifully participated in the
proceedings before the IBP-CBD and that he completely settled his obligation to the
complainant, as evidenced by the Acknowledgment Receipt signed by the
complainant's counsel. Therein, it was acknowledged that the respondent paid the
amount of ₱650,000.00 in payment for the: (1) ₱200,000.00 for the amount of
checks he issued in favor of the complainant; (2) ₱195,000.00 for the attorney's
fees he received for the annulment case; and (3) cost and expenses that the
complainant incurred in relation to the cases the latter filed against the respondent
including the instant complaint with the IBP. Unlike in Solidon where the
respondent failed to file the required petition and did not account for the money he
received, the respondent was able to file, albeit belatedly, the complainant's
petition. In addition, he returned in full the money he received as attorney's fee in
spite of having gone through all the trouble of preparing the required petition and in
filing the same - not to mention the cost he incurred for the purpose.

Hence, Atty. Alvarez is Suspended for 6 months from the POL with a stem warning.