The Problem of Poverty and the Limits of Freedom in Hegel's Theory of the Ethical

State
Author(s): Matt S. Whitt
Source: Political Theory , April 2013, Vol. 41, No. 2 (April 2013), pp. 257-284
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23484421

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 Political Theory
41(2) 257-284
The Problem of © 2013 SAGE Publications
Reprints and permission:

Poverty and the sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/0090591712470626

Limits of Freedom ptx.sagepub.com

in Hegel's Theory
of the Ethical State

Matt S. Whitt1

Abstract

This article reinterprets Hegel's much discussed "failure" to theorize a rem

edy for the poverty that disrupts modern society. I argue that Hegel does
not offer any solution to the problem of poverty because, in his view, the
sovereign state depends upon the persistence of poverty. Whereas a state's
achievement of external sovereignty requires the presence of another state,
its achievement of internal sovereignty requires the presence of a different,
internal other.This role is played by the impoverished and rebellious "rab
ble," which opposes the state's unity and stability. Ethical life cannot eliminate
poverty because poverty, and the insecurity that it engenders, are dialectical
conditions of the state's highest development. This interpretation reveals a
critical dimension to Hegel's political philosophy, Insofar as the state's prom
ise of actualized freedom can only be sustained in relation to a mass of inter
nal "outsiders" to whom that freedom does not extend.

Keywords
Rabble; Inequality; Sovereignty; Colonialism; Critique

'Warren Wilson College,Asheville, NC, USA

Corresponding Author:
Matthew S.Whitt, Warren Wilson College, Philosophy,WWC-CPO 6152 P. O. Box 9000,
Asheville, NC 28815,
Email: mattswhitt@gmail.com

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 258 Political Theory 41(2)

In the Philosophy of Right, G. W. F. H

and political reality of his day through
method is to reveal the "rational form"
and the state" so that these may be c
reconstructed as they ought to be.1 T
political philosophy is an uncritical af
Hegel gives rational form to not only
persistent failures of the modern stat
failures, he theorizes a political comm
fully realized, because the benefits of
conditioned by, and dependent upon,
promise of actualized freedom can on
group of internal "outsiders" to whom
This interpretation of Hegel's politic
through an examination of his remarks
his lectures on the Philosophy of Righ
tion of how poverty can be remedied
["bewegende und qudlende"] modern s
this paper is to show how this agitatio
account of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). I w
ethical life are deeply threatened, but
modern mass poverty. By clarifying th
Hegel assigns to the persistence of in
cussed mystery surrounding Hegel's "
erty in his philosophical system. M
critical, rather than conservative o
Sittlichkeit in general and the ethical s
Famously, Hegel does not offer any
causing many readers to identify it as
Hegelian system.3 Because this unsolv
actualization of freedom in the state,
it is an unintentional defect of the H
implicit or undeveloped remedies with
Hegel lacks the resources to eliminate
political philosophy with solutions
time.5 Still others, most famously Mar
poverty necessitates the revolution of
describes.6
In contrast to these established lines of interpretation, I will argue that the
unresolved problem of poverty is an intentional feature, rather than a defect,

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Whitt 259

of Hegel's phi
the persistenc
solution, of th
view is this: t
actualization
indignant und
rabble inevita
munity. Howe
makes possibl
state.Like the
ethical commu
freedom in th
the unfreedom
In defending
fies the persis
ends of ethic
particular
eth
purpose—the
of poverty fo
is aimed at co
ing the s how
ultimately sh
dom is both m
ation, and ins
Hegel's remar
This interpre
ductive for co
social and poli
onto the bord
for example,
advanced here
differentiatio
content, subst
tion among pe
benefits. In m
temporary fe
poverty, sover
The paper pro
poverty and c
ity of the eth

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260 Political Theory 41(2)

measures available within the framewo

I show them to be inadequate to the p
tion, colonization, is instructive for th
problem of poverty into a vehicle for
nity. The third section contains the cor
erty is a dialectical condition for the h
engendering the alienated and rebelliou
"other" that the ethical state must co
unity that Hegel calls "internal soverei
argument to Hegel's remarks on how
unity of sovereign states. The interna
tions much like the external agitation
cial to the development of the ethical s
critical potential of Hegel's thought t
cally necessary for actualized freedom
showing that this interpretation of H
resources for contemporary critical th

Inequality and Insecurity in

Hegel believes that poverty is a necess
need in industrialized civil society.
of particularity and privacy, in which
of the family. The lives of modem indi
tion of their own personal ends, and th
ous needs toward which they are direc
what they are—individuated persons—
society's endless generation of social an
In order to address this endless varie
systems of reciprocal labor, mutual
through which an individual's particu
universality of economic interdepende
movement, the particular is mediated b
in earning, producing, and enjoying o
produces for the enjoyment of others."1
is latent in this formal interdependenc
larizes individuals as self-regarding bo
tion, as citoyens, within the state's con
However, need also constitutes an in
integration that it sets in motion. Bec

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Whitt 261

apace with th
multiplicatio
overwhelms
experienced
satisfaction
Consequently
society, enab
condition of
and want" pa
integrated i
unity of the
Several feat
poverty is a
explicit abou
also theorize
among perso
lead to pover
acterized by
societies wh
needs and lu
In this respec
poverty perp
ment or pro
corporations
ticular inter
state.17 Exclu
actualized fr
addition to o
society, "the
essarily give
vidual agains
generates a s
society, but
and instituti
If allowed to
crisis. Hegel
oped societie
help itself."1
tegrated and
Lacking acce

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262 Political Theory 41(2)

ordered indifference of the state, poor

ordered indifference of the rabble, wh
inequality increases.21 Because its mem
rabble is not an organized estate or cla
tured multitude that grows within the e
from its unity.
Crucially, the rabble is not engend
Rather, it is "the disposition associate
viduals into a rabble.22 This "rabble-m
expression of the rabble's exclusion an
characterizes as a combination of sham
honor, incivility, idleness, lawlessness,
the rabble is indignant. Its indignatio
exclusion, and it takes the form of "in
society, the government, etc."24 Hege
abstract negativity, the rabble's indis
nate object. Rather, it is directed towar
and alienated, namely ethical life as a w
Denied social standing and freedom by
rebels against not only particular ind
rational unity of ethical life itself.
The rabble is a curious feature of Heg
an anomaly. Rather, it is a consequenc
by its own inner dynamic facilitates th
society, even as it simultaneously cre
class. Nevertheless, Hegel's readers are
rabble means for Hegel's theory of Si
existence of the rabble appears to bel
actualized freedom. Although I will ult
rabble is essential to the development
lar, there are two immediately negative
elaboration here.
First, the presence of the rabble can
development of ethical life is not yet f
zens persists within civil society, this l
universal freedom remains incomplet
Hegel associates disorganized masses in
with "barbarous" violence.27 In the pu
Reform Bill," he calls the rabble's beha
unpublished manuscript reads "bestialit

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Whitt 263

that, for Heg

internal lim
dom.29 As so
unsatisfied n
gests that th
cannot simpl
includes mas
rated, or mad
of freedom in
Second, the
rial threat t
Indeed, Hege
to the ration
the links He
criminality.
others and t
recognition
socialstandi
society and t
whole, rathe
words, becau
lion constitu
The indiscri
social recogn
Taken toget
Hegel's surpr
the ethical st

What matte
cal with the
has often be
zens. This is
subjective en
as such is th
insecure foot

By preventi
izing their s
versal, pover
the ethical s

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 264 Political Theory 41(2)

the level of theory, if Hegel can prov

erty, then the actualization of freedo
appears to be incomplete. At the level o
antisocial rebellion of the rabble, whic
ethical community. In both senses, th
undermine Hegel's entire political phi
Yet, the problem of poverty and the
components of that project. Rather, th
countermovement to the actualization
by the ethical state. The proliferation
drives the actualization of individual fr
some individuals and leaves them to fa
poverty, the rabble, and the threat of
the same dialectic that determines the various institutions described in the
Philosophy of Right. Through the dialectical realization of freedom, the
organic unity of the ethical community develops together with its internal
outcast, the disordered and lawless rabble.

Reframing the Problem of Poverty

Hegel presents the growth of mass poverty as a tragic and dangerous coun
termovement to the actualization of individual right and freedom in the state.
This is one way to interpret his remark that the problem of poverty "agitates
and torments [bewegende und qualende\ modern society."36 In this section, I
develop this interpretation by indicating the ways that civil society and the
state are spurred into action, and literally moved, by the poverty that agitates
them. Both civil society and the state attempt to mitigate poverty, integrate
the excluded particularity of the poor, and prevent the emergence of the
rabble. However, neither sphere includes the resources to do so effectively.
By reviewing the failures of civil society and the state to eliminate poverty,
this section prepares the ground for my argument that the unsolved problem
of poverty—as an unsolved problem—plays an ultimately productive role in
Hegel's theory of ethical life.
Civil society attempts to eliminate poverty by redistributing wealth and
work, but the problem is "merely exacerbated" by these proposals.37 The pri
vate redistribution of wealth cannot ameliorate poverty, because charity is
based upon limited, contingent, and subjective relations between poor persons
and their benefactors, and such relations are insufficient to replace the formal
universality of civil society's network of interdependence.38 Hegel maintains
that charity by itself may even intensify the alienation of the poor, because it

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Whitt 265

provides an
relation of d
self-consciou
would seem
would only
Hegel argue
increase pro
exacerbating
an excess of
resources ar
tion of a rab
However, th
from form
operations o
particular—
without dial
the dialectic
the public r
work of eco
tration.43 M
society, Heg
objective, un
When they
forming to
sphere.44 Th
autonomy o
remedy for
This leaves
glance, the g
poverty. Mu
integrate in
tary "second
enable them
them.46 Rec
lem of pove
receive supp
However, t
poor from t
other instit
ble in civil s

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266 Political Theory 41(2)

members in accordance with their ob

tude."48 This effectively bars the poor
because, according to Hegel, poor indi
and integrity that accompany produc
Moreover, although corporations may
eligible for entry, even this cannot he
the indigent are "more or less deprive
education."50 Thus, the poor are effec
they were members of corporations, t
and social standing, but because they la
to gain membership. Of course, the sta
their membership criteria, and perha
However, this proposal would run afou
tion in civil society. Thus, far from b
poverty, the corporations merely illust
with both private and public assistance
As a result of these failures to elimin
particularity and unmediated negativit
nity, where they continue to threaten
mean, however, that poverty is mere
Sittlichkeit. Instead, the cunning of re
means of ethical life's development. T
Hegel's discussion of colonization, whic
torments society into an engine of mo
Just after introducing the problem of
ety's "inner dialectic" of overproductio
of ethical life to new colonies.51 While
of overproduction to colonization,
directly attributing the need for colo
mass of people who cannot gain satisf
when production exceeds the needs of
clarify that it is the new urban poor th
colonists function as founding "peoples
a "return to the family principle" betw
in late modernity, the global spread of
heroic acts of generals, but also by th
stant expulsion of the needy—from ag
There is some reason to think that H
colonialism that he is often taken to be.
not consider colonial expansion to be

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Whitt 267

poverty. Col
purchase all
unrestricted
argues in on
colonization
the sending
lem of pove
ties. In his le
a simple exte
When a colo
outlet for t
Instead, it u
already emb
its own pove
and indepen
duces the th
It is genera
tory remed
edged, and
illustrates t
serve the de
rabble—as t
ate, and int
across the g
it could not
reproductio
This reveals
Hegel's polit
methodolog
function pr
system.59 G
colonization
community,
colonial repr
merely quan
However, th
colonization
plagues mod
Once this is
Rather than

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 268 Political Theory 41(2)

problem of poverty, or how his failure to

phy, we should instead ask whether Hege
rants its inclusion, as an unresolved prob
other words, given the collective failure o
tively eliminate the spread of poverty and
failure itself enable other aspects of Heg
"solving" the problem of poverty would
thought? In the next section, I argue that t
the threat of the rabble as the dialectical c
sovereignty, Hegel reveals that modern p
internal development, and not just the ex

How the Rabble Serves Ethical Life

The failure of civil society and the state to eliminate poverty has long pre
sented an interpretive aporia for Hegel's readers, insofar as the persistence of
poverty appears to undermine Hegel's philosophy of actualized freedom. The
aporia dissolves, however, when we consider what ends are served, with
regard to the actualization of freedom, by leaving the problem of poverty
unsolved. In this section, I argue that the unsolved problem of poverty earns
its place in Hegel's social philosophy by making possible the ethical state's
achievement of internal sovereignty and, more generally, the organic unity of
the ethical community.
For Hegel, sovereignty is the highest expression of political organization,
but it is not a property or characteristic that the state can possess entirely on its
own. Rather, sovereignty is a dialectical achievement that must be constantly
realized through the state's "negative relation [Beziehung]" to its 'others'.61
On Hegel's view, the modern state achieves the independence and unity neces
sary for sovereignty by differentiating itself from those entities that, by their
very presence, call into question the autonomy and coherence of the state. In
other words, in order to affirm what it is—an independent and united political
community—the sovereign state must differentiate itself from what it is not.62
Sovereignty thus requires the presence of others that serve as the dialectical
conditions for the state's achievement of "being in and for itself."63
Hegel theorizes two moments of sovereignty, which involve two different
modes of self-differentiation. External sovereignty refers to the state's "indi
viduality [as] an exclusive unit" vis-à-vis other political entities.64 This aspect
of sovereignty is a matter of outward-looking differentiation, through which
the state realizes itself as an independent and determinate individual. In dis
tinction, internal sovereignty refers to "the organization of the state and the

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Whitt 269

process of it
components.
ferentiation,
and rational
require the p
acts of extern
First, the st
maintaining
ence, calls th
state's indepe
individuality
entity that c
another sove
as not itself
entity. With
not realize it
Second, the
ing and main
presence call
a united who
that "the par
and fixed,...
self."68 With
and public au
perform div
end of the w
civic particip
element of t
ally condition
Like externa
relation to an
ethical life—
the state's le
organization
internal sove
sovereignty,
that it has b
bilityof diss
entity capab
name the oth

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270 Political Theory 41(2)

sovereignty, his account of internal sov

requires that there be one, insofar as
negating what is not itself.72
Given Hegel's description of internal
teristics of the other that the state m
tain itself as internally sovereign.
sovereignty should not mislead us into
must be another state, or any entity th
acteristic of internal sovereignty. Ext
dent individuality, and to realize this, th
other that is formally identical but nu
sovereignty is not a matter of individu
second other to be formally identical
ereignty is a matter of coherent unity,
an entity that is fundamentally unlike
ethical life—an entity that manifests a t
Second, because internal sovereignty i
the state "differentiates its moments wi
disorganized other must be internal to
mean that the state's internal other mus
the judiciary, executive, and sovereign p
act of internal differentiation that con
and thus internally sovereign, the stat
scope of those various elements—the f
ratus—that the state organizes in achiev
order to serve as the dialectical condit
internal other must exist within the bou
At the same time, however, the state's
sense other than the unity that the sta
genuinely alien to the whole of the ethic
the community's boundaries, so that the
differentiation that are required for inte
other must manifest a persistent disunit
the state can maintain its internal sover
nance of external sovereignty and d
referring negativity—namely, through
that the role of the immanent other can
tutions of civil society, or the particul
state has achieved internal sovereignty,
unity no longer oppose that unity. By c

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Whitt 271

continue to m
ethical life. A
ence which c
and not just m
within the bo
differentiatio
Finally, inte
too must be o
achieved by
disposition"
dutifulness,
stance."76 Fa
subjectivity i
in which ind
nity as the b
and maintain
interior alien
internal othe
In short, for
internal oth
dency that h
ethical comm
coherence to
version of th
ate itself, as
this unity in
opposed to it
gate, unorga
movement a
rous and terr
the internal
In his discus
other that th
Sittlichkeit.
unification o
haunts the p
the rational
aries of the
Three consid
state's intern

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272 Political Theory 41(2)

unlike the organic unity of the state. T

the state; rather, it is the negation of th
with internal sovereignty. Second, in
unity in its composition, the rabble reb
ethical life in its affect and actions; it is
counterforce to the achievement of in
importantly, the rabble persists as the
moment of opposition within the ethi
dates for the state's internal other—say
the self-serving members of the moder
erness negated by the dialectical unific
the rabble remains permanently and act
state, for reasons described earlier: the
Hegel's own account, to incorporate the
community. This failure enables the rab
ence in relation to the state, continually m
sovereignty's negative relation, while st
the ethical community and the scope of
tion of internality and otherness is wha
order to affirm and maintain itself as in
To put the point more finely, the state
because of all of those features that ma
erty more generally, so aporetic for He
outstanding problem within Hegel's poli
only internal threat to the coherence of
cisely this unique status that makes th
tion of the community's one unresolved
that the state confronts in actualizing
community as a whole. In much the sam
the rabble facilitate the external develo
driving colonization, they also facilitate
munity by occasioning the actualization
but this time more deeply, ethical
unsolved problem—is made to serve the
being a defective moment within Hegel
ble is the unwilling guarantor of the e
tion. Hegel's philosophical system cann
some of Hegel's readers, and perhaps H
the persistence of the impoverished rabb
system itself.

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 Whitt 273

Crises and Constitution

This interpretation can be supported by the relation that Hegel draws

between sovereignty and states of emergency or crisis. He writes, "But in a
situation of crisis—whether internal or external—it is around the simple
concept of sovereignty that the organism and all the particular spheres of
which it formerly consisted rally, and it is to this sovereignty that the salva
tion of the state is entrusted."79 For Hegel, political emergencies test the
vitality of states and provide occasions for the "idealism which constitutes
sovereignty" to be actualized.80 Hegel's thought privileges two different
states of crisis: the external threat of war and the internal threat of the rabble.
Hegel's remarks on war are well known. States achieve their external sov
ereignty (individuality) by differentiating themselves from other states, and
war provides an ideal occasion for this negation. Indeed, the external crisis of
war is so beneficial to external sovereignty that some states will, in times of
peace, "generate opposition and create an enemy" in order to have "occasion
for action abroad."81 Hegel notes that actual war may be unnecessary for the
realization of a state's individuality; the threat of war is enough to facilitate
the salutary confrontation.82 Thus, even if no external agitation is readily
available, the state may continually manufacture external threats in order to
continually realize its external sovereignty.
The internal threat of the rabble facilitates internal sovereignty in an analo
gous way. In "The German Constitution," Hegel argues that a "mass of iso
lated estates . .. might freely come together in times of danger or emergency
and thereby constitute a state and a political power out of their separate powers
in order to meet the current need."83 Although Hegel acknowledges that both
internal and external crises might serve political constitution, he notes that
German unity in the face of external opposition has been fleeting.84 However,
he immediately indicates that unity might be better accomplished by emulat
ing European states that have achieved internal sovereignty by "pacifying and
uniting those elements which fermented within them and threatened to destroy
the state."85 In other words, the various components of German society might
achieve political coherence in a state constitution—that is, in an internally
sovereign state—by confronting the threat posed by an internal other.
These historical observations are given philosophical form in the
Philosophy of Right. Hegel positions the rabble's growth as a structurally
guaranteed internal crisis that the state confronts in order to actualize the
organic unity of the ethical community. Through the constant proliferation of
need, civil society motivates the realization of individual freedom in the ethi
cal state and, simultaneously, engenders the rebelliously indignant masses of

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274 Political Theory 41(2)

poor. This double-movement ensures th

"the state itself stands on an insecure
move that is characteristic of Hegel's
vides the condition for the state's fulle
nation of the rabble not only provoke
the state—which fail—but also motivat
of the ethical community that are no
from the state's promise of actualized f
continually resecures its footing, and e
by producing and opposing the crisis of
This provides a final layer of signific
"agitates and torments" modem society.8
ethical community, but it does so like w
movement of the winds preserves the se
nent calm would produce, and which a
would produce among peoples."88 Like
crisis of poverty threatens the stability
threat spurs the unification of the rest
constitution, ultimately conditioning—in
limiting—the actualization of freedom in

Hegel's Critical Theory of t

I have argued that the unsolved problem
within Hegel's philosophical descriptio
drives the external reproduction of t
Second, it enables the internal sovereig
rebellious rabble that serves as the state
the state can realize itself as the unity o
earns the unsolved problem of poverty
not offer a solution to the problem of
erty is a condition of possibility of the
On this reading, poverty both enable
freedom in the ethical state. On one ha
alized in the internally sovereign state
realized through the state's ongoing o
persistent poverty makes possible the
hand, because persistent poverty is a co
also limits the actualization of freedo
poverty enables ethical life to fulfill i

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Whitt 275

that this fulf

cal communit
freedom is fu
whom that fr
This interpre
by appealing
Hegel's concer
concern for t
reading his p
defense, of th
for its own u
network of n
apparatuses, w
taining appall
something pa
institutions.90
here, the Phil
justice to Heg
frilly satisfy
By emphasizi
of Right as a
rationality of
testament to
problem—its
fulfillment of
or incomplete
vention consi
social
order an
freedom cann
ongoing oppo
ical
critique t
to be self-lim
of the Philoso
One of Hegel
feasible only
of history—w
nated, but on
philosophy co
what is—the
Nevertheless,

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 276 Political Theory 41(2)

the rational form of what exists, it also

nal form, which only become apparent
tracing the rational form of the ethi
rational purpose of that community co
the rabble, Hegel demonstrates reason
order. For Hegel, that is as much as p
already a deeply critical accomplishme

Conclusion: Internal Outsiders

in Post-Hegelian Critical Theory
Read as a critique, Hegel's political philosophy denies the universality of
freedom in a social order where individual self-interest and the demands of
collective life are ostensibly reconciled by mediating individuality, social
standing, and political representation through a particular system of eco
nomic interdependence. This opens a number of critical avenues that can be
productive for contemporary analyses of social and political inequality. To
conclude, I will highlight just one in order to clarify Hegel's relation to
political theory today.
Hegel is widely considered a critic of the liberal social contract tradition,
and my earlier arguments suggest an additional layer to his familiar critique.
For modem social contract theories, the benefits of membership in a legiti
mate polity become attainable and meaningful through a single axis of differ
entiation. These benefits—usually freedom and equality—are only realized
within the association of contractors. Whatever remains outside of this asso
ciation—be it a temporal, spatial, civic, or natural exterior—does not enjoy
the benefits that the contractors receive. Thus, the association of contractors is
founded and legitimated in opposition to whatever it excludes, and the benefits
of association are attained, enjoyed, and signified in contradistinction to their
absence outside the scope of the association. By privileging this single inside
outside axis of differentiation, modem contract theory can give the false
impression that all members enjoy the benefits of association equally, and in
equal opposition to nonmembers.
As I read his critical theory of the ethical state, Hegel preserves this
inside-outside axis of differentiation, but also acknowledges a second axis
within the political association—namely, the division between the impover
ished rabble and the rest of society. For Hegel, the political association is
founded and legitimated through opposition to, and differentiation from, not
only what it excludes but also some of what it includes—the internal remain
ders of ethical life. By doubling and internalizing the axis of normative

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 Whitt 277

differentiati
his readers w
bers of the a
the borders
the association.
To be clear, the upshot of Hegel's thought is not simply that political ben
efits are distributed unequally throughout the interior of the ethical-political
community. Rather, Hegel shows that, within a particular form of ethical
political community, political benefits gain their content, substance, and sig
nificance partly by virtue of their unequal distribution among persons who, as
members of the same community, have an equal claim to those benefits.
According to his critical analysis, the ethical state can actualize freedom only
if it maintains internal sovereignty, and this in turn requires the persistent
presence of an impoverished and unfree underclass. At the level of individual
lives, this means that citizens who are not excluded and alienated from the
unity of ethical life realize their own freedom only on the condition that other
citizens are impoverished, alienated, and unfree. Thus, the state not only fails
to universally actualize freedom but, what is more, the freedom that it does
actualize gains its significance from its particularistic and unequal distribu
tion throughout the community.
Put bluntly, this is the further lesson of Hegel's analysis of the productive
role of poverty in the ethical state: My own freedom may be made possible
and defined, not only in contradistinction to those who are not my cocitizens,
and so have not been promised the same freedom, but also in contradistinction
to those who are my cocitizens—my neighbors who have been formally
promised, but substantively denied, the very freedom that I enjoy. This is a
lesson that social contract theory cannot easily entertain. Nevertheless, it is
crucial to understanding forms of social inequality across a variety of institu
tional contexts. For instance, Carole Pateman has demonstrated that ideals of
freedom and equality gain their particular content in liberal societies by virtue
of a male-female axis of differentiation, according to which males enjoy polit
ical freedom and equality in ways that are denied their female co-citizens.95 Or
again, Charles Mills has shown that, in purportedly liberal societies, the free
dom of whites has been deeply conditioned, in theory and practice, by its
direct comparison to the unfree condition of nonwhites.96 Behind these analy
ses stands Hegel, whose remarks on poverty, sovereignty, and freedom remind
us that the unequal distribution of political goods within a community is
essential, not only to the particular ways that those goods are enjoyed but also
to the actual constitution—and so also the potential transformation—of the
community itself.

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 278 Political Theory 41(2)

Acknowledgments

I thank Mary Dietz and two anonymous rev

recommendations. I am especially indebte
Jens Frederiksen for guidance with early v

Declaration of Conflicting Interest

The author declared no potential conflicts
authorship, and/or publication of this artic

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica
tion of this article.

Notes

1. G. W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy ofRight, trans. H. Nisbet (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1991 ), 11,21. Hereafter PR. References to the main
body of the Philosophy of Right are cited according to section number (PR, §#);
the letter Z will indicate an addition (Zusatz). References to Hegel's preface are
cited according to page number (PR, #).
2. Hegel, PR, §244Z. Cf. Hegel, Die Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, in
Werke VII, ed. E. Moldenhauer and K. Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1970), §244Z.
3. "This is the only time in his system where Hegel raises a problem—and leaves it
open." Shlomo Avineri, Hegel s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cam
bridge University Press, 1972), 154. For similar assessments, see Richard Tei
chgraeber, "Hegel on Property and Poverty," Journal of the History of Ideas 38
(1977): 47-64; Allen Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), 248-50; Michael Hardimon, Hegel's Social Philoso
phy: The Project of Reconciliation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1994), 244-45; Ian Fraser, "Speculations on Poverty in Hegel's Philosophy of
Right," The European Legacy 1 (1996): 2055-68; Dominico Losurdo, Hegel and
the Freedom of the Moderns (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 177-9;
Michael Allen, "Hegel Between Non-Domination and Expressive Freedom:
Capabilities, Perspectives, Democracy," Philosophy and Social Criticism 32
(2006), 502; Michael Feola, "Truth and Illusion in the Philosophy of Right: Hegel
and Liberalism," Philosophy & Social Criticism 36 (2010): 582, n.20.
4. Joel Anderson, "Hegel's Implicit View on How to Solve the Problem of Pov
erty: The Responsible Consumer and the Return of the Ethical to Civil Society,"
in Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism, ed. R. Williams (Albany: SUNY

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 Whitt 279

Press, 2001),
Haven: Yale U
5. Alexander K
to the Poor,"
"The Problem
George's Theo
ogy 56 (1997)
6. For Marx's
State," in Earl
1992), 57-198.
erty," 60-64;
"Leaving the
of Poverty in
Rabble: An In
2011) is an esp
able contribut
Because Ruda'
I do not incor
"Indigence, In
& Event (forth
7. Throughout
of the individu
8. Hegel, PR,
9. Ibid., 21.
10. Ibid., §195, §238,
11. Ibid., §199; cf. §197-98.
12. Ibid., §187-99, §204, §238.
13. Ibid., §195.
14. Ibid., §195. See also §187, §192, §192Z, §196, §243-45.
15. "The emergence of poverty is in general a consequence of civil society, and on
the whole it arises necessarily out of it." Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts: Die
Vorlseung von 1819/20 in einer Nachschrift, ed. D. Heinrich (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1983), 194-6. Cited translation by A. Wood in PR, 453-54 at 453.
Hereafter VPR19b. See also Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Sci
ence: Heidelberg 1817-1818 with Additions from the Lectures of 1818-1819,
trans. J. Stewart and P. Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995),
§118. Hereafter VPR17. See also Avineri, Hegel's Theory, 96-97. For Hegel's
link between natural difference, social inequality, and poverty in PR, see §200,
§241, §243-44.
16. Hegel, PR, §195, 244-45.

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280 Political Theory 41(2)

17. Ibid., §201, 207, 252-53, 301Z. On the

Ibid., §300-15.1 discuss the corporations
18. Ibid., §207Z; Hegel, VPR19b, 194-96
19. Hegel, Jaener Realphilosophie II: Die V
(Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1967), 2
97. Hereafter JPRII. Cf. PR, §244-45.
20. Hegel, PR, §244.
21. Hegel, VPR17, §118.
22. Hegel, PR, §244.
23. Hegel, JRII, 232-33; VPRI7, §118; V
24. Hegel, VPR19b, 194—96; PR, §244; em
25. Hegel, VPR19b, 194-96. Elsewhere, H
indignation is the affective counterpart o
tive will" of undialectical Verstand, which
and views "every content as a limitation
26. Versions of this interpretation appea
remarks on poverty. See Avineri, Hegel s
Hegel's Social Philosophy, Frederick Ne
Theory (Cambridge: Harvard Universit
Property and Poverty"; Wood, Hegel's Et
alization of freedom does indeed remain
loose end that other commentators take i
27. Hegel, PR, §303, §302.
28. Hegel, "On the English Reform Bill,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres
29. Hegel describes social inequality as "a
the element of inequality," and he charac
resources, and education as "remnants of
(PR, §200). Cf. Losurdo, Hegel, 178.
30. Michael Hardimon argues that this ki
the problem of poverty. Hardimon, Heg
31. Versions of this interpretation appear
cism of Hegel; see note 6, above. For st
theorist of rebellion, see Dieter Henrich,
in Verwirklichung," in Hegel, VPRI9, 2
the Right of Rebellion," History of Polit
32. Hegel, VPR19b, 194-96. Elsewhere, He
and, as far as the disposition is concerned
destruction of the state, as has been wi
Revolution. PR, §272. To be sure, the situ

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Whitt 281

not identical t
not be conflat
by their simil
violently oppo
links between
negative under
33. Axel Honne
and criminalit
MA: Polity Pr
between indiv
disposition and
34. Hegel, VP
du marché: Le
Louvain 103 (
political threat
cally organize
35. Hegel, PR,
36. Hegel, PR
37. Hegel, PR
38. Hegel, VP
39. Hegel, PR,
40. Hegel, PR,
in "Feature B
losophy of Ri
41. Hegel, PR
42. Avineri ex
nomic activity,
it; but if he b
tion between
of mediation a
would collapse
43. Hegel, PR
44. Ibid., §237
remains subjec
bers have been
state. Ibid., §2
45. Ibid., § 25
46. Ibid., PR,
47. See Franco
Axel Honneth

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 282 Political Theory 41(2)

to the problem of poverty. Honneth, T

Hegel's Social Theory (Princeton: Prince
48. Hegel, PR, §253.
49. Hegel, VPR17, §118; PR, §244. Teichg
argument in "Hegel on Property and Pove
50. Hegel, PR, §252, §241.
51. Ibid., §246-48.
52. Hegel, PR, §248Z. See also Hegel, VPR
is too poor to be able to maintain its ow
means that civil society is too rich.... T
thus reaches beyond its frontiers, initiall
colonies."

53. Hegel, VPR17, §120; VPR19a, 208.

54. Hegel, PR, §248.
55. Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti and Universal History (Pittsburgh: University
of Pittsburgh Press, 2009).
56. Hegel, ERB, 248, italics added. See also Teichgraeber, "Hegel on Property and
Poverty," 62, and Franco, Hegel s Philosophy of Freedom, 273-74.
57. Hegel, VPR17, §120; PR, §248Z.
58. Hegel, PR, §248.
59. Teichgraeber, "Hegel on Property and Poverty," 59. By arguing that poverty may
function productively within Hegel's system, I mean to claim that it enables other
elements of his system, not that it has salutary effects.
60. In this regard, the dialectic of colonization and independence gives historical
expression to Hegel's logical concept of "bad infinity," in which superficial limits
are overcome without any genuine mediation. Hegel, Hegel's Logic: Part I of the
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. W. Wallace (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1975), §94Z. Hereafter EL. See also PR, §22, §22Z. I owe this
point to Joel Anderson, "Hegel's Implicit View," 192-93.
61. Hegel, PR, §323.
62. This does not mean that the state's others are merely momentary sites of opposi
tion, to be finally overcome in the realization of sovereignty. Insofar as sover
eignty must be maintained as well as achieved, the opposition between the state
and its others must be ongoing. The otherness of the state's others is preserved
through the state's act of differentiation.
63. Ibid., §331. It is tempting to describe the state's achievement of sovereignty
vis-à-vis its others in terms of recognition. Indeed, immediately after discussing
internal and external sovereignty, Hegel turns to the subject of international rela
tions, where he invokes the idiom of recognition between states. However, when
theorizing internal and external sovereignty directly, in §260-329, Hegel does not

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 Whitt 283

use the idiom

its others. Mo
Phenomenolog
is because rel
states, insofa
in PR are not
reviewer for
tion, I here f
See note 72,
64. Ibid., §27
65. Ibid.

66. Ibid., §278, §321.

67. Ibid., §322. See also §278.
68. Ibid., §278. See also §279, §286, §321.
69. Ibid, §279.
70. Ibid, §289.
71. Ibid, §286, §321.
72. PR, §278. Here, Hegel explicitly invokes his earlier statement that the self or "T
determines itself in so far as it is the self-reference of negativity," where nega
tivity is to be understood as an act of differentiation, in which the self is distin
guished from what is not it (PR, §7). The Zusatz to this section clarifies the role of
the other in this process: "Here, we are not one-sidedly within ourselves, but will
ingly limit ourselves with reference to an other, even while knowing ourselves in
this limitation as ourselves" (PR, §7Z). This general pattern is maintained in the
internally sovereign state's self-reference: it comes to know itself as sovereign
through its negative, limiting, and differentiating reference to its other.
73. See ibid, §278-81; §290Z; §302Z.
74. Ibid, §331, §271. On the link between internal legitimacy and internal sover
eignty, see §290Z.
75. Hegel, "On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, on Its Place in Practical
Philosophy, and Its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Right," in Political Writ
ings, 146. Hereafter AT,
76. Hegel, PR, §268, §301, §289.
77. Ibid, § 268.
78. Ibid, §302, §303. See also §264-65, §270.
79. Ibid, §278.
80. Ibid.

81. Ibid, §324Z, 334.

82. Ibid, §335.
83. Hegel, "The German Constitution," in Political Writings, 72. Hereafter GC.

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 284 Political Theory 41(2)

84. Ibid., 72-76.

85. Ibid., 77, italics added.
86. Hegel, PR, §265.
87. Ibid., §244Z.
88. Hegel, NL, 141. A well-known repetit
89. This interpretive strategy also enable
that Hegel assigns to war and colonialis
have had serious concerns. On war, se
losophy: A Systematic Reading of the Phi
University Press, 2009), 114—28. On c
Haiti.

90. See Honneth, Pathologies of Individual Freedom. Pace Honneth, I read Hegel
as intensifying, rather than abandoning, his critical diagnosis in Part III of the
Philosophy of Right.
91. Moreover, it is the rationality of the existing social order that makes it susceptible
to philosophical criticism in the first place. In the Philosophy of Right's famous
Doppelsatz, Hegel identifies "what is actual"—that is, existing phenomena in
general, and political phenomena in particular—with "what is rational," effec
tively giving himself permission to use philosophy's interrogation of reason as
a means of social criticism. Hegel, PR, 20. Because the actual is rational, Hegel
can use roughly the same critical method in the Philosophy of Right as he does in
the Phenomenology—namely the method of revealing internal limitations within
successive forms of reason's existence. For a compelling defense of this reading
of the Doppelsatz, see Robert Stem, "Hegel's Doppelsatz: A Neutral Reading,"
Journal of the History of Philosophy 44 (2006): 235-66. See also Steven Smith,
"Hegel's Idea of a Critical Theory," Political Theory 15 (1987): 99-126.
92. Cf. Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought, 255. Diverging from Wood's interpretation,
I emphasize that the limit in question is an internal and necessary limit, because
it is a condition of possibility of that which it limits, namely actualized freedom
within the social order.

93. Hegel, PR, preface, p. 23

94. Ibid.

95. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1988).
96. Charles Mills, The Racial Contract (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).

Author Biography
Matt S. Whitt is an Instructor of Philosophy at Warren Wilson College. He earned
his PhD in Philosophy from Vanderbilt University in 2010. In addition to his interests
in Hegel and Marx, his research focuses on theories of sovereignty, problems of
political exclusion, and democracy's boundaries.

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