RECHERCHES FUBuEES SOUS (A DIRECTION. DE LINSTHUT OE LETIRES ORIENTALES OF BEYRQUTH SERIE I; PENSEE ARABE ET MUSULMANE, Tome XXXI I FATHALLA KHOLEIF MA. (Alex), PAD. (Cama) “Lecnte in Philosophy, lerendria Univrty and Beirat Amb Univesity A STUDY ON FAKHR AL-DIN AL-RAZI AND HIS CONTROVERSIES IN TRANSOXIANA DAR EL-MACHREQ EDITEURS BEYROUTH, 1966I — PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD AND THE FOURTH QUESTIONS ‘Making to Be’ and ‘Made to Be’ Takwin, Mukawwan ‘More perplexing than any other problem in the study of theology is the problem of the Divine Attributes. This problem had bécn widely discussed to such a degree that we even find theology called at times \ethe science of the Unity of God and His Attributes'.” The controversy about this problem has been intense not only between the deniers of the additional attributes* and those who assert them, but also among the asserters. themselves. Nothing reveals this more than thé controversy which arose between Razi and his opponents concerning the attribute of ‘Making to Be’ Takwin. Both parties asserted the additional attri- utes. In their opinion, God knows by knowledge or ‘God knows and possesses knowledge’, and His knowledge is an eternal quality addi- tional to His essence, subsisting in His essence, and it is neither His cesserice nor other than His essence, The samie is true for His omnipotence, __ will, life, hearing, seeing and speech, All those who are in favour of the 1 Agitid, ps. 2 ‘The Mu'tasilah and the Falasfak deny the additional attributes. See Mal, Vok 1, p. 585 Iedén, pp. 128, 180; Lawn, pp. 16,17,18; Naat, pp. 250-51. + Maturidi prefers to say that God knows and possesses knowledge sitaply from the fear that the use of “by” might lead us to regard Imowledge as an instrument by which He knows, See Matutdt's Connentay, p. 19. + Sec for instance how Ghazilt and, Ibn Taymiyyah interpret this statement, Iplsid, p. O43 Rasi?il wa I-Mas@il, vol. 1, p. 112.90 FAKMR AL-DIN AL-RAZE additional attributes are agreed on these seven attributes! which are known as the abstract qualities or the attributes of essence’. However, they differ over the assertion of other additional attri- butes®, among them that of Takwin which the opponents of Razi, the earned people of Transoxiana who belonged to the Hanafi and Maturidi school, asserted as an additional attribute‘; in spite of the fact that it is not considered in their opinion as an attribute of essence, but is regarded as an attribute of action’, Like the early orthodox Sunnite and Tradi- tionists they do not differentiate between these two classes of attributes, for both of them are eternal attributes subsisting in His essence®. Ash‘ari, being influenced by the Mu‘tazila, does uphold the view that the attri- utes of essence are eternak but the attributes of action are temporal’. Razi, like the eponym of his school, considered Takzoin a temporal and relational attribute Sif. Nisbiyya renewed with the renewal of actions like all the attributes of action’. ‘This is the fundamental difference between Razi and his opponents regarding the attribute of Takwin. All other differences between them arise simply from this substantial difference, Thus the Mituridites distinguished between Takwin and Mukawwan by considering Takwin as an eternal attribute subsisting in the essence of God and Mukawwan asa temporal object which does not subsist in the essence of God?, Likewise, 2 Mavégif, vol. 2, p. 964, 2 This is a linguistic diference only. Compare Tambid, p. 262; Iskdé, p. 96; Lawini', p. 24; Maurits Commentary, - 18,19. 2 Mawizify vol, 2, p. 364, 4 Meawigi, vol. 2, p: 3873 ‘Agaid, p, 80, 87,803 Tabyiratal-Adilok Ms, Bidayah Ms; Mubogsal, p. 1885 Me‘dlin, p. 51, 5 AL-Figh al-Akbor, ps 9 8 Al-Pigh al-Atbar, pp. 35, 963 Igdim, p. 81; al-Rast'd wa 1-Masd'd, vol. 3, p. 118, 1 Maturides Commentary, ps 18. * Lawdmi', 25, 275 Mubageal, p. 195. * ALFigh al-Ather, pp. 35, 16; ‘Aga'id, pp. 87, 91; Tabsirat al-Adilah Ma.; Bidiyat Ms.commuererasies 1 in their opinion, the eternity of Takiin does not entail the eternity of Mukawwoan because Takoin was not such as to bring about Mukazewan in eternity; for the attribute of Takwin was to bring about the existence of Mukawwan at a specific time according to, God’s will. and. knowledge’, But according to R&zi the eternity of Takwin does entail the eternity of Mukawwan for he always considered Takwin as a’ mere relationship, and relationships entail the existence of the related things*. Therefore had Takwin been an eternal quality it would have entailed that Mukawwoan was. eternal®, Similarly Takwin is not a quality. (Ma‘nd) beyond Mukawwan, but it is \Mukawwan itself; for Takwin is something relative which appears in the mind through the relationship between the Creator and the created‘. Takvin is not a real quality externally opposed to Mukawioan, even if the intellect has to distinguish between the concept of Takin and the concept of Mukawwan in order to unders- stand the relationship between them®. But this is. solely a conceptual distinction and there is no distinction outside the intellect, because what exists in the external world is only the Creator and the created, and Takwin is merely our perception of the relationship between them®, Since Takwin is a relationship and relationships exist only when the things related exist, the temporality of Mukawwan necessitates the temporality of Takwin’. . It is clear that the. distinction between Talwin and Mukawwan which the Maturidites thought was the basis of the differences between them and those who opposed them in this question is in fact derivative from the fundamental difference which we have referred to — I mean 1X Tawhtd Ms.; Tabsirat al-Adillah Ms.; Bidiyak Ms. = Lmvdni', p. 27. ® Ibid, p. 27 Ibid, pe 2 5 Ibid, p. 27 © Bid, p. 27 + Ibid, p. 27; Massa, ps 188.C7} FAKE AL-DIN AL-RAZi { here that Takwin in the opinion of the Maturidites is a real attribute, while in the opinion of Razi it is a relational attribute, The problem which now arises is the reason for this disagreement. Apart from their difference over the attributes of action, the real reason for this goes back to their difference over the attribute of omnipotence; not on the question of whether it is an attribute of essence, eternal and subsisting in the essence of God — on this there was agreement between both parties — but on the question of the fimction of omni- potence’, The Matiridites confined the function of omnipotence to the connection (To'allug) with the potential existence of the created, but does not effect the actual coming into being of the created from non+ existence; for that is the function of Takwin®, The author of the Tabsirah says, “We do not say that the world came into existence after having been non-existent through an attribute other than Takwie which is ‘omnipotence. This is because omnipotence necessitates that its object should be contingent, it does not necessitate its actual existence. If it id necessitate its actual existence it would be Tahwin for Takwoin necessi- tates actual existence, but what is subjected to omnipotence does not necessarily exist?; and for this’ reason the non-existent is subjected to omnipotence. If actual existence came about through omnipotence there would be no need for us to assert creation and Talwin, and God would be omnipotent over the world without being its Creator.” He says also in another piace, “ow could bringing into being arise from omnipotence? It arises from Takwin and omnipotence is what makes the act of the Agent voluntary, not involuntary.®” 1 ‘Tritton and Macdonald did not mention this difference among the differences ‘which exist between the views of Maturidites and Ash‘arites, See Tassos; Muilin theology, pp. 174-76; Macclonald; Development of Muslin theology, pp. 198, 318-18. * Tabyival al-Adillah Ms, Bidéyah Ms, * Compar® the arguments given by Rixi in Mofatth al-Ghaib, vol. 1, p. 72, in favour of the opinion of the Matudites, ‘ LAdillah Ms,‘coxnumser Aas 93 It is clear that the cause of this free will, or the canse of God’s ‘omnipotence, is contingency which arises through the essence of the contingent, because if things were necessary or impossible omnipotence over them would be denied. Thus, according to the Maturidites omni- potence is not an attribute which determines or affects the potential existence of the created and its contingency, because this contingency arises from its essence. Therefore, Sabin was mistaken when, in his dispute with Razi, he said that omnipotence determined the potential ‘existence of the created}, Perhaps this mistake of Sabiini and his failure to distinguish between these two subtle concepts, ie. that omnipotence has connection with the potential existence of the created, and that ‘omnipotence determines the potential existence of the created and effects it, was the cause of his hesitation and confusion in his debate with Razi. It is strange that $abini who studied the Tabsirah should have made such a mistake®, If we did not know that Razi used to formulate the objections of his opponents in the most precise terms*, we would have thought that the attribution of this opinion to Sabini was a deliberate distortion arising from the nature of debate in the presence of a crowd, and Razi’s use of all the means at his disposal to defeat his opponents. But Razi genuinely believed this to be the opinion of the Maturidites, because he attributed it to them in the Mufassal*. Tisi corrected him on this point, asserting that Maturidites conceived omnipotence as an attribute which has connection with the potential existence of the created, and does not determine the potential existence of the created®. ‘This connection of the omnipotence with the potential existence of the created was agreed on by both parties*, The issue at stake was the ‘Mandzardt, the third Question, pp. 39-43. Abid; the Fifth Question, pp. 45-46. Nikiyat olUgil fz Ditdyat al-Ueil Ma; Tarjim, p. 88. Muhassal, p. 135, Talks, p. 135, Talgrat al-Adilah Ms; Arbain, p. 237.of FARHR AteDIY At-RAAT connection of omnipotence with the actual coriting into being of the creat~ ed. The Maiuridites denied that omnipotence had this connection and made actual coming into being a function of Takwint, whereas Razi connected it with omnipotence®. The point here for R&zi is that this connection is conditioned on the conjunction of God’s will and knowledge, in the sense that what God knows will exist and wills to exist comes into being through His omnipotence®, Takin is nothing more than the ‘connection between omnipotence and its object at the time of God’s will to create it‘, Therefore it is a temporal and relational attribute. For Razi omnipotence has two kinds of connection: one of them is its connec~ tion: with the potential existence of the created which is eternal, ang the other executive temporal connection (Ta‘allug Tanjici Hadith)’. In hhis opinion Takwin is this exccutive temporal connection which is itself the bringing of things into being, Therefore, it is meaningless and pointless to assert Takwin as an additional and real attribute when omnipotence is the determi ing attribute in the creation of things*. It seems to me that when Mituridites strip omnipotence of its cfiectiveness, what they do is to deny one of its fimctions and argue about part of its essence because omnipotence, as normally understood, includes in its meaning that which enables the agent to act and through which the action takes place’, It is also by its essence the attribute which relates to the choice (Iki) between action and inaction; its relation ship to action and inaction is the same except that when will s conjoined to it tips the scale in favour of action, Thus Razi’s view of omnipotence Tabsirat al-Adilah Ms., Bidyeh Ms, Lawini', p. 25; Muhaygal, p. 135; Matalin, p. 51, Ghaib, vol. 1, p. 713 vol. 2, Compare Igéam, pp. 41, 425 Arba't, p. 147. Mubassel, p. 185, Aréatin, p. M47. Mubassal, p. 116, 118, Me'alim, p. 51; Muhasral, p. 1955 Ghaib, vol. 1, p. 713 vol. 2, p. 56. Iatisad,-p. 39. eeae eB awcommen rane 8 and its function, like that of his fellow Ash‘arites* before him, is in accord ance with the essence of omnipotence and its true function. In the light of these fundamental differences we are in a position to discuss the arguments of both parties. We shall see that these differences. aré the immediate matters of the arguments of R&zi. In the case of the ‘Maturidites, although their arguments are more concerned with derivative problems such as the cternity of Takwin and its distinction from Makamoan, yet in the last resort their arguments go back to the same fimdamental differences. In the Mé'alim Razi says, “Some of the jurists of Transoxiana hold ‘that the attribute of Tabhlig® ‘creative act’ is distirict from the attribute of omnipotence, where as the majority hold otherwise, T have some objections to advance: First, if the effectiveness of the attribute of omnipotence is voluntary, and if the effectiveness of Takhlig is also voluntary, then this latter attribute is itself omnipotence®, If the effective ness of Takhlig is necessary, then God acts by necessity and not by choice Ikkiiyér which is false, Likewise since God is described as Omni- potent, His actions must be voluntary; but since He is also described by the attribute of Takhlig His actions must proceed by necessity as well, which is absurd. Similarly, if omnipotence is effective, then the coming into being of the éreated through omnipotence is not impossible, There- fore it is not possible to infer this attribute Takhitg from the temporal production of the thing, If omnipotence is not effective, then omnipo- tence would not be omnipotence, which is absurd. Again if this Takhlig ‘was an eternal attribute, it would necessitate the eternity of the creatures + Igdam, p. 41. 2 Takhlag and. Takuin have & common concept which is the bringing of a thing into existence. We have other word af the sort such as Ji, Lod Insi’ Zdth Iti, ‘Sur. However, each term indicates a different meaning though itis too subtle. See Ghaib, vol. 1, p. 723 Maghniseui’s Commenter, p. 35. 2 “Here I correct the toxt hecanse itis not correc to say, “Then this latter attri bute is distinct fom omnipotence.” Compare Gla, vol. 1, p- 71 Mubayl, p. 135. Rech, 32896 PARR AL-DIN AL-RKZI and if it was temporal it would itself have been created which would entail a regression to infinity.” It is obvious that the presupposition of all these arguments is that omnipotence is an attribute effective in bringing the created into exist- ence, and that Takblig or Takwtn is a relational attribute which consists in the creation of things, However, since the Maturldites distinguished the effectiveness of omnipotence from that of Takwin these arguments do not affect their position. In the same way the argument of Razi that God acts by necessity does not touch them, because when they say that the attribute of Takwin is effective by necessity, they do not mean that God was compelled to create, but that, when He wills the existence, of anything, it becomes necessary; otherwise impotence would be entail- ed®, Thus the necessity of the existence of the created is not prior to God's. will but consequent on it*, This is to. say that the connection of Takwin with the existence of the created is voluntary, but its effective. ness is necessary. In other terms, Mituridites asserted Takwin to be a real and additional attribute which has two connections like all other additional attributes. In this case, they do not attribute to one agent both activity by necesity and activity by volition as Razi imagines here, and in his debate with “Qadi Ghaznah”, because the volitional aspect is distinct from the necessary aspect. God is not active through both necessity and volition in the same respect in such a way as to entail contradiction, Likewise it is not necessary to combine two in- independent attributes in activity with reference to the same object, since according to the Maturidites omnipotence refers to something different from Takin’. We have said that the arguments of the Maturidites are concerned with the eternity of Takin and its distinction from Mukawwan. On these 1 Matalin, pp. 51, 82. © Tewid Ms.; Tabyvatal-Adilah Ms. Talks, p. 138, 3 Taltts, p. 135, + Tallis, p. 135,‘connneseTARIES 7 7 points they have arguments based on oth reason and revelation. They argue for the etértity of Takwin as follows? 1. God deséribes Himself in His eternal words as the Creator’, If this attribute? is not held torbe eternal, then either God must be consider- ‘ed to have lied, or His words must be taken metaphorically in the sense ‘that He will create in the future, or is able to create. This is not admis- sible because Khdlig is a- participle from Khalg like ‘lim from. ‘lim, and the participle is only applicable in the case of one who is actually doing the action in question. It is impossible for Khalig to. mean “able to-create” because the participle from Qadara is Qdir (able) not Khalig “Creator”; and also he who is able to create is not thereby regarded as a “Creator” * just as one who is capable of adultery is not defined as an adulterer 4, 2. ‘The term “Créator’” implies commendation, and if it is not applied to God in eternity but is applied. to Him now, then by His creation He has acquired greater virtue than He had in eternity, which is impossible because God possesses all the attributes of perfection in eternity ®. 3. If Takivin is temporal, then either it subsists in the essence of God, which is the opinion of the Karramiyyah® and is impossible because ‘of the impossibility of the subsistence of temporal qualities in the esserice of God, or it subsists apart from His essence, If it subsists apart from His essence, then either it subsists without location which is the opinion of Tha al-Rawandi and Bishr Thn al-Mu‘tamir, and is not admissible ‘because of the impossibility of the existence of an attribute without 4 This Quan, ‘one of His beautiful names which appears in several verses in the Meaning the attribute of TakhiZg or Tabwin. Tabsivat al~Adillah Ms.; Bidiyah Ms.s *Agiid, p. 88, Bildiyah Ms, Tabsirat al-Adilah Mis. Milal, vol. 1, pp. 147-51; Igdam, p. 1145 Aréattm, p. 118.98 PAKR AL-DIN AL-RAZT location; or it subsists in some place as is the opinion of Aba I-Hudhail al-‘Allaf, who holds that the Takein of everybody subsists in that body. This entails that everybody should bé the creator of itself which is false*. 4, If Takwin is temporal then either it must have arisen from another Takwin — which entails infinite regression? and the impossibility of the creation of the world which is a known fact; or it arose without another Tafwin® in which case the temporal object. is independent of a creator; and this is to deny the existence of the Creator We have two observations to make here. First, that the Maturidites confuse God’s description of Himself as Creator and His action in accord- ‘ance with this attribute, though they are two different concepts. Baqillin? and Ghazili observed this distinction, for Baqillini said that the attri- butes of action are attributes such that God existed before He carried out the actions referred to by these attributes, but God's description cof Himself by these attributes is eternal’, Ghazili has recourse to Aristotle and employs the two Aristotelian concepts of potentiality and actuality for the solution of this problem, “As for the Attributes derived from His actions, such as the Nourisher and the Creator, it was a matter of dispute whether they could be ascribed to Him in eternity or not...; some said that they were always ascribable, since if they were not, then their ascription to Him would imply change, Others held that they were not ascribable; there is no Creation in eternity, so how could He be called Creator? To make this subtle point clear: We call the sword ‘cutting’ both when it is in the scabbard and when it actually cuts, Here it is called “cutting” in two different senses: In the scabbard it is potentially cutting, and when it cuts it is actually 1 Tabsivat al-Adilloh, Ms, Ridiyah, Me This is the doctrine of Mu‘ammar Tpn ‘Abad as-Sulamt, See Magélat, vol. 2, pp. 364, 511 > This is the doctrine of Ab Musa aljMivdar, See Magaiat, vol. 2, p. 51. 4 Tabsirat al-Adilah, Ms., Bidéyoh, Ms, “Agi’id, pp. 88, 89. * Tanltd, pp. 262-68.‘op MN TARIES 99 cutting. What is meant by efilling the sword in the scabbard “cutting” is that the fact it is not actually cutting is not due to any defect in the nature of the sword or its sharpness but to something external. In the same sense that the sword in the scabbard is “cutting”, it is correct to describe God as “Creator” in eternity. When creation actually takes place, this is not duc to anything new in His essence; all the pre-conditions for realisation of the action exist in eternity. On the other hand it is not correct to describe God as “Creator” in eternity in the sense in which the sword is called “cutting” in the actual moment of cutting*” Riazi, however, does not follow his fellow-Ash‘arites in this solution because in this opinion creation cannot be ascribed to God in eternity: the concept of creation is not intelligible apart from the existence of the created; for relationships are subsequent to, not prior to, the existence of the things related, ‘The second observation I wish to make is that the Maturidites differ from the other sects who handled the problem of Talwin and Mukawwan, because they alone asserted Takin to be an eternal attribute subsisting in the essence of God while the Karramiyyah and the Mu‘tazila were agreed on the temporality of Taki but differed as to its location. For this reason it was said that this opinion — i.e, the opinion of the ‘Maturidites —came from the “Highlands” i.e, Bukhara and Samarqand, not from Baghdad®: In spite of this lack of agreement between the Maturidites and the the other sects regarding this attribute, the common basis for all their views was God's command “Be” ¢ ,/s‘y in the Qur’an4 — that Logos which had already occupied the minds of Christian theologians and had + Inte, pp. 72, 73. 2 Lawéini', p. 27. * Tabsirat al~Adillah Ms. This is not only the opinion of M&turidi and Hanafi school but itis also the opinion of Thn Hanbal and the view of the early orthodox Sunnites who do not differentiate beeween the ateributes of essence and the atxibutes of actions. See Igddm, p. 181; al-Rasd'il wa [Masti vol. 8, p. 118. © Mogdlt, vol. 2, pp. 363-86, 509-15,100 BAKER AL-DIN AC-RRZT acquired for them a peculiar metaphysical colouring and had incer- nated itself and become His Son, or God: Himself, Let us now examine Razis' objections to the eternity of Takivin. Rial advances the following objections: - _.L. If Takwin were eternal the created would be eternal; because itis correct to say, before the existence of the created, that the Omnipotent had not yet created it but that He was going to create it; and at the time of the coming into being of the object of omnipotence, it is correct to say He has created it, Therefore the concept of creation is not intelii- gibel except when the created exists. So if creation is eternal, the created must be eternal, and that is impossible, because eternity is a negation of having a beginning and ‘Creation’ implies a beginning, so the com- bination of them is absurd®, 2. If creation is an eternal attribute, it would be necessary to His essence, so His essence would necessitate, this attribute which in turn would necessitate the existence of the created; and what is necessitated by the necessary is itself necessary, so. the existence of the created is necessary to His essence, without choice, and Almighty God would not be a free Agent but would act by necessity. ‘This is clearly the opinion of the Falavifa and the ruin of Islam®, The second objection is the focus of his argument with Qadi Ghainah4. Tt is obvious that by these two objections Razi accuses the Maturidites of blasphemy since he argues that they must hold the view that the world is cternal and that God acts by necessity. It seems to me. that Razi’s arguments are irrelevant for these reasons: 2 Milal, vol. 2, pp. 60-68; The Holy Bibl, the Gospel according to John, p..1035 The Nuw English Bible, the Gospel according to John, p,50. * Lawani', p. 27. “ * Lawéni’, p. 27; Ma‘élim, p. 513 Mubastal, p. 135; Ghaib, vol. 1, p. Tl, vol. 2 P. 56. 4 AMinazardt, the Fourth Question, pp. 13-45.conmeesranues 101 1. We have pointed out that in. the opinion of the Mituridites the attribute of Takzoén does not necessitate the existence of the created in Razt's sense that God was compelled to create, On the contrary we have made it clear that its meaning is that God is free to créate or not to create; but that when He has willed the creation of anything, its existence becomes necessary, 2. We agree with Razi that if Takoin were a relational attribute its existence would. be inseparable from the existence of the created, Bat in the opinion of the Maturidites this is not 30; it is a real attribute, ‘and for this reason they held that, Takoin and Mukavwan were separable as are the will and that which is willed’, 3. They distinguish between action in. the perceptible world and action in the imperceptible world. In their opinion Takwin and Mukawo~ wan are not necessarily conjoined ia the same manner as the blow (Darb) and that which is struck (Magia), because Dard is « temporal action and an accident (‘Arad) whose endurance is impossible without the Madris, and its separation from Magri is inconceivable. On the other hand action in the imperceptible world, that isto say Takwin necessarily endures because it is eternal like the other attributes. It endures till the existence of the created and it is through it that the created comes into being’, Let us now consider the arguments of the. Maturidites for the distinction between. Takoin and Mukawwan, They argue on grounds of both revelation and reason as follows: 1. God says, “When We will the existence of anything We say to it “Be” and itis”, So “Be” is His eternal Word and His eternal attributes and Mukawan is a temporal object which exists apart from God's essence. ‘That is to say He expresses Takzcin by “Be” and Miskawwan by “it is" Tabsirat al-Aditiah Ms; Tawhtd Mi.; “Aga, p. 90. 2 Tabsinat ab-Adillah My ‘Agi’id, p. 90. * ‘Tabsivat al-Adillah Ms.102 FARR ALDI Aurel the created, God would be described by the created which includes devils and dung-heaps?, 9. We account for the existence of a thing by God's creation of X6 anid if Talutn were Matauoan the created or Mukawiean iseatt exist in itself, not through God's creation of it, which is blasphemy, If it existed through God’s creation of it, then Takwin must be distinct from Mukazowean 3, 4, If Takwin is the same as Mukowwan, then Mukeuwan rust be screated which entails the denial of the Creator, and the eveatet itself which depends for its existence on its Creator, Similarly, it leads to the doctrine of the ‘eternity of the world because that which exists in itselt is eternal, f. Greation is a single action related to many substances and accidents, Iisa single action because itis legitimate to divide, Takers ito the Talisn of substance and the Talain of accident, and the ground of this division is common to all the parts. Therefore Takwin is distinct from Mukawwans, 6. Takwin is a verbal noun and Mukawowan is a passive participle, and the distinction between the verbal noun and the passive patticiple is well known in philologys, ‘The paradoxes which arise from these arguments would only have Affected Razt’s postion had he held that Takwin is Mukaunn iuelf and had he meant by this that the ‘concepts of Takwin and Mukawwan are eS a / Tolsial l-Adila Ms.;‘Agt,p. 92; Bidiah Mas hai6o 2, P. 56, Tawi, Ms. * Tabsinat al-Adidlab, Ms ‘Aaaid pp. 91, 925 Bidayeh Ms.; Ghaib, vol, 2, p. 56 op, iti el-Adiliah Ms; “Aga, p, 21925 Bidayeh Ms.+ Chath, va ip 7, vol. 2, p. 56, * Ghaib, vol. 2, p. 56. * Ibid, vol. 2, p. 56,‘onneeseragons 108 identical. When one thing acts on another, this action differs from both the agent and the object of the action, but has no existence outside the mind, and is merely a mental construction referring to the relation be~ tween the agent and that which is acted on — ice. the Creator and the created?, In his debate with $abyni, Razi attacks the linguistic distine- tion between verbal noun and passive participle asserting that a linguistic difference docs not entail a difference in meaning and reality. This is because non-existence is a verbal noun and non-existent is a passive participle, yet there is no difference between them in meaning and eality*. In the Quan Razi finds evidence that Takuin is Mukaewan In the creation of Heaven and Earth...” In the opinion of Razi the creation of Heaven is Heaven itself, There are many other verses in the Qur'an which suggest that Takwin is Mukawwan, For instance, God says, “This is God’s creation; show Me what others have createds,” “God originates the creation and recreates it?** These verses suggest alio that creation or Takwin is temporal since God originated it, while that which is eternal has no beginning, ‘The Maturidites on the other hand had considered that when in these verses creation appears with the meaning of the created, this is merely the metaphorical substitution of the verbal noun for the passive “participle — as in the case of “knowledge” and “omnipotence” when they are used with the meaning of their subjects". Such metaphorical substitution is admissible in philology®, The word “creation” is not by linguistic origin the created itself; it is merely that it was often used Lavin’, p. 27. Manigerdl, the Third. Question, pp. 99-48 Sirah, 2, verse 161. Ghaib, vol. 2, p. 56. Sirai $1, verse 11 Sirah 90, verse M1. Tera al-Adilak Ms, Wid108 YARRR AL-DBY AL-RKZT for the created!, This explains the preference for the word “creative act” Takhlig to avoid this confission, for they thus emphasize its distinc= tion from ‘the created’ Makhliag. Tt is clear from all we have said that one who asserts Takwin as a mere relation is not affected by the objections of one who considers it a real attribute, and vice versa, For this reason it seems to me that Razi and his opponents do not meet on the same ground, and the argue ments of one side'do not affect the arguments of the other. The whole problem remains whether Takwin is a relational or veal attribute. This is the difference which we traced back to their disagreement on the func tion of omnipotence, We have shown that Razi was not in error when he ascribed effectiveness to: omnipotence, Ic is also of great importance to point out how the Qur’dn, together with reason, was the basis of the position of each party, and how they derived their terminology from it; and how God's command “Be” « Jed the Muslim theologians to raise one of the most delicate metaphysical problems, the problem of relation*, and in its most delicate form, For the relation between God and the world is the most delicate relation to perplex the minds of philosophers ancient and modem, since it is the relation between the One and the many, between the Constant and the changing, the Immaterial and the material, the Etemat-and the temporal. Nevertheless, the religious idea of the creation, which was unknown to the philosophies of the ancient world, is the solution which all the revelationary faiths have given to the problem of the relation between God and the world. Yet the idea of creation itself s too subtle for human understanding*. This is hecause the essence of God, who constitutes one side of the relation, cannot be directly kniown-to us. Therefore’ His relation to us will remain eternally enigmatic, 1 Tabpivat ol-Adillah Ms.; ‘Aged, p. 80. 2 ‘Tavtor: Elonent of Metapipsics, p. 140, * Tawtid. Ms.