G.R. No.
125797 February 15, 2002 The Facts
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),
Region VIII, Tacloban City, Represented by Regional Executive Director
Israel C. Gaddi, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO DARAMAN, NARCISO LUCENECIO and Hon. CLEMENTE C.
ROSALES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog
City, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Under the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, particularly Section 68-A,
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources secretary or a duly
authorized representative may order the confiscation in favor of the
government of, among others, the vehicles used in the commission of offenses
punishable by the said Code.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the December 6, 1995 Decision 1 and the June 3, 1996 Order2 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calbayog City (Branch 32) in Criminal Case
No. 1958. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for insufficiency of evidence, the Court hereby declares accused
GREGORIO DARAMAN and NARCISO LUCENECIO acquitted of the crime
charged, with costs de [o]ficio.
"The bond of the accused is hereby cancelled.
"The court hereby orders the CENR Officer of Samar, or any DENR employee
who is taking custody of the Holy Cross Funeral Services vehicle ‘St. Jude’, with
Plate No. HAJ-848, to return the said vehicle to the owner thereof."3
The assailed Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration challenging the last
paragraph of the Decision regarding the return of the subject vehicle to herein
respondents.
In the assailed Decision, the trial court summarized the facts of this case as
follows:
"The accused herein Gregorio Daraman and Narciso Lucenecio are charged
[with] violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by
Executive Order No. 277 in an information which is quoted herein below:
‘That on or about the 30th day of November, 1993, at about 1:00 o’clock in the
afternoon, at Barangay Bulao, Municipality of San Jorge, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect
and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, with a total
volume of 72.93 board feet valued at SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY NINE PESOS
(P729.30) and THIRTY CENTAVOS, without first securing and obtaining any
permit or license therefor from the proper authorities, thus Violating Section
68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended and further Amended by
Executive Order No. 277, series of 1989.
‘CONTRARY TO LAW.’
"Assisted by their counsels, the accused were arraigned and they entered the
plea of not guilty.
"Thereafter trial was conducted.
"The prosecution presented Pablo Opinion who testified as follows:
"That he is an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources as a Forest Ranger. On November 30, 1993 at about 1:00 o’clock in
the afternoon, while he was in his house in Brgy. Bulao, San Jorge, Samar, a
vehicle named ‘St. Jude’ with Plate No. HAJ-848 coming from barangay Blanca
Aurora passed by. He stopped the said vehicle and found some lumber of
assorted sizes [and] wood shavings inside. The lumber consisted of 62 pieces of
1" x 2" x 4", 16 pieces of 1" x 24" x 2.3" and 1 piece of 1" x 2" x 4." In his
estimate at the price of ₱10.00 per board foot the total value of the lumber
1
would be ₱729.30. He asked the driver for [the] owner of the lumber and he
was informed that it was a certain Asan of Brgy. Blanca Aurora. The driver also
informed him that the vehicle was owned by his employer, Narciso Lucenecio
of the Holy Cross Funeral Services in Calbayog City. He then took hold of the
vehicle and the assorted lumber and, thereafter, he issued a Seizure Receipt
marked as Exhs. ‘B’ and series. He also took photographs of the lumber which
are now marked as Exhs. ‘C’ and series. Besides, he signed a Joint Affidavit with
Oligario Mabansag, also a Forest Ranger. When he asked the driver Gregorio
Daraman for some papers for the assorted lumber, the latter replied that he
had none because they were not his. Daraman further told him that [they] went
to Brgy. Blanca Aurora to secure some wood shavings from the furniture shop
owned by Asan and Asan merely asked him a favor of loading his assorted
lumbers in the vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services to be brought to his
(Asan’s) house in Barangay Abrero, Calbayog City.
"The prosecution has still another witness in the person of Oligario Mabansag,
but both the prosecution and the defense agreed to dispense with his testimony
considering that the case would be merely corroborative [of] those already
offered by Pablo Opinion. The prosecution rested its case with the admission of
Exhs. ‘A’ and ‘B’ and their series. Its Exhs. ‘C’ and series were rejected because
the photographer who took them did not testify to identify [them].
"For the defense, only accused Gregorio Daraman testified because his co-
accused would merely offer corroborative testimony. From his testimony, the
following facts have been established:
"That on November 30, 1993 in the afternoon his employer Baby Lucenecio
instructed him to procure some wood shavings (‘sinapyo’) in San Jorge, Samar.
He used the service vehicle of the Holy Cross Funeral Services. His
companion[s] were Melio Bedoya, Fanny Fiel and Ragi Mabutol. They went to
barangay Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar and thereat, they got some wood
shavings from the furniture shop owned by a certain Asan Abing. They loaded
20 sacks of wood shavings, each sack measuring 22 inches in height by 32 1/2
inches in circumference as he demonstrated in court. The wood shavings
[were] being used by the Holy Cross Funeral Services as cushions in the coffin.
After the 20 sacks of wood shavings were loaded, Asan Abing asked him a favor
to bring his (Asan) assorted lumber to his house in Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City
where the Holy Cross Funeral Services [was] also located. Asan himself
personally loaded his assorted lumber into the vehicle. The subject assorted
lumber were already in the furniture shop where they got the wood shavings.
On their way home as they passed by Brgy. Bulao, Pablo Opinion stopped him
and took the wood shavings. Opinion also inquired about the assorted lumber
and he told him that they were owned by Asan, owner of the furniture shop in
Brgy. Blanca Aurora, who loaded them in his vehicle to be brought to his
(Asan’s) house in Barangay Obrero, Calbayog City. He told Opinion also that
Asan advised him that if somebody would [ask] about his lumber, just to tell the
person that Asan had the papers for the lumber with him in his furniture shop
at Brgy. Blanca Aurora, San Jorge, Samar. Pablo Opinion, however, did not take
his word and he instead impounded the vehicle together with the assorted
lumber. At about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon, the vehicle was still not
returned to him and so Gregorio Daraman left and returned to his employer at
Brgy. Obrero, Calbayog City and told the latter about what happened."4
After trial, the RTC acquitted both accused and ordered the return of the
disputed vehicle to Lucenecio.
Prior to these court proceedings, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Community and Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-
CENRO) of Catbalogan, Samar conducted administrative confiscation
proceedings on the seized lumber and vehicle in the presence of private
respondents.5 The two failed to present documents to show the legality of their
possession and transportation of the lumber seized. Hence, CENRO Officer
Marciano T. Talavera recommended to the Regional Executive Director (RED)
the final confiscation of the seized lumber and conveyance.6 Atty. Pastor C.
Salazar filed a Memorandum dated January 26, 1994, concurring with the
recommendation to forfeit the lumber and the vehicle seized from private
respondents. The Memorandum was approved by RED Augustus L. Momongan
and Arty. Fiel I. Marmita, chief of the Legal Division of the DENR, Region VIII,
Tacloban City.7
Atty. Rogelio G. Bato Jr. of DENR, Region 8, Tacloban City, moved for the
reconsideration of the assailed Decision, only insofar as it ordered the "return
of the said vehicle to the owner thereof."8 He contended that the vehicle had
already been administratively confiscated by the DENR on December 2, 1993,
and that the RED approved its forfeiture on January 26, 1994. 9 He further
claimed that the DENR had exclusive jurisdiction over the conveyance, which
had been used in violation of the Revised Forestry Code pursuant to Section 68-
A of PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
2
The trial court denied the Motion via the assailed Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court acquitted private respondents for insufficiency of evidence. The
unrebutted testimony of Respondent Daraman was that, in exchange for the
wood shavings from Asan, the former agreed to take the lumber to the latter’s
house in Calbayog City, where the Holy Cross Funeral Services office was also
located. Asan advised Daraman to reply, when asked, that the papers showing
the authorization for the lumber were in the former’s shop in Barangay Blanca
Aurora. Finding the evidence against Respondent Lucenecio to be likewise
insufficient, the RTC considered the vehicle as an effect of the crime and
ordered its delivery to him.
In the challenged Order, the trial court ruled that the Motion for
Reconsideration was untenable on procedural and substantive grounds. Since
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Feliciano Aguilar did not sign the Motion, the
RTC deemed his silence a sign of his disapproval of the Motion.
Substantively, the trial court ruled:
"x x x [T]he Court finds the motion still wanting in merits considering that as
found by the Court the owner of the vehicle in question, ‘St. Jude,’ which is the
Holy Cross Funeral Parlor owned by accused Narciso Lucenecio, did not
commit any violation of P.D. 705. Likewise, the prosecution failed to sufficiently
establish that accused Gregorio Daraman had taken or kept control of the
lumber subject of the motion which would thereby demonstrate that he had x x
x possession of the subject forest products. Instead, as established by the
evidence it was a certain Asan who owned the subject lumber. xxx.
xxx xxx xxx
"The decision of the Court has never been brought on appeal, thereby the same
has long become final and executory.
"Again, as shown by the evidence in the alleged confiscation proceedings
conducted by the OIC DENR Officer Marciano Talavera of Samar on December
2, 1992, the lumber in question [was] found to be owned by Asan Abing. But
notwithstanding this fact, for reasons not known to the Court, the said Asan
Abing was never made an accused in the present case.
"Sec. 68-1 of P.D. 705 contemplates a situation where the owner of the vehicle
is himself a violator of P.D. 705 or has been found to have conspired with any
other persons who committed the violation of Sec. 68 of P.D. 705 or consented
to the use of his vehicle in violating the said law. In the present case as shown
by the evidence, neither the Holy Cross Funeral Parlor or its owner accused
Narciso Lucenecio has committed a violation of P.D. 705 as already declared by
the Court in its decision of December 6, 1995 nor the driver, accused Gregorio
Daraman. In fact both were declared acquitted of the violation charged, and the
decision has not been appealed."10
Hence, this Petition.11
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for the Court’s
consideration:
"(A) Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction and/or authority to
order x x x the return of property already owned by the government.
(B) Respondent judge utterly disregarded and/or misinterpreted the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive
Order No. 277, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines.
(C) The government is not estopped from protecting its interest by
reason of mistake, error or failure of its officers to perform their
duties."12
Stated simply, the issues are: (1) whether the RTC had jurisdiction to release
the confiscated vehicle; (2) whether the trial court misconstrued PD 705, as
amended; and (3) whether, as a result of its filing of the criminal action,
petitioner is estopped from confiscating the vehicle administratively.
The Court’s Ruling
3
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction to Order Return of Vehicle
Petitioner contends that the RTC overstepped its jurisdiction when it ordered
the return of the disputed vehicle, because the vehicle had already become
government property by virtue of the forfeiture Order issued by DENR on
January 26, 1994. The DENR secretary or his duly authorized representative,
under Section 68-A of PD 705 as amended by EO 277, may order the
confiscation and disposition of all conveyances -- by land, water or air -- used in
illegally cutting, gathering, removing, possessing or abandoning forest
products.
We agree. Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law. A comparison of the
13
provisions of the two relevant sections of PD 705, as amended, shows that the
jurisdiction of the RTC covers the confiscation of the timber or forest products
as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the
area where the timber or forest products are found; it is the DENR that has
jurisdiction over the confiscation of forest products and, to stress,
all conveyances used in the commission of the offense. Section 68 reads:
"Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest
Products Without License. -- Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as
required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the
penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: x x x.
"The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of
the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or
possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally
used in the area where the timber or forest products are found."14
Section 68-A, in contrast, provides:
"SEC. 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department Head or His Duly
Authorized Representative to Order Confiscation. -- In all cases of violations of
this Code or other forest laws rules and regulations, the Department Head or
his duly authorized representative, may order the confiscation of any forest
products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or abandoned, and all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or
policies on the matter."15
If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be understood in its
literal meaning and applied without resort to interpretation, on the
presumption that its wording correctly expresses its intent or will. The courts
may not construe it differently.16
Machinery is a collective term for machines and appliances used in the
industrial arts;17 equipment covers physical facilities available for production,
including buildings, machineries and tools;18 and implements pertains to
whatever may supply a want, especially an instrument, tool or utensil. 19 These
terms do not include conveyances that are specifically covered by Section 68-A.
The implementing guidelines of Section 68-A define conveyance in a manner
that includes "any type or class of vehicle, craft, whether motorized or not, used
either in land, water or air, or a combination thereof or any mode of transport
used in the movement of any forest product."20
Hence, the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the confiscation of "all
conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the offense
and to dispose of the same" is vested in the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) secretary or a duly authorized representative. The
DENR secretary has supervision and control over the enforcement of forestry,
reforestation, parks, game and wildlife laws, rules and regulations.21
To implement Section 68-A, DENR promulgated Administrative Order (AO) No.
54-93, amending Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 59-90. AO 54-93
provides the guidelines for the confiscation, forfeiture and disposition of
conveyances used in violation of forestry laws, rules and regulations.
Even the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 1958 limited the acts attributed
to private respondents to "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather, collect
and possess seventy two (72) pieces of assorted sizes of lumber, x x x without
4
first securing and obtaining any permit or license therefor from the proper
authorities, x x x." The Information did not contain any allegation pertaining to
the transportation or conveyance of illegally cut, gathered, possessed or
abandoned lumber in violation of Section 68-A of PD 705, as amended.
Confiscation Without Due Process
Private respondents’ main defense is that the Order of Forfeiture (Annex "C") is
a "false, falsified and perjurious document." The Order was attached to and
made part of the record only when petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration dated February 6, 1996, or only after the trial court rendered
the assailed Decision. Petitioner made it appear, according to the private
respondents, that RED Momongan had approved the Memorandum on January
26, 1994. This does not appear to be true because Atty. Marmita, officer-in-
charge (OIC) of the DENR Legal Division of Tacloban City, signed the
Memorandum recommending approval only on January 31, 1994.
Further, on April 6, 1995, Judge Rosales of the RTC of Calbayog City (Branch
32) ordered the provincial environment and natural resources officer to
transfer the confiscated vehicle and pieces of lumber in connection with the
prosecution of Criminal Case 1958.22 Reynaldo R. Villafuerte, OIC of the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), replied that his
office could not deliver the vehicle because it was not in running condition.23
We are not persuaded. The validity and legality of the Order of Forfeiture falls
outside the ambit of the review of the assailed Decision and Order. The basis
for the assailed Order to release the vehicle was private respondents’ acquittal
of the charge of violating Section 68. On the other hand, the forfeiture Order
issued by the DENR was based on Section 68-A, which involved a distinct and
separate matter cognizable by it. Petitioner is questioning only the RTC’s
jurisdiction over the assailed Order to release the confiscated vehicle. Private
respondents have not appealed the DENR’s Order of Forfeiture, the validity of
which can thus be presumed.24 The genuineness of the Order and its proper
service upon them are factual issues that will not be dwelt upon by this Court,
which is not a trier of facts.25
The jurisdiction of this Court, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court, is in the
main limited to reviewing legal errors committed by a lower court.26 Under PD
705, the actions and the decisions of the DENR are reviewable by the courts
only through special civil actions for certiorari or prohibition.27
Second Issue:
Construing PD 705, as Amended
Petitioner alleges that the RTC misinterpreted the law when it held that Section
68-A, PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle
was the violator or was a conspirator with other violators of that law.
Department Order No. 54, Series of 1993, provides that the proceedings for the
confiscation and the forfeiture of the conveyance shall be directed against its
owner, and that lack of knowledge of its illegal use shall not bar its forfeiture.
In the present Petition, the trial court ruled in the assailed Order that Section
68-A of PD 705 contemplated a situation in which the very owner of the vehicle
violated this law or conspired with other persons who violated it or consented
to the use of his or her vehicle in violating it. Respondents Lucenecio and
Daraman were not shown to have violated PD 705, and their acquittals were
not appealed.
We side with petitioner. The guilt or the innocence of the accused in the
criminal case is immaterial, because what is punished under Section 68 is the
transportation, movement or conveyance of forest products without legal
documents. The DENR secretary or the authorized representatives do not
possess criminal jurisdiction; thus, they are not capable of making such a
ruling, which is properly a function of the courts. Even Section 68-A of PD 705,
as amended, does not clothe petitioner with that authority.
Conversely, the same law takes out of the general jurisdiction of the regional
trial courts the confiscation of conveyances used in violation of forestry
laws.1âwphi1 Hence, we cannot expect the DENR to rule on the criminal
liability of the accused before it impounds such vehicles. Section 68-A covers
only the movement of lumber or forest products without proper documents.
Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied
according to its express terms, and interpretation is resorted to only where a
literal interpretation would lead to either an absurdity or an injustice.28
5
We also uphold petitioner’s argument that the release of the vehicle to private
respondents would defeat the purpose and undermine the implementation of
forestry laws. The preamble of the amendment in EO 277 underscores the
urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for the
benefit of the present and future generations. Our forest resources may be
effectively conserved and protected only through the vigilant enforcement and
implementation of our forestry laws.29 Strong paramount public policy should
not be degraded by narrow constructions of the law that frustrate its clear
intent or unreasonably restrict its scope.30

Third Issue:

Estoppel

In view of the foregoing, it becomes unnecessary for this Court to resolve

petitioner’s third issue. It is no longer material to rule on whether it was
erroneous for the RTC to hold that the assistant provincial prosecutor’s failure
to comment on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was an implied
disapproval thereof. The public prosecutor’s disapproval does not vest in the
trial court the jurisdiction or authority to release the vehicle to private
respondents.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Order
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

6
G.R. No. 175289 August 31, 2011
CRISOSTOMO VILLARIN and ANIANO LATAYADA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Mere possession of timber without the legal documents required under forest
laws and regulations makes one automatically liable of violation of Section 68,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705,1 as amended. Lack of criminal intent is not a
valid defense.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the June 28, 2005
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720 which affirmed
in all respects the Judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 38,
Cagayan De Oro City, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 68, P.D. No. 705, as amended. Likewise assailed in this
petition is the September 22, 2006 Resolution4 denying petitioners’ Motion for
Reconsideration.5
Factual Antecedents
In a Criminal Complaint6 filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
4, Cagayan de Oro City by Marcelino B. Pioquinto (Pioquinto), Chief of the
Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit under the TL Strike Force Team of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioner Aniano
Latayada (Latayada) and three others namely, Barangay Captain Camilo
Sudaria (Sudaria) of Tagpangi, Cagayan de Oro City, Marlon Baillo (Baillo) and
Cipriano Boyatac (Boyatac), were charged with violation of Section 68, P.D. No.
705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277.7
Subsequently, however, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City
issued a Resolution8 dated March 13, 1996 recommending the filing of an
Information for the aforesaid charge not only against Latayada, Baillo and
Boyatac but also against petitioner Crisostomo Villarin (Villarin), then
Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City. The dismissal of the
complaint against Sudaria was likewise recommended. Said Resolution was
then approved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through a
Resolution9 dated May 9, 1996 ordering the filing of the Information in the RTC
of Cagayan de Oro City.
Thus, on October 29, 1996, an Information10 was filed against petitioners
Villarin and Latayada and their co-accused Baillo and Boyatac, for violation of
Section 68, P.D. No. 705 as follows:
That on or about January 13, 1996, in Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, pursuant to RA
7975, the accused, Crisostomo Villarin, a public officer being the Barangay
Captain of Pagalungan, this City, with salary grade below 27, taking advantage
of his official position and committing the offense in relation to his office, and
the other above-named accused, all private individuals, namely: Marlon Baillo,
Cipriano Boyatac, and Aniano Latayada, confederating and mutually helping
one another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously gather and
possess sixty-three (63) pieces flitches of varying sizes belonging to the
Apitong specie with a total volume of Four Thousand Three Hundred Twenty
Six (4,326) board feet valued at ₱108,150.00, without any authority and
supporting documents as required under existing forest laws and regulation to
the damage and prejudice of the government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
On January 14, 1997, Villarin, Boyatac and Baillo, filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation.12 They alleged that the Joint Affidavit13 of the personnel of the
DENR which became one of the bases in filing the Information never mentioned
Villarin as one of the perpetrators of the crime while the accusations against
Baillo and Boyatac were not based on the personal knowledge of the affiants.
They also asserted that their indictment was based on polluted sources,
consisting of the sworn statements of witnesses like Latayada and Sudaria, who
both appeared to have participated in the commission of the crime charged.
Instead of resolving the Motion for Reinvestigation, the RTC, in its
Order14 dated January 27, 1997, directed Villarin, Boyatac, and Baillo to file
their Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,
it being the entity which filed the Information in Court. On March 31, 1997, only
Villarin filed a Petition for Reinvestigation15 but same was, however, denied by
the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao in an Order16 dated May 15, 1997
because the grounds relied upon were not based on newly discovered evidence
7
or errors of fact, law or irregularities that are prejudicial to the interest of the
movants, pursuant to Administrative Order No. 07 or the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman in Criminal Cases. The Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao likewise opined that Villarin was directly implicated by Latayada, his
co-accused.
The RTC thus proceeded with the arraignment of the accused who entered
separate pleas of not guilty.17 Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Version of the Prosecution
On December 31, 1995, at around five o’clock in the afternoon, prosecution
witness Roland Granada (Granada) noticed that a public utility jeep loaded
with timber stopped near his house. The driver, petitioner Latayada, was
accompanied by four to five other persons, one of whom was Boyatac while the
rest could not be identified by Granada.18 They alighted from the jeep and
unloaded the timber 10 to 15 meters away from the Batinay bridge at Barangay
Pagalungan, Cagayan De Oro City. Another prosecution witness, Pastor
Pansacala (Pansacala), also noticed the jeep with plate number MBB 226 and
owned by Sudaria, loaded with timber.19 Being then the president of a
community-based organization which serves as a watchdog of illegal cutting of
trees,20 Pansacala even ordered a certain Mario Bael to count the timber.21
At six o’clock in the evening of the same day, Barangay Captain Angeles Alarcon
(Alarcon)22 noticed that the pile of timber was already placed near the bridge.
Since she had no knowledge of any scheduled repair of the Batinay bridge she
was surprised to discover that the timber would be used for the repair. After
inquiring from the people living near the bridge, she learned that Latayada and
Boyatac delivered the timber.23
Another prosecution witness, Ariel Palanga (Palanga), testified that at seven
o’clock in the morning of January 1, 1996, Boyatac bought a stick of cigarette
from his store and requested him to cover the pile of timber near the bridge for
a fee. Palanga acceded and covered the pile with coconut leaves.24
On January 13, 1996, at around ten o’clock in the morning, prosecution witness
Juan Casenas (Casenas), a radio and TV personality of RMN-TV8, took footages
of the timber25 hidden and covered by coconut leaves. Casenas also took
footages of more logs inside a bodega at the other side of the bridge. In the
following evening, the footages were shown in a news program on television.
On the same day, members of the DENR Region 10 Strike Force Team measured
the timber which consisted of 63 pieces of Apitong flitches and determined that
it totaled 4,326 board feet26 and subsequently entrusted the same to Alarcon
for safekeeping.
Upon further investigation, it was learned that the timber was requisitioned by
Villarin, who was then Barangay Captain of Pagulangan, Cagayan de Oro City.
Villarin gave Sudaria the specifications for the requisitioned timber. Thereafter,
Boyatac informed Villarin that the timber was already delivered on December
31, 1995.27
On January 18, 1996, Felix Vera Cruz (Vera Cruz), a security guard at the DENR
Region 10 Office, received and signed for the confiscated timber since the
property custodian at that time was not around.
The filing of the aforestated Information followed.
The Version of the Defense
In response to the clamor of the residents of Barangays Tampangan, Pigsag-an,
Tuburan and Taglinao, all in Cagayan De Oro City, Villarin, decided to repair the
impassable Batinay bridge. The project was allegedly with the concurrence of
the Barangay Council.
Pressured to immediately commence the needed repairs, Villarin
commissioned Boyatac to inquire from Sudaria about the availability of timber
without first informing the City Engineer. Sudaria asked for the specifications
which Villarin gave. Villarin then asked Baillo and Boyatac to attend to the
same. When the timber was already available, it was transported from
Tagpangi to Batinay. However, the timber flitches were seized by the DENR
Strike Force Team and taken to its office where they were received by Vera
Cruz, the security guard on duty.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Memorandum filed before the trial court, the defense notified the court of
Boyatac’s demise.28 However, the trial court did not act on such notice. Instead,
8
it proceeded to rule on the culpability of Boyatac. Thus, in its Judgment, the
trial court found herein petitioners and the deceased Boyatac guilty as charged.
On the other hand, it found the evidence against Baillo insufficient. The
dispositive portion of the Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and Aniano Latayada
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 68 of Presidential Decree
No. 705 as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused Marlon Baillo is hereby acquitted for lack of evidence.
SO ORDERED. 29
In reaching said conclusions, the RTC noted that:
Without an iota of doubt, accused Crisostomo Villarin, being then a Barangay
Captain of Pagalungan, Cagayan de Oro City, was the one who procured the
subject flitches, while accused Aniano Latayada and Cipriano Boyatac mutually
helped him and each other by transporting the flitches from Sitio Batinay to the
Pagalungan Bridge. The accused would like to impress upon the Court that the
subject fltiches were intended for the repair of the Pagalungan Bridge and were
acquired by virtue of Barangay Resolution No. 110 of Barangay Pagalungan.
The Court is not impressed by this lame excuse. There is no dispute that the
flitches were intended for the repair of the bridge. The Court finds it a laudable
motive. The fact remains though that the said forest products were obtained
without the necessary authority and legal documents required under existing
forest laws and regulations.30
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration31 which was denied by the
RTC in its Order32 dated August 20, 2002.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners filed an appeal which was denied by the CA in its Decision dated
June 28, 2005. The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the judgment of the court a quo
finding [d]efendant-[a]ppellants Crisostomo Villarin, Cipriano Boyatac and
Aniano Latayada GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violating Sec. 68 of
Presidential Decree 705 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to
cost.1avvphi1
SO ORDERED.33
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration34 which the appellate court
denied for lack of merit in its Resolution35 promulgated on September 22, 2006.
Issues
Undeterred, petitioners filed the instant petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] ON [THE] MATTER OF
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION[,] DECIDED NOT IN ACCORD WITH
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT;
2. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM WHAT THE
SUPREME COURT HAS ALWAYS BEEN SAYING, THAT, TO CONVICT AN
ACCUSED ALL ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME MUST BE PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT and;
3. WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS[,] IN AFFIRMING THE PENALTY
IMPOSED BY THE COURT A QUO[,] DEPARTED FROM JURISPRUDENCE THAT
EVEN IN CRIMES [INVOLVING] VIOLATION OF SPECIAL LAWS[,] SPECIAL
CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT [CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS MITIGATING HAD THE VIOLATION BEEN PENALIZED UNDER
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN ORDER TO REDUCE PENALTY].36
Petitioners argue that the refusal of the Ombudsman to conduct a
reinvestigation is tantamount to a denial of the right to due process. As Villarin
was indicted in the Information despite his not being included in the criminal
complaint filed by Pioquinto of the TL Strike Force Team of the DENR, they
claim that he was not afforded a preliminary investigation. They also bewail the
fact that persons who appear to be equally guilty, such as Sudaria, have not
been included in the Information. Hence, they argue that the Ombudsman acted
with grave abuse of discretion in denying their petition for reinvestigation
because it deprived Villarin of his right to preliminary investigation and in
9
refusing and to equally prosecute the guilty. They contend that the
Ombudsman should not have relied on the prosecutor’s
Certification37 contained in the Information to the effect that a preliminary
investigation was conducted in the case.
Moreover, petitioners contend that the evidence was insufficient to prove their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt since they had no intention to possess the
timber and dispose of it for personal gain. They likewise claim that there was
failure on the part of the prosecution to present the timber, which were the
object of the offense.
Our Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
Villarin was properly afforded his right to due process.
Records show that the investigating prosecutor received a criminal complaint
charging Sudaria, Latayada, Baillo and Boyatac with violation of Section 68 of
P.D. No. 705, as amended.38 The said complaint did not state the known
addresses of the accused. Neither was the notarized joint-affidavit of the
complainants attached thereto. The subpoena issued to the accused and the
copy of their counter-affidavits were also not part of the record. Moreover, the
complaint did not include Villarin as a respondent. However, said infirmities do
not constitute denial of due process particularly on the part of Villarin.
It is evidently clear from the Resolution dated March 13, 1996 of the Office of
the City Prosecutor that Villarin and all the accused participated in the
scheduled preliminary investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of
the criminal case.39 They knew about the filing of the complaint and even
denied any involvement in the illegal cutting of timber. They were also given
the opportunity to submit countervailing evidence to convince the investigating
prosecutor of their innocence.
Foregoing findings considered, there is no factual basis to the assertion that
Villarin was not afforded a preliminary investigation. Accordingly, we find no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
in denying Villarin’s motion for reconsideration. It validly relied on the
certification contained in the Information that a preliminary investigation was
properly conducted in this case. The certification was made under oath by no
less than the public prosecutor, a public officer who is presumed to have
regularly performed his official duty.40 Besides, it aptly noted that "Villarin was
implicated by x x x Latayada in his affidavit dated January 22, 1996 before
Marcelino B. Pioquinto, Chief, Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Unit. The
denial of Villarin cannot prevail over the declaration of witnesses."41
Moreover, the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely
raised and must not have been waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold
the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the
prosecutor to hold a reinvestigation, which, necessarily "involves a re-
examination and re-evaluation of the evidence already submitted by the
complainant and the accused, as well as the initial finding of probable cause
which led to the filing of the Informations after the requisite preliminary
investigation."42
Here, it is conceded that Villarin raised the issue of lack of a preliminary
investigation in his Motion for Reinvestigation. However, when the
Ombudsman denied the motion, he never raised this issue again. He accepted
the Ombudsman's verdict, entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment
and actively participated in the trial on the merits by attending the scheduled
hearings, conducting cross-examinations and testifying on his own behalf. It
was only after the trial court rendered judgment against him that he once again
assailed the conduct of the preliminary investigation in the Motion for
Reconsideration.43 Whatever argument Villarin may have regarding the alleged
absence of a preliminary investigation has therefore been mooted. By entering
his plea, and actively participating in the trial, he is deemed to have waived his
right to preliminary investigation.
Petitioners also contend that Sudaria should also have been included as a
principal in the commission of the offense. However, whether Sudaria should or
should not be included as co-accused can no longer be raised on appeal. Any
right that the petitioners may have in questioning the non-inclusion of Sudaria
in the Information should have been raised in a motion for reconsideration of
the March 13, 1996 Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor which
recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Sudaria.44 Having failed to
avail of the proper
10
procedural remedy, they are now estopped from assailing his non-inclusion.
Two Offenses Penalized Under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705.
Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest
Products Without License. – Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable
or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or
possess timber or other forest products without legal documents as required
under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that
in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who
ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if
such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported
without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation.
"There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of P.D.
No. 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authorization; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations."45
The Information charged petitioners with the second offense which is
consummated by the mere possession of forest products without the proper
documents.
We reviewed the records and hold that the prosecution had discharged the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense charged. The evidence of the
prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners were in custody
of timber without the necessary legal documents. Incidentally, we note that
several transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) were not submitted by the
trial court. No explanation was provided for these missing TSNs.
Notwithstanding the incomplete TSNs, we still find that the prosecution was
able to prove beyond reasonable doubt petitioners’ culpability.
The prosecution adduced several documents to prove that timber was
confiscated from petitioners. It presented a Tally Sheet 46 to prove that the
DENR Strike Force Team examined the seized timber on January 13, 1996. The
number, volume and appraised value of said timber were also noted in the
Tally Sheet. Seizure receipts were also presented to prove that the confiscated
timber were placed in the custody of Alarcon47 and eventually taken to the
DENR Office.48 There was a photograph of the timber taken by the television
crew led by Casenas.49
The prosecution likewise presented in evidence the testimonies of
eyewitnesses Granada and Pansacala who testified that Latayada and Boyatac
were the ones who delivered the timber.50
More significantly, Villarin admitted that he was the one who commissioned
the procurement of the timber51 for the repair of the Batinay bridge. He even
deputized Boyatac to negotiate with Sudaria and gave Latayada ₱2,000.00 to
transport the logs. Boyatac later informed him of the delivery of timber.
However, he could not present any document to show that his possession
thereof was legal and pursuant to existing forest laws and regulations.
Relevant portions of the testimony of Villarin are as follows:
Q As Barangay Captain of Pagalungan, of course, you heard reports prior to the
incident on December 31, 1995 that Barangay Captain Camilo Sudaria was also
engaged in supplying forest products like forest lumber?
A Yes, because I always go to Cagayan de Oro and I can always ride on his
jeepney.
Q And you were sure that information of yours was received by you and not
only by one but several persons from Barangay Tagpangi even up to Barangay
Pagalungan?
A That’s true because he even has a record with the police.
Q And you learned [this] prior to January 1995?
11
A Yes, Sir.
Q And your information was even to the effect that Sudaria was supplying
illegally cut lumber regularly?
A What I have noticed because I always ride on his jeep wherein lumber was
being loaded, the lumber will be taken when it arrived in Lumbia, kilometer 5.
Q Even if there were already raids being conducted to the person of Camilo
Sudaria, still he continued to load illegally cut lumber?
Q And thereafter on December 31, 1995, according to your testimony before,
Aniano Latayada delivered the lumber flitches you ordered on board the
passenger jeep of Camilo Sudaria?
A When the specifications were given, we were informed that the lumber were
already there. So, it was delivered.
Q Who informed you that the lumber were already delivered?
A Boyatac.

A He slowed down after several arrest because maybe he was ashamed because
he was the Barangay Captain of Tagpangi.
Q And his arrest and the slackening of his activities of illegally cut lumber
occurred prior to June 1995?
A Yes, sir.
Q [In spite] of your knowledge that he is engaged [in] illegally cut[ting] forest
products, you as Barangay Captain of Pagalungan transacted with him for the
purpose of acquiring lumber [for] the bridge at Pagalungan?
A As we rode together in his jeep, he informed me that he has some lumber to
be used to build his house and he told me he will sell it for the repair of the
bridge in Pagalungan.
Q And he is referring to those lumber placed alongside the Batinay Bridge.
A Yes, Sir.
Q And even without personally inspecting it, you immediately paid Latayada
the compensation for the delivery of those lumber?
A There was already an advance payment for his delivery.
Q To whom did you give the advance?
A To Latayada.
Q You have not given the amount to Camilo Sudaria?
A No, Sir.

Q And because of that, in addition, you sent him the specifications of materials Q In fact, the money that you paid to Latayada was specifically for the
for the repair of the bridge in Pagalungan? transportation of the lumber from Tagpangi to Batinay bridge?

A I let Boyatac go to him and [inquire] from him if he has those specifications. A Yes, Sir.

Q And he communicated to you that he has available lumber of those PROS. GALARRITA:
specification?
Q And at that time, you paid Latayada ₱2,000 as payment of the lumber?
A Yes, because he sent to Boyatac some requirements of the specifications and
A Yes, Sir.
he let me sign it.
COURT:
Q And after that, you closed the [deal] with Sudaria?
Q Did you pay Latayada?
A Yes, because I sent somebody to him and we did not talk anymore.
A Yes, Sir.

12
Q How much?
A ₱2,000.
Q And you gave this to the conductor?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You told the conductor to pay the money to Latayada?
A Yes, sir.
Q What did the conductor say?
A The conductor said that the money was for the payment for the transporting
of lumber from Tagpangi.52 (Underscoring ours.)
Violation of Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, is
malum prohibitum.
As a special law, the nature of the offense is malum prohibitum and as such,
criminal intent is not an essential element. "However, the prosecution must
prove that petitioners had the intent to possess (animus possidendi)" the
timber.53 "Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but
also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the [object of the
crime] is in the immediate physical control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the [object of the crime] is under the
dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found."54
There is no dispute that petitioners were in constructive possession of the
timber without the requisite legal documents. Villarin and Latayada were
personally involved in its procurement, delivery and storage without any
license or permit issued by any competent authority. Given these and
considering that the offense is malum prohibitum, petitioners’ contention that
the possession of the illegally cut timber was not for personal gain but for the
repair of said bridge is, therefore, inconsequential.
Corpus Delicti is the Fact of the Commission of the Crime
Petitioners argue that their convictions were improper because the corpus
delicti had not been established. They assert that the failure to present the
confiscated timber in court was fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
We disagree. "[C]orpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime
charged or to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not
refer to the ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the
body of the person murdered"55 or, in this case, to the seized timber. "Since the
corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, this Court has ruled
that even a single witness’ uncorroborated testimony, if credible, may suffice to
prove it and warrant a conviction therefor. Corpus delicti may even be
established by circumstantial evidence."56
Here, the trial court and the CA held that the corpus delicti was established by
the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. The Tally Sheet, Seizure
Receipts issued by the DENR and photograph proved the existence of the
timber and its confiscation. The testimonies of the petitioners themselves
stating in no uncertain terms the manner in which they consummated the
offense they were charged with were likewise crucial to their conviction.
We find no reason to deviate from these findings since it has been established
that factual findings of a trial court are binding on us, absent any showing that
it overlooked or misinterpreted facts or circumstances of weight and
substance.57 The legal precept applies to this case in which the trial court’s
findings were affirmed by the appellate court.58
The Proper Penalty
Violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended, is penalized as qualified
theft under Article 310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The pertinent portions of these provisions read:
Art. 310. Qualified Theft – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties
next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding articles, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of
confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle
or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation or fish taken
from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of fire,
13
earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any calamity, vehicular accident or as affirmed by the CA, erroneously fixed the minimum period of the penalty at
civil disturbance. twelve (12) years of prision mayor.

Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by: Finally, the case against Boyatac must be dismissed considering his demise
even before the RTC rendered its Judgment.
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 28,
pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty 2005 and the Resolution dated September 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 26720
shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one are AFFIRMED with the modificationS that petitioners Crisostomo Villarin and
year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which Aniano Latayada are each sentenced to suffer imprisonment of two (2) years,
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or maximum. The complaint against Cipriano Boyatac is hereby DISMISSED.
reclusion temporal, as the case may be. x x x
SO ORDERED.
The Information filed against the petitioners alleged that the 63 pieces of
timber without the requisite legal documents measuring 4,326 board feet were
valued at ₱108,150.00. To prove this allegation, the prosecution presented
Pioquinto to testify, among others, on this amount. Tally Sheets and Seizure
Receipts were also presented to corroborate said amount. With the value of the
timber exceeding ₱22,000.00, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods to be imposed in its maximum, the range of
which is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Since none of the qualifying circumstances in Article 310 of the RPC was alleged
in the Information, the penalty cannot be increased two degrees higher.

In determining the additional years of imprisonment, ₱22,000.00 is to be

deducted from ₱108,150.00, which results to ₱86,150.00. This remainder must
be divided by ₱10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than ₱10,000.00.
Consequently, eight (8) years must be added to the basic penalty. Thus the
maximum imposable penalty ranges from sixteen (16) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day to eighteen (18) years of reclusion temporal.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum imposable penalty

should be taken anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree,
without considering the modifying circumstances. The penalty one degree
lower from prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, the range of which is from
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the RTC,

14
G.R. No. 160932 : January 14, 2013
SPECIAL PEOPLE, INC. FOUNDATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN,
ROBERTO P. CERICOS, Petitioner, v. NESTOR M. CANDA, BIENVENIDO LIPA
YON, JULIAN D. AMADOR, BOHOL PROVINCIAL CHIEF, REGIONAL
DIRECTOR, AND NATIONAL DIRECTOR, RESPECTIVELY, ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT BUREAU, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, AND THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ALL SUED IN BOTH THEIR
OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE CAPACITIES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The peremptory writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that is issued
only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of procedure is powerless to
afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to the
performance of the act to be compelled.
Antecedents
The petitioner was a proponent of a water-resource development and
utilization project in Barangay Jimilia-an in the Municipality of Loboc, Bohol
that would involve the tapping and purifying of water from the Loboc River,
and the distribution of the purified water to the residents of Loboc and six
other municipalities. The petitioner applied for a Certificate of Non-Coverage
(CNC) with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7, seeking to be exempt
from the requirement of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 on the following justifications, to wit:
1) The whole project simply involves tapping of water from the Loboc River,
filtering and purifying it, and distributing the same to the consumers in the
covered towns;
2) From the source to the filtration plant, then to the purifier stations, then
finally to the consumers households, water flows through steel pipes;
3) The filtration and purifying process employs the latest
technology"electrocatalytic"internationally accepted for safety and
environment friendliness;
4) No waste is generated, as the electrocatalytic process dissolves all impurities
in the water;
5) The project involves no destruction [n]or harm to the environment. On the
other hand, it is environment friendly.1
Upon evaluating the nature and magnitude of the environmental impact of the
project, respondent Nestor M. Canda, then Chief of EMB in Bohol, rendered his
findings in a letter dated December 4, 2001, as follows:
1) The project is located within a critical area; hence, Initial Environmental
Examination is required.
2) The project is socially and politically sensitive therefore proof of social
acceptability should be established. Proper indorsement from the Protected
Area Management Bureau or PAMB should be secured.2 (Emphasis supplied)
On January 11, 2002, the petitioner appealed Candas findings to respondent
EMB Region 7 Director Bienvenido L. Lipayon (RD Lipayon), claiming that it
should also be issued a CNC because the project was no different from the
Loboc-Loay waterworks project of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) that had recently been issued a CNC.3
On April 3, 2002, RD Lipayon notified the petitioner that its documents
substantially complied with the procedural aspects of the EMBs review, and
that the application was assigned EMB-DENR-7 Control No. CNC-02-080 for
easy reference in case of follow-up and submission of additional
requirements.4?r?l1
Later on, RD Lipayon informed the petitioner that an Initial Environmental
Examination document was required for the project due to its significant
impact in the area.5
On August 26, 2002, RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit the following
documents to enable the EMB to determine whether the project was within an
environmentally critical area or not, to wit:
15
1. Certification from DENR, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) that it is not within areas declared by law as national parks,
watershed reserves, wildlife preservation area, sanctuaries and not within the
purview of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas
System (NIPAS) Act, and other issuances including international commitments
and declarations;
2. Certification from the DENR Regional Office/ PENRO [that] the areas within
the project do not constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened
species or indigenous wildlife (Flora and Fauna).
3. Certification from the following:
3.1. Philippine Atmospheric Geophysical and Astronomical Services
Administration (PAGASA) that the area is not frequently visited or hard-hit by
typhoons. This shall refer to all areas where typhoon signal no. 3 not hoisted
for at least twice a year during the last five (5) years prior to the year of
reckoning. Years to be considered shall be from January 1995 to December
2001.
3.2. Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS) that the
area was not subjected to an earthquake of at least intensity VII in the Rossi-
Forel scale or its equivalent and hit by tsunamis during the period of 1638 until
the year 2001.
3.3. PHIVOLCS that the area was not subjected to earthquakes of at least
intensity VII in the Rossi-Forel scale or its equivalent during the period of 1949
until the year 2001.
3.4. PAGASA that the area is not storm surge-prone.
3.5. Mines and Geosciences Bureau Region 7 (MGB 7) that the area is not
located along fault lines or within fault zones and not located in critical slope.
3.6. City Mayor and/or City Engineers Office that the area is not flood prone.
3.7. Network of Protected Areas for Agriculture (NPAA) of the Bureau of Soils
and Water Management (BSWM) that the area is not classified as Prime
Agricultural Land.
4. Certification from the Provincial Tourism Office or its equivalent office that
areas in your project are not set-aside as aesthetic potential tourist spot.
5. Certification from the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) that areas
within your project are not recharged areas of aquifer.
6. Certification from DENR regional Office and/or Environmental Management
Bureau 7 (EMB 7) that Loboc River is not characterized by one or any
combination of the following conditions:
a. Tapped for domestic purposes;
b. With controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate authorities;
and
c. Which support wildlife and fishery activities.
A Certificate of Non-Coverage will duly be issued to your foundation once all
the above mentioned required certifications are complied with.
Projects that are covered by P.D. 1586 or the Environmental Impact System
(EIS) Law should not start unless the Project Proponent should secure an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), otherwise penalties shall be
imposed.6 (Emphases supplied)
On January 28, 2003, the petitioner submitted eight certifications,7 including
the certification issued by the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and
Seismology (PHIVOLCS), as follows:
That the project area, Loboc, Bohol was subjected to an earthquake of Intensity
VII in the adapted Rossi-Forel scale of I-IX last February 8, 1990. The
magnitude of the earthquake is 6.8 and the highest intensity reported was VIII,
based on the Rossi-Forel Intensity Scale. During the said earthquake, the PMI
Academy Building collapsed while minor cracks were sustained by the
municipal hall, public school, town church and some other houses in the town.
There were reports that immediately after the earthquake, the force of the
incoming waves from the sea caused Alijuan River in the town of Duero to flow
inland. The report also states that the waves affected 10-50 meters of the
coastal beach of the towns of Jagna, Duero, Guindulman, Garcia Hernandez and
Valencia.8 (Emphases supplied)
16
The petitioner failed to secure a certification from the Regional Office of the
Mines and Geosciences Bureau (RO-MGB) to the effect that the project area was
not located along a fault line/fault zone or a critical slope because RO-MGB did
not have the data and expertise to render such finding, and thus had to forward
the petitioners request to the MGB Central Office.9
Upon the MGBs advice, the petitioner sought and obtained the required
certification from PHIVOLCS, but the certification did not state whether the
project area was within a critical slope. Instead, the certification stated that the
project site was approximately 18 kilometers west of the East Bohol Fault.10
Given the tenor of the certification from PHIVOLCS, RD Lipayons letter dated
February 4, 2003 declared that the project was within an environmentally
critical area, and that the petitioner was not entitled to the CNC, viz:
After thorough review of your submitted certifications, it was found out that
the area was subjected to an earthquake of Intensity VII in the adapted Rossi-
Forel scale wherein the magnitude of the earthquake is 6.8 with the highest
intensity reported of VIII and you fail to support certification that the project
area is not within critical slope. And based on the Water Usage and
Classification per Department Order (DAO) 34 Series of 1990, subject river
system was officially classified as Class B intended for swimming and bathing
purposes. Moreover, one component of your project involves opening of
roadway connected to the barangay road.
Therefore, we reiterate our previous stand that your project is covered by the
EIS System pursuant to P.D. 1586, the Environmental Impact Statement Law.11
On March 27, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and damages
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Loay, Bohol,12 alleging that it was now
entitled to a CNC as a matter of right after having complied with the
certification requirements; and that the EMB had earlier issued a CNC to the
DPWH for a similar waterworks project in the same area.
In the decision dated November 18, 2003,13 the RTC dismissed the petition for
mandamus upon the following considerations, namely: (1) PHIVOLCS certified
that the project site had been subjected to an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990;
(2) the CNC issued by the EMB to a similar waterworks project of the DPWH in
the same area was only for the construction of a unit spring box intake and
pump house, and the DENR issued a cease and desist order relative to the
DPWHs additional project to put up a water filtration plant therein; (3) the
determination of whether an area was environmentally critical was a task that
pertained to the EMB; (4) the assignment of a control number by the EMB to
the petitioners application did not mean that the application was as good as
approved; (5) the RTC would not interfere with the primary prerogative of the
EMB to review the merits of the petitioners application for the CNC; and (6)
there was already a pending appeal lodged with the DENR Secretary.
Hence, this appeal brought directly to the Court via petition for review on
certiorari.
Issues
The petitioner submits the following issues:cralawlibrary
A. WHETHER OR NOT, AFTER PETITIONERS DUE COMPLIANCE WITH THE
REQUIREMENTS MANDATED BY RESPONDENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
CERTIFICATE OF NON-COVERAGE (CNC) APPLIED FOR BY PETITIONER, IT IS
NOW THE RIPENED DUTY OF RESPONDENTS, THROUGH RESPONDENT EMB
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TO ISSUE SAID DOCUMENT IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER;
B. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER HAS EXHAUSTED AVAILABLE
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES THROUGH AN APPEAL TO RESPONDENT DENR
SECRETARY WHO HAS SAT ON SAID APPEAL UP TO THE PRESENT;
C. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER DAMAGES
FROM RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITY.14
The petitioner insists that RD Lipayon already exercised his discretion by
finding that the application substantially complied with the procedural aspects
for review and by assigning Control No. CNC-02-080 to its application; that
after the petitioner complied with the requirements enumerated in the August
26, 2002 letter of RD Lipayon, the EMB became duty-bound to issue the CNC to
the petitioner; that the EMB issued a CNC to a similar project of the DPWH in
the same area; that it filed an appeal with the DENR Secretary, but the appeal
remained unresolved; and that it brought the petition for mandamus precisely
as a speedier recourse.
17
In their comment, RD Lipayon and Canda aver that the act complained of
against them involved an exercise of discretion that could not be compelled by
mandamus; that the petitioners proposed project was located within an
environmentally critical area, and the activities to be done were so significant
that they would create massive earth movement and environmental
degradation; that the petitioner violated the rule against forum shopping; and
that the petitioner had no cause of action against them for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
On his part, the DENR Secretary, through the Solicitor General, contends that
the petition raises questions of fact that are not proper in a petition for review;
that the petitioner should have appealed to the CA under Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court; that the grant or denial of a CNC application is discretionary and cannot
be compelled by mandamus; and that the petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Accordingly, the Court is called upon to resolve, firstly, whether the appeal
directly to this Court from the RTC was proper, and, secondly, whether the
petition for mandamus was the correct recourse.
Ruling
The petition for review is denied for its lack of merit.
1.
Petitioners appeal is improper under Rule 45, Rules of Court
This appeal by certiorari is being taken under Rule 45, Rules of Court, whose
Section 1 expressly requires that the petition shall raise only questions of law
which must be distinctly set forth. Yet, the petitioner hereby raises a question
of fact whose resolution is decisive in this appeal. That issue of fact concerns
whether or not the petitioner established that its project was not located in an
environmentally critical area. For this reason, the Court is constrained to deny
due course to the petition for review.
It is a settled rule, indeed, that in the exercise of our power of review, the Court
is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the
evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case. The
Court relies on the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals or of the trial court,
and accepts such findings as conclusive and binding unless any of the following
exceptions obtains, namely: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings the
Court of Appeals or the trial court went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (h) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (j) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) when the Court of Appeals or the trial court
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.15 However, none of
the aforementioned exceptions applies herein.
2.
Mandamus was an improper remedy for petitioner
We dismiss the present recourse because the petitioner failed to exhaust the
available administrative remedies, and because it failed to show that it was
legally entitled to demand the performance of the act by the respondents.
It is axiomatic, to begin with, that a party who seeks the intervention of a court
of law upon an administrative concern should first avail himself of all the
remedies afforded by administrative processes. The issues that an
administrative agency is authorized to decide should not be summarily taken
away from it and submitted to a court of law without first giving the agency the
opportunity to dispose of the issues upon due deliberation.16 The court of law
must allow the administrative agency to carry out its functions and discharge
its responsibilities within the specialized areas of its competence.17 This rests
on the theory that the administrative authority is in a better position to resolve
questions addressed to its particular expertise, and that errors committed by
subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their superiors if given a
chance to do so.18?
18
 The records show that the petitioner failed to exhaust the available
administrative remedies. At the time RD Lipayon denied the petitioners
application for the CNC, Administrative Order No. 42 dated November 2,
200219 had just vested the authority to grant or deny applications for the ECC in
the Director and Regional Directors of the EMB. Notwithstanding the lack of a
specific implementing guideline to what office the ruling of the EMB Regional
Director was to be appealed, the petitioner could have been easily guided in
that regard by the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides that the
Director of a line bureau, such as the EMB,20 shall have supervision and control
over all division and other units, including regional offices, under the
bureau.21 Verily, supervision and control include the power to "review,
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or
units."22 Accordingly, the petitioner should have appealed the EMB Regional
Directors decision to the EMB Director, who exercised supervision and control
over the former.
It is relevant to mention that the DENR later promulgated Administrative Order
No. 2003-3023 in order to define where appeals should be taken, providing as
follows:cralawlibrary
Section 6. Appeal
Any party aggrieved by the final decision on the ECC/CNC applications may,
within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file an appeal on the following
grounds:cralawlibrary
a. Grave abuse of discretion on the part of the deciding authority, or
b. Serious errors in the review findings.
The DENR may adopt alternative conflict/dispute resolution procedures as a
means to settle grievances between proponents and aggrieved parties to avert
unnecessary legal action. Frivolous appeals shall not be countenanced.
The proponent or any stakeholder may file an appeal to the following:
Deciding Authority Where to file the appeal
EMB Regional Office Director Office of the EMB Director
EMB Central Office Director Office of the DENR Secretary
DENR Secretary Office of the President
Moreover, the petitioner states in its pleadings that it had a pending appeal
with the DENR Secretary. However, the records reveal that the subject of the
appeal of the petitioner was an undated resolution of the DENR Regional
Director, Region VII, denying its application for the CNC, 24 not the decision of
RD Lipayon. Nonetheless, even assuming that the pending appeal with the
DENR Secretary had related to RD Lipayons decision, the petitioner should still
have waited for the DENR Secretary to resolve the appeal in line with the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Its failure to do so rendered
its resort to mandamus in the RTC premature. The omission is fatal, because
mandamus is a remedy only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.25?r?l1
Another reason for denying due course to this review is that the petitioner did
not establish that the grant of its application for the CNC was a purely
ministerial in nature on the part of RD Lipayon. Hence, mandamus was not a
proper remedy.
The CNC is a certification issued by the EMB certifying that a project is not
covered by the Environmental Impact Statement System (EIS System) and that
the project proponent is not required to secure an ECC. 26 The EIS System was
established by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1586 pursuant to Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) that required all entities to submit
an EIS for projects that would have a significant effect on the environment,
thus:
Section 4. Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to the above enunciated
policies and goals, all agencies and instrumentalities of the national
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well
as private corporations, firms and entities shall prepare, file and include in
every action, project or undertaking which significantly affects the quality of
the environment a detailed statement on
19
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking a. Major mining and quarrying projects

(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the b. Forestry projects
proposal be implemented
1. Logging
(c) alternative to the proposed action
2. Major wood processing projects
(d) a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the
environment are consistent with the maintenance and enhancement of the 3. Introduction of fauna (exotic-animals) in public/private forests
long-term productivity of the same; and 4. Forest occupancy
(e) whenever a proposal involves the use of depletable or non-renewable 5. Extraction of mangrove products
resources, a finding must be made that such use and commitment are
warranted. 6. Grazing

x x x P.D. No. 1586 exempted from the requirement of an EIS the projects and c. Fishery Projects
areas not declared by the President of the Philippines as environmentally
1. Dikes for fishpond development projects
critical,27 thus:
III. Infrastructure Projects
Section 5. Environmentally Non-Critical Projects. - All other projects,
undertakings and areas not declared by the Presidents as environmentally a. Major dams
critical shall be considered as non-critical and shall not be required to submit
an environmental impact statement. The National Environmental Protection b. Major power plants (fossil-fueled, nuclear fueled, hydroelectric or
Council, thru the Ministry of Human Settlements may however require non- geothermal)
critical projects and undertakings to provide additional environmental
c. Major reclamation projects
safeguards as it may deem necessary.
d. Major roads and bridges.
On December 14, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2146 declaring
areas and types of projects as environmentally critical and within the scope of B. Environmentally Critical Areas
the EIS System, as follows:
1. All areas declared by law as national parks, watershed reserves, wildlife
A. Environmentally Critical Projects preserves and sanctuaries;
I. Heavy Industries 2. Areas set aside as aesthetic potential tourist spots;
a. Non-ferrous metal industries 3. Areas which constitute the habitat for any endangered or threatened species
of indigenous Philippine Wildlife (flora and fauna);
b. Iron and steel mills
4. Areas of unique historic, archaeological, or scientific interests;
c. Petroleum and petro-chemical industries including oil and gas
5. Areas which are traditionally occupied by cultural communities or tribes;
d. Smelting plants II. Resource Extractive Industries

20
6. Areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural calamities (geologic
hazards, floods, typhoons, volcanic activity, etc.);
7. Areas with critical slopes;
8. Areas classified as prime agricultural lands;
9. Recharged areas of aquifers;
10. Water bodies characterized by one or any combination of the following
conditions;
a. tapped for domestic purposes
b. within the controlled and/or protected areas declared by appropriate
authorities
c. which support wildlife and fishery activities
11. Mangrove areas characterized by one or any combination of the following
conditions:
a. with primary pristine and dense young growth;
b. adjoining mouth of major river systems;
c. near or adjacent to traditional productive fry or fishing grounds;
d. which act as natural buffers against shore erosion, strong winds and storm
floods;
e. on which people are dependent for their livelihood.
12. Coral reef, characterized by one or any combination of the following
conditions:
a. with 50% and above live coralline cover;
b. spawning and nursery grounds for fish;
c. which act as natural breakwater of coastlines.
Projects not included in the foregoing enumeration were considered non-
critical to the environment and were entitled to the CNC.
The foregoing considerations indicate that the grant or denial of an application
for ECC/CNC is not an act that is purely ministerial in nature, but one that
involves the exercise of judgment and discretion by the EMB Director or
Regional Director, who must determine whether the project or project area is
classified as critical to the environment based on the documents to be
submitted by the applicant.
The petitioner maintains that RD Lipayon already exercised his discretion in its
case when he made his finding that the application substantially complied with
the procedural requirements for review. As such, he was then obliged to issue
the CNC once the petitioner had submitted the required certifications.
The petitioner errs on two grounds.
Firstly, RD Lipayon had not yet fully exercised his discretion with regard to the
CNC application when he made his finding. It is clear that his finding referred to
the "procedural requirements for review" only. He had still to decide on the
substantive aspect of the application, that is, whether the project and the
project area were considered critical to the environment. In fact, this was the
reason why RD Lipayon required the petitioner to submit certifications from
the various government agencies concerned. Surely, the required certifications
were not mere formalities, because they would serve as the bases for his
decision on whether to grant or deny the application.
Secondly, there is no sufficient showing that the petitioner satisfactorily
complied with the requirement to submit the needed certifications. For one, it
submitted no certification to the effect that the project site was not within a
critical slope. Also, the PHIVOLCSs certification showed that the project site had
experienced an Intensity VII earthquake in 1990, a fact that sufficed to place
the site in the category of "areas frequently visited and/or hard-hit by natural
calamities." Clearly, the petitioner failed to establish that it had the legal right
to be issued the CNC applied for, warranting the denial of its application.
It is not amiss for us to observe, therefore, that the petitioner grossly
misunderstood the nature of the remedy of mandamus. To avoid similar
21
misunderstanding of the remedy hereafter, a short exposition on the nature
and office of the remedy is now appropriate.
The writ of mandamus is of very ancient and obscure origin. It is believed that
the writ was originally part of the class of writs or mandates issued by the
English sovereign to direct his subjects to perform a particular act or
duty.28 The earliest writs were in the form of letters missive, and were mere
personal commands. The command was a law in itself, from which there was
no appeal. The writ of mandamus was not only declaratory of a duty under an
existing law, but was a law in itself that imposed the duty, the performance of
which it commanded.29 The King was considered as the fountain and source of
justice, and when the law did not afford a remedy by the regular forms of
proceedings, the prerogative powers of the sovereign were invoked in aid of
the ordinary powers of the courts.30?r?l1
A judicial writ of mandamus, issued in the Kings name out of the court of Kings
Bench that had a general supervisory power over all inferior jurisdictions and
officers, gradually supplanted the old personal command of the
sovereign.31 The court of Kings Bench, acting as the general guardian of public
rights and in the exercise of its authority to grant the writ, rendered the writ of
mandamus the suppletory means of substantial justice in every case where
there was no other specific legal remedy for a legal right, and ensured that all
official duties were fulfilled whenever the subject-matter was properly within
its control.32 Early on, the writ of mandamus was particularly used to compel
public authorities to return the petitioners to public offices from which they
had been unlawfully removed.33?r?l1
Mandamus was, therefore, originally a purely prerogative writ emanating from
the King himself, superintending the police and preserving the peace within the
realm.34 It was allowed only in cases affecting the sovereign, or the interest of
the public at large.35 The writ of mandamus grew out of the necessity to compel
the inferior courts to exercise judicial and ministerial powers invested in them
by restraining their excesses, preventing their negligence and restraining their
denial of justice.36?r?l1
Over time, the writ of mandamus has been stripped of its highly prerogative
features and has been assimilated to the nature of an ordinary remedy.
Nonetheless, the writ has remained to be an extraordinary remedy in the sense
that it is only issued in extraordinary cases and where the usual and ordinary
modes of proceeding and forms of remedy are powerless to afford redress to a
party aggrieved, and where without its aid there would be a failure of justice.37?
r?l1
The writ of mandamus has also retained an important feature that sets it apart
from the other remedial writs, i.e., that it is used merely to compel action and to
coerce the performance of a pre-existing duty.38 In fact, a doctrine well-
embedded in our jurisprudence is that mandamus will issue only when the
petitioner has a clear legal right to the performance of the act sought to be
compelled and the respondent has an imperative duty to perform the
same.39 The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal
right to the performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the
part of the respondent to perform the act.40?r?l1
A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that
such extraordinary remedy lies to compel the performance of duties that are
purely ministerial in nature, not those that are discretionary.41 A purely
ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal
authority, without regard to or the exercise of its own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is ministerial only when its
discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.42
The petitioner's disregard of the foregoing fundamental requisites for
mandamus rendered its petition in the RTC untenable and devoid of merit.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
22

G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE
COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by
DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA
CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH
JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has
of late gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally
trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and
other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage.
And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a
scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.2 But
amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action,
the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of
their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect
and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas
polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official
complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national
priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier
attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution
problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once
brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for
different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse
mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that
could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents
of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus,
Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for
the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch
20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged
that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint
stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or
commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to
public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of
Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or
solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to
restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued
neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a
violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
23
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to
clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action
for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed
by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water
Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners,
stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila
Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to
80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative
Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of
contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200
MPN/100 ml.4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS)
and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce
pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project.
For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its
evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-
generated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean)
project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and
solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB
classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of
contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as
the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act
and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated
and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the
bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate
[sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and
increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide,
construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install,
operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous
substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-
generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels
that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and
appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as
well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of
wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to
revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous
fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the
purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
24
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that
obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and
liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and
engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in
removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-
biodegradable garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and
sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment
and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through
education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all
costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before
the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually
consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine
Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five
other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a
petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9,
2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated
appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent
provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart
from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning
purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a
ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and
affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision
did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions
under existing laws.7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45
petition on the following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED
UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S
DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES
CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS
SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF
SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN
GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A
MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY
MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152
under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations,
envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific
pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to
clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral
arguments.
Our Ruling
25
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the
premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial
duty.8 A ministerial duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law." 10 Mandamus is
available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but
not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain
adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy
evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned.
They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions,
including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility
studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear
and that petitioners’ duty to comply with and act according to the clear
mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to
respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for
example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which
discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain
that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the
problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s
ministerial duty to attend to such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as
defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the
other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDA’s
mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the
law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society
v. Atienza11 in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter
of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil
players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called
"Pandacan Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance.
But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an
adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal
as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty
being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in
Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines
and delineates the scope of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and
implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and
sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and
operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation
of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid
waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the
establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum
operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation
of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA
9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after
the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open
dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use
of controlled dumps.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set
forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its
charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot
be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes
the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially
according to their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that
"allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to
perform."14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to
perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want
of legal basis.
26
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and
pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are
enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions
relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to
perform these duties. Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,15 is the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of
the country’s environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine
Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as
the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality
management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Act’s Sec. 19(k),
exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its
location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent
information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and
technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality
Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-
year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope
covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless
otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions,
powers and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24)
months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall
thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said
report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve
(12) months following the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within
12 months following the completion of the framework for each designated
water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water
quality management area governing board every five (5) years or as need
arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in
the process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework.16 Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to
submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.17 Again, like the
MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under
RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that
the DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with various government
agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December
2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and
time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy,
for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of
its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track
what are assigned them under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction,
supervision, and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the
territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns
of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be
necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns
comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over
local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations
for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water
standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and
furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of
sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as
attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation
facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment,
27
and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.19 In relation to
the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation
facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution
in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code
of 1987 (EO 292),20 is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and
enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper
utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local
government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing
a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and
aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on
a sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with
coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality
standards in marine waters.22 More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be
responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the
development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic
resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national
government, is tasked under EO 29223 to provide integrated planning, design,
and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource
development systems in accordance with national development objectives and
approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to
perform metro-wide services relating to "flood control and sewerage
management which include the formulation and implementation of policies,
standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and
sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the
DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible
for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall
remain as the implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of
the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the
removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers,
waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other
pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard
Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979, 24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976,
shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations
governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It
shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national
rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon
consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and enforcement
of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel,
barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any
method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable
waters of the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown,
discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating
craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing
establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description
whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the
same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable
water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same
shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or
high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or
may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government
(DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP
Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police functions over the Philippine
territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of
the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability
to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained
the capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine
28
pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the
enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within
the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA
8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP
Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws,
rules, and regulations.25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish,
develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in
support of trade and national development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513
states that the PPA has police authority within the ports administered by it as
may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes
and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau
of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police
authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons
and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft.27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as
amended by MARPOL 73/78,28 the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure
the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the
reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is
tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and
dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the
Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial
waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said
vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain
adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as
other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would
necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are
frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as
roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps
and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable
materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as
enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an
environmental compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279),
eviction or demolition may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy
danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks
and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH,
LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other
pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With
respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite,
and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila
Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and
removal of such structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH
and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water
Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of
waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for
domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in
coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall
formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal
of sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage
treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or
a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the
Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH
is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal
of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the
requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge
29
collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their
environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment
Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education
in its school curricula at all levels.32 Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in
collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine
Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational
campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper
use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA
9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of
environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on
waste management principles.33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2,
Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound
utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the
country’s development objectives.34
One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall
pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection,
preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine
waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to
streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement
of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote
environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of
control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a
holistic national program of water quality management that recognizes that
issues related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about
water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and
quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water
pollution focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the
noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the country’s development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves
clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of
each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their
tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution
incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the
government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary
to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality
standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to
contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In
case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake
containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for
such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o,
amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD
1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15
and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in
excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to
contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the
extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and
beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are
necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR]
in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake
containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said
30
operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such
pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of
the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to
such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more
apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case,
merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup
operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution
incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions
would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which
defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the
pollutants discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in
water that result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct
the government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and
cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of
water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited
only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations that presuppose the
occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding
containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they
argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup operations" to restore
the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have
been a specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or
other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec.
62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and
cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners’ posture,
respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec.
20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed
covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of
businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly
accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far
from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope
of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents
contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled
with their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed
to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents
assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec.
20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup
operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting
definition. As pointed out, the phrases "cleanup operations" and "accidental
spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section
is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state
that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the
containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution
incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the
absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage."
This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when
appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the
quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates
that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is
caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such
instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work
for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they have to perform
cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution
incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal,
and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the
complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the
specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution
31
incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide
behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their
cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In
this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20
of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD
1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection
and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general
application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents."35
Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à -vis the
implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that
the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-
nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable
certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions
"water pollution incidents" which may be caused by polluters in the waters of
the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or
waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand,
specifically adverts to "any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water
bodies," which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the
land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants
eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are
so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly
be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies
concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to
apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be
amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been
few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain,
remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it
behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus,
Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and
purposes a general cleanup situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the
initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of
the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It
is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland
bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay.
Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no
time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the
ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It
thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-
agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about,
and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up
the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level. Under
what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus,"36 the Court
may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view
of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative
inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was
used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges
River from industrial and municipal pollution.37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other
unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Parañ aque-
Zapote, Las Piñ as) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the
Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting
waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the
accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the
Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river
systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of
the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously
addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these
important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as
much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is
Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,39 which prohibits the building of
structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways.
Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes
throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in
32
urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in
forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in
the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No
person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary
for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of
any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial
establishments standing along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major
rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as
unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly
contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying
industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary
waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial
discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River,
other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-
complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their
operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for
petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian
Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro
Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there
reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is
shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas,
Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and
leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface
and seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used
for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of
human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably
generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila
Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and
possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into
the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than
ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management
Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by
some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open
dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid
waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps
for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further
that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the
effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five
(5) years which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single
sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under
RA 9003 has yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003,
like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other
public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the
like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities
simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in
the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which
enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of
infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into
sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which
proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic
environment including "dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters,
discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous
materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid,
gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other
human-made structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to
emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and
33
agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and
obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set
timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as
defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and
mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a
historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day
to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and
sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as
they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and
cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these
tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners,
has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners
must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work
before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate
that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from
their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and
rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind
two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident
before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a
discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and
improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for
it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights,
to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental
importance with intergenerational implications.41 Even assuming the absence
of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the
bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their
obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila
Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal
of the trust reposed in them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the
CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002
Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but
with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening
events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila
Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per
Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990])
to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of
the country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275,
designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its
enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement
its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It
is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government
departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the
aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of
1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in
exercising the President’s power of general supervision and its duty to
promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec.
43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in
Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect
all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of
the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not
limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañ aque-Zapote, Las
34
Piñ as) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the
Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways
that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the
bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or
hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and
regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-
complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks
within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and
human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the
Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, 43 the MWSS is directed to provide,
install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment
facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest
possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in
coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and
maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection,
treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to
improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to
assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic
resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group,
in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall
apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and
regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately
adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid
wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from
vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects
for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in
coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other
agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other
applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañ aque-
Zapote, Las Piñ as) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and
connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of
the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and
Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group,
HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish
all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA
7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando
(Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that
discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary
landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality
of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection
with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like
undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the
appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions
of RA 9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws
on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275,
within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic
and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal
of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the
companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set
up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental
sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA
9003,49 the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
35
management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school
curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila
Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses
relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the
Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective to attain economic
growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of
our marine waters.

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH,
DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in
line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this
Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the
activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

36
G.R. No. 158290 October 23, 2006
HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES,
DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO
HENARES, petitioners,
vs.
LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING AND REGULATORY BOARD and
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require
public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as
alternative fuel.
Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation
Study of 1996,1 the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National
Capital Region,2 a study of the Asian Development Bank,3 the Manila
Observatory4 and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources5 (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership
in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine
powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air pollutants,
petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the
bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.
Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust,
dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into
the air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on
health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners
particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion
when these react to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with
hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it
creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it reacts
to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation
and leaf bleaching in plants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon
monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere
and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged
exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak
hearts.6
Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country
will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being
phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power generation over the next
10 years, and with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy
and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful
emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment
Monitor 20027, stating that in four of the country's major cities, Metro Manila,
Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10, a finer PM which can penetrate
deep into the lungs causing serious health problems, is estimated at over
US$430 million.8 The study also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused
the following:
· Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140
million.
· Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about
US$120 million.
· Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila
(averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six times in Metro
Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million. This is a 70 percent increase,
over a decade, when compared with the findings of a similar study done in
1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases.9
Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines' studies in 1990-91
and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to
the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that
pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to
27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms among school children and
15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the
children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than
their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the
emissions of PUVs.
37
To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs,
petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural
gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts of
propane and butane,10 is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest
fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum;
produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel;
reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half;
emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although,
according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more
methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming.11
Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their
petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG
as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our
ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 and Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749
otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999."
Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners'
motion to implead the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) as additional respondent.
In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the writ of
mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to
command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is required
to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.15 Further citing existing jurisprudence,
the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a discretionary act, a
ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done.
The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that
petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor
vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does
not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless
this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the
respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel.
The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement
Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the
Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 2616 of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is
required to set the specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products
to improve fuel compositions for improved efficiency and reduced emissions.
He adds that under Section 2117 of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to
implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles, and the herein
respondents cannot alter, change or modify the emission standards. The
Solicitor General opines that the Court should declare the instant petition for
mandamus without merit.
Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the
administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in accordance
with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically
Section 218 and Section 21.19 Petitioners state that under these laws and with all
the available information provided by the DOE on the benefits of CNG,
respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to recognize
CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative fuel while air pollution brought
about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the environment and
the people, is tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty which the law
enjoins.
Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners
insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very same Section 3,
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor General invokes.
In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO BRING
THE PRESENT ACTION
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY LAW
38
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE TO
IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY
VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG)
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE
PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A
WRIT OF MANDAMUS20
Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal personality
to bring this petition before us? Second, Should mandamus issue against
respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?
According to petitioners, Section 16,21 Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the
policy statement that bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in a
healthy environment. This policy is enunciated in Oposa.22 The implementation
of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These, according to petitioners,
are the bases for their standing to file the instant petition. They aver that when
there is an omission by the government to safeguard a right, in this case their
right to clean air, then, the citizens can resort to and exhaust all remedies to
challenge this omission by the government. This, they say, is embodied in
Section 423 of Rep. Act No. 8749.
Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the
government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor
vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies' awareness and
knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the
responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents' functions
and a writ of mandamus should issue against them.
The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent
government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel
the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General explains that the
function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set
forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only goes as far as setting the
maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as
alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the petition should be
addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the
use of CNG as alternative fuel.
Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only
procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners
propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered
course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in
the Oposa case,24 describes as "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice."
Now, as to petitioners' standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have
standing to bring their case before this Court. Even respondents do not
question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of
petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party's
standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the
exercise of the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the
issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the
transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand
that they be settled promptly.
Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance
to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with
public interest. The consequences of the counter-productive and retrogressive
effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of motor vehicles
immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the
legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition.
Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if
the writ could issue against respondents.
Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the
following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case
any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and
(3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 we said,
39
…It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to
require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of
conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the
petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should
have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative
duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful
cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it
must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do
anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the
applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers
powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already
possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced
hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already articulated in
operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of
1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically provides that when PUVs
are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on
respondent DOTC. It provides as follows:
SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the
emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this
Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall
review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the need
arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure
substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the
general public.
Paragraph (b) states:
b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs,
shall develop an action plan for the control and management of air
pollution from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality
Framework . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to
set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action
plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it devolves upon the DOTC and the
line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action
plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the
LTFRB.
In Oposa26 we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it
the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. We also said, it
is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to advance the said
right.
Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in
their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents
to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general
mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly
the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a program on the use
of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the
Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on
February 24, 2004. The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a
clean burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to produce
substantially lower pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project as
representing the beginning of the natural gas industry of the Philippines.
Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its objectives, the use of
CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of the
components of the program is the development of CNG refueling stations and
all related facilities in strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of
CNG-powered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66,
series of 2002, designated the DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the
natural gas industry of the country with the DENR, through the EMB and (b) in
formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4
tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for
"a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas
vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the issuance of directives/orders
providing preferential franchises in present day major routes and exclusive
franchises to NGVs in newly opened routes…" A thorough reading of the
executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment is
being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by
the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
40
Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must
petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes
PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of
of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us
mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory
vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners
4.5 (ii), Section 4 "to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.
Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of
the DOTC surveys." WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus
is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a
coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the SO ORDERED.
other.27 The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation
cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed
for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal
branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches
to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition.

In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a

balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa,28 where we upheld the
right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we
recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to
clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right is "assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind,… it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state
a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second,
the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come. . ."29

It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the
premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark
case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the
present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these
pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to

41
G.R. No. 180771 April 21, 2015
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON
STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER
CETACEAN SPECIES, Joined in and Represented herein by Human Beings
Gloria Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, In Their Capacity as
Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and as Responsible Stewards of
God's Creations, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region VII
and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape
Management Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR),
DIRECTOR MALCOLM J. SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for
Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD.
(JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD
SERVICES, INC. Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 181527
CENTRAL VISAYAS FISHERFOLK DEVELOPMENT CENTER (FIDEC), CERILO
D. ENGARCIAL, RAMON YANONG, FRANCISCO LABID, in their personal
capacity and as representatives of the SUBSISTENCE FISHERFOLKS OF
THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ALOGUINSAN AND PINAMUNGAJAN, CEBU, AND
THEIR FAMILIES, AND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF
FILIPINOS WHOSE RIGHTS ARE SIMILARLY AFFECTED, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Energy (DOE), JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, in his capacity as DENR Regional Director-
Region VII and as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape
Management Board, ALAN ARRANGUEZ, in his capacity as Director -
Environmental Management Bureau-Region VII, DOE Regional Director
for Region VIII1 ANTONIO LABIOS, JAPAN PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO.,
LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent, SUPPLY OILFIELD
SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
"Until one has loved an animal,
a part of one 's soul remains unawakened."
Anatole France
LEONEN, J.:
I concur in the result, with the following additional reasons.
I
In G.R. No. 180771, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their
case in their personal capacity, alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured
from the judgment on the issues. The human petitioners implead themselves in
a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-forms and as
responsible stewards of God's Creations."1 They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as
basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce international and domestic
environmental laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation
pour autrui.3 As the representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human
petitioners assert that they have the obligation to build awareness among the
affected residents of Tañ on Strait as well as to protect the environment,
especially in light of the government's failure, as primary steward, to do its
duty under the doctrine of public trust.4
Resident Marine Mammals and the human petitioners also assert that through
this case, this court will have the opportunity to lower the threshold for locus
standi as an exercise of "epistolary jurisdiction."5
The zeal of the human petitioners to pursue their desire to protect the
environment and to continue to define environmental rights in the context of
actual cases is commendable. However, the space for legal creativity usually
required for advocacy of issues of the public interest is not so unlimited that it
42
should be allowed to undermine the other values protected by current
substantive and procedural laws. Even rules of procedure as currently
formulated set the balance between competing interests. We cannot abandon
these rules when the necessity is not clearly and convincingly presented.
The human petitioners, in G.R. No. 180771, want us to create substantive and
procedural rights for animals through their allegation that they can speak for
them. Obviously, we are asked to accept the premises that (a) they were chosen
by the Resident Marine Mammals of Tañ on Strait; (b) they were chosen by a
representative group of all the species of the Resident Marine Mammals; (c)
they were able to communicate with them; and (d) they received clear consent
from their animal principals that they would wish to use human legal
institutions to pursue their interests. Alternatively, they ask us to acknowledge
through judicial notice that the interests that they, the human petitioners,
assert are identical to what the Resident Marine Mammals would assert had
they been humans and the legal strategies that they invoked are the strategies
that they agree with.
In the alternative, they want us to accept through judicial notice that there is a
relationship of guardianship between them and all the resident mammals in the
affected ecology.
Fundamental judicial doctrines that may significantly change substantive and
procedural law cannot be founded on feigned representation.
Instead, I agree that the human petitioners should only speak for themselves
and already have legal standing to sue with respect to the issue raised in their
pleading. The rules on standing have already been liberalized to take into
consideration the difficulties in the assertion of environmental rights. When
standing becomes too liberal, this can be the occasion for abuse.
II
Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or
juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or
entities that may be authorized by statute to be parties in a civil action.
Basic is the concept of natural and juridical persons in our Civil Code:
ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and
may be lost.
Article 40 further defines natural persons in the following manner:
ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be
considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born
later with the conditions specified 'in the following article.
Article 44, on the other hand, enumerates the concept of a juridical person:
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose
to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that
of each shareholder, partner or member.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than
simply construe, the provisions of the Rules of Court as well as substantive law
to accommodate Resident Marine Mammals or animals. This we cannot do.
Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure further defines real party
in interest:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest.-A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
(2a)6
43
A litigant who stands to benefit or sustain an injury from the judgment of a case
is a real party in interest.7 When a case is brought to the courts, the real party in
interest must show that another party's act or omission has caused a direct
injury, making his or her interest both material and based on an enforceable
legal right.8
Representatives as parties, on the other hand, are parties acting in
representation of the real party in interest, as defined in Rule 3, Section 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary
capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case and shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an
express rust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by
law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except
when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.(3a)9
The rule is two-pronged. First, it defines .a representative as a party who is not
bound to directly or actually benefit or suffer from the judgment, but instead
brings a case in favor of an identified real party in interest.10 The representative
is an outsider to the cause of action. Second, the rule provides a list of who may
be considered as "representatives." It is not an exhaustive list, but the rule
limits the coverage only to those authorized by law or the Rules of Court.11
These requirements should apply even in cases involving the environment,
which means that for the Petition of the human petitioners to prosper, they
must show that (a) the Resident Marine Mammals are real parties in interest;
and (b) that the human petitioners are authorized by law or the Rules to act in
a representative capacity.
The Resident Marine Mammals are comprised of "toothed whales, dolphins,
porpoises, and other cetacean species inhabiting Tañ on Strait."12 While
relatively new in Philippine jurisdiction, the issue of whether animals have
legal standing before courts has been the subject of academic discourse in light
of the emergence of animal and environmental rights.
In the United States, anim4l rights advocates have managed to establish a
system which Hogan explains as the "guardianship model for nonhuman
animals":13
Despite Animal Lovers, there exists a well-established system by which
nonhuman animals may obtain judicial review to enforce their statutory rights
and protections: guardianships. With court approval, animal advocacy
organizations may bring suit on behalf of nonhuman animals in the same way
court-appointed guardians bring suit on behalf of mentally-challenged humans
who possess an enforceable right but lack the ability to enforce it themselves.
In the controversial but pivotal Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal
Rights for Natural Objects, Christopher D. Stone asserts that the environment
should possess the right to seek judicial redress even though it is incapable of
representing itself. While asserting the rights of
speechless entities such as the environment or nonhuman animals certainly
poses legitimate challenges - such as identifying the proper spokesman -the
American legal system is already well-equipped with a reliable mechanism by
which nonhumans may obtain standing via a judicially established
guardianship. Stone notes that other speechless - and nonhuman - entities such
as corporations, states, estates, and municipalities have standing to bring suit
on their own behalf. There is little reason to fear abuses under this regime as
procedures for removal and substitution, avoiding conflicts of interest, and
termination of a guardianship are well established.
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is
indeed possible. The court indicated that AL VA might have obtained standing
in its own right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the
humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing
and indicated that another more well-known advocacy organization might have
had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's
standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant
consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to
commencing legal action. ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could
not identify previous activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and
commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The
court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated
44
commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in
the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.
This Comment advocates a shift in contemporary standing doctrine to
empower non-profit organizations with an established history of dedication to
the cause and relevant expertise to serve as official guardians ad !item on
behalf of nonhuman animals interests. The American legal system has
numerous mechanisms for representing the rights and interests of nonhumans;
any challenges inherent in extending these pre-existing mechanisms to
nonhuman animals are minimal compared to an interest in the proper
administration of justice. To adequately protect the statutory rights of
nonhuman animals, the legal system must recognize those statutory rights
independent of humans and provide a viable means of enforcement. Moreover,
the idea of a guardianship for speechless plaintiffs is not new and has been
urged on behalf of the natural environment. 'Such a model is even more
compelling as applied to nonhuman animals, because they are sentient beings
with the ability to feel pain and exercise rational thought. Thus, animals are
qualitatively different from other legally protected nonhumans and therefore
have interests deserving direct legal protection.
Furthermore, the difficulty of enforcing the statutory rights of nonhuman
animals threatens the integrity of the federal statutes designed to protect them,
essentially rendering them meaningless. Sensing that laws protecting
nonhuman animals would be difficult to enforce, Congress provided for citizen
suit provisions: the most well-known example is found in the Endangered
Species Act (ESA). Such provisions are evidence of legislative intent to
encourage civic participation on behalf of nonhuman animals. Our law of
standing should reflect this intent and its implication that humans are suitable
representatives of the natural environment, which includes nonhuman
animals.14 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
When a court allows guardianship as a basis of representation, animals are
considered as similarly situated as individuals who have enforceable rights but,
for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable to bring suit for
themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their very nature are
incapable of speaking for themselves (e.g., corporations, states, and others).
In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the
Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly
represented as real parties in interest. The same cannot be said about animals.
Animals play an important role in households, communities, and the
environment. While we, as humans, may feel the need to nurture and protect
them, we cannot go as far as saying we represent their best interests and can,
therefore, speak for them before the courts. As humans, we cannot be so
arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and that we know
what remedy they need in the face of an injury.
Even in Hogan's discussion, she points out that in a case before the United
States District Court for the Central District of California, Animal Lovers
Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger,15 the court held that an emotional response to
what humans perceive to be an injury inflicted on an animal is not within the
"zone-of-interest" protected by law.16 Such sympathy cannot stand independent
of or as a substitute for an actual injury suffered by the claimant.17 The ability to
represent animals was further limited in that case by the need to prove
"genuine dedication" to asserting and protecting animal rights:
What ultimately proved fatal to ALVA 's claim, however, was the court's
assertion that standing doctrine further required ALVA to differentiate its
genuine dedication to the humane treatment of animals from the general
disdain for animal cruelty shared by the public at large. In doing so, the court
found ALVA 's asserted organizational injury to be abstract and thus relegated
ALVA to the ranks of the "concerned bystander. "
....
In fact, the opinion in Animal Lovers suggests that such an arrangement is
indeed possible. The court indicated that ALVA might have obtained standing in
its own right if it had an established history of dedication to the cause of the
humane treatment of animals. It noted that the Fund for Animals had standing
and indicated that another more well-known advocacy organization might have
had standing as well. The court further concluded that an organization's
standing is more than a derivative of its history, but history is a relevant
consideration where organizations are not well-established prior to
commencing legal action. ALVA was not the proper plaintiff because it could
not identify previous activities demonstrating its recognized activism for and
45
commitment to the dispute independent of its desire to pursue legal action. The
court's analysis suggests that a qualified organization with a demonstrated
commitment to a cause could indeed bring suit on behalf of the speechless in
the form of a court-sanctioned guardianship.18 (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)
What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of guardianship is the
principle of human stewardship over the environment in a citizen suit under
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. A citizen suit allows any
Filipino to act as a representative of a party who has enforceable rights under
environmental laws before Philippine courts, and is defined in Section 5: .
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including
minors or generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or
obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court
shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest
their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice
thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general
circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said
order.
There is no valid reason in law or the practical requirements of this case to
implead and feign representation on behalf of animals. To have done so betrays
a very anthropocentric view of environmental advocacy. There is no way that
we, humans, can claim to speak for animals let alone present that they would
wish to use our court system, which is designed to ensure that humans
seriously carry their responsibility including ensuring a viable ecology for
themselves, which of course includes compassion for all living things.
Our rules on standing are sufficient and need not be further relaxed.
In Arigo v. Swift,19 I posed the possibility of further reviewing the broad
interpretation we have given to the rule on standing. While representatives are
not required to establish direct injury on their part, they should only be
allowed to represent after complying with the following: [I]t is imperative for
them to indicate with certainty the injured parties on whose behalf they bring
the suit. Furthermore, the interest of those they represent must be based upon
concrete legal rights. It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a
general, nebulous idea of a potential "injury."20
I reiterate my position in Arigo v. Swift and in Paje v. Casiñ o 21 regarding this
rule alongside the appreciation of legal standing in Oposa v. Factoran 22 for
environmental cases. In Arigo, I opined that procedural liberality, especially in
cases brought by representatives, should be used with great caution:
Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.
That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to
environmental concerns in light of emerging international legal principles.
While "intergenerational responsibility" is a noble principle, it should not be
used to obtain judgments that would preclude future generations from making
their own assessment based on their actual concerns. The present generation
must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who will
exist at a different time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the
unbridled resort to representative suit will inevitably result in preventing
future generations from protecting their own rights and pursuing their own
interests and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our children and our
children 's children. Even before they are born, we again restricted their ability
to make their own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental
cases should be allowed only when a) there is a clear legal basis for the
representative suit; b) there are actual concerns based squarely upon an
existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any countervailing interests
existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be born; and
d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of
catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is necessary.
Better still, in the light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all
together.23 (Emphasis in the original)
Similarly, in Paje:
A person cannot invoke the court's jurisdiction if he or she has no right or
interest to protect. He or she who invokes the court's jurisdiction must be the
"owner of the right sought to be enforced." In other words, he or she must have
a cause of action. An action may be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of
46
action if the person who instituted it is not the real party in interest. 24 The term
"interest" under the Rules of Court must refer to a material interest that is not
merely a curiosity about or an "interest in the question involved." The interest
must be present and substantial. It is not a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent interest.
A person who is not a real party in interest may institute an action if he or she
is suing as representative of a .real party in interest. When an action is
prosecuted or defended by a representative, that representative is not and does
not become the real party in interest. The person represented is deemed the
real party in interest. The representative remains to be a third party to the
action instituted on behalf of another.
....
To sue under this rule, two elements must be present: "(a) the suit is brought
on behalf of an identified party whose right has been violated, resulting in some
form of damage, and (b) the representative authorized by law or the Rules of
Court to represent the victim."
The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen's suit.
A citizen's suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the
enforcement of environmental law on behalf of minors or generations yet
unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are not
real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.
The expansion of what constitutes "real party in interest" to include minors and
generations yet unborn is a recognition of this court's ruling in Oposa v.
Factoran. This court recognized the capacity of minors (represented by their
parents) to file a class suit on behalf of succeeding generations based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility to ensure the future generation's
access to and enjoyment of [the] country's natural resources.
To allow citizen's suits to enforce environmental rights of others, including
future generations, is dangerous for three reasons:
First, they run the risk of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to
take part in the suit, putting into. question its representativeness. Second,
varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on
political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third,
automatically allowing a class or citizen's suit on behalf of minors and
generations yet unborn may result in the oversimplification of what may be a
complex issue, especially in light of the impossibility of determining future
generation's true interests on the matter.
In citizen's suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may file suits
for others. Uninterested persons will argue for the persons they represent, and
the court will decide based on their evidence and arguments. Any decision by
the court will be binding upon the beneficiaries, which in this case are the
minors and the future generations. The court's decision will be res judicata
upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented.25
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental
claims lies in its potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental
rights. Extending the application of "real party in interest" to the Resident
Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will
potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an
actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what
their concerns are. At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury
inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking legal redress
before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have
the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational,
scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of those they represent.
Creative approaches to fundamental problems should be welcome. However,
they should be considered carefully so that no unintended or unwarranted
consequences should follow. I concur with the approach of Madame Justice
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro in her brilliant ponencia as it carefully narrows
down the doctrine in terms of standing. Resident Marine Mammals and the
human petitioners have no legal standing to file any kind of petition.
However, I agree that petitioners in G.R. No. 181527, namely, Central Visayas
Fisherfolk Development Center,. Engarcial, Yanong, and Labid, have standing
both as real parties in interest and as representatives of subsistence fisherfolks
of the Municipalities of Aloguinsan and Pinamungahan, Cebu, and their families,
and the present and future generations of Filipinos whose rights are similarly
affected. The activities undertaken under Service Contract 46 (SC-46) directly
47
affected their source of livelihood, primarily felt through the significant
reduction of their fish harvest.27 The actual, direct, and material damage they
suffered, which has potential long-term effects transcending generations, is a
proper subject of a legal suit.
III
In our jurisdiction, there is neither reason nor any legal basis for the concept of
implied petitioners, most especially when the implied petitioner was a sitting
President of the Republic of the Philippines. In G.R. No. 180771, apart from
adjudicating unto themselves the status of "legal guardians" of whales,
dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species, human petitioners also
impleaded Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as "unwilling co-
petitioner" for "her express declaration and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter
to protect Tañ on Strait."28
No person may implead any other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner
without his or her consent. In our jurisdiction, only when there is a party that
should have been a necessary party but was unwilling to join would there be an
allegation as to why that party has been omitted. In Rule 3, Section 9 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 9. Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded. -Whenever in any
pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not joined, the
pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted.
Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order
the inclusion of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may
be obtained.
The failure to comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause,
shall be deemed a waiver of the claim against such party.
The non-inclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the court from
proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party.29
A party who should have been a plaintiff or petitioner but whose consent
cannot be obtained should be impleaded as a defendant in the nature of an
unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:
SEC. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be
joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the
reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.30
The reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be
part of the action but who do not consent should be put within the jurisdiction
of the court through summons or other court processes. Petitioners. should not
take it upon themselves to simply imp lead any party who does not consent as a
petitioner. This places the unwilling co-petitioner at the risk of being denied
due process.
Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be a party to this
suit. As a co-equal constitutional department, we cannot assume that the
President needs to enforce policy directions by suing his or her alter-egos. The
procedural situation caused by petitioners may have gained public attention,
but its legal absurdity borders on the contemptuous. The Former President's
name should be stricken out of the title of this case.
IV
I also concur with the conclusion that SC-46 is both. illegal and
unconstitutional.
SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. ·7586 or the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, and Presidential Decree No.
1234,31 which declared Tañ on Strait as a protected seascape. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the fourth paragraph of Article XII, Section
2 of the Constitution.
V
Petitioner Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center asserts that SC-46
violated Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 1 of the .1987 Constitution because
Japan Petroleum Exploration Co., Ltd. (JAPEX) is 100% Japanese-owned.32 It
further asserts that SC-46 cannot be validly classified as a technical and
financial assistance agreement executed under Article XII, Section 2, paragraph
4 of the 1987 Constitution.33 Public respondents counter that SC-46 does not
48
fall under the coverage of paragraph 1, but is a validly executed contract under
paragraph 4.34· Public respondents further aver that SC-46 neither granted
exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor violated Central Visayas Fisherfolk
Development Center's right to preferential use of communal marine and fishing
resources.35
VI
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception. of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not
be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is
owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights
for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of
the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters,
territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment
exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fish-workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
(Emphasis supplied)
I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations may participate in the
exploration, development, and use of natural resources, but only through either
financial agreements or technical ones. This is the clear import of the words
"either financial or technical assistance agreements." This is also
the clear result if we compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the
versions in the 1973 and 1935 Constitution:
1973 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIV
THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, of exploitation, or utilization
of any of the natural resources of the Philippines shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations or association at least sixty per centum of
the capital of which is owned by such citizens. The Batasang Pambansa, in the
national interest, may allow such citizens, corporations, or associations to enter
into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of
assistance with any foreign person or entity for the exploitation, development,
exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources. Existing valid and
binding service contracts for financial, the technical, management, or other
forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such. (Emphasis supplied)
1935 CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XIII
CONSERVATION AND UTILIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES
SECTION 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral. lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
49
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing
right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the
exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of
the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure
and the limit of the grant.
The clear text of the Constitution in light of its history prevails over any
attempt to infer interpretation from the Constitutional Commission
deliberations. The constitutional texts are the product of a full sovereign act:
deliberations in a constituent assembly and ratification. Reliance on recorded
discussion of Constitutional Commissions, on the other hand, may result in
dependence on incomplete authorship; Besides, it opens judicial review to
further subjectivity from those who spoke during the Constitutional
Commission deliberations who may not have predicted how their words will be
used. It is safer that we use the words already in the Constitution. The
Constitution was their product. Its words were read by those who ratified it.
The Constitution is what society relies upon even at present.
SC-46 is neither a financial assistance nor a technical assistance agreement.
Even supposing for the sake of argument that it is, it could not be declared valid
in light of the standards set forth in La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos:36
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several
safeguards, among which are these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted m accordance with a general law that
will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably
to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of
terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because,
supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for signature, it
will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it
conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it
to Congress to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the
agreement and interpose timely objections, if any.37 (Emphasis in the original,
citation omitted)
Based on the standards pronounced in La Bugal, SC-46' S validity must be
tested against three important points: (a) whether SC-46 was crafted in
accordance with a general law that provides standards, terms, and conditions;
(b) whether SC-46 was signed by the President for and on behalf of the
government; and (c) whether it was reported by the President to Congress
within 30 days of execution.
VII
The general law referred to as a possible basis for SC-46's validity is
Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of
1972.1âwphi1 It is my opinion that this law is unconstitutional in that it allows
service contracts, contrary to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations
involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,
development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In
such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local
scientific and technical resources. (Emphasis supplied)
The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration of the kind of
agreements the President may enter into with foreign-owned corporations for
exploration and utilization of resources means that service contracts are no
longer allowed by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the
1987 Constitution,38 this inconsistency renders the law invalid and ineffective.
50
SC-46 suffers from the lack of a special law allowing its activities. The Main
Opinion emphasizes an important point, which is that SC-46 did not merely
involve exploratory activities, but also provided the rights and obligations of
the parties should it be discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities in
the area. The Tañ on Strait being a protected seascape under Presidential
Decree No. 123439 requires that the exploitation and utilization of energy
resources from that area are explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress
specifically for that purpose, pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or
the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy R6'sources. - Consistent with the policies declared in
Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural
parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering
information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the
least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in
accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such
surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted to the President for
recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy
resources found within NIP AS areas shall be allowed only through a law
passed by Congress.40 (Emphasis supplied)
No law was passed by Congress specifically providing the standards, terms, and
conditions of an oil exploration, extraction, and/or utilization for Tañ on Strait
and, therefore, no such activities could have been validly undertaken under SC-
46. The National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 is clear that
exploitation and utilization of energy resources in a protected seascape such as
Tañ on Strait shall only be allowed through a specific law.
VIII
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not the signatory to SC-46,
contrary to the requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 for
service contracts involving the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered
into by then Department of Energy Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of
the government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in cases where the
Constitution or law requires the President to act personally on the matter, the
duty cannot be delegated to another public official.41 La Bugal highlights the
importance of the President's involvement, being one of the constitutional
safeguards against abuse and corruption, as not mere formality:
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of
the ConCom deliberations, as follows:
• In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used
the term service contracts in referring to agreements x x x involving either
technical or financial assistance. • They spoke of service contracts as the
concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.
• It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or
eradicate service contracts.
• Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to. put in place safeguards that
would eliminate or m minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital law
regime.42 (Emphasis in the original)
Public respondents failed to show that. Former President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo was involved in the signing or execution of SC-46. The failure to comply
with this constitutional requirement renders SC-46 null and void.
IX
Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was subsequently
informed of the execution and existence of SC-46. The reporting requirement is
an equally important requisite to the validity of any service contract involving
the exploration, development, and utilization of Philippine petroleum. Public
respondents' failure to report to Congress about SC-46 effectively took away
any opportunity for the legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and
conditions.
In sum, SC-46 was executed and implemented absent all the requirements
provided under paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2. It is, therefore, null and
void.
X
I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with the 1987
Constitution, is also null and void for being violative of environmental laws
51
protecting Tañ on Strait. In particular, SC-46 was implemented despite falling
short of the requirements of the National Integrated Protected Areas System
Act of 1992.
As a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234,43 Tañ on Strait is
covered by the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992. This
law declares as a matter of policy:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. Cognizant of the profound impact of man's
activities on all components of the natural environment particularly the effect
of increasing population, resource exploitation and industrial advancement and
recognizing the critical importance of protecting and maintaining the natural
biological and physical diversities of the environment notably on areas with
biologically unique features to sustain human life and development, as well as
plant and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure for
the Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of
all native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive
system of integrated protected areas within the classification of national park
as provided for in the Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess
common ecological values that may be incorporated into a holistic plan
representative of our natural heritage; that effective administration of these
areas is possible only through cooperation among national government, local
and concerned private organizations; that the use and enjoyment of these
protected areas must be consistent with the principles of biological diversity
and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas
System (NIPAS), which shall encompass outstanding remarkable areas and
biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered
species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems,
whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of which shall be designated as
"protected areas."44 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to this law, any proposed activity in Tañ on Strait must undergo an
Environmental Impact Assessment:
SEC. 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are
outside the scope of the management plan for protected areas shall be subject
to an environmental impact assessment as required by law before they are
adopted, and the results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the
decision-making process.45 (Emphasis supplied)
The same provision further requires that an Environmental Compliance
Certificate be secured under the Philippine Environmental Impact Assessment
System before arty project is implemented:
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the
required Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine
Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such
activities are allowed to be undertaken, the proponent shall plan and carry
them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse effects and take
preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be
liable for any damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion.46 (Emphasis
supplied)
In projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 additionally requires
that a program be approved by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The program shall also be
submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend the program to
Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law specifically allowing the
exploitation of energy resources found within a protected area such as Tañ on
Strait:
SEC. 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in
Section 2, hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural
parks, may be subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering
information on energy resources and only if such activity is carried out with the
least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys shall be conducted only in
accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the result of such
surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted to the President for
recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy
resources found within NIPAS areas shall be allowed only through a taw passed
by Congress.47 (Emphasis supplied)
52
Public respondents argue that SC-46 complied with the procedural
requirements of obtaining an Environmental Compliance Certificate.48 At any
rate, they assert that the activities covered by SC-46 fell under Section 14 of the
National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, which they interpret
to be an exception to Section 12. They argue that the Environmental
Compliance Certificate is not a strict requirement for the validity of SC-46 since
(a) the Tañ on Strait is not a nature' reserve or natural park; (b) the exploration
was merely for gathering information; and ( c) measures were in place to
ensure that the exploration caused the least possible damage to the area.49
claim any of our fundamental rights to a healthful ecology. In this way and with
candor and courage, we fully shoulder the responsibility deserving of the grace
and power endowed on our species.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote:
(a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing and STRIKE OUT the name
of Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo from the title of this case;
(b) to GRANT G.R. No. 181527; and

Section 14 is not an exception to Section 12, but instead provides additional (c) to DECLARE SERVICE CONTRACT 46 NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987
requirements for cases involving Philippine energy resources. The National Constitution, Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1234.
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 was enacted to recognize the
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
importance of protecting the environment in light of resource exploitation,
Associate Justice
among others.50 Systems are put in place to secure for Filipinos local resources
under the most favorable conditions. With the status of Tañ on Strait as a
protected seascape, the institution of additional legal safeguards is even more
significant.

Public respondents did not validly obtain an Environmental Compliance

Certificate for SC-46. Based on the records, JAPEX commissioned an
environmental impact evaluation only in the second subphase of its project,
with the Environmental Management .Bureau of Region

VII granting the project an Environmental Compliance Certificate on March 6,

2007.51

Despite its scale, the seismic surveys from May 9 to 18, 2005 were conducted
without any environmental assessment contrary to Section 12 of the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.

XI

Finally, we honor every living creature when we take care of our environment.
As sentient species, we do not lack in the wisdom or sensitivity to realize that
we only borrow the resources that we use to survive and to thrive. We are not
incapable of mitigating the greed that is slowly causing the demise of our
planet. Thus, there is no need for us to feign representation of any other species
or some imagined unborn generation in filing any action in our courts of law to

53
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA,
minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA,
ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed
FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents
SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and
MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL
and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO,
CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS
IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ,
minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all
surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA
ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors,
represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN,
MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented
by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE,
NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by
their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN
JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by
their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO,
ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented
by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and
THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced
and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the
twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational
justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have
a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National
Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal
petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological
Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation
organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for
the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original
defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in
this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves
and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource
but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as
54
well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment
be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in
his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine
archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000)
hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which
have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific
evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the
country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per
cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from
drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of
rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the
intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be
found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive
erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity,
with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic
meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare
and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural
communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures,
(f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals
and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the
entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the
absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation
and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and
operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and
the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to
process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic
climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known
as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration
that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as
well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-
growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted
timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the
aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
55
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum
or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays
included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of
this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest
the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to
plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex
"B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left
with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful
flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly
contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy
which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a
life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth"
and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article
XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article
II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the
natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
56
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable
cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment
of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause
of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No.
192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover
more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-
impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this
case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs
may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may
still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but
vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity
as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether
logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should
be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government.
They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to
court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban
logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the
same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a
TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five
(25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated
the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the
requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original
defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to
several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are
57
so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of
them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit
under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the
former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert
that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on
the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next
to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now
proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by
the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the
said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot
help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have
but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not
be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred
principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific
legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the
complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section
16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
58
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it
does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of
the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and
imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect
and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be
lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty
to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in
one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily
carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management
and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be
irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution
concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's
natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June
1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including
those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as
well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided
for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos."
Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of
the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources,
not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also
the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including
social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
59
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment
and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of
such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the
present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes
into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section
2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being
subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the
powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,
P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which
man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each
other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As
its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute,
on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced
and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and
by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should
be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to
the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth
of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise
the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted,
what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there
is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
60
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements
under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments
under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof,
they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears
stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned,
there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they
are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally
involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of
section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial
power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The
second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to
wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the
executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess
of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic
phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section
1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the
non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a
quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by
such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary
did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-
impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost
infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound
the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms
and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public
interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry
Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein . . .
61
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive
action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due
process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court
held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted.
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause;
it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be
unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin,
54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal
instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right
to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when
national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548,
October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which
reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the
instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-
impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further
that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications,
the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster
Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be
absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare.
In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts
are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is
that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property
rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise
his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent
Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
62
timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet
existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is
not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby

GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991
dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may
therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

63