CHAPTER 2 THE RADICAL RIGHT AND NATIONALISM TAMIR BAR-ON Siver the 19908, we have seen the explosion of electorally successful radical right- wing political parties and movements in Western, Central, and Bastern Europe, De Lange (2012, 173, 192) trenchantly highlights how in the 1990s and the new millen- nium these parties joined coalition governments in Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, Rydgren (2007) notes that ‘these political parties have also made inroads in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, ‘Moreover there are successful radical right-wing parties in countries as diverse as Israel, Japan, Russia, and ‘Turkey. ! "This chapter will explore the relationship between the contemporary radical right and nationalism, In this respect, itis important to stress thet the radical right includes political parties, social movements, Internet sites, radio statfons, intellectuals, and think tanks, all of which promote nationalistic or ultra-nationalistic discourses. While focus especially on the political parties of the radical right, I agree with Rydgren (2007) that the relationships between political parties and non-party movements and think tanks of the radical right are seldom exptored in the literature. In previous works T exam- ined the ways in which French nouvelle droite (ND, or New Right) intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist have provided ideological ammunition for the radical right-wing populist parties, including the notions of radical ethnopluralism and the “right to dif- ference” for peoples and nations against the steamrollers of capitalist globalization, Americanization, state homogenization, multiculturalism, and the European Union (BU) Bar-On 2007 265-176; 2013, 212-226), In this chapter, I argue that nationalism is the master concept of the radical right. Tborroyr the notion of “master concept” from Dan Stone (2013) to connote the main ani- ‘mating feature of any movement or political party. Rydgren (2004, 475) uses slightly different term, arguing that radical right-wing populist parties’ “master frame” is the combination of ethnonationalist xenophobia and anti-political-establishment pop- ulism, Stone (2013, 11) suggests that “when one examines the cultural polities of the18 TAMIR DAR-ON radical right fascism is not the master concept” I posit that the radical rights national: fein is diferent from that of the mainstzeam right in its radicalism (or far-reaching and fandamental nature), its obsession with the dominance of themain ethnic group, and its longing forthe erection of homogeneous nations and states. In adtion, this national. ism isoften populist in tone itis indebted to direct rather than representative variants of democracy; and in some cases itis ambiguous about itsreatfonship to fascism, Nazism, collaborationist regimes, or the Holocaust. In short, without etbnic nationalism, the master concept ofthe radical right, its thinkers its political parties, and its movements would nck stable anchor. ‘As the radical rights understanding of nationalism is ethnically driven, it privileges ethnic variants of nationalism as opposed to more liberal, civic variants (Kohn 2008, 574). Ase shal see, ethnicnationalismis the savior ofthe radical right its daly oxygens and_without any disrespect to Christianity—its Fathes, Son, and Holy Ghost. Without ‘ethnic nationalism, the radical right would be deprived of its principal arguments in respect to the following issues: 4, ‘Threats to cultural and national identity and even ethnic survival stemming from capitalist globalization, Americanization, terrorism, and especially pro- immigration “demographic swamping’ and cultural ghettos created through the rowing presence of nonwhite and Muslim immigrants, refugees, and asylum seokers, Williams (2006, 4-5) remarks that radical right parties have moved away from mainstream material concerns: “What people fear perhaps more than the ‘economic conditions that confront them is the loss of their identity. I is not that people do not fear poor conditions, but pethaps that they view these as more cas ily reversed than loss of identity, cultute, and values” Betz (1995, 417) points out that the French Front National (EN) and the Belgian Vlaams Belang (VB, Flemish Interest; formerly Vlaams Blok), as well as the Austrian Freiheitiche Partel Osterreichs (PPO, Preedom Party of Austria), were the first radical right parties io daw a connection between falling birthrates and foreign immigration.” As one BN propagancla pamphlet stated, immigration “threatens the survival of the French nation, the security ofits territory, the integrity of its patrimony, its cul ture its language” (quoted in Betz2993, 417). ‘2 The ways established national political parties and the EU “collude” to create & permissive iminigration regime and support molticlturaism, which leads to the “destruction? of the nation and ulimately a “osie-world civilization” (Faye 1981, 2000). Umberto Bossi the leader of the Lega Nord (LN, Northern League), ‘acctsed the mainstream parties of wanting to turn Italy into a “multiracial, mul tiethnic and multireligious society” that “comes closer to hell than to paradise” (quoted in Betz 993,417). As Pelinka (201s, 8) argues, “Right-wing populism sees rmulticulturalism as a recipe to denationalize one’ (own) nation, to deconstruct cone’s(ovrn) people” Fennema (2004, 3) insists that “the only programnaticissue all radical right paties have in common is their resentment against immigrants and against the immigration polices oftheir government” Ageinst the mainstream‘THE RADICAL RIGHT AND NATIONALISM 19 right and efi, the radical right aims to instil its supporters with radical national- ist fervor as well as profound pride in the accomplishments of the national past, It also seeks to, concretely overturn a policy of open borders for immigeants and refugees, and to replace multiculturalism with monoculturalism, How various BU states’spend too much money on a welfare state designed for immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers at the expense of “original” European nationals. Thus, the radical right promotes national preference in citizenship, ‘government jobs, corporate support, and. welfare benefits. As Kitschelt (2007, 1199) argues, “the geriersity of the welfare state” oils the immigration issue and “helps to boost radical right-wing party support” The radical rights “antl- \welfarism” i rooted in “a populist mistrust of elites, directed even at leaders of leftist parties, and a generalized rejection of intermediary representations in favor ‘of plebisicitatian politics” (Kitschelt 2007, 184). Thus, in order to bypass “litis” parliaments, the radical right proposes referenda on the welfare state, Inmigra- tion, multiculturalism, the EU and its treaties, and a number of other issues. In this way, by consulting the people, the nation would be better represented, ‘The ways in which allotment of government jobs, citizenship laws, state support for corporations, or educational curricula discriminate against nationals and favor “foreigners” Asa result, the radical right longs for ethnocracies, or the politi- cal, economic, legal, and cultural dominance of titular Buropean ethnic groups in allzealms of the state and society, which challenges the pluralistic values of liberal democracy (Betz 2005; Bar-On 2013, 138). “The linkages between rampant criminality, the breakdown of lay and order, and unemployment (of Buropean nationals) and an excess of foreigners. During the 1984 European elections, the French EN used the slogan “Two million immi- ‘grants are the cause of two million French people out of work” (quoted in Chebel Appolloniazot2, 241). “The dangers of the EU in relation to national sovereignty, the “Impotence” of national parliaments, and the lack of popular, democratic participation. In study- ing the positions of radical right parties in respect to the BU, Rodrigues-Aguilera de Prat (2013, 14) argues that unlike the radical left, which focuses on the anti- ‘worker neoliberal, and pro-big-business nature of the BU, “the ideological and programmatic centrality ofthe doctrine of national sovereignty” unites the radical right parties, In addition, ethnic or religious differences, minority rights, immi gration, multiculturalism, immigrants, refugees, and the BU are viewed as anti democratic and contrary tothe will ofthe dominant ethnic majority, asa threat to the existence of homogeneous nations aid sovereign states, and as steps toward 4 universal, “totalitarian” world order in which equality and cultural sameness reign (Griffin 2000). As Muclde (2010, 1169) explains, the redical right embraces “monisi? or “the tendency to treat cleavages and ambivalence as ileitimate” Asa result the radical right challenges pluralism within the nation andl consti- tutional limits on popular soverefgnty. The principal aim of the radical right is to restore national sovereignty through the establishment ofethnically and culturallyee 4 20 TAMIR BAR-ON homogeneous nations and states, which would restore European nations to the slories oftheir pasts. Jn some cases, nationalist pride leads to ambiguity about fas- ism, Nazism, of collaborationist regimes. Yet while the radical right shares with the fascists of the past a preference for ethnic nationalism, they do not openly reject parliamentary democracy like their interwar-era fascist counterparts (Bennema 2004.1). 7. The penchant for conspiracies, scapegoats, and “the politics of fear” (Fennema 2004, 10-12; Wodlak 2015) directed against “eneinies” whether internal (e.g. lib- erals, socialists, Muslims, Jews, Rom, etc. or external (e.g. Zionists, the BU, the United States, capitalism, elc.). Ultimately, the radical right wants to make the Doundaties of the state equivalent with those of the titular and dominant ethnic group (Mudde 2007), as well as to cleanse the nation ofthese internal and external “enemies?” “The purpose of this chapter is fivefold, Firs, I define both nationalism and the radical right. Second, I demonstrate how a general consensus exists in the iterature that ethnic nationalism is the master concept for the radical right. Despite this consensus, the dis- ‘courses changes ofthe radical right ar significant in relation to nationalism, including, the beliefin radical ethnopluralism and a tendency toward pan-Europeanism (Bar-On 2013). Thitd, I explore the discourses of movements and political parties of the radi- cal right in relation to natiohalism, focusing on immigration—the bread and butter of the contemporary radical right. Fourth, J highlight both similarities and important dif- ferences among the ethnic nationalisms of the radical right in Western, Central, and Eastern Butope. In the conclusion, I suggest areas of opportunity for researchers study- ing the radical right and nationalism, DEFINING NATIONALISM ‘Nationalism, writes Roger Griffin (2003, 152), “has an aura ofantiquity about it, even of the pre-historical” Yet Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1983) are united in | their belief that the vations types of nationalisms, as well as the nation-states that are based on them, are distinctively modern (Griffin 2003, 152). For Kohn (2008), nationalism is a mod- ern idea with ancient roots, While it is based on the unity of strangers linked through an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983), natiovialism is @ form of group solidarity ‘based on a number of shared characteristics, including common language, common. traditions, common territory, and attachment to the native soil, and it finds its highest expression in the destiny of the nation and a sovereign state (Kohn 2008, 18-19). For Gellner (1983, 1), nationalism is “primarily « political principle that holds that the politi- cal and the national unit should be congruent” Or as Mudde (2010, 1173) puts it, “The idea of the nation-state holds that each nation should have its own state and, although this is often left implicit, each state should have only one nation? For ethnic natignalists‘THE RADICAL RIGHT AND NATIONALISM. 2 of the radical right, this principle is sacred because the nation can achieve its destiny only through a state that represents and ultimately favors the dominant ethnic group. ‘To advance a liberal multicultural perspective isto be a “trator” to one’s people and the single nation, argue ethnicnationalists. Griffin (2003, 154) defines nationalism as “the sense of belonging to and serving a perceived national community” For the radical right, “serving a perceived national community” means first serving the “French French,’ “Hungarian Hungarians?” or “true Finns? as well as excluding non-domninant groups from the political community. Moreover, Griffin (2003, 154-155) highlights five other characteristics of nationalism: 4. ‘The belief that the nation possesses a distinctive cultural identity, which makes it unique from other nations and gives ita special historical mission. 2, ‘The belief that the nation has a unique set of constitutional historical, geographi- cal, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and/or genetic realities, 3. Pridein national culture and traditions. 4. The belief that the national community should form a state in which sover- eignty resides in the people and the slate is recognized by the international community. Both civic and ethnic forms, with the latter prone to chauvinism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, racism, or in extreme cases, genocide, ‘The radical right rejects lib- eral or civic nationalism and supports ethnic nationalism, It favors “natives” above foreigners in society and the state. It complains that the “true racism” isthe liberal state’ pro-immigration, pro-minority, and pro-multiculturalism regime, which “discriminates” against “natives? BuStikové (2014, 3739, 1758) claims that radical right parties aim to veverse the poltical gains of minorities, and she cites Bosnia- Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Switzerland, where popular discontent has been gen- erated by an excess of accommodation for minorities. 5 Like Griffin, Kohn (2008, 574) distinguishes between ethnic and civic varlants of nationalism, Ethnic nationalists valorize tribal solidarity, an emotional and mysti- cal connection to an idealized past, and national development. In contrast, civie nationalism focuses on liberal universalism, rationality, individual rights and self transcendence, and a community of numerous sovereign states living in harmony. This latter type of nationalism is, in theory, more cosmopolitan and colorless than ethnic nationalism and based on shared republican values, This distinction between ethnicand civic variants of nationalism is fundamental because it separates the radical right from the mainstream right. Civic nationalists stress the unity of all social and ethnic groups born on the national tersitory. In theory, they provide members of dominant and non- dominant ethnic groups with access to citizenship, welfare benefits, and government Jobs. In contrast, ethnic nationalists promote national preference, which allows the state to privilege nationals or “pure nationals” above non-netionals. Ethnic nationalists long for a homogeneous state cleansed of minority ethnic, cultural, religious, or biological sifferences.22 TAMIR BAR-ON For ethnic nationalists, “dangerous others” (eg, immigrants, Muslims, or Jews), who are supposedly outside ofthe nation, must be removed from the body politic (Albertaz and McDonnell 2008). Whereas civic nationalistsare united by merit and shared liberal ‘values, ethnic nationalists appesl to the mists of history, blood origins, and homoge- neous cultural roots. Itis thus no accident that the radical xight advances an ethnic vari- ant of nationalism, or a “specific, Manichean, form of nationalism, which emphasizes the antagonistic relationship between the Good nation and Evil outsiders” (Rooduijn +2014, 80), In practice, this means that ethnic nationalists of the radical right are more radical in their immigration and asylum policies than civic or “moderate nationalists preferring a fall halt to immigration from non-Western or Muslim countries; citizen- ship based exclusively on jus sanguins (tight of blood); complete end to worker immi- gration, asylum, and family reunion programs; zero tolerance for those who entered the country illegally, a drastic curtalling of permanent residency in order to protect the “ation? from decay; and the interrogation of dual nationals as threats to the “nation” and national identity (Akerman and Rooduija 2015, 1543), Radical right parties also demand cultural assimilation, tests of loyalty to the nation, civic education, extensive knowledge of the language, culture, and history ofthe countrys and acommitment to the dominant cultural and political values (Jacobs and Res 2007). Countries with stronger radical right parties “help to reduce immigration, whether by making conventional par ties in government tighten immigration laws and/or by generating a political climate that makes potential immigrants move elsewhere” (Kitschelt 2007, 199). Importantly established politicians in powes, from former French president Nicolas Sarkozy to a former British Prime Minister (David Cameron) to German chancellor Angela Merkel, hhave questioned the merits of multiculturalism because it supposedly creates ethnic ghettos, encourages the rise of radical Islamists predisposed toward a ‘lash of civiliza~ tions? and provokes charges of dual loyalty, thus co-opting the message of the radical right (Bar-On 2013, 45). “the Jobbik Magyarorszgért Mozgalom (known as Jobbik; Movement for a Better Hungary) and other radical right parties promote an ethnic variant of nationalism based ‘on “monuments and graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries of ancient times and of tribal solidarity” (Kohn 2008, 574). Gabor Vons, the Jobbik party leader, once stated that “we [Hungarians] are the descendants of Atti” (quoted in Kovics 2013, 227). ‘Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch Parti voor de Vrijheid (PVY, Party for Freedom), ‘could invoke the metaphor ofthe fall ofthe Roman Empire in relation to the West’ sup- port for immigration and multiculturalism: “they did not perceive the Immigration of ‘the Barbarians.as a threat until itwas too late" (quoted in Wodak 2015,31). Despite this opposition between civic and ethinic variants of nationelism, Calhoun, (2008, xii) warned that we should not be “too complacent” and posita simplistic dichot- omy betuveen out “good” liberal nationalism inthe West and “bad!” ethnic nationalism in Russia or Hungary today, We might also ask why we continue to base our political communities on nationalist distinctions between “us” and “them? which unites eth- nic and civic variants of nationalism. We underestimate how even civic liberal forms of nationalism, which have their origins in the American and French Revolutions, are‘THR RADICAL RIGHT AND NATIONALISM 23 in part based on ethnic forms of belonging rather than merely commitment to shared ral ideals, values, and constitational principles (Bar-On 2014, 2). Moreover, Billig, ‘41995, 6) uses the term “banal nationalism” to refer to “ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced ‘the celebration of national holi- days, which is an expression of “banal nationalism,” thus unites civic and ethnic sup- porters of nationalism, : Changes toward more restrictive citizenship laws and citizenship tests, as well as invit- ing radical right parties into national coalitions, point to the ways in which liberal and civic variants of nationalism can converge in practice. Vasilopoutoa (2013) demonstrates that electorally successful radical ight partes (e.g, the Swiss Schweizerische Volkspartei {SVB, Swiss Peoples Party], the Dutch Pim Portuyn List and PVV, and the French PN) have oscillated between ethnicand civic variants of nationalism, sometimes axguingin a civic vein that they are the true defenders ofthe nation’s tolerant and democratic values. ‘Zaslove (2004, 99) noted that “the Freeciom Party and the Lega Norel have been instru~ ‘mental in passing more restrictive immigration policy, limiting the flow of immigrants and the ability of non-EU labour to live, work or settle in either Austria or Italy” Mudide (2010) argues that sometimes there are more “dangers” to thehealthof democ- racies ftom the mainstream than from the radical right, Bale (2008, 19) insists that the mainstream tight ig more responsible than the radical right for rising anti-immigeant tide, suggesting that they adopted stricter immigration policies in some countries. This is the casewith the ruling Fidesz party in Hungary, which has becomea “prisoner” to the “illiberal”shetoric of the radical right (Pytlas 2016), In 2015, Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbén called for internment camps for illegal immigrants. Ata summer univer- sity camp, he argued that Flungary and Europe were fighting for “the suevival or extine- tion of Buropean values” and stated thathe wanted “to preserve Hungary as. Hungarian country” (Muelde 2016). Yet in official Fides election manifestos, the party refrains from such overtly radical right discourses (Muclde 2016). While its anti-Semitism is not as obsessive as Jobbik’, some of its members of parliament have resurrected anti- Semitic tropes about “anti-national” elementsand “Jewish financial control” of Hungary (Rensmann 2013, 227). These examples lead us to reflect on the ways in which the main- stream is influenced by the radical right, or how the radical right informs the ideals and policies of the mainstream. In this respect, Fileszis often classified as mainstream, conservative tight and Jobbik as radical right, but perhaps this approach needs some reassessment. DEFINING THE RADICAL RIGHT: A RapicaL Rica FAMILY? ‘The term “radical right” was used by Daniel Bell (2008) in an edited volume in 195s. Bells object of study was the radical right in the United States, which was distinguished24 ‘TAMIR BAR-ON byits vociferous opposition to domesticand international communism and rejection of the pro-welfare-state politics of the New Deal. Jn the context ofthe Cold Was the US. radical right tended toward MeCarthyism—an obsessive, dogmatic, and surreal search for communist enemies of the nation, Belts analysis could apply to many contempo rary Buropean radical right parties: thelr anti-communist, nationalism, and fea ofthe excesses of the welfare tate. In an age of “communism in ruins” the radical right’ anti- commamisin still exists, although today Immigrants and Muslims are often viewed as the primary threatsto the nation. "A literature emerged in the 1990s arguing that a radical ight populist family existed, “the French EN was inspired by the neofascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI, Tallan Social Movement) (Ighazi 2006), and in turn the Belgian Vlaams Belang engaged in “copying not just the posters but even whole programmes” of the FN (Mudde 2010, 180), Mudde (2002, 2) noted that the concept of “the party family” is often constructed ‘deologically. Von Beye (1983) highlighted nine Ideological or “spiritual families ‘which included regional and ethnic parties and right-wing extremist parties. Rydgren {200s) opined that the radical right parties embraced a new “master frame” in the 19808 and 19905, which le to more respectable profiles and the dropping of overt rac: jm, anti-Semitism, and anti-democratic tendencies. Ye as Akerman and Rooduij (oois, 141) argued, leaders of parties with neofascstsubcultares were unwilling 15 oF could not always, distance themselves from avert fascist and Nazi symbotism or antt Semitism. Eatwvel (1996, 174) made a crucial distinction between “esoteric and exoter appeal” related to the radical sight and its supporters, with the former limited to “closed circles” and the latter connoting what “considered wise to say in public” ‘Scholars do not agree on this“new consensus” or even on basic tezminology Inespect to the radicel right. So, for example, Mudde (2007) uses the term “populist radical right” while Carte (200s) prefers“extreme right” For Cartes parties are radical right if (0) they aze nationalistic in a xenophobic way, (2) they re racist or culturally onform- istsand (3) they reject Iberal democracy ot call or its restriction or expansion (Kitschelt 1007 3178). There are disagreements about which partis to include under the ambit of the radical right, sich as the Italian MSI, which was deeply indebted to its fascist past ana later made a transition to “post-fascism and national coalition government under ‘anew name in 3995, Alleanza Nazionale (AN, National Alliance), Art (zost) argues that the Austrian Freedom Party only became a radical right party after Jorg Heider captured control ofthe party in 1986, while Rydgren (2004) explains that the Progress Parties in Denmark and Norseay only joined the radical right family after they adapted the antt- Immigrant issuein the 19808. ‘Moreover, the radical right populist party literature is rather Eurocentric, focusing con parties in Burope and expecially Wéstera Europe. Kitschelt (2007, 98) notes that Norris (2005) and Mudde (2007) include Central and Basteén European countries in their analysis ofthe radical right, although “they are often not suflciently sensitive to these contextual differences between zegions and types of political economies” In coun ties such as Russia or Romania, former communists appeal to the same constituency ‘as radical right parties (Kitschelt 2007, 1198), which means that we should exainine‘THE RADICAL RIGHT AND NATIONALISM 25 boththe radical left and radical right, Furthermore, there is little research on the right or radical right in the Americas outside of the United States and Canada in Aftica, and in Asia, As intellectuals in Latin America are largely left-wing, they identify more swith research about the left, the people, social movements, and indigenous peoples. Yet Latin American intellectuals err in not studying the right because of ts importance and resilience inthe region, including its connections to the military, conservative and neo: liberal parties, ultra-Catholic circles, business elites, and even drug cartels (Lauma and Rovira Kaltwasser 2014). ‘While radical right populist parties such as the FN under Mavine Le Pen argued that they vere a “mass” ot “popular” party (Pourest and Venner 2011, 75), Betz (1994, 4) pos- ited that such patties combined radical right-swing and populist ideals they are “vight- swing” because they reject political projects that sought fo attain individual and social equality they are radical because they oppose the ‘established socio-cultural and social- political system" and they ave populist since.they appeal to “the superior common sense” ofthe ‘common man" Mudde (2007) highlighted three characteristics of what he termed the "populist radical right” parties: (1) nativism, or the defense of the privileges ofa homogeneous native population against immigrants; (2) authoritarianism, or the belief in strong leadership anda strong state, and (3) a pronounced populism, or a strong antt-establishment stance, disdain for established parties, anda valorization of the “little ‘man on the street” against the political, economic, and cultural elites. ‘Yet in an earlier work, Mudde (1995, 206) noted that scholars of the “extreme right” and “radical right” could not agree on core concepts, while nationalism, racism, xeno phobi lemocracy, and the strong state tended to repeat as core concepts in the Jiterature. This point is significant, as | argue that ethnic nationalism is the master con- cept ofthe radical right, Racism, xenophobia, and a strong state are tools used by the radical right in order to advance an ethnic conception of the nation and nationalism. While some radical right outfits are more critical and dismissive of democracy, most of the radical right today is not against democracy per se. Rather they are against iberal ‘variants of democracy, which hinder the emergence of the “true democracy” weddedl to the homogeneous nation. ‘in terms of the relationship between the radical right and nationalism, Mudd (2007, 18-24) holds that nativism is the key factor linking all “populist radical right” parties. “This nativism, argues Mudde, isbasedon “thebeliefthat states shouldbe inhabited exclu sively [emphasis added] by members of the ‘native’ group? while “non-native elements (persons and ideas) are farndamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state” ‘What Madde calls “nativism? is what Fhave in mind with the term “ethnic nationalism?” Tin short, nativism or ethnic nationalism is what ideologically drives the radical right. Tis the master concept fueling the ideals ofthe radical right. Furthermore, for Mudde (2oi0, 181), this nativism should not be viewed as. “normal pathology,” but rather isa “pathological normalcy” and “a xadicalisation of mainstream values” Itshould be noted that this nativism can, on occasion, ead to a defense of the West, Bucope, Christianity (or sometimes the Judeo-Christian teadition); humanism, or secular yalues—insofar as they ate presented as “authentic native culture” (Zaiquete 2008). “Denmark belongs to26 TAMIR DAR-ON the Danes, .. A multiethnic Denmark would mean the breaking down of our stable homogeneous society by anti-development and reactionary cultures” stated the Dansk Folkeparti (DF, Danish People’ Party) in its 2007 Work Program (yklund 2013, 267), “The radical right targets non-Europeans, Africans, Muslims, Immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers as the carriers of non-nativistvalues and cultures. THE MASTER CONCEPT: Erunic NATIONALISM In this section, I suggest that ethnic nationalism, or what Mudde dubs “nativism isthe raster concept for the radical right. Recall that Kohn made the distinction between eth- nic and civic variants of nationalism, while Griffin insisted that with ethnic variants of nationalism, common stances Include chauvinism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobis. Or as Dunn (2035, 369) wites, “An ethnicfcultural conceptualization of nationalism - Largely follows from a ‘primordia’ belief regarding the nature of the nation—the belief. that nations have existed since the dawn of human history. This sense of nationalism is narrows traditional and unchanging” For the radical right, ethnic nationalism, or whet Dunn dubs “exclusive nationalism,’ connotes that the national borders and the state should be equivalent with the dominant ethnic group; that national preference shoul! ‘bepromoted the homogeneous mation isidealized; that ethnocractes ate longed for; and that “enemy Others" constantly threaten to tear the nation asunder and hence should be’ removed from the body politic For the nation to be fre, sovereign, and whole, thestate., ‘must be cleansed of non-nativist influences and cultures. Remember that immigrants, asylum seekers, and Muslims (and at times Jews or Rom) are viewed by the radical right ‘asmortal dangers to the nation, more lethal than guns. ‘Some of the literature on nationalism suggests that ethnic nationalists ofthe radical right are “nationalists” and civic nationalists are merely “patriots” This position is best ‘exemplified by Blankand Schiniat (2003, 305): “Nationalism supports homogeneity within society, blind obedience, and ideatized ‘excessive valtation of one own nation, whereas patriotism supports heteroge- hreouts structures within thesociety and a critical distance to the stateand theregime. “They axe linked to different attitudes toward objects that are strange and ionalism Tn sort itis trough the erection of homogeneous political communities, Por Rylgren (2007), this organic ethno-nationalisn Is tied to myths bout the glories atthe national pat a desire to return to traditional values and the right of national majorities to protect their culture against incursions from internal minorities or inter- nationalist pressures. ‘As a result ofthe ethno-nationalist core atthe heart of the radical right, immigrants and in particular Muslim inumigrants are seen as the primary threats tothe “health” ar he ration, Yet even if immigrants are not openly scapegoated, as with Alain de senolst and some sectors ofthe AN in Italy (Le, instead global capitalism is blamed for immigration) (Igita! 2006, 35-62), the aim is nonetheless for imanigrants to sear te thelr counties of origins. If France belongs tothe French, similarly Algeria belongs fo the Algerians. A radical, worldwide cultural and ethnic ethnopluralismn is pro, weed in which internal ethnic homogenetty is highly valorized Global processes ofTHR RADICAL RIGHT AND NATIONALISM 29 tion promoted by established parties, the BU, capitalism, or the UN areseen as ‘killers’ of nations, ethnic groups, and cultures (Paye 1981, 2000). Givens (2005, 20) notes that “one of the main defining characteristics” of the radical rightis “nationalism but suggests that this nationalism isnot ordinarj, mainstream, or ral nationalism but rather ethnic nationalism, es the radical right parties are “a igrant” and promote “national preference in citizenship and welfare benefits (or ‘welfare chauvinism): ‘The radical right, insists Givens, plays on the feats associated with ‘malticalturalism: cultural sameness and the obliteration of national cultures and com ‘munities. In comparing the patty positions of radical right parties on immigration, the BU, and economy, Givens (2005, 35) suggests that “most of the positions of the radical right are derived from nationalism? Slogans of the radical right such as “Austria First” (FPO), “France for the French’ (EN), or “Our program is Germany” (the Republikaner arty in 1990) connote an ethnic nationalism as the highest political principle. These political outfits insist that the “true patriots” are the redical right because they protect the nation, its culture, and its past. The radical right is thus viewed as “the only possible guide of the nation” and the true representative of the peoples it isa nationalist antidote to supranational institutions, corrupt established elites, and political “infiltration” ofthe state by ethnic or religious minorities (Pirro 2015, 8) Norris argues that the “signature” issues of the radical right are related to xenopho- bia, nationalism, and cultural protectionism. She posits that supporters of radical right patties have “homogeneous values" (2005, 30-31), and that the parties have encour- aged more restrictive immigration policies compared to established patties. ‘The radical right parties promote strong cultural protectionism, the repatriation of immigrants, the closure of borders to foreigners (as foreigners are linked to criminality and the break- down of law and order), and economic protectionism (Norris 2005, 25) Taken together, the combination of fear of foreigners, nationalism, and defense of culture amounts to “nativism? “ethno-nattonalism,” or “ethnic nation Fennema (2004, 11) notes that the Italian MSI, the Belgian Vlaams Relang, and some members of the French BN go further than merely embracing “ethnic nationalism” instead “wefert{ing] quite openly to preva fascist intellectuals as their ideological inspiration? He also highlights hows in addition to thn nyanti-materialism anda tendency to conspiracy theories unite the contemporary radical right, What dis- tinguishes today’s radical right feom the fascist right, argues Fennema, is that they do not reject parliamentary democracy. If we move to Central and Eastern Europe, the radical right’ biological racism has become less pronounced and more ethnocentric, while its stances on democracy ate “softened” (Minkenberg 2002, 40). Nonetheless, the sharp rhetoric ofthe radical right toward “enemies ofthe nation” has even led to open violence against minorities. Jobbik’s Use of paramilitary uniforms mimics its interwat-era fascist counterpatts. Moreover, the radical right promotes at its core the myth of an “extreme” homogeneous nation, as well as a “romantic and populist ultranationalism” against the “perils” of liberal and pluralistic democracy, individualism, and universalism (Minkenberg 2002, 337). ‘Minkenberg (2002, 46) insists that Central and Eastern Europe are infused with “high nali30. TAMIR BAR-ON revels” of nationalism mixed with rabid anti-Semitism, territorial concerns, and anti system sentiments, What drives all these sues ian ethnic conception ‘of nationalism. (Gnas Pelinka (2013 24) malatains, both “open anti-Semitism and ethno-nationa}ism — dlisted expecially agast minorities” drive the radial right in Central and Hastern Burope. Treontras, in 2010 the European Freedom Alliance, consisting of Heinz Christian strache (HPO), Flip Dewinter (Vlaams Belang), an other politicians, traveled to Israel gna the West Bank in onder to stand with Israel and highlight their anti-Mislim tances {Shrouf 2055). Sectors ofthe radical ight in Western rope including the FN under ‘Marine Le Peng have toned down thelr anti-Semitism and seek “Yo prevent Isiamis sup- posed coniatnination ofthe nation’s cultural heritage” through “post-national cooper- von and European identity” (Shroufi 2015, 24) In short, some of these partes have arora “from nationalist antl-Jewish hatred to Buropean philo-Semitism,? arguing that Jewo represent an integral part of the Westem Judeo-Christian tradition and henes are wetee while “sla (not Islamism) represents a “totalitarian ideology” and Muslims {immigrants and refugees, or even sometimes citizens) are a real threat to national and pan-European caltutes because of thei radically . More discourse analyses of the ethnic nationalist core ofthe radical right, Greater attention to how “economic fationalism” including the rejection of a common currency (Marcus 1995); and national preference solutions proposed by the radical right are functions of historical, politica, social, or spiritual crises. |. An understanding of how the radical right appeals to women as the guardians of the ethnically based nation in different political contexts and countries, REFERENCES ‘Akerman, and M, Rooduijn. 2015 “Pariahs or Pertnets? Inclusion and Exclusion of Redical ‘Right Parties and the Effect on Theis Policy Positions” Political Studies 63.n0.5: 1140-1157 Albertaz2i, D, and D, McDonnell, eds, 2008. Twetty-Fist Century Populism: The Spectre of ‘Western European Democracy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 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