Code: Jurisprudence Part 5 – Legislative Department_ Page 1

A. Composition of Congress; Senate; House of Representatives

Navarro, et al. vs. Ermita,

G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010
En Banc, Peralta J.
Facts:
The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established under R.A. No.
2786 on June 19, 1960. The province is composed of three main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland
and Surigao City; (2) Siargao Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed
of seven municipalities, namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto, San Jose, and
Tubajon.
Based on the official 2000 Census of Population and Housing conducted by the National
Statistics Office (NSO), the population of the Province of Surigao del Norte as of May 1, 2000
was 481,416, broken down as follows:
Mainland 281,111
Surigao City 118,534
Siargao Island & Bucas Grande 93,354
Dinagat Island 106,951
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, a
province may be created if it has an average annual income of not less than ₱20 million based on
1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than
250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square
kilometers as certified by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if
it comprises two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not
contribute to the income of the province.
In July 2003, the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census,
with the assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator, in the Dinagat Islands to determine its
actual population in support of the house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. The special
census yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the proposed province. The NSO,
however, did not certify the result of the special census. On July 30, 2003, Surigao del Norte
Provincial Governor Robert Lyndon S. Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as
official, for all purposes, the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population of
371,576.
The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of the
proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002 to 2003 based on the 1991 constant
prices was ₱82,696,433.23. The land area of the proposed province is 802.12 square kilometers.
On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively, passed the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted
into law as R.A. No. 9355 on October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
On December 2, 2006, a plebiscite was held in the mother Province of Surigao del Norte
to determine whether the local government units directly affected approved of the creation of the
Province of Dinagat Islands into a distinct and independent province comprising the municipalities

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of Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo (Albor), Loreto, San Jose, and Tubajon. The result of the
plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.
Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands under R.A. No.
9355 is not valid because it failed to comply with either the population or land area requirement
prescribed by the Local Government Code. Petitioners contend that the proposed Province of
Dinagat Islands is not qualified to become a province because it failed to comply with the land
area or the population requirement, despite its compliance with the income requirement. It has a
total land area of only 802.12 square kilometers, which falls short of the statutory requirement of
at least 2,000 square kilometers. Moreover, based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the total
population of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands is only 106,951, while the statutory
requirement is a population of at least 250,000 inhabitants.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 9355 violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Held:
Yes; The constitutional provision on the creation of a province in Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution states: SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribed the criteria
for the creation of a province, thus: SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be
created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the
following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants
as certified by the National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
As a clarification of the territorial requirement, the Local Government Code requires a
contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau. However, the territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or
is separated by a chartered city or cities that do not contribute to the income of the province.
If a proposed province is composed of two or more islands, does "territory," under Sec.
461 of the Local Government Code, include not only the land mass above the water, but also that
which is beneath it? Respondents in Tan insisted that when the Local Government Code speaks of

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the required territory of the province to be created, what is contemplated is not only the land area,
but also the land and water over which the said province has jurisdiction and control. The
respondents submitted that in this regard, the marginal sea within the three mile limit should be
considered in determining the extent of the territory of the new province. The Court stated that
"such an interpretation is strained, incorrect and fallacious."
The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 is most revealing. As
so stated therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more
islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local
Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly, reflects that
"territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes
the waters over which the political unit exercises control.
Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical
contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, [next, or adjacent (Webster's New World
Dictionary, 1972 Ed., p. 307). "Contiguous," when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is
only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The
meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or
related to them in the statute (Animal Rescue League vs. Assessors, 138 A.L.R., p. 110). Therefore, in the
context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" — the physical mass of
land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended
that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters. It can be safely concluded
that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area"
only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature
(82 C.J.S., p. 636). The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction (In re Winton
Lumber Co., 63 p. 2d., p. 664).
The territorial requirement in the Local Government Code is adopted in the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR), thus: ART. 9. Provinces.—
(a) Requisites for creation—A province shall not be created unless the following requisites on
income and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income — An average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos
(₱20,000,000.00) for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years based on 1991
constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and
nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area - Population which shall not be less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by National Statistics Office; or land area
which must be contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers,
as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more
islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income
of the province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
However, the IRR went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local
Government Code when it added the italicized portion above stating that "[the land area

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requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more
islands." Nowhere in the Local Government Code is the said provision stated or implied. Under
Section 461 of the Local Government Code, the only instance when the territorial or land area
requirement need not be complied with is when there is already compliance with the population
requirement. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including
any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. There is no
dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations
implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot
go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.
Hence, the Court holds that the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the IRR stating that "the
land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1)
or more islands" is null and void.

Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being
implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature
of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof.
All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that
the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.

R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an
approximate land area of eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 hectares) or
802.12 sq. km., more or less, including Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47)
islets. R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to comply with the land area requirement of 2,000
square kilometers.
The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population
requirement of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000
Census of Population conducted by the NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat
Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census
of population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the
result was not certified by the NSO as required by the Local Government Code. Moreover,
respondents failed to prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population of the
original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte) would not be reduced to less than the
minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the creation of the new province.
To reiterate, when the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on December 3,
2006, it had an official population of only 106,951 based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population.
Less than a year after the proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the 2007 Census
of Population. The NSO certified that as of August 1, 2007, Dinagat Islands had a total population
of only 120,813, which was still below the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
In fine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population
requirement for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands. Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the creation of a province prescribed
in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code.

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 Navarro, et al. vs. Ermita,
G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011
Motion for Reconsideration
En Banc, Nachura J.
Facts:
On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic approved into law Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). On December 3, 2006, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of
the creation of the province under the Local Government Code (LGC).3 The plebiscite yielded
69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502 negative votes.4 With the approval of the people from both
the mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the
President appointed the interim set of provincial officials who took their oath of office on January
26, 2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized elections, the Dinagatnons elected their
new set of provincial officials who assumed office on July 1, 2007.
On November 10, 2006, petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O.
Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 175158) challenging the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9355.
The Court dismissed the petition on technical grounds. Their motion for reconsideration was also
denied.
However on February 10, 2010, the Court held that R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with
either the territorial or the population requirement for the creation of the Province of Dinagat
Islands. Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the criteria for the
creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code.
Meanwhile, the movants-intervenors filed on June 18, 2010 a Motion for Leave to
Intervene and to File and to Admit Intervenors’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution
dated May 12, 2010. They alleged that, because they are the duly elected officials of Surigao del
Norte whose positions will be affected by the nullification of the election results in the event that
the May 12, 2010 Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal interest in the instant case and
would be directly affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No. 9355. Simply put, movants-
intervenors’ election to their respective offices would necessarily be annulled since Dinagat
Islands will revert to its previous status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte
and a special election will have to be conducted for governor, vice governor, and House of
Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the First Legislative District
of Surigao del Norte.
On October 5, 2010, the Court issued an order for Entry of Judgment, stating that the
decision in this case had become final and executory on May 18, 2010. Hence, the above motion.
At the outset, it must be clarified that this Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent
Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on the second motions for
reconsideration of the original parties, and neither on Dinagat’s Urgent Omnibus Motion, which
our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Arturo D. Brion considers as Dinagat’s third motion for
reconsideration. Inasmuch as the motions for leave to admit their respective motions for
reconsideration of the May 12, 2010 Resolution and the aforesaid motions for reconsideration were
already noted without action by the Court, there is no reason to treat Dinagat’s Urgent Omnibus
Motion differently. In relation to this, the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-

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intervenors could not be considered as a second motion for reconsideration to warrant the
application of Section 3, Rule 15 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.
With due deference to Mr. Justice Brion, there appears nothing in the records to support
the claim that this was a ploy of respondents’ legal tactician to reopen the case despite an entry of
judgment. To be sure, it is actually COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 that set this controversy into
motion anew. To reiterate, the pertinent portion of the Resolution reads: c. If the Decision becomes
final and executory after the election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous
status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will
have to be nullified for the same reasons given in Item "b" above. A special election for Governor,
Vice Governor, Member, House of Representatives, First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte,
and Members, Sangguniang Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat Islands)
will have to be conducted.
It should be remembered that this case was initiated upon the filing of the petition for
certiorari way back on October 30, 2007. At that time, movants-intervenors had nothing at stake
in the outcome of this case. While it may be argued that their interest in this case should have
commenced upon the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 8790, it is obvious that their interest
in this case then was more imaginary than real. This is because COMELEC Resolution No. 8790
provides that should the decision in this case attain finality prior to the May 10, 2010 elections,
the election of the local government officials stated therein would only have to be postponed.
Given such a scenario, movants-intervenors would not have suffered any injury or adverse effect
with respect to the reversion of Dinagat as part of Surigao del Norte since they would simply have
remained candidates for the respective positions they have vied for and to which they have been
elected.

Issue:
Whether the Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors, dated
and filed on October 29, 2010 should be granted.

Held:
Yes.
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires
formation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review. The second exception attends this case.
On the merits of the motion for intervention, after taking a long and intent look, the Court
finds that the first and second arguments raised by movants-intervenors deserve affirmative
consideration.
The creation of a new province shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of
the original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
It bears scrupulous notice that from the above cited provisions, with respect to the creation
of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the

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creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and
projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of
one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in
Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality
or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites
for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and
municipalities, but not to provinces. In fact, considering the physical configuration of the
Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form
part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is,
therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442
(for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently
omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in
Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in
Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for
the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.

Aldaba, et al., vs. Comelec;

G.R. No. 188078, March 15, 2010
Motion for Reconsideration
En Banc (CARPIO, J.)
Facts:
RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos’ City Charter, by creating a separate
legislative district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress
in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill
No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May
2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated
certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that "the
projected population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the
population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000."
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition
contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold
of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
The ruling of the Supreme Court which held that RA 9591 unconstitutional for being
violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a
legislative district, the city must have "a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand." The
only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000, whether actual
or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos in time for the

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10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of Malolos
is unconstitutional.
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N.
Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of
the City of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." The Certification states that the population
of "Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291." The Certification further states that it was
"issued upon the request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in connection with
the proposed creation of Malolos City as a lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan."
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic
projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no
authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its
own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010.
In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any event,
a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in
the "immediately following election"7 after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued only if such projections are
declared official by the National Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications
based on demographic projections can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer. Third, intercensal population projections must be as of the middle of every year.
On motion for reconsideration the COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular reason,
already considered and rejected in the Decision, that Congress’ reliance on the Certification of
Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda), Region III Director, National Statistics Office (NSO), projecting
Malolos City’s population in 2010, is non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to the
other sources of Malolos City’s population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population –
PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report) and as of 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water
District, dated 31 July 2008, and Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 20084)
which Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC
extends its non-justiciability argument to these materials.

Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court would grant the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Comelec.

Held:
No; it will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and authoritativeness of
the population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-justiciable. If laws creating
legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this Court’s judicial review power, then
there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on their
constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific constitutional limitation under Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000 constituents are
entitled to representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of necessity, must
inquire into the authoritativeness and reliability of the population indicators Congress used to
comply with the constitutional limitation. Thus, nearly five decades ago, we already rejected

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claims of non-justiciability of an apportionment law alleged to violate the constitutional
requirement of proportional representation.
The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not one
which the court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question.
It is well settled that the passage of apportionment acts is not so exclusively within the
political power of the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring into their
constitutionality when the question is properly brought before it. It may be added in this
connection, that the mere impact of the suit upon the political situation does not render it political
instead of judicial.
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no excuse
for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the
means. Furthermore, there is no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing inequality of
representation, and impelled by its sense of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial
legislation in accord with the precepts of the Constitution.
Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators Congress used to
measure Malolos City’s compliance with the constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-
authoritative. On Miranda’s Certification, (that the "projected population of the [City] of Malolos
will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and
2000"), this fell short of EO 135’s requirements that (a) for intercensal years, the certification
should be based on a set of demographic projections and estimates declared official by the National
Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications on intercensal population estimates
will be as of the middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on projections or estimates must
be issued by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Further, using
Miranda’s own growth rate assumption of 3.78%, Malolos City’s population as of 1 August
2010 will only be 249,333, below the constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base
Malolos City’s population as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069). That Miranda issued his
Certification "by authority of the NSO administrator" does not make the document reliable as it
neither makes Miranda the NSO Administrator’s designated certifying officer nor cures the
Certification of its fatal defects for failing to use demographic projections and estimates declared
official by the NSCB or make the projection as of the middle of 2010.

Aquino and Robredo vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010
EN BANC (PEREZ, J.)
Facts:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C.
Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines
Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners

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consequently pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be restrained from making any
issuances and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or
fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation. In substance, the said law created an additional legislative district for the Province of
Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts in this wise:
1st District 417304
2nd District 474899
3rd District 372548
4th District 429070
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the
province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and
San Fernando were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form
a new second legislative district. The following table illustrates the reapportionment made by
Republic Act No. 9716:
1st District 176,383
2nd District 276,777
3rd District (formerly 2nd District) 439,043
4th District (formerly 3rd District) 372,548
5th District (formerly 4th District) 429,070
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:
Whether Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first district
of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of the legislative
district.

Held:
No; there is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district. The second
sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative."

10
 The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to
a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while
a province is entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population,
a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no
other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but not for
a province.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in
the Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.

Mariano vs. COMELEC,

G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995.
EN BANC [PUNO, J.]
Facts:
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by
petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., and others assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A.
No. 7854 on the following grounds: Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for: (a) it
increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within
three (3) years following the return of every census; and (b) the addition of another legislative
district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Issue:
Whether RA 7854 violates Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.

Held:
No; Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not
in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census),
the population of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said section
provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In
fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population
has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.

11
 Tobias vs. Abalos,
G.R. No. L-114783, Dec. 8, 1994
EN BANC [BIDIN, J.]
Facts:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners
assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San
Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No.
7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994.
The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The
turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted
"yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and
in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article
VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the
Constitution.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in
the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong
into two separate districts.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any
census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right
of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.

Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 7675 violates the constitution.

Held:
No; SC agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the
Constitution: ". . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).

12
 Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of
a separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section
49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into
a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject
treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably
adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73
Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI,
Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject."
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that
there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had
each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The
said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating
from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said
laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The
Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause
is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates
through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated
by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The
contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded
from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.

13
 Sema vs. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 177597, July 16, 1994
EN BANC [CARPIO, J.]
Facts:
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for
the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight
municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM), created under its Organic Act, R. A. No. 6734, as amended by R.A 9054. Although
under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it is not
part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the
plebiscite held in November 1989.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising
its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of
the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao.
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was
left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato
City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the Province of
Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s creation in a plebiscite
held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No.
3999 requesting the COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion
of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province" under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6
March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the
First Legislative District of Maguindanao."
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on
29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201. On 10 May 2007,
the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution
No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)."

Issue:
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.

Held:
Negative; the creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, which provides: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

14
 Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units – province, city,
municipality or barangay – must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local
government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such
creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a
plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution
for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government
units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative
bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided
no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to
provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the
Local Government Code, "only an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or
municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.
Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create
local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to
regional legislative bodies. In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the
ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is
another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall
be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be
created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a
population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the
creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative
district because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled
to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently
involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly
delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can

15
Congress validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create legislative
districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress: Under the
present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested
exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: SECTION 5. (1) The
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make
a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this
section.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase,
through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers
Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts
necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress
exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that
regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of
Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only
through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, we held that the "power of
redistricting is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws," and thus is
vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion
legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable
membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be
embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for
regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national
legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body,
cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly
or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides,
"The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power except on the following matters: (k) National
elections..." Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national
elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections.
Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in
the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its
occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a

16
regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative
powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national
funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on
the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional
offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office.

Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC,

G.R. No. 176970, December 8, 2008
EN BANC [BRION, J.]
Facts:
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed
and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone
Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro." This law eventually became Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to two. For the election
of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the
second district, depending on their place of residence. The constituents of each district would elect
their own representative to Congress as well as eight members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing
for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for
the division or conversion of a local government unit. He prayed for the issuance of an order
directing the respondents to cease and desist from implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for
a single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro. The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts
and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local government unit, and does not merely provide
for the City's legislative apportionment.

Issue:
Whether R.A. No. 9371 converts and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local
government unit.

Held:
Negative; legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as the
determination of the number of representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may
send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the
population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power
among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in
legislative districts brought about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional
requirement of equality of representation.
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the 1987 Constitution lays down the rules
on legislative apportionment under its Section 5 which provides:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty
members unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of

17
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, continuous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, the
authority to act has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature undertakes the
apportionment and reapportionment of legislative districts, and likewise acts on local
government units by setting the standards for their creation, division, merger, abolition and
alteration of boundaries and by actually creating, dividing, merging, abolishing local
government units and altering their boundaries through legislation. Other than this, not much
commonality exists between the two provisions since they are inherently different although they
interface and relate with one another.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and
the means to make a legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively
heard. As above stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting
power among districts." Hence, emphasis is given to the number of people represented; the
uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the representative districts; and accessibility
and commonality of interests in terms of each district being, as far as practicable, continuous,
compact and adjacent territory. In terms of the people represented, every city with at least 250,000
people and every province (irrespective of population) is entitled to one representative. In this
sense, legislative districts, on the one hand, and provinces and cities, on the other, relate and
interface with each other. To ensure continued adherence to the required standards of
apportionment, Section 5(4) specifically mandates reapportionment as soon as the given standards
are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X,
Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered." Its concern is the commencement, the
termination, and the modification of local government units' corporate existence and territorial
coverage; and it speaks of two specific standards that must be observed in implementing this
concern, namely, the criteria established in the local government code and the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Under the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) passed in 1991, the criteria of income, population and land
area are specified as verifiable indicators of viability and capacity to provide services. The division
or merger of existing units must comply with the same requirements (since a new local government
unit will come into being), provided that a division shall not reduce the income, population, or
land area of the unit affected to less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the Code.
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on
the requirement of a plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly
require a plebiscite to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary
of a local government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment

18
or reapportionment provision. In Tobias v. Abalos, a case that arose from the division of the
congressional district formerly covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate districts, we
confirmed this distinction and the fact that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative reapportionment.
The plebiscite issue came up because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in the course of
its conversion into a highly urbanized city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining why
this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite was necessary for San Juan because the objective
of the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as required by
Article X, Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of a new legislative district only
followed as a consequence. In other words, the apportionment alone and by itself did not call for
a plebiscite, so that none was needed for San Juan where only a reapportionment took place.
A Bit of History:
 In Macias v. COMELEC, we first jurisprudentially acknowledged the American roots of
our apportionment provision, noting its roots from the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution and from the constitutions of some American states. The Philippine Organic
Act of 1902 created the Philippine Assembly, the body that acted as the lower house of the
bicameral legislature under the Americans, with the Philippine Commission acting as the
upper house. While the members of the Philippine Commission were appointed by the U.S.
President with the conformity of the U.S. Senate, the members of the Philippine Assembly
were elected by representative districts previously delineated under the Philippine Organic
Act of 1902 pursuant to the mandate to apportion the seats of the Philippine Assembly
among the provinces as nearly as practicable according to population. Thus, legislative
apportionment first started in our country.
 The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 maintained the apportionment
provision, dividing the country into 12 senate districts and 90 representative districts
electing one delegate each to the House of Representatives. Section 16 of the Act
specifically vested the Philippine Legislature with the authority to redistrict the Philippine
Islands.
 Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 retained the concept of legislative
apportionment together with "district" as the basic unit of apportionment; the concern was
"equality of representation . . . as an essential feature of republican institutions."
Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen that the holding of a plebiscite was
never a requirement in legislative apportionment or reapportionment. After it became
constitutionally entrenched, a plebiscite was also always identified with the creation, division,
merger, abolition and alteration of boundaries of local government units, never with the
concept of legislative apportionment.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political
unit because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and
members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political subdivision through which
functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately be described as a
representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike
the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in
behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people
who will choose a representative in their national affairs. Unlike a province, which has a governor;
a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay, which has a punong barangay, a

19
district does not have its own chief executive. The role of the congressman that it elects is to ensure
that the voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the
legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that
must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite
in the creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are the
territorial and political subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality on the authority of
the Constitution and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that
Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose boundaries can be altered based on
standards again established by both the Constitution and the Legislature. A local government unit's
corporate existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority
of the members of its Sanggunian.
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in
accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the
Constitution.
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de
Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this
Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan,
Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao,
Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall
comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an,
Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto,
Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the
second district.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate
entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its
administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and
intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into
two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives. Thus, Article X,
Section 10 of the Constitution does not come into play and no plebiscite is necessary to validly
apportion Cagayan de Oro City into two districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries effects beyond the creation of another
congressional district in the city by providing, as reflected in COMELEC Resolution No. 7837,
for additional Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for along the lines of the congressional
apportionment made.
However, neither does this law (R.A. No. 6636) have the effect of dividing the City of
Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide the city
either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter representation by
giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.

Issue 2:
Whether R.A. No. 9371 violates the principle of equality of representation.

Held:

20
 Negative. The petitioner argues that the distribution of the legislative districts is unequal.
District 1 has only 93,719 registered voters while District 2 has 127,071. District 1 is composed
mostly of rural barangays while District 2 is composed mostly of urban barangays. Thus, R.A. No.
9371 violates the principle of equality of representation.
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides that the basis for districting shall
be the number of the inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of registered voters therein.
We settled this very same question in Herrera v. COMELEC when we interpreted a provision in
R.A. No. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313 that applied to the Province of Guimaras. We
categorically ruled that the basis for districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province of
Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas
P. Africa, Administrator of the National Statistics Office.
The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide information about the actual population of
Cagayan de Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the August 2007 census of the National
Statistics Office which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de Oro's first district have a
total population of 254,644, while the second district has 299,322 residents. Undeniably, these
figures show a disparity in the population sizes of the districts.

B. Party List - Republic Act 7941

Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC,
324 SCRA 244; October 6, 2000
EN BANC [PANGANIBAN, J.]
Facts:
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of
government -- the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or
sectoral party or organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the
election of party-list representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the
House of Representatives as regular members. In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the
House -- one for a district congressman and another for a party-list representative.
Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:
"Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred
and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector."

21
 Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the "selection or election" of
party-list representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995.
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law
(RA 7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall
constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No.
2847, prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives
through the party-list system.
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously
with the national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and
coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent
of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives
belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes.
PAG-ASA (People’s Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government Towards
Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to Proclaim
[the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that the
filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the
literal application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941
would defeat this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short
of the 52 party-list representatives who should actually sit in the House.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed
Resolution granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38
respondents who, in addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives.
It held that "at all times, the total number of congressional seats must be filled up by eighty (80%)
percent district representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating
the 52 seats, it disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11
(b) of RA 7941.
The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on
the basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected
to the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They
contended that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions
garnering at least two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the
House of Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated
to those which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast
for the winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Comelec en banc held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled
the two percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral
or group interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two
political parties, three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x
x. Such strict application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the

22
Constitution and the legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in
order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House
of Representatives x x x." Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying
with the constitutional and statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the
House of Representatives."
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to
be filled up has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted
RA 7941, by which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the
party-list election must obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in
order to qualify for a seat in the House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with
this legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations
or coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty
percent party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up
completely. The Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters
themselves are the ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how
many should represent them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties,
avers that the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the
two percent vote requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application
would make it mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.

Issue:
Whether the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling.

Held:
It is merely a ceiling; clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives
the determinant in arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall
comprise "twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party-list." We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:

This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may
be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list
seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the
1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:

23
 The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be
filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is "No."
The Constitution simply states that "the party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list."
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily
conveys the equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define
and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution
explicitly sets down only the percentage of the total membership in the House of
Representatives reserved for party-list representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said
earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the
election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them.
It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating
in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in
order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could
have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." Furthermore, no
winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House of
Representatives.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section
5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list
seats in Congress.
The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed Resolutions should be nullified, but
disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.

Issue 2:
Whether the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section
11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

Held:
Yes; the two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the
Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or
representative state, all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by
representatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must
have the mandate of a sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the
party-list system, the result might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress.
Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned according to "the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representation.

Issue 3:
How should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined?

24
Held:
The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties") according to the votes
they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes
cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the
total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter,
"those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute additional seats
"proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment:
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of
the votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat. Translated in
figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats;
another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will
be entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of
comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example,
when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6 percent.
Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats and
Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each
uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or
more times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats as the
other one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be contravened
and the law rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was
developed by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing
party-list seats in the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a
qualified party would be entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to
be allocated by the total number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the
total number of votes garnered by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting
product will be the number of additional seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:

The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the
descending order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election
results, the distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:

25
 The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the
Philippine setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty
percent allocation.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents,
as well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each
received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for
all the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are
guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation of additional
seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as the "first"
party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in
order to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that
to which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes. For example,
the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to two additional seats.
Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the same number of
seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first party. Depending on the
proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats has already been
predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party
for two reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1,

26
and (2) the formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing
as a fraction of a seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty
percent allocation. An academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not
necessary because the present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting
percentages obtained, will definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis
given by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to
one seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second
party, it should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore,
for computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:

If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at
least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall
be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without
a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party
shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent,
then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to
the maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than
the total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for
the highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to
which all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in
the House of Representatives.
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled
to one additional seat or a total of two seats.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three: The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other
qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed
by the following complex fraction:

27
 In simplified form, it is written as follows:

Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the
number of votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result
would be zero additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-
eight (38) herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list
seat, because it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and
proportional representation.

Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 177271, May 4, 2007
EN BANC [GARCIA, J.]
Facts:
In the first petition, docketed as G.R. No. 177271, petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-
RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR,) assail the various Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list
elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective
nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System
Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In the
second, docketed as G.R. No. 177314, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation

28
and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 dated April 3, 2007
effectively denying their request for the release or disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
fourteen accredited participating party-list groups mentioned in petitioner Rosales’ previous letter-
request.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 177271 have the following additional prayers: 1) that the 33
private respondents named therein be "declared as unqualified to participate in the party-list
elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition for failure to comply with the guidelines
prescribed by the [Court] in [Ang Bagong Bayani v. Comelec].

Issue:
Whether the 33 private respondents named therein be "declared as unqualified to
participate in the party-list elections as sectoral organizations, parties or coalition.

Held:
No; the Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR
for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. For, such course
of action would entail going over and evaluating the qualities of the sectoral groups or parties in
question, particularly whether or not they indeed represent marginalized/underrepresented groups.
The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside
the office of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings,
the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed
facts on record.
The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence.
Petitioners BA-RA 7941’s and UP-LR’s posture that the Comelec committed grave abuse
of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without simultaneously determining the
qualifications of their nominees is without basis. Nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement
that the qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation
of an organization. And as aptly pointed out by private respondent Babae Para sa Kaunlaran (Babae
Ka), Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941 requires a petition for registration of a party-list organization to
be filed with the Comelec "not later than ninety (90) days before the election" whereas the
succeeding Section 8 requires the submission "not later than forty-five (45) days before the
election" of the list of names whence party-list representatives shall be chosen.

Issue 2:
Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as
guaranteed by the Constitution.

Held:
Yes; the right to information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public,
or the citizens to be precise. And for every right of the people recognized as fundamental lies a
corresponding duty on the part of those who govern to respect and protect that right. This is the
essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Without a government’s acceptance of the

29
limitations upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an
acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill
of Rights becomes a sophistry.
By weight of jurisprudence, any citizen can challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise
of his right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen
by the simple fact of his citizenship possesses the right to be informed, objections on ground of
locus standi are ordinarily unavailing.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of
access to official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people’s right to know is
limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
Similarly, the policy of full disclosure is confined to transactions involving "public interest" and is subject
to reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Too, there is also the need of preserving a measure of
confidentiality on some matters, such as military, trade, banking and diplomatic secrets or those affecting
national security.
The terms "public concerns" and "public interest" have eluded precise definition. But both
terms embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want
to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally
whet the interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on
a case to case basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of
the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for
a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus,
therefore, lies.

CIBAC vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 172103, April 13, 2007
EN BANC [VELASCO, JR., J.]
Facts:
The COMELEC, sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers for the Party-List
System, issued Resolution No. NBC 04-004, which proclaimed petitioner CIBAC as one of those
which qualified to occupy a seat in Congress having received the required two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list representatives. In the computation for additional seats for the
parties, the COMELEC adopted a simplified formula of one additional seat per additional 2%,
thereby foreclosing the chances of CIBAC to gain an additional seat under the party-list system
for having received less than what was prescribed by the poll body.
Comelec Commissioner resolves to adopt the simplified formula of one additional seat per
additional two percent of the total party-list votes in the proclamation of the party-list winners in
the coming 10 May 2004 National and Local Elections.’
CIBAC - 3.8638
BUTIL - 3.3479
PM - 3.4947
Following the simplified formula of the Commission, after the first 2% is deducted from
the percentage of votes of the above-named party-lists, they are no longer entitled to an additional

30
seat. It is worth mentioning that the Commission, consistent with its formula, denied the petition
for a seat of ABA-AKO and ANAD after garnering a percentage of votes of 1.9900 and 1.9099
respectively.
Petitioner CIBAC asseverates that the COMELEC committed a serious departure from
settled jurisprudence amounting to grave abuse of discretion when it mistakenly relied on the
"simplified formula" as the basis for its resolution. Moreover, it stressed that the COMELEC
simplified formula runs counter to the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan Muna formula which used
the "number of allotted seats for the first party" as multiplier. If the Ang Bagong Bayani and Bayan
Muna formula were applied, CIBAC would be entitled to one additional seat, thus:

Issue:
Whether CIBAC is entitled for an additional seat.

Held:
No; the Court, in the leading case of Veterans, listed the four (4) inviolable parameters to
determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election mandated by the Constitution and
R.A. 7941, as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation––the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold––only those parties garnering a minimum of two
percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat
in the House of Representatives.
Third, the three-seat limit––each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation––the additional seats which a qualified party is
entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
In determining the number of additional seats for each party-list that has met the 2%
threshold, "proportional representation" is the touchstone to ascertain entitlement to extra seats.
The correct formula in ascertaining the entitlement to additional seats of the first party and
other qualified party-list groups was clearly explicated in Veterans.
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at
least six percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall
be entitled to two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without
a rounding off is equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party
shall have one additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent,
then the first party shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted the six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the
total number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the
highest rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which

31
all the parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the
House of Representatives.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties: The next step is to solve for the
number of additional seats that the other qualified parties are entitled to, based on proportional
representation.

The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole
number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers
and are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in
the awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining
absolute proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum
of two additional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party
may be entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself
has set the limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant
parameter.
Applying the Veterans formula in petitioner’s case, we reach the conclusion that CIBAC
is not entitled to an additional seat. Party-List Canvass Report No. 20 contained in the petition
shows that the first party, Bayan Muna, garnered the highest number of votes, that is, a total of
1,203,305 votes. Petitioner CIBAC, on the other hand, received a total of 495,190 votes. It was
proclaimed that the first party, Bayan Muna, was entitled to a maximum of three (3) seats based
on June 2, 2004 Resolution No. NBC 04-004 of the COMELEC. A computation using the
Veterans formula would therefore lead us to the following result:

Since petitioner CIBAC got a result of 0.82304986 only, which is less than one (1),
then it did not obtain or reach a whole number. Petitioner has not convinced us to deviate
from our ruling in Veterans that "in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact
whole number is necessary." Clearly, petitioner is not entitled to an additional seat.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed March 7, 2006
Comelec Resolution No. 06-0248 is hereby AFFIRMED only insofar as it denied petitioner
CIBAC’s motion for the proclamation of its second nominee to an additional seat under the 2004
party-list elections. The portion of Comelec Resolution No. 06-0248, which adopted and applied
the "simplified formula of the Commission on the matter per Comelec Resolution No. 6835
promulgated 08 May 2004," is annulled and set aside. Respondent Comelec is ordered to strictly

32
apply the Veterans formula in determining the entitlement of qualified party-list groups to
additional seats in the party-list system.

Bagong Bayani-OFW vs. COMELEC,

G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
Facts:
With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration
filed by sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec,
"[v]erifications were made as to the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and
hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard. With the number of these
petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of these petitions as
well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two
(2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political
parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s]
hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only
on 10 February 2001."
On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition
praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of
Political Parties/Sectoral Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System
for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked,
as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that
the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth
also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein
respondents.
Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor
Party filed a Petition 9 before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No.
147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001,
the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five
days from notice.

Issue 1:
Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is
there no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?

Held:
Yes, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-
list elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution and the Rules of Court, such challenge
may be brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission
en banc; hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under
Section 1 (d), Rule 13 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

33
Facts:
In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of
political parties in the party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned
Resolution." For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objects to the participation of "major political
parties." On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties,
submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in the party-
list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional
and sectoral parties or organizations."

Issue 2:
Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

Held:
Yes; under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from
the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI
of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties
may be registered under the party-list system.
"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid,
except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list
system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to
appoint poll watchers in accordance with law."
Indubitably, therefore, political parties – even the major ones -- may participate in the
party-list elections.

Issue 3:
Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented'
sectors and organizations.

Held:
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however,
that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite
character of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
provides as follows:
"(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

34
 (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector."
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves. The
foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of
the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of
Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that
will benefit the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack of well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district,
because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a
distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization
or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency" refers to the absence of a traditionally
identifiable electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government.
Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identified with the "marginalized or
underrepresented."

Issue 4:
Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785."

Held:
Yes; rom its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to
appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have
ignored the facet of the party-list system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before
the Court that any group, even the non-marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates
in the party-list elections.

35
 When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates
or ignores the Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion.
In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright
disqualification of the major political parties – Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and
PMP – on the ground that under Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the
five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues
that because of this, they have the "advantage of getting official Comelec Election Returns,
Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x." We note, however, that this accreditation
does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for
the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of
Republic Act No. 7166.
The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed
to participate in the party-list elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the
Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culled from the law and the
Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized
and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show --
through its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and
track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.
Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And
it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of
such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the
Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory
policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x
to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, while they are not disqualified
merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they represent
the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented.
Third, in view of the objections directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang
Yumabong, which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional
provision that the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system.
Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941,
which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as follows:
"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party,
foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members
or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

36
 (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at
least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two
(2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity
funded or assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or
organization must be a group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must
be independent of the government.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must
likewise do so.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and
underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the
nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a
retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow
otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and
underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the
nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole.

Banat vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009
EN BANC [CARPIO, J.]
Facts:
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The
COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System. On 27 June
2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided
by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition
because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the
national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling,
that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats."
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-
60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list
elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC), Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon
Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis,
Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono.
The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic. The Commission En Banc in NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re "In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and
Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-

37
List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections" resolved among others that
the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the
canvass of the party-list results."
BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC
Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No.
07-88.
In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to
allocate party-list representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2%
requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total
Members of the House of Representatives including those from the party-list groups as
prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941
and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats
shall have to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per
centum (2%) of the total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups
shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list
groups under the immediately preceding paragraph and after deducting from their total the
votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted proportionately to
all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2%
threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941. Forty-four (44) party-list seats
will be awarded under BANAT’s first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is
declared unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list representatives by following
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a
nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by each party, organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes
cast for the party-list system.
Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANAT’s second interpretation.

Issue:
Whether the two percent threshold and "qualifier" votes prescribed by the same Section
11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

Held:
[The petitions have partial merit]. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election
has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

38
 First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list
congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of
Representatives, including those elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of
two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a
seat in the House of Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes
it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and
two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party
is entitled to shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical
interpretation of the term "proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit
the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.
After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list
representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.
All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under
the Party-List System, as well as on the formula to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list
candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are numerous
interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of "additional seats" under the
Party-List System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule, and Justice Vicente V. Mendoza’s
dissent in Veterans presented Germany’s Niemeyer formula as an alternative.
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. In determining the allocation of seats
for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the
lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of
the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. — The
COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide
basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or
coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered
over the total votes for the party-list.
Votes Garnered
Rank Party Votes Garnered over Total Votes for Guaranteed Seat
Party-List, in %
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1

39
 3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that "those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes." This is where petitioners’ and intervenors’ problem with the formula in Veterans
lies. Veterans interprets the clause "in proportion to their total number of votes" to be in proportion
to the votes of the first party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No.
7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of
the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party
list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of
the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million
votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of
the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the
first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of
55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself
even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes
cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes
for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed
50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two
percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of
additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each
party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by
15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the
second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats,
38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System
and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the

40
percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining
available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all
available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the
second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of
seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:
Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats
Votes Guaranteed Additional (B) plus
Garnered Applying
over Seat Seats (C), in
Votes the three
Rank Party Total Votes (First (Second whole
Garnered for Party seat cap
Round) Round) integers
List, in % (E)
(A) (B) (C) (D)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
BAYAN
2 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
MUNA
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
COOP-
9 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
NATCCO
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-
list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats
are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one
whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
As whether the major political parties can participate in party-list system:

41
 Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly
intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent
sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state
that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations
for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party
participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its
sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their
chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can establish a fisherfolk wing
to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees.
Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organization’s
nominee "wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" as there is no financial status required in
the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or
she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior
citizen.
However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those
who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the
Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

Atong Paglaum vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
EN BANC [CARPIO, J.]
Facts:
The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations
registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant
Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National
Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to
apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an
organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."
These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI,
1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC, AT, ARARO, AGRI,
AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG,
ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM, AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-

42
IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK,
SENIOR CITIZENS) were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the
13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision
governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders.

Issue 1:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by
cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.

Held:
We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following
prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming 13
May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters
in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we
remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are
qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections, under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.
Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include
not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner
Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they
field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this
Constitution."
There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution expressly
rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that
they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.
The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list
system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, which states: Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not
more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or
organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations.

43
National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need
not represent any particular sector.
R.A. No. 7941; Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism
of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition
may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate
in the party-list system.
R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent
the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under
the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and
exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How
will these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district
elections, participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system? To
exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary struggle,
leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is,
apart from being obviously senseless, patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly
different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a sectoral party and need
not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or
regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient
that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same
governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens.
How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941
with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987
Constitution on the matter? The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to
the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically "marginalized and
underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these
sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must
have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It
is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the
economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as
classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district
elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they
neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system
are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically
reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack

44
well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the
House of Representatives.
To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the
accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are
expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives.’
"However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party
xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang
Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC’s refusal to register sectoral wings
officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice
when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system, even
through their sectoral wings.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties
on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth
Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. Thus, major political parties
can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to
the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list
elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through
their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or
lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the
House of Representatives.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in
party-list elections so as to encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies
to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared
towards the entry, as members of the House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and
underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them a voice
in law-making. Thus, to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields
candidates in the legislative district elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register under the party-list
system.
In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling
further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in
party-list elections, abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987
Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have
committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the
allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed the then

45
prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that
the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that
the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would not be in accord
with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT in determining who are qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list
elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule that a party may appeal to this Court from
decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may
participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall
adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-
list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or
lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees
of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those
that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations
must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong
to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been
disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along

46
sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners'
nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although
they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral
parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party
may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party
has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of
petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and
desist from engaging in socio-economic or political experimentations contrary to what the
Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution.
Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now
possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new
parameters prescribed by this Court.
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have
been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names of
petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision but they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list
elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include the names
of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed in this Decision.
The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This
Decision is immediately executory.

Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 192803, December 10, 2013.
EN BANC [LEONEN, J.]
Facts:
Petitioner, Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc.,(ARARO) was a duly
accredited party-list. It garnered a total of 147,204 votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked
fiftieth. Comelec En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed twenty-
eight (28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of thirty-five (35) seats guaranteed
and additional seats.
Petitioner then filed an election protest before the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal questioning the Resolution of the Commission on Elections that proclaimed the 28 party-
list groups. Without waiting for the resolution of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
the petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The petitioner asks that this Court: modify the
Commission on Elections’ interpretation of the formula stated in BANAT v. COMELEC by

47
making the divisor for the computation of the percentage votes, from total number of votes cast
minus the votes for the disqualified party-list candidates, to the total number of votes cast
regardless whether party-list groups are disqualified among others.
The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on Elections is flawed
because votes that were spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not counted.
According to the petitioner, around seven million (7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result
of the Commission on Elections’ erroneous interpretation. The figure presented by petitioner
resulted from the following computations:
37,377,371 (Number of voters who actually voted LESS votes for disqualified
party lists)
less 30,264,579 (Number of votes for party-list candidates LESS number of votes
for disqualified party-list candidates)
7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded votes according to petitioner ARARO)
The National Board of Canvassers’ Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula used in
Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC to
arrive at the winning party-list groups and their guaranteed seats, where:

The Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list should be greater than or equal
to 2% or 0.02 to entitle a party-list candidate to one (1) seat in the first round. There will be a
second round if the total number of guaranteed seats awarded in the first round is less than the total
number of party-list seats available. Thus:

If the total seats available for party-lists are not yet awarded after the second round (this is
computed by getting the sum of the seats awarded in the first round and the additional seats
awarded in the second round), the next in the party-list ranking will be given one (1) seat each
until all seats are fully distributed. A three-seat cap per party-list, however, is imposed on winning
groups. Fractional seats are not rounded off and are disregarded.
The petitioner argues that the Commission on Elections’ interpretation of the formula used
in BANAT v. COMELEC is flawed because it is not in accordance with the law. The petitioner
distinguishes the phrases, valid votes cast for party-list candidates on the one hand as against votes
cast for the party-list system on the other.
The petitioner argues that the correct interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No.
7941 or the Party-list Law does not distinguish between valid and invalid votes. Commission on
Elections through the Office of the Solicitor General took the position that invalid or stray votes
should not be counted in determining the divisor.

Issue:
Whether stray votes should be counted in determining the divisor in Party-list law.

48
Held:
This case is moot and academic. Several supervening events have already rendered this
case moot and academic. First, the Commission on Elections En Banc already proclaimed other
winning party-list groups. Second, the term of office of the winning party-list groups in the May
2010 national elections ended on June 30, 2013. Finally, the conduct of the May 13, 2013 elections
resulted in a new set of party-list groups.
However, the following exceptions to the rule of declining jurisdiction over moot and
academic cases are allowed: (1) there was a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case
involved a situation of exceptional character and was of paramount public interest; (3) the issues
raised required the formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public;
and (4) the case was capable of repetition yet evading review.
In Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, we reversed the Commission on
Elections’ ruling that the respondent parties, coalitions, and organizations were each entitled to a
party-list seat despite their failure to reach the 2% threshold in the 1998 party-list election.
Veterans also stated that the 20% requirement in the Constitution is merely a ceiling.
In BANAT v. COMELEC, we declared the 2% threshold in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats as void.
The most recent Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC does not in any way modify the formula
set in Veterans. It only corrects the definition of valid party-list groups. We affirmed that party-
list groups maybe national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. We abandoned the
requirement introduced in Ang Bagong Bayani that all party-list groups should prove that they
represent a "marginalized" or "under-represented" sector.
Proportional representation is provided in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7941. BANAT
overturned Veterans’ interpretation of the phrase in proportion to their total number of votes. We
clarified that the interpretation that only those that obtained at least 2% of the votes may get
additional seats will not result in proportional representation because it will make it impossible for
the party-list seats to be filled completely. As demonstrated in BANAT, the 20% share may never
be filled if the 2% threshold is maintained.
The divisor, thus, helps to determine the correct percentage of representation of
party-list groups as intended by the law. This is part of the index of proportionality of the
representation of a party-list to the House of Representatives. It measures the relation
between the share of the total seats and the share of the total votes of the party-list.
We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to
be invalid due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In
other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on
disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to
disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot contained all
the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the
ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose
disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters
prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor.
Not all votes cast in the elections should be included in the divisor. Contrary to the
argument of the petitioner, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes

49
cast for the party-list system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of
representation.
The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. The invalid votes, for the
determination of the denominator, may be votes that were spoiled or votes that resulted from
the following: improper shading or having no shade at all; existence of stray or ambiguous
marks; tears in the ballot; and/or ballots rejected by the Precinct Count Optical Scan
(PCOS) machines under the paper-based automated election system. All these are causes
that nullify the count for that vote that can be attributable to the voter’s action.
We qualify that the divisor to be used in interpreting the formula used in BANAT is the
total votes cast for the party-list system. This should not include the invalid votes. However, so as
not to disenfranchise a substantial portion of the electorate, total votes cast for the party-list system
should mean all the votes validly cast for all the candidates listed in the ballot. The voter relies on
the ballot when making his or her choices.

Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 190529, April 29, 2010
En Banc [BRION, J.]
Facts:
Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, provides: Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC
may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on any of the following grounds: (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system
in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list
organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in
2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this
Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely
affected can personally or through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on
October 26, 2009.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its
pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization
under the Party-List System Act. PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation,
as it is obvious that it failed to participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.

50
Implied in this is that it also failed to secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two
(2) preceding elections.
COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A.
7941. The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or
organization does not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party,
organization or coalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a request
for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.

Issue:
Whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI.

Held:
No. We find the petition partly impressed with merit. Our Minero ruling is an erroneous
application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBI’s delisting from the
roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under
the party-list system.
First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last
two (2) preceding elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. The word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one
thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the
law provides for two (2) separate reasons for delisting.
Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-
participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2%
threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does
not participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To
be sure, this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical language
and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or
fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application
of the law – in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the
framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.

Ang Ladlad vs Comelec

[G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010]
Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006.

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 On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second
Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that: This Petition is dismissible on moral
grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community.

Issue:
Whether Comelec erred in denying the registration of Ladlad as party for lesbians, gays, bisexuals,
or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).

Held:
Yes; Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment
clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters." Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." We thus find that it was grave violation of the
non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of
Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend,
instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere
conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways
that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: The morality referred to in the law is
public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings
as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved
only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what
some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema
to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views
that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its
citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
Freedom of Expression and Association: Under our system of laws, every group has the right to
promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic
means. It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions should be distilled and
deliberated upon.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this
freedom applies not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb.
Any restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any
compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace.
Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this
country. It follows that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a
political association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Non-Discrimination and International Law: In an age that has seen international law evolve
geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically
in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups struggling
with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly
significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become
actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.

52
 Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote
human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the
right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows: All persons
are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In
this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating
to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation
is not specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR
Human Rights Committee has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include
"sexual orientation." Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international agreements.
The UDHR provides; Article 21. (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. Likewise, the ICCPR states: Article 25 - Every
citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and
without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage
and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving
effect to the Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the
panacea for all social ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the
Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),
which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are
not reflective of the current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of
international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international
law to ascertain their true status.

Amores vs. HRET,

G.R. No. 189600, June 29, 2010
En Banc [CARPIO MORALES, J]
Facts:
Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of May 14, 2009 and Resolution
No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public
respondent), which respectively dismissed petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the
legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as
representative of the party-list organization Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the
House of Representatives, and denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
In her Petition for Quo Warranto seeking the ouster of private respondent, petitioner
alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation

53
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the
youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and
acceptance, he was already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act; and his change of
affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector
was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to
represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009, dismissed petitioner’s
Petition for Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list organizations which the
COMELEC had partially proclaimed as entitled to at least one seat in the House of Representatives through
National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition
which was filed on October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10 days from private
respondent’s proclamation.
In the matter of private respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector
to its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector, public respondent held that Section
15 of RA No. 7941 did not apply as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation.

Issue:
Whether petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissible for having been filed
unseasonably

Held:
No; the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
considering petitioner’s Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its counting of the 10-day
reglementary period provided in its Rules from the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-60 on July
9, 2007 is erroneous.
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in
the May, 2007 elections, along with other party-list organizations, it was by no measure a
proclamation of private respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No. 7941.
Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private
respondent’s proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on the
merits. Alternatively, since petitioner’s challenge goes into private respondent’s qualifications, it
may be filed at anytime during his term.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure.
Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.

Issue 2:
Whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 [age requirement for youth sector nominees]
apply to private respondent.

Held:
Yes. The Court finds no textual support for public respondent’s interpretation that Section
9 applied only to those nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification
of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a sectoral party is thereafter registered exclusively as

54
representing the youth sector. A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear
and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is
only room for application.
As the law states in unequivocal terms that a nominee of the youth sector must at least be
twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election, so it must be
that a candidate who is more than 30 on election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee.
Since this mandate is contained in RA No. 7941, the Party-List System Act, it covers ALL youth
sector nominees vying for party-list representative seats.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There is thus no
reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees nominated during the first three
congressional terms after the ratification of the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the
last elections where Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two months after the law was
enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and could not have been the objective of RA
No. 7941.
There is likewise no rhyme or reason in public respondent’s ratiocination that after the third
congressional term from the ratification of the Constitution, which expired in 1998, Section 9 of
RA No. 7941 would apply only to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the youth
sector. This distinction is nowhere found in the law. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire
debemus. When the law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish.
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of textual
support for public respondent’s ratiocination that the provision did not apply to private
respondent’s shift of affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and
their families sector as there was no resultant change in party-list affiliation. Section 15 reads:
Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That
if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he
shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private
respondent. The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the
youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130
dated August 6, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva is declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of Representatives representing the party-
list organization CIBAC.

V.C. Cadangen vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 177179, June 5, 2009
En Banc [NACHURA, J.]
Facts:
On September 13, 2006, petitioner Alliance of Civil Servants, Inc. (Civil Servants),
represented by its then president, Atty. Sherwin R. Lopez, filed a petition for registration as a
sectoral organization under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act. It claimed,
among others, that it had been in existence since December 2004 and it sought to represent past
and present government employees in the party-list system.

55
 The COMELEC Second Division, on December 11, 2006, issued an Order requiring Civil
Servants to file a memorandum that would prove its presence or existence nationwide, track record,
financial capability to wage a nationwide campaign, platform of government, officers and
membership, and compliance with the provisions of the Party-List System Act and the eight-point
guideline laid down by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections.
Civil Servants consequently filed the required memorandum attaching thereto the
following documents: (1) copies of its letters to the respective election directors/officers/registrars
of the Cordillera Administrative Region, Second District of Quezon City, and the cities of Iloilo,
Cotabato, Urdaneta and Dagupan, informing them of the names and addresses of its members in
the said localities; (2) revised list of its members as of November 30, 2006; (3) list of its
incorporators with brief descriptions of their credentials, including their
designations/appointments in government offices; (4) printed screen shot of the Internet homepage
of its on-line forum; (5) summary of its major activities and accomplishments since its inception;
(6) financial statement showing its net asset of ₱399,927.00; (7) platform of government; and (8)
list of its current officers with a summary of their credentials.
COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution denying Civil Servants’ petition for
registration.
Thus, in determining whether or not a party can participate in the party list elections, the
Commission (Second Division) is not only bound to verify the veracity of every petition, but also
to see to it that members of these organizations belong to the marginalized and the
underrepresented. Also put to test here is every petitioner’s capacity to represent and voice out the
sentiments and needs of the sector it represents. The eight-point guideline also requires that the
party or organization seeking registration should lack a well-defined political constituency but
could, nonetheless, contribute to the formulation of appropriate legislation to benefit the nation as
a whole. Thus, guided by the provisions of R.A. 7941 and the eight point (sic) guideline enunciated
in the Ang Bagong Bayani case, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves the following
petitions for registration.
On the issue of petitioner’s constituency which it claims to be nationwide, this cannot be
established by mere letters to the Commission’s Election Officers and providing them with a copy
of the list of officers and members. To establish the extent of the constituencies of the different
parties and organizations as claimed by them, the Commission directed its Election Officers to
verify the existence of petitioner’s chapters allegedly present in the NCR and the different regions.
The verification report shows that CIVIL SERVANTS exists only in Parañaque City’s (1st and
2nd Districts) and in Quezon City’s (4th District), contrary to petitioner’s claim of national
constituency in its memorandum. For having failed to prove its existence nationwide and for
having declared an untruthful statement in its memorandum, We resolve to DENY the instant
petition.
COMELEC en banc, in the assailed March 26, 2007 Resolution, denied the motion.

Issue:
Whether Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

56
Held:
No; incumbent on petitioner is the duty to show that the COMELEC, in denying the petition
for registration, gravely abused its discretion. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. It must be grave, as when it is exercised arbitrarily or despotically by
reason of passion or personal hostility. The abuse must be so patent and so gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in
contemplation of law. Here, petitioner failed to demonstrate, and neither do we find, that the
COMELEC, through the questioned issuances, gravely abused its discretion.
We note that in the registration of a party, organization, or coalition under R.A. No. 7941,
the COMELEC may require the submission of any relevant information; and it may refuse, after
due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition based on any of the grounds enumerated in Section 6 thereof, among which is that the
organization has declared untruthful statements in its petition. The COMELEC, after evaluating
the documents submitted by petitioner, denied the latter’s plea for registration as a sectoral party,
not on the basis of its failure to prove its nationwide presence, but for its failure to show that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Further, the COMELEC
found that petitioner made an untruthful statement in the pleadings and documents it submitted.
The Court emphasizes that the sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of
want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and it does not include a review of the tribunal’s
evaluation of the evidence.18 The findings of fact made by the COMELEC, or by any other
administrative agency exercising expertise in its particular field of competence, are binding on the
Court. The Court is not a trier of facts; it is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the
truth of factual allegations. The Court’s function, as mandated by Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, is merely to check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the
absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, this Court will
have no occasion to exercise its corrective power. It has no authority to inquire into what it thinks
is apparent error.
Thus, in this case, the Court cannot grant the prayer of petitioner for registration as a
sectoral party, because to do so will entail an evaluation of the evidence to determine whether
indeed petitioner qualifies as a party-list organization and whether it has made untruthful
statements in its application for registration.

Abang-Lingkod vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 2096952, October 22, 2013
En Banc [REYES, J.]
Facts:
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant
fanners and fisher-folks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009. It
participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat
in the House of Representatives.

57
 ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its intent to participate in the May
2013 elections. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9513, which, inter alia
required previously registered party-list groups that have filed their respective Manifestations of
Intent to undergo summary evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining their continuing
compliance with the requirements under R.A. No. 7941 and the guidelines set forth in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.
Accordingly, on August 9 2012, the COMELEC issued a Resolution, which set the
summary evidentiary hearing of previously registered party-list groups. The COMELEC
scheduled three (3) dates -August 17, 31 and September 3, 2012 -for the summary hearing of
ABANG LINGKOD's Manifestation of Intent to enable it to show proof of its continuing
qualification under the party-list system.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution dated November 7 2012,
cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list group. The COMELEC En Banc
pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track record in uplifting the cause of
the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely offered photographs of some alleged
activities it conducted after the May 2010 elections. The COMELEC En Banc further opined that
ABANG LINGKOD failed to show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and
underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
On April 2, 2013, the Court, in Atong Paglaum Inc. v. Commission on Elections, laid down
new parameters to be observed by the COMELEC in screening parties, organizations or
associations seeking registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party,
and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented or
lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of the sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
''marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or

58
 organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector
they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record or advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
Thus, the Court remanded to the COMELEC the cases of previously registered party-list
groups, including that of ABANG LINGKOD, to determine whether they are qualified under the
party-list system pursuant to the new parameters laid down by the Court and, in the affirmative,
be allowed to participate in the May 2013 party-list elections.
In maintaining the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration, the COMELEC held
that: The Commission maintains its position in the previous en banc ruling cancelling the
registration of ABANG LINGKOD. To reiterate, it is not enough that the party-list organization
claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented because representation is easy to
claim and to feign. It is but reasonable to require from groups and organizations consistent
participation and advocacy in the sector it seeks to represent, and not just seasonal and sporadic
programs which are unrelated to its sector.
ABANG LINGKOD submitted pictures showing a seminar held on 10 July 2010, Medical
Mission on 11 November 2010, Disaster Management Training on 21 October 2011, Book-giving
on 28 June 2011, and Medical Mission on 1 December 2011. And as if to insult the Commission,
the photographs submitted appear to have been edited to show in the banners that ABANG
LINGKOD participated in the activities. ABANG LINGKOD's name and logo was superimposed
on some banners to feign participation in the activities (Joint Medical Mission, Book-giving).
Under the party-list System Act, a group’s registration may be cancelled for declaring
unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not occur is
tantamount to declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the Commission cancels
ABANG LINGKOD s registration.

Issue 1:
Whether ABANG LINGKOD was denied due process when the COMELEC affirmed the
cancellation of its registration under the party-list system sans any summary evidentiary hearing.

Held:
No; the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or as applied to
administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not
at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
There was no necessity for the COMELEC to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing
to assess the qualification of ABANG LINGKOD pursuant to Atong Paglaum. ABANG

59
LINGKOD’s Manifestation of Intent and all the evidence adduced by it to establish its
qualification as a party-list group are already in the possession of the COMELEC. Thus,
conducting further summary evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of determining ABANG
LINGKOD s qualification under the party-list system pursuant to Atong Paglaum would just be a
superfluity.
Contrary to ABANG LINGKOD’s claim, the Court, in Atong Paglaum, did not
categorically require the COMELEC to conduct a summary evidentiary hearing for the purpose of
determining the qualifications of the petitioners therein pursuant to the new parameters for
screening party-list groups.
The records also disclose that ABANG LINGKOD was able to file with the COMELEC a
motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated May 10, 2013, negating its claim that it was
denied due process. As it has been held, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given a chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

Issue 2:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling ABANG LINGKOD’s
registration under the party-list system.

Held:
Yes; the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ABANG LINGKOD's registration on the
ground that it declared untruthful statement in its bid for accreditation as a party-list group in the
May 2013 elections, pointing out that it deliberately submitted digitally altered photographs of
activities to make it appear that it had a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. Essentially, ABANG LINGKOD's registration was cancelled on the ground that
it failed to adduce evidence showing its track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-
list groups to present evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented. Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an
indicator of likely future performance. As a requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for
groups intending to participate in the party-list elections, track record pertains to the actual
activities undertaken by groups to uplift the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
R.A. No. 7941 did not require groups intending to register under the party-list system to
submit proof of their track record as a group. The track record requirement was only imposed in
Ang Bagong Bayani where the Court held that national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations seeking registration under the party-list system must prove through their, inter alia
track record that they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
This is not merely a matter of semantics; the delineation of what constitutes a track record
has certain consequences in a group's bid for registration under the party-list system. Under Section
5 of R.A. No. 7941, groups intending to register under the party-list system are not required to
submit evidence of their track record; they are merely required to attach to their verified petitions
their "constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of officers, coalition agreement, and other
relevant information as may be required by the COMELEC."

60
 In Atong Paglaum the Court has modified to a great extent the jurisprudential doctrines on
who may register under the party-list system and the representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented. For purposes of registration under the party-list system, national or
regional parties or organizations need not represent any marginalized and underrepresented
sector; that representation of the marginalized and underrepresented is only required of sectoral
organizations that represent the sectors stated under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 that are, by their
nature, economically marginalized and underrepresented.
Contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as ABANG
LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record, i.e. proof of
activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector they represent. Indeed, it is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.
Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared
towards the cause of the sector/s, which they represent.
However, submission of a group's constitution, by-laws, platform of government, list of
officers, coalition agreement, and other relevant information required by the COMELEC, as
explained earlier, is not synonymous with the track record requirement. In such case, only sectoral
organizations would be required to present a track record (actual activities conducted by them to
further the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented); while national and regional
organizations need not present their track record as they are only required to submit documentary
evidence showing that they are bona fide organizations.
In the case of sectoral organizations, although they are still required to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, they are likewise not required to show a track record since
there would be no reason for them to feign representation of the marginalized and underrepresented
as they can just register as a national or regional party or organization. Thus, the Court, in Atong
Paglaum stated that, for purposes of registration under the party-list system, it is enough that the
principal advocacy of sectoral organizations pertains to the sector/s they represent.
It must be stressed that the COMELEC cancelled ABANG LINGKOD s registration solely
on the ground of the lack of its track record -that it falsely represented, by submitting digitally
altered photographs of its supposed activities, that it had a track record in representing the
marginalized and underrepresented. The existence of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group per
se and the genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolks were never raised in the
proceedings before the COMELEC. It would thus be the height of injustice in the Court, in this
certiorari action, would scrutinize the legitimacy of ABANG LINGKOD as a party-list group and
the genuineness of its representation of the farmers and fisherfolk, and affirm the cancellation of
its registration, when the issue is limited only to the track record of ABANG LINGKOD.
Moreover, ABANG LINGKOD had been previously registered as a party-list group, as in
fact it participated in the May 2010 party-list elections, and it was able to obtain a sufficient number
of votes in the May 2013 party-list elections to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives. These
are circumstances, which clearly indicate that ABANG LINGKOD is indeed a legitimate party-
list group.
ABANG LINGKOD, notwithstanding the cancellation of its registration three days prior
to the May 13, 2013 elections, was able to obtain a total of 260 215 votes out of the 26 722 131
votes that were cast for the party-list, thus entitling it to a seat in the House of Representatives.

61
This is indicative of the fact that a considerable portion of the electorate considers ABANG
LINGKOD as truly representative of peasant farmers and fisherfolk.
Lest it be misunderstood, the Court does not condone the deceit perpetrated by ABANG
LINGKOD in connection with its bid for continued registration under the party-list system. That
ABANG LINGKOD, to establish its track record, submitted photographs that were edited to make
it appear that it conducted activities aimed at ameliorating the plight of the sectors it represents is
a factual finding by the COMELEC, which the Court, considering that it is supported by substantial
evidence, will not disturb. The Court does not tolerate ABANG LINGKOD s resort to chicanery
and its shabby treatment of the requirements for registration under the party-list system.
Nevertheless, considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a group’s
misrepresentation as to its track record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel its registration
-it is no longer material to its qualification under the party-list system. In this case, ABANG
LINGKOD s submission of digitally altered photographs cannot be considered material to its
qualification as a party-list group.
Declaration of an untruthful statement in a petition for registration, or in any other
document pertinent to the registration and/or accreditation under the party-list system, as a ground
for the refusal or cancellation of registration under Section 6(6) of R.A. No. 7941, is akin to
material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy filed by an individual candidate under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Both provisions disallow prospective candidates from
participating in an election for declaring false statements in their eligibility requirements.
Elucidating on what constitutes material misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Court, in Lluz v. Commission on Elections,
explained that: From these two cases several conclusions follow. First a misrepresentation in a
certificate of candidacy is material when it refers to a qualification for elective office and affects
the candidate s eligibility. x x x Third a misrepresentation of a non-material fact, or a non-material
misrepresentation, is not a ground to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78. In other words, for a candidate s certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or
canceled by the COMELEC, the fact misrepresented must pertain to a qualification for the office
sought by the candidate.
In Velasco v. Commission on Elections, the Court further clarified that a false
representation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, in order to be a ground to deny
due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy, must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
The false representation that [Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code] mention
must necessarily pertain to a material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake.

B. b. Qualification and Term of Office (Sections 8-9)

62
 Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board,
G.R. No. 15780, November 2, 2008
EN BANC [VELASCO, JR., J]
Facts:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's
office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any
government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall
employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the
positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a
positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools
shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook
and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing.
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public
and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug
test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the
risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be
dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a
mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for
dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections):

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re -
election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule
65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates
for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether Section 36(g) of RA 9165 which requires national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test unconstitutional.

Held:

63
 Yes; Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be
certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper,
be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso
that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug -
free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of
no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non -
compliance with the drug - testing requirement.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency):
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a
registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute
undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also
breached by said provisions.

Issue 2:
Whether Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 which requires random drug testing for
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees is unconstitutional.

Held:
No; the drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and
tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and
suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process
"the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous
drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via
the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use
of dangerous drugs; through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement
of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and projects." The primary legislative intent is not criminal
prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not
necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal
drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation.
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right
protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure under Sec. 2, Art. III of the

64
Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the
first time that the validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory
random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to
random drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District
47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of
Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education), both fairly pertinent US Supreme
Court - decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace
in their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes.
After consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's
athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football program after
he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's
drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia,
considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children,
while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3)
athletes have less privacy rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress
before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected
themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples
does not invade a student's privacy since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing;
and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the
young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth
and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug - testing policy constitutional.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country
that threatens the well - being of the people, particularly the youth and school children who usually
end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in
motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable
but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a
legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia,
"deterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient
enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to
act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited not just upon the
users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. Needless to stress, the random testing scheme
provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting
individual students.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to
protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test,
the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and
the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results.
But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the
IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the "need to know"

65
basis; that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results." Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under
RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test
results, and is relatively minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the
part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well -
defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing,
we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency):
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck
down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary
to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

Issue 3:
Whether Section 36 (c) (d) of RA 9165 of the mandatory drug testing for persons accused
of crimes is unconstitutional.

Held:
Yes; unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no
valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students,
the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school
authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug
test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and
"suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus
charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone

66
waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives
of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to
incriminate themselves.

B. C. Residency Requirement
Romualdez-Marcos vs. Comelec,
G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
En Banc [KAPUNAN, J.]
Facts:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8,
1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
__________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative
of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation
and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8
On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that: This office
cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed
out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20,
1995 deadline.
Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the
head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven"
in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" which she
sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, came
up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification. COMELEC en
banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a
Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte.
On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing
that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number
of votes.

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 In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held
May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14,
1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared
to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte
for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

Held:
Yes; a perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law.
While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes
of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to
substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for
the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives
as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence."
In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place"
and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a
certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The
essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to
leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place
for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his
domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a
person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction
quite clearly: There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate
a place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one
place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is
generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of
residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

68
 For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile
which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." Larena vs. Teves reiterated the same doctrine
in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President
of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, held that the absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where
one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the concept (of domicile) in
our election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere
absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it
does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of
"residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile"
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to
be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there
is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to
deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead
to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting
the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The
circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space
provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein
petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in
the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a
resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in
the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her
Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the
confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence
in the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and
Seven Months.

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 Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in
Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period
of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 — the
first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing
down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not,
however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established
by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile
of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving
the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not)
re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We
do not agree.
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements
can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an
actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In
the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of
persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor
of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one
of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

Issue 2:
Prior to the elections: Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
After the Elections: Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections.

Held:
With the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881,
it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending
disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of
jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it

70
to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns
and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is
obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

Macalintal vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
En Banc [AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.]
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal,
a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming
that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition
as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article
V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for
at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to
support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the United
States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the
Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or
alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the
right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess
the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the
COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional
because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution: which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for president and vice-president.

Issue:
Whether Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit
expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section
1 of Article V of the Constitution.

Held:

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 No; as the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it
behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and
R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be
construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon, he Court held that a constitutional provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. Constitutional provisions are
mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest. The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the language of
the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers
through their debates in the constitutional convention.
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of
legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is
presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department)
of the Constitution.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same
time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless
pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence
in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile.
Citing Romualdez-Marcos vs. Comelec; SC held that for political purposes the concepts of
residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this
country, the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to require
Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting. Thus, Section 2, Article V of the
Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency
requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the
implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not
in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a
system for overseas absentee voting.
Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress
the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as stated in
Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This is in fact the reason why the
Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the system
of absentee voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by Commissioner Monsod, by the
use of the adjective qualified with respect to Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have the
"qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote."
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling
or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of
origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates

72
the Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise."
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because
by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return
to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile
shall remain.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to
"resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from
approval of his/her registration," the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied
for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure
to return "shall be cause for the removal" of their names "from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia."
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress
enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the
constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of
absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the "qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad"
is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of
the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad
who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having
become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an
abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under
the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the
law.

Issue:
Whether Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the
proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of
winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the
following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution.

Held:
Yes; Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of
Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the
winners for the said positions." The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the
land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the
canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-
president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

Facts 3:
Petitioners submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the
power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional

73
body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of government; that only
the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the
majority of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the
Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party, including the
legislators.
COMELEC agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional.
Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC.

Issue 3:
Whether Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC,
R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC.

Held:
Yes; there is no question that the authority of Congress to "monitor and evaluate the
implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law
itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation. However, aside from its monitoring and
evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to "review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the
COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC (The Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee) [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three
countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent
body "except those specifically granted by the Constitution," that is, to review its decisions, orders
and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive
legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but
to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that "the Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
by virtue of this Act for prior approval," and the second sentence of the second paragraph of
Section 25 stating that "it shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission," whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates
unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the
subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the
independence of the COMELEC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189
are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

74
 a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "subject to
the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "only upon review and approval
of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: "The Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;" and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: "It shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission" of the same law.

Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, et al.,

G.R. No. 221697; 221698-700, March 8, 2016
Separate Opinion of Justice []
Facts:
Petitioner was five years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.)
and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's
name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe."
Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the
court decreed adoption, the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of
2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new
Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive parents. Without
delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to
the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local
COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's
Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.

Issue:
Whether petitioner had obtain the residency requirements for presidency.

Held:
Yes; as a foundling found in Jaro, Iloilo, she acquired the domicile (and citizenship) of her
parents who, according to “generally-accepted principles of law,” are presumed to be Filipinos.
So, her domicile of origin is Jaro, Iloilo. After she married an American and moved to and worked
in the United States, she lost her domicile of origin and followed the domicile of her husband in
America. When she and her husband moved back for good here after the death of Fernando Poe
Jr., she acquired a new domicile of choice in the Philippines. As to when she acquired it depends,
on her clear intention, conduct and physical presence in the new location.

75
 Co vs. HRET,
G.R. Nos. 92191-92, July 30, 1991
En Banc [GUTIERREZ, JR., J.]
Facts:
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was
held.
Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative
district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.
The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te,
arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established his residence in the municipality of
Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang,
Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought
by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to
establish an enduring relationship with his neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the
community. As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he
absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was baptized into Christianity. As the years
passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and,
thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in
Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status
and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First
Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.
At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to
differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace
were concerned.
Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was
burned to the ground. Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed
another one in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no showing other than that Laoang was
their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better
education, went to Manila in order to acquire his secondary and college education.
Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work
here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he

76
worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was
elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen
was challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the
unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally
and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was
precisely amending the article on this subject.
The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and
spent his childhood days.
Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their
representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two petitioners are combined, Ong would
still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.

Issue:
Whether Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held:
Yes; the pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read: SECTION 1, the
following are citizens of the Philippines:
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;
2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those
who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect
Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino
mothers, elected citizenship before that date. The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct
an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women.
The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision
prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable
situation. It must also be retroactive.
It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by
the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter,
especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v. Court
of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970]).
The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born
of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born
citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.
Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers

77
with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born
citizens.
Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the
fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly
situated members.
It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this
accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.
There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of
her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to
be a Filipino citizen.
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords
natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came
of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen.
Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in
1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement
in 1969 electing citizenship in spite of his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969,
election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for
one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.
We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process. In
the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held: Esteban's exercise of the
right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship.
The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen
because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship. The Court cannot go into the collateral
procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date
just so we can go after the son. The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a
collateral approach. This cannot be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship
may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52
[1970]).

Issue 2:
Whether Jose Ong, Jr. is a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

Held:
Yes; the petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The
term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

78
 The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The
absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it
continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus
revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]).
The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is
fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned
said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.
The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that
after the fire that gutted their house in 1961, another one was constructed. Likewise, after the
second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their
family, two doors of which were reserved as their family residence.
Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the
Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not
required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is
enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative.
To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress
would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate
meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it required by the
Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run.

Issue 3:
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of HRET.
Held:
Generally No; the Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988])
stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal is original and
exclusive: The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction
conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by the
Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier
this grant of power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and
complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the
amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and
it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral
Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution.
The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power
to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns and qualifications of members of
the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its jurisdiction
shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is
full, clear and complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that
would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same."

79
 In the case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the
judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's
so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
or paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the
Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a
very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
that there has to be a remedy for such abuse."

D. Term vs. Tenure

Gaminde vs. COA,
G.R. No. 140335, December 13, 2000
En Banc [PARDO, J.]
Facts:
On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P.
Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22,
1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment,
Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment.
Geminde's term will expire on February 2, 1999. On March 24, 1999, CSC Resident
Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit
the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February
02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit en
banc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision No. 99-090 dismissing
petitioner’s appeal.

Issue:
Whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service
Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as
stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000.

Held:
Yes, the term of office of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission is
prescribed in the 1987 Constitution, as follows: "Section 1 (2). The Chairman and the
Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the
Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a Commissioner for five years, and another
Commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated
in a temporary or acting capacity."
The appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the
Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date
of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the

80
interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted
against the latter.
In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between "term" and "tenure."
"[T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means
the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval
after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term
during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by
the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the
power of the incumbent."
In concluding that February 02, 1987 is the proper starting point of the terms of office of
the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions of a staggered 7-5-3 year terms, we
considered the plain language of Article IX (B), Section 1 (2), Article IX (C), Section 1 (2) and
Article IX (D), Section 1 (2) of the 1987 Constitution that uniformly prescribed a seven-year term
of office for Members of the Constitutional Commissions, without re-appointment, and for the first
appointees terms of seven, five and three years, without re-appointment. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. There is no need to
expressly state the beginning of the term of office as this is understood to coincide with the
effectivity of the Constitution upon its ratification (on February 02, 1987).
However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX,
providing for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first appointees under this
Constitution.
Given the foregoing common starting point, we compute the terms of the first appointees
and their successors to the Civil Service Commission under the 1987 Constitution by their
respective lines, as follows: First line : Chairman – seven-year term. February 02, 1987 to February
01, 1994. On January 30, 1988, the President nominated Ms. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas Chairman,
Civil Service Commission. On March 02, 1988, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination. She assumed office on March 04, 1988. Her term ended on February 02, 1994. She
served as de facto Chairman until March 04, 1995. On March 05, 1995, the President appointed
then Social Welfare Secretary Corazon Alma G. de Leon, Chairman, Civil Service Commission,
to a regular seven-year term. This term must be deemed to start on February 02, 1994, immediately
succeeding her predecessor, whose term started on the common date of the terms of office of the
first appointees under the 1987 Constitution. She assumed office on March 22, 1995, for a term
expiring February 02, 2001.
On June 11, 1993, the President appointed Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde Commissioner, Civil
Service Commission, for a term expiring February 02, 1999. This terminal date is specified in her
appointment paper. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
appointment. She accepted the appointment and assumed office on June 22, 1993. She is bound by
the term of the appointment she accepted, expiring February 02, 1999. In this connection, the letter
dated April 07, 1998, of Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona clarifying that her term
would expire on February 02, 2000, was in error. What was submitted to the Commission on
Appointments was a nomination for a term expiring on February 02, 1999. Thus, the term of her
successor must be deemed to start on February 02, 1999, and expire on February 02, 2006.
Thus, we see the regular interval of vacancy every two (2) years, namely, February 02,
1994, for the first Chairman, February 02, 1992, for the first five-year term Commissioner, and

81
February 02, 1990, for the first three-year term Commissioner. Their successors must also maintain
the two year interval, namely: February 02, 2001, for Chairman; February 02, 1999, for
Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, and February 02, 1997, for Commissioner Ramon P. Ereñeta,
Jr.
WHEREFORE, we adjudge that the term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as
Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President
Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999. However, she served as de facto
officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other
emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in
disallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her co-terminous staff.

Socrates vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002
En Banc [CARPIO, J.]
Facts:
On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the
Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly at the Gymnasium of
Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was convened to initiate the recall of
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesa's mayor on June 30, 2001.
The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of
Barangay Captains, as interim chair of the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 which declared its loss of
confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule
the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall Resolution.
Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify
and deny due course to the Recall Resolution. Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of
notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members.
COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates'
petition. The COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall
election on September 7, 2002.
COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the calendar of
activities and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The
COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or a period of
10 days.
Edward M. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
Ma. Flores F. Adovo ("Adovo" for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo ("Gilo" for brevity) filed a
petition before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running
in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August 30, 2002, a certain
Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also seeking to
disqualify Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition,
docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging substantially the same facts and involving

82
the same issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that "Hagedorn is disqualified from
running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city
for three (3) consecutive full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same
post.

Issue 1:
In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving
due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.

Held:
No; COMELEC, however, found that on various dates, in the month of June 2002, the
proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of
the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government
Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof
of Service for each of the said notices were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "G" of
Volumes II and III of the Petition.
Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall.
Photos establishing the same were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex "H". The
proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the dissemination of the convening of
the PRA.
This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the
competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous.

Issue 2:
In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall
election of Puerto Princesa on September 24, 2002.

Held:
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which states: Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code.
These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an
elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that
only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service.
The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts
continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

83
 After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection
for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is
no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall
election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening
period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not
an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The
immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular
elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto
Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period
is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorn's service as mayor, not because of his
voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec, the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of
service in this manner: "The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
"Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected." The clear intent of the
framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their elected
official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does
not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service.
In Hagedorn's case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a
full term of three years, constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. The
Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear
intent is that interruption "for any length of time," as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient
to break an elective local official's continuity of service.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after
winning the recall election. Talaga's recall term did not retroact to include the tenure in office of
his predecessor. If Talaga's recall term was made to so retroact, then he would have been
disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he would already have served three consecutive
terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full
term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the recall term,
when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service.
Clearly, Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or
credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an elective
official's terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorn's recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office
of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if
the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can the recall term constitute a
fourth consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorn's recall term as a full term of three years,
retroacting to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24,

84
2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive or successive terms of office
which historically and factually are not.

E. Election
Lozada vs. Comelec,
G.R. No. L-59068 January 27, 1983
En Banc [De Castro, J.]
Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by Jose Mari Eulalio C. Lozada and Romeo B. Igot
as a representative suit for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective
of party affiliation, to compel COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies
numbering twelve in the Interim Batasan Pambansa. The petition is based on Section 5(2), Article
VIII of the 1973 Constitution which reads: (2) In case a vacancy arises in the Batasang Pambansa
eighteen months or more before a regular election, the Commission on Election shall call a special
election to be held within sixty (60) days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the
unexpired term.
Petitioner Lozada claims that he is a taxpayer and a bonafide elector of Cebu City and a
transient voter of Quezon City, Metro Manila, who desires to run for the position in the Batasan
Pambansa; while petitioner Romeo B. Igot alleges that, as a taxpayer, he has standing to petition
by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the 1973 Constitution. As reason
for their petition, petitioners allege that they are "... deeply concerned about their duties as citizens
and desirous to uphold the constitutional mandate and rule of law ...; that they have filed the instant
petition on their own and in behalf of all other Filipinos since the subject matters are of profound
and general interest.

Issue:
Whether the petition herein is meritorious.

Held:
No; the petition must be dismiss. As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition,
for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. The act complained of is
the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, as is allegedly its ministerial duty under
the constitutional provision above cited, and therefore, involves no expenditure of public funds. It
is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves
the illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed. What the
case at bar seeks is one that entails expenditure of public funds which may be illegal because it
would be spent for a purpose that of calling a special election which, as will be shown, has no
authority either in the Constitution or a statute.
As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify them to
maintain and prosecute the present petition. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns

85
the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. In the case before us, the
alleged inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election to fill-up the existing vacancies in the
Batasan Pambansa, standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all
citizens.
The Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the
latter's decision, orders or rulings.
There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC which is sought to be
reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction as provided for in the aforequoted provision
which is the only known provision conferring jurisdiction or authority on the Supreme Court over
the COMELEC. It is not alleged that the COMELEC was asked by petitioners to perform its
alleged duty under the Constitution to call a special election, and that COMELEC has issued an
order or resolution denying such petition.

Macalintal vs. Comelec,

G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
En Banc [AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.]
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal,
a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No.
9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming
that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that
public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition
as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article
V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for
at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to
support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the United
States is deemed to have abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the
Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or
alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the
right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess
the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the
COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional
because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the

86
Constitution: which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for president and vice-president.

Issue:
Whether Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit
expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section
1 of Article V of the Constitution.

Held:
No; as the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it
behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the Constitution and
R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be
construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon, he Court held that a constitutional provision
should function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. Constitutional provisions are
mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a different
intention is manifest. The intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the language of
the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers
through their debates in the constitutional convention.
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise of
legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of restrictions, Congress is
presumed to have duly exercised its function as defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department)
of the Constitution.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the same
time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and the countless
pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains attached to his residence
in the Philippines as residence is considered synonymous with domicile.
Citing Romualdez-Marcos vs. Comelec; SC held that for political purposes the concepts of
residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts
have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in this
country, the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled them to require
Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting. Thus, Section 2, Article V of the
Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency
requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any problems that could impede the
implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified Filipinos who are not
in the Philippines that the Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a
system for overseas absentee voting.
Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to Congress
the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications of voters as stated in

87
Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This is in fact the reason why the
Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified Filipinos abroad with respect to the system
of absentee voting that Congress should draw up. As stressed by Commissioner Monsod, by the
use of the adjective qualified with respect to Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have the
"qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote."
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling
or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the
immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of
origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates
the Constitution that proscribes "provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise."
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad because
by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished their intent to return
to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile
shall remain.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to
"resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from
approval of his/her registration," the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied
for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure
to return "shall be cause for the removal" of their names "from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia."
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress
enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the
constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of
absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the "qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad"
is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of
the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad
who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is
presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having
become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an
abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under
the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his
domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the
law.

Issue:
Whether Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the
proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of
winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the
following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution.

Held:

88
 Yes; Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of
Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the
winners for the said positions." The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the
land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the
canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-
president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

Facts 3:
Petitioners submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the
power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by
the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC which, as a constitutional
body, is not under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of government; that only
the COMELEC itself can promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the
majority of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any law, it is the
Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any interested party, including the
legislators.
COMELEC agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional.
Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon
Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional
commissions such as the COMELEC.

Issue 3:
Whether Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the power to review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the COMELEC,
R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the COMELEC.

Held:
Yes; there is no question that the authority of Congress to "monitor and evaluate the
implementation" of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law
itself and thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation. However, aside from its monitoring and
evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to "review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations" (IRR) promulgated by the
COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC (The Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee) [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three
countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an independent
body "except those specifically granted by the Constitution," that is, to review its decisions, orders
and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized extensive
legislative power to enact election laws, Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of

89
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but
to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that "the Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
by virtue of this Act for prior approval," and the second sentence of the second paragraph of
Section 25 stating that "it shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission," whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates
unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the
subject statute for constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the
independence of the COMELEC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are
declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "subject to the
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: "only upon review and approval of the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;"
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: "The Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue
of this Act for prior approval;" and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: "It shall review, revise, amend
and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission" of the
same law.

F. Parliamentary Immunity/Privileges
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. [Article VI,
1987 Philippine Constitution]

G. Freedom from Arrest

Trillanes IV vs. Judge Pimentel,
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008
En Banc [CARPIO MORALES, J.]
Facts:
At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by
junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and key
national officials.
Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress
the rebellion. A series of negotiations quelled the teeming tension and eventually resolved the
impasse with the surrender of the militant soldiers that evening.

90
 In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the "Oakwood Incident," petitioner
Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades, with coup d’etat defined under
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati.
Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention, threw his hat in the
political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June 30,
2007.
Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed with the RTC,
Makati City, Branch 148, an "Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate
Sessions and Related Requests."
Trial court denied all the requests in the Omnibus Motion. Motion for reconsideration was
also denied.

Issue:
Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's
motion to attend senate session.

Held:
No; it cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for
purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides: All persons,
except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance
as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d’etat cases, both being punishable
by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of
imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral
turpitude involved in the crime charged.
The Court was more emphatic in People v. Hon. Maceda: As a matter of law, when a person
indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed
in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of the
offense. He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is
authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence cannot practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.
This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence does not carry
with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.

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 People vs. Jalosjos,
G.R. No. 132875, February 3, 2000
En Banc [YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.]
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is
now confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and
acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the
sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative
in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions
of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by the intervention
of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from
pending criminal cases.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is
underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that — (2) A majority
of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from
day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such
penalties, as such House may provide.

Issue:
Whether Jalosjos be allowed to attend sessions in the House of Representative.

Held:
No; the immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the
Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended
beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from
arrest.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation of
Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that he
should be attending sessions or committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor
offenses, it is enough that Congress is in session.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

92
 A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of
justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo, it is the injury to the public which State action in
criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the
Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there
is risk of his absconding.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-
appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a
week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such an
aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been
an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people"
are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of
Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the
Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of a
function depends on the need to its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most
compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A
police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.

H. Privilege of Speech and Debate

Osmeña vs. Pendatun,
G.R. No. L-17144, October 28, 1960
En Banc [BENGZON, J.]
Facts:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., delivered his privilege speech before the House of
Representatives from the Second District of the province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber
on the one hour privilege to making serious imputations of bribery against the President of the
Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the creation of special House
Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made against the President, to summon petitioner
to substantiate his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause
why he should not be punished by the House.
Petitioner then resorted to SC seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground
that it infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the
House.

Issue:

93
 Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary
immunity for speeches.

Held:
No; our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege
cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with
firmness and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech,
and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise
of that liberty may occasion offense."
But is does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his
words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
[Atty. Olga’s Notes] Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and
conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof.

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang,

17 SCRA 876
Facts:
Respondent Cabangbang was a congressman when he wrote an open letter to the President
and caused the same to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. The letter
allegedly maligned several officials of the AFP, including petitioners Col. Jimenez et al.,
associating them in purported operational plans for a coup d’état. Jimenez et al. instituted this
present action for recovery of damages for libel against Cabangbang. In his defense, Cabangbang
invoked parliamentary immunity averring the letter is a privileged communication under Art VI,
Sec 15 (now 11) of the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether the publication in question is a privileged communication.

Held:
No. “Speech or debate therein (in Congress)” used in Art VI Sec 15 (now sec 11) of the
Constitution, refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions while Congress is in session. The open letter to the president was made by Cabangbang
when Congress was not in session. And in causing the communication to be so published,
Cabangbang was not performing his official duty xxx as a Member of Congress. Hence, the
communication is not absolutely privileged.

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 Pobre vs. Sen Santiago,
G.R. No. AC No. 7399, August 25, 2009
Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Trillanes vs. Castillo-Marigomen,

G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018
Facts:

Issue:

Held:

[Atty. Olga’s Notes] Parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the

lawmaker's speech or utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates in Congress,
extraneous to the "due functioning of the (legislative) process." To participate in or respond to
media interviews is not an official function of any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty
nor is it a component of the process of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to
discharge his duties and legislate without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker's
participation in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political in nature," outside the
ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987 Constitution.
Contrary to petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot invoke parliamentary immunity to cause the
dismissal of private respondent's Complaint. The privilege arises not because the statement is made
by a lawmaker, but because it is uttered in furtherance of legislation.

G. Restrictions (Sections 12, 13, 14, 20)

Section 12 - All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall, upon assumption
of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall notify the
House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that may arise from the filing of a proposed
legislation of which they are authors. [Art. VI]

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Section 13 - No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. [Art. VI]

Section 14 - No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as

counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before
any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on
account of his office. [Art. VI]

Section 20 - The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved and be open to
the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission on Audit
which shall publish annually an itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each
Member.[Art. VI]

Adaza vs. Pacana Jr,

135 SCRA 431
Facts:

Issue:

Held:

Puyat vs. De Guzman,

113 SCRA 31
Facts:

Issue:

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Held:

Dante Liban, Et. Al., vs. Richard Gordon,

G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009
Facts:

Issue:

Held:
Richard Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his election to and acceptance
of the post Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. PNRC is
a “private organization merely performing public functions”, and that the “PNRC Chairman is not
a government official or employee.” Not being a government office, the PNRC Chairmanship may
be held by any individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of Congress.
NRC is “autonomous, neutral and independent” of the Philippine Government. It is a voluntary
organization that “does not have government assets and does not receive any appropriation from
the Philippine Congress”. The PNRC is not a part of any of the government branches. PNRC
Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition
in the 1987 Constitution.” Senator Gordon an validly serve as the Chairman of the PNRC without
giving up his senatorial position.

Funa vs Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010
Facts:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H.
Bautista as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), vice
Agustin R. Bengzon. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime Transport. On September 1,
2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista was
designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as
DOTC Undersecretary.
Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant
petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants
to hold any other office or employment.
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in
this case. In fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the

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appointment of respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the
relinquishment of her post as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present
petition moot and academic.
Respondents also raise the lack of legal standing of petitioner to bring this suit. Clear from the
standard set in Public Interest Center is the requirement that the party suing as a taxpayer must prove that
he has sufficient interest in preventing illegal expenditure of public funds, and more particularly, his
personal and substantial interest in the case. Petitioner, however, has not alleged any personal or substantial
interest in this case. Neither has he claimed that public funds were actually disbursed in connection with
respondent Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC.

Issue:
Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the
position of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the
constitutional proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and
assistants.

Held:
Yes. Undersecretary Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC falls under the stricter prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
In Civil Liberties Union, a constitutional challenge was brought before this Court to nullify EO No.
284 issued by then President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987, which included Members of the Cabinet,
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries in its provisions limiting to two (2) the positions that appointive
officials of the Executive Department may hold in government and government corporations. Interpreting
the above provisions in the light of the history and times and the conditions and circumstances under
which the Constitution was framed, this Court struck down as unconstitutional said executive issuance,
saying that it actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by
the stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception
provided in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the
primary functions of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity,
which is the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.

Villegas vs. Legaspi,

G.R. No. 53869, March 25, 1982
[Appearance as Counsel]
Facts:

Issue:

Held:

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