2 Theories of Democratization Christian Welzel Introduction 22 The Nature of Democracy 22 + Ancient Democracy 23 The ‘Cool Water’ Origin of the West's Emancipatory Dynamic 24 The Principle of Representation 24 ‘The West-East, North-South Gradient 25 Rent-Seeking States 25 Patterns of Colonialism 27 Industrialization and Class Divisions 27 Ethnic and Religious Cleavages 29 Socioeconomic Modernization 29 International Conflicts and Regime Alliances 30 + Blte Pacts and Mass Mobilization 31 + State Repression and Grassroots Pressures 32 + The Role of Emancipative Values 32 + Elte Concessions versus Pressures from Below 33, * Institutional Configurations 34 + The Emancipatory Path to Sustainable Democracy 35 + A Typology of Democratization Processes 36 * Conclusion 36 Overview This chapter surveys the influences that the literature considers as significant in explaining why, when and where democratization happens—if it does. | order these influences along a sequence from moreChristian Welze! remote to more proximal broader process of human empowerment capt Introduction ‘The question of what type of regime prevails in a so- ciety has been at the heart of political science since Aristotle’s first treatment of the problem 2,500 years ago. And sois the question of when and why societies democratize, ‘When we think about democratization from the viewpoint of regime evolution, three aspects of democratic development are key: (1) the emergence of democracies in theretofore non-democratic regimes; (2) the survival of democracies once they are in place; and (3) the deepening of persisting democracies’ demo- cratic qualities. The emergence, survival, and deep- ening of democracy are distinct aspects of regime development that each deserve their own consider- ation. Nevertheless, they belong together under the umbrella of democratic evolution, In an evolutionary perspective, the central point of interest is sustainable democratization: the emergence of democracies that endure and progress. ‘There are many explanations of democratization. Assuming that most of them have a grain of truth, scholars t00 often take sidesin favouring one particular explanation over others, often forno better reason than personal taste. To overcome such biases, the neutral observer needs to theorize how the various suggested influences complement each other in driving democ- ratization. To achieve this goal, we need a meta-theo- retical scheme in which to place the diverse influences relative tocach other. Aselaboratedlaterin this chapter, I suggest for this purpose the human empowerment framework. The reason is my conviction that the root idea from which the most persuasive conceptions of democracy derive their inspiration is indeed human empowerment (Alexander and Welzel 2011). The Nature of Democracy In its literal meaning-—government by the people— democracy is about the institutionalization of people power. People power becomes institutionalized te ones. integrate both remote and proximate influences on democratization nan framework of human empowerment'—a concept that denotes the process by which ordinary people’ motivated, and entitled to commit ther ives to purposes oftheir choice | argue thatthe entilement compo ures democracy’s original inspiration and ulimate purpose, eer nth through civic fieedoms that entitle people tp their lives. Civic freedoms combine two co Be tary sets of individual righ (1) proce ge entitle people to pursue their personal preeeny their privat lives and (2) participatory rightsthaten a them to make their political preferences hein ay count in public life (Brettschneider 2007 Alena and Welzel 2011), In the history of states, granting civic freedoms the people is highly unusual. Because of vestediniy. ests in their privileges, ‘elites’ naturally tend to rein as much of their power as possible (Lipset 1960) Ts tendency predisposes elites against granting ce freedoms to the wider public because such freedoms curtail the elites’ power: protective rights limit te areas into which elites can govern; participatory rigs force elites to govern in accordance with publicpreke ences (Dahl 1971). To acquire civic freedoms onfnay people usually needed to join forces in social mow: ments and to mount pressures on the elites power enough to overcome their resistance (Fowersker asl Landman 1997). This is no easy achievement. [tte quires that wider parts of the public are both cpt and willing to coordinate their actions in ways tht cannot be ignored. For this reason, the history of ave freedoms is a history of public struggles for tet (Grayling 2007; Pinker 2011). Logically then, the conditions under which deme racy becomes likely must somehow affect the Po"! balance between the elites and the bulk ofthe PoPo tion, what we sometimes call the “masses'-SPe what Welzel (2013) calls ‘action resources“, material means, cognitive skills, and connect portunities—must be widely distributed actos population segments (Dahl 1971; Vanhanet Only then are ordinary people capable toj0% social movements that mount pressure 0” row 1998). When abundantaction resources bet distributed, people are capable of coordinating selves and organising effective resistance #8." annical rulers, Under this condition, TPT © ies jon forthe ‘opposition becomes too costly an option !Of” aay Asa consequence, the elites are able to tax Pe?in return for constitutional concessions that limit the lites’ jurisdiction in a social contract. Such was the case when the principle of ‘no taxation without rep: resentation’ was established during pre-industrial cap: italism in North-West Europe (Downing 1992; Tilly 1997). To be sure, no state in pre-industrial history would qualify as a democracy under today’s standards. The reason is that a defining element of contemporary democracies—universalsuffrage—was unknown. All pre-industrial democracies were partial in the sense that they restricted entitlements to the prop ertied classes. Moreover, among pre-industrial dem ‘ocracies, we need to draw a line between ancient and ‘modern ones. Ancient democracy, of which Athens in the fifth century BCis the signature example, is direct: the entitled citizens gather to form an assembly that then decides directly on substantive issues, usually by majority vote after a designated time of debate. Modern democracy, by contrast, is representative: the entitled citizens elect trustees or delegates who then assemble to decide on issues for their voters—again by majority vote after a designated time of debate. ‘Since gathering all entitled citizens at a central loca- tion meets physical limitations, direct democracy has been restricted to the territorial scope of city states. For this reason, the evolution of representation during the pre-industrial modern era was essential to revive the idea of democracy: representation allows to organize democracy at the territorial scope of a whole nation, including a union as wide as the United States (Finer 1999). Like direct democracy in ancient times, representa- tive democracy in modern times started out as partial democracy because it limited the right to vote—the franchise, that is—to the propertied classes, Neverthe: less, partially representative democracy set the stage to struggle for fully representative democracy, encour- aging the still excluded groups to demand political ‘equality. Paralleling the expansion of income taxation into the general population, the franchise extended in a stepwise process, until universal suffrage created fully representative democracies late in the nineteenth century (Markoff and White, see Chapter 6). Ancient Democracy To understand the driving forces of democratiza- tion, a look at the origin of democracy is instructive, The root elements of democratic decision making a 2 Theories of Democratization are debate and vote: debating an issue that affects all members of a group and then taking a decision by majority vote. These root elements of democratic decision making date back all the way to our original existence as hunter-gatherer bands. Apparently then, debate and vote are the natural form of collective de- cision making in the absence of an exclusive elite with central control over vital resources (Bollen and Paxton 1999) The legacy of ‘primitive’ hunter-gatherer times transpired into warrior tribes in which all able-bodied adults (including women sometimes) participated in military action. The war- riors gathered in assemblies to debate and vote on issues affecting the entire tribe. Among the Germanic tribes populating North-West Europe in early Medi eval times, such assemblies of the ‘free’ were known as the ‘thing’, ‘ting’, and ‘ding’. ‘Free’ meant freedom from bondage—a status tied to the right to bear weapons and the duty to partake in military cam- paigns. Since there is no centralized control over the ‘means of coercion among wartior tribes, elements of democratic decision making survive (Glassman 2017). The formation of well-organized states with pro- fessional armies and bureaucracies usually terminated democracy because state building always involves con- centration of executive power (Mann 1986), In fact, concentrating and professionalizing executive power is the quintessential definition of the state. Conse- quently, in the presence of states, democracy turns into a rare phenomenon that only surfaces in remod- elled fashion under special circumstances. Elements of democracy may survive atthe local level and within corporations, but even this only if local and corporate autonomies persist, as it was the case in North-West Europe during feudalism (Powelson 1997). Otherwise, state formation indeed eliminated elements of demo- cratic decision making. This is obvious in the rareness of ancient democracies, of which Athens, a couple of other Greek city states, and—with qualifications—the Roman Republic are the few documented examples (Biner 1999). Bynocoincidence, all ancientdemocracies emerged in agrarian economies of the freeholder type. Free- holder communities flourished where continuous rain made irrigation management superfluous, thus avoiding centralized control of water andits well docu- mented tendency to breed coercive states (Wittfogel 1957; Midlarsky 1997; Bentzen, Kaarsen, and Wingen- der 2016). Frecholder communities organize defence democracy from 2324 Christian Welzel in the form of a militia: the citizen-army (Finer 1999). In a frecholder-militia system, all men owning a plot of land provide military service and, in return, are en: titled to speak and vote in the citizen assembly. In such system, three vital resources are diffusely distributed in the hands of all citizens: water, land, and weapons (McNeill 1968). Elites, accordingly, have no chance to concentrate power by bringing these resources under their exclusive control. A similar system characterized the Swiss federation in Medieval times and the north- ern parts of the United States in the early colonial era. The ‘Cool Water’ Origin of the West's Emancipatory Dynamic In the end, the ancient democracies vanished. Limited to the spatial scope of city-states, they could not com- pete with land empires and have eventually been ab: sorbed, Athens, for instance, lost its sovereignty in the empire of Alexander the Great. Thus, the foundation ‘of democracy’s revival was laid much later, with the evolution of representation in North-West Europe during the late Medieval age (Finer 1999). In North-West Europe, the process of state forma- tion took a unique path (Jones 1985; Tilly 1997). Upon the adoption of agriculture, the Germanic peoples transferred their tribal freedoms into a feudal system characterized by multiple autonomies, including per- sonal, local, corporate, and sectoral autonomies, and all of that in the absence of imperial territorial unity (Powelson 1997). North-West Europe's ‘cool water’ condition—that is, the combination of cold seasons with continuous rain—supports this decentral, multi- polar, power-sharing arrangement because ‘cool water” bestows vital autonomies on an agrarian society's cel- lular unit: the family farm, These autonomies include autonomy in water access, food production, work organization, and household formation at the level of the ‘nuclear family’ (Hajnal 1982; Hartman 2004; Dilli 2015). These autonomies are emancipatory in the sense that they free individuals from obligations to the ‘extended family’, Human cooperation, thus, detaches from lineage-bonds and becomes an act of voluntary agreement, out of a reciprocal recognition of mutual benefit—the ingredients of contract and reason Initially, the feudal system was tailored to local self sustenance, with a barter economy that was barely able to feed town dwellers. State infrastructure re- mained rudimentary under these conditions: in the absence of regular cash f lows, rul levy monetary taxes, which are uot Wel eS, Which are essenygat abl Senta] ‘ofee mies and bureaucracies—th, bones of states (Finer 1999), "®*Rizationg re. The Principle of Representatig nm Beginning in the thirteenth jurope to a level sufficient to sustai increasingly specialized urban oat 2 oe to sprout and the economy became these! tized in the fourteenth and fifteenth cen rulers could start building a state by taxing mo incomes. Yer, in North-West Europe, rules poe) fronted with a society in which social grog ™ used to organize themselves in village comms town assemblies, guilds, leagues, corporation, all sorts of voluntary associations. The wi! Practice of collective selForganization enabled ‘groups that monarchs wished to tax to orgie, fective resistance against such ambitions. Ar rulers with absolutist aspirations tried to enforcether will on these groups, like the Stuart dynasty in Fag land for whom French absolutism was the model By in North-West Europe, royal absolutism was at bet temporarily successful. It eventually crumbled unde liberal revolutions, which were powerful testimors of the societies’ self-organizing capacities and rest: ance power. In the end, rulers proved unable to confisate sources without consent; they had to accept the prin ciple of ‘no taxation without representation’. This principle was written down in constitutions that e came emblems of a social contract. The represetatie principle gave rise to a ‘contractual state’, which tas in sharp contrast to the ‘coercive state’ that preva inall other parts of the world where statesem with certain exceptions in Japan, the cvilizatce closest to North-West Europe's ‘cool ‘water’ condi (Jones 1985; Mann 1986; Tilly 1997). Ieis inherent in the logic of the representative? ciple that, once taxation and other obligations 8 state expand into wider segments of the porta the franchise does so too. In a process of ee - tension, the franchise expanded to includes working class, and then women—unti oe cyt frage established fully representative in the nineteenth century. # sequen, ity in Now Mo,‘The representative principle ties state power to a society's aggregate preferences, which—paradoxical asit may seem—enhances state capacities because au- thorities can rely on people's voluntary support to a much greater extent than a coercive state ever could The West-East, North-South Gradient The representative principle shaped the state for- mation process only in Europe, and nowhere else. But within Europe, the principle’s dominance varied on a geographical axis: it turned less dom- inant as one moved away from the North-West to either the South or the East. Significantly, the same geographical gradation underlies pre-industrial capitalism, the Protestant Reformation, Enlighten- ment philosophy, and other signatures of the rising West's emancipatory spirit: they all turned weaker towards Europe's South and East (Jones 1985; Chi- rot 1994). The confoundingbasis of the geography shapingthe West's emancipatory features is the ‘cool water’ con- dition, which indeed culminates in the North-West, turning less pronounced as one moves South (which is drierand hotter) and East (which is drier and season- ally more extreme). In Freedom Rising, Welzel (2013; 2014) formulates a “cool water’ theory that tries to make sense of this ob- servation. The ‘cool water’ theory posits two theses. ‘The ‘seed-thesis’ posits that the ‘cool water’ condi tion bestows on people living under this condition some vital autonomies, most notably autonomy in water access, food acquisition, work organization, and household formation. These existential autonomies embody the seeds of an emancipatory dynamic. The “germination thesis’ suggests that the emancipatory seeds began to germinate as more complex social or- ‘ganizations—from private corporations to voluntary associations to state administration—begin to take shape: in the presence of grass-roots autonomies, social organization evolves through emancipatory struggles in which one group after the other claims freedoms, which then become increasingly firmly encultured. These ideas suggest that democratic structures ori- ginate in a specific condition: the resources that are vital for a society's subsistence are not available in high local concentrations but are spread out in ways 2 Theories of Democratization so diffuse that no single group can monopolize access to them (Dahl 1971; Vanhanen 2003). Water and its derivative assets, which are specific to colder climates, are most vital resources of this kind for every society. Given their importance, it is not surprising to find a strong correlation of (1) how pronounced the ‘cool water’ condition isin the most populated regions of a country with (2) how democratic the respective coun. try is—no matter if we use historic or contemporary measures of democracy (Welzel 2013) Figure 2.1 illustrates the evidence using data from a new monograph by Welzel et al. (forthcoming) on the historic role of the ‘cool water’ condition. The six diagrams demonstrate the strongly positive influence of the ‘cool water’ condition (1) on how early peasants were free in different European countries starting in 1700, (2) on per capita incomes among various econ omies in Eurasia at the eve of industrialization in 1765, @) on female reproductive autonomy! in about 1800, (4) on the dispersion of knowledge* around 1850, and (5) on effective democracy in 1900, as well as (6) 2012. ‘The latter four illustrations use 28 global regions, ra ther than countries, as units of observation because countries did not persist in today’s borders throughout these centuries. Mirroring the evidence in Figure 2.1, Bentzen, Kaarsen, and Wingender (2016) show that the highly concentrated water use in irigation-regulated agricul- ture predicts the regimes’ levels of authoritarianism, in the past as well as today—confirming Wittfogel’s (1957) classical idea that irrigation management breeds coercive states. Rent-Seeking States Democracy is statistically linked to the level of vital re sources, such as monetary incomes per capita. Yet, this link only holds in as much as a high level of resources indicates diffuseness in the respective resource’s dis- tribution, which it usually but not always does. This is most obvious in the case of the Gulf monarchies ‘whose exceptionally high level of per capita income is obviously in no way conducive to democracy. The Gulf monarchies’ wealth derives from oil rents. Like ‘gas, minerals, and other natural resources, oil is a lo- cally fixed resource. Because of its local fixation, ac- cess to oil can be centrally controlled. Related to this theme is another aspect of the ‘no taxation without representation’ principle: the 25Fosiamien voituni ost vara ° 3D 0061, 08 Z asom an = 5, i . aD oss. EX cad - wor Onm> sr0-0%08) ten % 90 mp8) or titi eee eer see 3D 0081 Feeages gry ont Kane ao Christian Welze! 26principle also applies conversely—'no representation without taxation’, The point is that states receiving rents from natural resources operate under a reduced need to tax their people, which weakens the demand for representation on the people’s part (Conrad and DeMeritt 2013). Further weakening this demand, ren- tier states actually do the opposite of taxation: they subsidize their citizens with generous social benefits. Of course, they also use their funds to finance the sur- veillance and oppression of potential opponents. The same logic explains why the economically advanced city state of Singapore is able to sustain a hegemonial party regime: state revenue from the world's biggest port and corporate tax from multi-national companies allow the government to keep the citizens’ income taxes low (Verweij and Pelizzo 2009). In numbers, state revenue from income and sales taxes contrib: utes about 60 per cent to the German state's revenue, which compares to less than 30 per cent in Singapore. ‘The question of whether vital resources are locally fixed or diffuse explains why democracy has been un: likely in agrarian societies where land is the key produc: tion factor: by definition, land isa locally fixed resource. Noticing this, Moore (1966) argued that, when land property is monopolized by a hereditary aristocracy, democracy will be blocked by the aristocracy's fear of land reforms, which democratically elected parties might enforce on them. However, while land itself is a locally fixed asset, the local fixity of its agrarian suit- ability varies with the local fixity of fresh water. Under the ‘cool water’ condition, fresh wateris so ubiquitously available that almost every slot of landis arable, Hence, farming under the ‘cool water’ condition has low entry barriers, which are further diminished by the low fixed costs of agriculture under this condition: there are no investments needed for expensive irrigation infrastruc- ture (Haber and Menaldo 2011). For this reason, historic ‘measures of the spread of family farm ownership cor- relate significantly with the diffuseness of water sources (Bentzen, Kaarsen, and Wingender 2016). Patterns of Colonialism ‘The representative principle matured in the ‘cool water’ area of North-West Europe. Settler colonialism transplanted this principle into those areas of the New World where the same ‘cool water’ climate allowed land-seeking Europeans to settle in large numbers as farmers. Hence, North America, Australia, and New 2. Theories of Democratization Zealand turned into their own centres of democratic innovation, with New Zealand becoming the first country in the world to introduce universal suffrage in 1893. The democratic spirit unfolded even more vigor: ously in the overseas areas because the settlers did not need to fight the privileges of a hereditary aristocracy. The tragic part of the history of white settler co- lonialism is the fate of the indigenous populations. "The ‘cool water’ areas in the New World were mostly pre-agrarian, for which reason these areas were thinly populated, In addition, the native Indians, Aborigines, and Maoris all were vulnerable to the diseases that the Europeans imported. Consequently, immigrating Eu- ropean farmers quickly outnumbered, repelled, and decimated the indigenous people (Diamond 1997). Figure 2.2 summarizes the origin of modern democracy in the ‘cool water’ areas of the Northern Atlantic. In contrast to the ‘cool water’ areas, trop- ical and sub-tropical climates did not attract masses, of settlers seeking to work their own plots of land. ‘Apart from traders and missionaries, Europeans of a more privileged background came as managers of plantations and mines, forcing the indigenous people todo the hard work while the colonizers confiscated their produce. Once the indigenous people were decimated, the colonizers imported slaves from Africa to replace them. This type of exploitative colonialism left the decolonized nations with rent- seeking economies focusing on raw materials that are locally fixed and easily monopolized, cementing sharp class divisions between rent seekers and manual workers. The fixation on raw materials also means a focus on low-end products, which disincen- tivizes investment into education because the bene- ficiaries have no interest in a skilled workforce when most of the work that needs to be done is just hard physical labour. From the viewpoint of resource distribution, all these conditions are not favourable to the flourishing of democracy (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; 2000). Industrialization and Class Divisions ‘The viewpoint of resource distribution is also im- portant for the ways in which the Industrial Revolu- tion affected class divisions. In the ‘cool water’ areas of North-West Europe, North America, and Aus- tralia/New Zealand, the Industrial Revolution did not create a division between the working class and a28. Christian Welzel coalwate’ =) Condition towards emancipatory developments) lization’ path towar aR ‘Western cv con Social entities form through seftorganization Pre-industral capitalism under Rulers’ attempts at |= | “middle classes knowing how ‘unconsented taxation] to organize resistance Urban middle classes ‘grow practised in ‘economic and social self-organization Democratic freedoms for the propertied classes: nascent democracy ‘Abandoning the privileges of the feudal aristocracy Middle classes not blocking the working class's claim for universal suffrage J Early Full Democracy the middleclass so sharp that the latter would ally with the aristocracy and other elements of the upper class to Keep the working class in check. By contrast, in Southern and Eastern Europe where royal abso- Iutism preserved the privileges of the aristocracy, in- dustrialization regularly produced exactly such sharp class divisions, polarizing an impoverished rural and urban working class against a privileged class of land owners industrialists, Bankers, and authorities in the State apparatus and the army (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Outside Europe, industralizationhad the same effet in areas colonized out of ‘extractive interests rather than for reasons of settlement (Acemoglu Johnson, and Robinson 2001), which—agein cine typical for the tropical and sub-tropical regions lack the ‘cool water’ condition. ‘Where industrialization produced extreme les larization, the privileged classes feared oe would be voted into power. Once in office, ie ge ties might use their power to enforce land a other redistributive measures that deprive ne 2% classes of their privileges. Thus, the WPPE Would rely on state repression to prevent soot ties from gaining power. Confronted with sal sion, working. class activists would, in #15 and embrace revolutionary goals aimed a! oi version of the existing social order (COME © 2003: Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).much the pattern that explains many former colonies’ longilasting capture between right-wing military regimes and leftist guerrilla warfare (see Ch. 19), Ethnic and Religious Cleavages Social polarization does not only unfold over class cleavages. Societies can also be segregated into hostile groups on the basis of religion, language, and ethni- Gity, and the chances for this to happen increase with a country’s religious, linguistic, and ethnic fraction- alization, especially when fractionalization goes to- gether with spatial segregation (Rokkan 1983). Spatial segregation facilitates the stabilization of exclusionary ‘group identities, and this is an important precondition for the development of group hostilities, Sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the highest ethnic fractional- ization, exemplifies the latter type of group enmity and its negative effect on the chances of democracy to flourish (see Chapter 24). In any case, extreme social polarization is det mental to democracy because it turns easily into vio- lent fights for the monopolization of the state (Dahl 1971). Peaceful power transfers from one group to another, as democracy foresees them, are not ac- cepted under these conditions. Instead, military coups and civil wars that end up in the dictatorship of one group over others are the regular result of polarized societal cleavage structures (Huntington 1968). It fits these points of view that democratic theor- ists from Lipset (1960) to Dahl (1971) to Held (2006) consider democracy essentially a middle-class breed. ‘The middle classis a natural buffer between the lowest and the highest income segments. Hence, the larger the middle class is, the smaller are the population seg- ments trapped in unbridgeable polarization, and the wider is the circle of solidarity in a society. Conflicts Of interest continue to persist but they are of a more modest nature when most of these conflicts are those inside the middle class itself. Socioeconomic Modernization Because of democracy’s obvious link to capitalist development, scholars early on suggested ‘mod- ernization’ as a diffuse force of nature driving dem- ocratization (Lerner 1958; Lipset 1959; Parsons 1964; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Barro 1997). 2 Theories of Democratization Understood in socioeconomic terms, moderniza- tion constitutes a bundle of intertwined grassroots processes, including—among other things—techno- logical innovation, productivity growth, occupational specialization, social diversification, urbanization, rising living standards and life expectancies, rising lit- eracy rates and levels of education, growing spatial and social mobility, as well as expanding informational and communicational connectivity The multiple aspects of modernization all work to- gether in producing a joint outcome: enhancing the material, intellectual, and connective resources avail- able to the median person. This process increases the masses’ capabilities to launch and sustain collective actions for a shared purpose. In other words, modern ‘masses are in a better position to mount pressures on state authorities. The major effect of modernization, then, is that it shifts the power balance between elites and the masses to the mass’ side by making greater action resources more diffusely available. This diffu sionist aspect of modernization has also the conse- quence of perforating previously impermeable class divisions, merging the bulk of a population into a broad service middle class whose lower layers blend into the working class and the upper layers into the managerial class (Vanhanen 2003). Scholars repeatedly disputed _modernization’s democratizing impulse. Following Moore (1966), O'Donnell (1973) argued that the pathway from mod- ernization to democracy has been a singularity of the Western ‘centre’ of the capitalist ‘world system’. By contrast, in the non-Western periphery of this system, modernization—if it happens—is deformed in ways leading to ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’ (cf. Waller- stein 1974). This remained a popular view among de- pendency theorists (Cardoso and Faletto 1979) until the ‘third wave of democratization’ demonstrated that also. non-Western countries can successfully modernize and adopt democracy (Huntington 1991). The revival of modernization theory was followed by repeated attempts to disprove it again (cf. Przeworski and Li- mongi 1997; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). But each of these attempts has been refuted in turn (Boix and Stokes 2003; Benhabib, Corvalan, and Spiegel 2013), Most recently, Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) effectively eliminated all reasonable doubts about moderniza- tion's democratizing impulse, disproving continuing claims to the contrary by Munck (forthcoming). ‘Which of the multiple facets of modernization does exactly what to turn modernization into a 2930 Christian Welze! sheult to isolate, precisely be interwoven. Still, the (2014) convincingly is a more important hat moderniza- active than its iemocratizing force i di ee these facets are so tightly study by Murtin and Wacziars ws that spreading education incomes, suggesting # ‘are more imp: sho facet than rising tion's cognitive impulses material ones. “The recent success of right wing populism in West- an democracies highlights the importance of mod- crn avion from its opposite angle: support for these anti-democratic tendencies is strongest among the so called ‘modernization losers’: Jow-skilled manual vvonkers with low education and stagnant wages in fading industries. In a nutshell, the pro-democratic force of modernization also involves anti-democratic counter-eactions among social segments left behind by modernization (Alexander and Welzel 2017). ‘This is reason for concern. Given democracy's dependence on a fuirly equal resource distribution, the risen income inequalities and resulting increases in class polarization throughout the Western world have the potential to undermine democracy, as the recent electoral triumphs of right-wing populist parties illus- trate (Alexander and Welzel 2017). + Sexial sions that foster group hosts hinder peaceful ower transfers that are necesary for democracy to function + Democracy is aachored in sei condor in which action resources are so widely dstibuted armong the "population thatthe costs of repressing eppesition from below become too hgh for rulers. * (Certain natural condtions have been favourable to a "ore widespread control over action resources, but mod mization can happen everywhere, andi i important "because it tends to distribute the control over action [= FEOurces in the ways tat favour democracy. Internatio i nal Conflicts at i ¢ n Alliances eae The fe es Scores of countries have democratized i international waves suggests that diriotrs tization ic a e considered as an isolated domestic eee es es and 7). International factors ob. rtant role, especiall : ; ly the outcome of confrontations between opp (Therborn 1977), The timepoint at whic} often been decided by nee demo Te of gy confrontations between the endisy mt Western democracies and shifting coun’ tite, autocratic empires, Thus, regime trans ay and away from democracy ate not gah ‘ power struggles between pro- and any git forces within countries. Instead, power fepereis,oas 3 epee = appar and |=) tras actions” HD] moar sain ecreaaing n ‘an tame presuig or : “hecive ayo tovoret democrat goa ‘smocc oe eseecraeging demoratc emocate shares th oa eon ‘recom trccoms prelates. Objcthe Scel Condos |C)[__Mothoont Was Tendencies Interne Cleve Atos MASS PRESSURED DEMOCRATIZATION "*Gonls aiming at the introduction, deepening or defence of democrat freedoms 3738 Christian Welzel sted by (4) critical events, in the context of (5) te eae ees ‘The role of objective social con- ‘enough, leads to an institutional ee Sing ditions i this causal interplay is that chey determine the system. oe toderys epabiesforcollecive acon. The role Again, masstesponsive democrayzaigg Stevriationalmastendencesisthatthey sbapethe only path to democracy. For democracy co Me intentions that inspire collective actions. The role of grievances is that they provide a reason to become active for the sake of given goals. The role of crit- ical events is that they provide a trigger for collective cd the role of collective actions is that they constitute a challenge that, when be, posed by foreign powers oradopted by yaa" 9 Una 9 le atone Sota democracy actions. But mass-responsive democry only path to democracy that creates democracy, And only socially rooted sustainable in and by itself, actions. An Qee iin 2 nl 1. Whatoferentiates ancient from modern democracy! 2. Which structural factors favour democratization? 3. Which structural factors impede democratization? 4, Why id democracy and capitalism co-evolve in Western Europe and North America! 5. Why didindustrialzation not always favour democratization? {6 Whatis the role of mass motivational tendencies in democratization? | @ Visit the online resources that accompanies this book for additional questions to accompany exch hu, and range of other resources: www.oup.com/uk/haerpfer2el. ‘Lniversty Press), Encompassng atcount ofthe rigns of democracy from a political economy perspec ae Gand Taylor MM (1996), Negotiating Democracy (Pitsburgh, PA: University of Pitsburg Fess) The ‘on actor strategies, comparing falled and successful cases of democratization. Dahl RA: (1971), PohercyPartdpaton and Oppestion (New Haven, CT ale University Pres). Ths casero *heoretcaly most comprehensive account of democracy until today. Fowerakr | and Landman, (1997 ? oe! 1(1997), tizenship Rights and Social Movements. (Oxford: Oxford Universi =) ‘Acemogli D and Robinson, JA. (2006), Economic Orgs of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York, NY: Care the i BEStEOOKS on democratization from a social movement perspective. Osha res) =) The clastic on waves of democratization and what causes them. rie Rand | Psst 8) Hot Gc Cure an Deroy New oe | a = ‘Omprehensve account of democratization in a politcal culture perspect™® a Webel. (2013), a Pos ment ond the fon (New Yo Pres) Mente (ies for Emancption (New ieee Freer ferarceaign na a sen 2M theoreti grouncing of rhea Re theory,2 Theories of Democratization 39 ORE TEN hetpipol guselenglshivarieties-of-democracy-v.dem- This website at Gothenburg University (Sveden) links tothe ‘Varieties of democracy (V-Dem) project and its worldwide longitudinal data. huxpdidemocracystanfordedu This isthe website of the Comparative Democratization project of Stanford University Sete by Larry Damond, __wwrjoumnalofdemocracyorg Thisisthe webste of the Journal of Democracy Some artis are free for downoad. on ‘werwtandf.co.uk/journals This is the website of the Taylor & Francis academic journal Derocratization. Article abstracts canbe read online 1 Female reproductive autonomy evens reduced fet pressures on women which i evident in relatively high | female agesat frst marrage and lover feralefertities inked wit lover natural disease loads, lover infant mortal ities, anda type of agriculture (\e.rain-fed grain cultivation combined with livestock farming) that has a limited labour per unit of cultivated land, ae Ret gica gay Sem a cee attendance into an index Pos aH rae potest east ype intB + Bi ear eR iar Mae pall Bah