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It is generally accepted that the crime of aggression exists in international customary law. The definitions
and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over this crime by the International Criminal Court were
adopted in 2010 at the Kampala Review Conference by the states parties to the court. Aggression is
criminalized according to the statute law of some countries, and can be prosecuted under universal
jurisdiction.
Aggression is one of the core crimes in international criminal law, alongside genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes. In 1946, the International Military Tribunal ruled that aggression was "the
supreme international crime" because "it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole".[1] The
standard view is that aggression is a crime against the state that is attacked, but it can also be considered a
crime against individuals who are killed or harmed as a result of war.
Background
Warfare has been part of human experience since the beginning of human history.[2] The criminalization of
aggression is of recent origin, dating to after World War II, but the idea of aggression as a grave moral
transgression and violation of the international order dates back much farther.[3][4] Just war theory, over the
centuries, held that a war fought for territorial aggrandizement was unjust, and that just wars are fought
only for self-defense, or in defense of allies, against such aggression.[5] The philosophical basis for the
criminalization of aggression derives from eighteenth-century theorist Emer de Vattel, although Vattel did
not envision formal trials for aggression, simply the execution of wrongdoers.[6] Early modern just war
theorists conceived aggression as the first wrong committed against another country, rather than the first
military strike.[7] Hugo Grotius, often considered the founder of international law, saw the principle wrong
in aggression in the violation of individual rights.[8] In 1815, Napoleon was outlawed "as an Enemy and
Disturber of the tranquillity of the World" in what was considered an "Exception to general rules of the
Law of Nations".[9]
World War II
Invasions during World War II led to new thinking on aggression.[17] Soviet criminologist Aron
Naumovich Trainin developed the ideas that were used to criminalize aggressive war, although he did not
attract international attention until 1943. Others making similar proposals included Hersch Lauterpacht,
Marcel de Baer, and Bohuslav Ečer.[18] Trainin argued that although material and political responsibility
rested with the state, criminal responsibility for aggressive war was vested in the individuals exercising
authority. He blamed Adolf Hitler, his cabinet, government officials, the Nazi Party and German
industrialists for acts of aggression against the Soviet Union, which he described as "the most heinous
crime".[19] The governments-in-exile represented in the London International Assembly lobbied for a
formal international tribunal with jurisdiction over acts of aggression.[20] In 1944, Trainin proposed that the
Nazi leaders could be dealt with either with a tribunal or by "the political verdict of the victorious
democratic States".[21] At the time, the Soviet Union still perceived itself as vulnerable to international
aggression, which motivated its interest in criminalizing aggression.[22]
Although there was not much in the way of international criminal law to work from, the United States
Department of War put together the legal framework for the Nuremberg trials in ten months.[23] Some
prominent United States policymakers thought that execution without trial compromised the principles of
the Allies and that formal trials before an international court would lend legitimacy.[24] At the London
Conference of 1945, the victorious Allies decided to criminalize aggression and try their vanquished
enemies[12] although at the conference doubts, were raised that wars of aggression were illegal under
customary law.[9] Both the Soviet Union, which invaded the Baltic States and Poland according to the
secret protocols of the German–Soviet pact, and Western countries, which had planned an invasion of
Norway, were aware that they could also be accused of acts of aggression and so they limited the definition
of crimes against peace to the actions of their defeated enemies during World War II.[25][26]
Case law
Almost all the trials for crimes against peace took place between November 1945 and November 1948,[27]
though in some cases such as Romania they extended into 1949;[28] no one has been prosecuted for
aggression before or since.[29] The courts faced the challenge, first of proving the criminality of acts of
aggression, and secondly in tying such acts to individuals.[30]
In 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Finland, leading to a peace treaty on unfavorable terms in 1940. In
1941, Finland attacked the Soviet Union, retaking the ceded territory and occupying parts of the Soviet
Union that had never been part of Finland.[31] In 1944, the war turned against Finland, which signed an
armistice on even less favorable terms.[32] The Allied Control Commission in Finland insisted on holding
trials for aggression during the second war, as the armistice had required Finnish cooperation in trying those
accused of war crimes.[33] The law establishing the tribunal established criminal responsibility for those
who "in a significant manner contributed in Finland's engagement in the war...or prevented peace" between
1941 and 1944.[34] Eight men were tried; wartime president Risto Ryti, six members of the cabinet, and the
Finnish ambassador to Germany, but not any generals.[35] Unlike other specifications of the crimes against
peace, the Finnish trials charged those who joined the government after 1941 and rejected peace offers
from the Soviet Union.[36] Initially seven were convicted and the ambassador was acquitted; the judgement
was revised to convict all the defendants with harsher penalties, up to ten years imprisonment with hard
labor.[37] The convicts were treated leniently in prison and all were released by 1949.[38]
All 22 defendants were charged with crimes against peace, and 12 were convicted: Hermann Göring,
Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel, Alfred Rosenberg, Wilhelm Frick, Walther Funk,
Karl Dönitz, Erich Raeder, Alfred Jodl, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, and Konstantin von Neurath.[41] The
Nuremberg verdict was groundbreaking, establishing international criminal law and rejecting that act of
state doctrine granted immunity for such serious crimes. The defendants were prosecuted even for acts that
were legal under domestic law.[50] Opinion on the Nuremberg trials was divided. While some heralded it as
a breakthrough in international law, crimes against peace specifically were subject to criticism as ex post
facto law.[9][51]
The main Nuremberg trial only considered the conspiracy to commit crimes against peace against Austria
and Czechoslovakia, ruling that these relatively bloodless invasions were not wars of aggression. The
slightly different wording of the offense in Law No. 10 allowed the invasions of these countries to be
counted as substantive crimes against peace, and ultimately two defendants were convicted for their role in
these invasions.[53] Chief prosecutor Telford Taylor was skeptical about prosecuting aggression, but
ultimately charged defendants in four of the subsequent Nuremberg trials: the IG Farben trial, Krupp trial,
High Command trial, and Ministries trial.[52] Of 66 defendants charged with aggression, only three were
convicted (Hans Lammers, Wilhelm Keppler, and Paul Koerner), all of them during the Ministries trial.[54]
Nevertheless, the trials helped clarify the scope of aggression as a criminal offense, defining its four
necessary elements as "a state act of aggression; sufficient authority to satisfy the leadership requirement;
participation in the planning, preparing, initiating or waging of the aggressive act; and mens rea".[55]
The charge of aggression was central to the trial; 36 out of 55 counts were for crimes against peace.[56] The
judgement in the Tokyo Trial was three times longer than the Nuremberg judgement, making it a valuable
source of case law on aggression.[57] The majority of the judges followed the Nuremberg interpretation of
crimes against peace, but two judges—Radhabinod Pal from India and Bert Röling of the Netherlands—
dissented against the prosecution of crimes against peace.[58] The prosecution used conspiracy to file more
charges as each member of a conspiracy was held responsible for all others acting in the same
conspiracy.[59] All of the conspiracy charges related to crimes against peace alleged that the conspiracy
sought to "secure military, naval, political and economic domination of East Asia and of the Pacific and
Indian Oceans, and of all countries and islands therein and bordering thereon" by "wag[ing] declared or
undeclared war or wars of aggression, and war or wars in violation of international law, treaties, agreements
and assurances, against any country or countries which might oppose that purpose." [60] The conspiracy
charges were partly successful as the judges accepted that there was a joint conspiracy to wage aggressive
war from 1928 to 1945.[61]
The judgement summarizes the rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s[62] leading up to the Conference of
11 August 1936 in which an expansionist policy was decided.[63] In 1937, Japan invaded China and in
1938–1939 it prepared with war with the Soviet Union.[64]
Romania
The 1947 treaty of peace with Romania obliged the country to apprehend and bring to trial people accused
of "war crimes and crimes against peace and humanity".[65] Consequently, on 18 August 1947, Romania
issued its "Law for the Prosecution and Punishment of Those Guilty of War Crimes or Crimes against
Peace or Humanity".[66] At least 8 members of the wartime government of Ion Antonescu were sentenced
in 1949 for crimes against peace, although one of them was rehabilitated by the Romanian Supreme Court
on 26 October 1998. Another Romanian sentenced for crimes against peace - Gheron Netta, Ion
Antonescu's last finance minister (1 April to 23 August, 1944) - was rehabilitated by the Supreme Court on
17 January 2000.[67][68]
Other trials
Arthur Greiser, a Nazi leader in Danzig and later Gauleiter in the Warthegau region annexed from Poland,
was tried and convicted by a Polish court in 1946 for aggression among other charges.[69] Historian
Catherine Epstein states that the evidence that Greiser had participated in a conspiracy to wage aggressive
war is weak or nonexistent.[70] According to Mark A. Drumbl, he would probably not be convicted
according to the Rome Statute definition of aggression.[71]
In 1946, former Japanese general Takashi Sakai was tried by a Chinese court for aggression, convicted, and
executed.[72] Sakai appears to have been responsible for carrying out policies designed by others, which
would put him outside the Rome Statute definition of aggression. According to jurist Roger S. Clark, he
probably would not have been convicted for crimes against peace if tried at the Tokyo trial.[73]
Maintenance of international peace and stability is a major function of the international order, and the
Charter of the United Nations prohibits acts of aggression against other states. The prohibition of
aggression is considered a peremptory norm in customary law, such that it is binding on states that are not
members of the United Nations.[75] The most important provision in the UN Charter is Article 2(4): "All
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." [76] "Force" refers to armed or military force, defined broadly: it can refer to conventional
armies or irregular forces.[77] Although not explicitly stated in the UN Charter, the conventional view is that
only state actors can commit aggression.[78] Although self-defense is an exception to the prohibition of
force, claims of preventative and pre-emptive self-defense is largely rejected.[79]
On 14 December 1974, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3314 elaborated on the prohibition
of the use of force in the UN Charter. Although not legally binding, it influenced the Rome Statute's
definition of aggression.[80] Resolution 3314 generally defines aggression as "the use of armed force by a
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition."[81] It includes an
incomplete list of acts of aggression and confirms that aggression are committed by one state against
another, excluding non-state actors.[82] The resolution also refers to "crime of aggression" and makes it
clear that there is individual criminal liability for aggression.[81]
Customary law
It is generally agreed by scholars of international criminal law that the crime of aggression is part of
international customary law, but there is no agreement on the exact scope of aggression that is covered in
customary law. This threshold is probably high, in order to distinguish criminal aggression from other acts
of aggression.[83] According to Antonio Cassese, the customary criminalization of aggression covers
"planning, or organizing, or preparing, or participating in the first use of armed force by a State against the
territorial integrity and political independence of another State in contravention of the UN Charter, provided
the acts of aggression concerned have large-scale and serious consequences".[84] Gerhard Werle and
Florian Jessberger argue that wars of aggression are criminalized under customary law, but not acts of
aggression falling short of war.[85] Others argue for a broader conception, including other acts of
aggression that have broad-ranging and severe consequences.[86]
Aggression requires both a mens rea and actus reus.[87] In terms of mens rea, Israeli jurist Yoram Dinstein
argues that aggression can only be committed by a few high state officials who decide to wage aggressive
war, and any subordinates who know in advance that their plans will be used to wage an aggressive war.
Other jurists require a special intent, in the form of seeking to "achieve territorial gains, or to obtain
economic advantages, or to interfere with the internal affairs" of the state that is aggressed.[88]
National law
After 1948, many states passed statute law criminalizing aggression,[89] with different variations in
prohibited conduct.[90] Dinstein has argued that national prosecutions for aggression are undesirable as "the
nature of crimes against peace is such that no domestic proceedings can conceivably dispel doubts
regarding the impartiality of the judges."[90] Aggression can be tried under universal jurisdiction.[91]
Rome Statute
In 1998, at the Rome Conference that adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ("the
Statute"), the crime was included as one of the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court (Article 5.1) and
over which any State that becomes party to the Statute accepts the Court's jurisdiction (Article 12.1).
However, participants to the Rome Conference could not agree on the definition of the crime nor on further
conditions for the Court's exercise of jurisdiction; the Statute did not allow the Court to exercise such
jurisdiction until these outstanding issues were solved (Article 5.2). At the 2010 Review Conference ("the
Conference"), States Parties agreed by consensus to adopt resolution RC/Res.6 accepting the amendments
to the Statute adding the definition of the crime and the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over this
crime.[92] Aggression is one of the core crimes in international criminal law, alongside genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.[93]
Under the Rome Statute, as amended in the 2010 Kampala Review Conference, the crime of aggression
"means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its
character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations".[94][95]
The criminal prosecution of aggression is limited to the most serious acts of state aggression;[96] non-state
aggression, an even more disputed concept, is excluded.[97] The Rome Statute also restricts the crime of
aggression to leaders of a state who have the power to determine a state's policy, excluding even high-
ranking officials or generals who carry out a war of aggression.[96][98]
Thus, the crime of aggression is distinguished from the act of aggression, defined in the Rome Statute by
the amendments of the 2010 Kampala Review Conference as follows:[94][95]
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, "act of aggression" means the use of armed force by a State
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts,
regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly
resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of
another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another
State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another
State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in
such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act
of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein.
— Kampala Review Conference, 11 June 2010[94]
Jurisdiction
The International Criminal Court may only prosecute an act of aggression if the aggressing state has
accepted its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, or following a referral from the Security Council.[100]
Critics argue that the ICC should not prosecute aggression; a prominent criticism is that justified war is a
political determination, and the involvement of a court in such a matter could compromise its legitimacy.[97]
A prosecution by the ICC is unlikely because of the narrow scope of the crime and limited jurisdiction.[101]
The ICC's jurisdiction over aggression was activated on 17 July 2018 after a decision by two-thirds of
states parties.[96] As of 17 March 2022, 43 State Parties have ratified or acceded to the amendments on the
crime of aggression to the Rome Statute.[102]
The traditional view is that only decision-makers can be held criminally responsible for aggression, rather
than lower-level military personnel and ordinary soldiers.[109] In recent times, however, there has been
consideration as to whether soldiers who knowingly participate in a war of aggression incur moral or
should incur legal liability.[110] Soldiers have a right and a responsibility to refuse to commit war crimes,
but in general the right to refuse to fight an illegal war is not recognized.[111] International law scholar Tom
Dannenbaum argues that soldiers should have a right not to fight in illegal wars, and those who refuse to do
so should be recognized as refugees.[112]
One controversial issue is whether waging aggressive war inherently violates the right to life guaranteed in
international human rights law. In 2019, the United Nations Human Rights Committee ruled that "States
parties engaged in acts of aggression as defined in international law, resulting in deprivation of life, violate
ipso facto article 6 [the right to life] of the" International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.[113]
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Sellars, Kirsten (2013). 'Crimes Against Peace' and International Law. Cambridge University
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Soler, Christopher (2019). The Global Prosecution of Core Crimes under International Law.
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Further reading
Bock, Stefanie; Conze, Eckart (2021). Rethinking the Crime of Aggression: International and
Interdisciplinary Perspectives. T.M.C. Asser Press. ISBN 978-94-6265-467-9.
Dannenbaum, Tom (2018). The Crime of Aggression, Humanity, and the Soldier. Cambridge
University Press. ISBN 978-1-107-16918-0.
Grzebyk, Patrycja (2013). Criminal Responsibility for the Crime of Aggression. Routledge.
ISBN 978-1-136-00120-8.
Jia, Bing Bing (2015). "The Crime of Aggression as Custom and the Mechanisms for
Determining Acts of Aggression". American Journal of International Law. 109 (3): 569–582.
doi:10.5305/amerjintelaw.109.3.0569 (https://doi.org/10.5305%2Famerjintelaw.109.3.0569).
S2CID 147754466 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:147754466).
McDougall, Carrie (2021). The Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-108-86476-3.
Politi, Mauro (2017). The International Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression.
Routledge. ISBN 978-1-351-21829-0.
External links
Resolution RC/Res.6 (https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/docs/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf) –
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the crime of
aggression
Review Conference (https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/reviewconference/Pages/review%
20conference.aspx) – Official Site of the Assembly of States Parties
Crime of Aggression (https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/reviewconference/Pages/crime%2
0of%20aggression.aspx) – Official Site of the Assembly of States Parties
UN Treaty Collection (UTC) – Status of Acceptance, Ratification
10 .a Amendment to article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (htt
p://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-a&chapte
r=18&lang=en)
10 .b Amendments on the crime of aggression to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. (http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=
XVIII-10-b&chapter=18&lang=en)
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