Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

HISTORICIZING PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY

(1947-88)

I RFAN W AHEED U SMANI

GC U NIVERSITY , L AHORE
P AKISTAN

A BSTRACT

This article makes an historical analysis of Pakistani

Kashmir policy between 1947-88. Besides providing
a synoptic view of the Kashmir policies, pursued by
various regimes in Pakistan both civilian and
military also provides a thorough insight into all the
major developments concerning Kashmir dispute as
well as the responses of Pakistani governments’ vis-
à-vis these developments. It contextualizes these main
planks of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy by situating
historical factors which invariably shaped its main
contours. The last portion of this article analyses this
policy by isolating discernable trends largely shaped
by extraneous factors which subsequently limitized
the options and choices before our policy makers.
Consequently, these factors led to the failure of
Kashmir policy in terms of realization of its main
objectives by reducing it merely to rhetorics. The
recurrent theme of this article is that Pakistan’s
Kashmir policy remained consistent i.e. focused on
resolution of Kashmir dispute through the UN
resolution.

K EY W ORDS : UN Resolutions, Kashmir, Pakistan, India.

Pakistan’s Kashmir policy cannot be comprehended without

tracing the nature of the origin of Kashmir dispute and its geo-
strategic significance for Pakistan. These two factors proved to
be the defining features of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Mussarat
Sohail has very aptly summed up the crux of the origin of
Kashmir dispute. She contends that:

The Kashmir dispute need never have arisen

had certain principles of partition of Indo-
Pakistan sub-continent as agreed by the
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

Muslims and the Hindus also been applied to

the issue of the accession for the Indian states. 1

The immediate roots of the Kashmir tragedy lie in the

mechanics of partition i.e. the manner in which British
surrendered their imperial role in South Asia. 2 According to
Pakistan’s perception Kashmir issue was outcome of Hindu-
British conspiracies aimed at undoing partition and ensuring
the preservation of the Indian unity. The view is lent further
credence by the findings of British Professor Alaistar Lamb’s
whose magnum opus Kashmir: A Disputed legacy: 1945-1990
(Karachi: OUP, 1993) provides a very candid analysis of the
long term interests of British rulers in this region and brings to
fore the main rationale behind Hindu-British connivance to
prevent Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. According to Lambs
research British believed that of the two successor dominions
of British in the sub-continent India would be much more
strong and in far better position to guard against Russian threat
(which by now had transformed in to the communist threat)
Lamb contends that British northwestern policy was based on
the premise of thwarting Russian advance towards the warm
waters of South Asia.
Burke is of the view that accession of Kashmir was
accomplished by Indian openly through “ministry of states” rather India
employed political pressure behind the scene. 3 Burke asserts that this
was done to create impression that majority of the Kashmir wanted to
accede to India of their own accord or choice as direct approach for
getting Kashmir seemed impossible on account of the stance taken up
by India for accession of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jodhpur. 4 The
Indian Kashmir case would have been certainly ruined had this
criterion applied to Kashmir case. There were three major hurdles in
the way of Kashmir’s accession to India.
The ruler of the state Maharaja Hari Singh intensely
disliked Nehru. The state had no direct link to East Punjab. The
state was predominantly a Muslim majority. 5 These hurdles
were systematically removed. 6 Most Pakistani historians hold
Mountbatten responsible in context of his controversial role in
facilitating Kashmir’s accession to India. At least three of his
steps significantly contributed towards the birth of Kashmir
tragedy. These include: his controversial role in Gurdaspur
episode, his ambivalent policy regarding the issue of the
accession of states, his facilitation in allowing only Congress
leaders to visit Kashmir. This enabled them to influence
Maharaja.
Most significant was the Award of Grudaspur District
to India 7 , which virtually decided the fate of Kashmir and
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

consequently paved the way for state’s accession with India. As

the transfer of Muslim majority Tehsils of Gurdaspur and
Batala enabled India to have a direct road access to Kashmir.
The construction of Jammu Khutta road “rendered possible the
maintenance of an Indian Air Force at Jammu, based on
Pathnakot as rail head and which enabled India to consolidate
her defences south-wards all the way from Uri to Pathan-Kot
boarder. 8 Even Andrew Roberts concedes that “It is not hard to
believe that Mountbatten also pressurized Redcliffe to ensure
that “Gurdaspur wound up in India”. 9
British pursued very ambivalent policy as regard the
issue of the accession of states was concerned. This was to
enable Congress leaders to annex more and more state to Indian
Union. As is evident from the fact that the clauses relating to
the accession issue were very vague and imprecise. 10 There is
ample circumstantial evidence to suggest that Congress leaders
were given “free hand” in this regard. Sardar’s Patel’s
confession in Indian parliament in 1949 amply corroborates this
contention. He revealed that “Congress only agreed to the
dominion status on the pre-condition that it should be given
free hand in the matter of accession of states”. 11 The manner in
which Nehru was allowed to manipulate state’s politics amply
exposed the contradiction in the British policy of accession of
Indian states. 12
According to a Pakistani historian, Sher Muhammad
Garewal, Mountbatten allowed Indian leaders such as Sardar
Patel, Acharya Kirplani, Nehru and Gandhi to visit Kashmir. In
fact Gandhi visited Kashmir twice but on the other Jinnah was
not allowed to visit Kashmir. 13 The visits of Indian leaders
were instrumental in changing the mindset of Maharaja.
Particularly Gandhi’s second visit to Kashmir had great bearing
on the politics of Kashmir “with in week of his visit Prime
Minister Ram Chander Kak was removed.” 14 The removal of
Kak cleared one of the major obstacle in the path of Kashmir’s
accession to India as he was the person who prevailed upon
Maharaja not to accede to any dominion and exercise
independence option. Kak was succeeded by Hindu Prime
Ministers like Janak Singh 15 and Mehar Chand Mahajan. 16 Thus
these extremist Hindus succeeded in getting access into the
inner cotrie of Maharaja and were able to influence decision-
making circles thus Maharaja was convinced to throw
Kashmir’s lot in favour of India.
India’s legal claim to Kashmir rests on the contention
that Hindu Maharaja on 27 October duly singed the instrument
of accession to join India and thus Kashmir became an integral
part of India. Accordingly India rushed it troops to Kashmir the
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

same day by claiming that Pakistani tribesmen, supported by

the Pakistan Government, had launched an invasion of Kashmir
which had become part of India. 17
It is argued by some analysts that either the signature
had been forged, the date changed or the whole document was
fabricated. Prominent British author, Alistair Lamb challenges
the Indian claims on the basis of his research into the
chronology of the events of days of the partition of sub-
continent in his books, Kashmiri Birth of Tragedy (1994),
Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy (1990), and Kashmir: An
Incomplete Partition (1997). Lamb has proved that Indian
military intervention on 27 Oct 1947 took place before
Maharaja had formally acceded to India. 18 In fact there remains
a mystery if the Maharaja ever did sign an Instrument of
Accession as this document is said to be “missing” from Indian
record. 19 Lamb shows that the record was falsified from the
very beginning by claiming that a top Indian official, V.P.
Menon had traveld to Jammu on 26 October to secure such an
instrument whereas Menon never visited Jammu on this date. 20
The succession of events also casts doubts about the
legality and nature of letter of succession, Lamb reveals that
Indian government made public the text of a pair letters one
form the Maharaja to Mountbatten bearing the date 26 October,
1947 and the other from Mountbatten to the Maharaja with the
date 27 October. Both were certainly drafted by V.P.Menon. 21
He argues that “we have no direct evidence as to when the
Maharaja’s letter was actually singed (if, indeed, it ever was),
but we can be sure that it was not on 26 October. 22 He even
suspects the very form of letter of accession. “Be that as it may
be the Maharaja’s letter dated 26 October 1947 gives us
absolutely no clue to what he ‘Instrument of Accession’ ”
actually look like Lamb 23 quotes the Indian White Paper on
Kashmir 1948 as having reproduced a sample text of an
Instrument of Accession such as was devised by the state
department on the eve of the transfer to power. He asserts that
this document was derived from the Indian Independence Act
1947, and the Government of India Act 1935. It was “in fact, a
printed form with spaces left for the name of state, the
signature of the ruler and the day of the month of August 1947.
There was also space for Governor General’s acceptance, again
with a blank for the day of month of August 1947.” 24 He
describes this document “singularly unsuitable” for the special
circumstances in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in October
1947.” 25 He also argues that the document presented in United
Nations Security Council in 1961 was different as compared

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with the document included in Indian White Paper on Kashmir

published in 1948. He argues that:

It is interesting that in the document

reproduced in Pt.1 No.29 in the Indian 1948
White Paper, all the spaces are left blank. It is
not a representation of the document signed by
the Maharaja, merely an example of the kind of
document the might have signed. One may well
wonder why the government of India had it
indeed been in a possession of a properly
singed instrument, did not publish it as such in
1948. This White Paper would have been the
documentary Jewel in India's crown. 26

The circumstantial evidence of the course of events

also proves that the instrument of accession was got singed by
V. P. Menon on 27th October, 1947 while Maharaja had left
Srinagar from Jammu losing virtually the control of the
capital. 27
Moreover, India Army was sent before the accession
was actually singed. This fact has been highlighted in the works
of Justice Yousaf Sarf, 28 Alastair Lamb and the documents of
Patiala State, which reveal that the Indian troops had penetrated
into Kashmir through the adjacent East Punjab States.
Particularly, the gunners of Maharaja Patiala were present in
Kashmir before the tribal invasion 29 occurred. Since the early
days of October a battalion of infantry and a battery of
mountain artillery loaned to Maharaja Hari Singh by the Sikh
Maharaja of Patiala were present in Jammu and Kashmir.
Patiala gunners had taken up position at the Sirinagar airfield at
least by 17 October and they were there when the Indian troops
landed on 27 October. 30 Taking cue from this fact Ijaz Hussain
comes to the conclusion that whole of this exercise becomes
invalid in context of International Law. He is of the view that
in this case, article 49 of the Vienna Convention of Laws of
Treaties applies which states “A treaty is invalid if its
conclusion is procured by the threat or use of force in violation
of principles of the charter of the United Nation.” 31 Another
defect in this document which further lends credence to the
argument of invalidity is that the accession as agreed by both
parties was “provisional”. In reply to the Maharaj’s letter
Mountbatten wrote, “In consistence with their policy that in the
case of any state where the issue of accession should be
decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the
state…It is my government’s wish that as soon as law and order
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

have been restored in Kashmir her soil cleared off the invaders,
the question of state’s accession should be settled by reference
to the people.” 32
Sir Frank Messervy, the C-in-C of Pakistan Army,
asserted that there was much evidence to prove that the
accession had been deliberately planned for some weeks before
the events. 33 The view is further corroborated by “Thakore
Hariman Singh’s Plane episode.” Maharaja’s cousin and envoy
Thakore Hariman Singh’s plane made a forced landing at
Lahore. This plane was attacked by a mob and Thakore’s suit
cases were seized and in one of the suit cases a draft treaty
between India and Kashmir was discovered. 34
The interesting aspect of Maharaja’s accession letter is
that he did not accuse Pakistan of giving assistance or
organizing the invasion where as the Indian officials did not
hesitate to level such charges against Pakistan. 35 All these
controversies decisively helped to influence the mindset of
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy formulators as they now sought to
redress this situation by getting Kashmir liberated from Indian
occupation. Thus they assumed anti-status quo posture right
from the very out set. The other factors which may also be
counted amongst the formative influences behind Pakistan’s
Kashmir policy included: geo-strategic significance of Kashmir
in context of Pakistan’s Security, economic interests and the
ideological under-pinning.

S IGNIFICANCE OF K ASHMIR FOR P AKISTAN

Kashmir was always viewed as an integral part of the Pakistan

scheme. Its initial letter “K” forming part of the name chosen
for the new Muslim country in the subcontinent. Moreover,
there have been strong ethnic, cultural, geographical and
economic linkages. 36
Strategically India’s military presence in Kashmir
stretches Pakistan’s dangerously large defense parameters and
cuts it off from the source of its lifeline of rivers. 37 Pakistan’s
military establishment believes that inclusion of Kashmir into
Pakistan would give it a strategic depth that it otherwise does
not possess. 38 While the whole Pakistan is vulnerable to Indian
air attacks, the better part of India remains beyond the range of
Pakistani aircraft. From Pakistan’s point of view, the Indian
ground forces stationed in Southern Kashmir threaten the
Shakergarh salient, and more importantly, the Grand trunk
Road linking Lahore and Islamabad. 39 In this context Pakistani
authorities started believing that without Kashmir Pakistan
could not defend itself against an unscrupulous government that
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might come in India. Veteran Kashmiri politician Sardar Abdul

Qayum contends “Pakistan could not exist as an Independent
entity by withdrawing its claim on Kashmir. It will be turned in
a virtual hostage to India and its lease of life will depend upon
the period which India will allow to exist. 40 Another factor
further enhancing Kashmir’s strategic significance for Pakistan
was its peculiar geo-strategic location as it is surrounded by
China to the north and east, the Central Asian republics and
Russia to the west and land mass of the subcontinent to the
South. 41 In this sense strategically Kashmir and Northern
territories provide that stability for Pakistan’s existence which
its four provinces do not possess. 42
The economic importance of Kashmir for Pakistan was
greater that for India. Mahnaz Ispahni explains why Kashmir…
“had numerous links to Pakistan’s territory. It separation has
meant economic disruption, since its waters were essential to
the irrigation and power supplies of (Pakistan) West Punjab; its
timber resources were rafted down West Punjab’s river; its
willow and resin were used in Pakistani Industry.” 43
Economically, Kashmir is of vital importance to the needs of
Pakistan producing timber and housing three rivers, Indus,
Jhelum and Chenab which flow from Kashmir region into
Pakistan and are vital for the agricultural growth. These rivers
are a potential source for a large-scale hydro electric power for
the country. 44
The chief significance of Kashmir for Pakistan also lay
in ideological factors such as a two nation theory, upon which
Jinnah based his demand for a separate Muslim homeland. 45
According to General Akbar Khan, “Kashmir’s accession to
Pakistan was not simply a matter of desirability but of absolute
necessary for our separate existence.” 46 While summing up the
significance we may conclude that “the conflict is as much as
clash between identities, imaginations and history as it is a
conflict over territory resource and peoples”. 47

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PAKISTAN’S KASHMIR POLICY — A HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE

1947-88

Muhammad Ali Jinnah was supremely conscious of the

significance of Kashmir for Pakistan. He believed it should be a
part of Islamic Pakistan on account of its Muslim identity. 48
According to Raiz Ali Shah’s diary the Quaid-e-Azam said:
“Kashmir is the Jugular vein of Pakistan and no nation or
country could tolerate its Jugular vein remains under the sword
of the enemy.” 49 Jinnah wanted to resolve the Kashmir conflict
through negotiations by following a friendly policy towards
India. However, the inflexible attitude of India foreclosed all
the possibility of negotiated settlement and compelled
Pakistan’s authorities to go for a military solution by
organizing tribal incursion in Kashmir. It is ironic that he was
not informed about the plans of tribal invasion as is
corroborated by the circumstantial evidence. Ch. Mohammad
Ali has revealed that Liaquat Ali Khan informed him excitedly
about the advance of tribal lashkar on October 21. When Ch.
Muhammad asked Liaquat Ali Khan whether he had informed
Jinnah he reply “not yet”. 50 Jinnah’s biographer Stanley
Wolpert highlights the prompt reaction of Jinnah as he
instructed C-in-C of Pakistan General Gracey to dispatch two
brigades to invade Kashmir. One was to march through Murree-
Khohala road and advance towards Muzaffarabad. The other
was to move through Jammu via Sialkot and it was to be
assigned the task of arresting Maharaja and block the
reinforcement from reaching Kashmir. 51 Gracey defied the
orders and referred the matter to Field Marshal Auckenlick.
Aukenlick asked Jinnah to take his orders back otherwise all
the British officers serving in both armies would resign. 52
Moreover, Jinnah planned a conference between the Governor-
Generals and Prime Ministers of the two dominions which
could not take place due to the illness of Jawahar Lal Nehru
and reluctance of Sardar Patel to talk with Pakistani Leaders. 53
However, the meeting between two Governor-Generals was
held on November 1, 1947. In this one-to-one meeting Quaid’s
response to Mountbatten’s suggestion that the accession issue
should be decided by a plebiscite in the state was that following
the logic of partition. There could be no question that the state
“should go anywhere under the circumstances except to
Pakistan. 54
Jinnah impressed upon Mountbatten the need for
plebiscite in Kashmir under the joint auspices of the
government of India and Pakistan, a proposal to which
Mountbatten showed agreement just to put before the Indian
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cabinet. This proposal was placed before the Indian Cabinet. 55

On second November Nehru declared in a Radio Broadcast that
Government of India after the restoration of peace and stability
in Kashmir, was prepared “to have a referendum held under the
international auspices like the United Nations” 56 . Thus the
demand for plebiscite remained a recurrent theme of Jinnah’s
Kashmir policy. But this does not mean that he was not in
favour of using UN platform to internationalize the issue.
Zafarullha and M.A. Hispani monitored the debate in the
United Nations. 57
Pakistan’s first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan also
considered Kashmir vital for the security of Pakistan. In a cable
message sent to Nehru he highlighted this fact that “The
security of Pakistan is bound up with that of Kashmir.” 58
Liaquat believed strategic significance of Kashmir was as such
that without it, Pakistan could not defend itself against an
“unscrupulous government that might come in India.” 59 In view
of its significance Liaquat Ali Khan always gave primacy to the
resolution of Kashmir dispute. In order to resolve this Kashmir
dispute his government adopted the following approaches
corresponding to the fluid situation in Kashmir:

1. The exercise of military option to thwart the Indian

conspiracies to annex Kashmir between October 1947
and 1 st January 1949. This policy was manifested in the
form of tribal invasion October 1947. This invasion
subsequently led to the outbreak of 1 st Kashmir war in
May 1948 which lasted till January 1 st 1948. It would
not be out of place to mention India’s policy viz-a-viz
Kashmir dispute India’s initial strategy seemed to
impose a quick military solution on Kashmir. In
pursuance of this strategy it sent its regular troops in
Kashmir on October 1947 but this policy failed to pay
dividends as it miserably failed to throw the tribesman
out of Kashmir territory and annihilate the Azad
Kashmir forces. It was this failure which prompted
India to take case to United Nations. 60 India took the
Kashmir case before the Security Council on 1 st
January 1948. It blamed Pakistan of assisting the
tribesmen and other invaders to violate her sovereignty.
Pakistan in its counter complaint, accused India of the
organized “genocide of Muslims in East Punjab Delhi
and other places in India”. It also charged India with
“forcible occupation of Junadagh and the “action taken
by India to secure the accession of Kashmir by fraud

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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

and violence”. 61 The ceasefire was brought about by

UN arbitration on 1 st January 1949. 62
2. Another conspicuous plank of Liaqat’s Kashmir policy
was re-invocation of the UN resolutions as an
international dispute. The UN resolution of 13 August
1948, 5 January 1949 provided the overall framework
of the resolution of Kashmir dispute by ensuring the
rights of self-determination through plebiscite. Taken
together these resolutions provided for ceasefire and
demarcation of a ceasefire line, demilitarization of the
state and a free and impartial plebiscite under the
auspices of United Nation. 63 These resolutions formed
the basic resolutions for the solution of Kashmir
dispute. Consequently, these defined the main
postulates of Liaquat Ali Khan’s Kashmir policy and
the Kashmir policies of all the subsequent rulers of
Pakistan
3. Another conspicuous feature of Liaquat’s Kashmir
policy was that Pakistan’s government in her bid to
internalize the Kashmir dispute through United Nations
adopted a strategy by accepting the proposals of AGL
McNaughtan 64 and Owen Dixion. 65

When Nizamuddin assumed the office of Prime Minister, he

pledged to continue his predecessor’s foreign policy, during his
period Pakistan continued to pursue the same foreign policy
though his control over government machinery especially in the
realm of foreign policy was not as firm as of Liaquat Ali
Khan’s. 66
The Kashmir cause also figured prominently during
Mohammad Ali Bogra’s premiership. Bogara, stuck to the
traditional Kashmir policy. The most peculiar feature of
Bogar’s period concerning Kashmir was Bogra Nehru meetings.
The two Prime Ministers held meeting between 1953 and 1955.
During the first meeting which was held in 16 August a joint
statement of the two Prime Ministers reiterated that the
Kashmir dispute should be resolved according to the wishes of
people. “with a view to promoting their well-being and causing
the least disturbance of the life of the people of the state…The
most feasible method of ascertaining the people’s choice was
fair and impartial plebiscite.” 67 The two Prime Ministers agree
to resolve Kashmir dispute by adopting three pronged strategy
(i) resolution the preliminary issues directly (ii) appointment of
plebiscite administration by the end of April 1954. (iii) This
plebiscite administrator after his appointment and induction in
to office by Azad Kashmir government was to examine the
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

situation and submitted its report. After their first meeting they
had a long correspondence between September 1953 and
November 1954. The last meeting was held in May 1955 but
this meeting proved inconclusive. 68 Ch. Mohammad Ali after
assuming office, tried to re-activate the issue. After assuming
the office of the Prime Minister he termed the Kashmir issue as
a ‘great moral issue of our time’ On 26 November 1955, he
convened an all parties Kashmir Conference to devise a new
strategy to secure plebiscite in the state. In his bid to
internationalize Kashmir dispute he pursued a new strategy i.e.
recruitment of a “peace army” to organize a “liberation march”
in to the occupied Kashmir. 69
Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy’s government reacted
sharply to the Indian attempts to integrate Kashmir in to Indian
Union. As an initial step the Constituent Assembly of Indian
occupied Kashmir passed an amendment that which envisaged
that “state is and shall be an integral par to the union of
India” 70 . This provision was to come into effect on 26 January
1957. Pakistan government in its bid to counterpoise such
maneuvere decided to take up the Kashmir issue to the United
Nations. In order to make this resolution successful the
Suharwardy Government decided to approach the Security
Council. To entice International support the government sought
US help. The US administration showed reluctance in doing
any thing that might spoil its increasing cordiality with India. 71
Despite US reluctance Suhrawardy’s government approached
the Security Council with the request that India should be
prevented from implementing these new provision aimed at
altering the constitution status of Kashmir. It also maintained
that a UN emergency force should be established to supervise
plebiscite in consistent with the principles expressed in
resolution The Soviet Union abstained from voting on this
resolution, but vetoed another one on 20 February calling for a
UN force to supervise the plebiscite. However, the Security
Council in another resolution, on which the Soviet Union
abstained, asked its president, Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden to
continue to strive for a settlement within the framework of
previous UN resolutions. In the midst of this crisis 26 January
was observed as a “Black day” throughout Pakistan. 72
During this period Pakistan’s Kashmir stance
increasing became more inflexible, as is evident from the tone
of official and public statements. On 8 September 1957,
Foreign Minster Feroze Khan stated that Pakistan would
consider an attack on Kashmir by India as an attack on Pakistan
provided Prime Minister honoured his international

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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

commitments with regard to the holding of a free and fair

plebiscite in Kashmir. 73
I.I. Chundriger during his premiership observed that
“we go all out to follow the West. But whenever problems
come up there is a certain amount of hesitation about
displeasing India.” 74 Prime Minister Noon staunchly reiterated
Pakistan Kashmir policy and unequivocally declared that: “Our
people if, they find themselves threatened by Bharat will break
all pacts and will shake hands with the people whom we have
made enemies because of others. Let there be no mistake about
it.” 75 These sentiments were also voiced by ex-prime minister
I.I. Chundrigar in a debate on foreign policy in National
Assembly in September 1958 called for a revision of foreign
policy. 76
Ayub Khan was also a great protagonist of Pakistan’s
Kashmir policy. He considered the resolution of Kashmir
dispute integral for the security of Pakistan. “The security of
Pakistan requires a fair solution of the Kashmir problem.” He
yearned to go down in history as the “liberator of the
Kashmir.” 77 Ayub considered the resolution of Kashmir dispute
integral for the security of Pakistan. “The security of Pakistan
requires a fair solution of the Kashmir problem.” 78 Before the
imposition of martial law, focus on the Kashmir issue had
created an emotionally charged atmosphere in which even
moderate elements started openly advocating war with India.
Military takeover diffused the situation. Ayub after assuming
power at first threatened ‘extreme action’ even war unless the
Indian leadership agreed to solve the Kashmir dispute. But soon
it initiated moves to cultivate India to resolve outstanding
bilateral disputes. It ignored “Indian leaders” unnecessarily
provocative remarks. 79 Among the reconciliatory steps Ayub
took included the demarcation of Pakistan India Boundaries.
The signing of the Indus Basin. Treaty which the political
governments had shelved. Ayub Khan made repeated offers of
joint defecne of the sub-continent to India despite the re-buffs
from the Indian leaders. 80 The primary objectives of all his
moves were to settle the Kashmir issue which, in his view as
the question “life and death” for Pakistanis and a key to
amicable Pakistan India relations. 81
This led some critics of believe that “he had made a
major shift from Pakistan’s principled stand on Kashmir
dispute.” 82 Stephen P. Colen provides a rather balanced
assessment of Ayub’s Kashmir policy “Pakistani authorities
believed that Kashmir was an important issue. They pursued the
cause of Kashmir with the ultimate goal of incorporating them
to Pakistan would fulfill the original vision of Pakistan.” 83
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

Cohen further asserts, “while the establishment was sometime

divided as how to deal with Kashmir, there, were tactical not
strategic differences”. 84 Despite Pakistan’s repeated over-tures
for peace India’s attitude became more and more hardened,
after the signing of Indus Basin Treaty. Particularly its leaders
became more and more aggressive in their pronouncements
after India’s occupation of Goa by a force in December 1961. 85
When the bilateral avenues closed and no one was
willing to mediate, Pakistan had no other option but to take the
Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council, although
a few months earlier it had not raised the issue in the General
Assembly at Kennedy’s request. 86 Pakistan raised this issue in
United Nation Security Council in 1962. The Security Council
debated this issue in the first half of 1962; finally, on 22 June,
the Irish representative at US suggestion presented a resolution
proposing that the UN Secretary General should sponsor direct
talks between Pakistan and India on the Kashmir dispute.
Pakistan was obviously disappointed. 87
This was towards the end of the year when the crisis in
India-China relations had escalated into an armed conflict.
During this crisis many Pakistanis were in favour of taking
advantage of India’s difficulties and considered the military
option a “calculated risk”. 88 This was widely seen both in
Pakistan and outside an “excellent opportunity”. It was a
common perception in Pakistan that the Sino-Indian war of
1962 had provided the best opportunity for Pakistan to retrieve
Kashmir. According to General Sher Ali Khan, had Ayub Khan
withstood American pressure Pakistan would have got the rare
chance of solving the Kashmir issue. 89
The Sino-Indian boarder clash opened new
opportunities for talks on Kashmir. On large measure, it was
the brain-child of the US and GBR which appeared to have
believed that the time was ripe for nudging the two rivals
towards a settlement of the Kashmir issue. 90 Washington and
London sent their respective high-level envoys Averell
Harriman and Duncan Sandys to work with the Indian and
Pakistani governments and ensure in accordance with their own
strategic interest, that Pakistan did not exploit the
opportunity. 91 According to Duncan Sundyas Ayub Khan did
not give this option the slightest thought partly because of the
level of western interest and pressure. He went for bilateral
negotiations. His main concern was to prevent western military
aid to India as it was linked with Kashmir dispute but
subsequently this condition was withdrawn on Nehru’s
objections. 92 After the end of their visit a “Joint Communiqué”
was issued simultaneously from Rawalpindi and New Delhi on
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

29 November 1962. In this communiqué Ayub Khan and Nehru

agreed to make ‘renewed efforts’ to resolve the Kashmir
dispute and other related matters and wish that end, in view
ministerial level backs were suggested to pave for an eventful
Ayub Nehru summit. 93
The renewed efforts for peace led to the search for
Kashmir through bilateral negotiations. This subsequently
culminated the Bhutto Swarn Singh talks. Six round of talks
were held because India and Pakistan at ministerial level
between December 1962 to May 1963. Pakistan’s Foreign
Minister Z.A. Bhutto and Indian Railway Minster Sardar Swarn
Singh led Pakistani and Indian delegations respectively. 94
There was little achievement in the first round the two
sides agreed to continue talks. The second round also resulted
in to stalemate. Pakistan stuck to its position on the plebiscite
but agreed to consider any alternative proposal. India came up
with a plan, supported by the US for the partition of Kashmir
based on existing ceasefire line without touching the valley,
followed by military disengagement and no war declaration. 95
According to one account of an Indian participant that Swarn
Singh was eager to achieve breakthrough over Kashmir,
actually included in his territorial offer to Bhutto “a toe-hold in
the connected valley of Kashmir”. 96 Swarn Singh was prepared
to concede up to 1,500 square miles of Indian held territory in
Kashmir in return for Pakistan’s acceptance of the modified
line as a permanent international boundary. 97 Discussion on this
plan continued in the third round. The Chief Pakistani
negotiator, then Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto, flatly rejected
the offer, telling Swaran Singh that Kashmir valley was
indivisible and that Pakistan had to have the whole of it. 98
Pakistan delegation rejected this offer as it was not in
accordance with the UN resolutions.
Thus nothing came out of these discussion but the two
sides agreed to resume talks at Calcutta. The fourth round was
dominated by discussions on Pakistan China Boundary
agreement. India skillfully exploited this agreement to increase
Pakistan-US differences.
A stalemate was reached in the fifth round both sides
sticking to their respective position. In the final round India
proposed a no war declaration which the Pakistani delegation
rejected as a device to side track the real issue and re-affirmed
its position on plebiscite as the only honourable and practical
basis for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It proposed that
for about one year the Kashmir valley should be put under
International Control and at the end of that period the wishes of

40
 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

Kashmir’s be ascertained to decide their future. India rejected

the Pakistani proposal. 99 .
The collapse of these talks led to the sudden
deterioration of Indo-Pakistan relations. Another factor which
caused this deterioration was India’s bid to integrate Kashmir
in to the Indian Union. One Step was to change in the
designation of “Sadr-i-Riyasat (head of the state) of the
Kashmir state to ‘governor’ and ‘prime minister’ to ‘chief
minister’. Another move was to abrogate Article 370 of the
Indian constitution which granted a special status ‘to the
disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir’, different from the other
Indian states. This abrogation was meant to extend the powers
of the Lok Sabha to frame laws for the state’s administration. 100
This factor coupled with Indian Army’s intrusion into the
village of Azad Kashmir which further led to the estrangement
of relations between the two countries. 101
The stalemate over Kashmir increased the frustration of
Pakistani policy makers concerning the solution of Kashmir
dispute as per United Nations resolutions. The growing amity
between India and the West particularly the US during
Kennedy’s administration made Pakistan to look for a military
solution of the problem.
After 1962, Western aid to India arose the
apprehensions of the “nationalist bourgeoisie’ in Pakistan’s
foreign office and military establishment, 102 which, now began
to believe that this would eventually disturb the military
proportion between the two armies that stood at time 3:1. It
apprehend that any disturbance, in this proportion would
decisively tilt the balance of power in South Asia in favour of
India. More importantly it was felt that, this would render
Pakistan increasingly incapable of finding a military solution of
Kashmir dispute. Moreover, these weapons would ultimately be
used against Pakistan in the wake of Indo-Pakistan war. This
element also rued the opportunity which Pakistan squandered
during 1962, Sino-Indian conflict by not taking benefit of
India’s vulnerability during the war, for the final solution of
Kashmir dispute. This thinking provided the main rationale
behind ‘Operation Gibraltor’. 103 The idea was that if Pakistan
could in a quick move liberate important area in Kashmir
particularly Akhnur Indian forces in the valley would be
stranded. It was assumed that India’s position would be further
vulnerable in the wake of popular uprising. Such situation
combined with international pressure would also compel India
to honor its commitment concerning plebiscite in Kashmir. 104
This operation backfired owning to some operational
flaws and tactical mistakes. The most glaring blunder was the
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

wrong anticipation of the intensity of Indian response.

Pakistanis believed that like 1948 Indo-Pakistan war the
conflict would not escalate and remain confined to Azad
Kashmir. But India opened West Pakistan front as Indian troops
crossed International border and full-scale war was unleashed.
The 1965 war may be called a Kashmiri’s war as its
long term as well as immediate causes concerned Kashmir.
Even amid the hectic diplomatic activity to bring an end to this
conflict Pakistani authorities tried to impress on the US
officials the significance of Kashmir cause. According to de-
classified American papers Bhutto conceded to US envoy.
“We (are) not bartering over the piece of territory but
are concerned with (the) fate of 5 million people. If they want
India okay, if they wish to be part of Pakistan that’s fine. If
they wish something else, that’s all right too, what ever they
want”. 105 The war remained inconclusive and both accepted the
UN sponsored ceasefire. 106 In the subsequent months, the
Soviet Union made repeated offers for the arbitration between
Pakistan and India. The Tashkent Summit was the first Soviet
attempt to mediate between Indian and Pakistan. The
declaration dismissed the Kashmir problem in a few words
Kashmir was discussed (it was not mentioned even as a dispute)
and each side put faith its respective position. The other
provisions such as the withdrawal of troops, resumption of
diplomatic relations, stoppage of the hostile propaganda and
repatriation of Prisoners of Wars (POWs) were implemented. 107
Talks about economic and cultural ties also remained inclusive.
According to Absar Hussain, it was a perception among
many people that there was some kind of secret understanding
or a “deal’ had been struck at Tashkent. They held the view that
the war was on the battlefield had been lost on the negotiations
table. Bhutto emerged as the most vocal exponent of this
thinking. He promised to let the Tashkent cat out of bag at
proper time. 108 The Tashkent Declaration had far reaching
consequences, however, neither Ayub nor Shastri could accrue
benefits out of it.
During Yahya Period the Kashmir issue was over-
shadowed by deepening political turmoil and East Pakistan
crises. The most significant development concerning Kashmir
was Indian Prime Minster Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s proposal of
“normalization and improvement of Indo-Pakistan Relations on
the basis of easing travel between the two countries,
encouraging cultural exchanges and improving commerce. 109
She further offered that if Yahya agreed both countries could
setup a joint India-Pakistan body for this purpose at any level

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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

which was acceptable to Yahya Khan. She also reiterated her

suggestion of no war pact between the two countries. 110
These proposal omitted mention of two most serious
disputes having an adverse effect on Indo-Pakistan relation,
Kashmir and Farkha Barrage. In his reply to Mrs. Indria Gandhi
President Yahah Khan tried to emphasize the resolution of two
outstanding issues (Kashmir and Water) first and then resort
towards the settlement of peripheral issues. He wrote a letter to
Indira Grandhi on 26, July 1969. In which he concluded that
‘It is our sincere conviction that the amity and
friendship will continue to elude India and Pakistan of our two
governments run after the shadow that the peripheral issues are
and evade the reality that our two outstanding disputes
regarding Jammu and Kashmir and the Ganges waters
represent.’ 111
The 1971 war and subsequent debacle of East Pakistan
was not the outcome of Kashmir. But once war started on West
Pakistan front. it soon spread to the Kashmir front as well.
During the war Pakistan lost 317 square kilometer territory to
India on Kashmir front. In this war Pakistan lost 5,000 miles of
territory on West Pakistan front as well as its 90,000 soldiers
were also taken as POWs by India. These issues were resolved
through Simla Accord with was concluded between Pakistani
President Z.A. Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
The salient features of this accord concerning Kashmir were as
follows.
Pakistan agreed to make a temporary arrangement on
the line of which without prejudice to its recognized position
on Kashmir. Both countries agreed to resolve Kashmir dispute
on the basis of principle of Bi-literalism. Para (VI) of the Sima
Agreement has no ambiguity as to the status of the Kashmir
issue. This agreement was a sort of re-affirmation by Pakistan
and Indian that Kashmir is an unresolved issue. 112
This agreement generated a very heated debate in
Pakistan and the divergent stance taken by India further cast
various doubts about Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. While
interpreting the Simla agreement. India often referred to the
second paragraph (dealing with the principles of bilateralism)
while Pakistan focuses on Paragraph one (referring to the
united Nations). 113 Z.A. Bhutto in a public speech tried to
remove the ambiguities concerning the interpretation of Simla
Agreements in these words:

There is nothing in the Simla Agreement that

we cannot go to United Nations. It is correct
that it emphasizes the resolution of Jammu and
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

Kashmir Dispute through bilateral approach.

But no where it stated that we can’t take up the
issue in United Nations we have not used the
word “exempted” or excluded. As I have stated
earlier that in it is maintained that the UN
charter recognized bilateral negotiations a
method of settlement of international disputes.
If (suppose) Simla agreement forecloses the
doors of United Nations as a result of which we
cannot take up this issue in the UN. Even the
UN charter contains provision 103 which, states
that under any other international treaty, what
their responsibility will be the obligations of
UN members under UN charter will hold
precedence in case of conflict between
obligations of UN members under UN charter
and their responsibilities under any other
international treaty. 114

Bhutto also maintained that the UN charter would prevail in

case of conflict between Simla agreement and the obligations
under the UN charter. Even if Simla accord prohibits, though
this has not been the case, even then the UN charter would hold
precedence. 115 Had UN charter not contained article 103, the
presence of article 34 also authorizes UN security council. It
stipulates that “UN may investigate any conflict or situation
which may cause international conflict in order to decide
whether the world peace is threatened by the persistence or
continuing of that conflict.” Security Council can itself take the
notice of this situation even in the case of those countries
which refuse to refer this matter to security council, it security
council may back up this issue on its own and discuss it. 116
Bhutto accorded great importance to Kashmir he
described Kashmir as “the handsome head of the body of
Pakistan” held by India “against all norms of morality” because
it wanted to keep a Muslim majority area of the Pakistan thus
negating the two nation theory. 117 During his premiership he
pressed on the one hand for the settlement of the Kashmir
dispute under the Simla Agreement and on the other pleaded for
the right for the self-determination of the people of Jammu and
Kashmir. This approach is reflected in one of his articles which
appeared in the Foreign Affairs which provides an insight into
his policy on Kashmir. “Indeed Simla agreement admits the
existence of the dispute by providing that the line of the control
in Jammu and Kashmir shall be respected by both sides without
prejudice to the recognized position of either side. A settlement
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

of this dispute has to be found, a settlement acceptable to the

people of Kashmir. They have the right of self-determination.
This is the position of the United Nations. This was also the
position at one time of India herself. And this is the position to
which Pakistan is pledged. 118
In 1973, Z.A. Bhutto in a top secret memo to Tikka
Khan, advocated people’s war against India to achieve
Pakistan’s Kashmir policy objectives. He said “In the new war
the enemies around us will be depending largely upon material
superiority and not human factor, upon technique and not force
proved, in China, in Korea, in Israel and in Vietnam that a
people’s war can withstand innumerable ups and down but that
no force can succeed in altering its general march towards
inevitable triumph…And we ourselves have ruled then for eight
centuries. All these are not ancient history. 119
Tensions once more increased between India and
Pakistan after India’s first nuclear explosion in May 1974.
From January 1974 onwards, Pakistan’s government began to
take strong exception of the moves by Indian government to
integrate Kashmir in Indian Union. Pakistani politician bitterly
criticized the negotiation prior to the conclusion of Indra-
Abdullah accord about Kashmir. The accord was concluded in
February 1975. In this accord the accession of Jammu and
Kashmir to India was reaffirmed by both the parties. After this
Sheikh Abdullah assumed the office of the Chief Minister of
the state and the plebiscite fourm was dissolved. 120
Bhutto termed this accord as a “sell out” because it
violated the terms of Simla and the UN requirements for a
plebiscite. 121 To him it was a shameful barter of the Kashmiris
which Sheikh Abdullah had pledged to support. He called for a
strike throughout Pakistan on 28 February, 1975. A complete
countrywide strike was observed in Pakistan on this day to
condemn the Indra Abdullah deal. 122
Zia’s Kashmir policy was quite ambivalent apparently
Zia’s government pursued two-pronged strategy i.e. on the one
hand Zia’s official stand towards India was openly
conciliatory. 123 On the other it envisaged a covert plan to train
Kashmir youth to launch an “armed crusade against India” in
the valley. General Zia ul Haq termed this strategy as a “peace
offensive” against India. Talking to Indian leader he stressed
that India-Pakistan dialogue for the normalization should begin
with Kashmir rather than contentious issues. 124 This ambivalent
policy of Zia led some critics to perceive that Kashmir dispute
was put in the cold storage. 125 Moreover, his government’s pre-
occupation with Afghan crisis further led credence to this
perception. 126
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

This view looks too simplistic in the light of other

sources (both Indian and Pakistani). Moreover, the dominance
of hawkish elements in the internal coterie of Zia’s government
further belie this view. While explaining Pakistan’s stance on
Kashmir Zia said: “Pakistan’s point of view is: let us talk…we
are not in favour of resorting to force. But we are not in favour
of being browbeaten by Indian point of view that since there is
a line of control there is therefore no issue involved”. 127
Indian commentators maintain that as early as 1982
almost immediately after Sheikh Abdulla’s death, General Zia
devised a plan to launch “armed crusade” in the valley. But it
did not meet with much success and it was not until the mid
1980s that the plan was again revived. 128 While India was busy
in “operation Pawn” in Srilanka Zia government planned
shrewd moves” in Indian Kashmir. According to Indian
perceptions Kashmir problem did not start in 1988 as is widely
believed but in 1984 when General Zia approved the plan to
destabilize India’s Northern Western border state. 129 Younas
Samad also seems to corroborate this view as he reveals that
“under Zia’s order in 1984 the Pakistan’s Army’s Field
Intelligence unit was helping to organize the insurgency.” 130

C ONCLUSION

While summing up this whole debate about Pakistan’s Kashmir

policy we may infer its following discernable trend: Pakistan’s
Kashmir policy may be divided into the following phases: 1 st
Phase from 1947-56, 2 nd Phase from 1957-65, 3 rd Phase from
1966-72, 4 th Phase from 1973-88.
The most crucial period of Pakistan’s Kashmir policy
was from 1947 to 1956. During this phase the struggle for
Kashmir was pursued with ideological favour to help Kashmiris
join Pakistan. Though Pakistan failed to obtain desired results
yet it was able to substantially pressurize India. Indian position
on Kashmir was considered more legal because of the
instrument of accession (although it was never accepted by
Pakistan). While Pakistan’s position drove its strength from
moral grounds as it championed the cause of right of self-
determination of Kashmir. Incidentally, the UN resolutions of
1948-49 were also favourable to both Pakistan and the
Kashmiris. In 1956, the Security Council rejected Indian claims
that local elections in Kashmir for Indian parliament were a
substitute for pledged plebiscite. During this period even Soviet
Union abstained to veto the resolutions in the Security Council.
By that time, Kashmir had not become a victim of the Cold War
politics.
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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

The second phase (1957-65) was marked by two

conspicuous features: indifference of the UN towards Kashmir
issue and Pakistan quest for having a military solution of
Kashmir particularly after post-Sino Indian war. The policy of
alignment defeated the very purpose for which it was adopted.
It virtually froze the Kashmir dispute. As Pakistan drew closer
to Western Alliance, this issue was also engulfed by the Cold
War politics. Pakistan’s efforts to resolve it through the UNSC
were frustrated by the Soviet Union’s frequent use of veto
power.
In 1964, Pakistan failed to obtain a favourable Security
Council resolution on Kashmir. In 1965 the Security Council
refused to even mention Kashmir by name, speaking instead the
political problem underlying Indo-Pakistan conflicts. Frustrated
by the lack of support, Pakistan resorted to the military option
and that led to operation “Gibraler” which eventually
culminated in the outbreak of the 1965 war.
During the third phase (1966-72) though Pakistan
continued to stick to its traditional stance over Kashmir but
practically this issue was placed at the back burner. Pakistan
Governments plagued by other domestic crises could not high
light Kashmir cause as vigorously as they used to do prior to
1966.
The significance of Kashmir issue was further reduced
in the fourth phase (1972-89), but it remained alive primarily
due to occasional utterances. During 1980s, an insidious change
occurred in Pakistan’s Kashmir policy which involved two
mutually inclusive strategies viz. altering the status-quo with
adventurism along with pursuing the traditional policy. This
synoptic view also suggests that Pakistan’s Kashmir policy
remained consistent from 1947 to 1988 and the right of self
determination on the basis of UN resolution served as a main
pivot around which our Kashmir policy revolved.

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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

E ND -N OTES

1
Mussarat Sohail, Partition and Anglo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-51 (Lahore:
Vanguard, 1992), p. 132.
2
Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History (Lahore: Vanguard, 2004), p. 115.
3
S.M. Burke, Lawrance Ziring, Pakistan Foreign Policy: An Historical
Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 17-26.
4
Ibid., p.18.
5
Latif Ahmed Sherwani, “Kashmir’s Accession to India Re-examined”,
Pakistan Horizon 52 (October 1999), p.55.
6
As a result of Hindu British connivance direct land link with
created between Pakistan and Kashmir. The principles of partition
were not applied to the issue of accession states in order to
provide India with a pretext for the occupation of Kashmir.
Maharaja was influenced through his internal coterie. Particularly
Maharani Tara Devi consequently such situation was created
Maharaja was left with no choice but to accede to India.
7
They Corroborate their contention with these following arguments
they assert that Mountbatten was fully aware of the strategic
significance of Gurdaspur. For example at least on three occasions
he indicated the possibility of inclusion of Gurdaspur with the
Indian Union.
In his press conference in Delhi on June 4, 1947, he quoted
absolutely wrong figures regarding the proportion of Muslim
population in the Gurdaspur District. He said that the proportion
of non-Muslim and Muslim population was 49.6% and 50.4%
respectively and the different was only 0.8%, where as the 1941
population census showed the Muslim population in the district
was 51.41%. Thus the actual difference between Muslim and non-
Muslim population was 2.28% not 0.8 as wrongly quoted by
Mountbatten. During the press conference he was asked about his
categorical statement that the final boundaries of the divided
provinces “will almost certainly not be identified” with those in
the notional division. Mountbatten replied that “you will see at
once that it is unlikely that the boundary commission will throw
the whole of (Gurdaspur) district into the Muslim majority area.
This example amply testifies to the fact that how resolutely he was
contemplating about the throwing the lot of Gurdaspur district in
favour of India. For details see Mountbatten of Burma, Time only
to Look Forward (London: Nicholas Kaye, 1949), p.30. Also see
Sherwani, “Kashmir Accession to India re-examined,” p.58. On 4
August while talking to the Nawab of Bhopal and ruler of Indore
he indicated that Kashmir because of its geographical situation
could accede to India also, provided part of Gurdaspur district was
transferred to East Punjab. The Transfer of Power XII, p.509 cited
by S. M. Burke and Salim Al-Din Quraishi, The British Raj in
India: An Historical Review (Karachi, Oxford University Press,
2004), p. 555.
He also a wrote in his personal report on 16 August 1947 that the
Maharaja “now talks of holding a referendum to deicide whether to

48
 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

join Pakistan or India, provided that the Boundary Commission

gives him land communication between Kashmir and India
See Transfer of Power XII, p. 769 cited by Burke and Quraishi,
The British Raj, p. 555. All these instances amply demonstrate that
he was pre-decided to hand over Gurdaspur to Indian Union.
8
Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir (London: Robert Hale,
1956), p. 74.
9
Andrew Roberts, Eminent Chruchillians (London: Weldenfeld
and Nicolson, 1994). cited by Sher Muhammad Garewal,
“Mountbatten and Kashmir Issue”, Journal of Research Society of
Pakistan, XXXIV (April 1997), pp.9-10. Despite these findings
Roberts has written “It is impossible accurately quantify the
personal responsibility for the tragedy of Kashmir as the
Mountbatten papers relating to the issue at the India Office
Library and records are closed to scholars for an indefinite period,
(Robert, Eminent Churchillans, p. 105.)
10
Mussarat Bano, Lord Mountbatten As a Viceroy 23 March-14 August 1947
(M.A Thesis, University of Punjab, 1997), p. 258-60.
11
See Durga Das, ed., Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 2-Vols. (Ahmedabad:
Niajivan Publishing House, 1971), pp.1-9. Also see Ch. Zafar Ullah Khan,
Almiya-i-Pakistan (trans. Ashraf Tanveer) (Lahore: Atishfishah Publishers,
1989), p. 89.
12
Bano, “Lord Mountbatten As a Viceroy 23 March-14 August 1947”, p. 89.
13
Sher Muhammad Garewal, “Mountbatten and Kashmir Issue”,
Journal of Research Society of Pakistan, XXXIV (April 1997). P.
11.
14
S.M. Burke, Lawrance Ziring, Pakistan Foreign Policy: An Historical
Analysis (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), 23.
15
Janak Singh was the member of R.S.S.
16
M.C. Mahajan belonged to Judiciary. He was representative of
Congress in Punjab Boundary Commission.
17
Shahid M. Amin, “A Re-Evaluation of the Kashmir Dispute”,
Pakistan Horizon, 56 (April 2003), p. 29.
18
Alastiar Lamb, Incomplete Partition: The Genesis of the
Kashmir Dispute 1947-48 (Herts: Oxford Books, 1995), p. 157.
19
Ibid., p.170.
20
Hence, Indian’s arguments that it had sent its forces to defend
its territory had not basis as by 27 October, no instrument of
Accession had been signed.
21
Alastair Lamb cited in Mohammad Riazuddin, “Solidarity with
Kashmiris”, News (5 February, 2004).
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy (Hertbirdbury: Oxford Books,
1994), p. 96.

49
 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

28
See Yousaf Saraf, Kashmir’s Fight For Freedom, Vol. II,
(Lahore: Ferozesons, 1977), p. 907.
29
In order to thwart the conspiracies directed towards accession of
Kashmir to Indian Union Liaquat Ali Khan’s government
organized a tribal invasion. Brigadier Akbar Khan and Sardar
Shaukat Hayat were mastermind behind this invasion. Under this
operation tribal Lashkar was sent to Kashmir for liberating it from
Maharaja’s yoke as overt militancy operation was not possible.
30
Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, pp. 154-55.
While the presence of the Patiala men was commented upon often
enough, very few of the commentators appeared to have wondered
at its implication. These included firstly, not only the fact that
troops “in theory subordinate to the C-in-C of the Indian Army” In
other words troops were deployed in Kashmir and engaged in
fighting well before accession. Secondly, but the great likelihood
that since the Patiala men were in Kashmir also before the tribal
advance of 22 October. “the presence of these tribesmen was a
direct response to the arrival of Patiala troops.”
31
Ijaz Hussain, Kashmir Dispute: An International Law
Perspective (Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies,
1998), p. 41.
32
Ibid., 75.
33
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan’ Defence Policy Early years
1947-58 (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p. 42.
34
Ibid.
35
Ibid., 41.
36
Shahid M. Amin, “A Re-Evaluation of the Kashmir Dispute”,
Pakistan Horizon, vol. 56 (April 2003), p.38.
37
Iqbal Ahmad, “A Kashmir solution for Kashmir”, Himal South
Asia, vol. 8 (Nov-Dec, 1996), p. 22.
38
P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohn,
Perception, Politics and Security in South Asia (London:
Routledge Curzen, 2003), p. 36.
39
Robert G. Wrising, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On
Regional Conflict and its Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1994),
p. 86.
40
Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, “Kashmir Problem an Appraisal” in Kashmir
Problem: Challenge and Response (Islamabad: Instittue of Policy Studies,
1990), p. 47.
41
Victoria Schafiled, Kashmir in Conflict: Pakistan and Unfinished War
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 225.
42
Further Kashmir’s significance is enhanced when it is perceived as the
meeting place of regional powers India, Afghanistan, China and Russia. Ishtiaq
Ahmed and Miss Rabia Khan, “Kashmir: Its strategic Importance for India and
Pakistan, The Journal of Political Science, vol. 12 (1999-2000), pp- 77-78.
43
Mahnaz Isphani, Roads and Rivals: The Political Uses of Access in the
Boarder lands of Asia (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 184.
44
Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), pp. 45-60.

50
 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

45
Iffat Malik, Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict International Dispute (Karachi: Oxford
University Press, 2002), p. 267.
46
Akbar Khan, Raiders in Kashmir (Delhi: Army Publishers, n.d.), p. 10.
The protagonists of such views even proclaim that “Jammu and Kashmir state
is a battleground, where, the national ideologies of India and Pakistan are being
tested”. Khan Zaman Mirza “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in 1990s with reference
to Kashmir dispute”, South Asian Studies, vol. 11 (July-1994), p. 70
Sharif-ul-Mujahid even equates Kashmir with ideology of Pakistan. He is of the
view “If Kashmir goes, the ideology goes. The liquidation of Pakistan as a state
may only be matter of time.” Sharif al Mujahid, “India-Pakistan Relations: An
Analysis”, in Foreign Policy of Pakistan An Analysis (Karachi: University of
Karachi, 1964), p. 43.
47
Chari, et.al., Perceptions, Politics and Security in South Asia, p.35.
48
Michael Brecher, The Struggle for Kashmir (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1982), pp-51-54.
49
Riaz Ali Shah, Dr. Riaz Ali Shah’s Diary (Lahore: Publishing House Bull
Road, 1950) quoted in Habibur Rehman, Kashmir: The Jugular view of
Pakistan (Rawalpindi: Kashmir Liberation Cell, 1998), p. 23.
50
Ch. M. Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan (Lahore: Research Society
University of the Punjab, 1986), p.235.
This impression is lent further credence with the account of A.H. Khursheed
and General Gul Hasan in their memories. The former served as private
secretary of Quaid, where as the later was ADC.
51
Stanley Wolpert, Jinnah of Pakistan (Karachi: OUP, 1984), p. 349.
52
Alastair Lamb, Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947 (Karachi:
Oxford Books, 1994), p.99. When Auckinlech met the Quaid on
28 t h October at Lahore and argued that the accession of the state
of Jammu and Kashmir to Indian Union sending of Pakistan troops
into state could result in an armed conflict between the two
dominions and would attract the “application of operation stand-
down”. According him in such an event all British officers serving
with the Government of Pakistan would have to be withdrawn.
Auchkinlech did not tell Quaid “operation stand down” applied
equally to Indian army whose British commanders were
masterminding the Indian operation in Kashmir. Nasim Hasan
Shah, The UN Settled State Some Legal Aspects (Rawalpindi:
Kashmir Liberation Cell, 1998), 11.
53
Farooq Ahmed Dar, “Jinnah’s Perception of Pakistan-India Relations.”
Regional Studies, vol. XVII. (Spring 1999), p.32.
54
Alastair Lamb quoted in A.H. Askari “India’s sensitivity on Kashmir,” Dawn
(29 October 1997).
55
Riaz Ahmed, “Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah’s Kashmir Policy as Governor-General
of Pakistan” in Papers presented at the International Seminar on Quaid-e-
Azam, Pakistan and Kashmir 8-9 May 1996 Islamabad 2 Vols, ed. Riaz Ahmed
(Islamabad: Quaid-e-Azam University, 1996), p.18.
The difference between Nehru’s and Jinnah’s approaches towards Kashmir was
easily discernable. Jinnah advised to have a plebiscite hold under the
arrangements made by Government of India and Pakistan were as Nehru
insisted that plebiscite should be held under the auspices like the United

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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

Nations. This view is further corroborated by Ch. Muhammad Ali’s account.

He has revealed on 8th November, Mountbatten and Sardar Patel agreed to the
urgency of withdrawal both the tribal lashkar and the Indian troops from the
valley, to be followed up by a free and fail plebiscite to be arranged by
government of India and Pakistan as desired by the Quaid, but Nehru disagreed.
Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, pp.297-98.
56
Sir Grafftey Smith the British High Commissioner’s Report also sheds light
on the main postulates of Jinnah’s Kashmir policy. (Grafftey Smith waited on
Quaid-e-Azam in Karachi on 9 December and discussed with him among other
things the Kashmir issue) These included
(I). He did not personally favour the intervention of the United Nations
Organization or of any other outside authority. He still preferred the solution
suggestion by him to India on 1st Nov. 1947, that the two Governor-General
duly authorized by their respective dominions should accept responsibility for
the task of setting up a neutral administration in Kashmir and organizing a
plebiscite. (II). He emphatically believed that the movement in Kashmir was
the inevitably natural result of cruelty and repressive action taken again the
Muslims of Poonch by Kashmir state forces as punishment for their attitude
favouring the state accession to Pakistan. (III). He considered the very notion of
partition of Kashmir on the basis of communal ground as absurd and spoke
“sarcastically of the ignorance which inspired talk of the partition of Kashmir
on the basis that Jammu is a predominantly Hindu state”. Sir Graffay Smith to
Noel-Baker a December 1947, received in Commonwealth Relations officers,
31 December 1947, POL/12010/47 in India office Library L/1/1/1419 cited by
Ahmed, “Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah’s Kashmir Policy”, p.13.
57
Lawrence Ziring, “Quaid-e-Azam on the Kashmir issue as Governor
General” in Papers Present at International Seminar on Quaid-e-Azam,
Pakistan and Kashmir, vol. 01, pp-10.
58
Robert G. Wrising, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On
Regional Conflict and its Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1994),
p. 86.
59
David Litenthal’s Interview with Wirsing (1951) cited by Iffat Malik,
Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict International Dispute (Karachi: Oxford University
Press, 2002), p. 207.
60
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan’ Defence Policy Early years
1947-58 (London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p. 44.
61
Ibid. The efforts of the Indian governments attempted to discuss Kashmir
case in isolation where as Pakistan government tried to expand the conflict-
canvas in order to bring India to negotiating table.
62
The ceasefire decision was by and large welcomed in Pakistan however some
military leaders termed it as a “great blunder” they contended that this decision
deprived Pakistan of military victory in Kashmir. Liaquat was criticized as
being pro-west and pro-British mainly due to his failure to entice substantial
international support over Kashmir. This resentment found expression in form
of “Pindi Conspiracy Case”. The plot was to over throw the Liaquat’s
government and replace it with military government. The common detonator
of most of the military officers involved in Pindi conspiracy was that mostly all
of them had taken active part in the Kashmir war 1948 and all of them greatly
resented the decision of cease-fire. Liaquat Ali Khan tried to pacify these

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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

sentiments by arguing that Pakistan’s objective was not to decide the fate of
Kashmir by force but to guarantee their right of self-determination through
plebiscite. Sohail, Partition and Anglo-Pakistan Relations, 1947-51, pp. 213-
214. Also see Irfan Waheed Usmani, Kashmir Ki Jung 1948 Aur Rawalpindi
Sazish Case (Lahore: University of the Punjab, M.A. Thesis, 1996), p. 353.
63
The ceasefire was quickly attained but the issue of demilitarization proved to
be insoluble. Even today it defies all direct and indirect efforts. Since 2nd stage
was not completed the third stage of plebiscite could not be reached. Pervaiz
Iqbal Cheema, Pakistan’ Defence Policy Early years 1947-58
(London: Macmillan Press, 1990), p. 45.
64
MC Naughtan was a Canadian General, MC Naughtan Mission was sent by
Security Council in 1949. It tried to bridge the difference by laying down these
recommendations withdrawal of Pakistani troops and of all Indian forces other
than those required for civil administration and the reduction of the state forces
on one hand and the Azad Kashmir forces on the other. These
recommendations were accepted by Pakistan but rejected by India. Rafique
Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 200),
p.75.
65
On 12th April the United Nations Security Council appointed Sir Owen
Dixion a Judge (later Chief Justice) of Australia. His recommendations
included: demilitarization seeking withdrawal of Pakistani forces first and that
of Indian forces afterwards. Proposal of regional plebiscite. This arbitration
could not make any head way as these proposal were rejected by India.
66
Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics, p.78.
67
Khawaja Sarwar Hasan ed. Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan:
The Kashmir Question (Karachi: Institute of International Affairs, 1966), p.26.
68
Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics, p.174.
69
Ibid., 175. This policy did revive public enthusiasm in Pakistan for the
liberation of Kashmir but failed to achieve anything concrete.
70
Ibid., p. 186.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Dawn, (9 September, 1957).
74
New York Times, 19 October, 1957, cited by Afzal, Pakistan History and
Politics, p.212.
75
Dawn, (9 March, 1958).
76
Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics, p.212.
77
Absar Hussain Rizvi, “Remembering Tashkent Declaration”, The Muslim
(Islamabad, January 1, 1991).
78
Ayub Khan, Friend not Masters (London: Oxford University Press, 1967),
p.123.
79
Pakistan Times (31 October, 1958).
80
Pandit Nehru had termed Ayub’s takeover as a “naked military dictatorship”
Two Indian Canberra Reconnaissance fights intruded in to Pakistan’s territory
one aircraft was shot down near Rawalpindi.
Dawn, (26 September, 1959) and Dawn, (27 July, 1960).
81
Field Marshal M. Ayub Khan, Speeches and statements October 1958—June
1959, Vol.I (Karachi: n.p.), p.69.

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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

82
Mirza, “Pakistan’s Foreign Policy in 1990s with reference to Kashmir
dispute”, p.72.
83
Stephen P. Cohen, The idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005),p.
71.
84
Ibid.
85
Krishna Menon, a former Indian Defence Minister, declared that India had
not ‘abjured violence’ and would solve the ‘Pakistan problem’ as it had done
the ‘Goa problem’ Sanjiva Reddy, President of the Indian National Congress,
advocated a forcible ‘liberation of Azad Kashmir’ leaving the time of such
venture to the Indian government. Nehru stated that the use of force was a
question of ‘suitability and opportunity’
86
Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics, p.298.
87
Ibid.
88
Hamid Yusaf, Pakistan: A study of Political Developments 1947-77 (Lahore:
Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1997), p.91.
The Indian Army was under tremendous pressure and many observers believed
that a military move as Pakistan’s part might as Alastiar Lamb has put it
“brought on an Indian debacle of the first magnitude”, However, Washington
and London sent their representatives exercise restrain on Pakistan.
89
Nawabazada Sher Ali Khan, Story of Soldering and Politics in India and
Pakistan (Lahore: Wajidahs, 1978), p.130. Also see Y.D Gundevia, Outside the
Archives (Hyderabad: Sangam Books, 1984), p.293. The Indian side had just
experienced military defeat and humiliation at the hands of Chinese communist
army in the border war of October-November 1962; and its pressing need for
arms provided the west with an obvious opening.
90
M.A. Askari, “India’s Sensitivity on Kashmir”, Dawn (29 October 1997).
91
Kessing’s Contemporary Archives 1963-64, quoted in Afzal, Pakistan History
and Politics, p. 302.
92
Z.A. Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.68.
93
Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics, p. 299.
These takes were held in Rawalpindi (27-29 December 1962), New Delhi (16-
19 January 1961), Karachi (8-10 February 1963), Calcutta (12-14 March 1963),
Karachi (22-25 April 1963), New Delhi (15-16 May 1963)
94
Morris Jones, Pakistan Chronicle, pp. 93-95.
95
Robert G. Wrising, India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute: On
Regional Conflict and its Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1994),
p. 194.
For details see, D.K Palit, War in High Himalayan: The Indian
Army in Crisis 1962 (New Delhi: Lance International, 1991), pp.
368-407.
96
Gundevia, Outside the Archives, p.248. Gundevia at that time secretary of
Commonwealth and a participant in the talks, provides a highly detailed and
illuminating account of these talks.
97
Ibid., 293.
98
Bhutto, Foreign Policy in Pakistan, pp. 77-78. Altaf Guhar, Ayub Khan: The
First Military Ruler of Pakistan (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publication, 1994),
pp.220-32. Morris Jones, Pakistan Chronicle, p. 93.
99
Dawn, (2 December, 1963).
100
Ibid.

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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

101
According Farhat Mahmud it was represented by Aziz Ahmed, General
Akhtar Malik. They also found a vocal exponent of this cause in Z.A. Bhutto
the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. See Farhat Mahmud, History of Pakistan-US
Relations 1947-1990 (Lahore: Vanguard, 1990).
102
Ibid., pp.225-237.
103
Absar Hussain Rizvi, “Remembering Tashkent Declaration”, Muslim,
(Islamabad, 11 January, 1991).
104
American Papers cited by I.A Rehman “Review Article: American Papers”,
Newsline, (December 1999).
105
Rizvi, “Remembering Tashkent Declaration”.
106
Absar Hussain provides very penetrating insight in to the developments in
Tashkent which led to the signing of this declaration. “For seven days Presidnet
Ayub Khan, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shashtri and the Soviet Prime
Minister Plekses Kosygin talked and talked to come to some understanding for
the solution of Kashmir dispute and the normalization of the situation created
by the 1965 war…For six days Mr. Kosygin shuttled between the “datchas” of
Shashtri and Ayub in a bid to produce some document acceptable to both”…[In
his speech at the inaugural session on January 4 Ayub emphasized the need for
peace between Indian and Pakistan. He even offered no war pact to India. But it
was conditional on the solution of Kashmir issue. Shastri on his part also
stressed the need for peace but said nothing about Kashmir. The talks were
initially held at the official level to finalize the agenda but difference cropped
over Kashmir. The Indians insisted that Pakistan should agree through a step by
step approach. This boiled down to taking small measures to improve relations.
Ayub and Shastri held face to face talks at a “neutral datchas” as they would
not visit other’s residence. No progress was made at the exchanges. It were the
Soviets who ultimately produces a draft. Mr. Kosiygin in a dramatic midnight
meeting with Ayub and Shastri on January, 9 and succeeded in getting their
approval for a draft declaration.” Rizvi, “Remembering Tashkent Declaration”.
American Papers also provide in depth insight in to the hidden details of
Tashkent agreement. It has been recorded in American Papers that “Ayub
hoped by not insisting on “Kashmir first” and Shastri did so by not insisting on
making the ceasefire line the permanent border. The Pakistani delegation was
also satisfied that India’s plan for a no war pact had failed and that the
declaration was a step forward.” I.A. Rehman, “Review Article: American
Papers”, p.89.
107
Bhutto was not altogether happy with Tashkent. Though initially he praised
the Soviet-move to hold Indo-Pakistan summit he described it as “a great
initiative” But he was not happy with the way negotiations proceeded in that
direction. He was very glum during these negotiations. According to American
papers Ayub stated his point of view frankly and Bhutto did not disagree at that
time though Shoaib reported the latter’s ill-conceived reserve.” Rehman,
“Review Article: American Papers”. According to insiders information: “It was
said in the corridors of Ayub’s dacha that Ayub asked F.M. Bhutto to go and
deliver it to Indian Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Singh and discuss related
matter’s with him. Bhutto just went to Sardarji’s dacha and handed it over to
whosoever was there…it clearly indicated that Bhutto was not happy with the
declaration”. Rizvi, “Remembering Tashkent Declaration”, pp. 51-52.
108
Ibid. Also See India News, (1st August, 1969).

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 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

109
“Indra Gandhi’s letter to Yahya” dated 22 June, 1969. cited by Burke and
Ziring, Pakistan Foreign Policy, pp. 250-52.
110
For details see Pakistan Affairs, (30 August, 1969).
111
See K. Sarwar Hasan (ed.), The Simla Accord: Pakistan Horizon’s Special
Issue, Vol.XXV. No.3 (1972).
112
Its supporter’s term it as a great diplomatic victory for Pakistan and they
attribute to the skilful diplomacy of Z.A. Bhutto, particularly, in the context
that Pakistan was in a weaker position but Bhutto’s skillful diplomacy secured
from India the recognition of Jammu and Kashmir as a disputed territory. There
is not other pact Pakistan has maintained its critics argue that it has localized
the Kashmir dispute between the two states and diminish its international
significance. Through it India has legitimized its territorial grains of 1971 war.
Its critics also contend that it tempers with the internationally recognized and
accepted ceasefire line under a bilateral arrangement with unavoidable
implication it accords the line of control (L.O.C) sanctity generally not
associated with the ceasefire or truce lines. It enjoins upon high contacting
parties to refrain altering the line of control unilaterally irrespective of mutual
differences and legal interpretations. It has no relevance in finding a solution of
the Kashmir dispute. It provides no means of settling it, nor it lays down any
broad principles even in this regard. The consistency, morality and legality of
the Pakistani position on Kashmir is derived from and enshrine in the UN
resolutions, while the Simla Agreement is merely a reaffirmation by Pakistan
and India that Kashmir is an unresolved issue.
113
Chari, et.al, Perceptions, Politics and Security in South Asia, p.
42.
114
Ahmed Saleem (ed.), Bhutto aur Kashmir (Lahore: Jhasssng Publications,
1992), p.273.
115
Ibid.
116
Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, p.32.
Bhutto made a statement in UNSC “The people of Jammu and Kashmir are part
of the people of Pakistan in blood, in flesh in culture, in geography, in history
an in every way and in every from…If necessary Pakistan would fight to the
end” cited by Ajit Bhattacharjea, “Z.A. Bhutto’s Double Speak: Turning defeat
in to victory”, The Times of India, (3 May, 1995).
117
Z.A. Bhutto, “Pakistan Builds Anew”, Foreign Affairs cited by Hameed
A.K. Roy, Reading in Pakistan’s Foreign Policy, Vol.I (Lahore: Aziz
Publishers, 1981), p. 145.
118
P.M. Bhutto to the Chief of Army Staff, June 23, 1973. as cited in Wolpert,
Zulfi: Bhutto of Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 186.
119
M. Hanif, “The Kashmir Dispute and Pakistan-India Relations 1972-1992”,
Pakistan Horizon, vol. 47(1). (January 1994), p. 38. see the text of India
Abdullah Agreement in Nawa-e-Waqat (Lahore, 7 March, 1975).
120
Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, p. 123.
121
Mussawat (Lahore, 2 March 1975).
122
Rajendra Sareen, Pakistan: The Indian Factor (New Delhi: Vikas
Publishers, 1984), p. 40.
123
M.H. Askari, “Kashmir: A New Phase”. Dawn (24 January 1990).
124
Mirza, “Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy in 1990s,” p. 73.
125
Ibid.

56
 Irfan Waheed Usmani, Historicizing Pakistan’s Kashmir Policy

126
Sareen, Pakistan: The Indian Factor, p. 40.
127
P.S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Cross Roads (New Delhi,
1994), p.229; also see Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, p.140.
128
Girital Jain, Hindustan Times (27 July, 1990).
129
Yunus Samad, “Kashmir and imagining of Pakistan”, Contemporary South
Asia, vol. 4 (1: 1995), p.73.
130
Afzal, Pakistan History and Politics, p. 134.

57