On the Consolation Offered by Leszek Kołakowski’s Horror metaphysicus*

by Janusz Dobieszewski

Abstract
The paper is a critical review of Leszek Kołakowski’s book Horror metaphysicus. According to
Kołakowski the starting-point of horror metaphysicus is the awareness of the transience, expediency,
randomness and fragility of the world and human existence in face of the abysmal and horrifying
depths of Nothingness. According to Kołakowski the inevitable urge to overcome horror
metaphysicus leads to the Absolute, which can appear in two forms: God and cogito.
The present paper proposes a diversion from Kołakowski’s perspective of horror metaphysicus and
instead asks whether there exists anything that justifies praise for human mortality and human
relations to Nothingness, if there is anything that warrants acceptance of the existential horror
looming before humankind.

Keywords: horror metaphysicus, horror religiosus, skepticism, nothingness, Absolute, cogito,

mortality

1. General remarks

Horror is usually associated with explicitly negative sensations like fear, anxiety, repulsion or panic,
however in Latin it could also denote religious piety and esteem, which are definitely positive. The
adjective horribilis meant “horrible”, “repulsive”, but also “respected” and “astounding”. The verb horreo
possessed broad connotations with fear, but also meant “to surround with devout veneration”. The Greek
orrodeo (to fear) and orrodia (fear, anxiety lead us (through the initial Ionian arr) to arretos, which is translated
as “dangerous” or “terrifying” as well as “unsaid”, “undescribed”, “immeasurable” or “mysterious”, and
even “holy”. Horror lost much of this ambiguity when it passed to the modern languages, it is, however,
still clearly discernible in today’s mass culture – whose influence on culture in general should perhaps not
be overestimated, but should on no account be totally ignored. Meant here is “horror” as a literary and
film genre, and its unique aesthetic, in which fear is attractive, where the horrifying rivets our eyes and
captivates us by ominous promises of elation, renewal and katharsis[1].
The semantic ambiguity of the term horror will underlie my further speculations in this paper, whose
main subject is Leszek Kołakowski’s small but excellent work Horror metaphysicus.
In Kołakowski’s book the title horror metaphysicus has several meanings which I will try to take a closer
look at. Before I do that, however, I wish to dwell on some associations which this title has invariably
aroused. Indeed, it can be understood in two ways: as pertaining to metaphysical horror, a unique and very
essential kind of fear which we could call “existential fear” and which is related to ultimate issues like
God, soul, ego, freedom, existence, truth, sense, reason, etc. In this case such issues would be experienced
as something extremely disturbing, threatening, absurd, contradictory and paradoxical, the resulting sense
of horror conditioned not so much by knowledge but a certain kind of sensitivity – one which seeks
solace and consolation in ultimate issues and is made to realize that the nature of such issues runs totally
against such desires. In such cases everyday life, which before the metaphysical search may have appeared
chaotic, disturbing and expedient, may prove a quiet, peaceful and harmonious refuge.

* Janusz Dobieszewski, O pocieszeniu, jakie niesie Horror metaphysicus Leszka Kołakowskiego (On the Consolation Offered by

Leszek Kołakowski’s Horror metaphysicus), “Sztuka i Filozofia” 1997, no. 14, pp. 60-91. Abbreviated version.
[1] Cf. N. Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror or Paradoxes of the Heart, New York – London 1990, pp. 3-8.
 This meaning of horror metaphysicus is close to horror religiosus, a term used by Søren Kierkegaard to
describe the feeling caused by efforts to spiritually penetrate Abraham’s experience on Mount Moriah.
“We must not cry over Abraham”, Kierkegaard wrote. “One regards him with a sense of horror religiosus”[2].
This religious horror situation can be described – if somewhat formally and affectedly, but in line with
Kierkegaard – as follows: “Is it not true that whoever God graces with His blessing He at the same time
damns?”[3]. Doubtless Kierkegaard’s Abraham is an available and excellent environment for horror
metaphysicus.
The book’s title may also be understood to refer to “metaphysical horror”, in other words the various
horrifying and often insurmountable theoretical conflicts which take place within metaphysics as a sphere
of human knowledge. In this sense horror metaphysicus means “the horror in metaphysics”.
The main reason why I made note of this difference in the meaning of horror metaphysicus was to draw
attention to the fact that the distinction is not too rigorous and both meanings sometimes intertwine and
complement themselves. After all, metaphysics is naturally close to ultimate issues, and indeed certain
human experiences give ample food for contemporary metaphysical thought. It must be remembered,
however, that what inter-penetrates here are two meanings, discernible and separate both on the theoretical
and psychological level. The difference is more or less like the difference between a very immediate and
personal experience of, say, death (e.g. when we escape it by a hair’s breadth), and our awareness that we
must all die. As the two meanings of horror metaphysicus, these two experiences of our own “self” may also
intertwine.
It appears that Kołakowski was mainly concerned with the second of the abovementioned two
meanings of horror metaphysicus. Although mainly interested in the worrying and often frightening
contradictions, paradoxes, antinomies and absurdities inherent in metaphysics, he by no means limited his
quest to the philosophical sense of horror.
As I have said, Kołakowski’s book mentions several meanings of horror metaphysicus. Its basic thesis is
that transience, fragility, time’s incessant negation of existence and the disappearance of existence in the
abyss of nothingness, of that what was but is no more, are typical traits of the world we experience. “We
will never really know what ‘existence’ is as what we experience is not existence but the constant loss of
our existence to an irretrievable ‘once’”[4]. The world of experience is unable to satisfy our desire for truth,
stability and order. With regard to the world of experience we are deprived of all truth criteria, all
regulations or reasoning that would enable the placement of one view above another. All thoughts,
concepts and theories base on facts, phenomena and observations which drift off into the abyss of
oblivion, and share the same fate.
Kołakowski points to two ways of escaping this situation. First, we can assume that the mentioned
desire for truth, stability and order (in their metaphysical dimension) is a self-mystification, that the
problems posed by metaphysics are badly posed, and that the value of metaphysical debate and study is
about equal to the value of trying to determine whether a square wheel is square or round. The other way
is to adopt a relativistic stance and dissolve the desire for metaphysical truth in usually pretentious
statements like, “everything is possible”, “every opinion carries some truth”, etc.
In both cases the aim is to stifle the inner metaphysical urge and in a sense draw closer to the world
and its spontaneous changeability. Hence, it is not coincidence that, although differently, both attitudes
herald the end of philosophy and with regard to the here-discussed offer not so much escape from
metaphysical horror as a blockade against it.

2. Horror and skepticism

The philosophy of skepticism attempts to comprehend and apprehend metaphysical horror. Here,
the world’s transient character, the undefinability of existence and the inability to attain “real reality” are
locked into the general conclusion that “nothing is certain”; this, however, does not lead skeptics to deny
their philosophy - quite to the contrary, they consistently nurture, defend and develop their theses and are
at constant war with other dogmas. The skeptics’ claim that the world we have been given to experience is
unable to offer up philosophical truth has an ominous ring, further strengthened (as Kołakowski aptly

[2] S. Kierkegaard, Bojaźń i drżenie (Fear and Trembling), in: S. Kierkegaard, Bojaźń i drżenie. Choroba na śmierć (Fear and
Trembling. Sick With Death), transl. by J. Iwaszkiewicz, Warsaw 1972, p. 64.
[3] Ibidem, p. 69.
[4] L. Kołakowski, Horror metaphysicus, transl. by M. Panufnik, Res Publica, Warsaw 1990, p. 38.
notes) by a self-reference paradox – namely if, as the skeptics say, nothing is certain, then neither are
skepticism and the claim that “nothing is certain”; if we are to be skeptical about everything, we also have
to be skeptical about skepticism.
Interestingly, in objective philosophical debates about horror skeptics and philosophers in whose
views skepticism plays a major role do not necessarily regard horror as terrifying – sometimes one even
gets the impression that skepticism is a way of taming, or even vanquishing, horror.
Of course it would not be hard to list thinkers, whom skepticism or skeptical leanings had led to
pessimism, helplessness and the brink of nothingness. Such, for instance, was the skepticism of Augustine,
La Rochefoucauld or Pascal. It seems, however, that over history philosophy was rather dominated by a
more cheerful skepticism (so to speak) which discouraged one not so much to the world at large as to
hasty, poorly-motivated and dogmatic theories about the world, theories which threatrened to entangle
one in falsehood and mystification. Socrates, Pyrrho, Montaigne, Descartes or Hume were all
philosophers who had more trust in humanity and its chances than desire to confront it with the Absolute,
Dread and Nothingness. Alongside doubt and denial, skeptical philosophies also contain diversely-
understood moments of affirmation, which in a way prevent such philosophies from slipping into the
bottomless pit of horror metaphysicus.
One of the most frequently-voiced arguments against skeptical philosophy involves the earlier-
mentioned self-reference paradox, which also plays a crucial role in Kołakowski’s Horror metaphysicus. Here,
the self-evidence of this paradox is to prove that prevailing in skepticism is impossible and with the self-
contentment of a polemist, Kołakowski lists the diverse forms it may take. However, alone the readiness
and ease with which he refers to it may evoke some doubts. At times one even gets the impression that
Kołakowski is more drawn by the beauty, charm and brilliance of the paradox (paradoxes are indeed
beautiful) than what it refers to.
One of the self-reference paradox variations is the statement that something is undefinable – which
according to Kołakowski is nothing but a camouflaged definition: “The pitfall of self-reference inevitably
makes itself apparent in every attempt to speak about the unspeakable. To define something as
undefinable is to deny its undefinability”[5]. Let us, notheless, try to somehow escape this paradox and
weaken – albeit somewhat indirectly – the claim that skeptical philosophy has close ties to horror
metaphysicus.
In fact defining something as undefinable does not negate this somethiong’s definability, does not
mean that its conceptualization is impossible. Kołakowski’s here-discussed opinions as well as most of
Horror metaphysicus appear to be founded on the belief that “philosophy has always sought an absolute
language, a language that would be perfectly comprehensive and transmit to us reality ‘as it really is’”, and,
simultaneously, on the conviction that “this search was forlorn from the very outset”[6]. This belief is a
very crucial – one might even say classic – element of Kołakowski’s philosophy and is present in his
writings since at least the 1950s and 60s. The year 1965 saw a second, extended edition of the excellent
collective work 20th Century Philosophy and Sociology, for which Kołakowski authored an essay on Husserl,
which he concluded by stating what he saw as a fundamental and insurmountable contradiction in
Husserl’s thought – between the definition of philosophy as an exact science (i.e. a perfect and
comprehensive language) and its postulate of returning to the essential (reality as it “really” is).
Kołakowski held both postulates to be irreconcileable and his point of view is rather convincing.
Subsequently, as we clearly see in Horror metaphysicus, the intellectual content that so unmistakeably
characterized Husserl’s phenomenology penetrated to all European philosophy, with the incapacity of
phenomenology regarded as the incapacity of philosophy at large. Rightly? Not necessarily. This is not to
say that any philosophy or philosopher has actually managed to combine the absolute language and real
reality postulates – much rather that not all philosophy sees this as its main task and that Kołakowski’s
thesis about a certain kind of philosophical thought does not reflect the situation in philosophy at large.
In Horror metaphysicus Kołakowski claims that consistent skeptics should be silent[7]. However,
skeptics do not believe that what they speak about does not exist – they do not know if it exists or not.
They do not claim with certainty that reality is not what they say it is, because they do not know what
reality is. And this insecurity is the main reason why they speak. It was much rather Zeno of Elea, who
knew that the tortoise, Achilles, the stadium and the arrow did not exist because they moved, changed and
were separated and were therefore not beings, who entangled himself in contradiction by devoting his

[5] Ibidem, p. 60.

[6] Ibidem, p. 18.
[7] Ibidem, p. 17.
famous Aporias to them, thus recognizing them as thoughtworthy and hence existent. It is not the
skeptics’ uncertainty but the Eleatic certainty of knowledge that leads to silence – occasionally broken by
the incessantly trivial A=A tautology. Apparently the Eleatians themselves realized the hopeless fix they
had gotten themselves into, which is why they left the literal tautology aside and set about proving it
indirectly and in a roundabout way by means of the Aporias, or non-existence. Much indicates – as
confirmed by most of philsophical history – that a move beyond this tautology would not be tantamount
to philosophical suicide and would not expose us to metaphysical horror (although, of course, it could).
One important aspect of skeptical philosophy appears to be its praise of ordinary, everyday
experience. We may justifiably add that this is the kind of experience skepticism culminates in as its
potential is really “put to the test” in situations in which it is easy to fall into dogmatism (social lore,
stereotypes). At the same time, however, skepticism sets boundaries to such experiences as social lore is
weakly-rooted and susceptible to restriction and relativization. This attitude has proven successful both on
the theoretical level (modern science) and in practice (where it takes on many forms, e.g. interim ethic or
political democracy). On the symbolic plane it is well expressed by the fact that while Athens sentenced
Socrates to death for impertinence and hypercriticism, Pyrrho, the founder of the ancient skeptical school,
was so revered by the inhabitants of Elis that they resolved to free all the city’s philosophers from taxes [8].
As Kołakowski notes in Horror metaphysicus, skepticism is such a terrifying condition and places us in
such a hopeless situation, that out of metaphysical and psychological necessity we attempt to flee it and
seek solace in the Absolute. However, basing on our to-date reflections on skeptical philosophy, we could
say that that the transition from skepticism to the horror-defying philosophy of the Absolute (which upon
adoption immediately reveals itself as another form of horror) is not – as Kołakowski would have it –
absolutely necessary, evident and automatic. Of course this transition cannot be denied – it is a historical
and intellectual fact – nonetheless I would seek its roots not so much in the need or desire to overcome
horror metaphysicus, but, quite to the contrary, in a “perverse”, “suicidal” and overpowering yearning to feel,
experience and coexist with metaphysical horror.

3. Horror and the Absolute

Let us, however, adopt Kołakowski’s perspective as this will lead us to the deeper structures of horror
metaphysicus. Here humans, confused by change, lost in the meanders of skepticism, terrified by transience,
in which everything perishes without reason or meaning, and the fragility and coincidentiality of the world,
find consolation and the answers to their problems in the Absolute. The Absolute is complete, lasting and
ultimate, keeps us from sinking into Nothingness, restores “security and the feeling that there is an order
after all”[9], and enables us to return to the postulates of “truth” and “real reality”.
On closer inspection, however, the Absolute and its references to the world and humans are a source
of numerous troubles and complications, with metaphysical horror again showing its face in various
situations and on various occasions.
“And this is what this horror is: if nothing really exists besides the Absolute then the Absolute is
nothing; if nothing really exists besides myself, then I myself am nothing”[10]. This formula breeds some
doubts, and in light of the general content of Horror metaphysicus does not seem fully justified. Moreover, it
would be entirely sensible to postulate its reversion. Indeed Kołakowski does not say “if there is no world
there is no God”. The Absolute’s dependence on the changeability, fragility and randomness of natural
reality would only be a more sophisticated form of “skeptical” horror metaphysicus. True horror begins when
we reverse the dependency into “if there is no God there is no world”. This can be interpreted as “solace”
(God’s existence is a necessary and sufficient pre-condition for the world’s existence) or “horror” (God’s
existence is a necessary but insufficient pre-condition for the world’s existence). In fact the author himself
proceeds to travesty his own formulation of horror by presenting it in the here-suggested perspective.
Consequently, on page 39 he concludes that we must “assume a self-identical, non-temporal existence – a
One – if we are not to be forced into the dispiriting conclusion that ‘there is nothing’”. Somewhat later he
suggests to overcome the world’s absurd and depreciating randomness “by pointing to a Being, perforce
timeless and single, which would magnanimously restore to existence the fragile world of experience and,

[8] Diogenes Laertios, Żywoty i poglądy słynnych filozofów (Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers), collective translation,
Warsaw 1982, IX 64 (p. 555).
[9] L. Kołakowski, Horror metaphysicus, op. cit., p. 38.
[10] Ibidem, p. 30.
as if by a miracle, make everything real again”[11]. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the world depends
on the Absolute and not the Absolute on the world, that the Absolute “is to serve the world’s salvation”
and not the other way around (as suggested by the outgoing formula). And the disclosure of horror
metaphysicus in this context cannot mean deconstructing the Absolute but should rather consist in leading it
to some kind of horrific fulfillment.
According to Kołakowski overcoming this horror entails – similarly as in the case of the horror of
creation – acceptance of the irreducible, creative ad positive role of humans. Let us quote: “God is pleased
by the good deeds pursued by the inhabitants of His cosmos, and is probably enriched in their effect”[12].
At the same time by aiding God, humans gain insight into existence. By our good deeds we enlarge
existence and open for ourseves a door to understanding its essential intuition. This precisely is humanity’s
irreplaceable role in God’s great plan.
Of course here as well the price for a solution that is positive for human subjectivity and the world’s
irreducibility is the doubtful “absoluteness” of the Absolute. The concept of good which appears in Horror
metaphysicus (and which I would describe as narrowly ethical) leads to other philosophically enticing
conclusions. For instance Kołakowski claims historical tradition associates good with “harmony and
peace”, which seems to indicate that ideal good consists of absolute harmony and peace and, as a
perfection, also of Divine Oneness[13]. While in fact the harmony and peace concepts assume the earlier
existence of difference that must be harmonized/placated, hence in this case unity is an effect. In the case
of the Absolute, however, unity is the starting-point and has little application for concepts like harmony
and peace. Thus, if we decide to identify harmony and peace with good we must also accept that good is
not a typical feature of the Absolute.
To my mind this rather complex situation could be resolved by setting a very clear distinction
between both approaches to good. In the first sense, the one pursued by Kołakowski, good is ethical
(even narrowly ethical) in character and denoted harmony, peace, calm and justice. In the second,
ontological sense good is tantamount with existence, a positive and tolerant attitude to life bereft of ny
desire to graduate and classify life forms. In the first case the postulate for more good is a postulate for
more harmony, in the second to want more good is to want more existence and more acceptance for
existence. In the first instance good is tied to the intention of making things happen this and not another
way; in the second with the wish for existence to exist. Kołakowski also mentions the ontological
perspective of good but refers it to existence understood as extreme harmony, peace, constance and
stability, in other word, the indifferent and lifeless loneliness of God. From our point of view the
ontological aspect of good lies in the fact that it denotes existence, being and creation. It is good to be, not
not to be[14].
The suggested distinction does provide a solution for several problems encountered by Kołakowski.
Thus, good in the ontological sense (existence, acceptance of existence, creation) can be attributed to God
without enmeshing Him in a rather troublesome relation with good in the ethical sense – which, being
secondary, would relate to an already created world and its peacefulness and harmony, whose growth
could and would please God – as Kołakowski wants – but which would neither add to nor take from His
goodness as no existence in the created world can dispose of existence; they can increase harmony, but
not life. Hence, the picture also has room for human subjectivity and activity, but not in relation to
existence but harmony. Our subjectivity cannot overstep the border to the “kingdom” of the Absolute; in
this case we are at the Absolute’s mercy and may reject good understood as harmony to sink down into
all-embracing, ultimate nothingness.
Let us note further that this approach completely eliminates horror metaphysicus: Preserved are the
independence, autonomy and unlimited power of the Absolute which, as the creator, holds full control
and supervision over the world. At the same time our existence within the boundaries “set” by Divine
creation is subjective and creative as a “surplus” of existence and the created world, which God has

[11] Ibidem, p. 67.

[12] Ibidem, p. 110.
[13] Ibidem, p. 52.

The ontological aspect of good was mentioned by, among others, Edith Stein, who stated that good “exuded perfection
[14]

not only – as truth – by virtue of its content, but also by virtue of its existence”, and was involved in “the realization of
something as yet unreal” (E. Stein, Byt skończony a byt wieczny /Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt to an Ascent to the
Meaning of Being/, transl. by I. J. Adamska OCD, Poznań 1995, pp. 329, 334).
endowed with broad autonomy and freedom as he is not absolutely conditioned by it. God does not have
to interfere directly – all that suffices are His signs, indirect symptoms and, as a final resort, the power of
granting and taking away existence, which is also a form of judgment. In His fatherly attitude to the world
God appears to be a “sensible parent” who does not riddle His offspring with ready-made (not to say
“only true”) solutions to everything. Much rather, he would like to see His children grow in rationale,
wisdom and ethicality. Let us repeat – in this approach the issue of “good vs. the Absolute” need not lead
to horror metaphysicus. We may halt at the largely reassuring mystery of the world’s creation, which both
enables and sets boundaries to our ongoing historical drama (not horror or despair) of making the world
as it should be.

4. Horror and cogito

The first of the mentioned methods of overcoming horror metaphysicus involves the above-described
Absolute. The second consists requires the introduction of an absolutitically interpreted human
subjectivity whose paradigmtic model is the Cartesian cogito (ego).
Where God dissolved into Nothingness as soon as thought tried to draw close to Him and – as
Kołakowski showed – punished us with renewed horror metaphysicus for our over-zealous attempts at
definiong Him, cogito appears to be something more familiar, near, our own, direct and simply present.
And it seems that cogito is what “provides us with our only direct intuition of existence”[15].
Unfortunately, Kołakowski points out, “the history of the continuing post-Cartesian debate shows how
fragile this intuition is”[16]. As soon as we try to pinpoint pure, primeval ego it immediately shows itself to
be nothing but secondary, a place of fulfillment for some p[revious reality which was to derive from ego.
Ego stands before us as the continuum of memory or a designate of the pronoun “I”, and its every activity
preassumes language – while the use of languge “preassumes the entire history of the culture, whose
symptom the language in question is”[17]. Ego appears devoid of epistemological innocence and ontological
virginity. “One cannot – Kołakowski wrote relating the views of Merleau-Ponty – reduce my existence to
the awareness of this existence”[18]. What is more, because “being a part of the human community and
communication with others are integral elements of what is not too adequately called “I” (inadequately as
“I” is not a noun)”, “by blocking ego [closing it within an individual – J. D.] the Cartesians propelled it into
nothingness”[19]. The result is the glorious return of horror metaphysicus.
According to Kołakowski the modern-day “cogitationism” of Husserl’s phenomenology does little to
change the situation. The effect of attempts to de-substantialize the Cartesian cogito by transcendental
(phenomenological) reduction is that “the ego appears as nothing more than an empty recipient of
ephemerical phenomena, or simply a motion of intent, an act without an actor”[20]. Things are no longer
objects of cognition, replaced by an intented object present only in the awareness. And substance is no
longer the subject of cognition, replaced by a transcendental “I”. In effect we have “two non-things, two
mutually supportive nothings. By depriving it of reality, we have attained the cognitive Absolute”[21]. No
need to add that here too one can feel the chilly breath of metaphysical horror.
According to Kołakowski metaphysical horror, which appears upon analysis of the “content” of
human subjectivity, can be overcome by a “historically constant community”, alter ego, the social and
historical dimension of existence. As it appears, however, by this Kołakowski does not mean full victory
over cogito-bred horror. His is merely an interim solution designed to ward of the most impeding threat of
horror metaphysicus. Because if ego cogito – in which we were to find the basic intuition of existence allowing
us to order our view of a fragile and changing world – has been transformed into a historical and social
community, then its diversity and changeability again deprives us of measure, the sought-after truth
criterion, reality and sense. As Kołakowski notes, the history of the human community shows that “there
is no such thing as an all-encompassing language; there are as many languages as there are possible
viewpoints regarding the perspective of Existence and Nothingness – which means there are undefinably

[15] L. Kołakowski, Horror metaphysicus, op. cit., p. 35 and following pages.

[16] Ibidem, p. 71.
[17] Ibidem, p. 73.
[18] Ibidem, p. 77.
[19] Ibidem, p. 117 and following pages.
[20] Ibidem, p. 75.
[21] Ibidem, p. 76.
many”[22]. And if we accept this – as, for the sake of consistence, we must – we “return to where our
horror takes its beginnings from. How can I remain with a language (or someplace from where I look at
the world, or a rule for interpreting the entirety of experience) without ascribing to it superior cognitive
prowess?”[23].
Thus, overcoming horror would require the emergence of a universal language as a framework
adding stability and order to the vitality of the historical community. “Will there – Kołakowski asks – one
day appear a genius who will show (and not only say) that from their superior level Augustine, Spinoza,
Hume, Kant and Hegel all said the same, or at least expressed perfectly reconcileable visions of reality
experienced from different vantage points?”[24]. In Kołakowski’s case the question is rhetoric, however I
believe there is some hope when it comes to such genius. Of course it would be far-fetched to claim that a
universal language has actually been formulated, systemized and accepted, nonetheless, at least since
philosophy made history a part of its domain (i.e. approximately since classical German philosophy), it has
hs clearly developed in the direction marked by Kołakowski’s question. Thus, from the point of view of
Hegelian philosophy it is quite true that Augustyn, Spinoza, Hume and Kant said the same – and the same
(albeit with some divergence) as Hegel, which means that Hegel’s thought merely complements theirs, and
simultaneously explains the conditions under which one speaks – and must speak – like Augustine or
Hume. Besides Hegel, a similar consolidation of viewpoints was proposed by Feuerbach, Nietzsche and
Heidegger.
I would not go so far as to claim that Hegel’s or Heidegger’s universalistic efforts were successful,
but they were certainly not completely futile. This kind of philosophy functions as a kind of glue bringing
all the existing philosophical perspectives together into an organized, to some extent ordered, and by no
means closed whole. Kołakowski himself – not without reservation – gives magnificent testimony to this
when he writes: “Despite the dispersion of languages philosophy has – if imprecisely – managed to mark
out a realm of cultural life, which, although frequently ridiculed, possesses a shaky legitimacy and absorbs
a variety on mutully-incomprehensible dialects”[25].
For Kołakowski the most open, non-arbitrary, undogmatic, “non-substantial” and continuously
mobile method of building a horror-metaphysicus-averting universal language is modern hermeneutics, which
he calls a non-theological and non-psychological way of comprehending in which we “approach the
historical process as a development of Hegel’s universal Spirit, which is neither divine nor human, has no
specific self-awareness or transcendental existence means, but, by means of human effort and desire paves
a path towards an unspecified goal; unlike Hegel, hermeneutics by no means needs to seek out the Spirit’s
final goal, and thus can proudly boast that it is metaphysically neutral. But it isn’t”[26]. Whether it wants to
or not, hermeneutics brings into history an impersonal and gradually-emerging Mind. Attempts to define
this Mind will lead us to the end of metaphysical horror, to answers allowing it to be overcome. Therefore,
this Mind “is rather a sense-generating Spirit which updates itself in the very process of revealing itself to
our minds, or sense-equipped Existence ‘which becomes what it is’ through human comprehension of
what it is. This draws near to the earlier-discussed ‘historical God’ concept”[27].

5. Resume, initial conclusions

According to Kołakowski the starting-point of horror metaphysicus is the awareness of the instability,
transience, randomness and fragility of the world and human existence in face of the abysmal and
horrifying depths of Nothingness. Skeptical philosophy was nothing but a well-ordered and sophisticated
expression of this abject condition, which, however, did nothing to eliminate the horror. The evident wish
to overcome horror metaphysicus led to the idea of the Absolute as a constant, basic and universal measure of
fundamental – and hence terrifying in their emptiness when inspected – concepts like existence, truth or
good. The idea of the Absolute appears in two forms: God and cogito. Their analysis revealed multifarious
dangers, still threatening with the return of metaphysical horror. In the case of the divine Absolute horror
appeared alongside basic, hence unavoidable questions about God’s recognizability, the reasons why He
created the world, the relations between divine good and ethic judgments over the world. All these issues

[22] Ibidem, p. 123.

[23] Ibidem, p. 124.
[24] Ibidem, p. 126.
[25] Ibidem, p. 136.
[26] Ibidem, p. 140.
[27] Ibidem, p. 142.
led to the brink of Nothingness, with salvation offered by the idea of historical God who attained His
ends thanks to cooperation by Humans.
Analysis of cogito led Kołakowski to conclude that it is impossible to define the sphere of the pure
“I”, the very “surrogate” of subjectivity – which again places us on the endge of Nothingness. Humans
cannot comprehend and describe themselves from a point beyond themselves. The solution lies in
“redirecting” the “I” issue onto a socio-historical community, whose appropriate way of understanding – a
way that avoids the pitfalls of historical relativism’s cognitive reductionism and at the same time offers
order and openness – is hermeneutics. The underlying idea of hermeneutics is convergent with the
historical God concept. Thus, two paths to the Absolute culminate in one horror-metaphysicus-vanquishing
point.
I must admit that I am not pleased by the presentation of horror in Horror metaphysicus. I say this with
all due responsibility as I lay great weight on the concept of horror, its presence in philosophy and, most
of all, the prospects it opens. I believe Kołakowski consciously refrains from full confrontation with the
horror metaphysicus problem. In the assumption that reference to Nothingness and the accompanying sense
of dread determine the human condition, Kołakowski ascribes to human nature a need for immediate,
nearly blind escape from horror – an escape whose sole source, motive and goal is reference to the
Absolute, to Existence understood as constance. Only through the Absolute can horror be overcome,
only in its light does anything have meaning, and only by its cause is the world more than an illusion
dissolving into nothingness.
The most perfect tool to seek the Absolute with is philosophy, in which, however – as Kołakowski
shows – we still encounter horror caused by the inability to attain the Absolute’s “absoluteness”. We
always find gaps in the Absolute’s philosophical definitions, whose removal iw the driving-force of
philosophy. Nor can we resign our desire of the Absolute; a desire which is by now perhaps somewhat
irritating, but at the same time soothes, calms and creates sense. “Our minds cannot resist the desire to
reach the ultimate limits of existence”; “since the emergence of philosophy there has been no way to
eliminate it”[28]. In philosophy horror, which heretofore manifested itself in a painful awareness of the
world’s transience and coincidentality and which initiated the search for Existence, becomes an effect of
the quest for Existence, a “leftover” of some error that was evidently committed in the mconstruction of
the Absolute. As philosophy develops, this “leftover” grows smaller and we learn to tame horror – the
culmination of which in Kołakowski’s vision is the historical God and hermeneutist concept.
The structure and placement of horror in Kołakowski’s book leads to the conclusion that its title
belies the content. Its main subject is not horror but the escape from horror. It not so much “looks
metaphysical horror in the eye” as lists ways and means against it (with, I concede, honest mention of their
various side-effects). Therefore, it is a book designed to bring consolation, which at the same time
discourages halfway efforts at consolation (whose effects may be very painful) in favour of more radical
forms (historical God, hermeneutics).
This interpretation of horror metaphysicus may lead one to the silent conclusion that it would be best for
humanity if it were able to overcome horror completely and if Nothingness ceased to concern it. In other
words, if it were immortal. And important here is not so much the reality or irreality of such a wish as the
rational perspective from which we regard our existence – which, realistically speaking, is mortal. In our
positive view of immortality we probably believe that its fulfilment would – immediately or after a period
of adjustment to a new “immortal” reality – allow us to see the world with greater clarity, precision and
insight. And that issues like existence, truth or good would not be approached with nervous
haphazardness but could finally be properly analyzed and resolved. Therefore, when we postulate
immortality, we do not necessarily do it out of narrow-mindedness or selfishness, but in the name of
existence, truth and good, which only immortality will allow us to recognize in their full extent; hence
people who are concerned about life, truth and good cannot rationally accept mortality; even if they are
painfully aware of their own mortal nature, they extrapolate their thinking to embrace the immortality of
the Absolute.
In this light our disagreement with Kołakowski’s interpretations of horror metaphysicus must perforce
lead us to consider the following, Kołakowski-contrary, and in itself quite surprising question: is there any
justification for praising human mortality, human reference to Nothingness and positive acceptance of lurking
horror? The answer appears to be affirmtive, and it seems that the best starting-point for such reflection is

[28] Ibidem, pp. 61, 19.

the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. It, then, shall be the beginning and core of this triadic “mortality
laudation”.
First of all, in Heidegger’s view – and contrary to general belief – the finiteness of human existence is
not a failure or imperfection. Death is not only a moment which interrupts life and hinders us in the
completion of our affairs, but an important phase in our life seen in its entirety. For Heidegger human life
is “being” (Dasein), while death is “the possibility not to be any more”. Death brings home to humans that
“their existence is the constant possibility of its impossibility”[29]. Man is a being thrown to Death
unavoidably and inescapably. This fact causes a sense of pain, anxiety and fear, from which we customarily
seek refuge in our quite real and concrete daily chores. However, even when we flee such fears we are still
beings progressing towards death, and secondly – death will not allow itself to be forgotten. Fear of
Nothingness can befall us in a variety of situations, sometimes as an expected sensation but more often
appearing suddenly. This in turn provides us with “the possibility to notice that the process of being we
are part of is by nature a possibility”[30], that our immersion in this process does not fulfil us, that it could
well be non-existent, or that it could be something quite different. Very important here is that even the
mere realization that a different way of life is possible is based upon the initial acceptance of the possibility
of non-existence. Whereas the most adequate expression of our escape from the everyday, non-authentic
perspective of human life, an expression of our reference to existence in face of its finiteness, is
conscience. Conscience breaks into our everyday routine – quite frequently against our will – and
bombards our daily life with demands and complaints that seem to originate in a different dimension, the
dimension of ultimateness. “The voice of conscience is nothing else but the voice of fear-enveloped
Dasein”[31]. Possibly conscience would have never spoken up without fear, Nothingness and mortality. And
without conscience the whole issue of truth, good, reality and values becomes questionable.
This leads us to another aspect of this mortality laudatio. I think the following reasoning is not
unjustified: If human existence were not threatened and doomed to perish, it would be difficult to find a
“motive” for human investigations of the world (attainment of truth), ethical conduct, attention,
concentration, or recognition of natural and moral laws. Here cognition could be constantly put off into
the distant future without the slightest scruples. Indeed, why would we want to begin with it now? If we
didn’t we wouldn’t be losing anything anyway. In this situation it could turn out that cognition for
immortals not only is infinite, but also takes its beginning in infinity – in other words, never begins. Such
ideal conditions could also considerably weaken the need for moral conduct. The crucial ethical compass
of death would be non-existent, I wouldn’t have to pay special attention to the sense of the life I live, as
from the vantage point of eternity nothing is irrestorable, irrepirable or unjustifiable. There would also be
no reason for me to pass judgment or pose moral demands on others, such needs having evaporated into
a eternal voiud in which everyone will be able to improve, comprehend and mature. As immortal
individuals in infinity humans would lose interest in what they had once known as earthly life, which they
now would be in no danger of losing. Any disinterestedness or responsibility would be brushed way into a
far-off future.
This would mean that our cognitive interest in the world and moral sense are rooted in our mortality,
our transience and our stigmatization by Nothingness. That, hence, mortality does not destabilize or
destroy truth and good but is the source and underlying core of humanity’s cognitive and ethical aims. If
we became immortal we would probably (in fact certainly) lose all interest for issues like truth or good.
This line of thought is also present in Kołakowski’s Horror metaphysicus: “The source of our fervent quest
for ‘reality’ is our fragility, our experiencing of which neither God nor Nature could prevent”[32]. Seen as a
whole, however, Kołakowski’s book is not very close to this statement. Kołakowski omits to dwell on the
fundamental character of this fragility, presenting it merely as the effect of the Absoluyte’s incomplete
absoluteness, a task to be resolved, a problem to be overcome.
As we tried to show here, Kołakowski’s horror metaphysicus is the inevitable consequence of
philosophies without an Absolute, or ones whose Absolute’s absoluteness shows noticeable shortcomings
upon closer inspection. Here the development of philosophy is portrayed as conquering successive forms
of horror (which appears amply in the history of philosophy) and a progressiong towards a soothing,
horror-stilling absoluteness (historical God, hermeneutics). This discovery of horror metaphysicus in diverse
and very different philosophical schools appears to me to be a rather hasty and somewhat forced

[29] K. Michalski, Heidegger i filozofia współczesna (Heidegger and Modern Philosophy), Warsaw 1978, p. 127.
[30] Ibidem, p. 129.
[31] Ibidem, p. 133.
[32] L. Kołakowski, Horror metaphysicus, op. cit., p. 23.
conclusion. In the picture painted by Kołakowski horror is almost everywhere, inspiring successive
philosophers to combat it, seek ways of vanquishing it and undertake efforts to bring it under their control
to attain a seemingly ultimate and adequate absoluteness.
In my opinion this vision reverses cause and effect. In the here-discussed aspect I see the
development of philosophy rather as a series of quite gratifying and horror-averting efforts at bringing
some kind of order and sense into the world – and against which Nothingness nevertheless remains
immovable. Under the skin and indirectly, Nothingness paved its way slowly through the ages, achieving a
form imbued with metaphysical horror approximately in our day and age, when it gained clarity and
becme almost tangible (Heidegger). In slightly different words: the horror of human existence, this
suspension in Nothingness, found no direct reflection in philosophy; philosophy rather consisted in the
calming, fear-averting concealment of Nothingness – or the irreducible transience of human life. At the
same time, however, the nature of the human condition prevented these efforts from fulfillment,
completion and continuity. A constantly-milling medley of philosophical positions called for constant
reference to and ever-deeper study of the sources of philosophical thought, until there naroise the need to
express the essence of not only Existence but lso Nothingness. Indeed, despite its “sidelining”,
Nothingness was lways the “fuel” of philosophy, its external driving-force and – absurd is it may sound –
enrichment. In Kołakowski’s vision, on the other hand, philosophy feeds upon itself, is its own lifegiving
fuel; if so, then no wonder that it exhausts and perhaps even degenerates itself, providing philosophy
historians with the rather pathetic privilege of heralding its demise[33].
This accepting, even outright affirmative approach to the elemental fragility of human existence, to
Nothingness as the fundament of existence, being, truth and good (whereby it must be said that
Nothingness does not create its own “world”, that it is impossible to settle down in it, that it is precisely
what it is, “nothing” and not “something”, but does provide a different view of “something”) can in a
sense be said to lie beyond philosophy and metaphysics and in fact proclaim the end of philosophy. The
charge is well-founded, but I believe there does exist a very philosophical (wisdom-loving) interpretation
of the end of philosophy, an option suggested by Heidegger, who said that the end of philosophy signified
philosophy’s failure to cope with its tasks, and that if it was indeed coming to its end, then only as a field
of study and not as love of wisdom and thought. The heart of philosophy lives on forever.
Finally we arrive at the third aspect of this commendation of human mortality. It reveals itself when
we compare human and divine existence. In such comparisons we usually accept divine superiority as a
matter of course, as God’s wisdom and power are bigger than ours, and first and foremost, who is
immortal. It is not impossible that all of God’s remaining powers result from His immortality, which
would make immortality His fundamental trait. The gods of ancient Greek mythology, who were closest
to humans in their appearance, differed from us in practically nothing besides immortality. If we were
asked what we envy God most for, we would probably name immortality. And indeed compared to us it
does appear to be His most distinguishing trait.
And still, our mortality gives us a certain very visible advantage over God: God is a being, an
existence. Constant, eternal, self-supporting. Existence is God’s essence, he cannot cease to exist as then
He would not be a being. Therefore, God has no access to Nothingness and the comprehension of
Nothingness. He is unable to imagine or think about Himself as non-existent. And if God has no access
to Nothingness, then in fact He is unable to understand what it means to be, nor realize and appreciate
the importance of being. The meaning of life can be understood only by someone who can lose it, who
dreads for it in face of Nothingness.
Even if God creates existence from nothing, He is unable to fully comprehend the nature of what He
creates. The truth of existence reveals itself only to humans – and this is our edge over God, an advantage
rooted in our fragility. “The evidence of human finiteness – death, suffering, historically-conditioned
limitations – does not stand in the path of comprehension but opens it [...] It is ‘much rather the mortal
who reach into the abyss’ of that which is to be understood”[34]. Therefore, the issue of God as well as His

[33] L. Kołakowski himself notices the pompousness of these hapless proclamations about the end of philosophy when he

writes: “philosophy is able to survive its own death safely and cheerfully, at the same time busily explaining that it has, in fact,
died”; however, when he sets about to explain why this is so, he states simply that philosophy “constitutes an irremovable element
of culture” (Horror metaphysicus, op. cit., p. 14), which is an insufficient explanation and suggests that philosophy feeds on itself.
From our position this undeniably present self-fuelling mechanism is a sign of deeper existential, metaphysical or other
nothingness-involving inspiration..
[34] K Michalski, Heidegger, in: M. Heidegger, Budować, mieszkać, myśleć. Eseje wybrane (Building Dwelling Thinking), Warsaw 1977,

p. 24.
“activity” fail to reach the core of the existence question and exist on another level of thought. God –
who after all “excludes from Himself all lack of existence” – “cannot know nothingness”[35] and therefore
does not comprehend existence. “The term ‘being’ not only does not apply to God, but is outright
untheological.”[36].
I would like to close these reflections on Leszek Kołakowski’s book with the following thought:
horror metaphysicus means that if anything is to have sense and meaning, then only in the light of
Nothingness – in the face of death, in whose light in turn everything appears to lose all sense and
meaning.

Professor Janusz Dobieszewski works at the Philosophy Institute at Warsaw University, where he
heads the Philosophy of Religion Faculty; professor Dobieszewski specializes in Russian and religious
philosophy, his chief book publications are: Włodzimierz Sołowjow. Studium osobowości filozoficznej
(Vladimir Solovyev. A Philosophical Personality Study), Warsaw 2002; Wokół słowianofilstwa.
Almanach myśli rosyjskiej (Around Slavophilia. An Almanach of Russian Thought), ed., Warsaw 1998;
Wokół Tołstoja i Dostojewskiego. Almanach myśli rosyjskiej (Around Tolstoi and Dostoevsky. An
Almanach of Russian Thought), ed., Warsaw 2000; Wokół Leontjewa i Bierdiajewa. Almanach myśli
rosyjskiej (Around Leontev and Berdaev. An Almanach of Russian Thought), ed., Warsaw 2001; Wokół
Szestowa i Fiodorowa. Almanach myśli rosyjskiej (Around Shestov and Fyodorov. An Almanach of
Russian Thought), ed., Warsaw 2007; Wokół Andrzeja Walickiego. Almanach myśli rosyjskiej (Around
Andrzej Walicki. An Almanach of Russian Thought), ed., Warsaw 2009.

[35] M. Heidegger, Czym jest metafizyka (What Is Metaphysics), transl. by K. Pomian, in: M. Heidegger, Budować, mieszkać, myśleć

(Buolding Dwelling Thinking), op. cit., p. 44.

[36] B. Baran, Saga Heideggera (The heidegger Saga), Cracow 1990, p. 162.