The Influence of Anger Fear and Emotion Regulation On Ethical Decision Making

Human Performance
ISSN: 0895-9285 (Print) 1532-7043 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hhup20
The Influence of Anger, Fear, and Emotion

Regulation on Ethical Decision Making
Vykinta Kligyte , Shane Connelly , Chase Thiel & Lynn Devenport
To cite this article: Vykinta Kligyte , Shane Connelly , Chase Thiel & Lynn Devenport (2013)
The Influence of Anger, Fear, and Emotion Regulation on Ethical Decision Making, Human
Performance, 26:4, 297-326, DOI: 10.1080/08959285.2013.814655
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.2013.814655
Published online: 10 Sep 2013.
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Human Performance, 26:297–326, 2013
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0895-9285 print/1532-7043 online
DOI: 10.1080/08959285.2013.814655
The Influence of Anger, Fear, and Emotion Regulation

on Ethical Decision Making
Vykinta Kligyte
Developmental Dimensions International, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Shane Connelly
University of Oklahoma
Chase Thiel
Central Washington University
Lynn Devenport
University of Oklahoma
Ethical decision making is influenced by a variety of cognitive processes and individual differences.
However, there is little empirical research on whether and how emotions and emotion regulation
strategies influence ethical decisions. Emotions have the potential to influence how people think
about ethical problems and make ethical decisions, implying that emotion regulation may also be
important to consider. This article examines the influence of anger and fear on ethical decisions and
ethical sensemaking strategies. In addition, emotion regulation strategies are examined as potential
moderators of these relationships. Findings indicated that anger inhibited ethical decision making
and sensemaking. Alternatively, fear facilitated ethical decisions compared to anger and no emotion
conditions. Emotion regulation significantly decreased the negative effects of anger on sensemaking
and ethical decisions. Implications are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Fostering ethical behavior in organizations has become increasingly important given the per-
sistence of corporate scandals and unethical business practices. The Ethics Resource Center’s
National Business Ethics Survey in 2011 reported a decline in business ethics over the last 4 years
based on the two leading indicators of misconduct. Perceived pressure to compromise rose from
10% to 13%, whereas experienced retaliation for reporting unethical behavior rose from 12% to
22%. In addition, 45% of the 4,683 employees surveyed in 2011 reported observing misconduct
in their organization (e.g., stealing, sexual harassment, and insider trading). More significantly,
Correspondence should be sent to Shane Connelly, Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma, 455 W.
Lindsey Street, Room 705, Norman, OK 73019. E-mail: sconnelly@ou.edu
298 KLIGYTE, CONNELLY, THIEL, DEVENPORT
these problematic trends occurred during an economic downturn, a time when ethical conduct
typically improves due to increased uncertainty and fear of job loss (Ethics Resource Center’s
National Business Ethics Survey 2011). Recent research has identified the potential importance
of emotional states on whether people perceive situations as having an ethical component and
how they make ethical decisions (Gaudine & Thorne, 2001; Haidt, 2001). Accordingly, this arti-
cle focuses on how emotions and emotion regulation influence ethical decision making (EDM)
and the strategies people apply when making such decisions.
The present study extends the research on emotions and EDM in several important ways.
First, it compares the effects of fear and anger on ethical decisions, two emotions that appear
to influence cognition and behavior in different ways. These emotions were selected because
they both occur in the workplace (Basch & Fisher, 2000; Dasborough, 2006), are plausible reac-
tions to ethical conundrums (Connelly, Helton-Fauth, & Mumford, 2004; Gaudine & Thorne,
2000), and result in different outcomes when contrasted in other (nonethical) decisions realms
such as risk assessment, interpersonal judgment, and seeking and processing of political infor-
mation (Angie, Connelly, Waples, & Kligyte, 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Parker & Isbell,
2010; Tiedens & Linton, 2001; Valentino, Hutchings, Banks, & Davis, 2008). Second, this study
examines the effects of anger and fear on strategies people apply when making sense of ethi-
cal situations, strategies that might be particularly susceptible to emotion influences. Finally, this
study examines how emotion regulation strategies, such as reappraising events and mindful relax-
ation, moderate the relationships of anger and fear to ethical decisions and strategies applied in
reaching those decisions. Empirical studies of EDM have not yet examined the impact of emotion
regulation.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Sensemaking and Ethical Decision Making
Although EDM has been approached from a variety of perspectives, recent theories have begun
to integrate intuitive and reflective processes with more logic-based approaches (e.g., Kohlberg,
1969; Rest, 1986). These newer approaches incorporate gut feelings or intuition (Haidt, 2001),
empathy (Detert, Trevino, & Sweitzer, 2008), and processes influencing sensemaking or form-
ing a mental model to guide complex ethical decisions (Brock et al., 2008; Kligyte et al., 2008;
Mumford et al., 2008; Sononshein, 2007). Sensemaking is a form of complex cognition that
occurs when people are presented with ambiguous and sometimes conflicting information and
results in the formation of a mental model to better understand the situation (Mumford et al.,
2008). This mental model is then used to guide information gathering, information evalua-
tion, solution construction, and solution evaluation/forecasting, all of which contribute to the
eventual decisions and actions in the situation (Mumford et al., 2008). Mumford, Devenport,
and colleagues (2006) identified a number of cognitive and social sensemaking strategies that
correlate with ethical decisions. Given prior research examining the influence of emotions on
information processing and social behavior, several strategies are of particular interest here. These
include recognizing the complexity of circumstances, anticipating outcomes, helping others (all
positively correlated with ethical decisions), and retaliation (negatively correlated with ethical
EMOTIONS AND ETHICS 299
decisions). We now review the literature on emotion appraisals and their influence on deci-
sion making and social behavior, which offers some specific insight as to how anger and fear
might influence ethical decisions and sensemaking strategies that correlate with ethical decision
making.
Anger, Fear, and Ethical Decision Making
Appraisal theories of emotion have identified various appraisals that are consistently associated
with anger and fear (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins,
1988; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Although both of these negative
emotions can be unpleasant and effortful to deal with, they differ from each other in some key
respects. Anger has been associated with appraisals of certainty, a sense of individual control or
ability to cope with the situation, the perception that another person is responsible for the event,
goal obstruction, unfairness, and threatened self-esteem (Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De
Boeck, 2003; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Alternatively, fear has been associated with appraisals
of danger or threat, low certainty, and a sense of situational control (vs. individual; DeSteno,
Petty, Wegener, & Rucker, 2000; Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Slovic,
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Experiencing anger or fear activates appraisal tenden-
cies, which in turn influence cognitive processes, social processes, and decision outcomes when
dealing with the emotion-eliciting event or subsequent unrelated events (Lerner & Keltner, 2000,
2001; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Tiedens & Linton, 2001).
Emotions influence how information is processed. With respect to cognitive processes asso-
ciated with EDM, anger and fear appraisal tendencies are likely to have different effects. The
perceived control and certainty associated with anger have resulted in optimistic judgments
and preferences for impulsive and risky decisions (DeSteno et al., 2000; Fischhoff, Gonzalez,
Lerner, & Small, 2005; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). Tiedens and Linton (2001) and others
have found that feelings of certainty result in heuristic information processing, while feelings
of uncertainty result in systematic processing to reduce the uncertainty (Chaiken, Liberman,
& Eagley, 1989; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mackie & Worth,
1991). Other lines of research support this idea, finding that fear leads people to learn more
and become better educated about a topic relative to anger (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen,
2000; Parker & Isbell, 2010; Valentino et al., 2008). Finally, Moons and Mackie (2007) found
that anger results in systematic processing of anger-related information and selective use of
heuristics to evaluate information. Although efficient and possibly useful in reducing self-directed
threat, this kind of processing is less than optimal for making ethical decisions because it
induces biased, risky, and retaliatory thinking (Moons & Mackie, 2007). This type of encod-
ing and use of social information results in a limited, self-focused interpretation of the situation,
which has the potential to result in retaliatory or self-serving behaviors (Lenhart & Rabiner,
1995).
Anger, Fear, and Ethical Sensemaking
Heuristic information processing and the tendency to make impulsive, risky decisions are likely
to negatively affect cognitive sensemaking strategies. Feeling angry could inhibit recognition of
circumstances surrounding the ethical situation and limit consideration of the consequences of
potential actions. Comparatively, fearful individuals are likely to recognize circumstances with
greater depth and breadth and forecast a range of possible consequences. This type of information
processing is associated with a desire to minimize reduce uncertainty and regain a sense of control
(Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).
Other aspects of anger and fear appraisals are likely to influence social sensemaking pro-
cesses associated with EDM. Appraisals of unfairness and other-responsibility characterizing
anger might lead to the assumption that one was purposefully provoked, triggering a desire for
retribution (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Bies, Tripp, & Kramer, 1997; Goldberg, Lerner,
& Tetlock, 1999; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998). This
is in line with Wenzel and Jordan’s (2005) finding that angry individuals have greater attentional
interpretation bias toward threat than anxious people and Gino and Schweitzer’s (2008) findings
that incidental anger reduces trust and receptivity to advice compared to neutral and positive emo-
tions. Angry individuals also tend articulate more punitive goals without considering situational
influences on people’s behavior, resulting in self-serving decisions and less helping behavior
(Gault & Sabini, 2000; Nabi, 2003). Alternatively, other research has shown that the situational
control and uncertainty associated with fear has resulted in more situational responsibility for
events and prevention-oriented (vs. punitive) goals (Nabi, 2003). Taken together, these findings
suggest several hypotheses on how fear and anger might influence ethical sensemaking strategies
and ethical decisions:
H1: Anger (vs. fear) will result in less recognition of circumstances and less consideration of
consequences, two cognitive sensemaking strategies that facilitate ethical decisions.
H2: Anger (vs. fear) will result in greater retaliation and less focus on helping others, two
social sensemaking strategies that inhibit ethical decisions.
H3: Anger (vs. fear) will result in less ethical decisions.
Emotion Regulation and Ethical Decision Making
Emotion regulation refers to the ability to influence what, when, and how one experiences and
expresses emotions (Gross, 1999, 2001). Gross’s research suggests emotion regulation can be
conscious or subconscious, and he offered several types of emotion regulation, some that occur
prior to or during the experience of an emotional state (antecedent strategies) and some that occur
after an emotion has been experienced (response-focused strategies). In this study, we focus on
two conscious emotion regulation strategies that have been studied in other contexts and that
have been found to successfully alter emotional states. These include cognitive reappraisal (e.g.,
assessment of the situation from different perspectives) and relaxation. Cognitive reappraisal
involves altering one’s interpretation of the situation or one’s ability to manage it (Bellarosa
& Chen, 1997; Bond & Bunce, 2000; Gross, 1998, 2002; Gross & Thompson, 2007). It involves
cognitive transformation of an emotion-inducing situation to modify the internal experience of
emotion (Côté, 2005; John & Gross, 2007). Relaxation focuses on decreasing the physiological
arousal that accompanies a number of emotions (Gross, 1998; Shapiro, Astin, Bishop, & Cordova,
2005).
Regulating Anger
If anger negatively influences sensemaking and ethical decisions, emotion regulation might
reduce these effects. Angry individuals often make distorted appraisals. Anger management inter-
ventions often utilize cognitive reappraisal to lessen biased processing and to change evaluations
and attributions about anger-evoking situations (Lochman & Wells, 2004). Reappraisal could be
instrumental in helping an individual to accurately attribute incidental anger to its correct source
and to be more objective about the role of others in the anger inducing event (Côté, 2005; Gross,
1998). Cognitive reappraisal has the potential to broaden an individual’s perspective regarding
the consequences of actions such as helping behavior and retaliation (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz &
Clore, 1983).
Alternatively, relaxation can also be used to reduce the physiological arousal and action ten-
dencies (e.g., fight response) associated with anger (Frijda et al., 1989). Relaxation can induce
calmness and a feeling of control (Robb, 2000; Totterdell & Parkinson, 1999). However, given
that physiological arousal is typically short-lived, relaxation may be less effective than cogni-
tive reappraisal for countering the effects of incidental anger given the time elapsed between the
eliciting event and the subsequent ethical decision-making situation. Many of the physiological
reactions that occurred when the emotion was initially experienced will be substantially dimin-
ished when, at some later point, an ethical dilemma is being considered. In addition, because
relaxation focuses on controlling physiological arousal by “letting emotions go,” it does not
encourage individuals to confront their emotions, thoughts, and behavior as is the case with
cognitive reappraisal (Richardson & Rothstein, 2008). Relaxation might not address the dis-
torted appraisals and rumination that can accompany the experience of anger. In light of this,
two additional hypotheses are proposed:
H4: Cognitive reappraisal will be more effective than relaxation and no emotion regulation
for decreasing the inhibitory effects of anger on ethical decisions.
H5: Cognitive reappraisal will be more effective than relaxation and no emotion regula-
tion for decreasing the negative effects of anger on ethical sensemaking strategies such
as recognizing circumstances, considering consequences, helping others, and avoiding
retaliation.
Regulating Fear
Fear is predicted to have a less negative effect than anger on ethical decisions given the
effects of fear appraisal tendencies on information-processing and social motives. However, fear
often triggers physiological responses and action tendencies related to escape or flight from the
emotion-eliciting situation (Lang, 1984; Lerner, Dahl, Hariri, & Taylor, 2006). When escape or
flight is blocked, fear can turn into anxiety or “undirected arousal following the perception of
threat” (Ohman, 1993, p. 512). Anxiety can create cognitive overload and impede performance
on cognitively demanding tasks (Zinbarg & Mineka, 2007), potentially making it important to
regulate during consideration of complex ethical issues. Similar to what we expect with anger,
the emotion regulation strategies of cognitive reappraisal and relaxation may have different mod-
erating effects on the relationship between fear and EDM. Specifically, cognitive reappraisal may
be less necessary when experiencing fear because fear facilitates in-depth cognitive processing
and consideration of alternative perspectives. Also, cognitive reappraisal is an effortful strategy

that could worsen cognitive overload in fearful individuals (Edwards & Weary, 1993). Regulating
fear through relaxation may reduce physiological arousal and potentially enhance self-efficacy to
cope with stress (Siev & Chambless, 2007). Accordingly, the following hypotheses are proposed:
H6: Relaxation will be more effective than reappraisal and no emotion regulation for
regulating the effects of fear on ethical decisions.
H7: Relaxation will be more effective than reappraisal and no emotion regulation for
regulating the effects of fear on ethical sensemaking strategies such as recognizing
circumstances, considering consequences, helping others, and avoiding retaliation.
Integral or Incidental Emotions?
Integral emotions, those central to or stemming from the situation at hand, and the appraisals
associated with those emotions can certainly influence cognitions and actions (Han, Lerner, &
Keltner, 2007; Lerner, Han, & Keltner, 2007). Emotions that are triggered by one event can also
carry over, incidentally, to influence perceptions of and reactions to subsequent events. Integral
and incidental emotions are capable of influencing both rapid, intuitive subconscious judgments
and conscious, intentional aspects of EDM (Haidt, 2001). In fact, recent research has shown
that manipulations of incidental disgust by seating participants in a bad-smelling room or at a
dirty desk or by having them drink something bitter resulted in harsher moral judgments across a
variety of scenarios (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011; Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008; Schnall,
Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008).
In fact, much of the experimental research on emotions uses high-impact manipulations to
induce incidental emotion and tests its effects on various outcomes (Harmon-Jones, Amodio,
& Zinner, 2007). These kinds of manipulations are designed to elicit emotional responses that
are meaningful, that mimic what participants might experience outside of the laboratory, and
that reduce demand characteristics so participants will not be tempted to respond in a way that
conforms to the experimenter’s hypotheses (Harmon-Jones et al., 2007). Sometimes this involves
the use of deception and a cover story, or requires participants to think about affective events in
their own lives. Much of the research on emotions and decision making in other realms has in
fact relied on methodologies to induce incidental emotion using photographs, movie clips, event
recall, and false negative feedback to test effects on decisions in realms other than those used
for emotion induction. Thus, the present study uses bogus feedback to induce modest levels of
incidental anger or fear and to test their impact on ethical decisions.
METHOD
Participants
One hundred sixty-three undergraduates enrolled in psychology classes at a large midwestern

university participated in the study in exchange for class credit. Participants included 63 men and
100 women, whose average age was 19.2 years (SD = 1.81). Most participants reported having
no exposure to ethics classes or seminars (N = 144), whereas some indicated they had 3 credit
hours or less (N = 17). The remaining two people indicated they had 5 and 7 credit hours of
ethics classes. Subjects were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions in the 2 (emotion
type: anger vs. fear) × 3 (emotion regulation strategy: reappraisal vs. relaxation vs. no regulation)
factorial design. A control condition that did not include emotion manipulation or regulation was
used as a baseline.
Procedure
Participants completed the study independently, with each data collection session including four
to six people and one experimenter. Participants were seated in private cubicles to reduce dis-
traction and emotional contagion. Participants read and signed the informed consent form, which
described the study as an examination of general strategies that facilitate decision making in
social and professional situations.
At the beginning of the experiment, the 20-item Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson,
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was used to assess state affect as a covariate. Respondents rated 20 emo-
tion adjectives on a 5-point scale to indicate the extent to which they are currently feeling that
emotion. Next, to introduce participants to an emotion regulation strategy (cognitive reappraisal
or relaxation), participants were provided with a short written description and examples of
one of the strategies. The emotion regulation strategies were contextualized as decision-making
strategies that should help participants better handle the demands placed on them during the study.
Following the introduction to a regulatory strategy, participants were asked to justify five con-
troversial public statements (e.g., “Freedom of speech causes more harm than good”). They were
given 10 min to support the statements in writing, even if they disagreed with the statement.
To increase motivation, participants were promised two additional class credits for high-level
performance on this task. They were informed that their responses would be evaluated by an
expert assessor and that individualized feedback would be provided. While the assessor was sup-
posedly scoring their responses (which actually never occurred), participants completed verbal
intelligence and social desirability covariate measures.
Two doctoral students in psychology served as confederates for providing individualized
face-to-face feedback to participants on the performance task. Each participant met with the con-
federate, was given bogus feedback, and was escorted back to a cubicle. For consistency purposes,
one confederate provided anger-inducing feedback to all participants in the anger conditions and
another confederate provided fear-inducing feedback to all participants in the fear conditions. The
nature of this feedback is explained in detail next in the Emotion Manipulation section. The feed-
back was provided in a large conference room located next to the experiment room. Confederates
kept their facial expressions emotionally neutral.
Next, participants were provided with a packet of written materials. After completing an emo-
tion manipulation check, participants were instructed to practice the specific emotion regulation
strategy to which they had been introduced earlier (cognitive reappraisal or relaxation). This was
followed by another emotion manipulation check. Participants assigned to the no-regulation con-
ditions completed the first emotion manipulation check but did not engage in emotion regulation
and did not complete the second emotion manipulation check.
Finally, participants completed an EDM measure (Mumford et al., 2006) followed by an
emotion regulation scale (Gross & John, 2003) and a postquestionnaire assessing perceptions
of and reactions to study manipulations. Participants in the no emotion, no regulation control

condition completed only covariate and EDM measures in a room separate from experimental
conditions.
A debriefing session revealed the true purpose of the study and the mild deception used dur-
ing the feedback part of the study. To counter any residual effects of negative emotions as a
result of emotion inducement, participants were asked to relax and think about three of their
favorite things. Prior studies involving mood inducement show that negative mood is successfully
alleviated using this strategy (Isen, 1984, 2000; Raps, Reinhard, & Seligman, 1980).
Emotion Manipulation
Anger and fear were manipulated in the study during the bogus feedback. A confederate provided
verbal comments regarding the participants’ justifications of the controversial statements as they
referred to the evaluators’ written “ratings.” Ratings were clearly low in the anger condition and
had extensive red marking with question marks in the fear condition.
To induce anger, participants were informed that they scored poorly on the task but that they
had an assessor who was a “hard grader” who denied them additional credits that were granted
to other participants (who had similar responses) by more lenient assessors. Participants were
promised more specific feedback after the experiment.
To induce fear, participants were informed that assessors had difficulty evaluating their perfor-
mance because of a “concerning pattern” that had not been observed in undergraduates’ responses
before. Participants were told that after the experiment, they would meet face-to-face with a senior
professor to further justify their responses, something that never actually occurred.
Emotion Manipulation Check
Participants were presented with 16 positive and negative adjectives (three reflecting anger,
three reflecting fear, 10 reflecting other emotions) and were asked to rate each one indicating how
they felt at that particular moment. They used a 5-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very
much so). The manipulation check was conducted immediately following the feedback and then
again following their engagement in emotion regulation.
Emotion Regulation
At the outset of the experiment, participants were given a short description of one emotion regu-
lation strategy (cognitive reappraisal or relaxation) as well as examples of how the strategy might
be applied. To ensure participants’ understanding, they were asked to describe three different
ways to apply the strategy. Then, following the bogus feedback, participants were instructed to
practice the emotion regulation strategy they had learned for 15 min.
Cognitive Reappraisal
In the cognitive reappraisal condition, participants were asked to write responses to seven
open-ended questions requiring them to assess the feedback situation from different angles and
perspectives. First, they identified potential causes of their feelings. Second, they explained why
they reacted to the situation in a particular way and assessed personal factors that might have
influenced their reactions. Third, they identified situational factors that might have influenced
their reactions. Fourth, participants identified factors (e.g., biases) that might have clouded their
judgment and thought about the ways to obtain an objective assessment of the situation. Fifth,
they were asked to look at the situation from the assessor’s perspective and to identify personal
and situational factors influencing that person’s behavior. Sixth, they identified possible ways they
could have prevented the outcome from happening. Finally, they wrote about potential benefits of
the experience for the future. Participants spent 15 min doing this. To ensure that the participants
were actually engaged in cognitive reappraisal after the bogus feedback, three doctoral students in
psychology independently assessed the written responses using 5-point benchmark rating scales
(1 for each of the seven reappraisal questions) reflecting overall quality and thoroughness of
responses to each question.
These ratings served not only as a manipulation check on use of this emotion regulation strat-
egy but also as additional evidence that participants were experiencing the emotions we had
intended them to experience. In identifying causes of their feeling, participants in the anger
condition often mentioned being mad, angry, or annoyed that they had been given low ratings.
Participants in the fear condition often mentioned that they were worried or nervous about what
their scores meant or about what they would say to the professor at the end of the study.
Relaxation
In the relaxation condition, participants practiced muscle relaxation and deep breathing by
following tape-recorded instructions. They were also asked to imagine a 2-min vacation. After the
relaxation session, participants were asked to provide a written description of their 2-min vacation
and any sensations that they experienced during the relaxation session. Participants spent a total
of 15 min practicing relaxation. To make sure participants actually engaged in relaxation, the
proctor observed participants to ensure people were following recorded instructions and reminded
them of the importance of the procedure. Three doctoral students in psychology independently
rated participants’ descriptions of the 2-min vacation and relaxation sensations using 5-point
benchmark rating scales.
A lack of relaxation was represented by mentioning of irrelevant sensations (e.g., “I was really
hungry”), whereas an average level of relaxation (3 on a 5-point scale) was represented by a
limited but relevant description of experience (e.g., “My body felt heavier”). Finally, a high level
of relaxation (5 on a 5-point scale) was defined in terms of elaborate and relevant description of
the experienced sensation (e.g., “I felt like nothing worried me and for once nothing could go
wrong. I felt like I weighed 30 pounds heavier and a wave of heat came over me. I felt like my
body was then weightless and had no power”). The 2-min vacation was assessed in terms of the
degree of relaxed nature of the experience and the detail provided. An illustration of a highly
relaxing 2-min vacation is as follows: “I pictured I was at our beach house in Texas and I was
swinging in the hammock on the back porch, with my hair blowing in the wind, and listening
to waves crashing on the shoreline.” An example of a nonrelaxing experience is as follows: “I
couldn’t stop thinking about a test that I have to take in two hours.”
Prior to scoring the emotion regulation manipulation checks, all the judges received 10 hr of
frame-of-reference training. The training consisted of (a) construct definitions and examples, (b)
individual practice scoring targeted constructs, and (c) group discussions.
Dependent Variables
Ethical Decision Making
To assess EDM, an adapted version of a situational judgment EDM measure developed by

Mumford et al. (2006) was used. This type of situational judgment measure or low-fidelity
simulation (Motowidlo, Dunnett, & Carter, 1990) has been used to assess cognitive ability, super-
visory potential, leadership skills, interpersonal skills, teamwork skills, and other constructs
(Christian, Edwards, & Bradley, 2010). Such simulations predict how well one may perform
on a job by presenting hypothetical by realistic scenarios within a job context (McDaniel &
Nguyen, 2000). Meta-analytic findings have demonstrated that paper–pencil situational judg-
ment measures are good predictors of job performance (e.g., supervisory ratings; McDaniel,
Morgeson, Finnegan, Campion, & Braverman, 2001) showing an estimated correlation of .34.
Recent research has shown that question framing situational judgment tests has implications for
construct and criterion-related validity. Asking respondents what they should do (vs. what they
would do) focuses attention on what would be most effective in the situation, reduces faking, and
results in somewhat larger estimated correlations with job performance (McDaniel, Hartman,
Whetzel, & Grubb, 2007; Ployhart & MacKenzie, 2010).
The EDM measure consisted of four broad scenarios and 12 subscenarios reflecting ethical
decisions one might face in research contexts. An example scenario is shown in the appendix.
These scenarios covered a number of research ethics issues, including data massaging, publi-
cation practices, treatment of human participants, informed consent, objectivity in evaluating
work, adherence to professional commitments, intellectual property protection, conflict of inter-
est, resource management, and deceptive bids and contracts. Each scenario was followed by eight
multiple-choice responses options reflecting different choices regarding what the protagonist in
each scenario should consider or how this person should respond. Three of these reflected uneth-
ical decisions (scored as 1), two or three reflected moderately ethical decisions (scored as 2), and
two or three reflected highly ethical behaviors (scored as 3) as identified by three expert judges
during measure development. Participants were asked to select the two best choices, out of eight
possible, for each scenario. An overall EDM score was calculated by summing the points asso-
ciated with the 24 responses selected across all 12 subscenarios. The split-half reliability of the
measure was .69.
Sensemaking Strategies
In addition to assessing ethicality, the EDM measure also enabled the assessment of cog-
nitive and social strategies associated with sensemaking (Mumford et al., 2006). Specifically,
all response options were evaluated for the extent to which each reflected (a) recognizing cir-
cumstances, (b) considering consequences, (c) retaliation, and (d) helping others. Definitions
TABLE 1
Ethical Decision Making Construct Definitions
Sensemaking Strategies Operational Definition
1 Recognizing circumstances Thinking about origins of problem, individuals involved, and relevant
principles, goals and values
2 Considering consequences Being mindful of others’ perceptions, concerns, and the impact of one’s actions
on others, socially and professionally
3 Retaliation Acting aggressively, vengefully, or spitefully in response to a situation
4 Helping others Making a decision that helps another individual, organization, collaborator, or
industry instead of focusing on a personal gain or aggrandizement
for these constructs are shown in Table 1. Three judges not involved in evaluating the ethical-
ity of the response options ratings these using a 6-point Likert scale from 0 (absent) to 5 (to a
great extent). Prior to scoring, judges received 10 hr of frame-of-reference training, resulting in
interrater agreement, ICC(strategies) = .79 and ICC(social dimensions) = .81.
Covariate Measures
State Affect
To control for state affect, the 20-item Positive and Negative Affect Scale (Watson et al.,
1988) was included. Participants used a 5-point scale to rate 10 positive (α = .84) and 10
(α = .81) negative adjectives to describe how they were currently feeling, from 1 (not at all)
to 5 (extremely).
Emotion Regulation
An Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003) was applied in the study to
control for individuals’ ability to regulate their emotions. Emotion Regulation Questionnaire mea-
sures habitual suppression (four items) and reappraisal (six items) by asking participants to rate
their ability to cognitively reappraise (α = .69) and suppress emotions (α = .71) on a 7-point
Likert scale from 1 (never) to 7 (always).
Verbal Intelligence
As a number of tasks in the study, such as the EDM measure, required verbal skills, the
Employee Aptitude Scale (Ruch & Ruch, 1980) was included in the study (α = .74). The measure
requires participants to solve 10 analogical problems.
Social Desirability
To account for socially desirable responding, the impression management scale from the
BIDR-6 (Paulhus, 1994) was used. Participants were asked to indicate to what extent they agreed
or disagreed with 20 statements on a 7-point Likert scale (α = .70) from 1 (not at all) to 7 (great
extent).
Postquestionnaire
To assess study believability, participants were asked to describe the purpose of the study and
then report if they believed the ostensible purpose of the study. Two individuals were excluded
from the analyses because they did not believe the stated purpose of the study and correctly
guessed that we were trying to manipulate and regulate emotions. Participants also provided
ratings of study relevance, challenge, engagement, and fatigue.
Analyses
Analyses were conducted to assess the influence of emotions and emotion regulation strategies
on the overall ethical decision-making score as well as the four sensemaking strategies. Interrater
reliabilities (ICC) for rated measures (manipulation checks and sensemaking dimensions) were
calculated, along with split-half (EDM) and coefficient alphas (covariates). Intercorrelations
among the dependent variables and covariates were also calculated. Third, the effectiveness of
manipulations was assessed using t tests. Fourth, an analysis of covariance was run to assess
whether any of the covariates significantly influenced the EDM, whereas a multivariate analysis of
covariance was run to assess whether any covariates influenced the sensemaking strategies. None
of the covariates were significant in these analyses. A series of follow-up analyses of variance
were conducted to test the effects of anger and fear on ethical decision making and sensemaking
strategies and to test for the joint influences of emotions and regulation strategies on the depen-
dent variables. Finally, post hoc pair-wise comparisons using the Least Significant Difference test
were conducted to assess the nature of mean differences across conditions.
RESULTS
Emotion Manipulation Check
To examine the effectiveness of emotion inducement, participants rated three anger-related and
three fear-related adjectives on a 5-point Likert scale. Independent t tests showed that individuals
in the anger condition experienced significantly higher level of anger (M = 2.45, SD = .90) than
fear (M = 1.64, SD = .72), t(139) = 5.86, p < .001, whereas individuals in the fear condition
experienced a significantly higher level of fear (M = 2.47, SD = .93) than anger (M = 1.62,
SD = .69), t(168) = 6.25, p < .001.
Fear and anger levels in the baseline control condition were also contrasted with emotion
levels in the fear and anger conditions. Levene’s test for equality of variances was significant, so
t tests reported here do not assume equal variances. Participants in the control group experienced
significantly lower levels of anger (M = 1.50, SD = .60), t(54) = 5.70, p < .001, than those in
the anger condition. Likewise, participants in the control group experienced significantly lower
levels of fear (M = 1.52, SD = .64), t(44) = 5.98, p < .001, than those in the fear condition. Four
people in the control condition who reported above-average anger (M > 2.5) were excluded from
further analyses.
Although these tests indicated that the manipulations worked as intended, overall levels of
preregulation fear and anger were still slightly below the scale midpoint of 3. In light of this,
several points are important to bear in mind. First, high levels of felt or self-reported emo-
tion are not necessary for associated emotion appraisal patterns to be activated and to have an
effect on subsequent decisions (Andrade & Ariely, 2009; Angie et al., 2011; Lerner, Small,
& Loewenstein, 2004; Moons & Mackie, 2007). Second, the average levels of fear and anger
reported in the manipulation conditions were similar, reducing the possibility that the strength
of emotion induction in one condition was stronger for one emotion than for the other. Third,
a number of researchers have recognized that self-report assessments of emotion are less than
perfect and are subject to sources of error such as socially desirable responding and retrospective
reporting bias (Gray & Watson, 2007; Robinson & Clore, 2002).
Emotion Regulation Manipulation Check
To assess participants’ engagement in emotion regulation, several different manipulation checks

were performed. First, a trained rater (blind to the study’s purpose) assessed participants’ descrip-
tions of how to apply the assigned emotion regulation strategy. Participants provided reasonable
descriptions of how they would apply the targeted strategy (M = 4.74, SD = .53) indicating that
they read and understood the introductory material provided.
Second, to assess participants’ engagement in practicing the emotion regulation strategy, three
trained raters (blind to the purposes of the study) evaluated the quality of participants’ emotion
regulation. To assess engagement in cognitive reappraisal, ratings on seven open-ended responses
(ICC =.87) were performed using 5-point benchmark rating scales. Overall people were moder-
ately effective at reappraisal (M = 3.06, SD = .59) with no significant differences observed
between the fear and anger reappraisal conditions. Two people who failed to reappraise (i.e., M
< 2.0) were excluded from the analyses.
As for relaxation, raters examined participants’ descriptions of sensations that they experi-
enced during the session (ICC = .88) using 5-point benchmark rating scales. Overall, people were
engaged in relaxation (M = 3.88, SD = .91) with no significant differences observed between the
fear and anger relaxation conditions. Two people who did not engage in relaxation (i.e., M <
2.0) were excluded from the analyses. These individuals did not write down any description of
relaxation sensations or the minivacation they were asked to imagine, or wrote down something
indicating they were not relaxed (i.e., I could not stop thinking about my upcoming test). In addi-
tion, the proctor in these sessions indicated that these individuals did not follow instructions (i.e.,
didn’t close their eyes; didn’t appear as if they were trying to relax).
Third, to assess the effectiveness of emotion regulation, participants rated how they felt at that
particular moment after using the emotion regulation strategy. They rated 16 emotion adjectives
using a 5-point Likert scale immediately following the emotion regulation session. The anger
level significantly decreased (M = 1.75, SD = .81) after anger regulation, t(46) = 7.82, p <
.001. Similarly, the fear level significantly decreased (M = 1.67, SD = .72) after fear regulation,
t(47) = 7.93, p < .001.
Reactions
Using a 5-point Likert scale, participants reported high-level motivation and engagement in the
experiment (M = 3.73, SD = .62). They perceived the experimental materials and tasks as
relevant (M = 3.18, SD = .79) and challenging (M = 3.14, SD = .73). Participants reported mod-
erate fatigue (M = 3.13, SD = 1.09), but no differences were observed across the experimental
conditions and baseline control group.
Correlations
Correlations among the dependent variables and covariates are shown in Table 2. The constructs
showed meaningful patterns of correlations. Relatively high intercorrelations were observed
among the sensemaking strategies (r = –.66 to .87) and between the sensemaking strategies
and the EDM score (r = –.66 to .88). As for the covariates, positive and negative affect were
negatively correlated (r = –.18). Impression management was unrelated to the EDM score but
correlated positively with considering consequences (r = .23, r = .27) and helping others and
negatively with retaliation (r = –.23). Verbal intelligence was not significantly correlated with
EDM or the sensemaking strategies.
Ethical Decision Making
Emotion Effects
Table 3 presents analysis of variance results for the effects of emotion on ethical decision
making and the sensemaking strategies. An initial multivariate analysis of variance showed
a significant effect (Wilks’s λ) of unregulated emotion on the sensemaking strategies, F(8,
124) = 3.35, p < .01, η2 p = .18. Follow-up univariate analyses showed partial support for H1,
which predicted that anger would result in less recognition of circumstances and less consid-
eration of consequences than fear. In fact, significant differences in the expected direction were
observed between emotion groups with respect to recognizing circumstances and marginal effects
for considering consequences of one’s actions for others. Least significant difference post hoc
tests showed that individuals in the unregulated anger condition showed less recognition of cir-
cumstances across the ethical problems than those in the fear and no emotion conditions, and
marginally less consideration of consequences. H2, which suggested that anger would results in
greater retaliation and less helping behavior than fear, was also partially supported. Individuals in
the unregulated anger condition chose options reflecting greater retaliation and less willingness
to help others than those in the unregulated fear and control conditions.
There was also substantial effect of unregulated emotion on EDM, F(2, 65) = 15.32, η2 p =
. 32. In support of H3, which predicted that anger would result in less ethical decisions than fear,
post hoc tests showed that individuals experiencing unregulated anger made less ethical decisions
than those experiencing unregulated fear. Of interest, participants in the fear condition made more
ethical decisions than those in the control group.
TABLE 2
Intercorrelations and Reliabilities
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Ethics Constructs
1 Ethical decision making
2 Recognizing circumstances .87∗∗
3 Considering consequences .78∗∗ .83∗∗
4 Retaliation −.66∗∗ −.64∗∗ −.66∗∗
5 Helping others .68∗∗ .76∗∗ .88∗∗ −.71∗∗
Covariates
6 Positive affect .00 −.05 −.05 −.07 .00 .84
7 Negative affect −.07 −.03 −.06 −.05 −.02 −.18∗∗ .81
8 ERQ: Suppression −.04 −.04 −.10 .12 −.12 −.12 .15∗ .71
9 ERQ: Reappraisal .08 .10 .06 .10 .02 .22∗∗ −.16∗ −.03 .69
10 Verbal intelligence .08 .08 .01 .04 −.07 .06 .11 .17∗ .03 .74
11 Impression management .07 .12 .23∗∗ −.23∗∗ .27∗∗ .10 −.10 −.19∗∗ −.10 −.19∗∗ .70
Note. N = 163. Covariate reliabilities are provided along the diagonal in italics. ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire.
∗ Significant at p < .05. ∗∗ Significant at p < .01.
311
312
TABLE 3
Emotion Effects on Ethical Decision Making and Sensemaking Strategies
Anger1 Fear2 Control3 Post Hoc

N = 23 N = 23 N = 22 Significance Effect Size Tests
Ethics Constructs M SD M SD M SD F df p η2 p LSD
1 Ethical decision making 1.96 .16 2.23 .16 2.11 .17 15.32 2, 65 .001 .32 1v2∗∗ ; 2v3∗
2 Recognizing circumstances 3.77 .28 4.07 .32 4.00 .30 6.46 2, 65 .01 .17 1v2∗∗ ; 1v3∗∗
3 Considering consequences 3.95 .29 4.14 .31 4.10 .36 2.41 2, 65 .10 .07
4 Retaliation 2.13 .20 1.91 .18 1.98 .19 8.38 2, 65 .001 .21 1v2∗∗ ; 1v3∗∗
5 Helping others 3.48 .30 3.64 .26 3.66 .29 2.57 2, 65 .08 .07 1v2∗ ; 1v3∗
Note. Superscript numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 correspond to numbers used in Post Hoc Tests column.
∗ Pairwise comparisons are significant at p < .05. ∗∗ Pairwise comparisons are significant at p < .01.
Emotion Regulation Effects
Results for the emotion regulation strategies are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6. First mention
Tables 4, 5, 6 In H4 and H5 we expected that cognitive reappraisal would be more effective
than relaxation and no regulation for reducing the effects of anger on ethical decisions and eth-
ical sensemaking strategies. As seen in Table 4, emotion regulation significantly interacted with
emotion type to influence EDM and the sensemaking strategies. Table 5 presents the means, stan-
dard deviations and post hoc comparisons for reappraisal, relaxation, and no regulation anger
conditions, and for the control group (no emotion, no regulation). In partial support of H4,
cognitive reappraisal resulted in better EDM than no emotion regulation. Contrary to what we
expected, relaxation had a similar effect in minimizing the deleterious effects of anger on EDM
(see Figure 1). A similar pattern emerged for the sensemaking strategies. In partial support of H5,
cognitive reappraisal resulted in more recognition of circumstances, greater consideration of con-
sequences, less retaliation, and more helping others than no emotion regulation (see Figures 2–5).
Relaxation was equally effective in moderating the effects of anger on these strategies. Both reg-
ulation strategies resulted in levels of EDM and use of sensemaking strategies similar to that of
the control group.
Table 6 presents the means, standard deviations, and post hoc comparisons for the fear
conditions. H6 and H7 predicted that relaxation would be more effective than reappraisal or no
regulation for reducing the effects of fear on ethical decisions and sensemaking strategies. EDM
in the fear/relaxation condition was significantly better than in the no-emotion/no-regulation
control group. However, there were no differences in ethical decision making across in the
fear/relaxation, fear/cognitive reappraisal, and fear/no regulation conditions, so H6 was not
supported. This pattern also held for the sensemaking strategies of recognizing circumstances
and considering consequences. The fear/reappraisal, fear/relaxation, fear/no regulation, and
control conditions showed similar means for these two strategies. Also contrary to H7 was the
finding that cognitive reappraisal reduced retaliation and increased helping others more than
relaxation in the fear conditions.
DISCUSSION
The need for understanding and influencing ethical behavior in organizations has never been
more apparent in light of large-scale ethical misconduct that stubbornly persists. Whether one
TABLE 4
Interactions of Emotions and Regulation Strategies on Ethical Decision Making and Sensemaking Strategies
Significance Effect Size
Ethics Constructs F df p η2 p
1 Ethical decision making 13.63 3, 160 .001 .15

2 Recognizing circumstances 5.26 3, 160 .01 .06
3 Considering consequences 3.50 3, 160 .05 .04
4 Retaliation 4.27 3, 160 .01 .05
5 Helping others 3.11 3, 160 .05 .04
Note. N = 163.
314
TABLE 5
Means and Standard Deviations of Anger for Ethical Decision Making and Sensemaking Strategies
Reappraisal1 Relaxation2 No Regulation3 Control4

N = 25 N = 22 N = 23 N = 22 Post Hoc Tests
Ethics Constructs M SD M SD M SD M SD LSD
1 Ethical decision making 2.23 .14 2.17 .12 1.96 .16 2.11 .17 1v3∗∗ ; 1v4∗∗ ; 2v3∗∗ ; 3v4∗∗
2 Recognizing circumstances 4.14 .27 4.07 .23 3.77 .28 4.00 .30 1v3∗∗ ; 2v3∗∗ , 3v4∗
3 Considering consequences 4.13 .25 4.23 .29 3.95 .29 4.10 .35 1v3∗ ; 2v3∗∗
4 Retaliation 1.90 .16 1.91 .17 2.13 .20 1.98 .19 1v3∗∗ ; 2v3∗∗ ; 3v4∗∗
5 Helping others 3.68 .27 3.72 .26 3.48 .29 3.66 .29 1v3∗∗ ; 2v3∗∗ ; 3v4∗
TABLE 6
Means and Standard Deviations of Fear for Ethical Decision Making and Sensemaking Strategies
Reappraisal1 Relaxation2 No Regulation3 Control4

N = 22 N = 26 N = 23 N = 22 Post Hoc Tests
Ethics Constructs M SD M SD M SD M SD LSD
1 Ethical decision making 2.17 .17 2.22 .15 2.23 .17 2.11 .17 2v4∗ ; 3v4∗
2 Recognizing circumstances 4.07 .32 4.14 .24 4.07 .32 4.00 .30
3 Considering consequences 4.25 .34 4.12 .23 4.14 .31 4.10 .35
4 Retaliation 1.79 .19 1.90 .16 1.91 .18 1.98 .19 1v2∗ ; 1v3∗ ; 1v4∗∗
5 Helping others 3.77 .26 3.61 .22 3.64 .26 3.66 .29 1v2∗
315
FIGURE 1 Moderating effects of emotion regulation on the relationship between incidental emotion and ethical
decision making.
FIGURE 2 Moderating effects of emotion regulation on the relationship between incidental emotion and
recognition of circumstances.
considers Bernard Madoff’s fraudulent investment operation, estimated to cost investors more
than $60 billion (Bray, 2009) or Dr. Hwang Woo Suk’s fabrication of what was believed to be the
first cloned human embryo lines, it is clear that more work is needed.
The current research used a sensemaking approach to EDM to better understand the influence
of incidental emotions and emotion regulation on EDM. Results of this experiment indicated that
anger and fear not only influence ethical decision making but do so in different ways. Specifically,
FIGURE 3 Moderating effects of emotion regulation on the relationship between incidental emotion and
consideration of consequences.
FIGURE 4 Moderating effects of emotion regulation on the relationship between incidental emotion and retaliation.
individuals experiencing incidental anger made worse ethical decisions compared to those expe-
riencing incidental fear or no emotion. In addition, decisions in the unregulated anger condition
were characterized by less recognition of circumstances (how the problem arose, people involved,
ethical principles, goals, and values) and more retaliation in response to perceived unfairness
or wrongdoing compared to the fear conditions and control group. Notably, we also found that
individuals experiencing incidental fear made more ethical decisions than those in the control
condition.
FIGURE 5 Moderating effects of emotion regulation on the relationship between incidental emotion and helping
others.
Emotion regulation also had some important moderating influences on the relationship of emo-
tions to ethical sensemaking and decisions. Cognitive reappraisal and relaxation both mitigated
the negative effects of anger on EDM and affected sensemaking strategies. Regulating anger
was beneficial, enabling better recognition of circumstances and consideration of consequences.
Emotion regulation did not affect the relationship of fear to ethical decision making.
Implications and Contributions
This study contributes to the research on appraisal tendencies, emotion regulation, and ethical-
decision making in some unique ways. First, our findings provide additional support for appraisal
theories of emotion, extending this body of evidence into the domain of complex ethical deci-
sion making. The pattern of thinking and decision making for anger and fear was consistent
with the appraisal tendencies, associated cognitive processes, and motivations stemming from
such appraisals. As pointed out by Lerner and Tiedens (2006), the certainty, control, and other
responsibility appraisals characterizing anger results in judgments and decisions that are more
punitive, risky, optimistic, and careless, as well as greater readiness to act. This is a particularly
devastating pattern of responding considering the nature of the processes contributing to ethical
sensemaking, which involves self-reflection, in-depth consideration of causes and consequences
of the problem, scrutiny and questioning of one’s own motives and judgment, and sometimes
delaying action until sufficient information or context is available for more fully understanding
the situation (Kligyte et al., 2008; Mumford et al., 2006). The tendency to appraise threat, uncer-
tainty, and situational control with fear facilitated EDM. Potentially, fear appraisal tendencies
triggered broader information search, thereby reducing uncertainty, threat, and risk (Lerner &
Keltner, 2000, 2001).
This research also extends the literature on EDM, suggesting that both the intuitive and ratio-
nal components of EDM are important to consider. Although there are a number of cognitive
processes that might be brought to bear on an ethical dilemma, EDM is not a purely rational
process. It is influenced by emotional states even when they have nothing to do with the ethical
dilemma at hand. Most accounts of the role of emotions in EDM deals with emotions elicited by
the situation at hand, such as disgust over others’ financial indiscretions, fear of getting caught
falsifying quarterly earnings, or guilt over mistreating a subordinate. Such integral emotions cer-
tainly play a role in the immediate and sometimes unconscious judgments and evaluations made
in various ethical situations. However, the findings here suggest that the influences of incidental
emotions are just as important to consider in terms of how they impact EDM. Spillover research
(Grzywacz & Marks, 2000) suggests that it is common for negative emotional events outside the
workplace, such as an argument with a family member, to influence emotions at work. In addi-
tion, employers need to be aware of the implications conflicts at work might have on ethical
decisions. Theories of EDM have not considered how incidental and integral emotions jointly
influence ethical decisions, an interesting topic for future research.
This study also contributes to the EDM literature through the use of complex, realistic ethical
problems that place some cognitive demand on problem solvers. Emotions may be particularly
influential when ethical situations involve multiple people, conflicting goals, and when solutions
may not fully satisfy any of the individuals or groups involved. Given the seeming lack of choices
available, people may rely on their emotional states to provide information about whether one
option is better or worse than another, even when one cannot fully explain or logically articu-
late why (Haidt, 2001). When an appraisal tendency is activated by affective experiences, the
information considered in framing the ethical situation narrows to “who” or “what” is of greatest
concern, which ethical principles apply, and what decisions or actions seem optimal.
Our finding that emotion regulation mitigated the negative effects of anger has important
implications. It suggests that people can moderate the effects emotions have on ethical deci-
sion processes. The fact that relaxation had effects similar to cognitive reappraisal on ethical
decisions and sensemaking strategies suggests that physiological regulation does something to
change appraisal tendencies. Exactly how this occurred requires further research. In addition, the
contrasting findings for fear and anger indicate that it may be more important to regulate anger
than fear. This raises the question of what other discrete emotional states significantly influence
ethical sensemaking and decisions and how responsive are such emotions to conscious emotion
regulation attempts?
From a practical standpoint, organizational training and development encouraging ethical
sensemaking and the recognition of emotions and application of emotion regulation strategies
could potentially enhance managerial and employee EDM. Emotion recognition and regulation
strategies could be integrated into educational efforts to increase awareness of the impact of
emotion in the workplace, and to provide tools for managing emotional responses in general.
In addition, EDM research has shown that ethics instruction in the current cognitive strategies
enhances EDM and helps restructure mental models (Brock et al., 2008; Kligyte et al., 2008;
Mumford et al., 2008).
Limitations
The findings here should be considered in light of several limitations beyond the generalizability
limitations of the sample. First, the situational judgment measure of EDM used in this study
assessed respondents’ judgments about ethical decisions and actions that should be taken in a
given situation. As such, they are low-fidelity simulations and do not necessarily reflect actual
EDM behavior as it would occur in an organizational setting. However, being able to perceive
and choose more ethical courses of action in hypothetical scenarios is an important precursor to
actual EDM (Jones, 1991).
Second, this study investigated the influence of incidental emotions on ethical decision mak-
ing. Emotions integral to the situation might have different effects. Although incidental and
integral anger should activate similar appraisal tendencies, responses to them may differ with
respect to emotion regulation. With integral emotions, people may be more aware of their emo-
tional states (due to physiological arousal, changes in verbal or nonverbal behavior, etc.). These
cues may alert people to the danger of not letting their emotions “rule the moment” result-
ing in greater regulation. Because integral emotions are triggered at earlier points in time,
some of the obvious cues dissipate, making people less aware that the negative emotional
state still persists. Thus, initial effects of integral emotion might be smaller than incidental
emotion effects. Alternatively, integral emotions may be more intense and, despite autonomic,
cognitive, and physiological countering strategies, could exert stronger effects than incidental
emotions.
The way participants regulated emotion also has some limitations. We investigated only two
regulation strategies, and many others could be employed, sometimes simultaneously. Also,
strategies can be applied consciously and unconsciously, so more research is needed on the extent
to which people are aware of and can control these diverse regulation methods. In addition,
randomly assigning the emotion regulation strategy may have concealed important individual
differences. A self-selected rather than experimentally imposed strategy might have helped par-
ticipants to deal more effectively with their negative emotions (Baumeister, 1996). Furthermore,
some researchers argue that emotion regulation is part of emotional experience, meaning that
emotions are regulated all the time (Frijda, 1986; Gross, 1998). Therefore, it is likely that people
in the no-regulation condition were using their preferred regulation strategies. Still, the emotion
regulation conditions showed better outcomes than the conditions in which an emotion regulation
strategy was not offered.
Related to this is the possibility that the emotions induced in this study may have naturally dis-
sipated over the course of the study even without conscious use of emotion regulation strategies.
However, prior research has found that even when feelings such as anger and fear diminish, these
emotions can have lasting impact on cognitions and behavior due to the activation of appraisal
tendencies that influence associative memory processes and the desire for behavioral consistency
(Andrade & Ariely, 2009; Lerner et al., 2007; Lerner et al., 2004; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006).
Further, the fact that we saw significantly better EDM scores in the regulated anger condition
compared to the unregulated anger condition, and better use of sensemaking strategies in the reg-
ulated fear condition compare to the unregulated fear condition, suggests that these emotions had
lasting effects when they were not regulated.
In sum, we hope that the present study stimulates research and interest in the influence of dis-
crete emotions and emotion regulation strategies on EDM and other forms of complex cognition.
Furthermore, we hope it contributes to further exploration of sensemaking approaches to the mod-
eling of EDM. Understanding the factors contributing to, or detracting from, ethical sensemaking
is critical for fostering ethical behavior.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This research was supported by the National Institutes of Health. We thank Mike Mumford and
Ryan Brown for their review and comments on various aspects of this project. The first author’s
dissertation was the basis for this article, and an earlier version of this article was presented at the
April 2009 Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology conference.
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APPENDIX
Example Items From the Ethical Decision-Making Measure
Scenario 1
You are conducting research on leadership skill development at an applied research institute.
As an expert in this area, you are requested by a consulting company interested in personnel
selection to coordinate and participate in the proposal review process for projects in development
of leadership skill assessments. Eight proposals have passed a first screen by meeting the criteria
but only two finalists can receive funding. You, as head of the review committee, along with
several others, are currently conducting more extensive reviews of the eight proposals.
1. During the review, you realize that your colleague Dr. Reeves, a project manager at
your research institute who reviews the in-house proposals and assigns researchers
on teams, has submitted a proposal. Paradoxically, you also submitted a proposal last
week and asked him for the leadership position on this well-funded and promising
5-year project. Dr. Reeves’s proposal has been initially ranked as fifth out of eight
proposals. What will you do? Choose two from the following:
a. Provide an honest evaluation of the proposal and see if other reviewers agree
b. Withdraw from the review and selection process
c. Evaluate all proposals except the one by Dr. Reeves
d. Inform the other reviewers and remain involved in the review and selection process
e. Inform the other reviewers and let them make the selection decisions
f. Emphasize the key positive qualities of Dr. Reeves’s proposal to other reviewers
g. Evaluate Dr. Reeves’s proposal positively
h. Emphasize the key negative qualities of others’ proposal to other reviewers
2. While closely reviewing one of the three top proposals you notice that one of them
contains data that look very similar to data collected by your colleague from your
former job at another consulting company. The methodology is very unique and the
data were originally published in a small and not-well-known journal. You know
about this research only because you heard about it at an informal company luncheon
for your former colleague. When you compare the original article to the proposal
submitted by Dr. Ericsson, they have enough differences that you cannot be sure
if Dr. Ericsson has done anything improper. What will you do? Choose two from the
following:
a. Send the proposal to your former colleague and do not proceed with the review
until you hear his assessment on data similarity
b. Contact the client who contracted you to review the proposals and let them
investigate the issue
c. Call Dr. Ericsson’s company and talk to the head of the department to gather more
facts about him and the proposal
d. Submit Dr. Ericsson’s name to the State Legislature’s board of ethics and let them
investigate the issue
e. Consult a senior colleague for advice on how to handle the situation
f. Proceed with the evaluation as you don’t have facts to prove Dr. Ericsson’s
improper behavior
g. Postpone the evaluation and discuss options with the rest of the reviewers
h. Contact Dr. Ericsson and ask him personally to explain the data similarity

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Human Performance

ISSN: 0895-9285 (Print) 1532-7043 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hhup20

The Influence of Anger, Fear, and Emotion

Vykinta Kligyte , Shane Connelly , Chase Thiel & Lynn Devenport

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.2013.814655

Published online: 10 Sep 2013.

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The Influence of Anger, Fear, and Emotion Regulation

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Sensemaking and Ethical Decision Making

Anger, Fear, and Ethical Decision Making

Anger, Fear, and Ethical Sensemaking

Emotion Regulation and Ethical Decision Making

and consideration of alternative perspectives. Also, cognitive reappraisal is an effortful strategy

Integral or Incidental Emotions?

One hundred sixty-three undergraduates enrolled in psychology classes at a large midwestern

of and reactions to study manipulations. Participants in the no emotion, no regulation control

Emotion Manipulation Check

Ethical Decision Making

To assess EDM, an adapted version of a situational judgment EDM measure developed by

Sensemaking Strategies Operational Definition

Emotion Manipulation Check

Emotion Regulation Manipulation Check

To assess participants’ engagement in emotion regulation, several different manipulation checks

Ethical Decision Making

Anger1 Fear2 Control3 Post Hoc

Ethics Constructs M SD M SD M SD F df p η2 p LSD

Emotion Regulation Effects

Significance Effect Size

1 Ethical decision making 13.63 3, 160 .001 .15

Reappraisal1 Relaxation2 No Regulation3 Control4

Ethics Constructs M SD M SD M SD M SD LSD

Reappraisal1 Relaxation2 No Regulation3 Control4

Ethics Constructs M SD M SD M SD M SD LSD

Implications and Contributions

Frijda, N. H. (1986). Emotions. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Example Items From the Ethical Decision-Making Measure

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