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    (Week - 4) (AASHTO) AASHTO Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges (AASHTO, 200

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    Guide Specifications and Commentary for Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges ‘ond Edition, 2009 Si ret eee inn eT Mtr ain ceni verte Copyright 2008, by the Ameran Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, All Rights Resetved, Printed in the United Sites of Amevice, This book, or pars thereof, may not be reproduced in any form without wetten Permission of the publishers a © 200 by the AmarcenAssction of She Highway ad Traprstion Oia ‘Allright esved:Dupleaion = elton a pps ow EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 2008-2009 Voting Members Officers: President: Allen Biehler, Pennsylvania Vice President: Larty L. “Butch” Brown, Sr., Mississippi Secretary-Treasurer: Carlos Braceras, Utah Regional Representatives: REGION I; Carolan Wieks, Delaware, One-Year Term Joseph Marie, Connecticut, Two-Vear Term REGION Il: Larry L. “Butch” Brown, Mississippi, One-Year Term Dan Flowers, Arkansas, Two-Year Term REGION Ill: Kirk T, Steudle, Michigan, One-Year Term ‘Nancy J, Richardson, lowa, Two-Year Term REGION IV: Rhonda G. Faught, New Mexico, One-Year Term Will Kempton, California, Two-Year Term Nonvoting Members Immediate Past President: Pete K. Rahn, Missouri AASHTO Executive Director: John Horsley, Washington, DC ot (© 100 bythe Arian Asocaon of Sie Higa and Transporation Ol ‘Allright sured, Depaion vation a apt a HIGHWAYS SUBCOMMITTEE ON BRIDGES AND STRUCTURES, 2008 MALCOLM 7, KERLEY, Chair KEVIN THOMPSON, Vice Chair M. MYINT LWIN, Federal Highway Administration, Searetary FIRAS I. SHEIKH IBRAHIM, Federal Highway Administration, Assistant Secretary ALABAMA, John F. Black, William P. Conway, George H. Conner ALASKA, Richard A. Pratt ARIZONA, Jean A. Nehme ARKANSAS, Phil Brand CALIFORNIA, Kevin Thompson, Susan Hida, Barton J Newton COLORADO, Mark A. Leonard, Michael G. Salamon CONNECTICUT, Gery J. Abramowier, Julie F. Georpes DELAWARE, Jiten K. Songji, Burry A. Benton DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Nicolas Glados,L. Donald Cooney, Konjit “Connie” Eskender FLORIDA, Robert V, Robertson, Jr, Marcus Ansley, Andre Pavlov GEORGIA, Paul V. Lites, J, Brian Summers HAWAII, Poul T. Santo IDAHO, Matthew M. Farrar ILLINOIS, Raiph E. Anderson, Thomas J. Domagalski INDIANA, Anne M, Reatick IOWA, Norman L, MeDonald KANSAS, Kenneth F. Hurst, James J. Brennan, Loren R, Risch KENTUCKY, Allen Frank LOUISIANA, Hossein Ghara, Adthur D” Andrea, Paul Fossier MAINE, David Sherlock, Jeffrey S. Folsom MARYLAND, Earle S. Freedman, Robest J. Healy MASSACHUSETTS, Alexander K, Bardow MICHIGAN, Steven P. Beok, David Juntunen MINNESOTA, Daniel L. Dorgan, Kevin Western MISSISSIPPI, Mitchell K. Carr B. Keith Carr MISSOURI, Dennis Heckman, Michael Harms MONTANA, Kent M, Bares NEBRASKA, Lyman D. Freemon, Mark Ahlian, Hussam “Sam” Falah NEVADA, Mark P, Elicegui, Maro Grunert, Todd Stefonowiez NEW HAMPSHIRE, Mark W. Richardson, David L, Scott NEW JERSEY, Richard W, Dane NEW MEXICO, Jimmy D, Camp NEW YORK, Geocge A. Christian, Donald F. Dyer, Arthur. Yannous NORTH CAROLINA, Greg R. Perfetti NORTH DAKOTA, Terrence R, Udland ONTO, Timothy J. Keller, Jawdat Siddiqh OKLAHOMA, Robert J. Rusch, Gregory D. Allen OREGON, Bruce V. Jobson, Hormoz Seradj PENNSYLVANIA, Thomas P. Macioce, Harold C. “Hal” Rogers, J, Lou Ruzzi PUERTO RICO, Jaime Cabré RHODE ISLAND, David Fish SOUTH CAROLINA, Berry W, Bowers, Jeff Sizemore SOUTH DAKOTA, Kevin Goeden ‘TENNESSEE, Pdward P. Wasserman TEXAS, William R. Cox, David P. Hohmann US. DOT, M, Myint Lwin, Fras I. Sheikh Ibrahim, Hala Elgaaly UTAH, Richard Mille VERMONT, Willian Michael Hedges VIRGINIA, Malcolm T, Kerley, Kendal Walus, Prasad LNallapaneni, Julius F. J. Volgyi, Je. WASHINGTON, Jugesh Kapur, Tony M, Allen, Bijan Khaleghi WEST VIRGINIA, Grogory Bailey WISCONSIN, Scot Becker, Beth A. Cannestra, Fina Hubbard WYOMING, Gregg C, Fredtick, Keith R, Fulton ALBERTA, Tom Loo NEW BRUNSWICK, Doug Noble NOVA SCOTIA, Mark Pertus ONTARIO, Bala Tharmabala SASKATCHEWAN, Howard Yea GOLDEN GATE BRIDGE, Kury H. Wit Nal. TURNPIKE AUTHORITY, Richard J. Raczynski N.Y. STATE BRIDGE AUTHORITY, Willi J. Morea PENN. TURNPIKE COMMISSION, Gary Grahams ‘SURFACE DEPLOYMENT AND DISTRIBUTION COMMAND TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING AGENCY, Robert D. Pranz US. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS— DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, Paul C, Tan U.S. COAST GUARD, Nick E, Mpras, Jacob Patna US. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURF— FOREST SERVICE, John R, Katell (©2099 te amen Asin fn Hihny and Tempo Oia va Tights reserved. Duplication is a violation of applicable law. TABLE OF CONTENTS FOREWORD. SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION., EL PURPOSE ses 1.L1 Intordiseiplinary Team... 112 New Bridges 1.1.3 Existing Bridges. 12 BACKGROUND... se 1.2.1 AASHTO Guide Specification (1991) woo 1.22 AASHTO LRED Bridge Design Specifications. 1.3 BASICCONCEPTS. 14 DESIGN ANALYSIS. 15 FLOWCHARTS. REFERENCES SECTION 2 SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS. Design Provisions SECTION 3 GENERAL PROVISIONS.. 3.1 GENERAL. sen 3.2 APPLICABILITY OF SPECIFICATION .. 33 OPERATIONAL CLASSIFICATION... 3.4 DATA COLLECTION 3.5 VESSEL TYPE AND’ 3.5.1 Barge Vessels 3.52 Ship Vessels, 3.53 Special Veswos. 3.6 DESIGN VESSEL... 3.7 DESIGN IMPACT SPEED. 3.8 VESSEL COLLISION ENERGY. 3.9 SHIP COLLISION FORCE ON PIER, 3.10 SHIP BOW DAMAGE DEPTH 3.11 SHIP COLLISION FORCE ON SUPE! 3.411 Bow Collision. 3.11.2 Deskhouse Collision, 3.11.3. Mast Collision _ 3.12 BARGE COLLISION FORCE ON PIER... 3.13 BARGE BOW DAMAGE DEPTH, 3.14 IMPACT LOAD COMBINATION 3.15 LOCATION OF IMPACT FORCES... 3.15.1. Substructure Design. 3.15.2. Supersructure Design. {©2009 the Areca Asoc of Se Hina ad Tnaprtation Miia, Aitigs served Dapliaon fn saan o epi ew 3.16 MINIMUM IMPACT REQUIREMENT. 3.17 BRIDGE PROTECTION SYSTEMS... REFERENCES... SECTION 4 DESIGN VESSEL SELECTION.. SAL GENERAL sonra 4.1.1 Design Method. o 4.12 Selection of Design Method... 421 Method Fen 4.1.22 Method I, 4.1.23 Method Ul. 42 WATERWAY CHARACTERISTICS 42.1 Channel Layout 42.2 Water Depths 423 Water Currents 43 BRIDGE CHARACTERISTICS. PRIBUTION 4.6 DESIGNLOADS. 4.7 METHODL 471 Genera _ é 4.7.2 Design Vessel Accepiance Criteria. METHODIL 4.8.1 General 4.82 Design Vesol Acceptance Criteria. 4.8.3 Annual Frequency of Collapse. 4.8.3.1 Vessel Frequency (N) 4.83.2 Probability of Aberancy (PA).. 48.33 Geometric Probability (PG) 483.4 Probubility of Collapse (PC).. 4.83.5 Protection Factor (PA) 49 METHOD UL 49.1 General 49.2 Design Vessel Acceptance Criteria 4.93 Disruption Cost. REFERENCES. 4 SECTION 5 SUBSTRUCTURE PROVISIONS.. 5. GENERAL, 5.2 ANALYSIS 5.3 FOUNDATION DESIGN. REFERENCES. SECTION 6 CONCRETE AND STEEL DESIGN. 6.1 GENERAL. 62 REINFORCED CONCRETE... 63 STRUCTURAL STEEL REFERENCES {©2009 the Ansan Assen of Sate ih and Transportation Oia ‘Alright ree-ved Dupleaton vlan of epee nw SECTION 7 BRIDGE PROTECTION DESIGN PROVISIONS 193 TA GENERAL. 93 72 DESIGN LOADS a sit rims non 94 73 PILYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS 96 73.1 Fender Systems.. 97 ‘73.1.1 Timber Fenders. semana 9T 7.3.1.2 Rubber Fenders. . 7 ssn 100 731.3 Conerete Fenders... se boos one 2 7.3.14 Steel Fenders. ns ns sen loz 7.3.2 Pile-Supported SytMS swsesinnnnnsen . ses woe 73 Dolphin Protection eves ssn ns vo 14 734 Island Protection ~ ~ sn 6 73.5 Floating Protection Systems... ~ : 138 74 MOVABLE BRIDGE PROTECTION... a4 7.5 MOTORIST WARNING SYSTEMS. MS 7.5.1 Hazard Detection Systems 7.3.2 Verification Devices vw AT 1.83 Tale Control end Information Devices. 148 7.6 AIDS TO NAVIGATION ALTERNATIVES yesnnn 148 7.6.1 Operational Altematives i nasi 150 7.62 Standard Navigation Altermatives ose nnn . se ve 150 7.63 Blectronic Navigation System..nsessnsnnsinnensnnninnsn rnnnnnnn ST REFERENCES .. vs itis SD SECTION 8 BRIDGE PROTECTION PLANNING GUIDELINES. 8.1 GENERAL... 82 LOCATION OF CROSSING.. 83 BRIDGE ALIGNMENT. 84 TYPE OF BRIDGE. 8.5 NAVIGATION SPAN CLEARANCES., 8.5.1 Horizontal Clearances... 852 Vertical Clearances... 8.6 APPROACH SPANS 8.7 PROTECTION SYSTEMS .. 8.8 PLANNING PROCESS. 8.8.1 Route Location Stuly 482 Bridge Type, Size, and Location Study» 8.83 Preliminary and Final Design REFFRENCES, Risk Assessment Example 10 INTRODUCTION srssnsnsnes so 1B svn YOM 1.11 Published Sources sn YO 1.1.2 Interviews and Correspondence . aan 164 2 WATERWAY CHARACTERISTICS ~ sen 16 1.2.1 General Deseription . sn 164 22 Navigation Channel... . . css 167 1012009 by ihe AnarcanAstocation of Ste igh sn Trantporaion Oca All igh esred Duplo i ton a ape 1.23 Tide Level and Tidal Range ens 6? 1.24 Currents... 167 125 Water Depths. 109 1.3 PROPOSED BRIDGE ALTERNATIVES, 169 1.4 VESSEL FLEET CHARACTERISTICS.. 169 LAL Vessel Categories. 1169 1.42 Vessel Traffic GroWth snes 174 143 Vessel Transit Speeds 1s 1.44 Vessel Transit Path... 175 1.5 VESSEL IMPACT CRITERIA, 176 1.5.1 General Requirements... 176 1.5.2. Extreme Event Load Combinations (Seour) 76 1.53 Minimum Impact Load Crit secrnssnnnnnmnnnin . o v1 6 1.54 Maximum Impact Load Criteria, 1176 1.55 Operational Classification, sol 1.6 MINIMUM IMPACT LOAD ANALYSIS. sol 1,7 MAXIMUM IMPACT LOAD (METHOD 1) ANALYSIS. sense TT 1.8 MAXIMUM IMPACT LOAD (METHOD I!) ANALYSIS, ein 180 LBA Method 1! Methodology sms ses 180 18.1.1 Vessel Frequency (N), soe BT 1.8.1.2 Probability of Aberrancy (Pa), 181 1.8.13 Geometric Probability (PG)... ses vn BBD 1.8.1.4 Probability of Collapse (PC), 182 LB.L5 Protection Factor (PP) 1.8.2. Risk Acceptance Criteria 1.8.3 Method II Risk Analysis Summa) enn 19. SUMMARY OF LA | PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS. 1.9.1 Vessel Impact Forees 1.9.2 Bridge Main Span Alternatives. 1.9.3 Vessel Bow Overhang Collisions. 1.9.4 Mast Collisions 1.10 RISK ASSESSMENT EXAMPLE COMMENTS 2.0 VUNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF NEW BRIDGES, 3.0 VUNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF EXISTING BRIDGES. APPENDIX A—PASSED-THE-POINT QUERY FOR CARGO COMMODITY AND VESSEL, TRIP DATA (2000) APPENDIX B-~MeTi00 I ANALYSIS: BAYOU LAFOURCHE, [APPENDIX C—MetHon II ANALYSIS: CONCRETE GIRDER OPTION A3 FUTURE FLEET (2083) EQUAL SK. wi (©2009 he American Association af State Highway and Teneponstion Of ‘Alls estradDanleaton = satan 9 appease FOREWORD ‘The 1980 collapse of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge was a major turing point in awareness and inereased concern about vessel collision and the safety of bridges erasing navigable waterways in the United States, Studies initiated as a result of this wagedy led to the 1988 pooled-fund research project sponsored by 1 stees and the Federal Highway ‘Administration (FHWA) which developed a proposed design code for use by bridge engineers in evaluating structures for vessel collision. This effort culminated in 1991 with the adoption by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) of the Guide Specification and Commentary for Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges (AASHTO, 1991), ‘The 1991 AASHTO Guide Specification established design provisions for bridges erossing navigable waterways to minimize their suscepuibilty to damage from vessel eolisions. The provisions applied to both new bridges and t0 the analysis of existing bridges to determine vulnerability and potential reuofit. The intsnt of the AASHTO provisions isto provide bridge components with a “reasonable” resistance capacity against ship and barge collisions. In navigable Waterway areus where collision by merchant vessels may be anticipated, the Guide Specification requires that bridge structures be designed to prevent collapse af the superstructure by considering the size and type of vessel flet navigating the channel, available water depth, vessel speed, structure response the risk of collision, and the operational classification of he bridge, This Second Edition of the Guide Specification was developed (o incorporate lessons learned from the use of the ariginal 1991 Vessel Collision Guide Specitication; incorporate the eurent LRFD Bridge Design methodology; clarify some of the risk procedure elements; make minor modifications and comections; and diseuss, and incomporate where deemed necessary, results from barge and ship collision research conducted since the original vessel collision publication. ‘The wse ofthe Guide Specification procedures to evalua existing bridges has been highlighted inthis revised edition, ‘new worked example ilustrating the vessel collision risk assessment procedures has been provided, Compared to mote mature and established fields such as wind and earthquake engineering, vessel collision design is {in its infaney stages. Although there are @ numberof important research needs within the discipline, the key ateas of ship impact forces; barge impact forces; risk acceptance criteria; physical protection systems; and ab improvements should be highlighted as areas of future research This Second Edition was prepared by the consulting firm of Moffatt and Nichol. The principal author was Mic Knott, PLE. (ho was also the principal author of the original 1991 Guide Specification). Moffatt and Nichol provided thelr services under contract to HDR Engineering on behelf ofthe Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). © 200 by he Ameen Asscition of Sine Higa ond Tampon Oa Altighsresined, Duplntog sa naion oops ay SECTIONT INTRODUCTION 11 PURPOSE, In navigable waterway areas, where vessel collision bby merchant ships and barges may be anticipated, bridge siructutes shall be designed to prevent collapse of the superstructure by considering the size and type of the vessel, evailable water dept, vessel speed, and siricture response. The requirements apply to all bridge types Which eross.a navigable shallow draft inland waterway ‘oF canal with barge trafic, and deep draft waterways th large merchant ships, The provisions are for normal ‘merchant stel-hulled vessels (ships and barges) and are ‘ot applicable for waterways whose maritime traffic consists of recreational or other special vessels constructed of wood ot fberglass. “The intent of the vessel eolision requirements is to ‘establish analysis and design provisions to. minimize bridge suscepibility 10 catestrophic collapse, The ‘purpose ofthe provisions is to provide predictable design vessel collision effects in order to proportion bridge ‘components with a reasonable resistance t0 collapse, The provisions apply to bridges crossing navigable Waterways which carry waterborne commerce ¢8 established by federal and state agencies. Judgment should be used when applying the criteria to waterways, in which no defined navigation channel exists and no commercial maritime trafic can’ be reasonably anticipated Bridges over a navigable waterway meeting the criteria above, whether existing or under design, should be evaluated as to vulnerability to vessel collision in fonder to determine prudent protective measures. The ‘recommendations listed below summarize the essential elements ivhich should be addressed in developing. a Program for evaluating bridges and providing pier protection for vessel collision, LL Interdiseiplinary Tea Vessel collision evaluations of new and existing bridges should be conducted by an Interdiseplinary team comprised of structural, geotechnical, and hyde ‘engineers. In special eases where benefvcost analysis of visk reduction is required, an economic spevalist should also be putt of the’ team. Representatives and coordination with the U.S. Coast Guan the Army Comps ‘of Engineers, and other federal and state agencies as appropriate for the bridge location should also. be included inthe imerdisciptinery evaluation, 1.12 New Bridges ‘Vessel collision evaluations of new bridges over navigable waterways should be conducted in accordance ‘with this Guide Specification. ' (© 2000 he American Association of Sine Highway an Trapt Oi ‘Allriphs reseed: Duplication sa Welaon apa aw 2 Guus SprcwicaT10Ns Ano CoMMENTARY FOR VESSEL. COLLISION DESIGN OFM ‘The AASHTO Guide Specifications conlain three alterative analysis methods for determining the design vessel for each bridge component in the structure in accordance with two-tiered risk acceptance teria Method Tis a simple to use semi-deterministic procedure; Method Mis a detaled risk analysis procedure; and Method II Is a cost-ffectiveness of risk eduction procedure (based on a classical benefivicost analysis). The Guide Specifications require the use of Method II risk analysis for all bridges unless special circumstances exist as described in the code forthe use ‘of Methods I and Ill. Special circumstances for using Method [ include shallow draft watersvays where the ‘marine traffic consists almost exclusively of berges, and for using Method Il include very wide waterways with any piers exposed 10 collision, as well as existing bridges to be retrofitted, 1.13 Buisting Bridges Unless an existing bridge was des.gned in accordance with the previous. 1991 edition of the ‘AASHTO Vessel Collision Specifications, all remaining existing bridges over navigable wulerways with commercial barge and ship tific should be evaluated using a vulnerability assessment in accordance with the Method TI risk analysis procedures contained in this current guide specifications. ‘The vulnerability assessments would meet NTSB recommendations t0 AASHTO, FHWA and other federal agencies for improved’ bridge safety based on previous vessel collision accidents involving bridge failures ‘Based on the vulnerabily assessment evaliations of existing bridges within the slate system, a sereening process based on the estimated annusl frequency of collapse ean be used to identify and rank high risk bridges, and to. prioritize vulnerable strucures for potential rehabilitation, retrofit, pler protection countermeasures, or replacernen ‘AASHTO recognizes the potential that a signifiant portion of older bridges erossing navigable waterways the Nation may not meet the risk acceptance criteria for ew bridges contained in the AASHTO Specifications adopted since 1991, ‘The intent of performing. vessal collision vulnerabilgy assessments on the existing bridge systom Isto identify those structures that are pacularly vulnerable to cutastrophie collapse. The vesse collision vulnerability information would provide a framework for States 10 be aware of high-risk sefety needs requiring immediate or short-term action, as well as information to prioritize and budget for the long-term needs for bridge ‘chabilitation or replacement. The risk assessirent of the existing bridges will be used as a part of the prioritization process and allocation of federal funds ‘AASHTO recognizes that the cost of retofiting the potentially large number of existing beidges over ‘navigable waterways to mest the rsk acceptance eriter for new bridges may not be realistic based on current (©2009 by the Anwean Assocation of Sate Highway an Tanspataion Oia Altai etre, Dphaon x sinvon aap nw Secriox 1—Inrmooucrion budget constraints of most State DOTS. However, the vulnerability assessments will allow States to identify those structures that ere particularly high risk and vulnerable to catastrophic collapse due to vessel collision. Federal funding may require that such high risk bridges receive priority treatment by State DOTS ‘with options for revofiting, rehabilitation, installation of pier protection system countermeasures, of replacement. 1.2 BACKGROUND Ship and barge collisions with bridges thot are focated in coastal areas and along inland waterways represent a growing and serious threat to public safety, Port operations, » motorist tlic pattems, and environmental protection in many cities throughout the World. In the 42-year period from 1960 to 2002, there hhave been 31 major bridge collapses worldwide due to ship or barge collision, with a total loss of life of 342 people. Seventeen of the bridge catastrophes discussed above occurred in the United States, including the 1980 collapse of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge crossing in Tampa Bay, Plorida, in which 1,300 feet of the main span collapsed and 35 lives were lost asa result of the collision by an empty 35,000-DI7T (deadweight tonnage) bulk carer. Recent bridge collapses in the United States include the Queen Isabella Bridge connecting San Padre Island to the Texas mainland, which was hit by a barge in September 2001 (8 fatalities); and the collapse ofthe I- 40 Bridge over the Arkansas River near Webber Falls, ‘Oklahoma, which was hit by a barge in May 2002 (13 fatalities) 1 should be noted that there are numerous vessel collision accidents with bridges which cause damage that varies from very minor to significant damage, but do not necessarily result in collapse of the structure ar loss of life. A recent U.S. Coast Guard study (May 2003) of towing vessels and barge collisions with bridges located on the U.S. inland waterway system duting the 10-year period from 1992 to 2001 revealed that there were 2,692 accidents with bridges. Only 61 of these caused bridge damage in excess of $500,000 (1,702 caused very minor slamage with no repair costs tothe bridge), and there were no fatalities within the study period. The staly ‘concluded that 90 percent of the barge accidents were related to human performance (78 percent to pilot error lind 12 peteent t0 other operational factors). Only 5 Percent were related to moshanical problems, and forthe Femaining 5 percent there was insufficient information to assign a cause ca Many factors account for the present shiprbvidge accident problem confronting many countvies around the world, One factor is that a larger number of merchant ships are making more frequent transits past more bridges. Since 1960, the number of bridges across major ‘waterways leading to US. coastal pots has increased by ‘one-third. During that same petiod, the numberof vessels. the world fleet has increased three-fold and worldwide scaborne tonnage hes inereased by more than 235 percent (MeDorald, 1983; US. Deparment of Commerce, 1978) ihr factors include poorly sited bridges. Inade- «quate attention is often given tothe bridge's relationship with waterborne traffie with the result that bridges are placed too near tricky bends oF turns in the navigation channel, or too near waterfom docks where berthing ‘maneuvers could threaten the bridge. Many bridges today have inadequate spans over the navigation channel for the safe transit of modem ships which regularly exceed {800 feet in length and 100 feet in width. ‘These narcow spans leave litle room for error on ‘bohalf of the merchant vessel—pertcularly under adverse wind and hydraulic current conditions. These small spans often result from economic pressure on behalf of the bridge ‘owner and designer 10 minimize the in-place cost of the substructure and superstructure of the bridge without regard to the potential for ship impact against the structure, Economic pressures have long been recognized as conflicting with safety. This is true of both the bridge industry and the maritime industry. In the later, safety concems are often placed second t0 the maintenance of ship schedule—with predictably disastrous consequenc- «3. Since masters und pilots are often rated on thelr ability to make schedules, they are sometimes. very Feluctant to abort transits’ into harbors even during adverse environmental conditions. This may have been fone of the factors involved in’ the Skyway Bridge ‘accident, where the pilot on-board the empty inbound merchant ship attempted to transit under the bridge ducing very low visibility, dense rainfall, and high wind conditions. The vessel strick an anchor pier ofthe bridge located approximately 800 feat from the centerline ofthe channel, A comprehensive literature review of the cument domestic and foreign pructce, experience, and research {©2009 by the Amsrian Association of Site Highway a Tranportion Oi, ‘Al igh esueved Dla eatin of pps a 4 Gurpe Sevciricamtons aN Cowounnrany oR Vissi, COLLISION DESIGN OF HIGMWAY BRIDGES 1.2.1 AASHTO Guide Specification (1991) The 1980 collapse of the Sunshine Skyway Bridge was a major tuening point in awareness and increased coneem for the safety of bridges crossing navigable waterways in the United States, Studies inidated as & result of this tragedy led to the 1988 pooled-fund research project sponsored by 11 states and the Federal Highway” Administration (FHWA) which developed a proposed design code for use by bridge engineers in evaluating structures for vessel collision, This effort culminated in 1991 with the adoption by the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO) of the Guide Specification and Commentary for Vessel Collision Design of Highway Bridges (AASHTO, 1991). ‘The AASHTO Guide Specification established design provisions for bridges crossing navigable ‘waterways to minimize their susceptibility to damage fiom vessel collisions. The provisions applied to both new bridges and 10 the analysis of existing beidges to determine vulnerability and potential retrofit. The intent fof the AASHTO provisions was to provide bridge ‘components with a “reasonable” resistance capacity against ship and barge callisions. In navigable waterway areas where collision by merchant vessels. may be anticipated, the Guide Specifications require that bridge structures ‘be designed to prevent collapse of the Superstructure by considering the size and type of vessel Meet navigating the channel, available water depth, vessel speed, structure response, the risk of collision and the operational classification of the bridge. It should be noted that damage to the bridge (even filure of secondary structural members) is permitted by the code as long as the bridge deck carying motorist traffic docsn't collapse (i.e, sufficlent redundancy and altemate load paths exist in the remaining structure to prevent collapse of the superstructure), ‘When the original 1991 Guide Specification was developed in the late 1980s, most analysis was done by hand calculation; therefore, the specifeation provisions included some simplifying requirements to minimize the hhand analysis effort. With modern personal computers and software programs, the vessel callsion rsk analysis, procedures can be easily programmed. Therefore, come (of those earlier simplifications have been removed in this, 2008 Baltion ofthe Guide Specifications. (©2009 he American Associa Allis reserved Du findings available on the subject of vessel collision with bridges was performed during the development of the Guide Specifications. Particular atention was given to ‘new research conducted since the initial adoption of the 1991 Guide Specifications, as well as lessons learned from users of the 1991 specification. cia Since its adoption by AASHTO in 1991, the Guide Specification has been Used to design numerous new bridges and to evaluate existing structures for their susceptibility to vessel collision. Because the code was published a8 a “guide specification,” its use by the State Departnents of Transportation (DOTs) was optional, not ‘mandatory. Tn general, the use of the code was well received in the engineering community. The major drawbacks in the carly implementation of the specifications Involved luck. of experience in collecting the large amount of vessel Feet data needed to perform the risk analysis for each bridge, as well asa general unfumilarity of most bridge designers (and bridge owners) in directly using risk ‘concepts in structural desig. Histoially in the United States, the risk of struotural collapse end potential loss of life have been {and to a great extent stil are) buried in various “safety factors,” “reliably indexes." ete, used in structural design equations within the design codes. Similar to most ‘countries, the United States has a great amount of ‘iticulty in deating direetly with engineering risks in @ public environment (and this is reflected in our design codes). Defining an acceptable level of risk is a value- oriented process and is by mature subjective. This subjectiveness and the wide range of public opinion oncerming risk acceptance levels results in an engineering. isue that most bridge designers would rather not address. "The vessel collision code is somewhat unique in the United States In that the acceptable isk of collapse is clearly stated by the Guide Specifications, and risk analysis procedures are divectly used (© design the siruoture. Experience 1 date has shown that the use of the vessel impact and bridge protection requirements of the ‘AASHTO Guide Specifications for planning and design ‘of new bridges has resulted in a significant change in proposed structure types over navigable watervays. Tncorporation ofthe risk of vessel collision and cast of protection in the total bridge cost has almost always resulted in longer span bridges being more economical ‘han traditional shorter span structures. This is a consequence of bridge designs involving longer spans reaqiring fewer piers, and therefore fewer pier protection systems, thus producing lower total (bridge plus protection systom) costs [Experience has also shown that itis less expensive \o include the eost of protection inthe planning stages of of Sit Hight nd Tetrion ls on sa wala of ppl ‘Seemion 1—ernopuction a proposed bridge than to add it after the basie span configuration has been established without consider vessel collision concems. Typical eosts for adding protection, or for retrofitting an existing bridge for vessel collision, have ranged from 25 percent to over 100 percent ofthe existing bridge costs (C1.2.1.1 Extreme Event Combinations (Scour) The 1991 AASHTO Guide Specification recommended a load combination of vessel impact plus

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