Extortion: must have delivery of property, must have fear (but not as enuf to delivery)

dihonestly induce
Theft: moving the property (not necessarily take away, mere moving is enough)

Robbery: must instil fear，voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any

person (AR)
death, or hurt, or wrongful restraint, or fear of ○1 instant death, or of ○2 instant hurt, or
of ○3 instant wrongful restraint (Harm).
Theft, Robbery : Talk about act of the accused, in Extortion, the victim must do an act
(delivery)
In theft: If taking back something that belongs to you, does it satisfy theft? No. But if in the
process I intend to cause wrongful loss to that person, it is theft.
In extortion: If want to take back money belonging to you, does it satisfy extortion? No.
Because both of these does not have dishonest intention.

Che Man Bin Che Mud v. Public Prosecutor

The facts of the case are as follows, the appellant is the solicitor and advocator under Che
Man &Partners, who is involved in a plan to defraud Bank Negara. One Harun is the the
former clerk Bank Negara, who was also involved in the defrauding plan. Harun as the clerk
had received a cheque of RM22.2 Million to be credited to the Accountant General’s account.
He had forged signatures of his superiors, thus crediting the amount to the Bank Bumiputra,
which later paid the sum to Che Man & Partners’ account. Later in time, the appellant had
signed and issued 5 open cheques to cash out the RM22.2 Million that was wrongfully
credited to Che Man & Partners account. Harun later pleaded guilty for the charge against
him on theft under Section 378.
However, the court looked into the meaning of theft under Section 378, where the subject of
theft must be “movable property”, which is defined in Section 22 of the code, must refer to
corporeal property, which means the property must consist of the form of a material object.
The subject must be something that can be perceived by the sense. Thus, there cannot be a
theft of a incorporeal property. On the other hand, Section 378 requires that there be dihonest
intention to take a movable property out of its rightful possession coupled with the act of
actually moving the movable property. Thus, in court’s language, the subject of theft must be
movable property that can be perceived by sense, and it has been actually moved with a
dishonest intention.
The court continued to say that the mvoable property which was the subject of theft by Harun
was the RM22.2 Million. An issue does arose that the only possible corporeal things are the
cheque for RM22.2 million that had been handed to Harun, and the currency notes totalling
the RM22.2 Million that the Dayabumi brance paid out. The court held that the subect of theft
could not be the cheque as if so, the charge of theft would have mentioned it, and the
currency notes was not moved by Harun. Thus, there was no theft by Harun in terms of the
currency notes in the meaning of Section 378.
The court held that since the subject cannot be the cheque and the currency notes, the subject
of theft can only be the sum that someone owes to someone, and that in the case is RM22.2
million. To put in simple terms, the initial cheque would make Bank Negara be indebted to
the Accountant General of RM22.2 million, thus Bank Negara would pay that sum to the
Accountant General. But because of Harun’s actions, the Bank Negara was indebted to Bank
Bumiputra, and later Bank Bumiputra is indebted to Che Man & Partners. Thus, the court
held that the owing of a sum was not movable property. Harun did not move a movable
property, but merely manipulated the cheque(there are other provisions) so that the money
would be paid to Che Man & Partners account. Thus, no cash money was actually moved or
passed between the banks. Thus, the court held tha there was no theft done.
378 is out of possession of any person, not out of possesion of the owner. So Dr gave an
example, where if she lost a pen a year ago, and she now see a friend D use it. She thinks it
looks nice, then she takes it for herself. This is theft as she had taken it out of the possession
of D, so you can actually forcefully steal your own item.

Pendakwa Raya v Isa bin Johnit [1994] 3 MLJ 218 Extortion: Must be delivery of property
Facts:
Rs were charged for an offence under S 384 for confining a man, Abdul Razak Efendi bin
Osman in order to extort from his father, Osman bin Hamzah for a sum of money amounting
RM 426,767. Osman had a get rich quick scheme where the 1st R, Sadam had invested RM
345,000. Osman agreed that he had made mistakes in his business and a lot of people had
come to collect their money. The Rs were acquitted the magistrate but an appeal was made
against R.

Decision:
The offence of extortion was not proved since the 1st until the 4th Rs just wanted to meet
with Osman to ask for their money back and not to extort him. According to Ratanlal &
Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes, the chief element in the offence of extortion is that the inducement
must be dishonest. It is not sufficient that there should be wrongful loss caused to an
individual but the person putting that individual in fear of injury must have the intention that
wrongful loss should be caused.

Here, the respondents sincerely believed that Osman had taken money belonging to them,
therefore an attempt to get it back cannot be said as having the intention to cause wrongful
loss to Osman. Besides, it could not be said that the respondents caused fear or injury to
Abdul Razak because even Abdul Razak himself is willing to follow the respondents out of
sympathy. The respondents were also willing to switch on the aircon for Abdul Razak just
because he felt hot in the car and the 1st respondent even prepare food and clothes for him.

Since, there is no extortion, the 1st to the 4th respondents were found guilty under S 340
(wrongful confinement) and not S 348 (wrongful confinement for the purpose of extorting
confession or of compelling restoration of property) for confining Abdul Razak.

According to Ratanlal & Dhirajlal's Law of Crimes (23rd Ed), 'wrongful confinement, which
is a form of wrongful restraint, is keeping a man within limits out of which he wishes to go
and has a right to go'. Here, Abdul Razak was “invited” to enter into the car by being dragged
by 1st respondent and was not able to move as he wished though Abdul Razak did try to get
himself out from the situation and called for help. Thus, it constituted as a wrongful
confinement.

However, the wrongful confinement ends when the victim choose not to escape despite the
opportunity and instead follow the wrongdoer. In this case, Abdul Razak at least has 11 times
to escape from the place and the victim did not request to go back home

The fact that the 1st to the 4th R’s story had been given the run-around by Osman and had not
mistreated Abdul Razak were mitigating factors.

Ang Eng Beng v PP [1990] 3 MLJ 321

Facts:
On 23th of November 1985, the applicant and two others jointly committed robbery
concerning a gold chain valued at $504 in the possession of one Wong Frankie and whilst
committing the said robbery, one Toh Guan Chin voluntarily caused hurt to Wong Frankie by
fisting him on the face and had thereby committed an offence punishable under section 394
of the Penal Code.

The issue here is whether in the case of a person charged with being jointly concerned with
another person in committing robbery pursuant to s 394 of the Penal Code, such other person
having in committing the robbery caused hurt, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove
the existence of a common intention to commit the robbery as between the person so charged
and the person who caused the hurt.

Held: Answering the question in the negative:

S 394 deals with the group liability of robbers one or more of whose number causes hurt.
There are two distinct classes of persons: (a) those who cause the hurt, and (b) those who do
not, but are 'jointly concerned' in the commission of the robbery. So according to the
wordings of the section, the guilty act of a robber who causes hurt in committing the robbery
is imported to all the others who are 'jointly concerned' in the commission of the robbery.
Thus, the applicant who did not hurt the victim would need to be convicted too because he
was “jointly concerned”(he was one of the robbers) in this robbery.

Though the counsel of the applicant raised that there is no common intention of applicant in
hitting the victim, but the court rejected this submission. Instead, the court raised S 37 of the
Penal Code that says:

“When an offence is committed by means of several acts, whoever intentionally co-operates

in the commission of that offence by doing any one of those acts, either singly or jointly with
any other person, commits that offence.”

Here, this section would be more suitable to define “jointly concerned” because the Toh
hitting the victim is one of the actions that is used to achieve the final act, which is the
robbery where the applicant was also involved. Thus, the applicant again fell under the
“jointly concerned” categories. And, he shall be convicted under S 394 too.

Common intention is different with jointly concerned (involved in one act). Section 394 does
not require you to have common intention but only jointly concerned. Thus 394 need not be
read with 34 (common intention)