Marketing Transformtion Case Study

IMB 629
MARKETING TRANSFORMATION USING SOCIAL

NETWORK ON DIGITAL MEDIA:
HOW BJP USED WHATSAPP TO CREATE A
SUCCESSFUL WOM CAMPAIGN
AMI MITINKUMAR SHAH AND U. DINESH KUMAR
Ami Mitinkumar Shah and U. Dinesh Kumar, Professor of DSIS, Indian Institute of Management Bangalore, prepared this case for class
discussion. This case is not intended to serve as an endorsement, source of primary data, or to show effective or inefficient handling of decision
or business processes.
Copyright © 2017 by the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore. No part of the publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or
by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise (including internet) – without the permission of Indian Institute of
Management Bangalore.
This document is authorized for use only in Prof.Ashish Dubey's MDP-NC/405/23/DGMP/326 at Indian Institute of Management - Lucknow from Nov 2023 to May 2024.
Marketing Transformation using Social Network on Digital Media: How BJP Used WhatsApp to
Create a Successful WOM Campaign
Jiten Gajaria, the convener of social media cell of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Maharashtra, was visiting
the district offices to meet party workers and volunteers who were part of the 2014 human chain that
comprised over 32,000 people. This human chain of influencers had played a critical role in BJP’s word-
of-mouth (WOM) campaigning and its subsequent victory in the 13th Maharashtra Legislative Assembly
Election held in 2014.
The human chain of influencers was yet functional even after two years of government formation;
however, all members were not as active as earlier. Gajaria’s eyes were set on 14th Maharashtra
Legislative Assembly Election; his mind was processing 2014 election campaign outcomes and he was
trying to formulate the course of action for the 2019 election campaign. He knew that he had successfully
implemented one of the largest influencer marketing campaigns in the country; his processes had
improved over time. However, he had to re-design his communication strategy, optimize his influencer
recruitment and training strategy, and develop new capabilities to make the most of changing consumer
trends and political environment. Further, rapid advancements in digital media could pose newer
opportunities and/or challenges. Gajaria said:
Although the fundamentals of our influencer marketing program will not change, the
context of upcoming election and go-to-market time will force us to re-visit and re-design
our strategies. We will have to carry out an extensive target market analysis once again.
We may have to identify, recruit and train new influencers in certain constituencies. We
would like to develop a process for better measurement of our campaign reach and
effectiveness. There is lot of work to be done and we have to get started now!
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
India is a federal1 parliamentary democratic republic that follows a dual polity system. In the country, the
President is the head of state and the Prime Minister is the head of government. The country functions on
a double government that consists of the central authority at the center (central government) and the state
authorities at the periphery (state governments). In 2016, there were 29 states and 7 union territories (of
which two union territories, Delhi and Puducherry, were partially state-like in their functioning).
Further, at the center and in 7 states, there is a bicameral2 legislature, consisting of an upper house and a
lower house. The upper house at the center and in bicameral states is known as Rajya Sabha (Council of
States) and Vidhan Parishad (Legislative Council), respectively. The lower house at the center is known
as Lok Sabha (House of the People). The lower house in bicameral states and the sole house in
unicameral3 states (and two state-like union territories) is known as Vidhan Sabha (Legislative
Assembly). More details are available in Exhibits 1 and 2.
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The Constitution of India is well-defined by a rigid and well-recognized framework. Exhibits 3 and 4
provide the central and state governments’ structures, along with their powers and limitations. The
judication in the Indian constitution is independent and headed by the Supreme Court.
ELECTIONS IN LOWER HOUSES
While members of the upper house are indirectly elected, the members of lower houses are directly
elected by citizens (every 5 years) through: (1) General election (country-level) and (2) Legislative
assembly elections in 29 states (and 2 union territories).
An autonomous and constitutionally established federal authority, Election Commission of India (ECI), is
responsible for organizing elections and administering all electoral processes. Interested individuals can
contest in elections either as sole contestants or by forming a political party. Central and state
governments are formed by a political party (or parties) that claim a majority of members in the lower
house.
GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA
According to the ECI, as on September 16, 2014, there were 6 national political parties, 49 state political
parties, and 1,706 registered unrecognized political parties. In independent India, the first general election
(also known as Lok Sabha election) was held in 1951. This election was won by the Indian National
Congress (INC), one of the national political parties that remained dominant in successive elections until
1977. In 1977, for the first time, a non-INC government was formed. In the late 1980s, single party
domination ended; the country witnessed a rise of coalition4 governments.
In 2014, the 16th general election was held in 9 phases (from April 7 to May 12). There were 464 political
parties5 and 8,251 candidates6 who contested for 543 Lok Sabha seats. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
won 282 seats6 and emerged as a single-party majority. Despite having earned a clear majority by itself,
BJP chose to continue with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), the coalition it had led since 1998.
Together, the NDA controlled 336 seats6. India had last seen any single-party led government in the 1984
election.6 On August 15, 2014, India completed 68 years of independence of which the country was ruled
for over 50 years by the INC.
2014 GENERAL ELECTION
According to the ECI, in 2014, 814.5 million people6 were eligible to vote and the average turnout over
all nine phases was 551.3 million people6 (around 66.38%), which was the highest ever in the history of
Indian general elections.7
In addition to several political parties that contested independently and in alliance, there were two major
political coalitions in the 2014 general election:
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1) National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a grand alliance of 22 political parties. The top three
dominant parties were BJP (contested 427 seats), Telugu Desam Party (contested 30 seats), and
Shiv Sena (contested 20 seats).
2) United Progressive Alliance (UPA), a grand alliance of 12 political parties. The top three
dominant parties were INC (contested 462 seats), Nationalist Congress Party (contested 27 seats),
and Rashtriya Janata Dal (contested 27 seats).
The NDA won 336 seats and received total vote share of 38.5% of which the BJP itself won 31.0% of all
votes and 282 (51.9%) of all seats. 8 The UPA, won 58 seats, of which 44 were won by the INC. INC won
19.3% of all votes.8 In 2014, INC recorded an all-time low performance8 in the general election. INC
could not appoint a leader of opposition; they needed a minimum of 10% of total seats in order to qualify
as the opposition party.
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN INDIA
Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) were chosen by the Indian electorate through the assembly
elections that were held every 5 years. The assembly elections were never carried out in the same year for
all states and union territories. In 2014, legislative assembly elections took place for eight states: Andhra
Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Odisha and Sikkim.
In the state of Maharashtra, it was the 13th Legislative Assembly Election.
OVERVIEW ON POLITICS IN MAHARASHTRA
The state of Maharashtra was formed in May 1960. As on May 2014, Maharashtra was the second largest
electoral state in the country. Since its formation, the politics of the state was dominated by the INC party
until 1995 when the BJP and Shiv Sena (SS) secured majority in the state to form a coalition government.
SS, founded by Late Bal Keshav Thackeray (1966–2012), did not have nation-wide presence; however, it
was a prominent political party in Maharashtra.
In 1999, Sharad Pawar, a notable leader in Maharashtra, quit INC to incept his own party, the Nationalist
Congress Party (NCP). Although Sharad Pawar formed NCP, he entered into an alliance with the INC in
the very same year. INC-NCP alliance ensured that BJP-SS alliance did not win (and formed government)
the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly election.
Starting 1999, the INC-NCP coalition government remained in power for 15 consecutive years until the
13th Legislative Assembly election that was held in October 2014. Prithviraj Chavan of INC was the last
Chief Minister of Maharashtra under the INC-NCP alliance until September 2014 and thereafter it was
President’s rule in the state until Devendra Fadnavis of the BJP took over in October 2014.
2014 LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTION IN MAHARASHTRA
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The 13th Legislative Assembly election was held in a single phase on October 15, 2014. A total of 4,119
candidates9 contested the election for 288 seats.9 Two major alliances, INC-NCP and BJP-SS were
dissolved just a few days before the election date. Non-agreement over seat distribution was cited as the
reason for dispute and separation for both alliances. Key facts on BJP-SS alliance:
 BJP and SS were alliance partners for 25 years. In 2009, the SS and the BJP contested for 169
and 119 assembly seats, respectively. 10
 Just before the 2014 general election, BJP-SS added four smaller parties to their alliance, called
the Mahayuti or grand alliance. 11
 After spectacular performance in 2014 general election, BJP demanded additional seats to
contest. They wanted 130 seats. 11
 SS offered 119 seats to the BJP and 18 seats to four other allies, keeping 151 seats for itself. 12
 After several rounds of negotiations, the parties did not arrive at any conclusion. BJP-SS alliance
ended12 on September 25, 2014.
 Before election, BJP released its list of 261 candidates of which over 50 candidates did not
originally belong to the BJP. Most were turncoats from INC and NCP, while a few were turncoats
from SS. 13
 A leading newspaper quoted a BJP leader, "With the exception of some seats such as Hingna that
belonged to us, outsiders have been accommodated in seats which were either not with us (were
with SS) or where we had not won." 13
The competition was intense since all four heavyweight political parties contested independently for the
first time after several years.
Of the state's 8.35 crore eligible voters, a turnout of 64% was recorded. The result was announced on
October 19, 2014. BJP won 122 seats14 and received a plurality15; however, it needed 23 seats more for a
clear majority. SS was the first runner-up with 63 seats14 followed by INC (42 seats) 14 and NCP (41
seats).14 BJP initially formed a minority government and named Devendra Fadnavis as the chief minister.
Later, in December 2014, BJP and SS re-united; SS entered the government to create a comfortable
majority in the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly.
In the history of Maharashtra Legislative Assembly election, no party other than the INC had ever won
100 seats or more; the highest was that of the Janata Party’s (99 seats in 1977). Since 1995, the state was
run by coalition government; no political party, including the INC, could by itself win 100 seats. 16 In the
13th Legislative Assembly election, both these marks were breached by the BJP.
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BJP MAHARASHTRA’S DIGITAL MARKETING CAMPAIGN
For the 16th general election, BJP made extensive use of digital and social media to reach out to citizens
and communicate their key messages. The digital media campaign outreach was massive and
unprecedented. The party campaign employed a mix of digital platforms such as official website, various
social media platforms, short message service (SMS), webinars and webcasts, user generated content
websites, and mobile applications. Several political analysts affirmed that social media platforms such as
Twitter and Facebook played an important role in BJP’s overwhelming victory.
In addition to building the party brand, BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, rose to
prominence owing to his well-planned and well-executed social media outreach programs. According to
FollowerWonk, in December 2013, Modi, had 3,040,192 followers on Twitter and his social authority
was 81. On Facebook, Modi had 7,549,972 likes and 960,914 people talking about him.17 In August 2013,
the BJP’s official Twitter handle had 97,538 followers and Facebook page had 1,098,339 likes and 47,488
talking about the party.18 Modi and other BJP leaders also made use of conventional media and direct
marketing (public meetings and political rallies) for campaigning.
The 13th Legislative Assembly election in Maharashtra was held just a few months after the 16 th general
election. Expectations from the state’s social media marketing cell were high. Several insiders (party
leaders, workers, etc.) and outsiders (political analysts, competing political parties, supporters of BJP,
etc.) felt that the Maharashtra social media team would replicate the scale of social media presence in the
state; however, they were disappointed with the results. Criticism included:
 Social media presence of BJP Maharashtra was chaotic and confusing. There were multiple
Twitter handles, Facebook pages and YouTube accounts. The official properties of BJP
Maharashtra were neither verified19 by Facebook nor by Twitter. It was hard to identify official
properties of the party.
 In October 2014, the official Facebook page of BJP Maharashtra had about 150,000 likes and the
Twitter handle had about 13,000 followers.
 There were about 4-5 parody20 accounts on Twitter and 7-8 fan-managed community pages on
Facebook. All these properties were managed by party workers and party supporters. Each handle
and page had a small fan following and there was no structured flow of communication.
However, Gajaria had conviction in his strategy and execution; he believed that chaos was good and he
had a strong reason to justify his belief. Gajaria said:
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Our strategy was to bring about convergence of social media with ground-level
mobilisation. Social media is nothing but social conversations that are enabled by
technology. It’s best to make conversations look real rather than have an official
mouthpiece send out formal messages. Messages received from friends and family and
social media managed by volunteers can create a deeper impact than messages received
from a political party. After all, WOM marketing always scores over advertising;
especially in the case of a political party.
Gajaria also believed that campaigning strategies that worked at the national level would fail to deliver
results at the state level. The national-level campaign had adopted a two-pronged approach where the
party and the prime ministerial candidate were promoted. In Maharashtra, the BJP had not announced the
name of their chief ministerial candidate.
Another difference was that of the objectives and time-resource availability; Modi’s objective was brand
building (and eventually to garner maximum votes for the BJP). He had started campaigning on social
media much prior to the election dates (almost 36 months of campaign period). For Gajaria, the objective
was to secure maximum votes and he had only 5 months for campaigning and a limited budget.
Further, needs and behavior of target audiences of both campaigns were different. Although the target
audience of the state was a subset of the audience targeted by national-level campaigns, their needs
differed at the time of general and legislative assembly elections. Their expectations from central and
state governments were different; this was largely because of the unique functions that both governments
performed.
Also, the population using social networking applications such as Facebook and Twitter were highly
concentrated in urban India. The size of this population was large enough when one wished to roll out a
national-level campaign; however, the population size was too small for state-level campaigning.
Interestingly, users of a messaging application, WhatsApp, were spread evenly across urban and rural
India; and hence could be well-targeted by both, national-level and state-level campaigners. Gajaria said:
At time of the general elections, we met several people who cast their ballot. We realised
that a vast majority of mobile phone users in rural areas used WhatsApp messenger.
There were fewer Facebook users and those using Twitter were negligible. Although
there was no means of formal measurement, we decided to use WhatsApp as our primary
platform for campaigning. After all, our goal was not to count Facebook likes and Twitter
followers, we wanted votes!
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
May 10: The last leg of general election in Maharashtra concluded.
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May 12: Maharashtra core social media team that comprised one convenor (Jiten Gajaria) and five co-
convenors met for a debrief session. They pondered over insights gained from the general election and
discussed the way forward for the Legislative Assembly election.
May 16: Result of the general election was declared. BJP won with a clear majority and Narendra Modi
was declared the Prime Minister elect.
May 31: Core social media team met senior party leaders to present its marketing strategy. They
discussed segmentation and targeting, social media platform selection, content strategy, capability, and
resource development. They agreed upon desired outcomes and measurement criteria. The core social
media team had proposed creation of 288 social media centers that would manage campaign execution in
each constituency. Team size and roles were well-defined at this stage.
June–July: Core social media team traveled to 15 major cities, spread across 6 administrative divisions in
Maharashtra. They appointed 55 district social media heads.
July 25: Bhau Cha Dhakka (brother’s push) campaign was launched.
August 01: WhatsApp opt-in campaign was launched.
August 13: In addition to a central content creation team, five regional content creation teams were
formed in Aurangabad, Pune, Wardha, Jalgaon, and Mumbai.
August 15: Aghadi Cha Ghotala (scams by former government) campaign was launched.
September 06: Core social media team organized a mega workshop that was attended by all members
from regional content creation teams, all 55 district social media heads and two members from each of the
288 constituency social media centers. Purpose was to familiarize everyone with campaign execution and
reporting process.
September 10: Core social media team divided the responsibility of monitoring performance of all 288
constituencies and personally visited each constituency to check the campaign execution.
September 25: BJP–SS alliance was dissolved.
October 15: 13th Legislative assembly election was held.
October 19: Result was announced.
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SEGMENTATION AND TARGETING STRATEGY
Historically, geographically and according to political sentiments, Maharashtra was divided into five main
regions – Vidarbha, Marathwada, Uttar Maharashtra (Northern Maharashtra), Paschim Maharashtra
(Western Maharashtra), and Konkan (includes Mumbai and Thane)
There were six administrative divisions and 36 districts. Exhibit 5 provides complete details of the state.
BJP had further divided a few of the 36 districts to create 55 distinct districts. Newly created districts
were heterogeneous and each district was homogeneous. For example, the biggest concern of voters in
district 1 was water scarcity and their expectation from the government was modern irrigation facility. On
the other hand, the biggest concern of voters in district 2 was lack of formal employment and their
expectation from the government was local job creation. Each district had unique requirements and BJP
decided to send carefully tailored, relevant messages to voters.
CONTENT STRATEGY
The content strategy of BJP revolved around (1) their development agenda and (2) uncovering scams and
mismanagement by the INC-NCP coalition government. They stayed away from accusing or responding
to accusations by their estranged ally, SS.
Campaigns that targeted the opposition parties made use of humor in the form of caricatures and comic
strips. Gajaria believed that use of humor would improve BJP’s outreach (especially in rural
Maharashtra). Further, use of humor could convey strong messages in a lighter way; thus, BJP could
maintain dignity and respect for the opposition.
Deep understanding of consumers had revealed an interesting insight; voters in different regions preferred
a different flavor of humor.
1) People in Vidarbha preferred harsh humor.

2) People in Marathwada preferred factual and direct humor.
3) People in Uttar Maharashtra preferred spicy humor.
4) People in Paschim Maharashtra preferred classic humor.
5) People in Konkan preferred witty humor.
6) People in Mumbai and Thane had an appetite for a mix-and-match of all.
Two major campaigns, Bhau Cha Dhakka and Aghadi Cha Ghotala, were conceptualized. These
campaigns uncovered 116 scams by the INC-NCP coalition government. A sample creative is available in
Exhibits 6a and 6b.
Bhau Cha Dhakka was a slice of life campaign that revolved around a fictional character, Rambhau, a
man from a middle-class family, his wife Chandrika and their son Bandya. The family indulged in
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hilarious everyday conversation to highlight issues faced by people in Maharashtra. These issues were
handpicked to address concerns and grievances of a common man in every district. Bhau Cha Dhakka
campaign mainly focused on the urban issues faced in Paschim Maharashtra, Konkan, Mumbai, and
Thane.
Aghadi Cha Ghotala campaign was devised to uncover graver issues such as farmers’ suicides, water
scarcity, irrigation scam, etc. This campaign was mainly targeted at people in Vidarbha and Marathwada
regions. A powerful punchline along with caricatures of political leader from opposition parties who were
involved in scams were used.
A mix of images, text messages, video and audio clips were produced and used over the campaign period.
Messages were written in Marathi, the state’s local language; a few were translated into English.
About 600 images were created to communicate different messages such as BJP’s vision, development
agenda, appeal to vote and Bhau Cha Dhakka and Aghadi Cha Ghotala campaign creatives. These images
were designed by the central and regional content creation teams. Text messages were mostly used as
reminders for any local on-ground event or any major online activity.
Eleven videos were produced to showcase BJP’s first quarter achievements at the center. Every video
communicated BJP’s vision for Maharashtra and what people can expect if the party was voted to power.
Owing to the demise of two prominent BJP leaders, sentiments in two constituencies had turned gloomy
and pessimistic. To offset these negative sentiments, two videos were created in fond memory of these
senior leaders, Gopinath Munde and Pramod Mahajan. These videos were produced to regain lost
confidence of voters and assure them of good governance and progressive development.
Two audio clips and four video clips were created for circulation closer to the election date. Bytes of
common people, who were looked upon as influencers locally, were recorded and these clips served as the
call-to-vote campaign input.
SELECTION OF PLATFORM
While Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were used to reach out to the target audience, WhatsApp
remained the platform of choice for Gajaria. Gajaria said:
The reach that WhatsApp alone could offer was much higher than all others (Facebook,
Twitter and YouTube) put together. Moreover, we could send targeted messages using
WhatsApp... Every district faced unique challenges… communication that was relevant
to one set of voters was not relevant to another set of voters… For instance, Uttar
Maharashtra faced issues such as farmer suicide while Paschim Maharashtra faced issues
such as irrigation and cooperative sector scams and Nandurbar district in Uttar
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Maharashtra lacked overall development. With this kind of variance, it could easily turn
out to be highly insensitive to send non-targeted messages.
Further, in the Marathwada region, political sentiments were highly negative for Pawar of
NCP party; we could leverage the insight to our advantage... Due to the strong leadership
of Mundeji and Mahajanji, voters in Beed and Dhule, had been pro-BJP for years…
However, with their sudden demise, we realised that we were losing hold on both these
constituencies. Thanks to one-on-one messaging on WhatsApp, we could address low
morale and negative sentiments of voters out there. Targeted communication over
WhatsApp gave us full control; a broadcast approach would have clearly failed,
TEAM BUILDING
After selecting the platform of choice, Gajaria planned the execution strategy. He had three options: (1)
automated message blast, (2) developing a community on WhatsApp, and (3) creating a trackable
influencer marketing program to create WOM using WhatsApp.
Gajaria knew that the first option, of using a tool to send messages to his target audience, was the easiest;
however, in this approach, the message would look like a spam. This could annoy voters and spoil the
party’s image.
Developing a single community on WhatsApp that could be effectively managed had several practical
limitations. First and foremost, time was a constraint; it was impossible to develop a huge community in 5
months. Second, technology had limitations; every WhatsApp number had a limit of 50 groups of 50
participants. Third, the initiative would once again be looked upon as a broadcast approach; the personal
touch would be lost. Despite these shortcomings, Gajaria did not completely discard the second option.
Finally, launching a trackable influencer marketing program to create WOM using WhatsApp sounded
the most difficult; yet, it was the most promising option available. Gajaria created three teams – internal
party workers, external creative partners, and external volunteers, who could influence the local
communities. He developed a process for campaign roll-out and trained all members who were involved
in execution. Exhibit 7 presents the team structure.
Internal Party Workers: There were three sub-divisions in the team of internal party workers. There was
a strategy team, a team for content development, and a team for campaign execution and monitoring.
Strategy Team: The core social media team that comprised one convener and five co-
conveners worked with 55 district social media heads to form 288 constituency social
media centers. District social media heads were knowledgeable, well-connected with
party leaders and workers, and had good understanding of local politics in their respective
districts. Each district was responsible for 5-6 constituencies. District social media heads
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worked with content development teams and ground-level campaign execution teams.
They provided briefs on what content should be developed for their constituencies and
took decisions on when messages should be sent out to voters. They were also
responsible for collecting ground-level feedback and passing the information to party
senior leadership and core social media team. Core social media team was partially
responsible for content creation and solely responsible for management of official
WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube accounts, and overall smooth functioning of
digital campaign. Also, the team was responsible for quality control; they reviewed every
campaign input that was produced by the content development team and sent approved
material to district social media heads for roll-out.
Content Development Team: In addition to a central content creation team, five

regional content creation teams that comprised two people were formed. Each team
worked with local external partners to produce campaign material. Their responsibility
was to create compelling content that would appeal to voters in their respective regions.
They would receive briefs from their district social media heads and had to send
campaign material to core social media team for review and further dissemination.
Campaign Execution and Monitoring Team: As mentioned earlier, 288 constituency

social media centers were incepted. Every social media center had a center head and 10
active party workers. Center heads received campaign material from their district social
media head; their job was to forward campaign inputs to active party workers and ensure
that it was further rolled out as planned. Center heads also collected ground-level
feedback from active party workers and sent insights to district social media heads. The
job of active party workers was to recruit and mentor about 10 content carriers each.
Content carriers were volunteers who were willing to and could influence their social
circle. Thus, a team of 100 external influencers was created in every constituency. While
recruiting volunteers, it was important to understand their motivation and affection
towards the BJP.
External Creative Partners: Multiple creative partners for designing, copywriting, and rich media
production were recruited at regional levels. The selection criteria not only assessed creative abilities but
also assessed alignment of core values and philosophies with that of BJP’s. Most creative partners offered
services at discounted price; they genuinely believed in the party’s vision and wanted to contribute to its
success.
External Volunteers: About 28,800 influencers were carefully selected across 288 constituencies. Every
constituency had about 100 volunteers who came from diverse backgrounds – diversity in terms of age,
gender, education, income level, professional accomplishments, ethnicity, religion, and so on. Every
volunteer was committed to further reach out to 100 people in his/her social and professional circle to
spread the party’s message. Gajaria said:
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Our volunteers came from different walks of life. We had students, homemakers;
professionals such as teachers, doctors, local theatre artists; and entrepreneurs such as
farmers, barbers, tea stall owners, pan stall owners, potters and so on. Our objective was
to reach out to every voter with the help of these influencers as they were true
representation of their society.
Every volunteer was highly motivated and wanted to drive change; they had strong conviction in BJP’s
ability to form the government and provide good governance. Selection criteria included their ability to
connect and influence as well. Gajaria said:
Faith in the BJP government and passion to create a positive change, were two factors
that we were looking for while appointing volunteers. Their job was to send WhatsApp
messages to 100 people in their social circle. A few did much more than what we
requested. In a few constituencies, our volunteers would visit homes to show BJP
communication to those people who did not own a smartphone. In rural Satara, there is a
small village that does not have the last mile connectivity. Our volunteers would take a
bus and later walk for about 25 minutes to reach the village and engage with voters out
there. We are very grateful to all our volunteers.
WHATSAPP CAMPAIGN EXECUTION AND MEASUREMENT
On August 1, 2014, BJP launched a missed call campaign. Any citizen of Maharashtra could give a
missed call on a mobile number to include his/her name on the party’s database. Registered citizens
received campaign communication from BJP’s official WhatsApp number. Over 32,000 voters had opted-
in.
The core social media team developed campaign inputs and relevant messages to 32,000 voters who had
opted-in through missed call campaign. They also sent campaign material to 55 district social media
heads. The district social media heads ensured that relevant communication was sent to their respective
social media centers.
The center heads in every constituency social media center would receive campaign material from their
district head. Their job was to forward the material to 10 of their active party workers who further sent the
material to 100 volunteers. Every volunteer would further send the party message to 100 people in his/her
social and professional circles.
Direct Reach: Thus, one piece of communication reached about 10,000 people in every
constituency (viral marketing).
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Indirect Reach: On a conservative estimate, these 10,000 people would further forward
the campaign input to at least one person; thus, the indirect reach was another 10,000
(WOM creation).
Going by the above estimates, one campaign input across 288 constituencies was circulated 5,760,000
times directly (viral marketing) and indirectly (WOM creation). The party also sent campaign inputs to
32,000 people who had opted for receiving official communication. At least 200 campaign inputs were
sent out in every constituency. Gajaria said:
We could calculate the campaign “direct” reach measurement; however, it was hard to
justify the “indirect” reach. I personally feel that the word-of-mouth was much higher
than what I proposed as “conservative estimate”. I wish I had better campaign reach
calculation formula. Further, my interest lies in understanding the campaign
effectiveness. How the campaign translated into votes is yet another mystery I wish to
solve.
As reported by Gajaria, the total campaign budget was INR 1.8 million ($1 = INR 65 approximately,
March 2017). The money was largely used for travel and training purposes by the core social media team.
They also spent a portion of the budget to avail creative design services. Gajaria said:
We had created 600 images, 17 video clips and 2 audio clips. Further, we had sent several
text messages. Of course, we did not send all material to every constituency; however, by
and large, every constituency received at least 200 messages in the campaign period. Had
we used any form of paid media instead of creating a human chain, we would pay at least
10 paise per SMS/WhatApp message, about 40 paise per engagement using Facebook
Sponsored Post and cost for sponsoring a tweet on Twitter would have been extremely
high. Our total cost of marketing would have been Rs. 1 billion! Well, our total budget
was just Rs. 1.8 million.
Gajaria has the following questions:
1) What could be the key competitive threats to BJP in 2019 Legislative Assembly Elections? What
strategies BJP should adopt to combat these threats?
2) How BJP could further increase the effectiveness of its influencer marketing program for the
forthcoming election in 2019?
3) Based on past election data (Exhibit 8), how could BJP determine the number of influencers and
level of campaigning required in 2014 and 2019?
Page 14 of 23
Exhibit 1
Details of 29 Indian States
Sr. Assembly
State Capital Statehood Legislature
No. Seats
1 Andhra Pradesh Hyderabad (de jure capital) 01-Oct-53 Bicameral 175 + 50
2 Arunachal Pradesh Itanagar 20-Feb-87 Unicameral 60
3 Assam Dispur 26-Jan-50 Unicameral 126
4 Bihar Patna 26-Jan-50 Bicameral 243 + 75
5 Chhattisgarh Naya Raipur 01-Nov-00 Unicameral 90
6 Goa Panaji 30-May-87 Unicameral 40
7 Gujarat Gandhinagar 01-May-60 Unicameral 182
8 Haryana Chandigarh 01-Nov-66 Unicameral 90
9 Himachal Pradesh Shimla 25-Jan-71 Unicameral 68
Jammu and Srinagar (Summer) and 26-Jan-50 Bicameral 87 + 36

10 Kashmir Jammu (Winter)
11 Jharkhand Ranchi 15-Nov-00 Unicameral 81
12 Karnataka Bengaluru 01-Nov-56 Bicameral 224 + 75
13 Kerala Thiruvananthapuram 01-Nov-56 Unicameral 140
14 Madhya Pradesh Bhopal 01-Nov-56 Unicameral 230
15 Maharashtra Mumbai 01-May-60 Bicameral 288 + 78
16 Manipur Imphal 21-Jan-72 Unicameral 60
17 Meghalaya Shillong 21-Jan-72 Unicameral 60
18 Mizoram Aizawl 20-Feb-87 Unicameral 40
19 Nagaland Kohima 01-Dec-63 Unicameral 60
20 Odisha Bhubaneswar 26-Jan-50 Unicameral 147
21 Punjab Chandigarh 01-Nov-66 Unicameral 117
22 Rajasthan Jaipur 01-Nov-56 Unicameral 200
23 Sikkim Gangtok 16-May-75 Unicameral 32
24 Tamil Nadu Chennai 26-Jan-50 Unicameral 234
25 Telangana Hyderabad 02-Jun-14 Bicameral 119 + 40
26 Tripura Agartala 21-Jan-72 Unicameral 60
27 Uttar Pradesh Lucknow 26-Jan-50 Bicameral 403 + 100
28 Uttarakhand Dehradun (Interim) 09-Nov-00 Unicameral 70
29 West Bengal Kolkata 26-Jan-50 Unicameral 295
Source: Election Commission of India Website
Page 15 of 23
Exhibit 2
Details of 7 Union Territories in India
Union territory Capital Legislature Not applicable

Andaman and Nicobar Islands Port Blair Not applicable Not applicable
Chandigarh Chandigarh Not applicable Not applicable
Dadra and Nagar Haveli Silvassa Not applicable Not applicable
Daman and Diu Daman Not applicable Not applicable
Delhi New Delhi Unicameral 70
Lakshadweep Kavaratti Not applicable Not applicable
Puducherry Pondicherry Unicameral 30
Exhibit 3
Structure of Central Government of India
Page 16 of 23
Exhibit 4
Structure of State Government of India
Page 17 of 23
Exhibit 5
Details of 36 Districts, 6 Divisions and 5 Regions in Maharashtra
Population
Sr. District Administrative Area % of State
Formed Region (2001
No. Name Division (km2) Population
census)
Uttar
1 01-May-60 17,413 4,088,077 4.22%
Ahmednagar Nashik Maharashtra
2 Akola 01-May-60 Amravati Vidarbha 5,417 1,818,617 1.68%
3 Amravati 01-May-60 Amravati Vidarbha 12,626 2,606,063 2.69%
4 Aurangabad 01-May-60 Aurangabad Marathwada 10,100 2,897,013 2.99%
5 Beed 01-May-60 Aurangabad Marathwada 10,439 2,161,250 2.23%
6 Bhandara 01-May-60 Nagpur Vidarbha 3,717 1,135,835 1.17%
7 Buldhana 01-May-60 Amravati Vidarbha 9,680 2,232,480 2.30%
8 Chandrapur 01-May-60 Nagpur Vidarbha 10,695 2,071,101 2.14%
Uttar
9 01-May-60 8,063 1,707,947 1.76%
Dhule Nashik Maharashtra
10 Gadchiroli 26-Aug-82 Nagpur Vidarbha 14,412 970,294 1%
11 Gondia 01-May-99 Nagpur Vidarbha 4,843 1,200,151 1.24%
12 Hingoli 01-May-99 Aurangabad Marathwada 4,526 987,160 1.02%
Uttar
13 01-May-60 11,765 3,679,936 3.80%
Jalgaon Nashik Maharashtra
14 Jalna 01-May-81 Aurangabad Marathwada 7,612 1,612,357 1.66%
Paschim
15 01-May-60 7,685 3,515,413 3.63%
Kolhapur Pune Maharashtra
16 Latur 15-Aug-82 Aurangabad Marathwada 7,372 2,080,285 2.15%
Mumbai
17 01-May-60 67.7 3,326,837 3.43%
City Konkan Konkan
18 Mumbai 01-Oct-90 369 8,587,000 8.86%
Suburban Konkan Konkan
19 Nagpur 01-May-60 Nagpur Vidarbha 9,897 4,051,444 4.18%
20 Nanded 01-May-60 Aurangabad Marathwada 10,422 2,876,259 2.97%
Uttar
21 01-Jul-98 5,035 1,309,135 1.35%
Nandurbar Nashik Maharashtra
Uttar
22 01-May-60 15,530 4,993,796 5.15%
Nashik Nashik Maharashtra
23 Osmanabad 01-May-60 Aurangabad Marathwada 7,512 1,486,586 1.53%
24 Parbhani 01-May-60 Aurangabad Marathwada 6,251 1,527,715 1.58%
Paschim
25 01-May-60 15,642 7,224,224 7.46%
Pune Pune Maharashtra
26 Raigad 01-May-60 Konkan Konkan 7,148 2,207,929 2.28%
27 Ratnagiri 01-May-60 Konkan Konkan 8,208 1,696,777 1.75%
Page 18 of 23
Exhibit 5 (Contd.)
Paschim
28 01-May-60 8,578 2,583,524 2.67%
Sangli Pune Maharashtra
Paschim
29 01-May-60 10,484 2,796,906 2.89%
Satara Pune Maharashtra
30 Sindhudurg 01-May-81 Konkan Konkan 5,207 868,825 0.90%
Paschim
31 01-May-60 14,845 3,849,543 3.97%
Solapur Pune Maharashtra
32 Thane 01-May-60 Konkan Konkan 9,558 8,131,849 8.39%
33 Wardha 01-May-60 Nagpur Vidarbha 6,310 1,230,640 1.27%
34 Washim 01-Jul-98 Amravati Vidarbha 5,150 1,020,216 1.05%
35 Yavatmal 01-May-60 Amravati Vidarbha 13,584 2,077,144 2.14%
36 Palghar 01-Aug-14 Konkan Konkan 5,344 2,990,116 3.09%
Exhibit 6a
Sample campaign creative
Page 19 of 23
Exhibit 6b
Translation of the cartoon text from Marathi
(Translation of Marathi text in left side cartoon (Translation of Marathi text in right side
in Exhibit 6a) cartoon in Exhibit 6a)
Hello, My name is Ram Bhau (you can call me We are aware of your so-called "good"
Bhau). This is my wife Chandrika (we refer to governance; don't expect us to be taciturn over
her as Chandra). This is our son Bandya. the Ramoshi issue.
The Government has been punching us since Note: To give the underprivileged Ramoshi
past 15 years; now we're here to reciprocate and tribe a source of sustenance, in 1858, the
give back humorous punches! British government had leased out 102 acres
of land in Pune. However, a construction
Note: Bhau in Marathi stands for Brother. company, Mayureshwar Developers,
manipulated the tribals to transfer the property
to their name and got the necessary clearances
such as non-agricultural use certificate and
order under Urban Land Ceiling Act. The
scam came to light in December 2009, when a
small-time builder, Ravindra Barhate,
petitioned the Pune Collector, Pune Municipal
Commissioner (PMC) and also the then Chief
Minister, Ashok Chavan of INC party, calling
the entire deal a massive scam. On March 5,
2011, PMC Commissioner, Mahesh Zagade,
passed an order calling the land transfer and
other related clearances illegal. He also
recommended strict legal action against the
guilty.
Source: Tehelka News
Source: Bharatiya Janata Party
Page 20 of 23
Exhibit 7
Creation of the Human Chain along with number of people at each level
Source: Bharatiya Janata Party
Page 21 of 23
Exhibit 8
Details of 2009 and 2014 Assembly Elections in Maharashtra
(Provided as Spreadsheet Supplement: File IMB631)
Page 22 of 23
END NOTES
1
Federalism is a compound mode of government in a single political system. The central or ‘'federal'’ government
shares power with regional (provincial, state, territorial, and so on) governments.
2
In the government, bicameralism is the practice of dividing the legislature into two separate assemblies or houses.
3
In the government, unicameralism is the practice of having legislature with just one assembly or house.
4
A coalition government is formed when several political parties cooperate and form an alliance; this reduces the
dominance of any one party within that coalition.
5
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-05-21/news/50001911_1_parties-lok-sabha-general-elections
6
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Indian-Parliamentary-Elections-of-2014-The-2004659
7
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/bou8tVJWkmJRd5rk1jTLXI/Lok-Sabha-polls-Voting-for-last-phase-begins-in-
41-constitu.html
8
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/news/BJPs-31-lowest-vote-share-of-any-party-to-win-
majority/articleshow/35315930.cms
9
http://www.elections.in/maharashtra/
10
http://www.livemint.com/Politics/HQzkI4CrPTroWZx0lx8t6O/How-BJP-Shiv-Sena-shared-Maharashtra-seats-in-
the-past.html
11
http://www.firstpost.com/politics/sena-bjp-hit-hurdle-maharashtra-seat-demands-smaller-alliance-members-
1684173.html
12
http://www.india.com/news/india/maharashtra-assembly-election-2014-shiv-sena-bharatiya-janata-party-alliance-
ends-158061/
13
http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/maharashtra-assembly-polls-bjp-babanrao-pachpute-bhausaheb-wakchaure-
sameer-meghe--manikrao-kokate-sanjay-patil-dudhgaonkar/1/394466.html
14
http://www.india.com/news/india/maharashtra-assembly-election-results-2014-with-122-seats-won-bjp-looks-to-
restore-alliance-with-shiv-sena-176393/
15
Plurality: In an election contested by more than two candidates, plurality occurs when one candidate receives most
votes but not necessarily more than half of the votes, while in a majority election, a candidate wins if he/she receives
over half of the votes.
16
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/maharashtra/behind-bjp-upper-castes-obcs-and-rich/
17
http://www.lifehacker.co.in/jugaad/Building-Of-The-Brand-Narendra-Modi-using-Social-
Media/articleshow/28138520.cms
18
http://indianexpress.com/article/india/politics/facebook-twitter-and-youtube-bjp-surges-far-ahead-of-congress/
19
Verified accounts on Facebook and Twitter are those accounts where a blue verified badge appears next to the
name on an account’s profile and next to the account name in search results. This blue badge lets people know that
an account of public interest is authentic.
20
Parody account is a fan or commentary account on Twitter where individuals can share different ideas about a
specific issue, person, or company.
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IMB 629

MARKETING TRANSFORMATION USING SOCIAL

AMI MITINKUMAR SHAH AND U. DINESH KUMAR

ELECTIONS IN LOWER HOUSES

GENERAL ELECTIONS IN INDIA

2014 GENERAL ELECTION

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN INDIA

OVERVIEW ON POLITICS IN MAHARASHTRA

BJP MAHARASHTRA’S DIGITAL MARKETING CAMPAIGN

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

May 10: The last leg of general election in Maharashtra concluded.

August 01: WhatsApp opt-in campaign was launched.

September 25: BJP–SS alliance was dissolved.

October 15: 13th Legislative assembly election was held.

October 19: Result was announced.

SEGMENTATION AND TARGETING STRATEGY

1) People in Vidarbha preferred harsh humor.

Content Development Team: In addition to a central content creation team, five

Campaign Execution and Monitoring Team: As mentioned earlier, 288 constituency

WHATSAPP CAMPAIGN EXECUTION AND MEASUREMENT

Gajaria has the following questions:

Jammu and Srinagar (Summer) and 26-Jan-50 Bicameral 87 + 36

Source: Election Commission of India Website

Union territory Capital Legislature Not applicable

Source: Election Commission of India Website

Source: Election Commission of India Website

Source: Election Commission of India Website

Source: Election Commission of India Website

Source: Tehelka News

Source: Bharatiya Janata Party

Source: Bharatiya Janata Party

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