REYES vs.

BARRETTO-DATU
G.R. No. L-17818
January 25, 1967
REYES, J.B.L

Decedent/Testator: Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936

Proponent: TIRSO T. REYES, guardian of the minors Azucena, Flordelis
and Tirso, Jr.
Oppositor: LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU
Type of Succession: Testate

I. Facts:

Spouses Barretto had accumulated real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and

Bulacan. When Bibiano died he left his share through a will to the mother of
plaintiff's wards, and a small portion to his two sisters Rosa and Felisa and also his
nephew and nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond located in Bulacan was reserved
for his widow, Maria Gerardo.

Maria prepared a project of partition signed by her and as guardian of the

minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court of
First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate and
the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed. As a consequence, Salud Barretto
took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the original
certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
When Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948, it was discovered that she had
executed two wills. In the first will, she instituted Salud Barretto and Milagros
Barretto as her heirs and in the second, she revoked her first will and left all her
properties in favor of Milagros Barretto. The lower court held that Salud was not
the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. This
ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.

Hence, plaintiff filed an action for the recovery of one-half portion of the
estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow
Maria Gerardo.
 The lower court declared the project of partition submitted in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto to be null and
void ab initio because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs, was
not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo on the basis of
Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 providing as follows:

"A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without

being so, has been included, shall be null and void."

The Court a quo also ordered them to return the properties received under
the project of partition to Milagros Barretto. Hence, this patition.

II. Issue: Whether or not there was preterition. (No)

III. Ruling:
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under
appeal is reversed and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey
to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the properties enumerated in said decision, and
the same is affirmed in so far as it denies any right of said appellee to accounting.
Let the records be returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed with
the action for partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT
No. T-13734 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.

IV. Ratio Decidendi:

Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been misapplied to the present case
by the court below. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late
Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros hence,
the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was
believed to be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under
said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak of children, or
descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or
intestate ones, and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator
does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament.
Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to
whomsoever he chose. While the share (1/2) assigner to Salud impinged on the
legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason a cease to be a testamentary heir
of Bibiano Barretto.
 Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share
smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was
here no preterition, or total omission, of a forced heir.

A project of partition is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, the

court may accept or reject. It is the court alone that makes the distribution of the
estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is
entitled (Comia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629, 643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules
of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree of
distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees.

Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were

shown that the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of partition.
But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could stand, since it was in conformity
with the probated will of Bibiano Barretto

The Court hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros
Barretto in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto,
duly approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939 is not void for
being contrary to either articles 1081 or 1814 of the Civil Code of 1889; (2) that
Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition and decree of distribution is
barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant
guardian is a possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from
the properties inherited by Salud Barretto is legally untenable. Therefore, the
plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond should have been given due course.

V. Doctrine/Principle:

Judicial decree of distribution, once final, vests title in the distributees. If

the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament, the same
should be corrected by opportune appeal. But once it had become final, its binding
effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud. It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a
decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or
invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.

Digested by: Abie dela Cruz

You are here: Home ∼ 2013 ∼ July ∼ Case Digest: Reyes v. Barretto-Datu (19 SCRA 85)

CASE DIGEST: REYES V. BARRETTO-

DATU (19 SCRA 85)
Published by paul on July 11, 2013 | Leave a response

Reyes v. Barretto-Datu
19 SCRA 85

FACTS:

Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. When Bibiano Barretto died he left his
share in a will to Salud Barretto and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion
as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and
nieces. The usufruct of a fishpond was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo. Maria
Gerardo, as administratrix prepared a project of partition. It was approved and the
estate was distributed and the shares delivered.

Later on, Maria Gerardo died. Upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two
wills, in the first, she instituted Salud and Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as
her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of
Milagros Barretto alone. The later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting the
first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the LC
held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband
Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the SC, which affirmed the same.

Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a
legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate
of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria
Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.

This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not
only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered
to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of
Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of
partition, but of the decision of the court based thereon as well.

ISSUE:
W/N the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and Salud
did not acquire valid title to it.

HELD:

NO. Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto’s last
will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between
them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without
really being one, and was not null and void. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not
speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced,
voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of
the testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his
testament; for Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to
whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime
of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano
Barretto.

Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father’s will a share smaller than her
legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition,
or total ommission of a forced heir.

G.R. No. L-17818 January 25, 1967

TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and Tirso, Jr., all surnamed
Reyes y Barretto, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.

Recto Law Office for plaintiff-appealant.

Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Civil Case No. 1084,
dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Reyes and ordering the same to deliver to the
defendant-appellee, Lucia Milagros Barretto-Datu, the properties receivea by his deceasea wife
under the terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto, consisting of lots in Manila, Rizal, Pampanga
and Bulacan, valued at more than P200,000.

The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as follows:

"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the barrio of San
Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-13734 of the Land
Records of this Province, being the share of plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased
Salud Barretto, widow of plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors."
It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a
vast estate, consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan, covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, 31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057, 6501, 2991,
57403 and 12507/T-337.

When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share of these
properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a
small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew anä
nieces® The usufruct oæ the fishponä situateä iî barrio Saî Roque¬ Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-
mentioned, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo® Iî the meantime¬ Maria Gerardo
was appointeä administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of partition, which was signed
by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was
approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution of the
estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith. As a consequence, Salud
Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the cancellation of the original
certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.

Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any irregularity in the distribution
of the said estate until the widow, Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948. Upon her death, it was
discovered that she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and Milagros,
both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she revoked the same and left all her
properties in favor of Milagros Barretto alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected.
In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud Barretto, the
lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband
Bibiano Barretto. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.1

Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a legitimate heir of Maria
Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto,
which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-
half portion, thereof.

This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of ownership, not only of the
fishpond under litigation, but of all the other properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for
being a spurious heir, and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby directly
attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the decision of the court based
thereon as well.

The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond in
question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the court
did not acquire any jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was then a minor.'

Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower court declared the project of
partition submitted in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case
No. 49629 of the Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void ab initio (not merely voidable)
because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs (now appellants), was not a
daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition
was decreed on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as
follows: .

A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been
included, shall be null and void.
The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that since Bibiano Barretto was
free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of
Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded that, as
defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was entitled to recover from
Salud, and from the latter's children and successors, all the Properties received by her from
Bibiano's estate, in view of the provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the Philippines
establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held by its acquirer in implied trust for the
real owner. Hence, as stated at the beginning of this opinion, the Court a quo not only dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint but ordered them to return the properties received under the project of partition
previously mentioned as prayed for in defendant Milagros Barretto's counterclaim. However, it
denied defendant's prayer for damages. Hence, this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and
defendant.

Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has been misapplied to
the present case by the court below. The reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been
instituted heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros;
hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to
be an heir without really being one, and was not null and void under said article. The legal precept
(Article 1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between
forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the
testator does not preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano
Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the
share (½) assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason
cease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.

Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime
invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a
forced heir. For this reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked by appellee, is not at all
applicable, that case involving an instance of preterition or omission of children of the testator's
former marriage.

Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise on the civil status of
Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code. This view is erroneous, since a compromise
presupposes the settlement of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code
of 1889, Article 1809; Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2028); and the condition of Salud as
daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto, while untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement
of the estate of the testator. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And while a
compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids a settlement by the parties over
the share that should correspond to a claimant to the estate.

At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name implies, is merely a
proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court may accept or reject, it is the court alone that
makes the distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to
which each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629, 643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of
1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is that judicial decree of distribution, once final, that
vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the
testament, the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it had become final,
its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud.

It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the
same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of the estate of the late
Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of partition executed by Salud Barretto and the
widow, Maria Gerardo (who signed for herself and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto), and
since no evidence was taken of the filiation of the heirs, nor were any findings of fact or law made,
the decree of distribution can have no greater validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand
or fall with it, being in the nature of a judgment by consent, based on a compromise. Saminiada vs.
Mata, 92 Phil. 426, is invoked in support of the proposition. That case is authority for the proposition
that a judgment by compromise may be set aside on the ground of mistake or fraud, upon petition
filed in due time, where petition for "relief was filed before the compromise agreement a proceeding,
was consummated" (cas. cit. at p. 436). In the case before us, however, the agreement of partition
was not only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually consummated, so much so that
the titles in the name of the deceased were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the
heirs, long before the decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata does not apply.

Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were shown that the sole basis
for the decree of distribution was the project of partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution
could stand, since it was in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano Barretto, against the
provisions whereof no objection had been made. In fact it was the court's duty to do so. Act 190,
section 640, in force in 1939, provided: .

SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. — When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant
letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippine Islands. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate
upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates
in these Islands belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.
(Emphasis supplied)

That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court distributed the estate of
her father in 1939 does not imply that the said court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of
distribution. Passing upon a like issue, this Court ruled in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports, pp.
741 and 742:

If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally intervene, still they
would be concluded by the result of the proceedings, not only as to their civil status but as
the distribution of the estate as well. As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil.
938, "The proceeding for probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court acquires
jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by
section 630 C.P.C.; and any order that any be entered therein is binding against all of them."
(See also in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156.) "A final order of distribution of the estate of
a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees". (Santos vs.
Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895.) There is no reason why, by
analogy, these salutary doctrines should not apply to intestate proceedings.

The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate proceeding
may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even
then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion
within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of which, if
successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a
 decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed
and disposed of.

It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared in Reyes vs. Barretto Datu, 94
Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157), that:

... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed the partition, and
that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed guardian. The claim is not true. Maria
Gerardo signed as guardian of the minor. (Secs. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) The mere
statement in the project of partion that the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia
Milagros Barretto are pending in the court, does not mean that the guardian had not yet been
appointed; it meant that the guardianship proceedings had not yet been terminated, and as a
guardianship proceedings begin with the appointment of a guardian, Maria Gerardo must
have been already appointed when she signed the project of partition. There is, therefore, no
irregularity or defect or error in the project of partition, apparent on the record of the testate
proceedings, which shows that Maria Gerardo had no power or authority to sign the project
of partition as guardian of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto, and, consequently, no ground
for the contention that the order approving the project of partition is absolutely null and void
and may be attacked collaterally in these proceedings.

So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only made a party by
publication but actually appeared and participated in the proceedings through her guardian: she,
therefore, can not escape the jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First Instance which settled her
father's estate.

Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria Gerardo) could not have
ignored that the distributee Salud was not her child, the act of said widow in agreeing to the oft-cited
partition and distribution was a fraud on appellees rights and entitles her to relief. In the first place,
there is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano Barretto was judicially settled and distributed
appellants' predecessor, Salud Lim Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so that if
fraud was committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely responsible, and neither
Salud nor her minor children, appellants herein, can be held liable therefor. In the second
placegranting that there was such fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years from its
discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed long ago.

Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years old (Exhibit 24), she
became of age five years later, in 1944. On that year, her cause of action accrued to contest on the
ground of fraud the court decree distributing her father's estate and the four-year period of limitation
started to run, to expire in 1948 (Section 43, Act. 190). In fact, conceding that Milagros only became
aware of the true facts in 1946 (Appellee's Brief, p. 27), her action still became extinct in 1950.
Clearly, therefore, the action was already barred when in August 31, 1956 she filed her counterclaim
in this case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano Barretto's estate.

In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced evidence that appellant Tirso
Reyes had induced her to delay filing action by verbally promising to reconvey the properties
received by his deceased wife, Salud. There is no reliable evidence of the alleged promise, which
rests exclusively on the oral assertions of Milagros herself and her counsel. In fact, the trial court
made no mention of such promise in the decision under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo that
the promise was made, the same can not bind the wards, the minor children of Salud, who are the
real parties in interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a guardian, being an act of disposition, and
not of administration, can not bind his wards, being null and void as to them unless duly authorized
by the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil. 136, 142).
In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the proceedings
for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto duly approved by the Court of First Instance of
Manila in 1939, in its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for being contrary to either Article 1081 or
1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition and
decree of distribution is barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-
appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the
properties inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable. It follows that the
plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in the complaint should have been given due
course.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under appeal is reversed and
set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the
properties enumeracted in said decision, and the same is affirmed in so far as it denies any right of
said appellee to accounting. Let the records be returned to the court of origin, with instructions to
proceed with the action for partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No.
T-13734 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and for the accounting of the fruits
thereof, as prayed for in the complaint No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

Austria v. Reyes Digest

Austria v. Reyes

Facts:

1. Basilia Austria executed a will wherein the bulk of her estate was given to the respondents, alll
have been declared by the former as her legally adopted children.

2. During her lifetime, Basilia filed a petition for the probate of her will. It was opposed by the
petitioners who are the nephews and nieces. The opposition was dismissed and the will was
allowed.

3. In 1954, the petitioners filed a petition for intervention for partition alleging that they were the
nearest kin of Basilia and that the respondent had not been in fact adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, hence the latter were strangers with no right to succeed as heirs.
4. The lower court held that the validity or invalidity is not material to the institution of heirs. It held
that the testator was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will was executed free from
falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence.

Issue: Whether or not the institution of the heir is valid

RULING: Yes. The general rule is that the falsity of the stated cause for the testamentary institution
does not affect the validity or efficacy of the institution. An exception to the rule is that the falsity will
set aide the institution if certain factors are present. Before the institution of the heirs will be annulled
under Art. 850 the following requisites must concur; 1) the cause must be stated in the will, 2) the
cause is shown to be false, and 3) it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not
have made such institution if he had known the falsity. Moreover, testacy is favored and doubts are
resolved on its side especially when the will shows a clear intention on the part of the testator to
dispose of practically his whole estate as in this case.

G.R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-SANSON, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 promulgated August 29,1986 affirming in toto the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXII 2 dated March 21, 1985, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring the holographic will marked in
evidence as Exhibit "H" as one wholly written, dated, and signed freely by the late
Herminia Montinola in accordance with law while in possession of full testamentary
capacity, and allowing and admitting the same to probate.

Upon the finality of the decision, let letters testamentary issue to the executor,
Eduardo F. Hernandez, as well as the certificate of probate prescribed under Section
13 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

SO ORDERED. 3

This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty. Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22,
1981 with the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) seeking the probate of the
holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola executed on January 28, 1980. The testatrix, who
4

died single, parentless and childless on March 29,1981 at the age of 70 years, devised in this will
several of her real properties to specified persons.

On April 29,1981, private respondent who was named executor in the will filed an urgent motion for
appointment of special administrator. With the conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the
5

testatrix except oppositor, the court in its order of May 5, 1981 appointed private respondent as
6

Special Administrator of the testate estate of deceased.

On June 29,1981, Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the deceased
but who was not named in the said win, filed her Opposition to Probate of Will, alleging inter alia:
7

that the subject will was not entirely written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same
was falsely dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her mental faculties to
make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence was exerted upon the person and mind of the
testatrix by the beneficiaries named in the win; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to
the remainder of the estate.

After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, finding the evidence presented in support of the
petition to be conclusive and overwhelming, rendered its decision allowing the probate of the
disputed will.

Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate court to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
in toto the decision.8

On September 24,1986, petitioner filed with the respondent court a motion for new trial. Attached to
9

her motion was the Affidavit of Merit of Gregorio Montinola Sanson, petitioner's son, alleging that
witnesses have been located whose testimonies could shed light as to the ill health of the testatrix as
well as undue influence exerted on the latter.

The appellate court in its resolution of October 13, 1986, denied the motion for new trial of
10

petitioner on the following grounds: (1) the Affidavit of merit attached to the motion alleged that
efforts were exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after the court's decision was handed down,
and (2) the unnamed witnesses would allegedly shed light on the fact of grave illness of the testatrix
as well as the undue influence exerted on her which are merely corroborative or cumulative since
these facts were brought to light during the trial.

The motion for reconsideration of petitioner dated October 27, 1986 was likewise denied by the
11

appellate court in its resolution of November 20, 1986 on the ground that the affidavit of one
12

Patricia Delgado submitted with the motion constitutes cumulative evidence and the motion being in
reality a second motion for reconsideration which is prescribed by law.

In the petition now before Us, petitioner assigned the following errors:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS'

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUND THAT THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT TO
BE PRESENTED IS MERELY CUMULATIVE.

II
 THE SAID COURT ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS' MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE RESOLUTION DENYING THE AFORESAID
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

III

AT ANY RATE, THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN QUESTION WAS WHOLLY WRITTEN, DATED AND
SIGNED BY THE LATE HERMINIA MONTINOLA.

IV

THE SAID COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED WILL WAS
FRAUDULENTLY ANTEDATED TO CONCEAL ITS ACTUAL DATE OF
EXECUTION AND TO SHIELD IT FROM PROBABLE DISPUTES AS TO THE
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY ON THE PART OF THE ALLEGED TESTATRIX AT
THE TIME OF ITS ACTUAL EXECUTION.

THE SAID COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE LATE HERMINIA MONTINOLA
WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO UNDUE PRESSURE AND
IMPROPERIMPORTUNINGS ON THE PART OF THOSE STANDING TO BENEFIT
FROM THE ALLEGED WILL.

VI

THE SAID COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL IN

QUESTION TO PROBATE.

In the meantime, petitioner who passed away on November 3, 1986, was substituted by her heirs.

In the first and second assigned errors, petitioners maintain that the appellate court erred in denying
the motion for new trial insisting that the new evidence sought to be presented is not merely
corroborative or cumulative.

On the other hand, the contention of private respondent is that the motion for new trial was a pro-
forma motion because it was not in accordance with Sec. 1, Rule 53 of the Rules of Court. We find
merit in this contention.

Section 1, Rule 53 provides —

Before a final order or judgment rendered by the Court of appeals becomes

executory, a motion for new trial may be filed on the ground of newly discovered
evidence which could not have been discovered prior to the trial in the court below by
the exercise of the diligence and which is of such a character as would probably
change the result. The motion shall be accompanied by affidavits showing the facts
constituting the grounds therefor and the newly discovered evidence.

The affidavit of merit executed by Gregorio Montinola Sanson alleged the following:
 xxx xxx xxx

3. That in her plea for new trial in the said case, I have exerted efforts to locate
witnesses whose whereabouts were not known to us during the trial in the lower
court, but I have finally succeeded in tracking them down;

4. That despite their initial reluctance to testify in this case,I am convinced that they
would testify under proper subpoena for purposes of shedding light on the fact that
the testatrix was gravely ill at or but the time that the questioned will was allegedly
executed;

5. That they had the clear opportunity to know the circumstances under which the
purported will was executed; and that they know for a fact that there was 'undue
influence' exerted by petitioner and other relatives to procure improper favors from
the testatrix;

xxx xxx xxx 13

Said motion for new trial is not in substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 53. The lone
affidavit of a witness who was already presented said the hearing is hardly sufficient to justify the
holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were unnamed without any certainty as, to their
appearance before the court to testify. Affiant attests only on his belief that they would testify if and
when they are subpoenaed by the court. Furthermore, the allegations in the affidavit as to the undue
influence exerted on the testatrix are mere conclusions and not statement of facts. The requisite
affidavits must state facts and not mere conclusions or opinions, otherwise they are not valid. The14

affidavits are required to avoid waste of the court's time if the newly discovered evidence turns out to
be immaterial or of any evidentiary weight.

Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be presented is new having been
discovered only after the trial. It is apparent from the allegations of affiant that efforts to locate the
witnesses were exerted only after the decision of the appellate court was handed down. The trial
lasted for about four years so that petitioner had ample time to find said alleged witnesses who were
admittedly known to her. The evidence which the petitioner now propose to present could have been
discovered and presented during the hearing of the case, and there is no sufficient reason for
concluding that had the petitioner exercised proper diligence she would not have been able to
discover said evidence. 15

In addition, We agree with the appellate court that since the alleged illness of the testatrix as well as
the charges of undue influence exerted upon her had been brought to light during the trial, and new
evidence on this point is merely corroborative and cumulative which is generally not a ground for
new trial. Accordingly, such evidence even if presented win not carry much probative weight which
16

can alter the judgment. 17

It is very patent that the motion for new trial was filed by petitioner only for the purpose of delaying
the proceedings. In fact, petitioners son in his manifestation admitted that he had to request a new
law firm to do everything legally possible to meet the deadline for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration and/or for new trial. This would explain the haphazard preparation of the motion,
18

thus failing to comply with the requirements of rule 53, which was filed on the last day of the
reglementary period of appeal so that the veracity of the ground relied upon is questionable. The
appellate court correctly denied the motion for new trial.
The motion for new trial being pro-forma, it does not interrupt the running of the period for
appeal. Since petitioner's motion was filed on September 24,1986, the fifteenth or last day of the
19

period to appeal, the decision of the respondent court became final on the following day, September
25. And when the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was filed on October 30,1986, it was
obviously filed out of time.

Since the questioned decision has already become final and executory, it is no longer within the
province of this Court to review it. This being so, the findings of the probate court as to the due
execution of the will and the testamentary capacity of testatrix are now conclusive. 20

At any rate, even assuming that We can still review this case on its merits, the petition will also have
to fail.

During the hearing before the probate court, not only were three (3) close relatives of the testatrix
presented but also two (2) expert witnesses who declared that the contested will and signature are in
the handwriting of the testatrix. These testimonies more than satisfy the requirements of Art. 811 of
the Civil Code in conjunction with Section 11 of Rule 76, Revised Rules of Court, or the probate
21 22

of holographic wills.

As regards the alleged antedating of the will, petitioner failed to present competent proof that the will
was actually executed sometime in June 1980 when the testatrix was already seriously ill and dying
of terminal lung cancer. She relied only on the supposed inconsistencies in the testimony of
Asuncion Gemperle, niece and constant companion of testatrix, which upon careful examination did
not prove such claim of antedating.

The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of Appeals that the will in question was
executed according to the formalities required by law are conclusive on the Supreme Court when
supported by evidence. We have examined the records of this case and find no error in the
23

conclusion arrived at by the respondent court that the contested will was duly executed in
accordance with law.

Petitioner alleges that her exclusion from the alleged holographic will was without rhyme or reason,
being the only surviving sister of the testatrix with whom she shares an intimate relationship, thus
demonstrating the lack of testamentary capacity of testatrix.

In the case of Pecson v. Coronel, it was held —

24

The appellants emphasize the fact that family ties in this country are very strongly
knit and that the exclusion of a relative from one's estate is an exceptional case. It is
true that the ties of relationship in the Philippines are very strong, but we understand
that cases of preterition of relatives from the inheritance are not rare. The liberty to
dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered sacred by
the Civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889...

Article 842 of the Civil Code provides that one who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of
all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

It is within the right of the testatrix not to include her only sister who is not a compulsory heir in her
will. Nevertheless, per testimony of Asuncion Gemperle, the latter had reserved two boxes of jewelry
worth P850,000.00 for petitioner. Furthermore, petitioner's son Francis was instituted as an heir in
the contested will.
Petitioner still insists that the fact that in her holographic will the testatrix failed to dispose of all of her
estate is an indication of the unsoundness of her mind.

We cannot subscribe to this contention. Art. 841 of the Civil Code provides —

A will shall be valid even though it should not contain an institution of an heir, or such
institution should not comprise the entire estate, and even though the person so
instituted should not accept the inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.

In such cases, the testamentary dispositions made in accordance with law shall be
complied with and the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal heirs.

Thus, the fact that in her holographic will, testatrix disposed of only eleven (11) of her real properties
does not invalidate the will, or is it an indication that the testatrix was of unsound mind. The portion
of the estate undisposed of shall pass on to the heirs of the deceased in intestate succession.

Neither is undue influence present just because blood relatives, other than compulsory heirs have
been omitted, for while blood ties are strong in the Philippines, it is the testator's right to disregard
non-compulsory heirs. The fact that some heirs are more favored than others is proof of neither
25

fraud or undue influence. Diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for making a testament,
26

otherwise, the decedent might as well die intestate. 27

The contention of the petitioner that the will was obtained by undue influence or improper pressure
exerted by the beneficiaries of the will cannot be sustained on mere conjecture or suspicion; as it is
not enough that there was opportunity to exercise undue influence or a possibility that it may have
been exercised. The exercise of improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by
28

substantial evidence that it was actually exercised. 29

Finally, We quote with approval the observation of the respondent court —

There is likewise no question as to the due execution of the subject Will. To Our
minds, the most authentic proof that decreased had testamentary capacity at the
time of the execution of the Will, is the Will itself which according to a report of one of
the two expert witnesses (Exhibits X to X-3) reveals the existence of significant
handwriting characteristics such as:

1. Spontaneity, freedom, and speed of writing

xxx xxx xxx

3. good line quality.

4. presence of natural variation... (Exhibit X).

The characteristics of spontaneity, freedom and good line quality could not be
achieved by the testatrix if it was true that she was indeed of unsound mind and/or
under undue influence or improper pressure when she the Will.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit with
costs against petitioner. The decision of respondent court dated August 29, 1986 in toto the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated March 21, 1985 is hereby declared to be immediately
executory.

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE MATILDE MONTINOLA-

SANSON, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDUARDO F. HERNANDEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 76648 February 26, 1988

Ponente: Justice GANCAYCO

Facts

This case arose from a petition filed by private respondent Atty.

Eduardo F. Hernandez on April 22, 1981 with the CFI of Manila seeking
the probate of the holographic will of the late Herminia Montinola executed
in 1980. The testatrix, who died single, parentless and childless in 1981 at
the age of 70 years, devised in this will several of her real properties to
specified persons. Private respondent who was named executor in the will
filed an urgent motion for appointment of special administrator. With the
conformity of all the relatives and heirs of the testatrix except oppositor, the
court appointed private respondent as Special Administrator of the testate
estate of deceased.

Matilde Montinola Sanson (petitioner), the only surviving sister of the

deceased but who was not named in the said will, filed her Opposition to
Probate of Will, alleging inter alia: that the subject will was not entirely
written, dated and signed by the testatrix herself and the same was falsely
dated or antedated; that the testatrix was not in full possession of her
mental faculties to make testamentary dispositions; that undue influence
was exerted upon the person and mind of the testatrix by the beneficiaries
named in the win; and that the will failed to institute a residual heir to the
remainder of the estate.

After a hearing on the merits, the probate court, allowed the probate
of the disputed will. Petitioner thus appealed the decision of the probate
court to the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision.

On September 24,1986, petitioner filed with the respondent court a

motion for new trial. Petitioner's son, alleging that witnesses have been
located whose testimonies could shed light as to the ill health of the
testatrix. The appellate court denied the motion for new trial for efforts
were exerted to locate unnamed witnesses only after the court's decision
was handed down.

Issue

Whether the CA erred in allowing the holographic will in question to

probate.
Ruling

The petition is denied. Said motion for new trial is not in substantial
compliance with the requirements of Rule 53. The lone affidavit of a
witness who was already presented said the hearing is hardly sufficient to
justify the holding of new trial. The alleged new witnesses were unnamed
without any certainty as, to their appearance before the court to testify.
Affiant attests only on his belief that they would testify if and when they are
subpoenaed by the court. Furthermore, the allegations in the affidavit as to
the undue influence exerted on the testatrix are mere conclusions and not
statement of facts.

Moreover, it could not be said that the evidence sought to be

presented is new having been discovered only after the trial. It is apparent
from the allegations of affiant that efforts to locate the witnesses were
exerted only after the decision of the appellate court was handed down.
The trial lasted for about four years so that petitioner had ample time to find
said alleged witnesses who were admittedly known to her. In addition, We
agree with the appellate court that since the alleged illness of the testatrix
as well as the charges of undue influence exerted upon her had been
brought to light during the trial, and new evidence on this point is merely
corroborative and cumulative which is generally not a ground for new trial.

At any rate, even assuming that We can still review this case on its
merits, the petition will also have to fail. During the hearing before the
probate court, not only were three (3) close relatives of the testatrix
presented but also two (2) expert witnesses who declared that the
contested will and signature are in the handwriting of the testatrix. These
testimonies more than satisfy the requirements of Art. 811 of the Civil
Code in conjunction with Section 11 of Rule 76, Revised Rules of Court, or
the probate of holographic wills. As regards the alleged antedating of the
will, petitioner failed to present competent proof that the will was actually
executed sometime in June 1980 when the testatrix was already seriously
ill and dying of terminal lung cancer.
 The factual findings of the probate court and the Court of Appeals
that the will in question was executed according to the formalities required
by law are conclusive on the Supreme Court when supported by
evidence. We have examined the records of this case and find no error in
the conclusion arrived at by the respondent court that the contested will
was duly executed in accordance with law.

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY,
JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI;
AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.

Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.

Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dated
February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the
testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the corresponding
notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808). The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:

Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the
age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate
children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob,
Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his
mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria
Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that
she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and
(c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her
husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (Par.
IV).

Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two years
old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my
properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part of her will. She
devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the
will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. *

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence,
preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate
certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.

Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr.
dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that
he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument
captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he
manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in
her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which
he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in
the manner indicated in her will.

Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and "conformation" of
Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition
and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix
Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special
administrator of the decedent's estate.

Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18, 1973 on the
grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern half of the
conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine
lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that
motion. The lower court denied it in its order of October 15, 1973.

In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the
lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated
September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and
requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to
be the lawyer not only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B.
Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or
allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the probate of the will be
withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding. In another motion of
the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be issued.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments dated
October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to
creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy
be declared.

The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice to
creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys.
Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the
petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the
issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974.
The lower court did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to
creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of
petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.

Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion dated April 15,
1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of February 28, 1974 on the ground
that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to
the motion was a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by
Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they
terminated Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition for the probate of
the will was without their consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder to him that their
mother's will was "very sacred" to them.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The lower court
denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of
its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will,
before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious
legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court
assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The
probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void.
Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA
449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho
vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693). 1äwphï1.ñët

But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and
in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its
order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his
renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal
estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made
such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code).
"Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if
they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering
with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to
law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143,
Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal
declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.

The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs
during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash
is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads:
 ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, or by
will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of
the compulsory heirs.

A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial,
or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this
article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not
assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)

The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her
husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign
the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to
require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only
for a period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her
husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless
there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal
partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a
donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil
Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A
portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at
least his legitime should be respected.

Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the
partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes.
The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the
meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.

It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his
renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased
wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will
without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.

Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will shall only
pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the
will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing
belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to
him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will,
afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."

In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the
conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of
by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the
dissolution of the conjugal p
G.R. No. L-14474 October 31, 1960

ONESIMA D. BELEN, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and MILAGROS BELEN DE OLAGUERA, oppositors-
appellees.

E. A. Beltran for appellant.

E. P. Villar for appellees.
R. F. Aviado for Trustee Bank.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from an order, dated May 23, 1958 of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
Proceedings No. 9226, denying appellant's petition therein as hereafter discussed.

Briefly, the facts and circumstances that brought about this present appeal may be narrated as
follows:

Benigno Diaz executed a codicil on September 29, 1944, the pertinent provisions of which read:

9.0 — En caso de muerte de alguno o de todos los legatarios nom brados por mi, seran
beneficiarios o sea parasan los legados a favor solamente de los descendientes y
ascendientes legitimos, pero no a los viudos conyuges.

10.0 — Transcurridos diez o quince años despues de mi muerte todas mispropiedades,

muebles o inmuebles, derechos y ventajosos, pueden proceder a la venta de todos dando
preferencia a los legatarios y de su importe total se deduciran mil pesos (P1,000) para los
cuartrohijos de mi difunto hermano Fabian, todos los gastos y reservando una cantidad
suficiente y bein calcumada para sufrugar se distriburia a las siguientes personas que aun
vuiven, o a sus descendientes legitimos:

A Isabel M. de Santiago — cincuente por ciento (50%)

Los hijos de Domingo Legarda — treinta por ciente (30%)
Filomena Diaz — diez por ciento (10%)
Nestor M. Santiago — diez por ciento (10%)

On November 7, 1944, Benigno Diaz died; and the aforesaid codicil, together with the will, was
admitted to probate in Special Proceedings No. 894 of the same Court of First Instance of Manila.
The proceedings for the administration of the estate of Benigno Diaz were closed in 1950 and the
estate was thereafter put under the administration of the appellee Bank of the Philippine Islands, as
trustee for the benefit of the legatees.

Filomena Diaz died on February 8, 1954, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros Belen de
Olsguera, married, with seven (7) legitimate children, and Onesima D. Belen, single.
On March 19, 1958, Onesima D. Belen filed a petition in Special Proceedings No. 9226, contending
that the amount that would have appertained to Filomena Diaz under the codicil should now be
divided(equally) only between herself and Milagros Belen de Olaguera, as the surviving children of
the said deceased, to the exclusion, in other words, of the seven (7) legitimate children of Milagros
Belen de Olaguera. The court, in its order on May 23, 1958 denied, as initially pointed out Onesima's
petition. More specifically, the court said:

After due consideration of the petition filed by Onesima D. Belen on March 19, 1958, wherein
it is prayed that the trustee Bank of the Philippine Island be directed to deliver to her "one-
half of whatever share is due to the deceased Filomena Diaz as legatee in the will and
codicil of the deceased testator Benigno Diaz y Heredia, subject of trusteeship in these
proceedings," this Court of the resolution of September 28, 1959, in which resolution the
following was declared:

"That the share of Filomena Diaz in the residue of the proceeds of the sale of the
properties covered in paragraph 10 of the codicil aforesaid does not and should not
from part of her estate; it pertains to her legitimate descendants; and

"That the aforesaid share of Filomena Diaz should be distributed not only between
her children, Milagros Belen de Olaguera and Onesima D. Belen, but also among her
other legitimate descendants, if any, for descendientes include not only children but
also grandchildren, etc., and in this connection. it is not amiss to observe that one
may be a descendant and not yet not be an heir, and vice versa, one may be an heir
and yet not be a descendant.

From this order Onesima D. Belen has appealed to this Court, insisting that (1) the Court below was
in error in holding that its former resolution of September 16, 1955 had been affirmed by our decision
of February 28, 1958 in the case of Arguelles vs. Belen de Olaguera, G.R. No. L-10164 Feb. 28,
1958; and (2) that the term "sus descendeintes legitimos," as used in the codicil, should be
interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee Filomena Diaz. In the
present case, they are her two daughters (Milagros and Onesima Belen), thereby excluding the
seven grandchildren of said legatee.

As to her first point, the appellant is the correct ion her view that the trial court's interpretation of
clause 10 of the codicil to the will of Benigno Diaz has not been affirmed in our previous decision
(G.R. No. L-10164). Perusal of that judgment will show that this Court left the issue open at the time,
contenting itself with pointing out that the then appellant Administrator of the estate of Folimena Diaz
was not the proper party to the raise the particular issue.

As the actual meaning of the provision —

El restro se distribuira a las siguientes personas que aun viven, o a sus descendientes
legitimos,

it is undeniable that but this cluase the testator ordained a simple substitution (sustitucion vulgar)
with a plurality of substitutes for each legatee. This form of substitution authorized by the first poart
of Article 860 of the Civil Code (Art. 778 of the Code of 1889):

Two or more persons may be substituted for one and one person for two or more heirs.
The issue is now squarely before us : do the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly to
all living descendant (children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a class; or they refer to the
descendants nearest in degree?

Appellant Onesima Belen contends that the phrase should be taken to mean the relatives nearest in
degree to Filomena Diaz; and that the legacy should be therefore divided equally between her and
her sister Milagros Belen de Olaguera, to the exclusion of the latter's sons and daughters, grand
children of the original legatee, Filomena Diaz. As authority in support of her thesis, appellant
invokes Article 959 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (reproducing ne varieter Article 751 of the
Code of 1889):

A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as
made in favor of those nearest in degree.

The argument fails to note that this article is specifically limited in its application to the case where
the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. In such an event, the law
assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives
closest to him, because, as Manresa observes, —

la razon y la logica ha cen fundadamente suponer que, al procurar este favorecer a sus
parientes, habria de ajustarse mas a ligadas al mismo (testador) por los vinculos de la
sanger y de la familia (6 Manresa, Comm., 7th Ed., p. 72).

But the ratios legis (that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest) obviously does not
supply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the legatee) and noot of the testator .
There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer to the rules of
intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be
said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since
he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.

Should Article 959 (old Art. 751) be applied by anology? There are various reasons against this. The
most important one is that under this article, as recognized by the principal commentators on the
Code of 1889, the nearest of exclude all the farther relatives and right of representation does not
operate. Castan, in his monograph "El derecho de representacion y mecanimos jurididos afines en
la sucesion testamentaria" (Reus, 1942), says on this question (Pp. 13, 14, 15):

En el subgrupo ibericio de Europia y America predomina, aunque haya ex excepciones,

cuando menos en principio, no tiene cabida en la sucesion testamentaria. Asi, por ejemplo,
lo establece la doctrina cientifica en Portugal y en la Argentina y lo ha sancionado la
jurisprudencia en Cuba.

En igual sentido, en la doctrina española es opinion general que el derecho de

representacion, dentro del Codigo civil, no tiene lugar mas que en la sucesion intestada, y
en la testamentaria en la parte refernte a las legitimas. MUCIUS SCAEVOLA juzga que la
reopresentacion, atraida por la herencia legitima, es repelida por la testada, y apunta, como
razon de ello, la de que "la primera descansa en la ley de la sangre, en el parentesco con su
consiguiente atributo de linea y grado, elementos propios o indispensabnles para la
repretascion , en tanto que l asegunda se basa exclusivamente en la voluntad del testador,
elemento diverso, en la orderen legal, al de la naturaleza o de la sandre". Y el maestro DE
DIEGO, con orientacion anologa, piensa que como el titulo de la sucesion testada es de
origen voluntario y caracter personalismo, es evidente que no hay terminos habiles para el
 derecho de representacion: los llamamientos son individuales y la premoriencia del
instituido, como su incapacidad, aniquilan la institucion.

In the second place, the history of Article 751 (of the 1889 Code) shown that the right of
representation was deliberately suppressed. Says Castan (op. cit., 24):

En nuestra Patria opino GARCIA GOYENA que debia tener a los parientos mas
representacion aun cuando el testator llame abiertamente la voluntad del testador, debe
"observarse el orden de la sucesion legitima, al que se presume que en todo lo demas quiso
atemperase. Poe ello, el art. 562 Proyecto de 1851 quedo redactadso asi: "La disposicion
hecha simple y generalmente a favor de los parientes del testador, se entiende hecha en
favor de los mas proximos en grado ; pero habra lugar al derecho de representacion con
todos sus efectos, con arreglo al tittulo siguiento".

Con poco acierto, a nuestro juicio, los autores del vigente Codigo han suprimido esta
salvedad del Proyecto del 51, y con ello han instaurado una norma rigida, distanciada de lo
que exige la equidad y de lo que suelen establecer los Codiogos extranjeros. Los
commentaristas convienen en que la supresion ha sido intencionada, y por consiguiente el
proposito del legaslador es que en esta clase de llamamientos no se da el derecho, de
representacion. Dice Manresa que el art. 751 "tiene por favorecidos con tal institucion, no a
los parientes de mejor derecho, sino a los mas proximos en grado y, por lo tanto, los de
primer grado excluiran a los de segundo y asi sucesivamente, toda vez que la art. 915". La
misma interpretacion dan al articulo de referencia NAVARRO AMANDI, MUCIUS
SCAEVOLA, SANCHEZ ROMAN y VALVERDE.

The result would be that by applying to the descendants of Filorema Diaz the "nearest relatives" rule
of Article 959, the inheritance would be limited to her children, or anyone of them, excluding the
grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the intention of the testator who, in the selfsame
clause 10 of his council (ante), speaks of "cuatro hijos de mi difunto hermano Fabian" and of
"los hijos de Domingo Legarda," as well as of "descendientes legitimos" of the other legates, to us
indicating clearly that he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous terms.
Observe that, in referring to the substitutes of Filomena Diaz, Nestor Santiago and Isabel M. de
Santiago, the testator, does not even use the description "sus hijos o descendientes," but only
"descendientes".

It is suggested that "descendientes legitimos" could mean the nearest descendant but with the right
of representation in favor of the more distant relatives. Unquestionably, the testator was at liberty to
provide a series of successive substitutions in the order of proximity of relationship to the original
legatee. And he, likewise, was free to ordain that the more distant descendants should enjoy the
right of representation as in intestate succession. But to arrive at such conclusion, we must declare
that the testator had:.

(a) Rejected, or intended to reject, the right of accretion among co-heirs and co-legatees, as
established for testamentary successions by Articles 10016 (old Art. 982) and 1019, and intended to
replace such accretion with representation;

ART. 1016. In order that the right of accretion may take place in a testamentary succession,
it shall be necessary:

(1) That two or more persons be called to the same inheritance, or to the same portion
thereof, pro indiviso; and
 (2) That one of the persons thus called die before the testator or renounce the inheritance, or
be incapacitated to receive it.

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 1019. The heirs to whom the petition goes by the right of accretion take it in the same
proportion that they inherit.

(b) Refused, likewise, the rule of Article 846 (reproduced from Article 765 of the Code of 1889)
providing that:

Heirs instituted without designation of shares shall inherit in equal parts,

which would not obtain if the right of representation were to apply;

(c) Rejected finally the rule of Article 1022 (old Art. 986), that vacancies in the free part should be
filed according to the rules of accretion or substitution (not representation); and in default of these
two, ultimately inherited by the testator's own heirs intestate:

ART. 1022. In testamentary succession, when the right of accretion does not take place, the
vacant portion of the instituted heirs, if no substitute has been designated, shall pass to the
legal heirs of the testator, who shall receive it with the same charges and obligations.

There is no doubt that, the testator's intention being the cardinal rule of succession in the absence of
compulsory (forced) heirs, he could have rendered inoperative all the articles mentioned, if he had
so desired. But without any other supporting circumstances, we deem expression "o a sus
desecendientes legitimos," the testator Benigno Diaz did intend to circumvent all the legal provisions
heretofore quoted. It was incumbent upon appellant to prove such intention on the part of the
testator; yet she has not done so.

It is interesting to note that even under the Anglo-Saxon doctrine, the courts are divided on the
question whether a bequest to "relatives" or "issue," made in general terms, gives rise to
succession per capita or per stripes. In Wyeth, et al., vs. Crane, 174 N.E. 871, the Supreme Court of
Illinois said;

The meaning of the word "descendants", when used in a will or deed to designate a class to
take property passing by the will or deed, has been frequently considered and decided by
the Court of England and the United States. They established rule in England from an early
date was that the word "descendants" or the word "issued" unexplained by anything in the
context of the instrument, means all persons descending lineally from another, to the
remotest degree, and includes persons descended, even though their parents are living, and
that such descendants take per capita stripes.

The courts of this country are divided on the question of whether in case of a gift or
conveyance to "descendants" or "issue", children take concurrently with their parents. The
so- called English rule has been adhered to in New York, New Jersey, and Tenessee. . . . On
the other hand, the courts of Massachusetts, Maine, Rhode Island and South Carolina have
held that, in case of a gift or conveyance to descendants or issue, unexplained by anything
in the context of instrument, children do not take currently with their parents.
We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to apply in the
instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members
thereof to succeed per capita, in consonance with article 846. So that the original legacy to Filomena
Diaz should be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchidren.

The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the appellant..

Onesima Belen v BPI and Milagros Belen De Olaguera October 31, 1960| Reyes, J.B.L., J. | Legacies and
Devises Digester: Anna Mickaella Lingat SUMMARY: Benigno Diaz made a codicil naming Filomena
Diaz as one of the legatees. Benigno died and his will was admitted for probate and the estate was put
under the administration of BPI as trustee. When Filomena died, she left two children – Milagros Belen v
de Olaguera (married with 7 legitimate children) and Onesima Belen (single). Onesima filed a petition
praying that BPI be ordered to deliver to her one-half of her share. She contends that the estate of
Filomena under a codicil should only be divided between her and Milagros, to the exclusion of the 7
children. CFI held that the children should be included. Onesima invokes Art 959 where “a distribution
made in general terms in favor of the testator shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in
degree.” The Court ruled that the words “sus descendientes legitimos” in the codicil of Benigno Diaz
refer to all living descendants and not only to descendants nearest in degree. DOCTRINE: The word
“descendant” must be interpreted, in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, in that the proper
rule to apply is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees, intended all members to
succeed per capita. FACTS:  On September 29, 1944, Benigno Diaz executed a codicil which provides
that: (Loose google translation HUHUHELP) o 9.0 - In case of death of some or all legatees appointed(?)
by me, beneficiaries or legacies in favor only legitimate descendants and ascendants, spouses but not
widowers. o 10.0 - Ten or fifteen years after my death all my properties, movable or immovable, rights
and advantageous, they can proceed with the sale of all giving preference to the legatees and their total
amount thousand pesos (P1,000) is deducted for four children of my late brother Fabian, all expenses and
reserving enough and well cover calcumada(??) to the following people who still vuiven(??) or their
legitimate descendants distribute:  Isabel M. de Santiago - (50%)  Domingo Legarda children - (30%)
 Filomena Diaz - (10%)  Nestor M. Santiago - (10%)  When Diaz died, the codicil was admitted to
probate. The estate was thereafter put under the administration of BPI as trustee for the benefit of the
legatees.  Ten years later, Filomena Diaz died, leaving two legitimate children, Milagros Belen de
Olaguera (married with 7 legitimate children) and Onesima Belen (single).  Onesima filed a petition in
Special Proceedings contending that the estate of Filomena under the codicil should only be divided
between her and Milagros, to the exclusion of the 7 legitimate children of Milagros. Onesima, as legatee,
prayed that BPI be ordered to deliver her one-half of whatever share is due to Filomena Diaz.



The Court denied this petition and held that the share of Filomena should also be distributed among her
grandchildren. Descendientes include not only children but also grandchildren. One may be a descendant
but not yet an heir and vice versa. Onesima appealed to this Court and argued that: o The interpretation of
Clause 10 of the codicil of the will of Benigno Diaz has not been affirmed in the previous case Arguelles
v Belen de Olaguera. o The term “sus descendeintes legitimos” as used in the codicil, should be
interpreted to mean descendants nearest in the degree to the original legatee Filomena. In this case, they
are her two daughters (Milagros and Onesima); thereby excluding the seven grandchildren of said legatee.

RULING: Judgment is affirmed Whether the words “sus descendientes legitimos” (their legitimate
descendants) refer conjointly to all living descendant (children and grandchildren) of the legatee, as a
class (or do they refer to the descendants nearest in degree)? – YES, it refers to all living descendants. 
Onesima argues: the phrase should be taken to mean the relatives nearest in degree. She invokes Article
959 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: A distribution made in general terms in favor of the testator's
relatives shall be understood as made in favor of those nearest in degree.  Art 959 is specifically limited
in its application to the case where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not those of the legatee. 
In such an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, in order to
benefit the relatives closest to him.  Manresa: la razon y la logica ha cen fundadamente suponer que, al
procurar este favorecer a sus parientes, habria de ajustarse mas a ligadas al mismo (testador) por los
vinculos de la sanger y de la familia o Translated: by reason and logic, we can reasonably assume that, in
seeking this favor their relatives, would have to conform more to come with it (testator) by the ties of
family and sanger(?)  There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the testator intended to refer
to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and provided substitutes for each legatee; nor
can it be said that his affections would prefer the nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant,
since he envisages all of them in a group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.  There
are various reasons against applying Art 959 by analogy. o Under this article, the nearest of exclude all the
farther relatives and right of representation does not operate. o The history of Art 751 (of 1889 Code)
shown that the right of representation was deliberately suppressed.  The result would be that by applying
to the descendants of Filorema Diaz the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959, the inheritance would be
limited to her children, or anyone of them, excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be
the intention of the testator who, in the same clause 10 of his council (ante), speaks of "cuatro hijos de mi
difunto hermano Fabian" and of "los hijos de

• Nuguid vs. Nuguid; G.R. No. L-23445; June 23, 1966 G.R. No. L-23445 June 23, 1966 REMEDIOS
NUGUID, petitioner and appellant, vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID, oppositors and
appellees. Custodio O. Partade for petitioner and appellant. Beltran, Beltran and Beltran for oppositors
and appellees. SANCHEZ, J.: Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962,
single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six (6) brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios,
Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid. On May 18, 1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid filed
in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on
November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise. Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to
probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. On June 25, 1963, Felix
Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, concededly the legitimate father and mother of the deceased Rosario
Nuguid, entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground therefor, inter alia, is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are
compulsory heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in
consequence the institution is void. On August 29, 1963, before a hearing was had on the petition for
probate and objection thereto, oppositors moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute preterition. On
September 6, 1963, petitioner registered her opposition to the motion to dismiss.1äwphï1.ñët The
court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce
create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid" and dismissed the petition without costs.
A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on appeal. 1. Right at
the outset, a procedural aspect has engaged our attention. The case is for the probate of a will. The
court's area of inquiry is limited — to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the
will. The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities by law prescribed, are the questions solely to be presented, and to be acted
upon, by the court. Said court at this stage of the proceedings — is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy therein.1 A
peculiar situation is here thrust upon us. The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the
will should be allowed probate. For them, the meat of the case is the intrinsic validity of the will.
Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. But
petitioner and oppositors, in the court below and here on appeal, travelled on the issue of law, to wit: Is
the will intrinsically a nullity? We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the
will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be protracted. And for aught that appears
in the record, in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result:
waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us
to a belief that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in
question.3 After all, there exists a justiciable controversy crying for solution. 2. Petitioner's sole
assignment of error challenges the correctness of the conclusion below that the will is a complete nullity.
This exacts from us a study of the disputed will and the applicable statute. Reproduced hereunder is the
will: Nov. 17, 1951 I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having
amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I
may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C.
In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-
one. (Sgd.) Illegible T/ ROSARIO NUGUID The statute we are called upon to apply in Article 854 of the
Civil Code which, in part, provides: ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. Except for inconsequential variation in terms, the foregoing is a
reproduction of Article 814 of the Civil Code of Spain of 1889, which is similarly herein copied, thus —
Art. 814. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of
the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the institution of heir; but the
legacies and betterments shall be valid, in so far as they are not inofficious. ... A comprehensive
understanding of the term preterition employed in the law becomes a necessity. On this point Manresa
comments: Preterition consists of omitting the heir from the will. Either he is not even named, or even if
he is named as father, son, etc., he is not established as an heir, nor is he expressly disinherited, nor is he
assigned any part of the assets, resulting in him being tacitly deprived of his right to legitimacy. For there
to be preterition, in accordance with article 854, it is enough that in the will the testator omits any one
of those to whom the forced inheritance corresponds due to his death. It is necessary, therefore, a) That
the omission refers to a forced heir. b) That the omission is complete; that the forced heir receives
nothing in the will. It may now appear trite bat nonetheless helpful in giving us a clear perspective of the
problem before us, to have on hand a clear-cut definition of the word annul: To "annul" means to
abrogate, to make void ... In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6 The word "annul" as used
in statute requiring court to annul alimony provisions of divorce decree upon wife's remarriage means to
reduce to nothing; to annihilate; obliterate; blot out; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish.
N.J.S.A. 2:50 — 38 (now N.J.S. 2A:34-35). Madden vs. Madden, 40 A. 2d 611, 614, 136 N..J Eq. 132.7
ANNUL. To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to
do away with. Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774.8 And now, back to the facts and
the law. The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced
heirs in the direct ascending line her parents, now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And,
the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were
deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition.
Such preterition in the words of Manresa "will always annul the institution of heir, giving absolute
character to this order referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-
sentence will here institutes petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or
bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say that the nullity is complete. Perforce,
Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Says Manresa: As for the institution of heir, it is annulled. What is
canceled ceases to exist, in whole or in part? No limitation is added, as in article 851, which states that
the institution of heir will be annulled insofar as it prejudices the legitimacy of the disinherited person. It
must, therefore, be understood that the annulment is complete or total, and that this article as
especially in the case that motivates it, it governs with preference to 817. The same view is expressed by
Sanchez Roman: — La consecuencia de la anulacion o nulidad de la institucion de heredero por
pretericion de uno, varios o todos los forzosos en linea recta, es la apertura de la sucesion intestada total
o parcial. Sera total, cuando el testador que comete la pretericion, hubiese dispuesto de todos los bienes
por titulo universal de herencia en favor de los herederos instituidos, cuya institucion se anula, porque
asi lo exige la generalidad del precepto legal del art. 814, al determinar, como efecto de la pretericion, el
de que "anulara la institucion de heredero." ... 11 Really, as we analyze the word annul employed in the
statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the entire
inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal
heir — without any other testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing
at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854 offers no leeway for inferential
interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute. On this
point, Sanchez Roman cites the "Memoria annual del Tribunal Supreme, correspondiente a 1908", which
in our opinion expresses the rule of interpretation, viz: ... El art. 814, que preceptua en tales casos de
pretericion la nulidad de la institucion de heredero, no consiente interpretacion alguna favorable a la
persona instituida en el sentido antes expuesto aun cuando parezca, y en algun caso pudiera ser, mas o
menos equitativa, porque una nulidad no significa en Derecho sino la suposicion de que el hecho o el
acto no se ha realizado, debiendo por lo tanto procederse sobre tal base o supuesto, y
consiguientemente, en un testamento donde falte la institucion, es obligado llamar a los herederos
forzosos en todo caso, como habria que llamar a los de otra clase, cuando el testador no hubiese
distribudo todos sus bienes en legados, siendo tanto mas obligada esta consecuencia legal cuanto que,
en materia de testamentos, sabido es, segun tiene declarado la jurisprudencia, con repeticion, que no
basta que sea conocida la voluntad de quien testa si esta voluntad no aparece en la forma y en las
condiciones que la ley ha exigido para que sea valido y eficaz, por lo que constituiria una interpretacion
arbitraria, dentro del derecho positivo, reputar como legatario a un heredero cuya institucion fuese
anulada con pretexto de que esto se acomodaba mejor a la voluntad del testador, pues aun cuando asi
fuese, sera esto razon para modificar la ley, pero no autoriza a una interpretacion contraria a sus
terminos y a los principios que informan la testamentifaccion, pues no porque parezca mejor una cosa
en el terreno del Derecho constituyente, hay razon para convereste juicio en regla de interpretacion,
desvirtuando y anulando por este procedimiento lo que el legislador quiere establecer. 12 3. We should
not be led astray by the statement in Article 854 that, annullment notwithstanding, "the devises and
legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious". Legacies and devises merit consideration only
when they are so expressly given as such in a will. Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere
institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would give the heir so instituted a
share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a
testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified
institution of heir. Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states
that preterition annuls the institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference
to legacies and bequests) "pero subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la
institucion de heredero ... . 13 As Manresa puts it, annulment throws open to intestate succession the
entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o
donacion. 14 As aforesaid, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of
petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void. And, intestate succession ensues. 4.
Petitioner's mainstay is that the present is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition". 15 From this, petitioner draws the conclusion that Article 854 "does not apply to the case at
bar". This argument fails to appreciate the distinction between pretention and disinheritance. Preterition
"consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they
are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
disinherited." Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his
share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law." In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la
legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina pretericion." Sanchez
Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition,
upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria". Express as disinheritance should be, the same
must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself. The will here does not explicitly disinherit
the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will rather than be
labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition. On
top of this is the fact that the effects flowing from preterition are totally different from those of
disinheritance. Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code, we repeat, "shall annul the institution of
heir". This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the
form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of the same Code, such
disinheritance shall also "annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar as it may prejudice the person
disinherited", which last phrase was omitted in the case of preterition. 21 Better stated yet, in
disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have
been illegally deprived. Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited
heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus:
"Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o dos tercios, 22
el caso. 23 5. Petitioner Remedios Nuguid insists that the compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are
entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the
inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. This is best answered by a
reference to the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Moran in the Neri case heretofore cited, viz: But the theory
is advanced that the bequest made by universal title in favor of the children by the second marriage
should be treated as legado and mejora and, accordingly, it must not be entirely annulled but merely
reduced. This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil
Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be made to fall into the concept of legacies and
betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851 regarding
total or partial nullity of the institution, would be absolutely meaningless and will never have any
application at all. And the remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of
inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because they would be absorbed by Article
817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code. The
destructive effect of the theory thus advanced is due mainly to a failure to distinguish institution of heirs
from legacies and betterments, and a general from a special provision. With reference to article 814,
which is the only provision material to the disposition of this case, it must be observed that the
institution of heirs is therein dealt with as a thing separate and distinct from legacies or betterments.
And they are separate and distinct not only because they are distinctly and separately treated in said
article but because they are in themselves different. Institution of heirs is a bequest by universal title of
property that is undetermined. Legacy refers to specific property bequeathed by a particular or special
title. ... But again an institution of heirs cannot be taken as a legacy. 25 The disputed order, we observe,
declares the will in question "a complete nullity". Article 854 of the Civil Code in turn merely nullifies
"the institution of heir". Considering, however, that the will before us solely provides for the institution
of petitioner as universal heir, and nothing more, the result is the same. The entire will is null. Upon the
view we take of this case, the order of November 8, 1963 under review is hereby affirmed. No costs
allowed. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428; Pimentel vs. Palanca, etc., et al.,
5 Phil. 436, 440-441; Limjuco vs. Ganara, 11 Phil. 393, 394-395; Montañano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679;
Riera vs. Palmorali, et al., 40 Phil. 105, 116; In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156, 174; Palacios vs.
Palacios, 58 O.G. No. 2, 220, 221; Teotico vs. Del Val, etc., L-18753, March 26, 1965. 2Section 13, Rule 76
of the Rules of Court. 3Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court. Case, et al. vs. Jugo, et al., 77 Phil. 517, 522.
4Betterments are eliminated in the present Civil Code. II Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, p. 1077. 5VI
Manresa, Commentarios al Codigo Civil Español, 7th Edition, (1951), p. 424. 6Words & Phrases, Vol. 3A,
Permanent Ed., p. 3. 7 Id., p. 4. 8Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., p. 117. 9Manresa, id., p. 426.
10Manresa, id., pp. 431-432. 11VI Sanchez Roman, Estudios de Derecho Civil, 2nd Edition, Volumen 2.o,
p. 1140. 12VI Sanchez Roman, id., p. 1138. This is also cited in the Neri case, 74 Phil. 192-193. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes and Judge R.C. Puno, in their work entitled "An Outline of Philippine Civil Law", 1956 ed., Vol.
III, p. 8; citing Gil vs. Murciano, L-3362, March 1, 1951, likewise opined that "the right to make a will is
statutory, not a natural right, and must be subordinate to law and public policy". 13Sanchez Roman, id.,
p. 1141. 14Manresa, id., p. 434. 15Petitioner's brief, p. 15. 16Neri, et al. vs. Akutin, et al., supra, 72 Phil.,
at p. 325. 17Justice J.B.L. Reyes and Judge R.C. Puno, id., p. 106. 18Manresa, id., p. 424. Justice Reyes and
Judge Puno, id., 107, speaking of the requisites of a valid disinheritance, confirm the theory that
disinheritance "must be express (not implied) (Art. 918 ; otherwise there is preterition". 19Sanchez
Roman, id., p. 1131. 20Arts. 915, 916, Civil Code; II Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, pp. 750-752. 21 III
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1961 Edition, p. 172. 22Now one-half, Articles 888 and 889, Civil
Code. 23Manresa, id., p. 430. 24Petitioner's brief, p. 13. 25Neri, et al. vs. Akutin, et al., 74 Phil. pp. 191-
192. Arts. 817 and 851, Civil Code of Spain of 1889, referred to in the opinion above, are now Arts. 907
and 918 of the present Civil Code.
083 REMEDIOS NUGUID vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID
G.R. No. L-23445 | June 23, 1966 | Sanchez

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution
of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they
are not inofficious. ...

Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate.
- Surviving her were
o legitimate parents - Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid
o 6 brothers and sisters
 Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid.

1963, petitioner Remedios Nuguid (sister) filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on
November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her demise.
- Petitioner prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her.

Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid (parents) entered their opposition to the probate of her will. moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute
preterition.
- Claim that by the institution of petitioner Remedios Nuguid as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors — who are compulsory
heirs of the deceased in the direct ascending line — were illegally preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

CFI held that "the will in question is a complete nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid"

Petitioner claims:
- it is "a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition" therefore Article 854 "does not apply to the case at bar".
- compulsory heirs ineffectively disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated,"
although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes.

WON the issue, which is the intrinsic validity to the will, is proper in the probate proceedings – NO, but if the case were to be remanded
litigation would be protracted, hence the Court will rule despite the procedural lapse

In the case for the probate of a will. The court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the
will.
- The due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity, and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities by law
prescribed is the issue
- at this stage of the proceedings — the Court is not called upon to rule on the efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any
devise or legacy therein.

in the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.

WON there was preterition – YES

The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents,
now oppositors Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid. And, the will completely omits both of them: They thus received nothing by the
testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited.

This is a clear case of preterition. Such preterition in the words of Manresa "anulara siempre la institucion de heredero, dando caracter
absoluto a este ordenamiento1 referring to the mandate of Article 814, now 854 of the Civil Code. The one-sentence will here institutes
petitioner as the sole, universal heir — nothing more. No specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that we say
that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate.

WON the preterition had the effect of nullifying the entire will – YES, there is no other provision in the will before us except the institution of
petitioner as universal heir. That institution, by itself, is null and void.

Definition of “annul”
- To "annul" means to abrogate, to make void ... (In re Morrow's Estate, 54 A. 342, 343, 204 Pa. 484.6)

1
always annuls the institution of heir, giving absolute character to this order
 - To reduce to nothing; annihilate; obliterate; to make void or of no effect; to nullify; to abolish; to do away with. (Ex parte Mitchell,
123 W. Va. 283, 14 S.E. 2d. 771, 774)

as we analyze the word annul employed in the statute, there is no escaping the conclusion that the universal institution of petitioner to the
entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will. Because, the nullification of such institution of universal heir — without any other
testamentary disposition in the will — amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854
offers no leeway for inferential interpretation. Giving it an expansive meaning will tear up by the roots the fabric of the statute.

Sanchez Roman favors this statutory construction

The art. 814, which prescribes in such cases of pretericion the nullity of the institution of heir, does not consent to any interpretation favorable to
the person instituted in the above-mentioned sense even if it seems, and in some cases could be, more or less equitable, because a nullity it does
not mean in Law but the supposition that the act or act has not been carried out, and therefore must proceed on such basis or assumption, and
consequently, in a will where the institution is lacking, it is obligatory to call the forced heirs in all case, as it would be necessary to call those of
another class, when the testator had not distributed all his assets in legacies, being this legal consequence more obligatory since, in terms of
wills, it is known, according to the jurisprudence has declared, with repetition , that it is not enough to know the will of the person who tests if
this will does not appear in the form and in the conditions that the law has demanded to be valid and effective, or that would constitute an
arbitrary interpretation, within the positive law, to consider as legatee an heir whose institution was annulled on the pretext that this was better
suited to the will of the testator, because even if this were the case, this would be the reason to modify the law, but does not authorize an
interpretation contrary to its terms and the principles that inform the testamentifaccion, because not because it seems better a thing in the field
of Constitutional Law, there is reason to converte judgment in rule of interpretation, distorting and nullifying by this procedure what the
legislator wants to establish (google translated)

Manresa comments on 814 Civil Code of Spain (Our current 854, except for an inconsequential variation in terms, is a complete reproduction)

As for the institution of the heir, it is annulled. What is annulled ceases to exist, in whole or in part? No limitation is added, as in Article 851, in
which it is expressed that the institution of heir be annulled as soon as prejudice to the legitimacy of the uninherited One, therefore, it must be
understood that the annulment is complete or total, and that this article as special in the case that motivates it, it preferentially governs 817.
(google translated)

Sanchez Roman expresses the same view

The consequence of the annulment or nullity of the institution of heir by preterition of one, several or all the forced ones in a straight line, is the
opening of the total or partial intestate succession. It will be total, when the testator who commits the preterition, had disposed of all property
by universal title of inheritance in favor of the instituted heirs, whose institution is annulled, because this is required by the generality of the
legal precept of art. 814, when determining, as an effect of the preterition, that "annul the institution of heir." (google translated)

Legacies and devises merit consideration only when they are so expressly given as such in a will.
- Nothing in Article 854 suggests that the mere institution of a universal heir in a will — void because of preterition — would give the
heir so instituted a share in the inheritance. As to him, the will is inexistent. There must be, in addition to such institution, a
testamentary disposition granting him bequests or legacies apart and separate from the nullified institution of heir.
o Sanchez Roman, speaking of the two component parts of Article 814, now 854, states that preterition annuls the
institution of the heir "totalmente por la pretericion"; but added (in reference to legacies and bequests) "pero
subsistiendo ... todas aquellas otras disposiciones que no se refieren a la institucion de heredero ... . As Manresa puts it,
annulment throws open to intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que) no hubiese
dispuesto en virtud de legado, mejora o donacion.

WON the case was on of ineffective disinheritance – NO, was a case of preterition

Preterition
consists in the omission in the testator's will of
the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or,
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code,
we repeat, "shall annul the institution of heir".
This annulment is in toto, unless in the will there
are, in addition, testamentary dispositions in the
form of devises or legacies.
Disinheritance
is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a
cause authorized by law.
In ineffective disinheritance under Article 918 of
the same Code, such disinheritance shall also
"annul the institution of heirs", put only "insofar
as it may prejudice the person disinherited",
which last phrase was omitted in the case of
preterition.

In Manresa's own words: "La privacion expresa de la legitima constituye la desheredacion. La privacion tacita de la misma se denomina
pretericion." (The express deprivation of legitimacy constitutes disinheritance. The tacit deprivation of it is called pretericion. "
Sanchez Roman emphasizes the distinction by stating that disinheritance "es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed
to be "involuntaria". ("es siempre voluntaria"; preterition, upon the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntaria".)

Express as disinheritance should be, the same must be supported by a legal cause specified in the will itself.
- The will here does not explicitly disinherit the testatrix's parents, the forced heirs. It simply omits their names altogether. Said will
rather than be labeled ineffective disinheritance is clearly one in which the said forced heirs suffer from preterition.

in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
- Manresa's expressive language, in commenting on the rights of the preterited heirs in the case of preterition on the one hand and
legal disinheritance on the other, runs thus: "Preteridos, adquiren el derecho a todo; desheredados, solo les corresponde un tercio o
dos tercios, ( Preterited, they acquire the right to everything; disinherited, only one third or two thirds,)

WON the compulsory heirs disinherited are entitled to receive their legitimes – NO

This theory, if adopted, will result in a complete abrogation of Articles 814 and 851 of the Civil Code. If every case of institution of heirs may be
made to fall into the concept of legacies and betterments reducing the bequest accordingly, then the provisions of Articles 814 and 851
regarding total or partial nullity of the institution, would. be absolutely meaningless and will never have any application at all. And the
remaining provisions contained in said article concerning the reduction of inofficious legacies or betterments would be a surplusage because
they would be absorbed by Article 817. Thus, instead of construing, we would be destroying integral provisions of the Civil Code.

__

What is preterition?

Manresa (translated via google)

The preterition consists of omitting the heir in the will. Either he is not named or even named as father, son, etc., he is not instituted
or explicitly disinherited or assigned any part of the property, being deprived in a tacit way of his right to legitimacy.

For there to be a preterition, according to Article 814, it is sufficient that in the will the testator omits any one of those to whom, by
his death, the forced inheritance corresponds.

It is necessary, then, a) That the omission refers to a forced heir. b) That the omission be complete; that the forced heir receives
nothing in the will.

The will

Nov. 17, 1951

I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise,
and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga,
Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one.

(Sgd.) Illegible
T/ ROSARIO NUGUID

Case Digest: Crisologo vs. Singson, G.R. No. L-13876,

February 28, 1962
November 22, 2023

Succession
Ponente:
Fernan, J.:

Facts:

In 1948, Dña. Leona Singson died single. Her nearest living relatives
were her brothers, her nieces and her grandniece.

Clause IX of her last will reads as follows: .

NOVENO. — Ordeno que se de a mi nieta por parte de mi hermana mia y

que al mismo tiempo vive en mi casa, y, por tanto, bajo mi proteccion, y
es la CONSOLACION FLORENTINO: —

(A). La mitad de mi casa de materials fuertes con techo de hierro

galvanizado, incluyendo la mitad de su solar, ubicado en la Poblacion de
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Calle Plaridel, actualmente arrendada por los hermanos
Fortunato, Teofilo y Pedro del appellido Kairuz. Pero si falleciere antes o
despues que yo mi citada nieta, esta propiedad se dara por partes iguales
entre mis tres hermanos Evaristo, Manuel y Dionisio, o a sus herederos
forzosos en el caso de que alguno de ellas murieie antes ... (Exhibit F.)

Translation: Clause IX of her last will reads as follows:

NINTH. — I order that be given to my grandniece by my sister's side, who

currently lives in my house and, therefore, under my protection, and she is
CONSOLACION FLORENTINO: —
(A). Half of my house made of strong materials with a galvanized iron roof,
including half of its land, located in the Poblacion of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
Plaridel Street, currently leased by the brothers Fortunato, Teofilo, and
Pedro with the surname Kairuz. But if my said grandniece dies before or
after me, this property shall be equally divided among my three brothers
Evaristo, Manuel, and Dionisio, or their forced heirs in case any of them
should die before ... (Exhibit F.)

Spouses Consolacion Florentino and Francisco Crisologo filed an action

for partition against Manuel Singson.

They allege that Singson owned one-half pro-indiviso of said property and
that Consolacion Florentino owned the other half by virtue of the
provisions of the duly probated last will of Dña. Leona Singson, the
original owner. They had made demands for the partition of said property,
but defendant refused.

The defendant claims that Consolacion Florentino was a mere

usufructuary of, and not owner of one-half pro-indiviso of the property in
question. Thus, she was not entitled to demand partition.

CFI-Ilocos Sur: Declared that the plaintiff is a co-owner pro-indiviso with

the defendant and ordered to execute an agreement of partition.

Issue:

WoN the testamentary disposition above-quoted provided for what is

called sustitucion vulgar and not for a sustitucion fideicomisaria. YES
Held:

This issue is, we believe, controlled by the pertinent provisions of

the Civil Code in force in the Philippines prior to the effectivity of the
New Civil Code, in view of the fact that the testatrix died on January 13,
1948. They are the following:

Art. 774. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute
the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before
him, or should not wish or should be unable to accept the inheritance.

A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it is to

apply, shall include the three mentioned in the next preceeding
paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise provided:

Art. 781. Fidei-commissary substitutions by virtue of which the heir is

charged to preserve and transmit to a third person the whole or part of
the inheritance shall be valid and effective, provided they do not go
beyond the second degree, or that they are made in favor of persons living
at the time of the death of the testator." .

Art. 785. The following shall be inoperative: .

1. Fiduciary substitutions not made expressly, either by giving them this

name or by imposing upon the fiduciary the absolute obligation of
delivering the property to a second heir." ....
In accordance with the first legal provision quoted above, the testator
may not only designate the heirs who will succeed him upon his death,
but also provide for substitutes in the event that said heirs do not accept
or are in no position to accept the inheritance or legacies, or die ahead of
him.

The testator may also bequeath his properties to a particular person with
the obligation, on the part of the latter, to deliver the same to another
person, totally or partially, upon the occurrence of a particular event (6
Manresa, p. 1112).

It is clear that the particular testamentary clause under consideration

provides for a substitution of the heir named therein in this manner: that
upon the death of Consolacion Florentino — whether this occurs before or
after that of the testatrix — the property bequeathed to her shall be
delivered ("se dara") or shall belong in equal parts to the testatrix's three
brothers, Evaristo, Manuel and Dionisio, or their forced heirs, should
anyone of them die ahead of Consolacion Florentino. If this clause
created what is known as sustitucion vulgar, the necessary result would
be that Consolacion Florentino, upon the death of the testatrix, became
the owner of one undivided half of the property, but if it provided for
a sustitution fideicomisaria, she would have acquired nothing more
than usufructuary rights over the same half. In the former case, she
would undoubtedly be entitled to partition, but not in the latter. As
Manresa says, if the fiduciary did not acquire full ownership of the
property bequeathed by will, but mere usufructuary rights thereon until
the time came for him to deliver said property to the fideicomisario, it is
obvious that the nude ownership over the property, upon the death of the
testatrix, passed to and was acquired by another person, and the person
cannot be other than the fideicomisario (6 Manresa p. 145).
It seems to be of the essence of a fideicommissary substitution that an
obligation be clearly imposed upon the first heir to preserve and transmit
to another the whole or part of the estate bequeathed to him, upon his
death or upon the happening of a particular event. For this reason, Art.
785 of the old Civil Code provides that a fideicommissary substitution
shall have no effect unless it is made expressly ("de una manera
expresa") either by giving it such name, or by imposing upon the first heir
the absolute obligation ("obligacion terminante") to deliver the
inheritance to a substitute or second heir. In this connection Manresa
says: .

Para que la sustitucion sea fideicomisaria, es preciso segun el art. 781,

que se ordeno o encargue al primer heredero, cuando sea tal, que
conserve y transmita a una tercera persona o entidad el todo a parte de
la herencia. O lo que es lo mismo, la sustitucion fideicomisaria, como
declaran las resoluciones de 25 de Junio de 1895, 10 de Febrero de 1899 y
19 de Julio de 1909, exige tres requisitos: .

1.o Un primer heredero llamado al goce de los bienes preferentemente.

2.o Obligacion claramente impuesta al mismo de conservar y transmitir a

un tercero el todo o parte del caudal.

3.o Un segundo heredero.

A estos requisitos anade la sentencia de 18 de Noviembre de 1918, otro

mas, el del que el fideicomisario tenga derecho a los bienes de la
herencia desde el momento de la muerte del testador, puesto que ha de
suceder a este y no al fiduciario.
Por tanto, cuando el causante se limita a instituir dos herederos, y por
fallecimiento de ambos o de cualquiera de ellos, asigna la parte del
fallecido o fallecidos, a los herederos legitimos o a otras personas, solo
existe una sustitucion vulgar, porque falta el requisito de haberse
impuesto a los primeros herederos la obligacion de conservar y transmitir
los bienes, y el articulo 789, en su parrafo primero, evige que la
sustitucion sea expresa, ya dandole el testador el nombre de sustitucion
fideicomisaria, ya imponiendo al sustituido la obligacion terminante de
conservar y transmitir los bienes a un segundo heredero.

Translation:

For the substitution to be fiduciary, according to article 781, it is

necessary that it is ordered or entrusted to the first heir, when such is the
case, to preserve and transmit the whole or part of the inheritance to a
third person or entity. Or in other words, as stated in the resolutions of
June 25, 1895, February 10, 1899, and July 19, 1909, fiduciary
substitution requires three requirements:

1. A first heir called to enjoy the assets preferably.

2. Clearly imposed obligation on the same to preserve and transmit
the whole or part of the estate to a third party.
3. A second heir.

To these requirements, the judgment of November 18, 1918, adds another

one, that the fiduciary has the right to the inheritance assets from the
moment of the testator's death, as they are to succeed the testator, not
the trustee.

Therefore, when the deceased limits themselves to instituting two heirs,

and upon the death of both or either of them, assigns the portion of the
deceased to legitimate heirs or other individuals, there is only a simple
substitution, because the requirement of imposing on the first heirs the
obligation to preserve and transmit the assets is lacking. Article 789, in
its first paragraph, requires that the substitution be explicit, either by
giving it the name of fiduciary substitution or by imposing on the
substituted the definitive obligation to preserve and transmit the assets
to a second heir.

A careful perusal of the testamentary clause under consideration shows

that the substitution of heirs provided for therein is not expressly made of
the fideicommissary kind, nor does it contain a clear statement to the
effect that appellee, during her lifetime, shall only enjoy usufructuary
rights over the property bequeathed to her, naked ownership thereof being
vested in the brothers of the testatrix. As already stated, it merely
provides that upon appellee's death — whether this happens before or
after that of the testatrix — her share shall belong to the brothers of the
testatrix.

In the light of the foregoing, we believe, and so hold, that the last will of
the deceased Dña. Leona Singson, established a mere sustitucion vulgar,
the substitution Consolacion Florentino by the brothers of the testatrix to
be effective or to take place upon the death of the former, whether it
happens before or after that of the testatrix.

54 Phil. 431

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The amount of P21,428.58 is on deposit in the plaintiff's name with the

association known as La Urbana in Manila, as the final payment of the
liquidated credit of Ana Maria Alcantara, deceased, whose heiress is said
plaintiff, against Andres Garchitorena, also deceased, represented by his
son, the defendant Mariano Garchitorena.
And as said Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for P7,872.23 against
Joaquin Perez Alcantara, husband of the plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, the
sheriff pursuant to the writ of execution issued in said judgment, levied an
attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana.
The plaintiff, alleging that said deposit belongs to the fideicommissary heirs
of the decedent Ana Maria Alcantara, secured a preliminary injunction
restraining the execution of said judgment on the sum so attached. The
defendants contend that the plaintiff is the decedent's universal heiress,
and pray for the dissolution of the injunction.
The court below held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the plaintiff's
children as fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara, and granted a
final writ of injunction.
The defendants insist in their contentions, and, in their appeal from the
decision of the trial court; assign the following errors:
"1. The lower court erred in holding that a trust was created by the will of
Dona Aha Maria Alcantara.
"2. The lower court erred in concluding and declaring that the amount of
P21,428.58 deposited with La Urbana is the property of the children of the
plaintiff as 'herederos fidei-comisarios.'
"3. The lower court erred in making the injunction permanent and
condemning defendant to pay the costs."
The question here raised is confined to the scope and meaning of the
institution of heirs made in the will of the late Ana Maria Alcantara already
admitted to probate, and whose legal force and effect is not in dispute.
The clauses of said will relevant to the points in dispute, between the
parties are the ninth, tenth, and eleventh, quoted below:
"Ninth. Being single and without any forced heir, to show my gratitude to
my niece-in-law, Carmen Garchitorena, of age, married to my nephew,
Joaquin Perez Alcantara, and living in this same house with me, I institute
her as my sole and universal heiress to the remainder of my estate after the
payment of my debts and legacies, so that upon my death and after probate
of this will, and after the report of the committee on claims and appraisal
has been rendered and approved, she will receive from my executrix the
properties composing my hereditary estate, that she may enjoy them with
God's blessing and my own. "Tenth. Should my heiress Carmen
Garchitorena die, I order that my whole estate shall pass unimpaired to her
surviving children; and should any of these die, his share shall serve to
increase the portion of his surviving brothers (and sisters) by accretion, in
such wise that my estate shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or
her children in so far as it is legally possible.
"Eleventh. Should my aforesaid heiress, Carmen Garchitorena, die after me
while her children are still in their minority, I order that my estate be
administered by my executrix, Mrs. Josefa Laplana, and in her default, by
Attorney Ramon Salinas and in his default, by his son Ramon Salinas; but
the direction herein given must not be considered as an indication of lack of
confidence in my nephew Joaquin Perez Alcantara, whom I relieve from the
duties of administering my estate, because I recognize that his character is
not adapted to management and administration."
The appellants contend that in these clauses the testatrix has ordered a
simple substitution, while the appellee contends that it is a fideicommissary
substitution.
This will certainly provides for a substitution of heirs. and of the three cases
that might give rise to a simple substitution (art. 774, Civil Code), only the
death of the instituted heiress before the testatrix would in the instant case
give place to such substitution, inasmuch as nothing is said of the waiver of
inheritance, or incapacity to accept it. As a matter of fact, however, clause
XI provides for the administration of the estate in case the heiress
instituted should die after the testatrix and while the substitute heirs are
still under age. And it is evident that, considering the nature of simple
substitution by the heir's death before the testator, and the fact that by
clause XI in connection with clause X, the substitution is ordered where the
heiress instituted dies after the testatrix, this cannot be a case of simple
substitution.
The existence of a substitution in the will is not and cannot be denied, and
since it cannot be a simple substitution in the light of the considerations
above stated, let us now see whether the instant case is a fideicommissary
substitution.
In clause IX, the testatrix institutes the plaintiff herein her sole and
universal heiress, and provides that upon her death (the testatrix's) and
after probate of the will and approval of the report of the committee on
claims and appraisal, said heiress shall receive and enjoy the whole
hereditary estate. Although this clause provides nothing explicit about
substitution, it does not contain anything in conflict with the idea of
fideicommissary substitution. The fact that the plaintiff was instituted the
sole and universal heiress does not prevent her children from receiving,
upon her death and in conformity with the express desire of the testatrix,
the latter's hereditary estate, as provided in the following (above quoted)
clauses, which cannot be disregarded if we are to give a correct
interpretation of the will. The word sole does not necessarily exclude the
idea of substitute heirs; and taking these three clauses together, such word
means that the plaintiff is the sole heiress instituted in the first instance.
The disposition contained in clause IX, that said heiress shall receive and
enjoy the estate, is not incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution (it
certainly is incompatible with the idea of simple substitution, where the
heiress instituted does not receive the inheritance). In fact the enjoyment of
the inheritance is in conformity with the idea of fideicommissary
substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted receives the inheritance
and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass it
an to the second heir. On this point the illustrious Manresa, in his Civil
Code (Vol. 6, pp. 142 and 143, 5th ed.), says:
"Or, what amounts to the same thing, the fideicommissary substitution, as
held in the Resolutions of June 25, 1895, February 10, 1899, and July 19,
1909, requires three things:
"1. A first heir called primarily to the enjoyment of the estate.
"2. An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a
third person the whole or a part of the estate.
"3. A second heir.
"To these requisites, the decision of November 18, 1918 adds another,
namely that the fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from the time
the testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latter and not from the
fiduciary.' (Italics ours.)
It appears from this quotation that the heir instituted or the fiduciary, as
referred to in article 783 of the Civil Code, is entitled to enjoy the
inheritance. And it might here be observed, as a timely remark, that the
fideicommissum arising from a fideicommissary substitution, which is of
Roman origin, is not exactly equivalent to, nor may it be confused with, the
English "trust."
It should also be noted that said clause IX vests in the heiress only the right
to enjoy but not the right to dispose of the estate. It says, she may enjoy it,
but does not say she may dispose of it. This is an indication of the usufruct
inherent in fideicommissary substitution.
Clause X expressly provides for the substitution. It is true that it does not
say whether the death of the heiress herein referred to is before or after that
of the testatrix; but from the whole context it appears that in making the
provisions contained in this clause X, the testatrix had in mind a
fideicommissary substitution, since she limits the transmission of her estate
to the children of the heiress by this provision, "in such wise that my estate
shall never pass out of the hands of my heiress or her children in so far as it
is legally possible." Here it clearly appears that the testatrix tried to avoid
the possibility that the substitution might later be legally declared null for
transcending the limits fixed by article 781 of the Civil Code which
prescribes that fideicommissary substitutions shall be valid "provided they
do not go beyond the second degree."
Another clear and outstanding indication of fideicommissary substitution
in clause X is the provision that the whole estate shall pass unimpaired to
the heiress's children, that is to say the heiress is required to preserve the
whole estate, without diminution, in order to pass it on in due time to the
fideicommissary heirs. This provision complies with another of the
requisites of fideicommissary substitution according to our quotation from.
Manresa inserted above.
Lastly, clause XI more clearly indicates the idea of fideicommissary
substitution, when a provision is therein made in the event the heiress
should die after the testatrix. That is, said clause anticipates the case where
the instituted heiress should die after the testatrix and after receiving and
enjoying the inheritance.
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that all the requisites of a
fideicommissary substitution, according to the quotation from Manresa
above inserted, are present in the case of substitution now under
consideration, to wit:
1. A first heir primarily called to the enjoyment of the estate. In this case the
plaintiff was instituted an heiress, called to the enjoyment of the estate,
according to clause IX of the will.
2. An obligation clearly imposed upon the heir to preserve and transmit to a
third person the whole or a part of the estate. Such an obligation is imposed
in clause X which provides that the "whole estate shall pass unimpaired to
her (heiress's) surviving children;" thus, instead of leaving the heiress at
liberty to dispose of the estate by will, or of leaving the law to take its course
in case she dies intestate, said clause not only disposes of the estate in favor
of the heiress instituted, but also provides for the disposition thereof in case
she should die after the testatrix.
3. A second heir. Such are the children of the heiress instituted, who are
referred to as such second heirs both in clause X and in clause XI.
Finally, the requisite added by the decision of November 18, 1918, to wit,
that the fideicommissarius or second heir should be entitled to the estate
from the time of the testator's death, which in the instant case, is, rather
than a requisite,, a necessary consequence derived from the nature of the
fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit
from the heir first instituted, but from the testator.
By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not belong
to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but
to her children, from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria
Alcantara.
Therefore, said inheritance, of which the amount referred to at the
beginning, which is on deposit with the association known as La Urbana in
the plaintiff's name, is a part, does not belong to her nor can it be subject to
the execution of the judgment against Joaquin Perez, who is not one of the
fideicommissary heirs.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant,
Mariano Garchitorena. So ordered.
Case: Emilio Natividad v. Basilia Gabino (36 PHIL. 663), March 31, 1917
FACTS

ISSUE/S LAWS

PETITIONER: Emilio Natividad RESPONDENT: Basilia Gabino PONENTE:

Torres, J. On August 21, 1915, an order given by the judge of the Court
of First Instance arose from interpreting the true wishes of the testator,
Salvador Y Reyes that on accord to clause 6 of the testament, ownership
and dominion of subject property should be awarded to Basilia Gabino,
subject to the reservation made in behalf od Lorenzo Salvador and Emilio
Natividad. Because of this, an amendment was ordered to clarify the
confusion on Clause 6 of the testament. The original clause 6 was: “I
bequeath to Doña Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the
urban property, consisting of a house and lot situated on Calle Lavezares
of the said district of San Nicolas and designated by No. 520, and in
addition eleven meters by two meters of the lot designated by No. 419,
situated on Calle Madrid. This portion shall be taken from that part of
the lot which is adjacent to the rear of said property No. 520. If the said
legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver this
house, together with the lot on which it stands, to my grandson Emilio
Natividad, upon payment by the latter to the former of the sum of four
thousand pesos (P4,000), Philippine currency.” This case was filed by
Emilio Natividad, the administrator of the estateof the decedent, Tiburcio
Salvador Y. Reyes as an appeal from the order upheld by the CFI.
Whether the CFI erred in interpreting clause 6 of the testament Article
1181. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as
the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon
the happening of the event which constitutes the condition. (1114)
Suspensive Condition/Condition Precedent: Also know as condition
antecedent – a condition that rules an obligation as non-‐existent should
an event NOT take place. The event is considered future and
uncertain. If this event does not happen, the parties will stand as if
the conditional obligation never existed; Resolutory Condition/Condition
Subsequent: A condition that extinguishes rights and obligations already
existing; The rights and obligations are already existing but are under
threat of extinction upon the happening or fulfillment of the resolutory
condition. A “but, if” condition: e.g #1: Piece of land given with a
resolutory cause that it be used as a park, if a park

is not constructed then entitles the donor to revoke the obligation. e.g
#2: propter nuptias e.g #3: reserva troncal

HOLDINGS
No. The CFI did not err with their ruling. The condition imposed by the
testator in the double legacy mentioned depends upon the happening
of the event constituting the condition, to wit, the death of the
legatee Basilia Gabino, a perfectly legal condition according to article
1114 of the Civil code, as it is not impossible of performance and is
not contrary to law or public morals, as provided in article 1116 of said
code. The moment the legatee Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo
Salvador, is obliged to deliver the property to the heir Emilio Natividad
who, in his turn and in exchange, must pay the legatee Salvador the sum
of P4,000, thereby fulfilling the double legacy contained in the said sixth
clause of the will, the first of these legacies being the voluntary
reservation to Basilia Gabino of the ownership of the said house, and the
second, the conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador. If the
provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it
cannot be understood that the testator meant to bequeath to Basilia
Gabino the mere usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by unmistakable
language employed in the said sixth clause, he bequeathed her the
ownership or dominion of the said property — language which expresses
without the slightest doubt his wishes which should be complied with
literally, because it is constant rule or jurisprudence that in matters of last
wills and testaments the testator's will is the law. Also, both conditions
set forth by the testator are not contrary to law or public morals. The
August 21 Ruling was affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

EMILIO NATIVIDAD v. BASILIA GABINO, GR No. 11386, 1917-03-31

Facts:

The testator Salvador y Reyes contracted a valid and legal marriage with
Anselma Nicasio, who died in 1868, leaving a daughter named Higinia
who married Clemente Natividad. Higinia Salvador died in 1913, survived
by two children Emilio and Purificacion, both surnamed
Natividad y Salvador. Tiburcio Salvador disposed of all his property in the
manner recorded in the will executed in legal form on November 9, 1914,
instituting as sole heirs his grandchildren Emilio and Purificacion, both
surnamed Natividad y Salvador. In the sixth clause of... this will the
testator left to Basilia Gabino the legacy mentioned therein. Literally, this
clause is as follows:

"I bequeath to Dona Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of the
urban property, consisting of a house and lot situated on Calle Lavezares
of the said district of San Nicolas and designated by No. 520, and in
addition eleven meters by two meters of the lot designated by

No. 419, situated on Calle Madrid. This portion shall be taken from that
part of the lot which is adjacent to the rear of said property No. 520. If the
said legatee should die, Lorenzo Salvador shall be obliged to deliver this
house, together with the lot on which it stands, to... my grandson Emilio
Natividad, upon payment by the latter to the former of the sum of four
thousand pesos (P4,000), Philippine currency."

The executor of the estate of the decedent is the decedent's own heir,
Emilio Natividad, who in due season and by counsel presented to the
court for its approval a proposed partition of the property pertaining to
the estate, setting forth in the fourth basis the following... relative to the
legacy made to Basilia Gabino:

"Summarizing the statements made in respect to this matter, we are of

the opinion that the sixth clause expresses in itself a right of usufruct, in
favor of Doña Basilia Gabino, of the house at No. 520 Calle Lavezares, and
a general legacy in favor of Lorenzo Salvador of the... sum of P4,000
whenever Basilia should die; but that the ownership of the property upon
which this right and legacy are established belongs to the heir Emilio
Natividad who, by the express will of the testator, has been made liable
for these encumbrances."

By a writing of August 5, 1915, counsel for the legatee Basilia Gabino

opposed the approval of the proposed partition with regard to the
adjudication to the legatee of the usufruct only of the property at No. 520
Calle Lavezares, claiming that said legatee ought to be... recognized as
entitled to the dominion and ownership of the same. For this and the
other reasons set forth, her counsel requested that the testamentary
executor be ordered to amend the fourth basis of the proposed partition
in order that ownership and dominion, instead of... usufruct only, of said
property be adjudicated to the objector-legatee, Basilia Gabino.

Issues:
What construction must be given to the above-quoted sixth clause of the
will executed by Tiburcio Salvador?

Ruling:

In the sixth clause of the will executed by the decedent Tiburcio Salvador
y Reyes, he bequeathed to Basilia Gabino the ownership and dominion of
the property therein specified as to its location and other circumstances,
on condition that if the legatee should die Lorenzo

Salvador would be obliged, upon the payment of P4,000 by the testator's

grandson and heir Emilio Natividad, to hand over this property to the
latter.

The condition imposed by the testator in the double legacy mentioned

depends upon the happening of the event constituting the condition, to
wit, the death of the legatee Basilia Gabino, a perfectly legal condition
according to article 1114 of the Civil Code, as it is not... impossible of
performance and is not contrary to law or public morals, as provided in
article 1116 of said code.

The moment the legatee Gabino dies the other legatee, Lorenzo Salvador,
is obliged to deliver the property to the heir Emilio Natividad who, in his
turn and in exchange, must pay the legatee Salvador the sum of P4,000,
thereby fulfilling the double legacy contained in the... said sixth clause of
the will, the first of these legacies being the voluntary reservation to
Basilia Gabino of the ownership of the said house, and the second, the
conditional legacy of P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador, Making use of his right,
the testator provided in his will that... the dominion, that is, the
ownership and possession of his house situated on Calle Lavezares, No.
520 together with a part of the lot at No. 419, should be delivered as a
legacy, provided that if the legatee should die, this property instead of
passing to her successor, would... revert to the testators's grandson and
heir, provided that he in turn would pay to Lorenzo Salvador the sum of
P4,000. It cannot be understood that the legacy conveyed only the
usufruct of the property because the plain and literal meaning of the
words employed... d by the testator... in the said clause sixth clearly
shows beyond all doubt the express wishes of the testator who,
establishing a voluntary reservation of the ulterior and final disposition of
the bequeathed property, ordered that the legatee's right of dominion
should end at her death, and that... on this occurrence his wish was that
the ownership of the property should pass to Emilio Natividad, provided
the latter in turn delivered said P4,000 to Lorenzo Salvador who appears
to be the son of the legatee Gabino.
If the provisions of article 675 of the Civil Code are to be complied with, it
cannot be understood that the testator meant to bequeath to Basilia
Gabino the mere usufruct of the property, inasmuch as, by unmistakable
language employed in the said sixth clause, he bequeathed... her the
ownership or dominion of the said property language which expresses
without the slightest doubt his wishes which should be complied with
literally, because it is constant rule, of jurisprudence that in matters of
last wills and testaments the testators's will is the... law.

It is true that the legatee could not make any disposal of the bequeathed
real property to be effective after her death, nor could the property be
acquired from her by her heir through testate or intestate succession; but
if we take into account that the institution of... donations and legacies
depends on the full free will of the testator, and that if the testator
intended no more than that Basilia Gabino should enjoy the ownership of
the property during her lifetime, this testamentary provision is not
contrary to law or to public morals,... inasmuch as the testator thereby
intended that the property should revert to its lawful heir, the latter being
obliged to make a monetary compensation to Lorenzo Salvador who
appears to be the successor of the legatee Gabino.

For the foregoing reasons, considering that the order appealed from is in
accordance with law and that the several features of the sole assignment
of error made thereto are without merit, the said order of August 21,
1915, must be affirmed, with the costs against the... appellant. So
ordered.

Principles:
Obligations and Contracts

A person is entirely free to make his will in such manner as may best
please him, provided the testamentary provisions conform to law and
meet its requirements. He may impose conditions, either with respect to
the institution of heirs or to the designation of legatees and,... when the
conditions imposed upon the former or the latter do not fall within the
provisions of those articles of the Civil Code touching heirs and legatees,
they shall be governed by the rules therein prescribed for conditional
obligations. (Civ. Code, arts. 790 and 791.)

ELENA MORENTE v. GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA, GR No. 3891, 1907-12-

19
Facts:

That my said husband shall not leave my brothers after my death, and
that he shall not marry anyone; should my said husband have children by
anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except
the one-third part thereof and the two remaining thirds... shall be and
remain for my brother Vicente or his children should he have any.

After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in which the

bakery is located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.

Her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, married again within four months

of the death of the testatrix

Elena Morente, a .sister of the deceased, filed a petition in the proceeding

relating to the probate of the will of Consuelo Morente pending in the
Court of First Instance of... the Province of Tayabas in which she alleged
the second marriage of Gumersindo de la Santa and asked that the legacy
to him above mentioned be annulled

She claims that by the mere act of marriage the husband at once lost all
rights acquired by the will.

To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to

comply with them he shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause
of the will.

Issues:

Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may
be made conditional and article t93 provides that a prohibition against
another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed upon the widow
or widower.

Ruling:

It is nowhere expressly... said that if he does leave the testatrix's sisters,

or does not continue to dwell in the building mentioned in the will he shall
forfeit the property given him in the first clause; nor is it anywhere
expressly said that if he marries again he shall incur such a loss.

Principles:

Did the... testatrix intend to impose a condition upon the absolute gift
which is contained in the first clauses of the will?... t is to be observed
that by the second clause she directs that her husband shall not leave her
sisters. It is provided in the third clause that he must continue to... live in
a certain building.
It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry again.

We are bound to construe the will with reference to all the clauses
contained therein, and with reference to such surrounding circumstances
as duly appear in the case, and after such consideration we can not say
that it was the intention of the testatrix that if her husband... married
again he should forfeit the legacy above mentioned. In other words, there
being no express condition attached to that legacy in reference to the
second marriage, we can not say that any condition can be implied from
the context of the will.

what is said in article 797 that, in order to make a testamentary provision

conditional, such condition must fairly appear from the language used in
the will.

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA
VILLACARLOS
G.R. No. 113725
June 29, 2000

FACTS:
Testator Aleja Belleza appended a codicil to his last will and testament wherein he instituted Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee of 511, 855 sq meters of Lot 1392 in Bacolod. The codicil was duly
probated and admitted before the CFI of Negros Occidental.

The codicil stated that should the devisee die ahead of the testator, the property and rights shall
be inherited by his children and spouse. The codicil also required Rabadilla to deliver 75 piculs
of export sugar and 25 piculs of domestic sugar to Maria Marlina Cosculuella y Belleza, and
should he die, his heir shall have the same obligation. Lastly, in the event that the devisee or his
heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage the said lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee shall also have the
obligation to deliver the piculs. Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife and
children (pet).

In 1989, Maria Marlena brought a complaint against the heirs to enforce the provisions of the
codicil (to deliver piculs of sugar) and to revert the ownership to the heirs of the testator. A
memorandum of agreement to enforce the codicil was agreed but was only partially complied.

Thereafter, the RTC dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the
trial court ruling that Dr. Rabadilla is instituted through modal institution and ordered the
reconveyance of lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does
not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix intended a mere simple
substitution (to deliver piculs of sugar to private respondents).

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was substitution and not institucion sub modo?

HELD:
NO.
The contention is without merit. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or
persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first instituted. In simple substitutions, the second
heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, predecease or
renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide
that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the
testatrix’s near descendants would substitute him. What the par. 6 of the Codicil provides is that,
should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfil the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the
property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix’s near descendants.

Further, in a institucion sub modo or modal institution (Art. 882), the testator states the 1) object
of the institution; and 2) the purpose or application of the property left by the testator or the
charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A “mode” imposes an obligation upon the heir or
legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession. On the other hand, in a
conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order for the
heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and the
mode obligates but does not suspend. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir
without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution. To some extent, it is similar to a
resolutory condition. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not
conditional.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-35213. August 31, 1978.]

BALDOMERA GARCIA and JUAN GARCIA, substitute by SOLEDAD GARCIA,

MARTIN GARCIA, CLEMENTINA GARCIA, MERCEDES GARCIA and JOSE
GARCIA, Petitioners, v. SERAFIN OROZCO, substituted by IRENE ALBAN VDA.
DE OROZCO, and children, ELENA A. OROZCO, CORAZON A. OROZCO, TERESA A.
OROZCO, GRACIA A. OROZCO, ANGELES A. OROZCO, LILIA A. OROZCO,
SERAFIN A. OROZCO, JR., ALFONSO A. OROZCO, and the COURT OF APPEALS
(SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION), Respondents.

Domingo D. Sison Law Office, for Petitioners.

 O. Phythaporas A. Oliver for Respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Prior to the partition of the conjugal properties, the widow specifically sold the disputed
lots to her sister, a defendant herein. In the intestate proceedings, the court denied the
sister’s motion for intervention and, pursuant to a "convenio", adjudicated to the widow
lots other than those which she had previously sold. Thereafter, or in November 1932,
the court by a writ of execution placed the plaintiffs (the decedent’s acknowledged
natural children) in possession of the disputed lots. Two months later, the widow’s
brother, another defendant, wrested the disputed lots from plaintiffs and for doing so,
he was cited for contempt. However, he remained in possession thereof as "encargado"
of the widow, until 1942 when plaintiff filed the instant action for recovery of possession
and ownership. In 1942, the Court adjudged plaintiffs as owners of the disputed lots.
Defendants appealed. But the records were destroyed on account of the war before
they could be elevated. Since the records could not be reconstituted, the court ordered
a trial de novo and allowed plaintiffs to file an amended complainant updating the
amount of damages originally prayed for by them.

After trial the court ordered defendants to vacate the lots in question. The appellate
court affirmed the judgment.

On petition for review, defendants claim that the appellate court erred (1) in not
declaring that the sale was valid insofar as 1/2 thereof was concerned; (2) in not
declaring that defendants had acquired the property by prescription; (3) in holding that
the lower court had discretion to permit the filing of an amended complaint after the
appeal was perfected; (4) in not declaring that the trial court should not have
conducted a new trial.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s decision.

SYLLABUS

1. CONJUGAL PROPERTY; SALE OF SPECIFIC PROPERTY PRIOR TO LIQUIDATION,

INEFFECTIVE. — Where the ganancial partnership consists of numerous lots of
properties, no particular lot or property can be said to appertain to the surviving spouse
or to the heirs prior to liquidation and partition. And while the rights of the surviving
spouse and the heirs are not yet fully vested in the particular lot or property in specific
metes and bounds, a sale by the surviving spouse of a specific property rather than of
the said spouse’s conceptual interest or contingent share in the ganancial partnership is
ineffective, if the lots so disposed of were not subsequently adjudicated to the surviving
spouse at the time of liquidation and partition.

2. ID.; ID.; VALIDITY OF SALE WITH RESPECT TO ONE-HALF OF PROPERTY. — If the

property sold by the surviving spouse prior to liquidation constituted the entire asset or
is the only asset of the conjugal partnership, the sale is valid with respect to the
surviving spouse’s 1/2 share of the property and void as to the other half which is
passed to the heirs of the deceased spouse. This rule, however, does not apply where
the conjugal partnership consists of numerous lots and properties, and the surviving
 spouse sells specific properties of the conjugal partnership. Until a liquidation and
partition is made in the manner and with the formalities required by law, the particular
and corporeal share of the surviving spouse could not yet be determined.

3. ID.; ID.; PARTITION; ACCEPTANCE OF PROPERTY OTHER THAN THAT PREVIOUSLY

SOLD. — Where prior to the partition the surviving spouse, sold specific properties of
the conjugal partnership, and later, during the partition, she accepted other lots,
instead of those which she had previously sold, the sale is ineffective. To uphold the
validity of the sale would give the surviving spouses more than she was entitled to and
had agreed upon with the heirs of the deceased spouse. At any rate, the buyer has a
right of action against the surviving spouse.

4. APPEAL; FINDING OF FACT OF APPELLATE COURT. — The findings of fact of the

Court of Appeals is final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court and may not be
revised by the latter in an appeal by certiorari.

5. PRESCRIPTION; ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION; FLAW IN THE TITLE OF POSSESSOR.

— Where at the time defendant wrested possession of the properties in question he was
cited for contempt for defying a writ of execution issued by the court which heard the
action for partition, he cannot thereafter claim possession of the land in the concept of
owner as then and there the flaw in his title was apparent and patent. Even as he
continued in possession of the land thereafter as "encargado" of the widow from 1933
to the filing of the action for recovery of possession on December 18, 1942, his
possession could not ripen to ownership through acquisitive prescription considering
that prescribed since the courts were closed from December 12, 1941 to August 10,
1942.

6. AMENDED COMPLAINT; TRIAL DE NOVO. — Where after the rendition of judgment

and perfection of an appeal, a trial de novo had to be ordered on account of the
destruction of the records, it is not error for the trial court to allow the plaintiffs to file
an amended complaint updating the amount of damages originally prayed for by them.
A trial de novo means a new trial upon the merits without regard to the proof
represented in the trial court or the conclusions reached by it, whereby the court will
make its own findings, lay down its own conclusions, and dispose of the case as if the
same had never been tried before, and had been originally commenced therein.

7. APPEAL; JURISDICTION; TRIAL COURT MAY ORDER TRIAL DE NOVO WHERE

RECORDS WERE DESTROYED. — After the perfection of appeal, the trial court does not
lose jurisdiction of a case and may order a trial de novo, where admittedly, the records
had been destroyed, on account of the war, before they could be elevated. Under such
circumstances, the perfection of the appeal through the filing of the record on appeal
and the corresponding appeal bond would serve no purpose as the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to review the legal and factual issues would be rendered useless with
nothing more than a record on appeal which is but a chronological compendium of
pleadings and court orders.

8. ID.; TRIAL DE NOVO; AMENDED COMPLAINT; ESTOPPEL. — Where after the

perfection of the appeal a trial de novo had been ordered by the trial court on account
of the destruction of the records, the plaintiffs may be allowed to amend the complaint
for purposes of updating their claim for damages. And where defendants followed the
move of the plaintiffs by reassessing their counterclaim and praying for an amount, in
the re-amended answer, that exceed their original counterclaim, and defendants
participated in the new trial by representing new witnesses as well as documentary
exhibits and by cross-examining the plaintiffs’ witnesses, said defendants are estopped
from objecting the plaintiffs’ amended complaint.

9. ACTION; ID.; RECONSTITUTION OF RECORDS. — Where the trial court had ordered
the reconstitution of evidence pursuant to Section 25, Act 3110, but counsels for both
parties manifested that they did not have a transcript of the destroyed stenographic
notes taken in the previous trial nor copies of the documents presented therein as
evidence, the trial court committed no error in conducting a trial de novo and in
rendering a new judgment for purposes of appeal.

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE FOR RECONSTITUTION OF RECORDS. — Section 6 of Act
3110 which provides the procedure for the reconstruction of records pending judicial
proceedings, requires that the testimony of witnesses taken in civil cases shall be
reconstituted by means of an authentic copy thereof of a new transcript of stenographic
notes, and if no authentic copy can be obtained and the stenographic notes have also
been destroyed, the cases shall be tried de novo as if called for trial for the first time.
Under Section 7, if a civil case has already been decided, the decision shall be
reconstituted by means of an authentic copy. On the other hand, Section 25 refers to
the reconstitution of the records of civil actions, special proceedings and registration
and cadastral proceedings which at the time of their destruction were ready to be sent
to the appellate court on appeal.

DECISION

GUERRERO, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 4,
1972 in CA-G.R. No. 36944-R entitled "Serafin Orozco, Et Al., v. Baldomera Garcia, Et
Al.," which affirmed the decision of the trial court in the original case, Civil Case No. R-
30, "Serafin Orozco, Et Al., v. Baldomera Garcia, Et Al., Court of First Instance of
Albay."cralaw virtua1aw library

The decision of the appellate court recites the following findings of fact: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"It appears that the original plaintiffs, Serafin Orozco, Carmen Orozco, Merced Orozco
and Arsenio Orozco, are brothers and sisters. They were declared as the natural
children of the deceased Epifanio Orozco, by the lower court on March 26, 1906, in Civil
Case No. 474 (Exh. A). Meanwhile, Epifanio Orozco had on May 20, 1905, married
Albina Garcia, sister of the original defendants, namely, Juan Garcia and Baldomera
Garcia. The marriage was not blessed with a child. The original plaintiffs were the
children of Epifanio Orozco with another woman.

"During the marriage with Albina Garcia, the land Mataguisi Guinobatan, containing an
area of 221,192 square meter was acquired by Epifanio Orozco, identified as Lots Nos.
5789 and 5833 of the Cadastral Survey of Guinobatan.

"It also appears that the land in Malobago, Guinobatan, with an area of 261,035 square
meters, originally formed an integral part of a big parcel of land owned and possessed
by Epifanio Orozco since Spanish Regime. The land in Malobago was subdivided into
Lots, 7207, 7213 and 7217 of the Cadastral Survey of Guinobatan.

"When Epifanio Orozco died on August 20, 1917, he was survived by Albina Garcia, his
widow, and Serafin Orozco, Carmen Orozco, Merced Orozco and Arsenio Orozco, his
acknowledged natural children. After the death of Epifanio Orozco, his widow, Albina
Garcia, executed the deed of sale, Exhibit 2, conveying the land in Mataguisi to
Baldomera Garcia for a consideration of P4.400.00.

"In the intestate estate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Epifanio Orozco,
one of his acknowledged natural children, original plaintiff Serafin Orozco, was
appointed as administrator. As judicial administrator, Serafin Orozco brought an action
on July 22, 1929, for the recovery of Lots Nos. 5789 and 5833 located in Mataguisi,
Guinobatan, and Lots Nos. 7207, 7213 and 7217 located in Malobago, same town (Civil
Case No. 5127). In that case, defendant Baldomera Garcia filed a motion for
intervention, which was denied on August 6, 1932. Her motion for reconsideration of
the order of denial was also denied on August 27, 1932, on the ground that "la misma
Albina Garcia demandada on esta causa de quien la tercerista pretende derivar su
derecho de propiedad sobre el terreno objeto de su mocion de terceria ha declarado
expresamente a hizo constar en el convenio entre ella y el demandante Serafin Orozco
del cual el Jusgado base su decision en esta causa de dicho terreno forma parte
integrante de los bienes ganaciales entre ella y su difunto esposo Epifanio Orozco el
cual terreno esta marcado en el convenio de transaccion como parcela "A" bajo el Tax
No. 19100." (Exh. E).

"Pursuant to the "Convenio" submitted by the parties in Civil Case No. 5127, the lower
court rendered judgment on August 10, 1932, adjudicating, among other properties,
Lots Nos. 5789 and 5833, composing the lands in Mataguisi, Guinobatan, and Lots
7207, 7213 and 7217, composing the lands in Malobago, same town, to the intestate
estate of Epifanio Orozco, while the other properties involved therein were given to
Albina Garcia as her share in the conjugal partnership. The decision expressly stated
that Albina Garcia no longer had the usufructuary right as a widow of the deceased
Epifanio Orozco in view of her waiver. (Exh. B).

"By virtue of the writ of execution issued to enforce the judgment in Civil Case No.
5127, Serafin Orozco, as administrator of Epifanio Orozco, was placed in possession of
the lands adjudicated to the estate by the sheriff in November 1932. However, not long
thereafter, Juan Garcia re-entered the lands in question and extrajudicially ejected
therefrom Serafin Orozco. Since that date until the present, the plaintiffs have not been
able to possess said lands.

"It further appears that in a "Sentencia", dated March 26, 1906, rendered in Civil Case
No. 474 of the Court of First Instance Albay, entitled "Serafin Osabel y Otros contra
Epifanio Orozco", the plaintiffs therein (who are herein plaintiffs Serafin, Carmen,
Merced and Arsenio, all surnamed Orozco) were declared natural children of Epifanio
Orozco.
"Now, in a subsequent decision, dated August 10, 1932, rendered in Civil Case No.
5127, entitled "Serafin Orozco, en su capacidad de administrador del abinestato del
finado Epifanio Orozco, demandante contra Albina Garcia, demandada", ownership of
the parcels of land involved in the instant case were adjudicated to the estate of
Epifanio Orozco. Such being the case, and inasmuch as the plaintiffs-appellees are the
natural children of the late Epifanio Orozco, the lower court correctly held that they are
entitled to the parcels of land in question, the ownership of which had been adjudicated
in his (Epifanio’s) favor as early as in 1932."cralaw virtua1aw library

The protracted court proceedings and numerous legal incidents though which this case
had undergone from the time the original complaint was filed more than 35 years ago
are as stated in the appealed decision, thus —

"This is an action filed by the plaintiffs against the defendants on December 18, 1942,
in the Court of First Instance of Albay. The former seek to recover from the latter two
parcels of land, or situated at Mataguisi, Guinobatan, Albay, containing an area 221,192
square meters and the other situated at Malobago, same town and province, with an
area of 261,035 square meters.

"It is alleged that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the parcels of land in
question and that the defendants in bad faith dispossessed the former of their
possession thereof. It is also claimed that by reason of the acts of the defendants, the
plaintiffs suffered damages in the amount of P26,208.00.

"Instead of answering the complaint, the defendants filed a "motion to Quash Plaintiffs’
Complaint" on the ground of prescription. As the motion to dismiss was denied, the
defendants seasonably filed their answer to the complaint, alleging among other things,
absolute ownership, continuous possession of the contested parcel land in the concept
of owners for more than the period for acquisitive prescription, and denying the rest of
the averments in the complaint.

"On March 24, 1943, the plaintiffs filed two actions, one for the declaration of defendant
Baldomera Garcia in default and the other to order Juan Garcia also one of the
defendants to make his answer specific. The court in its order of March 27, 1943,
denied plaintiffs’ motion to declare Baldomera Garcia in default but in the same order
required defendant Juan Garcia to make specific the allegations of his answer.

"Accordingly, on May 12, 1943, defendants filed an amended answer interposing as

defense absolute ownership of the parcels of land involved by virtue of the deeds of
sale executed in their favor. In reply to the amended answer the plaintiffs denied the
claim of the defendants of absolute ownership over the subject parcels of land by virtue
of the deeds of sale dated December 29, 1924, and May 6, 1910, respectively and also
denied that they were guilty of laches or estop pel, claiming that the deeds of sale were
null and void. Thus, the court on July 3, 1943, required the defendants to attach copies
of the deeds of sale, which they did.

"After the case had been heard on the merits, the court a quo on April 28, 1944,
rendered a decision, declaring the plaintiffs joint owners of the lands in question, and
ordering the defendants to deliver the possession of said lands to the former.
"Consequently, the original defendants-appellants interposed an appeal within the
reglementary period. However, before the records of the case could be elevated to the
Court of Appeals, the same was destroyed when the provincial capitol building where
the court house was located was destroyed by bombs and fire during the liberation of
Albay.

"Thus, on February 5, 1946, a petition for the reconstitution of the record of the case
was filed by the plaintiffs. As the petition was granted the parties were ordered to bring
all pleadings, documents and papers which they may have in their possession
necessary for the reconstitution of the records. However, only the record on appeal was
reconstituted. For this reason, the lower court ordered that the case will be tried de
novo.

"Owing to the death of some of the original parties to the case, the plaintiff filed an
amended complaint under date of May 29, 1958. However, the defendants filed on July
2, 1958 a motion to strike out on the ground that the order of the lower court dated
May 16, 1958, only authorized the plaintiffs to amend the party defendant in the
complaint due to the death of the original defendant Juan Garcia but: paragraph 4 in
the amended complaint, increases the amount of damages claimed from P26,208.00 to
P46,000.00. The defendants further contend that the plaintiffs have no right to increase
or to alter the substance of the original complaint. To the motion to strike out, plaintiffs
on July 24, 1958, filed their opposition, alleging that they have the right to update the
damages according to the date of the amended complaint and further claimed that they
have the right to do so since the case is being tried de novo. In its order of July 23,
1957, the lower court admitted the amended complaint.

"Consequently, on August 1, 1958, the defendants filed their answer to the amended
complaint denying the allegations of paragraph 2 thereof, and claiming absolute
ownership over the subject parcels of land, on the part of Baldomera Garcia by virtue of
a deed of sale executed by the late Albina Garcia Vda. de Epifanio Orozco in her favor;
and on the part of Juan Garcia, by virtue of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
executed by the late Epifanio Orozco in his favor and another deed of sale on May 6,
1916, in favor of one Chino Angel Conihero who in turn ceded and conveyed the same
to Juan Garcia. By way of special and affirmative defenses they interposed prescription.
Under their counterclaim, they claimed P50,000.00 as reasonable value of the
improvements introduced into the lands by them, the sum of P6,000.00 representing
the expenses for introducing the improvements and maintenance and care thereof, and
the sum of P7,000.00 which is the value of the land or a total sum of P64,000.00. The
plaintiffs in answer to the counterclaim alleged possession in the bad faith of the
defendants.

"After trial, decision was rendered on December 19, 1964, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring plaintiffs as absolute owners and

entitled to the possession of the lands in question, as described in paragraph 2 of the
amended complaint in the following proportion: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Heirs of Serafin Orozco 1/4

Carmen Orozco 1/4

Merced Orozco 1/4

Arsenio Orozco 1/4

and to recover in the same proportion damages at the rate P500.00 a year for the land
in Mataguisi, Mauraro and P800.00 a year for the land in Malobago from November 23,
1932 until they obtain possession of said lands from the following: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

For the land in Malobago, from November 23, 1932 until April 27, 1943, from the estate
of Juan Garcia and thereafter from Mercedes Garcia.

For the land in Mataguisi, Mauraro, from November 23, 1932 until September 8, 1957,
from Baldomera Garcia; and thereafter from Mercedes Garcia, and the costs.

The defendants are hereby ordered to vacate the lands in question and to deliver the
same to the plaintiffs.’"

Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, the defendants appealed to the Court of
Appeals. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

The appellate court in the decision of April 4, 1972, affirmed the judgment of the lower
court. Defendants-appellants’ motion for reconsideration having been denied, they now
come to Us and in their Brief, make the following assignment of errors: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. The Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that the sale by Albina Garcia to
Baldomera Garcia of the land situated at Mataguisi Guinobatan, Albay, after her
husband’s death, was valid and binding upon Albina Garcia and vested legal title upon
Baldomera Garcia, insofar as one-half (1/2) of it was concerned, in view of the fact that
this parcel of land belonged to the ganancial partnership between the spouses Albina
Garcia and Epifanio Orozco and, under the law, one-half (1/2) of it became Albina
Garcia’s share in the property upon the death of Epifanio Orozco and the consequent
dissolution of their ganancial partnership.

II. The Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that petitioners have acquired, through
acquisitive prescription, ownership of the other half of the Mataguisi property — or of
the whole of it for that matter, assuming that Albina Garcia’s sale to Baldomera cannot
be sustained even as to her one-half (1/2) share in the ganancial property.

III. The Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that petitioners have acquired
ownership of the Malobago property by prescription.

IV. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was within the lower court’s discretion
to permit the filing of an amended complaint because at the time the amended
complaint was filed, the lower court had lost jurisdiction over the case, as the appeal
from its decision had already been perfected. The only purpose of the pending
proceedings was to reconstitute the destroyed evidence.
V. The Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that the trial court should not have
conducted a new trial or rendered a new decision considering that the records were
successfully reconstituted.

VI. Assuming arguendo that it was proper for the lower court to conduct a new trial and
render a new decision and assuming further that the decision rejecting petitioner’s
claim to the Mataguisi and Malobago lots is correct, the Court of Appeals nevertheless
erred in not reversing the trial court’s award of damages in view of its confessed lack of
basis for awarding the same.

Petitioners contend under the first assignment of error that the Court of Appeals erred
in not declaring that the sale by Albina Garcia to Baldomera Garcia of the land situated
at Mataguisi, Guinobaton, Albay after her husband’s death, was valid and binding upon
Albina Garcia and vested legal title upon Baldomera Garcia insofar as 1/2 of it was
concerned. They argue that this parcel of land belong to the ganancial partnership
between the spouses Albina Garcia and Epifanio Orozco, and under the law, 1/2 of it
became Albina Garcia’s share in the property upon the death of Epifanio Orozco and the
consequent dissolution of their ganancial partnership. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

There is no merit to petitioners’ contention. The respondent court committed no error in

ruling that" (s)uch being the case, and inasmuch as the plaintiffs-appellees are the
natural children of the late Epifanio Orozco, the lower court correctly held that they are
entitled to the parcels of land in question, the ownership of which had been adjudicated
in his (Epifanio’s) favor as early as in 1932." cralaw virtua1aw library

The judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 5127 dated Aug. 10, 1932 based upon the
"convenio" agreed upon and submitted by the parties, Serafin Orozco and his co-heirs
on one hand and the widow Albina Garcia, on the other, awarded among others, the
ownership of the Mataguisi properties (Lots Nos. 5789 and 5833), and Malobago
properties (Lots Nos. 7207, 7213 and 7217) to the intestate estate of Epifanio Orozco,
while the other properties involved therein were given to Albina Garcia as her share in
the conjugal partnership, the decision expressly stating that Albina Garcia no longer
had the usufructuary right as widow of the deceased Epifanio Orozco in view of her
waiver. This judgment had long become final and executory. Considering that the
petitions Baldomera Garcia and Juan Garcia are the sister and brother of the widow
Albina Garcia, that Juan Garcia lived with sister Albina Garcia and that Juan Garcia
merely ministered the properties for her, We hold that Baldomera Garcia and Juan
Garcia were not strangers to nor third parties in the proceedings against their sister,
Albina Garcia. The former are therefore charged with knowledge of and are bound by
the decision rendered in said Civil Case No. 5127.

Moreover, the records show that Baldomera Garcia attempted to intervene in Civil Case
No. 5127 but was denied by the court on the ground that "la misma Albina Garcia
demandada on esta causa de quien la tercerista pretende derivar su derecho de
propiedad sobre el terreno objeto de su mocion de terceria ha declarado expresamente
hizo constar en el convenio entre ella y el demandante Serafin Orozco del cual el
Jusgado base su decision en esta causa que dicho terreno forma parte integrante de los
bienes ganaciales entre ella y su difunto esposo Epifanio Orozco el cual terreno esta
marcado en el convenio de transaccion como parcela "A" bajo el Tax No. 19100." She
moved for a reconsideration of the denial and the same was also denied. Yet, she did
not appeal from said denial nor pursue any other remedy or action to protect her rights.
Consequently, Baldomera Garcia and her successors-in-interest may not now claim on
appeal that their rights and interest have been prejudiced thereby. For whatever right
or interest Baldomera Garcia had in the Mataguisi properties which she claims were
prejudiced by the act of her sister, the widow Albina Garcia, in renouncing her rights to
the Mataguisi and Malobago properties and further agreeing accordingly to the
"convenio" which became the basis of the judgment in Civil Case No. 5127, Baldomera
Garcia’s right of action was against her own sister, the widow Albina Garcia, as the
vendor thereof.

The law then governing the dissolution and liquidation of conjugal partnership was
Section 685 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 3176 which
provided:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 685. Community Property. — When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered and
liquidated, and the debts thereof shall be paid in the testamentary or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse, in accordance with the provisions of this Code
relative to the administration and liquidation of the estates of deceased persons, or in
an ordinary liquidation and partition proceeding, unless the parties being all of age and
legally capacitated, avail themselves of the right granted them by this Code for
proceeding to an extrajudicial partition and liquidation of said property.

In case it is necessary to sell any portion of said community property in order to pay
the outstanding debts and obligations of the same, such sale shall be made in the
manner and with the formalities established by this Code for the sale of the property of
deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property effected
without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that
belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made." cralaw virtua1aw library

Commenting on the alienation of community property by the surviving spouse, a

distinguished civil law authority writes: chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"After the death of one of the spouses, in case it is necessary to sell any portion of the
community property in order to pay outstanding obligations of the partnership, such
sale must be made in the manner and with the formalities established by the Rules of
Court for the sale of the property of deceased persons. Any sale, transfer, alienation or
disposition of said property effected without said formalities shall be null and void,
except as regards the portion that belongs to the vendor as determined in the
liquidation and partition. (Act No. 3176) Pending the liquidation, the disposition must be
considered as limited only to the contingent share or interest of the vendor in the
particular property involved, but not to the corpus of the property. Such disposition
cannot include the half that may be adjudicated to the heirs of the deceased spouse.

This rule applies, not only to sale, but also to mortgages. The alienation, mortgage or
disposal of the conjugal property without the required formality, is not, however, null
ab initio, for the law recognizes their validity, so long as they do not exceed the portion
which, after liquidation and partition, should pertain to the surviving spouse who made
the contract. Of course, before liquidation and partition have been completed, such
portion cannot be determined . . .
Manifestly, when third persons are in connivance with the husband or knowingly lend
their aid, directly or indirectly to the commission of fraudulent acts by the husband, the
court will see to it that they do not profit by their misconduct, and the fraud to which
they are parties will vitiate and annul all their transactions." (Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, by Arturo M. Tolentino, Vol. I, pp.
438-439 (1974 Ed.)

In the case at bar, the formalities required by the law were not followed by the widow.
Here the assets of the ganancial partnership between Epifanio Orozco and Albina Garcia
consisted of numerous lots and properties aside from the Mataguisi and Malobago
lands, and until a liquidation and partition was made upon the death of the husband,
Epifanio Orozco, no particular lot or property can be said to appertain to the widow or
to the heirs of the deceased husband who are his acknowledged natural children, the
respondents herein. At the time of the sale, the rights of the widow and the heirs were
not yet fully vested in the particular lot or property in specific metes and bounds. Since
the sale executed by Albina Garcia was after the death of her husband, Epifanio Orosco,
and was prior to the liquidation and partition of the conjugal partnership, said
disposition which specifically transferred the two lots in Mataguisi rather than the
conceptual interest or contingent share of the surviving spouse in these ganancial
properties was ineffective because the Mataguisi lots were not adjudicated to the
surviving spouse at the time the liquidation and partition was made, as provided in the
law.

The ruling in the first decision dated April 28, 1944 that the purported sale in favor of
Baldomera Garcia was a mere subterfuge resorted to in anticipation of the possible
claims that may be made by the natural children and was intended to defeat said claims
and prevent the latter from obtaining what is justly their due, as well as the ruling in
the second decision of December 19, 1964 to the effect that the said sale is not
effective, were both affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We find no error in the Court’s
affirmance. Under the particular facts and circumstances of this Case, We hold that
Baldomera Garcia cannot be considered a third party insofar as the proceedings for the
partition and liquidation of the conjugal partnership is concerned, within the
contemplation of Art. 4 of the old Civil Code cited by petitioners.

Petitioners rely on the cases of Antioho v. Court of Appeals, 87 Phil. 522, and Corpus v.
Geronimo, 98 Phil. 623, as authorities for holding that the sale by the widow of a parcel
of land belonging to the ganancial partnership is valid with respect to her 1/2 share of
property and void as to the other half which is passed to the heirs of the deceased
husband. The ruling in said Antioho case is correct for the facts show that the property
sold constituted the entire asset of the conjugal partnership, as also the Corpus case
which involve a single parcel of land admittedly conjugal property. In the case at bar,
these were numerous lots and properties constituting the assets of the conjugal
partnership and until a liquidation and partition is made in the manner and with the
formalities required by the law, the particular and corporeal share of the surviving
spouse could not yet be determined. At any rate, when the widow agreed to the
partition of the properties left by her husband and accepted other lots instead of those
in Mataguisi which she had previously sold to her sister, Baldomera Garcia, the latter
had a right of action against the former. To uphold the validity of the sale made by the
widow in favor of her sister would due more share to the widow than she was entitled
to and had agreed upon with the heirs of her husband, the respondents herein.

We find no merit in the contention of petitioners under the second and third assignment
of errors that they had acquired through acquisitive prescription ownership of the other
half of the Mataguisi properties or of the whole of it for that matter, and the Malobago
properties. The Court of Appeals committed no error in ruling that: chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

"In the light of the foregoing circumstances showing (1) that the estate of the deceased
Epifanio Orozco was the owner of the parcel of land herein involved, (2) that the
plaintiffs are the successors in interest of said Epifanio Orozco, (3) that the real
properties were delivered to original plaintiff, Serafin Orozco on November 28, 1932 (4)
that Juan Garcia occupied said properties two months after delivery to Serafin Orozco,
and (5) that Juan Garcia was cited for contempt, it could not be said that the appellants
possessed the parcels of land in good faith. Appellant Baldomera Garcia had al
knowledge of the existence of Civil Case No. 5127. For this reason, appellants are not
entitled to reimbursements for whatever improvements they might have introduced
thereon."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners cite in support of their claim of acquisitive prescription Section 41 of Act

190, Code of Civil Procedure, which provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 41. Title to land by Prescription. — Ten years of actual adverse possession by any
person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land,
uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or otherwise, in
whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall be in every
actual occupant or possessor of such land, full and complete title, saving to the persons
under his abilities the rights secured by the next section. In order to constitute such
title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the claimant or by the
person under or through whom he claims must have been actual, open, public,
continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other
claimants. But failure to occupy or cultivate land solely by reason of war shall not be
deemed to constitute an interruption of possession of the claimant and his title by
prescription shall be complete, if in other respects perfect, notwithstanding such failure
to occupy or cultivate the land during the continuance of war." cralaw virtua1aw library

As found by the appellate court, "the land in Malobago, Guinobatan, with an area of
261,035 square meters originally formed an integral part of a big parcel of land owned
and possessed by Epifanio Orozco since the Spanish regime. The land in Malobago was
subdivided into Lots 7207, 7213 and 7217 of the Cadastral Survey of Guinobatan." In
effect, the Court of Appeals rejected the theory of Juan Garcia that he bought the
Malobago property from Epifanio Orozco and Angel Conejero. This finding of fact is final
and conclusive upon this Court and may not be reviewed or revised by Us in the
present appeal by certiorari. The claim of Juan Garcia that he has acquired the
Malobago properties through prescription is, therefore, clearly without factual or legal
basis.

Moreover, when Juan Garcia wrested possession of the Malobago properties in January
1933 and was cited for contempt by the court in Civil Case No. 5127, he was aware that
the court had adjudicated ownership of the lands to the Orozco heirs and consequently
he cannot thereafter claim possession of the land in the concept of owner as then and
there the flaw in his title was apparent and patent. Even as he continued in possession
of the land thereafter as "encargado" of Albino Garcia as hereinbefore stated, from
1933 to the filing of the instant case on December 18, 1942, his possession could not
ripen to ownership through acquisitive prescription, considering that the period when
the courts in Albay were closed from December 12, 1941 to August 10, 1942 and that
the ten-year period to file the case had not prescribed. We cannot sanction petitioners’
usurpation of respondents’ possession, such ouster being committed in bad faith and in
flagrant defiance of the writ of execution issued by the court.

With respect to the fourth, fifth and sixth assignment of errors, these are directed
against two alleged procedural mistakes, namely, the admission of the amended
complaint after rendition of the first judgment and perfection of the appeal therefrom,
and the conduct of the trial de novo which eventually led to the new decision awarding
to respondents damages previously denied in the first decision.

As far as the amended complaint is concerned, the records show that the amended
complaint was filed after the case was set for trial de novo, which means a new trial
upon the merits without regard to the proof presented in the trial court or the
conclusions reached by it, whereby the court will make its own findings, lay down its
own conclusions, and dispose of the case if the same had never been tried before, and
had been originally commenced therein. (Lizo v. Carandang, 73 Phil, 64 [1942];
Lichauco v. Guash, 76 Phil. 5 [1946]).

We cannot agree with petitioners that the lower court had lost jurisdiction over the case
after perfection of the appeal when admittedly, the records of the same had been
destroyed on account of war. We are not concerned with the cold letters of the Rules.
In the case at bar, the intended appeal from the decision of April 28, 1944 was quite
impossible in view of the destruction of the court records, including the documentary
and testimonial evidence which need to be elevated to the Court of Appeals. The
perfection of the appeal through the filing of the record on appeal and the
corresponding appeal bond, therefore, would serve no purpose as the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals to review the legal and factual issues would certainly be rendered
useless with nothing more than the record on appeal which is but a chronological
compendum pleadings and court orders. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Moreover, on grounds of fairness and impartiality, petitioners are estopped to question

the updating of the amount of damages originally prayed for by respondents. We note
that in the first decision, neither party was awarded the damages respectively claimed,
so at least on this aspect, both were at par. In the original complaint filed in 1942, the
total amount of damages prayed for was P26,208.00, subsequently increased to
P46,000.00 in the questioned amended complaint filed on May 29, 1958, (Record on
Appeal, p. 113). The objection of petitioners to the amendment notwithstanding, the
challenge was accepted by them when in their corresponding amended answer dated
August 1, 1958, (Record on Appeal, p. 126), they also reassessed their counterclaim
and prayed for a total amount of P64,000.00, much exceeding their original
counterclaim of P31,000.00 prayed for in the amended answer dated May 12, 1943
(Record on Appeal, p. 31) and later, in the re-amended answer filed on September 3,
1943 (Record on Appeal, p. 39) the total was increased to P38,000.00. As stated by the
trial court, the plaintiffs had the right to update their claim of damages which by the
passing of the years since 1942 had increased. Clearly, petitioners are estopped from
complaining after following the move of their opponent. The trial court acted with
fairness and due process whereby both parties were allowed equal opportunity to
replead and re-estimate their pecuniary interests which both availed. We find no abuse
of discretion on the part of the trial court, and the Court of Appeals is correct in
upholding the admission of the amended complaint.

The petitioners contend that the trial court should not have conducted a new trial or
rendered a new decision considering that the records were successfully reconstructed.
There is no factual basis for this assertion as the trial court, in its decision, said: "On
November 11, 1946, the court denied the motion for execution on the ground that the
decision having been appealed, the Court had lost jurisdiction to execute said decision.
Inasmuch as the oral and documentary evidence had been destroyed, the Court set this
case for trial de novo pursuant to Section 6, Act No. 3110." (Decision, Record on
Appeal, p. 137).

The trial court committed no error in conducting a trial de novo and in rendering a new
judgment. As indicated previously, the court, in its order of December 1, 1947, (Record
on Appeal, p. 109) ordered the reconstitution of the evidence, pursuant to Sec. 25, Act
No. 3110, and since counsels for both parties upon inquiry of the court, manifested that
they did not have a transcript of the destroyed stenographic notes taken in the previous
trial nor copies of the documents presented therein as evidence, with the exception of
the two writings now in the possession of the plaintiffs which have been alluded to in
the decision, the court announced that the case will be tried de novo (Order dated
October 24, 1950, Record on Appeal, pp. 109-111).

Sec. 6 of Act 3110 which provides the procedure for the reconstruction of the records of
pending judicial proceedings, requires that the testimony of witnesses taken in civil
cases shall be reconstituted by means of an authentic copy thereof or a new transcript
of the stenographic notes and if no authentic copy can be obtained and the
stenographic notes have also been destroyed, as in the case at bar, the cases shall be
tried de novo as if called for trial for the first time. Under Sec. 7, if a civil case has
already been decided, the decision shall be reconstituted by means of an authentic
copy. On the other hand, Sec. 25 of the Act refers to the reconstitution of the records of
civil actions, special proceedings, and registration and cadastral proceedings which at
the time of their destruction were ready to be sent to the appellate court on appeal an
said records shall be reconstituted by means of an authentic copy of the bill of
exceptions or appeal record, which, together with the reconstituted evidence, shall form
the reconstituted record for the purposes of the appeal.

We find that the trial court, in reconstituting the records of the instant case which was
ready to be forwarded to the Court of Appeals for purposes of appeal, followed the
procedure provided under both Secs. 6 and 25 of Act 3110 since it was necessary under
the circumstances to reconstitute the evidence originally presented in the first trial of
the case. At any rate, petitioners/participated in the new trial by presenting new
witnesses as well as their documentary exhibits also cross-examined the witnesses of
the respondents. Petitioners had not complained of any irregularity much less raised or
protected any proceedings or process prejudicial their interest during the trial de novo,
hence they cannot, at this late hour, be allowed to complain that there should have
been no trial and that there should have been no judgment at all. cralawnad
Finally, We hold that, contrary to petitioners’ claim that the trial court’s assessment of
the damages awarded lacked basis, the appellate court correctly ruled, thus: "The
amount of damages at the rate of P500.00 a year for the lands in Mataguisi and
P800.00 a year for the lands in Malobago is way below the amount established by the
evidence." In fact, the Court of Appeals cited in the appealed decision the very evidence
in support of the assessment of damages this wise: "Anent the award of damages,
suffice it to say that the very evidence of the defendants show that the lands in
question are planted to abaca, coconuts and rice; that the original defendants and their
successor have been continuously gathering the products from the lands in question
from the time Juan Garcia entered the same shortly after the delivery thereof by the
sheriff to Serafin Orozco on Nov. 23, 1932, until the present; and that the land in
Mataguisi is a little over 22 hectares. Now, when the lands in question were delivered
by the sheriff on November 28, 1932, to Serafin Orozco he was able to gather around
10,000 coconuts and 13,000 kilos of hemp." Plaintiffs’ evidence showing that the price
of abaca fluctuated from P20.00 to P25.00 per 100 kilos from 1932 to 1960 and that
coconuts averaged P0.05 each was also taken into account. The award of damages is
therefore amply justified and supported by credible evidence.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby

affirmed with costs against petitioners.

FRANCISCO A. TONGOY, for

himself and as Judicial
Administrator of the Estate
of the Late Luis D. Tongoy and Ma.
Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy,
Petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, MERCEDES T.
SONORA, JUAN T.
SONORA, JESUS T. SONORA,
TRINIDAD T. SONORA,
RICARDO P. TONGOY,
CRESENCIANO P. TONGOY,
AMADO P. TONGOY, and
NORBERTO P.
TONGOY, Respondent
Facts:
The case is basically an action for
reconveyance respecting two (2)
parcels of
land. The Cadastral Survey referred to
as Cuaycong property, registered co-
owners
of Hacienda Pulo. On April 17, 1918,
Hacienda Pulo was mortgaged by its
registered co-owners to the Philippine
National Bank as security for a loan
payable
in ten years with interest per annum.
The mortgagors however were unable
to
keep up with the yearly amortizations,
in which the PNB instituted judicial
foreclosure proceedings over
Hacienda Pulo on June 18, 1931. To
avoid
foreclosure, one of the co-owners and
mortgagors, proposed to the PNB an
amortization plan that would enable
them to liquidate their account. But,
was
rejected and that the foreclosure suit
had to continue. As a matter of fact,
the suit
was pursued to finality up to the
Supreme Court which affirmed on
July 31, 1935,
the decision of the CFI giving the
PNB the right to foreclose the
mortgage on
Hacienda Pulo.
In the meantime, owner and co-owner
Tongoy’s and Luis Tongoy executed a
Declaration of Inheritance wherein
they declared themselves as the only
heirs
entitled to their father's share in
Hacienda Pulo. Then, March 13, 1934
Sonora-
Tongoy executed an "Deed of Sale”
transfer their consideration of rights
and
interests over Hacienda Pulo in favor
of Luis D. Tongoy. and in the
following year,
the title of the adjacent Cuaycong
property also with its Transfer
Certificate with
"Deed of Sale" executed in favor of
the couple by owner Basilisa
Cuaycong. In the
case of Jose Tongoy, the execution of
the "Deed of Sale" was executed for
an
Assignment of Rights in favor of Luis
D. Tongoy by the Pacific Commercial
Company as judgment lienholder
(subordinate to the PNB mortgage).
On the basis
of the foregoing documents, Hacienda
Pulo and Cuaycong property now
under the
name of Luis D. Tongoy, married to
Maria Rosario Araneta with its
Transfer
Certificate.
On June 26, 1936, Luis D. Tongoy
executed a real estate mortgage over
the
Cuaycong property in favor of the
PNB, as security for loan, thereafter in
the
sameyear, he also executed a real
estate mortgage over Hacienda Pulo in
favor of
the same bank to secure an
indebtedness, payable for a period of
fifteen years
with interest per annum. After two
decades, on April 17, 1956, Luis D.
Tongoy paid
off all his obligations with the PNB,
including the mortgage obligations on
the
Cuaycong property and Hacienda
Pulo. However, a release of real estate
mortgage
was executed by the bank in favor of
Luis D. Tongoy, but on February 5,
1966, Luis
D. Tongoy died leaving as heirs his
wife Maria Rosario Araneta and his
son
FRANCISCO A. TONGOY, for himself and as Judicial Administrator of the Estateof the Late Luis D. Tongoy
and Ma. Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy, Petitioners,vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
MERCEDES T. SONORA, JUAN T.SONORA, JESUS T. SONORA, TRINIDAD T. SONORA, RICARDO P.
TONGOY,CRESENCIANO P. TONGOY, AMADO P. TONGOY, and NORBERTO P.TONGOY, RespondentFacts:The
case is basically an action for reconveyance respecting two (2) parcels of land. The Cadastral Survey
referred to as Cuaycong property, registered co-ownersof Hacienda Pulo. On April 17, 1918, Hacienda
Pulo was mortgaged by its registered co-owners to the Philippine National Bank as security for a loan
payablein ten years with interest per annum. The mortgagors however were unable to keep up with the
yearly amortizations, in which the PNB instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over Hacienda Pulo on
June 18, 1931. To avoid foreclosure, one of the co-owners and mortgagors, proposed to the PNB an
amortization plan that would enable them to liquidate their account. But, was rejected and that the
foreclosure suit had to continue. As a matter of fact, the suit was pursued to finality up to the Supreme
Court which affirmed on July 31, 1935, the decision of the CFI giving the PNB the right to foreclose the
mortgage on Hacienda Pulo. In the meantime, owner and co-owner Tongoy’s and Luis Tongoy executed a
Declaration of Inheritance wherein they declared themselves as the only heirs entitled to their father's
share in Hacienda Pulo. Then, March 13, 1934 Sonora-Tongoy executed an "Deed of Sale” transfer their
consideration of rights and interests over Hacienda Pulo in favor of Luis D. Tongoy. and in the following
year, the title of the adjacent Cuaycong property also with its Transfer Certificate with "Deed of Sale"
executed in favor of the couple by owner Basilisa Cuaycong. In the case of Jose Tongoy, the execution of
the "Deed of Sale" was executed for an Assignment of Rights in favor of Luis D. Tongoy by the Pacific
Commercial Company as judgment lienholder (subordinate to the PNB mortgage). On the basisof the
foregoing documents, Hacienda Pulo and Cuaycong property now under the name of Luis D. Tongoy,
married to Maria Rosario Araneta with its Transfer Certificate. On June 26, 1936, Luis D. Tongoy executed
a real estate mortgage over the Cuaycong property in favor of the PNB, as security for loan, thereafter in
the sameyear, he also executed a real estate mortgage over Hacienda Pulo in favor of the same bank to
secure an indebtedness, payable for a period of fifteen years with interest per annum. After two
decades, on April 17, 1956, Luis D. Tongoy paidoff all his obligations with the PNB, including the
mortgage obligations on the Cuaycong property and Hacienda Pulo. However, a release of real estate
mortgage was executed by the bank in favor of Luis D. Tongoy, but on February 5, 1966, LuisD. Tongoy
died leaving as heirs his wife Maria Rosario Araneta and his son

Francisco A. Tongoy. Before his death, Luis D. Tongoy received a letter from Sonora’s, demanding the
return of their shares in the properties to the co-owners. And then, not long after his death the case was
instituted in the court on complaint filed on June 2, 1966 by Sonora-Tongoy. Named principally as
defendants were Francisco A. Tongoy, the son himself as judicial administrator of the estate of the late
Luis D. Tongoy, and Maria Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy. Also impleaded as defendants, because of
their unwillingness to join as plaintiffs were the three Tongoy’s, alleging in sum that plaintiffs and their
predecessors transferred their interests on the two lots in question to Luis D. Tongoy by means of
simulated sales, pursuant to a trust arrangement whereby the latter would return such interests after
the mortgage obligations has been settled, and complaint prayed that 'judgment be rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants.Declaring that the HACIENDA PULO and the former Cuaycong
property, as trust estate belonging to the plaintiffs and the defendants of this complaints ordering the
Register of Deeds to cancel and to issue new ones in the names of the plaintiffs and defendants, based
on the original area of HACIENDA PULO. Ordering Francisco A. Tongoy and Ma. Rosario Araneta Vda. de
Tongoy to render an accounting of the income of the above two properties and to deliver to each
plaintiffs their corresponding share with legal interest until the same shall have been fully paid; and for
attorney's fees and costs of this suit. Plaintiffs also pray for other further remedies fair and just.LOWER
COURT DECISION:After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision finding the existence of
an implied trust in favor of plaintiffs, but at the same time holding their action for reconveyance barred
by prescription, except in the case of minor Tongoy’s, who were adjudged entitled to reconveyance of
their corresponding shares in the property and having been excluded therefrom in the partition during
their minority, and dismissing the complaint of all surnamed Sonora. The defendants Francisco Tongoy
and Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy are hereby ordered to reconvey the proportionate shares of all
surnamed Tongoy in Hda. Pulo and the Cuaycong property and with the view to avoid further
controversy with respect to the share of each heir, the dispositive portion of the decision is clarified in
the sense that, the proportionate legal share of the Tongoy and the rest of the heirs in Hda. Pulo and
Cuaycong property consist of the whole trust estate and leaving the same potionto the heirs of Luis D.
Tongoy. SO ORDERED.Parties appealed the decision of the lower court to respondent appellate court are
plaintiffs-appellants Sonora, the heirs questioned the lower court's decision dismissing their complaint
on the ground of prescription, and assailed that the agreement created among the Tongoy-Sonora family
in 1931 was an implied, and not an express trust; that their action had prescribed. For the part,
defendants-appellants Francisco A. Tongoy and Ma. Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy not only refuted the
errors assigned by plaintiffs-appellants, but also assailed the findings that there was preponderance of
evidence in support of the existence of an implied trust; that the three Tongoy’s are the legitimate half-
brothers of the late Luis D. Tongoy; that their shares in Hacienda Pulo and Cuaycong property should

be reconveyed to them by defendants-appellants. Therefore, an execution was ordered pending

appeal.On December 3, 1975The respondent Court of Appeal rendered modification judgment, ordering
Maria Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy and Francisco A. Tongoy to reconvey to Sonora and Tongoy heirs
each portion of both Hacienda Pulo and the Cuaycong property, based on their original shares and to
render an accounting to the party’s name andto pay attorney's fees and the costs of the suits. SO,
ORDERED.Subsequently, petition for review on certiorari follows that the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that there was a trust constituted on Hacienda Pulo; That the Court of Appeals erred in finding
that the purchase price for the Cuaycong property was paid by Jose Tongoy and that said property was
also covered by a trust in favor of respondents; Conceding, the sake of argument, that respondents have
adequately proven an implied trust in their favor, that the court erred in not finding that the rights of
respondents have prescribed, or are barred by laches; that the court erred in finding that the
respondents Tongoys’ are the legitimated children of Francisco Tongoy; that the Court of Appeals erred
in ordering petitioners to pay attorney's fees and its costs.ISSUES:1) whether or not the conveyance
respecting the questioned lots made in favor of Luis D. Tongoy were conceived pursuant to a trust
agreement among the parties?2) whether or not the trust created was an express or implied trust? 3)
whether or not an express trust done to enforce it has prescribed?Ans Q no.1To begin with, the trial
court found and ruled that the transfers made in favor of Luis D. Tongoy were clothed with an implied
trust, arriving at this conclusion as follows:The Court finds that there is preponderance of evidence in
support of the existence of constructive, implied, or tacit trust. The hacienda could have been leased to
third persons and the rentals would have been sufficient to liquidate the outstanding obligation in favor
of the Philippine National Bank. But the co-owners agreed to give the administration of the property to
Atty. Luis D. Tongoy, so that the latter can continue giving support to the Tongoy-Sonora family and at the
same time, pay the amortization in favor of the Philippine National Bank, in the same manner that Jose
Tongoy did. And of course, if the administration is successful, Luis D. Tongoy would benefit with the
profits of the hacienda. Ans Q no.2Simulated deeds of conveyance in favor of Luis D. Tongoy were
executed to facilitate and expedite the transaction with the Philippine National Bank. Luis D.

FRANCISCO A. TONGOY, for

himself and as Judicial
Administrator of the Estate
of the Late Luis D. Tongoy and Ma.
Rosario Araneta Vda. de Tongoy,
Petitioners,
vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, MERCEDES T.
SONORA, JUAN T.
SONORA, JESUS T. SONORA,
TRINIDAD T. SONORA,
RICARDO P. TONGOY,
CRESENCIANO P. TONGOY,
AMADO P. TONGOY, and
NORBERTO P.
TONGOY, Respondent
Facts:
The case is basically an action for
reconveyance respecting two (2)
parcels of
land. The Cadastral Survey referred to
as Cuaycong property, registered co-
owners
of Hacienda Pulo. On April 17, 1918,
Hacienda Pulo was mortgaged by its
registered co-owners to the Philippine
National Bank as security for a loan
payable
in ten years with interest per annum.
The mortgagors however were unable
to
keep up with the yearly amortizations,
in which the PNB instituted judicial
foreclosure proceedings over
Hacienda Pulo on June 18, 1931. To
avoid
foreclosure, one of the co-owners and
mortgagors, proposed to the PNB an
amortization plan that would enable
them to liquidate their account. But,
was
rejected and that the foreclosure suit
had to continue. As a matter of fact,
the suit
was pursued to finality up to the
Supreme Court which affirmed on
July 31, 1935,
the decision of the CFI giving the
PNB the right to foreclose the
mortgage on
Hacienda Pulo.
In the meantime, owner and co-owner
Tongoy’s and Luis Tongoy executed a
Declaration of Inheritance wherein
they declared themselves as the only
heirs
entitled to their father's share in
Hacienda Pulo. Then, March 13, 1934
Sonora-
Tongoy executed an "Deed of Sale”
transfer their consideration of rights
and
interests over Hacienda Pulo in favor
of Luis D. Tongoy. and in the
following year,
the title of the adjacent Cuaycong
property also with its Transfer
Certificate with
"Deed of Sale" executed in favor of
the couple by owner Basilisa
Cuaycong. In the
case of Jose Tongoy, the execution of
the "Deed of Sale" was executed for
an
Assignment of Rights in favor of Luis
D. Tongoy by the Pacific Commercial
Company as judgment lienholder
(subordinate to the PNB mortgage).
On the basis
of the foregoing documents, Hacienda
Pulo and Cuaycong property now
under the
name of Luis D. Tongoy, married to
Maria Rosario Araneta with its
Transfer
Certificate.
On June 26, 1936, Luis D. Tongoy
executed a real estate mortgage over
the
Cuaycong property in favor of the
PNB, as security for loan, thereafter in
the
sameyear, he also executed a real
estate mortgage over Hacienda Pulo in
favor of
the same bank to secure an
indebtedness, payable for a period of
fifteen years
with interest per annum. After two
decades, on April 17, 1956, Luis D.
Tongoy paid
off all his obligations with the PNB,
including the mortgage obligations on
the
Cuaycong property and Hacienda
Pulo. However, a release of real estate
mortgage
was executed by the bank in favor of
Luis D. Tongoy, but on February 5,
1966, Luis
D. Tongoy died leaving as heirs his
wife Maria Rosario Araneta and his
son

Tongoy supported the Tongoy-Sonora family. The letter of Luis D. Tongoy dated is very significant, the
tenor of which is quoted: Dear Brother Jose,Herewith is the deed which the bank sent for us to sign. The
bank made me pay the sum of P100.00 so as not to sell anymore the land in public auction. This deed is
for the purpose of dispensing with the transfer of title to the land in the name ofthe bank, this way we
will avoid many expenses.Yours, Luis D. TongoyJose Tongoy signed the deed because he incurred the
obligation with the Pacific and paid it. In releasing the second mortgage, Luis Tongoy paid only P100.00
and the deed was in favor of Luis Tongoy. This was done in order "to avoid many expenses " of both Jose
and Luis as obviously referred to in the word "WE". Those two transactions with existing considerations
are impossible to deny and obvious evidence of the existence of constructive or implied trust.Ans Q-
3The Court considers the evidence of execution of express trust agreement insufficient. The express trust
agreement was never mentioned in the plaintiffs' pleadings, nor its existence asserted during the pre-
trial hearings. It was only during the trial on the merits when Atty. Eduardo P. Arboleda went on to testify
that he prepared the deed of trust agreement. Accordingly, the co-owners had agreed to entrust the
administration and management of Hacienda Pulo to Luis D. Tongoy who had newly emerged as the
lawyer in the family. Neither has the existence of the alleged contra-documento by which Luis D. Tongoy
supposedly acknowledged the transfers to be simulated and bound himself to return the shares of his
co-owners after the mortgage on the Hacienda had been discharged-been satisfactorily established to
merit consideration as proof of the supposed express trust. COURT CONCLUSSIONS:The Court of Appeals
found enough convincing evidence not barred by the aforecited survivorship rule to the effect that the
transfers made by the co- owners in favor of Luis D. Tongoy were simulated.In fact, as recited in the deed
of sale executed between Luis. D. Tongoy and Jose Tongoy, it appears that the series of transfers made in
favor of the former by the co-owners of Hacienda Pulo followed, and was made pursuant to prior
arrangement made with the PNB by Luis D. Tongoy to redeem the shares or participation of his co-
owners.Furthermore, the tenor of the letter from Luis D. Tongoy to Jose Tongoy, dated November 5, as
hereto quoted with portions of the decision on appeal, is very revealing of the fact that the steps taken
to place Hacienda Pulo in the name of

Luis D. Tongoy were made for the benefit not only of himself but for the other co-owners as well. Thus,
the letter ends with the clause-"this way we will avoid manyexpenses.Finally, it is not without
significance that the co-owners and their dependents continued to survive apparently from the
sustenance from Hacienda Pulo for a long time following the alleged transfers in favor of Luis D. Tongoy.
In fact, it doesnot appear possible that Jesus T. Sonora and Ricardo P. Tongoy could have finished
medicine and law, respectively, without the support from Luis D. Tongoy as administrator of the common
property.All the foregoing, consideration constitute clear and convincing evidence that the transfers
made in favor of Luis D. Tongoy by his co- owners were only simulated, under circumstances giving rise
to an implied contract whereby Luis D. Tongoy is bound to hold title of trust for the benefit of his co-
owners.Whether or not the rights of herein respondents over subject properties, which were the
subjects of simulated or fictitious transactions, have already prescribed?Art. 1410. The action or defense
for the declaration of the inexistence of a contractdoes not prescribe.The characteristic of simulation is
the fact that the apparent contract is not really desired nor intended to produce legal effects nor in any
way alter the juridical situation of the parties. Thus, where a person, in order to place his property
beyond the reach of his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does notreally intend to divest
himself of his title and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. (Rodriguez vs.
Rodriguez, No. L-23002, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 908)1) As a general rule, they produce no legal effects
whatsoever in accordance with the principle "which is null produces no effect."2) They are not
susceptible of ratification. 3) The right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be
waived or renounced.c4) The action or defense for the declaration of their inexistence or absolute nullity
is imprescriptible.ch5) The inexistence or absolute nullity of a contract cannot be invoked by a person
whose interests are not directly affected.From what time should such period be counted?Considering
that the implied trust resulted from the simulated sales which were made for the purpose of enabling
the transferee, Luis D. Tongoy, to save the properties from foreclosure for the benefit of the co-owners, it
would not do to apply the theory of constructive notice resulting from the registration in the trustee's
name. Hence, the ten-year prescriptive period should not be counted

from the date of registration in the name of the trustee, as contemplated in the earlier case of Juan vs.
Zuñiga (4 SCRA 1221). Rather, it should be counted from the date of recording of the release of mortgage
in the Registry of Deeds.Indeed, as respondent Court of Appeals had correctly held:As already indicated,
the ten-year prescriptive period for bringing the action to enforce the trust or for reconveyance of
plaintiffs-appellants" shares should be toned from the registration of the release of the mortgage
obligation, since only by that time could plaintiffs-appellants be charged with constructive knowledge
ofthe liquidation of the mortgage obligations, when it became incumbent upon them to expect and
demand the return of their shares, there being no proof that plaintiffs-appellants otherwise learned of
the payment of the obligation earlier. More precisely the prescriptive period should be reckoned from
May 5, 1958, whenthe release of the mortgage was recorded in the Registry of Deeds, which is to
saythat the present complaint was still filed within the period on June 4, 1966.Hence, WE find no
evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Court of Appeals when it ordered such
accounting from May 5, 1958, as well as the imposition of legal interest on the fruits and income
corresponding to the shares that should have been returned to the private respondents, from the date
of actualdemand which has been determined to have been made on January 26, 1966 by the demand
letter of respondent Jesus T. Sonora to deceased Luis D. Tongoy.As for the claim for attorney's fees, the
same appears to be well taken in the light of the findings considering that prevailing plaintiffs- appellants
were forced to litigate to enforce their rights, and that equity under all the circumstances so dictate, said
plaintiffs-appellants should recover attorney's fees in a reasonable amount. The remaining assignment of
error dwells on the question of whether or not respondents Amado, Ricardo, Cresenciano and Norberto,
all surnamed Tongoy, may be considered legitimated by virtue of the marriage of their parents, Francisco
Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, subsequent to their births and shortly before Francisco died on September
15, 1926. The liberal view taken by respondent Court of AppealsIndeed, it does not make much sense
that appellees should be deprived of their hereditary rights as undoubted natural children of their father,
when the only plausible reason that the latter could have had in mind when he married his second wife
Antonina just over a month before his death was to give legitimate status to their children. It is not in
keeping with the more liberal attitude taken by the New Civil Code towards illegitimate children and the
more compassionate trend of the New Society to insist on a very literal application of the law in
requiring the formalities of compulsory acknowledgment, when the only result is to unjustly deprive
children who are otherwise entitled to hereditary rights. As a matter of fact, they are really children of
Francisco Tongoy and Antonina Pabello, and the only ttechnicality that their acknowledgment as natural
children has not been formalized in any of the modes prescribed by law. The right to participate in their
father's inheritance should necessarily follow.

ANTONIO MACADANGDANG VS CA (1980)

Posted by kaye lee on 1:01 PM

G.R. No. L-49542 September 12 1980 [Paternity and Filiation : Legitimate Children]

FACTS:
Elizabeth Mejias, married to Crispin Anahaw, had sex with Antonio Macadangdang sometime in March
1967. Because of the affair, she and her husband allegedly separated. On October 30, 1967, she gave
birth to a baby boy named Rolando Macadangdang. Elizabeth filed with the CFI a recognition and support
against Antonio. The lower court dismissed the complaint, applying the provisions of Articles 255 and 256
of the Civil Code. CA reversed the decision and declared Rolando to be an illegitimate son of Antonio. CA
denied Vicente's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate child of Elizabeth and Crispin.
2) Whether or not Elizabeth may institute an action that would bastardized her child without giving her
husband, the legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard.

RULING:

SC held that CA made judgement based on misapprehension of facts and the its finding of facts
contradicted by evidence on record.

Under the Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of
Elizabeth and Crispin.
Rolando was born only 7 months after the incident took place, and also 7 months after their alleged
separation. The birth of Rolando came more than 180 days following the celebration of said marriage and
before 300 days following the alleged separation between the spouses. The fact that the child was born in
the rented house, normally delivered, and raised normally by the yaya, according to the testimony of the
yaya Patrocinia Avila. If he was otherwise born prematurely, he would have needed to be placed under
special care, attended by a physician.

The child Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her spouse. This presumption
becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there was physical impossibility of access between the
spouses in the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the child. This presumption is actually
quasi-conclusive and may be rebutted or refuted by only one evidence — the physical impossibility of
access between husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 which preceded the birth of the
child. This physical impossibility of access may be caused by any of these:

1. Impotence of the husband;

2. Living separately in such a way that access was impossible and

3. Serious illness of the husband.

Article 256 of the Civil Code which provides that the child is presumed legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Hence, good morals and public policy
require that a mother should not be permitted to assert the illegitimacy of a child born in wedlock in order to obtain
some benefit for herself.

The law is not willing that the child be declared illegitimate to suit the whims and purposes of either parent, nor
Merely upon evidence that no actual act of sexual intercourse occurred between husband and wife at or about the
time the wife became pregnant. Thus, where the husband denies having any intercourse with his wife, the child was
still presumed legitimate.

With respect to Article 257, it must be emphasized that adultery on the part of the wife, in itself, cannot destroy the
presumption of legitimacy of her child, because it is still possible that the child is that of the husband.

At this juncture, it must be pointed out that only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he
should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral or economic interest involved.

It has, therefore, been held that the admission of the wife's testimony on the point would be unseemly and
scandalous, not only because it reveals immoral conduct on her part, but also because of the effect it may have on
the child, who is in no fault, but who nevertheless must be the chief sufferer thereby.

It also appears that her claim against petitioner is a disguised attempt to evade the responsibility and consequence of
her reckless behavior at the expense of her husband, her illicit lover and above all — her own son. For this Court to
allow, much less consent to, the bastardization of respondent's son would give rise to serious and far-reaching
consequences on society. This Court will not tolerate scheming married women who would indulge in illicit affairs
with married men and then exploit the children born during such immoral relations by using them to collect from
such moneyed paramours. This would be the form of wrecking the stability of two families. This would be a severe
assault on morality.
Chua v. CFI
G.R. No. L-29901 31 August
1977, 78 SCRA 412
FACTS:
Jose Frias Chua had 2 marriages.
First with Patricia, he had 3
children- Ignacio, Manuel and
Lorenzo. When Patricia died, he
married Consolacion de la Torre
and had one child- Juanito
Frias Chua. Jose Frias Chua died
intestate. After the intestate
proceeding the court adjudicated
half of lot in question to
Consolacion and the other half to
their only son, Juanito. The two
sons
in the first marriage, Lorenzo and
Ignacio, received P3000 and
P1550 respectively. (Manuel
already died). Juanito also died
intestate without issue.
Consolacion de la Torre executed a
declaration of heirship
adjudicating in her favor the pro-
indiviso share of her son Juanito in
the
lot in question. When dela Torre
died, Ignacio and the heirs of
Lorenzo filed a complaint praying
that the one-half portion of the Lot
be declared as a reservable
property for the reason that the
lot in question was subject to
reserval troncal pursuant to
Article 981 NCC. Lower
court
dismissed complaint.
ISSUE:
WON property in question was
acquired by Juanito Frias Chua
from his father Jose Frias Chua
gratuitously (as first requisite of
Reserva Troncal).
RULING:
Yes. In order that a property
may be impressed with a
reservable character the
following
requisites must exist, to wit:
(1) That the property was acquired
by a descendant from an ascendant
or from a brother or
sister by gratuitous title;
(2) That said descendant died
without an issue;
(3) That the property is inherited
by another ascendant by operation
of law; and
(4) That there are relatives within
the third degree belonging to the
line from which said property
came.
All of the foregoing requisites are
present. Thus, as borne out by the
records, Juanoito Frias
Chua of thesecond marriage died
intestate in 1952; he died without
leaving any issue; his pro-
indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No.
399 was acquired by his mother,
Consolacion de la Torre died,
Juannnito Frias Chua who died
intestate had relatives within the
third degree. These relatives
are Ignacio Frias Chua and
Dominador Chua and Remidios
Chua, the suppose legitimate
children of the deceased Lorenzo
Frias Chua, who are the petitioners
herein
According to Manresa, “The
transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient
does not give anything in return.”
It matters not whether the property
transmitted be or be not
subject to any prior charges; what
is essential is that the transmission
be made gratuitously, or
by an act of mere liberality of the
person making it, without
imposing any obligation on the
part
of the recipient; and that the person
receiving the property gives or
does nothing in return
Chua v. CFIG.R. No. L-29901 31 August 1977, 78 SCRA 412FACTS:Jose Frias Chua had 2 marriages. First
with Patricia, he had 3 children- Ignacio, Manuel andLorenzo. When Patricia died, he married
Consolacion de la Torre and had one child- JuanitoFrias Chua. Jose Frias Chua died intestate. After the
intestate proceeding the court adjudicatedhalf of lot in question to Consolacion and the other half to
their only son, Juanito. The two sonsin the first marriage, Lorenzo and Ignacio, received P3000 and
P1550 respectively. (Manuelalready died). Juanito also died intestate without issue. Consolacion de la
Torre executed adeclaration of heirship adjudicating in her favor the pro-indiviso share of her son Juanito
in thelot in question. When dela Torre died, Ignacio and the heirs of Lorenzo filed a complaint
prayingthat the one-half portion of the Lot be declared as a reservable property for the reason that
thelot in question was subject to reserval troncal pursuant to Article 981 NCC. Lower
courtdismissed complaint.ISSUE:WON property in question was acquired by Juanito Frias Chua from his
father Jose Frias Chuagratuitously (as first requisite of Reserva Troncal).RULING:Yes. In order that a
property may be impressed with a reservable character the followingrequisites must exist, to wit:
(1) That the property was acquired by a descendant from an ascendant or from a brother or sister by
gratuitous title;(2) That said descendant died without an issue;(3) That the property is inherited by
another ascendant by operation of law; and(4) That there are relatives within the third degree belonging
to the line from which said propertycame.All of the foregoing requisites are present. Thus, as borne out
by the records, Juanoito FriasChua of thesecond marriage died intestate in 1952; he died without leaving
any issue; his pro-indiviso of 1/2 share of Lot No. 399 was acquired by his mother, Consolacion de la
Torre died,Juannnito Frias Chua who died intestate had relatives within the third degree. These
relativesare Ignacio Frias Chua and Dominador Chua and Remidios Chua, the suppose
legitimatechildren of the deceased Lorenzo Frias Chua, who are the petitioners hereinAccording to
Manresa, “The transmission is gratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipientdoes not give anything
in return.” It matters not whether the property transmitted be or be notsubject to any prior charges;
what is essential is that the transmission be made gratuitously, orby an act of mere liberality of the
person making it, without imposing any obligation on the partof the recipient; and that the person
receiving the property gives or does nothing in return

“The essential thing is that the person who transmits it does so gratuitously, from
puregenerosity, without requiring from the transferee any prestation.” It is evident from the recordthat
the transmission of the property in question to Juanito Frias Chua of the second marriageupon the death
of his father Jose Frias Chua was by means of a hereditary succession andtherefore gratuitous.As long as
the transmission of the property to the heirs is free from any condition imposed bythe deceased himself
and the property is given out of pure generosity, it is gratuitous.

LACERNA VS VDA. DE CORCINO CASE DIGEST

(G.R. NO. L-14603 APRIL 29, 1961)
LACERNA vs Vda. DE CORCINO
FACTS:
1. Catalino, Marcelo, Agatona and Bonifacia Lacerna are brothers and
sisters.
2. Bonifacia Lacerna was married to Valentin Marbebe, and had a son
named Juan. Upon her death, the lands she owns passed by
succession to Juan.
3. Juan then according to records, died intestate in 1943.
4. Defendant Agatona, was the sister of Bonifacia Lacerna, and had
in her possession the lands inherited by Juan.
5. The plaintiffs, who are cousins of Juan, instituted an action
against Agatona since according to them, they are the sole heirs
of Juan.
6. Jacoba Marbebe filed an answer in intervention alleging that she
is a half sister of Juan Marbebe who died intestate, leaving
neither ascendants nor descendants, and that, as his half sister,
she is entitled, by succession, to the properties in dispute.
According to her, in the order of intestate succession, brothers
and sisters exclude all other collateral relatives.
7. Plaintiffs however contend that, in reserva troncal, properties in
dispute should pass to the heirs of the deceased within the third
degree, who belong to the line from which said properties came. Since the
property came from the Juan’s mother, then Jacoba is excluded,
and the cousins are to inherit.
ISSUE: Who shall inherit.
HELD: Jacoba shall inherit.
a. Contrary to the plaintiffs allegations, there is NO RESERVA
TRONCAL in this case.
b. This article applies only to properties inherited, under the
conditions therein set forth, by an ascendant from a descendant,
and this is not the case before us, for the lands in dispute were
inherited by a descendant, Juan Marbebe, from an ascendant, his
mother, Bonifacia Lacerna .
c. a sister, even if only a half-sister, in the absence of other
sisters or brothers, or of children of brothers or sisters,
excludes all other collateral relatives, regardless of whether or
not the latter belong to the line from which the property of the
deceased came. (intestate succession).
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO v. CA, GR No. 83484, 1990-02-12

Facts:

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr.,
author of the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who
died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1)... his maternal
aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother,
Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.

He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after
his marriage in December, 1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before
Esteban, Jr. was born.

Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels

of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited
from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first wife (p. 325,
Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her... short-lived
marriage to Esteban, Sr.

On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only
child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where
she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these
properties were transferred in the name of Esteban,... Jr.

a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving students
obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart... attack on
February 26, 1977 without having set up the foundation.

Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what
to do with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's
desire to place his estate in a foundation to be named after his mother,
from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping... indigent
students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the
deceased.

After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended
petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana,
Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons: (1) because the
properties of the estate had come from her sister,... Salustia Solivio; (2)
that she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3)
with her as sole heir, the disposition of the properties of the estate to
fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared
her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the
estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and
proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA

FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and

Exchange Commission on July 17, 1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98,
Rollo).

Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva

filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia
as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the
deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the... court for
tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia
filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No.
13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia
Javellana-Villanueva v. Celedonia

Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil

Case No. 13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.

Issues:

whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in

favor of Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's
side from whom he had inherited them

Ruling:

Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of
Esteban within the third degree on his mother's side was not false.
Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that because
the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his... father, she,
as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful
heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and inconsistent with her
claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition that Concordia was her
coheir. Her omission to so... state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.

We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the

deceased was subject to reserva troncal and that it pertains to her as his
only relative within the third degree on his mother's side. The reserva
troncal provision of the Civil Code is... found in Article 891 which reads as
follows:
"ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of... relatives
who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which
said property came."

The persons involved in reserva troncal are:

"1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista) the

ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his
descendants.

"2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees
(reservatarios) relatives within the third degree counted from the
descendant (propositus), and belonging to the line from which the
property came.

"3. The propositus the descendant who received by gratuitous title and
died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of
law." (p. 692, Civil Law by Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)

Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana Jr., is not

reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the
descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited the
properties in question.

Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance... subject to a reservation in

favor of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third
degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties
inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited it from
another ascendant or a brother... or sister. It does not apply to property
inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation
covered by Article 891.

Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants,

ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters,
nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which... provide:

"ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate

children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
"ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of
brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate.

"The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among

them by reason of relationship by the whole blood."

Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:

"Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the

decedent within the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore,
shall succeed to the subject estate 'without distinction of line or
preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole... blood,'
and is entitled to one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate."

The question of Concordia's one-half share... she is bound by that

agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her
inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of
Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation"
which Esteban, Jr., during his... lifetime, planned to set up to honor his
mother and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as
well.

Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the

Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia
has honored hers.

Principles:

The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from

a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother... or
sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a descendant from his
ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.

Mendoza vs. Delos Santos, 694 SCRA 74, G.R. No. 176422 March 20, 2013NATURE OF
PROCEEDINGSPETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
FACTSThe properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta.
Maria,Bulacan.Lot 1 and 2 – named under Julia Delos SantosLot 3 - named under Julia Delos Santos
but coowned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought ½ of theproperty from Maria Mendoza and her
siblingsPetitioner are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza and Dominga MendozaPetitioners alleged
that the properties were part of Placido and Dominga’s properties that weresubject of an oral partition
and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, itpassed on to his spouse Leonor and
only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonor’s death, her sharewent to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died
intestate and without issue. They claimed after Gregoria’s death respondent, who is Leonor’s sister,
adjudicated unto herselfall these properties as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence,
petitioners claimthat the properties should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must
nowrevert back to them, applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal. Arguments of
respondents:The property did not originate from petitioners’ familial line and were not originally
owned byPlacido and DomingaThe properties were bought by Exequiel and Antonio from a certain
Alfonso Ramos in 1931. Itappears, however, that it was only Exequiel who was in possession of the
properties. RTC : Found merit and granted their action for recovery of possession by reserve truncalCA :
Reversed the RTC decisionReason :-petitioners failed to establish that Placido and Dominga owned the
properties in dispute.-even assuming that Placido and Dominga previously owned the properties, it still
cannot besubject to reserva troncal as neither Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga nor
didGregoria predecease Exequiel. ISSUE1. WON THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTIESARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE
FAMILY LINE OF THEPETITIONERS MENDOZAS. 2. WON THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERSMENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ONRESERVA TRONCAL.

RULING1. Yes.There are three (3) lines of transmission in reserva troncal. The first transmission is by
gratuitoustitle, whether by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a
descendantcalled the prepositus. The second transmission is by operation of law from the prepositus to
theother ascendant or reservor, also called the reservista. The third and last transmission is fromthe
reservista to the reservees or reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degreefrom which the
property came.The lineal character of the reservableproperty is reckoned from the ascen-dant from
whom the prepositus re-ceived the property by gratuitous title The fallacy in the CA’s resolution is that it
proceeded from the erroneous premise that Placido isthe ascendant contemplated in Article 891 of the
Civil Code. From thence, it sought to trace theorigin of the subject properties back to Placido and
Dominga, determine whether Exequielpredeceased Placido and whether Gregoria predeceased
Exequiel. It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only
fromExequiel’s as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whomGregoria
inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than
suchascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property.17 It was
alsoimmaterial for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga orwhether
Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the

properties and he is the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came.Gregoria, on
the other hand, is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel bygratuitous
title.Moreover, Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by
thedescendant or prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission
isgratuitous or by gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk ofbeing
repetitious, what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute wereowned by
Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired theproperties as
inheritance. Ascendants, descendants andcollateral relatives under Article964 of the Civil CodeArticle
891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant(also known as the
reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is notGregoria’s ascendant; rather,
she is Gregoria’s collateral relative. Gregoria’s ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor,
her grandparents, great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregoria’s descendants, if she
had one, would beher children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being Gregoria’s
ascendants, bothpetitioners and Julia, therefore, are her collateral relatives. The conclusion, therefore,
is that while it may appear that the properties are reservable incharacter, petitioners cannot benefit
from reserva troncal. First, because Julia, who now holdsthe properties in dispute, is not the other
ascendant within the purview of Article 891 of theCivil Code and second, because petitioners are not
Gregoria’s relatives within the third degree.Hence, the CA’s disposition that the complaint filed with the
RTC should be dismissed, only onthis point, is correct. If at all, what should apply in the distribution of
Gregoria’s estate areArticles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code, which provide:Art. 1003. If there are no
descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,the collateral relatives shall succeed
to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with thefollowing articles.Art. 1009. Should there be
neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or sisters, theother collateral relatives shall succeed
to the estate.The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason
ofrelationship by the whole blood.

WHAT THE RTC SHOULD HAVE DONE IS assuming for argument’s sake that reserva troncal isapplicable, is
have the reservable nature of the property registered on respondent’s titles. Infact, respondent, as
reservista, has the duty to reserve and to annotate the reservablecharacter of the property on
the title.24 In reserva troncal, the reservista who inherits from aprepositus, whether by the latter’s wish
or by operation of law, acquires the inheritance byvirtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute
ownership. All the attributes of ownership belongto him exclusively. It is when the reservation takes
place or is extinguished,27 that a reservatario becomes, byoperation of law, the owner of the
reservable property.28 In any event, the foregoing discussiondoes not detract from the fact that
petitioners are not entitled to a reservation of the propertiesin dispute. FINAL DISPOSITION BY THE
COURTDENIED
Sumaya v. IACG.R. No. 68843-44 September 2, 1991FACTS:Raul Balantakbo inherited from two (2)
different ascendants the two (2) setsof properties subject of this case: 1) 1/3 interest of a
parcel of land from his fatherJose, Sr., who died on January 28, 1945; and 2) 1/7 interest
from his maternalgrandmother, Luisa Bautista, who died on November 3, 1950. On June 13, 1952,
Rauldied intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving onlyhis mother, Consuelo Joaquin Vda.
deBalantakbo, as his sole surviving heir tothe subject real properties.Vda. de Balantakbo
caused the registration of an affidavit of self-adjudication of theestate of Raul, wherein it was
clearly stated that the properties were inherited by Raulfrom his father Jose, Sr. and from his maternal
grandmother, Luisa Bautista.Vda de Balantakbo sold the property to Sumaya which was subsequently
sold to VillaHonorio Development Corporation. Villa then transferred and assigned its rights overthe
property to Agro Industrial Coconut Cooperative.The parties admit that the certificates of titles covering
the above described propertiesdo not contain any annotation of its reservable character.On March 4,
1970,five brothers in full blood of Raul Balantakbo and three survivingchildren of deceased Jose
Balantakbo, Jr., another brother of the firstnamed Balantakbos, filed civil cases to recover
the subject properties which theyclaimed were subject to a reservatroncal in their
favor.ISSUE:Whether or not the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo stating the sourceof
the properties thereby showing the reservable nature of the properties is sufficientannotation of the
reservable nature of the same.RULING:NO. The Court disagreed with the disposition of the appellate
court that there is no needto register the reservable character of the property, if only for the
protection of thereservees (reservatarios), against innocent third persons.In this case, the affidavit of
self adjudication executed by Consuelo Vda. de Balantakbowhich contained a statement that the
property was inherited from a descendant, Raul,which has likewise inherited by the latter from another
ascendant, was registered with

the Registry of Property. The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservablecharacter of the
property in the certificate of title cannot be attributed to Consuelo.As to the sale of subject properties,
the Court affirmed the order of lower courts againstplaintiff Agro Industrial Coconut Cooperative to
convey the subject properties back toreservatarios. The Court held that there is sufficient proof that the
petitioners had actualknowledge of the reservable character of the properties before they bought the
samefrom Consuelo as evidenced by the Deed of Sale executed by the parties.Moreover, the Court a quo
found that the petitioners and private respondents were longtime acquaintances and that they knew all
along that the properties litigated in this casewere inherited by Raul Balantakbo from his father and from
his maternal grandmother,and that Consuelo Vda. deBalantakbo inherited these properties from his son
Raul
Nieva v Alcala41 Phil 915FACTS: 1. Juliana Nieva, natural mother of Segunda Maria Nieva, married
Francisco Deocampo. Of said marriage Alfeo was born. 2. Juliana Nieva died intestate and Alfeo inherited
from her parcels of land. 3. Alfeo died intestate and the parcels of land passed to his father, Francisco, by
intestate succession. 4. Thereafter Francisco married Manuela Alcala, of which marriage was born Jose.
5. Francisco De Ocampo died whereupon his widow and son, the defendants herein, took possession of
the parcels of land in question, under the claim that Jose (a minor) had inherited the same, ab intestate,
from his deceased father. 6. Segunda, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Juliana Nieva,
instituted the present action for the purposes of recovering from the defendants the parcels of land in
question invoking reserve troncal. ISSUE: Is an illegitimate relative within the third degree entitled to
reservatroncal?RULING: 1. No. The provision of Article 811 of the Civil Code applies only to legitimate
relative.2. In Article 811 (ReservaTroncal) the legislator uses the generic terms
“ascendant,”“descendant,” and “relatives,” without specifying whether or not they have to belegitimate.
Does the legislator, then, refer to legitimate as well as toillegitimate relatives?3. This
question has not been decided before by any court or tribunal.However, eminent
commentators on the Spanish Civil Code, who have devotedtheir lives to the study and solution of the
intricate and difficult problems thatmay arise under the provisions of that Code, have dealt with the very
question inthis case, and are unanimous in the opinion that the provision of Article 811 ofthe Civil Code
apply only to legitimate relative.

4. Manresa, one of the eminent commentators, in determining the persons inwhose favor
the reservation is established, says: Persons in whose favor thereservation is established —
This is one of the most delicate points in theinterpretation of article 811. According to
this article, the reservation isestablished in favor of the parents who are within the third degree and
belong tothe line from which the properties came.5. It treats of blood relationship, which is
applicable to questions onsuccession, according to articles 915 to 920. It could not be otherwise,
becauserelationship by affinity is established between each spouse and the family of theother, by
marriage, and to admit it, would be to favor the transmission of theproperties of the family of one
spouse to that of the other, which is just what thearticle intends to prevent.6. It also treats of
legitimate relationship. The person obliged to reserve it isa legitimate ascendant who inherits
from a descendant property which proceedsfrom the same legitimate family, and this being true, there
can be no question, because the line from which the properties proceed must be the line of thatfamily
and only in favor of that line is the reservation established.7. To hold that the appellant is entitled
to the property left by her naturalbrother, Alfeo Deocampo, by operation of law, would be a
fragrant violate of theexpress provision of the foregoing article.
REYES vs. BARRETTO-DATUG.R. No. L-17818January 25, 1967REYES, J.B.LDecedent/Testator: Bibiano
Barretto died on February 18, 1936Proponent: TIRSO T. REYES, guardian of the minors Azucena, Flordelis
and Tirso, Jr. Oppositor: LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATUType of Succession: TestateI. Facts:Bibiano
Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate,
consisting of realproperties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan. When Bibiano Barretto died on
February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left hisshare of these properties in a will to Salud Barretto,
mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion aslegacies to his two sisters
Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in
barrioSan Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan was reserved for his widow, Maria Gerardo.Maria Gerardo was
appointed administratrix. She prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her own
behalfand as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the
Court of First Instance of Manila onNovember 22, 1939. The distribution of the estate and the delivery
of the shares of the heirs followed. As a consequence, SaludBarretto took immediate possession of her
share and secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance ofnew titles in her
own name.When Maria Gerardo died on March 5, 1948, it was discovered that she had executed two
wills. In the first will, she institutedSalud Barretto and Milagros Barretto as her heirs and in the second,
she revoked her first will and left all her properties in favor ofMilagros Barretto. The lower court held
that Salud was not the daughter of the decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband BibianoBarretto. This
ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.Hence, plaintiff filed an action for
the recovery of one-half portion of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which wasgiven in
usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo.The lower court declared the project of partition submitted in the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of BibianoBarretto to be null and void ab initio because the
distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs, was not a daughter of thespouses Bibiano Barretto
and Maria Gerardo on the basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 providing as follows:"A partition
in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been included, shall be null
andvoid."The Court a quo also ordered them to return the properties received under the project of
partition to Milagros Barretto. Hence, this patition.II. Issue: Whether or not there was preterition. (No)III.
Ruling: Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now under appeal is reversed
and set aside in so far as itorders plaintiff-appellant to reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the
properties enumerated in said decision, and the same isaffirmed in so far as it denies any right of said
appellee to accounting. Let the records be returned to the court of origin, withinstructions to proceed
with the action for partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT No. T-13734 of
theOffice of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan.IV. Ratio Decidendi:Article 1081 of the old Civil Code has
been misapplied to the present case by the court below. Salud Barretto admittedly hadbeen instituted
heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant Milagros hence, the
partition hadbetween them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir
without really being one, and was not null andvoid under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081)
does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinctionbetween forced, voluntary or
intestate ones, and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude
herbeing one of the heirs expressly named in his testament. Bibiano Barretto was at liberty to assign the
free portion of his estate towhomsoever he chose. While the share (1/2) assigner to Salud impinged on
the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason acease to be a testamentary heir of Bibiano
Barretto.Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share smaller than her legitime
invalidate the institution ofSalud as heir, since there was here no preterition, or total omission, of a
forced heir.A project of partition is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, the court may accept
or reject. It is the court alonethat makes the distribution of the estate and determines the
persons entitled thereto and the parts to which each is entitled(Comia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629,
643; Act 190, Section 750; Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is thatjudicial
decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees.Moreover, the defendant-appellee's
argument would be plausible if it were shown that the sole basis for the decree ofdistribution was
the project of partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could stand, since it was in
conformity with theprobated will of Bibiano Barretto

The Court hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros Barretto in the proceedings for the
settlement of theestate of Bibiano Barretto, duly approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila in
1939 is not void for being contrary to eitherarticles 1081 or 1814 of the Civil Code of 1889; (2) that
Milagros Barretto's action to contest said partition and decree of distributionis barred by the statute of
limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a possessor in bad faith and
shouldaccount for the fruits received from the properties inherited by Salud Barretto is legally untenable.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' action forpartition of the fishpond should have been given due
course.V. Doctrine/Principle:Judicial decree of distribution, once final, vests title in the distributees. If
the decree was erroneous or not in conformity withlaw or the testament, the same should be corrected
by opportune appeal. But once it had become final, its binding effect is like that ofany other judgment in
rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. It is thus apparent that where a court has
validlyissued a decree of distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or
invalidity of the project of partitionbecomes irrelevant.