4

Taiwan

The contextualization of Taiwan’s international

relations
The real size of a small island
The number of states that recognize Taiwan is the first indicator of the extent
to which this country is isolated from the rest of the world. At the time of
writing, Taiwan was recognized by 14 UN member states plus the Holy
See.1 This is not much higher than the number of UN members that
recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and significantly less than Western
Sahara, Kosovo and especially Palestine. Like other unrepresented and
unrecognized states, Taiwan is not a member of the UN. It is not a member
of any specialized agency within the UN system. It is, however, a member
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which recognizes it under the
name Chinese Taipei, rather than its official name.
But there is another side of Taiwan, which allows little room for
comparison with other unrepresented and unrecognized states. Let us make
a very practical case in point: Abkhazia and South Ossetia issue their own
passports, but these are not ‘recognized in most of the world, and their
citizens mostly have dual-​citizenship that grants them a valid passport from
another country’ (Li, 2019). In contrast, at the time of writing carriers of
the Taiwanese passport could travel visa-​free to 146 countries, which puts
them in 33rd place, ahead of, for example, the Russian Federation and
the PRC.2
Taiwan’s contribution to the international community is often high profile,
as has been recently demonstrated by its handling of the COVID-​19 virus
that has plagued the entire world, with Taiwan being the least affected
among developed states.3 Indeed, in terms of relative development, Taiwan
is considered one of the richest countries in the world. According to the
2019 data generated by the International Monetary Fund, Taiwan had the

45
 PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

22nd largest economy and was in 17th place in the ranking of countries
by GDP per capita.4 This explains all the attention that Taiwan attracts,
which dwarfs that received by all other unrepresented and unrecognized
states combined. Starting with a simple insertion of the keyword ‘Taiwan’
into the Google search engine (Figure 4.1) the difference already becomes
obvious. We get a similar picture if we limit our research to non-​fiction
literature via the Google Scholar engine (Figure 4.2). If we narrow down
our (re)search even further, to the Web of Science Core database based on
a title of an academic work (Figure 4.3), we see that the scientific attention
on Taiwan is indeed many times bigger than on any other unrepresented
and unrecognized state.

Figure 4.1: Hits by inserting the word ‘Taiwan’ in general Google Search
1,200,000,000

1,000,000,000
800,000,000
600,000,000

400,000,000
200,000,000

Hits Taiwan Transnistria S. Ossetia Abkhazia N-Karabakh Somaliland Western Sahara Kosovo Palestine

Figure 4.2: Hits by inserting the word ‘Taiwan’ in Google Scholar

5,000,000
4,500,000
4,000,000
3,500,000
3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000

Hits Taiwan Transnistria S. Ossetia Abkhazia N-Karabakh Somaliland Western Sahara Kosovo Palestine

Figure 4.3: Hits by inserting the word ‘Taiwan’ as a title of the work in a Web
of Science Core Collection
45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000

Hits Taiwan Transnistria S. Ossetia Abkhazia N-Karabakh Somaliland Western Sahara Kosovo Palestine

46
 Taiwan

These randomly picked indicators alone encourage us to insist that Taiwan’s

importance in international relations and especially in international economic
relations cannot be ignored, which means that scholarly attention to its
isolation, the damage it causes, and how to deal with it is all the more
relevant. We will see in the next section that Taiwan differs from the other
unrepresented and unrecognized countries not only in terms of economic
power but also in terms of history.

History
Unlike other states we have studied here, Taiwan did not emerge from
secession. It has not been part of the decolonization process either. Its history
is intrinsically connected with the history of China, especially since 1911,
when the so-​called Xinhai Revolution (10 October 1911–​12 February
1912) overthrew the Qing dynasty. The dynasty, which had ruled since
1644, did not respond well to the Industrial Revolution, which in the 19th
century tilted the balance of power in favour of Europe. During that period,
China was subjected to numerous invasions by foreigners. It was signing
unequal treaties, losing wars and territories. Internally, structural problems
led to the ‘rise of elite activism’ (Rankin et al, 2002: 54), and eventually to
the revolution. After the revolution, which resulted in the creation of the
Republic of China (1 January 1912), the country was supposed to become
a modern democracy. Sun Yat-​sen, ‘the unquestioned leader of the great
push to change China’ (Lary, 2007: 72), was inaugurated as the provisional
president but, in March of the same year, he was replaced by the military
strongman Yuan Shih-​k’ai. The first presidential elections were held in
China in 1913 in the newly formed National Assembly. The elections
confirmed Yuan, but the democracy was short-​lived. In the same year he
‘ended China’s experiment in parliamentary democracy by suppressing
revolutionaries, disbanding parliament and provincial assemblies, and ending
the thousands of local assemblies that had flourished in the first year of the
republic’ (Rankin et al, 2002: 64). Meanwhile, World War One started in
1914. China continued to suffer from external threats which Yuan, who
died of illness in June 1916, could not prevent.
The military regime, the localization of power, warlordism and Japanese
territorial gains in China following the 1919 Treaty of Versailles (Lary,
2007: 54–​5, 62–​3) were among the factors that kept China weak. To
prevent it from complete fragmentation, Sun Yat-​sen brought the Chinese
National Party or Kuomintang (KMT) to life in 1919, with one goal: to
reunify China. With such an agenda, the KMT was seen as a threat to
Western powers. Isolated as he and his party were, Sun Yat-​sen sought –​
and received –​support and training from the Soviet Communist Party.

47
 PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formed in 1921 and was soon
seen as a competitor to the KMT, which itself had been divided between
the left-​and the right-​wingers.5 However, the two parties shared one goal,
to end the fragmentation of power caused by warlords and to unify China.
After Sun Yat-​sen died in 1925, Chiang Kai-​shek took over the KMT. He
halted the fragmentation of China by successfully concluding the so-​called
Northern Expedition launched to complete the unification (Wilbur, 2005).
But for Chiang Kai-​shek, who represented the right w ​ ing in the KMT, the
expedition did not end there. In 1927, he began to purge the party by getting
rid of ‘key parts of the revolutionary movement, the Soviet advisors, the left-​
wing of the KMT, and the Communists’ (Lary, 2007: 98). The dominance
of Chiang Kai-​shek did not last long. His government encountered many
problems, which it failed to address successfully. The governing of China
outside the cities and the growing influence of the CCP that filled the
political vacuum in the province (Rankin et al, 2002), and the inability to
fend off the Japanese, who occupied Manchuria and kept it until the end of
World War Two were some of these problems that discredited the central
government. Eventually, in 1949 the CCP overpowered Chiang Kai-​shek
and his supporters, who retreated to Taiwan.
The retreat was only meant to be temporary, simply for Chiang Kai-​shek’s
army to ‘regroup and counterattack’ (Copper, 2013: 47). As time went by,
the ‘temporary relocation’ of the government of the Republic of China was
becoming permanent. The future of the Republic became uncertain. At
the beginning of the 1950s the anti-​communist stance of the Republic of
China, operating from Taiwan, earned it an alliance with the United States.
According to Cohen and Tang, ‘prior to June 1950, the US decided not to
provide further military aid to Chiang Kai-​shek’s government. … However,
the outbreak of the Korean War made Taiwan strategically important to the
US … Fearing the spread of communism in Asia, US policy-​makers now
felt they had a vested interest in Taiwan’s future, and made a commitment
to protecting Taiwan’ (Cohen and Teng, 1990: 161). In fact, ‘because of the
Korean War and China’s role in it … Taiwan became a valued member of
the Western bloc. With the polarization of the world into two camps and
because the Republic of China continued to represent China in the United
Nations and most other international organizations … Taipei was at the
center stage in the East–​West struggle’ (Copper, 2013: 48).
Gradually, the tide was turning against Chiang Kai-​shek. More and more
countries accepted the reality that the government in Taipei was not in
control of mainland China and it was unlikely that it would be ever again.
Support for Beijing reached a culmination on 25 October 1971. On that
day, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted Resolution
2758 in which it decided to ‘recognize the representatives of [the PRC’s

48
 Taiwan

government] as the only legitimate representatives of China to the United

Nations, and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-​shek from
… the United Nations and … all the organizations related to it’.6
This turn of events coincided with US foreign policy disaster in Vietnam.
American voters elected Richard Nixon in 1968 with the mandate ‘to get
out of Vietnam with honor’ (Copper, 2013: 188), but he could not do so
without the support of the PRC. A thaw in relations between the two
countries followed, with Taiwan being the collateral damage.7 By 1970,
the number of countries recognizing the PRC or Taiwan (the Republic
of China) had already been 68:53 in the PRC’s favour. ‘Three years later,
Beijing had more than twice as many: 85:39. In 1977, Beijing had 111
compared to Taipei’s 23’ (Copper, 2013: 189). The final blow was sent
from Washington to Taiwan on 15 December 1978 when President Jimmy
Carter declared that US diplomatic relations with Taiwan (the Republic of
China) would be terminated, and diplomatic relations with the PRC would
be established instead.
The radical change of the political context for Taiwan, from being a
permanent member of the Security Council of the UN to becoming isolated
from the international community, did not mean a change of its foreign policy.
The so-​called Three No’s Policy applied: as long as the communists continued
to rule mainland China there would be no contact, no negotiations and no
compromise (Copper, 2013: 189). For the PRC, on the other hand, the status
of the island mattered much more than who currently governed it. Beijing
argued that as Chiang Kai-​shek troops were defeated in 1949, the Chinese
Communist Party was the sole successor of China, which could only be one,
not two. Taiwan is part of the territory of China and, as such, Taiwan can
never be a sovereign state. This view prevailed at the end of Nixon’s ‘7-​day
historic visit to China’8 in February 1972. On 28 February of the same year,
the two countries agreed to the so-​called Shanghai Communiqué, in which
the US government declared, somewhat ambiguously, that it ‘acknowledges
that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one
China and that Taiwan is a part of China’.9
The US position in the communiqué is ambiguous in the sense that it
acknowledged but did not accept Beijing’s position towards Taiwan.10 As
explained in a report by the Congressional Research Service, the ‘US policy
leaves the Taiwan question to be resolved by the people on both sides of
the strait: a “peaceful resolution” with the assent of Taiwan’s people and
without unilateral changes. In short, US policy focuses on the process of
resolution of the Taiwan question, not any set outcome’ (Kan, 2014a: 32).
This interpretation is not at all shared with the PRC, arguing that ‘it is
not normal diplomatic practice to recognize a nation’s sovereignty over a
territory and then agree to defend that territory from the aggression of the

49
 PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

nation in question’ (Cohen and Teng, 1990: 172). Such ambiguity,11 which
was formalized with the adoption in 1979 of the US and Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA),12 worked to the benefit of Taiwan. Protected as it was from
a potential attempt of the PRC to conquer the island by force, Chiang
Kai-​shek and his successors could build up the military force (Lin et al,
2012) and carry out economic reforms (Kuo, 2019) that gradually brought
Taiwan to among the most developed economies in East and Southeast Asia.
Additionally, the process of democratization started to take shape in Taiwan
in the 1980s, as the decades-​long authoritarian grip of the KMT over the
country began to loosen (Gold, 1997; Tien, 1997). Opposition gathered
around the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), founded in 1986. The first
democratic elections were held in 1991 (for the National Assembly) and in
1992 (for the Legislative Yuan). In 2000, the presidential candidate of the
DPP, Chen Shui-​bian, won the race, ‘which effectively ended fifty-​five years
of rule by the KMT’ (Lim, 2014: 184).
Besides, even though UN member states were revoking the recognition
of the Republic of China, many of them have not erased the contacts with
the government in Taipei altogether. The US has provided a blueprint
on how these relations could be continued. Upon the establishment of
diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC as of 1 January 1979,13
President Carter issued a memorandum with guidelines concerning future
relations between Washington and Taipei. Those guidelines include the
continuing representation of American interests, ‘as appropriate, by an
unofficial instrumentality in corporate form. On January 16, 1979, an entity
was incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia to serve as this
instrumentality. It was named The American Institute in Taiwan’ (TRA,
1979: 2). In practical terms, the Institute was to have a similar function as
any diplomatic representation. Taiwan was treated in the same way as foreign
countries, except that ‘members of the American Foreign Service formally
resign when they serve in Taiwan, but then return as regular members of
the diplomatic corps when they leave Taiwan’ (Krasner, 2011: xvi). Many
other countries have opened similar institutes in Taiwan, and vice versa.

Contemporary Taiwan: two realities

This brief overview of Taiwan’s history shows the remarkable difference
between the island and other unrepresented and unrecognized states. First,
the history of Taiwan’s statehood as the Republic of China is much longer
than any of the other unrepresented and unrecognized states discussed before.
The second difference concerns the legal status of Taiwan, which led some
authors to describe Taiwan as an intermediate state.14 The position of the PRC

50
 Taiwan

is that Taiwan is part of China and should be returned under its sovereignty.
However, Taiwan’s perspective is a different one. Taiwan has not seceded
from the PRC. The government that used to rule mainland China retreated
to Taiwan for political reasons, after the Communists prevailed. The PRC
cannot claim that Taiwan violates the UN Charter, because neither has it
used force against the territorial integrity of the PRC nor has it exercised the
right to self-​determination. The third difference concerns Taiwan’s ability to
function as a state. Taiwan is a de facto state, with a functioning government
that controls its territory, and has an army to defend itself. Moreover, despite
the threats Taiwan receives from the PRC, many states develop economic
cooperation with it. Several national parliaments of these countries have
followed suit by creating (informal) Taiwan friendship groups.
Yet, Taiwan still faces two realities in its international relations from
which it cannot escape: the reality of the One China principle and the
reality of international isolation. Finding a sensible way out of this situation
continues to be a work in progress. After the developments in 1979, Taiwan
and the PRC had attempted to define the future relationship. In 1992, as
a result of the KMT-​led negotiations, the so-​called ‘One China, respective
interpretations’ or ‘1992 Consensus’ was proposed as the basis for future
relations between Beijing and Taipei.15 Considered by an insider as ‘the
first political compromise reached between Taiwan and mainland China in
over 40 years’ (Su, 2009: 15) the 1992 Consensus has never been accepted
by the DPP (Su, 2009: 14). Seven years later, in 1999, then president of
Taiwan Lee Teng-​hui upset the PRC by beginning to interpret the relations
between Taiwan and China as a ‘special state-​to-​state relationship’ (Su,
2009: Chapter 3). The so-​called Two States Theory that emerged from
Taiwan was said to have destroyed ‘the foundation for the dialogue and
consultations authorized by the two sides’ (Shiquan, 2001: 121). Since then,
the relations between the PRC and Taiwan have been tense, especially if
the DPP is in power. As demonstrated in the speech of the PRC’s president
Xi Jinping, Beijing is determined to integrate Taiwan, if necessary by force
(Xi, 2017: 50–​51; Buckley and Horton, 2019).16 Currently none of the
mainstream political parties –​the KMT and the DPP –​sees the future of
the Taiwanese being absorbed by the PRC, which leaves the PRC with
no significant political ally on the island (Hille, 2020). With this state of
affairs comes a huge bill to Taiwan from the PRC. The ‘anaconda’ approach
Beijing uses aims at stripping Taiwan of its diplomatic allies, restricting access
to international institutions and disrupting its trade. Isolated as it is from
the international community Taiwan has to be innovative in its policies to
address the threat from the mainland. Taiwanese diplomacy, in particular,
has developed several new approaches and concepts to this end.

51
 PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Taiwan’s diplomacies
Taiwan’s diplomatic experience has a lot to contribute to the literature
on diplomacy. It is not our task to delve deeper into these practices, but a
brief overview is necessary because it will help us to understand the status
and importance of parliamentary diplomacy for Taiwan. We can break its
diplomatic practices into two categories: hard and soft informal diplomacy.
The era of hard informal diplomacy, designed in Taiwan to assert itself in
an inter-​governmental spectrum of international relations, lasted from the
early 1970s after Taiwan was ousted from the UN until the presidency of
Chen Shui-​bian (2000–​2008). Hard informal diplomacy meant entering
into fierce competition with the PRC over maintaining diplomatic
relations with countries that still recognized Taiwan, mostly by offering
lucrative financial deals to them. In this respect, Taiwan used several
terms, such as ‘total diplomacy’, defined as the mobilization of ‘every kind
of resource –​political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and
sporting –​to develop “substantial” links with states that had terminated
diplomatic relations, in the hope of gaining political concessions’ (Hughes,
1997: 131). In the MOFA the term ‘collective diplomacy’ has been defined
as ‘mobilizing the nation’s overall resources to forward foreign relations. It
is aimed at elevating the nation’s international status while advancing the
interests of the country and its people’ (MOFA, 1993). Another term that
has been used to describe Taiwan’s response to its new position in the world
is ‘pragmatic’ diplomacy, defined as ‘a functional complex of economic aid,
trade and investment, arms purchases, and nongovernmental and informal
diplomacy’ (Yang, 2006: 116). The aim of pragmatic diplomacy is seen as
threefold: ‘the advancement of formal diplomatic ties; the establishment
and promotion of substantive relations with non-​hostile nations; and active
participation in international organizations and activities’ (Yang, 2006: 116).
Some argued that ‘pragmatic diplomacy’ was ‘designed to attract diplomatic
recognition even from countries that already recognized Beijing, thereby in
effect implementing a Two China policy’ (Bing 2017: 135).
Other terms that are used in the literature are ‘beacon-​fire’ or ‘torching
diplomacy’, ‘confrontational diplomacy’ (Lee, 2019: 12; Huang, 2016: 466),
‘dollar diplomacy’ (Hughes, 1997: 131) and ‘chequebook diplomacy’ (Huang,
2016: 467). Terms such as ‘vacation diplomacy’ or ‘golf diplomacy’ –​a practice
in which Taiwanese politicians at the highest level visit other countries on the
pretence of private vacation (Leifer, 1994; Scobell, 2011: 33) –​are also used
to portray Taiwan’s era of hard informal diplomacy. Also worth mentioning
is the term ‘visit diplomacy’ launched by the Coordination Council for
North American Affairs (CCNAA), now called the TECRO (Taiwan
Economic and Cultural Representative Office). The CCNAA/​TECRO

52
 Taiwan

began to invite ‘Americans who are not current federal government officials
but who may have a say in policy-​making … to visit Taiwan … The purpose
of this visit diplomacy is not so much to influence these American visitors
as it is to build access to them or their offices’ (Wang, 1990: 39).17 The term
‘visit diplomacy’ could also be used in another context, to describe travels of
high-​profile Taiwanese politicians with the purpose of meeting politicians in
the country they ‘visit’. Such was the visit of Cornell University in 1995 by
then Taiwanese president Lee Teng-​hui. An alternative expression is ‘transit
diplomacy’ ‘where the Taiwanese president is permitted to “transit” through
the United States en route to another country and is allowed to engage in
a set of carefully defined activities while on US soil’ (Wang, 2016: 577).
The framework for transit diplomacy has been laid out in the 1994 Taiwan
Policy Review, a document from the US administration about the future
conduct of relations with Taiwan.18 Most of the recent Taiwanese presidents
took advantage of this possibility: presidents Lee Teng-​hui, Chen Shui-​bian
and Tsai Ing-​wen have all ‘travelled through’ the US.19
Some of the diplomatic activities Taiwan has undertaken have been
controversial. This is particularly true for ‘chequebook diplomacy’. In some
cases, this type of diplomacy has been successful, for example, in the case of
Taiwan’s effort to remain in the Asian Development Bank, of which it was
a founder after the PRC had demanded its exclusion from the organization
(Lindemann, 2014: 72). On other occasions, Taiwan’s financial assistance
turned out to be a risky investment. Taylor provides an example of a
negative experience with ‘African elites who have held Taiwan to ransom in
attempting to extract the maximum amount of aid and financial assistance’
(Taylor, 2002: 132). Such experiences led the Taiwanese to reconsider the
utility of such an approach to win or retain allies (Copper, 2006: 66). Besides,
Taiwan could not afford to beef up its foreign policy preferences with the
kind of money the PRC could. The experience with Central America,
in particular, has attracted the attention of scholars (Alexander, 2014).
Adjustments to hard informal diplomacy had been sought already during
the presidency of Ma Ying-​jeou (2008–​2016). During his term, Taiwan was
engaged in what has been called ‘truce diplomacy’ and ‘flexible diplomacy’.
Truce diplomacy (Huang, 2016: 468), also referred to as ‘viable diplomacy’
(Fukuda, 2019: 305; Huang, 2016: 467, 472), represented a conceptual
framework for the new approach in Taiwan’s foreign policy. It was based on
the 1992 Consensus and the Three No’s Policy.20 The rationale of this new
concept was to end the competition between the PRC and Taiwan to ‘win
over diplomatic partners with foreign aid’ (Glaser, 2013: 8),21 hoping that in
this way the PRC might loosen its grip on Taiwan and its efforts to actively
participate in international relations. To some extent, these expectations
had materialized, for example, by the PRC’s approval for Taiwan to be

53
 PARLIAMENTARY DIPLOMACY OF TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

invited as an observer to sessions of the World Health Assembly (WHA), the

principal organ of the WHO. Things took a different turn with the change
in the Taiwanese presidency in 2016. The new Taiwanese president, Tsai
Ing-​wen, lived up to her electoral promise and took a position that Taiwan’s
future should not be tied to the 1992 Consensus. As a result, Taiwan has not
been invited to the WHA since 2017. Officially, the WHO says that future
invitations depend on ‘cross-​strait understanding between China and Taiwan’
(Wu, 2017). This statement, which does not at all reflect the consensus in
the WHO membership, symbolizes the limits of hard informal diplomacy
and the need to explore alternative options.
By avoiding ‘sovereignty issues’ (White, 2006: 216), soft informal
diplomacy, which may also be called ‘multifaceted diplomacy’ according to
Foreign Policy Guidelines of Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs,22 has been
introduced. It is designed to advocate Taiwan as an indispensable member of
the international community, able to add value to the magnitude of problems
common to humanity. Taiwan has developed a system of public diplomacy
that includes the promotion of culture (Rawnsley, 2014), sports diplomacy
(Yen, 2017), environmental/​climate change diplomacy (Gao, 2018) and even
image diplomacy (Chen, 2002: 269). ‘Humanitarian diplomacy’, or ‘disaster
diplomacy’, has been introduced by the administration under Chen Shui-​ban
(Guilloux, 2016).23 It was followed up by Ma Ying-​jeou’s presidency. Because
of Taiwan’s ‘outstanding medical capabilities, active volunteer groups and a
generous private sector’, Ma believed that his country could be an important
player in emergency rescue and relief (Huang, 2016: 472). One example of
such diplomacy is Taiwan’s participation in Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief (HADR) groups. ‘The Taiwan Red Cross Society worked
directly with the Japanese Red Cross Society in the aftermath of the March
2011 Tsunami in Japan’ (Glaser, 2015: 28). Non-​governmental organizations
play an important role in international ‘people-​to-​people’ diplomacy, aimed
at promoting good relations among people from states in the region and
beyond. According to Glaser, people in Japan seem to have remembered
the assistance of Taiwanese NGOs after the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake that
led to the aforementioned Tsunami. ‘91 per cent of Japanese respondents
said the Japan–​Taiwan relationship was good or very good, compared to 76
per cent in 2009’ (Glaser, 2015: 30).
Recently, the most promising field for Taiwan to enhance its presence
in international relations through soft informal diplomacy has been health.
Following the outbreak of the SARS epidemic in 2002, Taiwan entered
into the ‘health diplomacy’ (Lindemann, 2014: 212)24 or ‘medical diplomacy’
(Ward, 2020). Nowadays, such diplomacy aims at proving the relevance of
Taiwan’s experience for the global fight against the COVID-​19 pandemic.
The main message Taiwan has sent to the world is that despite the isolation,

54
 Taiwan

‘Taiwan can help’ and is ‘willing and able to contribute to global public
health during the crisis using its strength in manufacturing, medicine, and
technology’ (Sung, 2020: 1; Aspinwall, 2020). Despite the global damage
caused by the pandemic and the unquestionable expertise of Taiwan in
dealing with it, it is not likely that Taiwan’s health diplomacy alone could lead
to a breakthrough in terms of Taiwan’s visible participation in international
relations, for example, by being allowed to cooperate with the WHO. As
Herrington and Lee conclude, ‘the question of Taiwan’s sovereignty, and the
fluctuating temperature of cross-​strait relations, needed to be addressed before
health concerns could come to the fore’ (Herington and Lee, 2014: 12).
Plenty of studies have addressed Taiwanese diplomacy, but some stones are still
left unturned. This is particularly true for Taiwanese parliamentary diplomacy.
Only a few authors have considered the topic in their work on Taiwan’s
foreign affairs. For example, Chen Jie describes the foreign policy relevance
of parliamentarians in Taiwan’s ‘total diplomacy’ (Chen, 2002: 223–​7),
and Dennis Hickey refers to ‘inter-​parliamentary diplomacy’ as a new tool
in Taiwan’s foreign policy (Hickey, 2007: 55). Comprehensive research of
Taiwan’s experience with parliamentary diplomacy is still missing, so the
rest of the book will be devoted to this topic.

55