KUMASI CAMPUS

Case Brief assignment

Criminal Law1

Nov 2023

Name:
Abdulai Mahama Naziru

LECTURER:
Bill Graham Akomea ESQ
 REPUBLIC v. AMADU FULANI [1971] 1 GLR 44-49

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

19 OCTOBER 1970
REPUBLIC Appellant
VS
AMADU FULANI Defendant
CORAM:
SOWAH, ANIN AND ARCHER JJ.A

Relevant provision cited in support of judgement:

Criminal Procedure Code, 1960 (Act 30), ss. 294-296

Procedural History: The defendant was convicted and sentenced to seven years by a circuit court, .on
appeal to the high court; the sentence was reduced to two years. The state won a further appeal from the
high court ruling

Facts: Amadu Fulani was sentenced for stealing by the circuit court in Accra in a summary trial.
The defended appealed to the high court arguing that the circuit court imposed sentence outside
its jurisdiction and that by the mode of trial, the court was limited in the sentence it could
impose. The high court reasoned with the appellant and reduced the sentence to two years. The
state appealed further and the court of appeal set aside the ruling of the high court and returns the
verdict of the circuit court.
Issue(s): (1) Whether or not the jurisdiction of the High Court or circuit court in imposing
punishment is generally determined by the mode of trial
Holdings: (1). no provision within the codes that the mode of trial shall govern the infliction of
punishment

(2). punishment by trial courts shall consider factors such as the prevalence of the offence, the
nature of the evidence, the presence of any extenuating or aggravating circumstances, and the
character and antecedents of the offender.

Determination: the appeal is allowed:

Comments: the appeal is allowed on fair ground

COUNSEL
Kisseih, Senior State Attorney, for the appellant.
D. K. Afreh for the respondent.
 MENSAH GYIMAH vs. THE REPUBLIC [1971] 2 GLR 147
[COURT OF APPEAL]
28 MAY 1971.

MENSAH GYIMAH Appellant

VS
THE REPUBLIC Defendant
CORAM:
APALOO, ANIN JJ.S.C. AND ARCHER J.A

Relevant provision cited in support of judgement:

Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29), ss. 112 and 183

Procedural history: The appellant was convicted by a trial by a judge with the aid of assessors.
For negligent libel and sedition of border guards in an article, he published in the Ashanti
pioneer. Appellant lost the appeal on sedition at the court of appeal.
Facts: The appellant admitted authorship of the article in question, and its publication in the
Pioneer. The words complained of in the article were clearly defamatory in law and in fact of the
Border Guards. The article was published intentionally and proved reckless. The article alleged a
corrupt and collusive agreement between Border Guards and smugglers. Border guards, who
were called, testified against the publication and consider it grossly false and defamatory
Issue(s): (1) whether or not learned trial judge erred in law in refusing counsel’s application to
allow the case to be tried by a jury instead of assessor (2) whether or not learned judge
misdirected himself on the law of privilege, conditional privilege, and fair comment in the law of
criminal libel
Holdings: (1) the judge properly exercised his discretion by not allowing jury trial
(2) The learned judge made a competent and accurate analysis of the ingredients of both
offences, and that there is no blemish in his statement of the law applicable to the case
(3) ) The learned judge misdirected himself by failing to consider all evidences on record in
respect of negligent libel
Determination: Appeal on negligent libel allowed but appeal on seditious libel disallowed
Comment: Given the evidence adduced, the verdict was fair.

COUNSEL:
DR. I. L. OHENE DJAN FOR THE APPELLANT.
F. P. SARKODEE, SENIOR STATE ATTORNEY, FOR THE RESPONDENT.
References:
Knupffer v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. [1944] 1 All E.R. 495, H. L
Eastwood v. Holmes (1858) 1 F. & F. 347 at p. 349
Ako Adjei v. R. (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 253
Wallace- Johnson v. R. (1936) 5 W.A.C.A. 56 at p. 60, P.C.
R. v. Adade [1959] G.L.R. 365
R. v. Sarpong [1959] G.L.R. 383,
Kotey v. The State [1963] 1 G.L.R. 41-42, S.C.;
Asare (F. Y.) v. The State, Court of Appeal, 11 October 1968, unreported;
State v. Adjei, Court of Appeal, 11 December 1967
The Service Press Ltd. v. Attorney-General (1952) 14 W.A.C.A. 176)
R. v. Ologen (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 333. B
Hudston v. Viney [1921] 1 Ch. 98 at p. 104
 SENE AND ANOTHER v. THE REPUBLIC [1977] 1 GLR 434-440

COURT OF APPEAL, ACCRA

31 DECEMBER 1976

BRIEF FACTS: The appellants are brothers. They were convicted of the murder of one
William Kwame Kwadam. The first appellant engaged in an unlawful fight with the deceased
and that in the course of the fight, the second appellant threw a heavy stone at the deceased from
the back. Consequently, the deceased died from injuries inflicted by the appellants on him.

LEGAL ISSUES: (1) whether or not learned trial judge erred in his treatment of the question of
intent. (2) Whether or not learned trial judge omission to deal with the issue of provocation was
a misdirection to the jury and prejudicial to the appellants

HOLDINGS: on the question of intent, the appeal court held that the learned trial judge
misdirected the jury on the proper understanding of the element of intent in a homicide resulting
from a fight.

(2) The court held that, though the appellant did not plead provocation, it is well established that
even if the accused does not rely on a particular defence, if that defence is open on the evidence
the judge is in duty bound to put that case to the jury.

REASONING: the Court was of the reason that, the trial Judge’s inadequate treatment of intent
and his omission to deal with the issue of provocation were prejudicial to the appellants. The
court therefore quashed the conviction for murder and substitutes a conviction for manslaughter
 REGINA v. GYAMFI [1960] GLR 45-53

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

25TH MARCH, 1960

Brief facts of the case: the appellant was the secretary of the united party at Badu in the Brong-
Ahafo region. on October 5, 1959, he was leading a group of the members of the united party
towards the convention peoples party and they started throwing stones at each other. The
appellant also threw a stone, which struck Kwabena Oppong and subsequently lead to his death.
The appellant in court failed on his plea of alibi. He was charged for murder. Dissatisfied with
the decision, he appealed to the court of appeal on eight grounds of appeal

Leagal Issue (1) whether or not The trial judge erred in misdirecting himself and the assessors
that the evidence could not support a charge of manslaughter, and that it was either murder or
nothing. (2) whether or not the facts proved intent to murder, or otherwise

Holdings: (1) allowing the appeal, the court held that, within the meaning of section 250 of the
Criminal Code (Cap. 9) the trial judge failed to consider adequately the distinction between
murder and man- slaughter when he found that intent to murder must be inferred from the facts
and circumstances (2) intent to kill was not properly to be inferred from the facts and
circumstances. The proper finding was "guilty of manslaughter

Reasoning: the court was of the reason that the learned trial judge was bad for misdirection by
non-direction and that the judge’s approach to the case resulted in the appellant's being
adjudged guilty of murder, which in the opinion of the court involved a miscarriage of justice.
The court therefore set aside the conviction for murder, quashing the sentence of death, and
substituting a verdict of guilty of manslaughter and a sentence of five years.
 AMETEWEE v. THE STATE [1964] GLR 551-558

IN THE SUPREME COURT

6 NOVEMBER 1964

Brief factsof the case: The appellant, a police officer was charged for the murder of the body-
guard of the president. The appellant admitted firing shots at the president but denied that it was
his gunshots that killed the bodyguard. Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the autopsy report
confirmed that the deceased died of bullets wounds. He was found guilty of murder by the jury
and was sentenced to death. Appellant therefore appealed against his conviction at the Supreme
Court

Legal issues: (1) whether or not the appellant was liable for the death of the deceased despite the
fact that the deceased was not his target.

(2) Whether or not the conflicting evidence given by prosecution witnesses to prove murder, the
doubt of which should be given to the appellant

Holdings: (1) the Supreme Court held that in accordance with section 11(5) of the criminal
offence Act, 1960 (Act 29) even though the deceased was not his actual target at the time he was
still liable for the death of the deceased

(2) The Court h eld that the conflicts in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses were not
germane to the crucial issue which the jury had to determine and that the jury were amply
directed on the conflicts.

Reasoning: The court dismissedthe appeal and in the reasoning of the court, the appeal is of no
merits and the evidence adduced in court undoubtedly ties the appellant to the murder of the
deceased.
R V QUAYE (JACK TOLLER) (1954) 14 WACA 488

Where the appellant and two others were charged with the murder of one Kwaku Amaka, an old
man of approximately seventy years old. By a unanimous decision of a jury, they were found
guilty of murder and one of them, of manslaughter. In allowing the appeal of No. 1 and
dismissing those of No. 2 and No. 3, the court held that the degree of criminality depends on the
knowledge and consciousness on the part of the accused that death is likely to result from what
he does, that is, on whether or not he willfully incurred the risk of causing the death of another
person.