Global Finance Journal xxx (xxxx) xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Global Finance Journal

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gfj

Do female CEOs matter for ESG scores?

Tom Aabo a, b, *, Iasmina Cristina Giorici c
a
Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Allé 4, DK 8210 Aarhus V, Denmark
b
Danish Finance Institute, Amaliegade 7, DK 1256 Copenhagen K, Denmark
c
Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy, Borupvej 16, 7330 Brande, Denmark

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

JEL classifications: Environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues are important for consumers, investors, and
G32 other stakeholders. The same applies for gender diversity. We show that whether female CEOs
G34 seem to matter for the firm's ESG profile depends crucially on the data used for the analysis:
G40
depending on the specific data provider, ESG scores for the same firms are either strongly and
Keywords: significantly positively associated, or not associated at all, with having a female CEO. Conclusions
Behavioral corporate finance
on this important topic are vulnerable to data discrepancies across ESG data providers.
CEO gender
Corporate social responsibility
ESG scores

1. Introduction

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO gender and corporate social responsibility, and this relationship's sensitivity
to the choice of ESG data provider. The paper responds to three prompts.
The first prompt is the call for diversity in the C-suite. Women remain severely underrepresented in the C-suite in spite of research
showing that women score higher than men in most leadership skills (Zenger & Folkman, 2019).
The second prompt is the call for and increased focus on corporate social responsibility as measured by ESG (environmental, social,
and governance) scores (Chollet & Sandwidi, 2018; El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kim, 2017; Fatemi, Glaum, & Kaiser, 2018; Flammer, 2015;
Gangi, Meles, Monferrà, & Mustilli, 2020; Herremans, Nazari, & Mahmoudian, 2016; Johansen, 2016; Sabbaghi, 2022). This is ar­
ticulated by Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, who writes in his 2020 letter to CEOs,
Climate change has become a defining factor in companies' long-term prospects. Last September, when millions of people took
to the streets to demand action on climate change, many of them emphasized the significant and lasting impact that it will have
on economic growth and prosperity—a risk that markets to date have been slower to reflect. But awareness is rapidly changing,
and I believe we are on the edge of a fundamental reshaping of finance.1
In line with Gillan, Koch, and Starks (2021) and Berg, Koelbel, and Rigobon (2020), we treat the terms ESG and CSR as if they are
interchangeable.
The third prompt is the inconsistencies across data providers in the measurement of ESG scores. Not only is the quality of the
individual ESG scores questionable, but ESG scores from different data providers vary markedly (Avramov, Cheng, Lioui, & Torelli,

* Corresponding author at: Aarhus University, Fuglesangs Allé 4, DK 8210 Aarhus V, Denmark.
E-mail addresses: taa@econ.au.dk (T. Aabo), iasmina.giorici@siemensgamesa.com (I.C. Giorici).
1
Available at https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2020-larry-fink-ceo-letter).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfj.2022.100722
Received 24 October 2021; Received in revised form 7 April 2022; Accepted 7 April 2022
Available online 20 May 2022
1044-0283/© 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Please cite this article as: Tom Aabo, Iasmina Cristina Giorici, Global Finance Journal, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfj.2022.100722
T. Aabo and I.C. Giorici Global Finance Journal xxx (xxxx) xxx

2021; Bender, Bridges, He, Lester, & Sun, 2018; Dorfleitner, Halbritter, & Nguyen, 2015). According to the article “Climate change has
made ESG a force in investing. But the figures behind ESG rating systems are dismal” (Economist, December 5, 2019), Hester Peirce,
commissioner at the Securities and Exchange Commission, described the scoring system that purports to assess firms' environmental,
social, and governance (ESG) performance as “labelling based on incomplete information, public shaming, and shunning wrapped in
moral rhetoric.”2
These three prompts lead us to our research question: Are female CEOs associated with an increased focus on corporate social
responsibility as measured by ESG scores?
We examine nonfinancial S&P 1500 firms in the period 2014 to 2019. Our paper contributes to the existing literature by inves­
tigating our research question using ESG scores from two different data providers, Refinitiv and Bloomberg Sustainability (Dorfleitner
et al., 2015). Chatterji, Durand, Levine, and Touboul (2016) show that ESG ratings from different providers differ substantially, and
Berg et al. (2020) conclude that results based on data from one provider may not be replicable in data from another provider. We ask
whether this is the case in regard to the association between CEO gender and corporate social responsibility. While the existing
literature indicates a positive (if any) association between female CEOs and corporate social responsibility, we know of no study that
explicitly investigates that association while measuring corporate social responsibility by ESG scores from different data providers. We
run a simple, random effects regression analysis based on panel data following Petersen (2009). We include relevant control variables
but do not explicitly address causality or endogeneity concerns, as our aim is to show the crucial impact of the data provider even in a
simple comparison of associations.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and states hypotheses. Section 3 presents the sample, the data, and
the variables. Section 4 explains the regression analysis and presents the empirical results, including the robustness analysis. Section 5
concludes.

2. Literature review and hypotheses development

Felin and Foss (2005) argue that firms are made up of individuals and that there is no firm without individuals. CEOs are crucial
players in the firm (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), and their personalities act as subjective lenses through which
they view strategic situations and decide on responses (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010). To the extent that female and male CEOs differ,
such differences could affect the firm's strategy on corporate social responsibility as measured by ESG scores.
Buss (2009) argues that women and men are expected to differ psychologically in domains in which they have faced different
adaptive problems over time. When it comes to the relationship between gender and ESG scores, women would be expected to be more
nurturing towards other beings, since they exhibit higher rates than men of empathy-related evolutionary traits (Christov-Moore et al.,
2014). Whether nature or nurture dominates, empirical studies indicate that female leaders are more social and more socially
responsible (Borghesi, Houston, & Naranjo, 2014; Byron & Post, 2016; Eagly, 2009; Hofstede, 1998; Kish-Gephart, Harrison, &
Treviño, 2010; Liu, 2021). In a meta-analysis, Eagly (2009) finds female leaders to be more transformational and more engaged in
contingent reward behaviors. Hofstede (1998) argues that women are relation oriented while men are achievement oriented. Kish-
Gephart et al. (2010) find a positive relationship between males and unethical behavior. Borghesi et al. (2014) find that female CEOs
are significantly more likely to invest in corporate social responsibility. Liu (2021) finds that female CEOs have superior employee
relations. Byron and Post (2016) find that female board representation is positively associated with socially responsible business
practices.
Analyzing 392 observations, Huang (2013) finds a weak positive association between female CEOs and the frequency of corporate
social responsibility rankings.3 Examining U.S. firms in 1992–2006, Borghesi et al. (2014) find that female CEOs are significantly more
likely to invest in corporate social responsibility as measured by ESG data from KLD Research & Analytics. Examining lawsuits filed
against Standard & Poor's 1500 firms from 2001 to 2014, Liu (2021) finds that female CEOs have superior employee relations.
Cronqvist and Yu (2017) focus on the gender of the CEOs' children but also show that female CEOs of S&P 500 firms are associated with
more socially responsible corporate practices as measured by data from KLD Research & Analytics in the period 1992–2012. Going
beyond the CEO role and expanding to the board of directors, a meta-analysis by Byron and Post (2016) finds that female board
representation is positively associated with socially responsible business practices, and McGuinness, Vieito, and Wang (2017) find that
gender diversity on boards promotes Chinese firms' social performance and that the appointment of female officers to top-level
management positions improves CSR ratings.
Accordingly, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1. Female CEOs are positively associated with corporate ESG scores.
However, our conclusion may depend on the provider of ESG scores. Chatterji et al. (2016) show that ESG ratings from different
providers differ substantially. Berg et al. (2020) argue that the divergence of ratings poses a challenge for empirical research because
the simple choice of data provider may alter a study's conclusions—a confusion that ultimately challenges decision-makers who try to

2
The same article reports a low correlation between ESG scores from two providers, Sustainalytics (owned by Morningstar) and RobecoSAM
(partly owned by Morningstar).
3
Huang (2013) measures the frequency of CSR rankings by the following rating agencies: the Global 100 by Corporate Knights between 2005 and
2010, CRO magazine's 100 Best Corporate Citizens between 2005 and 2010, the Most Ethical Companies by Ethisphere between 2007 and 2010, and
Newsweek's Green Ranking between 2008 and 2010.

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T. Aabo and I.C. Giorici Global Finance Journal xxx (xxxx) xxx

contribute to a more ESG-friendly economy. Berg et al. identify three distinct sources of divergence: (1) the choice of attributes that
together constitute the overall concept of ESG performance (“scope”), (2) the numerical measures of those attributes (“measurement”),
and (3) how these numerical measures are aggregated (“weights”). They find that the “measurement” divergence is the most important
reason why ESG ratings diverge. On top of these more objective sources, the authors also identify and document a “rater effect” in
which a rater lets performance in one ESG category influence perceived performance in other ESG categories. This leads us to our
second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. The degree to which female CEOs are positively associated with corporate ESG scores depends on the provider of ESG
scores.
Dorfleitner et al. (2015) provide a nice overview of the main methods (and differences in methods) applied by our two providers of
ESG scores, Refinitiv (previously under Asset4, a Thomson Reuters business, now under London Stock Exchange Group) and
Bloomberg. Refinitiv bases its assessment of ESG performance on 850 binary data points, while Bloomberg uses more than 100 data
points. Both providers assess on a scale from 0 to 100. In the environmental dimension (E), both providers rate firms in terms of
emissions, water, waste, resource reduction, biodiversity, and the environmental impact of a firm's products and services. However,
Refinitiv also covers animal testing, while Bloomberg also covers the extent to which a firm's practice complies with environmental
regulations. In the social dimension (S), both providers rate firms in terms of employment quality, occupational health and safety,
diversity (including gender) and opportunity, human rights, and product responsibility. However, Refinitiv provides more detailed
information and covers compliance with local regulations regarding political contributions, the level of general business ethics, and tax
fraud. In the governance dimension (G), both providers rate firms in terms of reporting quality, public policy, governance structure,
business ethics controversies, shareholder and stakeholder engagement, and board functions and structure. Generally, Dorfleitner et al.
(2015) find that the Refinitiv scores are more diverse (i.e., have a higher standard deviation) than those of Bloomberg. The authors find
that, when compared to a third data provider (KLD), Refinitiv and Bloomberg show the highest resemblance in scores but conclude (p.
461) that “ESG scores of different providers do not coincide largely and are therefore incomparable on the whole.”
We abstain from going more deeply into the methods used by these providers, as our focus is on the outcomes rather than the
procedural details. Nor do we aim to give a comprehensive view of the various conclusions that might be reached by using ESG scores
from all of the more than 600 ESG score providers identified by SustainAbility; we merely demonstrate that data from two of the main
providers support divergent conclusions related to hypothesis 1.

3. Sample, data, and variables

3.1. Sample

The sample consists of nonfinancial S&P 1500 firms in the period 2014 to 2019. We exclude SIC codes beginning with 6 (Finance,
Insurance, and Real Estate) and 49 (Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services), as firms in these sectors are heavily regulated. We have a total
of 3592 firm-year observations for 723 firms and 1042 CEOs, for which we require ESG data from Refinitiv and/or Bloomberg.
Initially, we analyze the ESG data from Refinitiv and Bloomberg separately. However, for elaboration, we also analyze the subset of
firm-year observations that are common to the two data providers (a maximum of 657 firm-year observations).

3.2. Variables

The dependent variables are the composite ESG score based on data from Refinitiv and/or Bloomberg, and the separate scores for
the underlying three pillars: environmental, social, and governance. Firm control variables include firm size, leverage, cash flows,
ROA, and Tobin's Q. CEO control variables include gender, age, tenure, duality, and founder status. All regressions include industry
dummies. All variables are described in Appendix A.

3.3. Descriptive statistics

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our variables.

All ESG scores (including environmental, social, and governance scores) use a scale from 0 to 100. The means and medians are fairly
close to each other, indicating that our regression results are unlikely to be driven by outliers or skewed ESG distributions.
Our average firm has total assets of $5.1 billion. Following normal procedure, we take the log of total assets to create our firm size
variable. The average firm has return on assets of 6.2%, a Tobin's Q of 2.64, a leverage ratio of 48%, and cash flows of 11.5%. The
average CEO in our sample is 56 years old and has a tenure of 7.8 years. 44% of our CEOs also chair the firm's board of directors, while
8.4% are founders of their firms. Only 4% of our CEOs are women.4

4
Appendix B reports descriptive statistics for the common sample (i.e., the sample of firm-year observations that are covered by both Refinitiv and
Bloomberg). The firms in the common sample tend to be larger, be more profitable, and have a higher Tobin's Q than the firms in the combined
sample. The CEOs in the common sample are more likely to be founders and less likely to be chairs of the board of directors than CEOs in the
combined sample.

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Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. p5 Median p95

ESGScore – Ref. 2097 37.963 17.478 15.12 34.49 71.890

Environmental – Ref. 1365 30.884 24.582 2.55 24.41 76.130
Social – Ref. 2060 40.799 19.777 13.965 37.59 78.510
Governance – Ref. 2060 47.921 21.022 13.86 48.265 81.755
ESGScore – BB 2152 49.98 26.406 7.143 49.772 90.802
Environmental – BB 2135 49.843 26.609 7.323 49.439 92.218
Social – BB 2151 55.486 24.392 14.054 57.178 92.458
Governance – BB 2101 48.147 28.189 4.448 47.823 92.662
ROA 3592 0.062 0.117 − 0.064 0.062 0.186
Tobin'sQ 3592 2.64 1.9 1.052 2.082 5.983
FirmSize 3592 22.356 1.69 19.671 22.418 25.159
Leverage 3592 0.475 0.257 0.129 0.455 0.854
CashFlow 3592 0.115 0.09 0.016 0.109 0.247
Gender 3592 0.04 0.196 0 0 0.000
CEOAge 3591 57.187 6.799 47 57 69.000
CEOTenure 3592 7.842 7.821 0 5 24.000
CEODuality 3592 0.442 0.497 0 0 1.000
Founder 3592 0.084 0.278 0 0 1.000

Note: This table reports descriptive statistics for all variables for all firm-year observations that are covered by at least one of the two ESG score
providers. Variables are described in Appendix A.

3.4. Univariate tests

Table 2 reports a univariate analysis based on CEO gender. Female CEOs are associated with higher ESG scores, whether from
Refinitiv or from Bloomberg. They are furthermore associated with higher scores for each of the three ESG pillars (except for the
environment pillar for Refinitiv). However, female CEOs are also associated with other CEO and firm characteristics, so multivariate
analysis is needed to disentangle the true relationship between CEO gender and ESG scores.
Table 2 shows that female CEOs tend to be employed in larger firms (“FirmSize”) that are more profitable (“ROA”), have higher
cash flows (“CashFlow”), and are more leveraged (“Leverage”). They also tend to have less tenure (“CEOTenure”) and are less likely to
have founded the firm (“Founder”).
As Bender et al. (2018) have pointed out, the correlation between ESG scores from different data providers is far from perfect. This
is also the case when we compare the ESG scores from Refinitiv and Bloomberg. The correlation between the general ESG scores from
Refinitiv and Bloomberg is 0.63, while the correlations for the three pillars (environmental, social, and governance) are 0.62, 0.62, and
0.24, respectively (not tabulated). Such discrepancies may generate different answers to the same research questions simply because of
the choice of ESG score provider.

4. Empirical results

Below we report results from random effects regression models based on panel data. In line with Petersen (2009), we cluster
standard errors at the firm level and include time and industry dummies. To address the association between female CEOs and ESG
scores, we apply the following regression model:
∑
N
ESGi,t = α + β1 Genderi,t + βj Controlj,t + ei . (1)
j=2

The dependent variable, ESG, is either the total ESG score or an individual score for one of the three ESG pillars. Gender is a dummy
variable equal to one if the CEO is female and zero if the CEO is male. Control is a range of control variables.
Table 3, Panel A, reports the estimated coefficients from the regression of ESG scores from Refinitiv (Model 1) and Bloomberg
(Model 2). The regression based on scores from Refinitiv does not find a significant association between CEO gender and ESG scores. In
contrast, the regression based on scores from Bloomberg finds a significant and positive association between CEO gender and ESG
scores. The result in Model 2 is significant not only statistically but also economically: the Gender coefficient of 9.427 signifies that
having a female CEO increases a firm's ESG score by an amount corresponding to 19% of the median and mean ESG scores and 36% of
the standard deviation.5 Table 3, Panel A, is the first indication of how two different data providers may provide two different answers
to the same research question.
Panel B elaborates on the findings in Panel A by disaggregating the overall ESG score into its three pillars. Panel B demonstrates that
no pillars show a significant relationship with CEO gender when we analyze data from Refinitiv (Models 1–3) but that the

5
The coefficient for gender in Table 3, Model 2, is 9.427. The ESG scores from Bloomberg are arranged on a scale from 0 to 100, with a mean of
49.98, a median of 49.77, and a standard deviation of 26.41 (Table 1).

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Table 2
Univariate analysis based on CEO gender.
Variable Obs. female Obs. male Mean female Mean male Difference Standard error

ESGScore – Ref. 81 2016 44.119 37.716 6.403*** 1.976

Environmental – Ref. 54 1311 35.349 30.7 4.649 3.413
Social – Ref. 81 1979 48.16 40.498 7.662*** 2.236
Governance – Ref. 81 1979 54.395 47.656 6.739** 2.379
ESGScore – BB 89 2063 66.361 49.273 17.088*** 2.836
Environmental – BB 89 2012 63.209 47.481 15.728*** 3.035
Social – BB 89 2046 63.301 49.258 14.043*** 2.866
Governance – BB 89 2062 61.708 55.218 6.49** 2.638
ROA 143 3449 0.082 0.06 0.022** 0.007
Tobin'sQ 143 3449 0.777 0.805 − 0.028 0.046
FirmSize 143 3449 22.756 22.339 0.417** 0.144
Leverage 143 3449 0.56 0.472 0.088*** 0.022
CashFlow 143 3449 0.132 0.115 0.017** 0.007
CEOAge 143 3448 56.979 57.196 − 0.217 0.581
CEOTenure 143 3449 1.438 1.824 − 0.386*** 0.076
CEODuality 143 3449 0.378 0.444 − 0.066 0.043
Founder 143 3449 0.035 0.086 − 0.051** 0.024

Note: Variables are described in Appendix A. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

environmental and social pillars show significant relationships with CEO gender when we analyze data from Bloomberg. Thus, the
discrepancy in the overall ESG score identified in Panel A seems to rest primarily on the environmental and social pillars as opposed to
the governance pillar.
Such different findings might arise from either or both of two circumstances. First, the methods of the two data providers differ.
Second, the samples of firms differ. To disentangle these possibilities, Table 4 provides an analysis based on firms that have data from
both Refinitiv and Bloomberg. As this common sample is markedly reduced, all else equal, statistically significant results in Table 4 are
less likely than in the corresponding analysis in Table 3.
Table 4, Panel A, reports the estimated coefficients from a regression of composite ESG scores corresponding to Table 3, Panel A.
Again, the regression based on scores from Refinitiv does not find a significant association between CEO gender and ESG scores, while
the regression based on scores from Bloomberg finds a highly significant and positive association. Thus, the common sample yields the
same conclusion as the two independent samples, despite having many fewer observations.
Table 4, Panel B, reports the estimated coefficients from separate regressions for the three ESG pillars, corresponding to Table 3,
Panel B, and showing similar results. Again, the environmental and social pillars show significant relationships with CEO gender when
we analyze data from Bloomberg. However, in contrast to Panel B of Table 3, Panel B of Table 4 indicates that female CEOs are
associated with significantly worse governance pillar scores when we use data from Refinitiv.
Thus, the discrepancy in results generated by the scores from Bloomberg and Refinitiv is due to different scoring methods rather
than to different samples. If the difference in methods relates to the inclusion/exclusion of gender issues, our findings could be caused
by the simple fact that Bloomberg includes gender issues (specifically, the gender of the CEO) in its ESG scores while Refinitiv does not.
For two reasons this is not likely to be the case. First, although the specific methods of ESG data providers are not fully transparent,
from what is known about the methods of Bloomberg and Refinitiv we see no indication that the two providers treat gender issues in
markedly different ways; Refinitiv does explicitly include aspects of gender diversity in its ESG score. Second, our findings are sig­
nificant not only for the overall ESG score (Tables 3 and 4, Panel A), but also across at least two pillars of ESG scores (Tables 3 and 4,
Panel B).6
The analyses reported in Tables 3 and 4 use a simple, random effects regression analysis based on panel data, following the rec­
ommendations of Petersen (2009). We do not explicitly address causality or endogeneity concerns—for example, that female CEOs
may self-select into certain firms, or that certain firms may consider gender in selecting their CEOs. However, Table 4 shows that even
for exactly the same firms, we find a statistically significant, positive association between having a female CEO and corporate social
responsibility when we use ESG scores from Bloomberg but no such association when we use scores from Refinitiv.7

5. Conclusions

We examine non-financial S&P 1500 firms in the period 2014–2019 and use the data from two of the main ESG data providers,
Refinitiv and Bloomberg (Dorfleitner et al., 2015). We find no association between CEO gender and corporate social responsibility
when we base our analysis on ESG data from Refinitiv. However, we find a strong, positive association between female CEOs and ESG
scores when we base our analysis on ESG data from Bloomberg. Thus, female CEOs are associated with a 19% increase in the ESG score
when we use data from Bloomberg. The discrepancy in results is primarily born by the Environmental and Social pillars. The

6
Only the social pillar relates to gender diversity.
7
Furthermore, when we include a common sample dummy into our analysis (not tabulated), the lack of statistical significance of the interaction
between such a dummy and our gender dummy indicates that selection bias is no issue in our analysis.

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Table 3
Gender and ESG scores—full samples.
Panel A: ESG scores

(1) (2)

Variable ESG – Ref. ESG – BB

Gender 3.333 9.427**

(3.348) (3.685)
ROA 1.529 13.7
(4.595) (14.132)
Tobin'sQ 1.956 1.515
(1.166) (4.313)
FirmSize 6.68*** 9.047***
(0.451) (1.739)
Leverage − 2.2 2.121
(1.934) (7.868)
CashFlow 0.625 41.114*
(4.194) (20.533)
CEOAge 0.063 0.172
(0.101) (0.155)
CEOTenure 0.729 − 0.385
(0.555) (1.463)
CEODuality 0.415 1.309
(1.077) (2.26)
Founder − 2.906** − 5.802
(1.247) (3.554)
Constant − 114.838*** − 178.95***
(8.744) (43.482)
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 2097 2151
R-squared 0.365 0.171

Panel B: ESG pillars

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Variable Environ. – Social – Governance – Environ. – Social – Governance –

Ref. Ref. Ref. BB BB BB

Gender − 0.158 5.015 1.415 7.618* 9.984** − 1.481

(4.341) (4.78) (2.494) (4.489) (3.785) (4.528)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
variables
Year-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Industry-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Observations 1365 2060 2060 2100 2134 2150
R-squared 0.373 0.315 0.106 0.179 0.135 0.05

Notes: This table reports the estimated coefficients from the regression of ESG scores (Panel A) and
ESG pillars (Panel B) based on data from Refinitiv (Model 1, Panel A, and Models 1–3, Panel B) and
Bloomberg (Model 2, Panel A, and Models 4–6, Panel B), respectively. Variables are described in
Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are clustered at the firm
level. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

discrepancy cannot be attributed to non-identical samples as our results hold when we limit our analysis to firms covered by both
Refinitiv and Bloomberg. Furthermore, an unreported analysis indicates no difference in effect between the common sample and the
divergent samples. Therefore, the discrepancy in results is caused not by differences in firms covered by the two ESG data providers but
by the application of different methods.
Our results are especially important given the increased focus on corporate social responsibility and gender diversity. The lack of
consistency in ESG scores across a broad range of ESG data providers is well known (e.g., Bender et al., 2018), and as long as there are
no consistent standards for ESG disclosure, such divergence is likely to remain (Berg et al., 2020). Thus, our conclusions are likely to
apply to other data providers and not be confined to our specific research method. This not only is unsatisfactory from an academic
point of view but also—and more importantly—may lead to suboptimal policy decisions in the real world. The disagreement about
corporate ESG performance presents a challenge for firms as ESG scores may fail to reliably guide firms towards ESG improvement
(Berg et al., 2020). In our context, when we fail to find consensus even when dealing with simple associations in a common sample,
there is little guidance for decision-makers in terms of a potential female CEO corporate social responsibility benefit.

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Table 4
Gender and ESG score—common sample.
Panel A: Gender and ESG scores

(1) (2)

Variable ESG – Ref. ESG – BB

Gender − 1.231 20.388***

(3.245) (4.374)
Control variables Yes Yes
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 657 657
R-squared 0.259 0.217

Panel B: Gender and ESG pillars

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Variable Environ. Social – Governance Environ. Social – Governance

– Ref. Ref – Ref. – BB BB – BB

Gender − 2.222 5.087 − 6.62*** 22.14*** 19.95*** 10.594

(5.4) (4.396) (2.225) (7.828) (4.311) (6.762)
Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
variables
Year-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Industry-fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
effects
Observations 565 650 654 565 650 654
R-squared 0.2 0.196 0.157 0.179 0.194 0.108

Notes: This table is similar to Table 3 except that the analysis is based on firms with data from
both Refinitiv and Bloomberg. Variables are described in Appendix A. T-statistics are reported in
parentheses, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate signifi­
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Declarations of competing interest

None.

Acknowledgements

We thank two anonymous referees, Anna Bahvala, Berit Hansen, Mikkel Lilholt Jacobsen, Martin Jakobsen, Martin Andreas
Thusholt Jakobsen, Emil Folmer Kristensen, Natalie Langstad, Mette Kerstine Lauritsen, Mads Gammelby Lybecker, Benjamin
Mogensen, Marcell Póser, Kasper Stendys, Johan Hede Sørensen, Robert Haugaard Sørensen, Emma Lykke Therkildsen, and Aziz
Zadran for helpful comments and suggestions. Support from the Danish Finance Institute (DFI) is gratefully acknowledged. We bear
sole responsibility for all remaining errors and omissions.

Appendix A. Variable descriptions

Variable Description

ESG Categories
ESGScore Refinitiv Overall score based on the reported information in the ESG pillars below. – Refinitiv
Environmental Refinitiv Company's score based on emissions, innovation, and resource use – Refinitiv
Social Refinitiv Company's score based on community, human rights, product responsibility and workforce – Refinitiv
Governance Refinitiv Company's score based on its CSR strategy, management, and shareholders – Refinitiv
ESGScore Bloomberg “Overall percentile rank based on its environmental, social and governance score relative to its industry peers” – Bloomberg
Environmental “Percentile rank for the company's management of its environmental record” – Bloomberg
Bloomberg
Social Bloomberg “Percentile rank for the company's management of its social impact” – Bloomberg
Governance Bloomberg “Percentile rank for the company's management of its governance activities” – Bloomberg
Independent Variables
ROA Earnings before extraordinary items divided by total assets
Tobin'sQ
(continued on next page)

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(continued )
Variable Description

(Market value of equity minus book value of equity plus total assets) divided by total assets (this variable was later transformed to a
natural logarithm)
FirmSize Natural logarithm of total assets
Leverage (Current liabilities plus long-term debt) divided by total assets
CashFlow Net cash flow from operating activities divided by total assets
Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is female and 0 if the CEO is male
CEOAge CEO's age in years
CEOTenure Number of years the CEO has been in the current position (this variable was later transformed to a natural logarithm)
CEODuality Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is chair of the board of directors and 0 if the CEO is not chair
Founder Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is a founder of the company and 0 if not a founder
Industry Industry classification in Fama and French's 48-industry scheme

Appendix B. Descriptive statistics—common sample

Variable N Mean Std. Dev. p5 Median p95

ESGScore – Ref. 657 50.592 18.7 19.1 50.84 81.650

Environmental – Ref. 565 44.191 25.622 5.52 44.82 84.190
Social – Ref. 650 53.871 20.006 22.04 54.025 88.600
Governance – Ref. 654 54.075 21.694 16.1 56.49 87.590
ESGScore – BB 657 458.866 27.176 5.658 43.551 91.691
Environmental – BB 565 48.285 27.8 5.393 47.779 92.563
Social – BB 650 46.285 28.055 5.185 45.09 91.710
Governance – BB 654 51.014 25.282 10.704 49.937 91.044
ROA 657 0.086 0.087 − 0.045 0.083 0.221
Tobin'sQ 657 3.343 2.255 1.197 2.68 7.311
FirmSize 657 23.145 1.242 21.497 22.885 25.673
Leverage 657 0.472 0.216 0.144 0.463 0.856
CashFlow 657 0.143 0.084 0.026 0.138 0.286
Gender 657 0.041 0.199 0 0 0.000
CEOAge 657 56.346 6.554 46 56 66.000
CEOTenure 657 7.708 7.007 0 6 24.000
CEODuality 657 0.353 0.478 0 0 1.000
Founder 657 0.142 0.349 0 0 1.000
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for all variables for all firm-year observations that are covered by both ESG score providers. Variables
are described in Appendix A.

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