Farming Futures - Safeharvest Chapter

FARMING
FUTURES:
EMERGING
SOCIAL
ENTERPRISES
IN INDIA
Editors:
Ajit Kanitkar and C. Shambu Prasad
13
Linking Farmer Producers and Urban
Consumers for Pesticide Free and Safe food
Safe Harvest Private Limited
Safe Harvest Pvt. Ltd (SHPL), founded in 2009 as a social enterprise was
conceptualized by a group of eight grassroots NGOs with the twin objectives
to strengthen the non-pesticide management (NPM) of agriculture – by
enabling farmers shift to sustainable agriculture by creating a market for
their ‘pesticide-free’ produce – and offering consumers a safe and affordable
alternative to food produced through conventional farming. SHPL aims
to provide a remunerative market for the produce of one lakh small and
marginal farmers by reaching out to one million consumers by 2023.
After facing challenges both in procurement and sales in its initial years,
it is now in its turnaround phase, with annual sales improving from just
`25 lakh to nearly `16 crore. SHPL partners with about 25 organizations
comprising farmers’ collectives, with a membership base of about one lakh
farmers spread over 13 states. In 2018–19, it procured 50 commodities
under the five categories of cereals, millets, pulses, spices, and flavourings
worth more than `25 crore.
SHPL has had a three-fold impact on farmers, with claims of up to 20 per

cent increase in their incomes; on consumer markets through advocacy for
compulsory testing for pesticide residues in the pesticide-free segment and
bridging the trust deficit; and on the ecosystem for nurturing the farmer-
owned producer companies.
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Safe Harvest
1. Introduction
According to Rainfedindia.org, more than half of India’s gross cropped
area (55 per cent, 1,060 lakh hectares) is rainfed and 61 per cent of
our farmers rely on rainfed agriculture. Natural precipitation – mostly
rainwater received during monsoons – is the only source of irrigation
for crops in rainfed agriculture. A primary source of livelihood for 84
per cent of rural poor, rainfed agriculture is also a major contributor to
our food security by producing 40 per cent of the total rice, 89 per cent
of millets, 69 per cent of oilseeds, and 88 per cent of pulses respectively.
However, rainfed farming has been largely left out of mainstream
agricultural development in terms of public investments.
Figure 1: Extent of rainfed irrigation in India
RI class irrigated
0 - 40
40 - 55
55 - 70
70 - 85
85 - 100
Source: www.rainfedindia.org
Note: RI class – percentage of land irrigated by rain
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Farming Futures: Emerging Social Enterprises in India
Irrigated agriculture promoted by the Green Revolution since the

1960s focuses on high external inputs. Modern farming practices
coupled with irrational use of chemicals to control pests have adversely
affected the environment, reduced food quality and increased cost of
cultivation. The Green Revolution has covered a few regions of the
country such as Punjab, Haryana, western Maharashtra, western Uttar
Pradesh, and delta regions of major rivers in southern India, while large
tracts of rest of the country continue to practice rainfed farming.
Small and marginal farmers in India, especially in the rainfed tracts,
do not use chemical pesticides due to lack of money to buy external
inputs. So, a significant proportion of produce from the rainfed areas is
largely pesticide-free, even though it is not recognized as such. These
‘default organic’ farmers rarely obtain a premium on their produce
as they are unorganized, have poor access to markets, and have not
‘certified’ their produce as organic.
Government policies like the National Programme for Organic
Production (NPOP) and Participatory Guarantee System (PGS) that
regulates and promotes ‘organic farming’ are centralized and exorbitantly
expensive or are fraught with shortcomings that exclude a majority
of smallholders. At the consumer end, an increasing demand for safe
food has also resulted in growing apprehension about the nature and
authenticity of various claims made by companies that market these
products. In many instances, the comparatively expensive ‘certified
organic’ products, when tested, have been found to contain pesticide
residues.
It is therefore necessary to create a viable alternative that, while
offering the benefits of certification, enables farmers to conveniently
market their produce. It is in this context that the NPM movement
was born. Its objective is to encourage farmers to grow crops without
any synthetic pesticides and to retail this ‘pesticide-free’ produce in
organized consumer markets by creating a unique identity for it.
To take the idea of NPM forward, a series of meetings were held in
2005 in which nationally reputed NGOs with significant experience of
working at the grassroots participated. The eight founding partners of
the NPM movement were:
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Safe Harvest
1. Samaj Pragati Sahayog (SPS), Madhya Pradesh

2. Chirag, Uttarakhand
3. Watershed Support Service and Activities Network (WASSAN),
Andhra Pradesh
4. Samarthak Samiti, Rajasthan
5. Chetna Organic, Hyderabad
6. The Covenant Centre for Development (CCD), Tamil Nadu
7. Samuha, Karnataka
8. Satvik, Gujarat
These NGOs formed the NPM Network to promote pesticide-free

sustainable agriculture at the grassroots. Ford Foundation, the US-based
international philanthropic organization evinced interest in supporting
NPM. The grant funding from Ford Foundation was critical to the
movement as it catalysed the NPM Network’s partner organizations’
efforts to help farmers switch to practising pesticide-free sustainable
agriculture.
To retail the ‘pesticide-free’ produce in consumer markets,
V. K. Madhavan, Ganesan Balachander, Muthuvelayutham Nagamalai,
Shailesh Vyas, and Rajesh Sahadevan, each pooled `20,000 and
registered Safe Harvest Pvt. Ltd as a for-profit company in 2009.
Ganesan Balachander, former head of Ford Foundation, India, played
a unique role in SHPL, first as an investor and later as chairman of
the company’s Board. V. K. Madhavan, who headed Chirag – one of
the founding partners of the NPM movement – steered SHPL in its
formative years.
The vision of SHPL is as follows:
1. To boost the NPM movement at the grassroots and accelerate

farmers’ switch to sustainable agriculture by creating a market
for their ‘pesticide-free’ produce
2. To offer urban consumers a safe, credible, and affordable
alternative to food produced through conventional, input
intensive agriculture
SHPL aims to achieve this vision by creating a stable and remunerative
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market link for 1,00,000 small and marginal farmers by reaching out to
10,00,000 urban consumers by 2023.
2. Early Years of SHPL (2009–13)

Like many a young enterprise, Safe Harvest encountered a number
of challenges in its formative years. According to Ravindra, CEO,
WASSAN – another founding organization of the NPM movement,
‘In the initial years, SHPL suffered from a wide dispersal of member
organizations, instability at the helm, lack of focus and coordination,
and operational problems in areas such as procurement and marketing.’
The usual challenges of establishing a brand were compounded by
dearth of resources and inexperience in tackling challenges at both the
front end and back end. The issues that Safe Harvest faced in its initial
years can be summed up as follows:
a. Lack of working capital: Equity providers in the social space

considered agri-based enterprises to be too risky. Consequently,
SHPL did not have adequate working capital to begin with and for
a long time later. This impacted SHPL’s procurement operations
and prevented the company from achieving economies of scale.
Insufficient capital also hindered the company from investing in
storage, packaging, and marketing. However, contributions from
individual investors like Vidyaben Shah, Mekhala Krishnamurthy,
Ganesan Balachander, Gurdeep Singh Puri, and Palash Ventures
– a boutique investor who believed in SHPL’s vision – kept the
company afloat in the early years.
b. Challenges at the front end: Safe Harvest was not equipped to
navigate complex and often volatile consumer markets. There
was a dearth of personnel and resources to comprehend, reach
out to, and establish presence in organized retail.
i. General Trade (comprising proprietor run brick and mortar

stores) is personnel intensive and requires constant servicing.
It is fraught with issues such as delayed payments and store
closures (resulting in blocked/loss of working capital).
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Safe Harvest
ii. Modern Trade (centrally regulated models like SPAR,

Spencer’s) on the other hand requires considerable
investment upfront to be listed in stores and further
investment for regular promotions that eat into the already
razor thin margins. Payments in Modern Trade are assured.
However, they are dependent on the terms of trade (ToT).
Negotiating favourable terms requires considerable market
expertise, something that Safe Harvest lacked. Being new,
the company also had no brand value to leverage that made
it further difficult to negotiate profitable ToT.
iii. In addition to these challenges, it was up to Safe Harvest to
entirely establish a niche ‘pesticide-free’ category in a market
neatly divided between ‘conventional’ (read chemical) and
‘organic’. This humongous undertaking would succeed only if
spearheaded by extensive branding and marketing, which in
turn require considerable investment.
c. Challenges at the back end:
i. Almost all partner farmer producer companies (FPCs) of

Safe Harvest were accessing organized markets for the very
first time. Some of the FPCs promoted by the founding
NGOs (e.g. SPS, Samuha, Chetna Organic) had the ability to
procure commodities at scale, but were not conversant with
the working of organized retail. It was therefore natural for
each FPC to defend its own farmers’ quality of goods and
demand higher prices. This put, SHPL at a disadvantage in
the highly competitive consumer markets.
ii. In addition to facing procurement issues, Safe Harvest
also had to set up critical capital intensive processes
such as storage, cleaning, grading, packing, and logistics.
Inexperience in managing these processes resulted in
inefficient supply chains that added to the price of the
products. Mismatch between demand and supply, delayed
delivery of orders, and high expiry returns resulted in
considerable losses.
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3. Turnaround of SHPL (since 2013)

The Board of SHPL wanted a person to be based full time in
Bengaluru (the location of Safe Harvest’s head office) and requested
Rangu Rao to take up the responsibility as its CEO. Rangu is a leading
development professional with over 25 years of experience having
worked in some of the most challenging tribal, drought-prone, and
backward areas of the country. He is the co-founder of SPS, Madhya
Pradesh. SPS is one of India’s largest grassroots initiatives for water
and livelihood security.
Rangu joined as CEO in 2013 when SHPL was on the verge of
closure. It was during this time that the board was also restructured
to comprise Ganesan Balachander (who recently stepped down), Dr
Mihir Shah (co-founder, SPS and Member, Planning Commission,
Government of India, 2009–2014), Muthu Velayudham, and Rangu
Rao.
Rangu believed that commercial operations of a company should be
run with either equity or debt funds based on a sound business model.
He therefore leveraged his ties and convinced Ashish Kacholia of Lucky
Securities to invest in SHPL. With support from Ashish, a farsighted
investor who firmly believed in the company’s potential to benefit
smallholder farmers, Rangu was able to restructure the organization
and turn the operations around. Ashish’s steadfast commitment to
Safe Harvest resulted in an expansion of the company’s operations and
outreach.
Rangu was also largely responsible for driving strategy and recruiting
skilled professionals in senior management roles, both at the front and
back end to lead to the company’s expansion:
a. At the front end: SHPL has been able to make a mark on

platforms of emerging e-commerce players such as Grofers, Big
Basket, and Flipkart. Likewise, SHPL has been able to negotiate
better ToT with Modern Trade partners and also intensify its
presence in existing and new General Trade outlets across
geographies. Earlier confined to southern Indian urban markets
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Safe Harvest
SHPL expanded its operations to the National Capital Region

(NCR, Delhi).
In 2016, SHPL also entered into a ‘co-branding’ agreement
with Metro Cash & Carry, an international retail giant, and has
successfully established a niche pesticide-free category in their
stores.
With a monthly sales turnover of over `2 crore and with
a retail presence in Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Chennai, and the
NCR, Safe Harvest today is a recognized brand in the safe food
category.
b. At the back end: Increasing year on year procurement volume has
augmented the number of farmers benefited and also developed
the management capacities of partner FPCs to supply produce of
retail quality. Additionally, through tripartite agreements, SHPL
has enabled its partner FPCs to raise working capital for their
procurement operations.
SHPL also trains and provides handholding support to partner

FPCs in the following areas – (a) practices to be followed during
aggregation, (b) weighing and commodity specific quality parameters,
(c) safe storage, (d) grading, cleaning, and processing of aggregated
commodities to achieve market standards, and (e) value addition.
With an improved working capital base and with assistance from
Safe Harvest, many of these FPCs have been able to move up the
agricultural value chain and take up post-harvest activities resulting
in higher returns for farmers and enhancing the efficiency of SHPL’s
supply chains.
Recognizing that farmer organizations, both formal and informal,
can learn from each other and also contribute to the larger policy
environment, SHPL revived and expanded the NPM Network. The
Network as of today comprises 35 farmer organizations, agricultural
research institutions, and policy makers committed to further the agenda
of NPM in Indian agriculture. SHPL also played a key role in helping
the Network cement collaborative partnerships with organizations like
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the Bharat Rural Livelihoods Foundation (BRLF) to assist and promote

FPCs in some of the most difficult geographies of the country.
3.1 Role of financial institutions

Given that the procurement of agri-commodities by Safe Harvest from
its partner organizations had to be debt-based, the company would
have found it impossible to move forward without strong support from
financial institutions, who in addition to being sensitive to the ecosystem
also possessed domain expertise. Axis Bank, from the time Rangu took
over as the CEO, and even when the equity base of the company was
insignificant, offered debt support through various financial products to
the company and its partners. It continues to play a pivotal role and has
extended a cash credit limit and a loan against warehouse receipts with
critical support in the form of a credit guarantee coming from Rabo
Bank Foundation.
Ananya Finance was the first direct lender to the company.
Loan from them allowed the company to make timely procurement
from FPCs. Ananya moved many steps forward when it decided
in partnership with Safe Harvest to advance credit to partner
organizations so that procurement could take place on behalf of Safe
Harvest by the FPCs. Tripartite agreements were signed between
Ananya, the FPC partner, and Safe Harvest which allow the FPCs
to transfer custody of aggregated agri-commodities to Safe Harvest
with the promise that Safe Harvest will pick up the cost of finance.
Such agreements based primarily on trust has no precedents. The
years 2016–17 onwards, SHPL has built similar partnerships with
NABKISAN and Avanti Finance, which have helped the company to
not only scale up its operations in terms of volumes and its reach, but
also in bringing down its cost of finance. In the near future, Avanti
Finance plans to make credit available directly to all shareholder
farmers of SHPL partner FPCs to meet all needs related to cultivation
and post-harvest operations at an affordable cost.
4. Business of SHPL
The organizational structure of SHPL is depicted in Figure 2.
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Safe Harvest
Figure 2: Structure of organization, SHPL
SHPL Board
CEO
Sales, Marketing, Finance and

Procurement Operations
and Communications Accounts
Source: Company records
4.1 Procurement
4.1.1. Sourcing
SHPL procures more than 50 pesticide-free commodities from about
25 partner organizations spread across 13 states. Since different
commodities are grown in different states and the same commodity is
harvested during different times of the year, procuring from different
geographies reduces the inventory and assures quality of the produce.
SHPL sources its products in three different ways:
1. From founding partners and organizations who have been working

on NPM for long. These organizations today are relatively well
versed in procurement, storage, and transportation of aggregated
commodities. Farmers associated with these organizations only
require refresher trainings to continue practising NPM.
2. From organizations located in regions where farmers, by default,
practise pesticide-free agriculture. In many cases, these partners
are not experienced in aggregation and procurement. SHPL
therefore builds the capacities of these organizations by providing
technical, financial, and managerial support before procuring
from them.
3. From organizations who share the same belief in NPM’s potential
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to positively impact farmers and the environment. SHPL trains

the farmers associated with these organizations on NPM
practices and accelerates their switch to pesticide-free sustainable
agriculture. SHPL procures from these farmers once they have
become conversant with practices and protocols of NPM.
SHPL procures in all three cropping seasons with kharif being the
most important. The aggregation season starts in October and peaks
during December and January when paddy is procured. SHPL (as of
September 2018) deals in 53 products and 76 stock keeping units
(SKU) across five categories – cereals, pulses, spices, flavourings, and
millets (Table 1).
Table 1: SHPL’s stock across five categories
Cereals Pulses
Sona Masuri 12M and brown Tur, mung (whole and split), urad and
rice, Red Samba parboiled rice, urad cota, chana, chana dal, Kabuli
Ponni boiled rice, wheat flour, chana, rajma (Himalayan, Chitra, and
white and red poha, sooji, puffed Kashmiri), red lobiya, horse gram, moth
rice, wheat daliya bean
Spices Flavourings Millets
Red chilli (long, round, and Khandsari sugar, Barnyard, Kodo,

powder), cumin (seeds and jaggery powder, Little Millet, Foxtail
powder), coriander (seeds and groundnut, flax rice, bajra and
powder), black pepper, turmeric seeds, tamarind, jowar daliya
powder mustard, honey
(eucalyptus and
forest)
Over the years, Safe Harvest has expanded its operations to include
a greater number of partners, products and farmers. Safe Harvest’s
expansion has resulted in an increase in both the quantity (Figure 3)
and value (Figure 4) of commodities procured.
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Safe Harvest
Figure 3: Increase in quantity of procurement,

SHPL, (2015–16 to 2018–19)
7000 6528
6000
5000
Quantity in MT
4008
4000
3000
2000
1274
1000 598
0
2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Year
Figure 4: Increase in value of procurement,

SHPL, (2015–16 to 2018–19)
30
25.86
25
Value in Crore (`)
20
16.08
15
10
5.91
5 3.7
0
2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Year
4.1.2 Residue testing of commodities

A burgeoning demand for safe food has also resulted in growing
apprehensions about the tall claims made by food manufacturers. As
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mentioned earlier, in many instances, ‘certified organic’ products do

not live up to their claims. This discrepancy between what is promised
and what is actually delivered is leading to an erosion of trust at the
consumer level and necessitates foolproof mechanisms to ensure the
‘safe’ nature of the food.
Safe Harvest implements one such mechanism: residue testing
of products. Residue testing is an internationally recognized way of
ascertaining the authenticity of safe food claims. Every batch of products
that Safe Harvest procures from its partner FPCs is tested in Food Safety
and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) accredited laboratories for
the pesticide compounds listed in the Food Safety and Standards
(Contaminants, Toxins and Residues) Regulations, 2011.
Safe Harvest is the only organization in the Indian safe food segment
today to make the maximum residue limit (MRL) test reports publicly
available for all its products. By testing the end product, Safe Harvest
ensures the pesticide-free nature of the agri-commodities and effectively
addresses the growing trust deficit in the safe food space.
Following suit, FSSAI in December 2017, introduced ‘Jaivik Bharat’, a
set of standards for the production and sale of organic food. It is now
compulsory for ‘certified organic’ players too to test all the commodities
for pesticide residues.
4.1.3 Purchase of commodities
1. Pricing and procurement: Safe Harvest draws up a memorandum of

understanding (MoU) with its partner FPCs in which the detailed
terms and conditions regarding quantity, quality, price, timing,
etc., are specified. After representative samples (drawn randomly)
of the commodity have tested negatively for pesticide residues,
prices are pegged to the prevailing rates in the nearest Agricultural
Produce Market Committee (APMC) mandi (market) in partner
locations. Safe Harvest offers these prices to farmers (who, due
to the remoteness of their location, are often at a considerable
disadvantage) at the farm gate and eliminates the risks/costs
associated with transporting the material to the mandis. The
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Safe Harvest
weighing mechanisms followed by Safe Harvest are transparent,

and open to scrutiny. Safe Harvest also provides for the storage
bags during procurement. Furthermore, the promise of season-on-
season, year-on-year procurement gives farmers sufficient time to
make suitable sowing plans.
2. Payment – enabling partners access timely working capital:
Many FPCs face the problem of inadequate working capital.
Lack of sufficient capital makes procurement during the peak
season difficult. The cash strapped FPCs often have to compete
with exploitative traders whose ability to pay the farmer quickly
gives them a considerable edge. Since most of Safe Harvest’s
partner FPCs work with small and marginal farmers, their equity
base is small, even with schemes like matching equity from the
government being available. Recognizing this critical problem,
SHPL often extends the transaction amount as advance to the
partners or pays them within a maximum of 2–3 weeks of the
delivery of goods.
Additionally, Safe Harvest also connects partner FPCs with
formal lending institutions that facilitate affordable credit. By
entering into tri-partite agreements with banks and financial
services platforms such as NABKISAN (subsidiary of NABARD),
FWWB, India, Ananya Finance, and Avanti Finance, Safe Harvest
enables partner FPCs to receive loans for working capital to
finance the purchase of commodities from their farmers. This
critical intervention motivates partners to form FPCs, and also
improves the ‘credit-worthiness’ of these FPCs. Improved ‘credit-
worthiness’ in turn helps these FPCs access more credit to take
up activities like value addition.
4.1.4 Post-harvest processes – milling and value addition

In most cases, the procured primary agricultural commodities need to
be cleaned, graded, and further processed before they can be packed for
retail use. Utmost care needs to be taken to ensure that the pesticide-
free commodities are not contaminated during these stages of the value
addition. Safe Harvest incentivises its partner FPCs to take up and
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manage these activities. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Safe Harvest

conducts regular pilots at the partner level to train FPCs in various
post-harvest processes such as storage, milling, and transportation. By
developing infrastructure and capacities of partner FPCs, Safe Harvest
enables farmers associated with FPCs to move up the agricultural value
chain and claim a greater share of the consumer rupee.
4.1.5 Case study of a typical partner

Janara Samuha Mutual Benefit Trust (JSMBT) is promoted by Samuha,
a Karnataka-based grassroots NGO working in the Devadurga block
of Raichur district. Under the agriculture programme, JSMBT started
NPM in 2008 with 18 farmers. Today more than 600 farmers across 23
villages practice pesticide-free agriculture. JSMBT through its trained
field staff helps farmers cultivate pesticide free Sona Masuri variety of
paddy.
Since 2014, Safe Harvest has consistently provided a market connect
to JSMBT’s small and marginal farmers. The transaction volumes have
grown steadily over the years with 4,645MT paddy sold in 2017–18
alone. The growth in the engagement of JSMBT with SHPL over the
past three years, in terms of the quantity of paddy procured and annual
turnover are depicted in Figures 5 and 6.
Figure 5: Growth in paddy procurement from JSMBT by SHPL
5000
4645
4500
4000
Quantity in MT
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500 1367
1000
500 291
0
2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
Year
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Safe Harvest
Figure 6: Growth in paddy sales by JSMBT to SHPL
600
502
500
Value in lakh (`)
400
300
200
108
100
35
0
2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
Year
JSMBT is run by a 46-member team who hails from 23 villages –

with a man and a woman farmer representing from each village. Each
year, JSMBT develops a procurement plan (Figure 7) with Safe Harvest,
negotiates prices with, and procures paddy from farmers. JSMBT, with
help from Safe Harvest, stores, transports, and mills the procured
paddy in strict adherence to the NPM protocol. SHPL pays the cost of
Figure 7: JSMBT–SHPL procurement plan
SHPL JSMBT makes a FPC gets the Warehouse

places the order resolution for procurement plan
procurement of in September–
paddy October
Paddy is procured
from farmers in
January
Source: Based on interactions with JSMBT and SHPL staff
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logistics (for bags, transport, etc.) in advance to JSMBT. The price of

procurement is decided by a JSMBT expert in consultation with the
farmers’ representatives in the FPC. Farmers are paid the total amount
due to them by JSMBT within 15 days of aggregation. The money and
commodity flowchart is made out in Figure 8.
Figure 8: SHPL–JSMBT-farmer money and commodity chart
SHPL transfers JSMBT deposits the amount Farmer

advance in farmer’s bank account
SHPL requests JSMBT delivers paddy and

quantity of paddy raises an invoice for the
quantity delivered and settles
advance
Source: Based on interactions with JSMBT and SHPL staff
Some of the critical issues faced by JSMBT include:
• Farmers (about 15–20 per cent) reneging on the agreement and

using pesticides by violating NPM norms
• Some farmers are forced in to ‘tied-sales’, where they have no
option but to sell their produce to money lenders and other
input providers. JSMBT is addressing this issue by forming
farmer federations and helping them access formal credit from
banks
4.2 Operations
Inventory is mostly managed by Safe Harvest, and in some cases by
the partners. Safe Harvest has obtained the requisite retail licences and
approvals and complies with various regulatory requirements including
those of FSSAI, legal metrology, GST, local municipality, trade, labour
and APMC. The external network of the procurement and operations
hub in Hyderabad is depicted in Figure 9.
A series of processes transpire between procurement from farmers
and marketing to consumers. They are as follows:
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Safe Harvest
Figure 9: External network of SHPL’s Hyderabad hub
Government/
regulatory
agencies
Customers
FPCs (farmers)
(wholesale
and traders
and retail)
Procurement
and
operations
Warehouse and
Transporters
cold storage
Banks and
financial
institutions
a. Transportation to the hub: Products from various FPCs across

the country are transported with great care to Safe Harvest’s
hub in Hyderabad. Safe Harvest deploys its personnel at partner
locations to supervise the weighing and loading of commodities,
which are then transported to Hyderabad. Adequate care is taken
to eliminate all possibilities of contamination during transit.
b. Receipt of goods and storage: Upon receiving the goods at
Hyderabad, an acknowledgement note and a Quality Report
are generated and sent to the procurement team by the hub
operations team. The Quality Report records various parameters
such as splits, damaged seeds, foreign matter, etc. If there is a
mismatch between the MoU (signed between SHPL and the
concerned partner) and the Quality Report, the procurement
team raises a debit note, issues a warning, or (very rarely)
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returns the goods to the supplier, depending on the extent of

the discrepancy.
The company stores its products in a leased cold storage
facility that has a capacity of 900 metric tonnes (MT). The
products are stored separately as per the NPM post-harvest
protocols. Products from the cold storage are transferred to the
hub periodically to address the demand. At the hub, SHPL has an
additional 350MT of storage space to process daily orders. Safe
Harvest partners with Grain-Pro, an international leader in safe
storage solutions and has installed cocoons with a storage capacity
totalling 220MT. Hermetically sealed, cocoons are an alternative
to chemical fumigation. All incoming products from the cold
storage are mandatorily stored in these cocoons for 14 days to
eliminate any residual pests from the farm gate. Safe Harvest has
also installed de-humidifiers to control moisture levels in all the
company managed storage spaces given that presence of excess
moisture is one of the primary reasons for pest multiplication.
c. Grading: A majority of products need to be cleaned and graded
to remove foreign matter and to achieve uniform grain size
before they are packed for retail consumption. These and other
processes of value addition are often fraught with possibility of
contamination. Safe Harvest has therefore installed a state of
the art Buhler machine that cleans, grades, and processes the
produce with minimal human handling.
d. Manual cleaning: The products, after they are graded, are
subject to one final round of manual cleaning to eliminate any
contaminants/matter. Safe Harvest has installed cleaning tables
to help the workers clean the material.
e. Packaging: The cleaned, graded, and processed products are then
automatically packed in foodgrade plastic pouches in a state of
the art VFFS (vertical form, fill and seal) packaging machine. The
packed products are then transported to mini-hubs in Bengaluru,
Hyderabad, Chennai, and the NCR, from where they are further
delivered to major online and brick and mortar retail outlets as
per the purchase orders raised by these outlets.
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Safe Harvest
f. Inventory management: First in first out (FIFO) is practised in

inventory management in the hubs with well laid out racks,
signage, and mechanisms for physical monitoring of stock in
place. Safe Harvest is also planning to install an inventory
management software to ensure systematic movement and
disposal of goods before their date of expiry.
g. Personnel: There are 45 people working in the procurement
and operations hub of SHPL in Hyderabad. These include six
procurement staff, four operations staff, and 35 unskilled and
semi-skilled women labour.
The material flow in the hub is as depicted in Figure 10.
Figure 10: Material flow in SHPL’s Hyderabad hub

Machine cleaning (for some commodities)
Material received
(in hub or cold storage)
Cocoon (minimum of 14 days)
Inventory (stock of 1.5 to 2 weeks)
Production area
Manual tables (cleaning of physical impurities)
Buffer bulk (2-3 days stock) Flour mill and vibro machine
Packing
Buffer retail
Sales (Purchase order)
Despatch
Transport to customer
Source: Based on interactions with SHPL staff
359
4.3 Sales and marketing

Safe Harvest’s ‘pesticide-free’ products are sold in ‘brick and mortar’
(General Trade and Modern Trade) as well as online retail outlets. The
three major sales geographies are Bengaluru, Hyderabad, and Chennai.
SHPL has also recently expanded its operations to Delhi-NCR. The
geography wise and the format wise breakup of Safe Harvest’s retail
presence is as detailed in Table 2. Modern Trade ‘brick and mortar’
Table 2: SHPL’s retail presence
Territory General Trade Modern Trade Online

(independently
owned stores)
Bengaluru 230 75 4
Hyderabad 63 18 4
Chennai 90 3 4
NCR 3 3 2
retail partners of SHPL include Spencer’s, SPAR, and Aditya Birla Retail
Limited – ABRL (with whom a recent deal was cemented to place SHPL’s
products in 56 ‘More’ supermarkets across Bengaluru). Online retail
partners of SHPL include Big Basket, Grofers, Flipkart and Amazon. Safe
Harvest has also negotiated a co-branding deal with Metro Cash & Carry
(an international retail company) to introduce the pesticide-free range of
products under their own brand label ‘Fine Life Bio’. This is a significant
achievement and an important step towards the creation of a nation-
wide ‘pesticide-free’ food category. A similar agreement with Grofers, a
nationally recognized e-commerce market platform is under discussion.
The role of the 15-member sales team serving seven Modern Trade
(SPAR, Spencer’s, ABRL, etc.) and about 400 General Trade retailers
includes branding, developing an annual sales plan and increasing the
consumer base.
Although sales are spread round the year, the numbers plateau during
360
Safe Harvest
the monsoons and spike during the festival season. The sales team
coordinates and plans with the hub operations and procurement teams
to account for these fluctuations, to prevent stock-outs and to review
the performance vis-à-vis their monthly sales projections. Furthermore,
the sales team conducts periodic surveys to gauge the market demand
for new products (e.g. ‘value-adds’ such as peanut butter, millet cookies,
etc.).
Safe Harvest’s three-member communications team is based at the
head office in Bengaluru and works closely with the sales team. Instead
of resorting to expensive advertising (such as newspaper advertisements
and billboards) the communications team relies on the use of social
media and participates regularly in direct consumer outreach events
to generate traction. Regional and language specific communication
material comprising brochures, leaflets, labels, display units, and social
media posts are developed in-house that gives Safe Harvest a significant
advantage over other brands.
The persistent efforts of the sales and marketing teams have resulted
in a steady increase in the dispatch volumes as can be seen in Figure
11. As can be seen in Table 3 (see page 362), SHPL has been recording
a healthy growth over the past five years.
Figure 11: SHPL’s dispatch volumes FY ’18 vs FY ’19 (metric tonnes)

300.0
281.4
250.0 249.5
200.0 203.1
187.1
161.6
150.0
143.0
108.1 97.3 116.0
100.0 106.7 100.6
93.2
97.6 85.1
50.0 60.2
40.2
0.0
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
FY 18-19 FY 17-18
361
Table 3: SHPL sales revenue (2010–11 to 2018–Jan 19)
S. No. Year Sales revenue Increase (%)
1 2010–11 `0.25 crore –
2 2011–12 `0.66 crore 164
3 2012–13 `0.57 crore (13)
4 2013–14 `1.69 crore 196
5 2014–15 `2.76 crore 63
6 2015–16 `3.22 crore 16
7 2016–17 `5.23 crore 62
8 2017–18 `10.50 crore 101
9 2018–Jan 19 (Unaudited) `17.89 crore 70

Source: Audited annual profit and loss statements of SHPL
5. Financial Analysis and Shareholding Pattern

Between 2013 and 2018, SHPL raised four rounds of equity. The first
institutional investor was Palash Ventures Pvt. Ltd. They provided
debt in 2013 and later converted it into equity, before exiting in
2018. Palash’s shares in the company were bought by the primary
investor, Ashish Kacholia, who firmly believes in the company’s
vision. Ashish’s strong backing has improved the company’s financial
credibility and helped it to raise debt from financial institutions like
Axis Bank, NABKISAN, and Ananya Finance at 10.3–15 per cent
interest.
The capital infusion also improved lenders’ confidence in the model
and resulted in tripartite agreements between FPCs and lenders with
SHPL as a guarantor. This in turn greatly enhanced the credit-worthiness
of FPCs, many of whom today access affordable credit. Moreover, six
FPCs hold a 3.63 per cent stake in the company.
The shareholding pattern of major shareholders is shown in
Table 4:
362
Safe Harvest
Table 4: Major shareholders of SHPL
Investor Shareholding as on 31 March 2018

1 Ashish Kacholia 52.46 %
2. Dars Business Finance Pvt. Ltd 36.73 %
3 Ganesan Balachander 4.89 %
4 Vidyaben Shah and others 2.29 %
5 FPCs 3.63 %
Source: Audited annual balance sheet of SHPL
‘Fortunately for SHPL, Ashish Kacholia, and other investors in the company
are more interested in viability of the company, rather than immediate
returns,’ says Rangu Rao. As there are no operational losses now, Rangu Rao
believes that SHPL will be able to report profits after tax by end of 2019.
The share capital increased from `1 lakh in 2009–10 to about `12.90
crore in January 2019, while the long-term debt has increased from `25
lakh in 2012–13 to more than `2 crore in January 2019.
The summary of key performance indicators based on the audited
financial statements of SHPL from 2009–10 to January 2019 is shown
in Table 5 (see page 364) and in Figures 12–17.
Figure 12: SHPL’s share capital (2009–10 to 2017–18)

1400 1290.5826
1200
1000
813.6826
` (in lakh)
800
600
355.1466
400
220.194
165.194
200
61
1 1 1
0
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
Year
Source: Audited annual balance sheets of SHPL
363
Table 5: Summary of financial statements of
SHPL (2009–10 to January 2019)
Year 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 Till Jan 2019
Equity
Share capital
(`) 1,00,000 1,00,000 1,00,000 6,10,0000 1,65,19,400 2,20,19,400 3,55,14,660 8,13,68,260 12,90,58,260 12,90,58,260
Reserves (`) 2,46,246 1,15,560 -2,98,6181 -34,42,772 -23,50,987 -48,16,554 -2,09,03,361 -4,46,26,664 -9,51,63,715 -12,69,85,419
Long term
364
(`) 25,00,000 50,00,000 43,66,637 2,44,39,842 3,31,72,392 2,02,36,288 2,02,36,288
Inventory (`) 5,17,379 38,64,221 31,55,716 65,82,780 61,04,186 79,65,607 2,16,76,272 3,09,63,482 6,46,97,328 8,53,03,115
Revenue (`) 7,88,324 2,50,711 67,83,751 86,05,155 1,69,37,411 2,76,13,363 3,22,33,508 5,22,51,405 10,11,45,671 16,68,57,763
Net profit (`) 2,36,321 -1,30,686 -31,01,741 -4,56,591 -40,03,735 -1,24,65,567 -1,60,86,807 -2,37,23,303 -5,05,37,052 -3,18,21,703
Accumulated
profit/loss
(`) 2,36,321 1,05,635 -29,96,106 -34,52,697 -74,56,432 -1,99,21,999 -3,60,08,806 -5,97,32,109 -11,02,59,235 -14,20,80,939
Source: Audited annual balance sheets and profit and loss statements of SHPL
Safe Harvest
Figure 13: SHPL’s share capital vs long-term (LT)

debt (2009–10 to 2017–18)
1400
1200
1000
` (in lakh)
800
600
400
200
0
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
Year
Share capital LT debt
Figure 14: Composition of share capital and long-term (LT)

debt in the total funds of SHPL
1600
1400
1200
1000
` (in lakh)
800
600
400
200
0
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
Year
Share capital LT debt Total
365
Figure 15: SHPL’s sales revenue (2010–11 to 2018–Jan 19)
2000
1789
1800
1600
1400
1200
1050
` (in lakh)
1000
800
600 523
400 276 322
169
200
25 66 57
0
1
19
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
20
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
n
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
-Ja
18
20
Year
Figure 16: Net loss and profit, SHPL, (2009–10 to January 2019)
Year
100
0
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 Jan-19
-100
` (in lakh)
-200
-300
-400
-500
-600
366
Safe Harvest
Figure 17: Accumulated loss and profit,

SHPL, (2009–10 to 2017–2018)
Year
200
0
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18
-200
` (in lakh)
-400
-600
-800
-1000
-1200
6. Impact of SHPL
Safe Harvest is the first brand in the country to retail food grown
without the use of synthetic chemical pesticides.
The value proposition of SHPL is:
• Promotion of sustainable agriculture

• Safe and healthy food at affordable price for consumers
• Benefiting small and marginal farmers – reducing their input
costs by helping them adopt NPM practices and improving
their incomes by connecting them with remunerative organized
markets
a. Impact of Safe Harvest on farmers: Safe Harvest has been able

to provide a stable and a remunerative organized market connect
to thousands of small and marginal farmers associated with
partner FPCs. SHPL currently works with about 25 FPCs with
a member base of close to 1,00,000 small and marginal farmers.
The gradual increase in the number of partners and farmers is
depicted in Figure 18 and 19 respectively.
367
SHPL regularly trains these FPCs in NPM protocols and

package of practices. NPM farmers are insulated from the
risks of high input conventional farming while being assured of
comparable productivity and volumes. They benefit from lower
input costs. Further SHPL offers the price quoted in the closest
organized market platform (APMC) to member farmers at their
farm gate. Efforts of the enterprise have led in majority of the
cases to a 20 per cent rise in farmers’ income.
The various advantages that accrue to farmers due to their
partnership with SHPL are as follows:
• A premium for their ‘pesticide-free’ produce

• Savings on commission (about 3 per cent) that would have
otherwise been charged by agents in the AMPC market
• Saving in cost of transportation of produce to APMC
markets
• Savings in loading and unloading and those arising from
following fair weighing practices
• Prompt payment (7–15 days)
Figure 18: Growth of partner organizations of SHPL

30
25
25
22
20 18
No. of FPCs
17
15
10
0
2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Year
368
Safe Harvest
Figure 19: Farmers impacted by SHPL
20000 19000
18000
16000
14000
12000 11000
Number
10000
8000 1710
6000
8000
2000 1500
0
2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Year
Apart from giving direct business to partner FPCs, Safe Harvest

also helps them access affordable credit by linking them with
formal lending institutions. Such initiatives have improved the
credit-worthiness of these FPCs and have enabled them to deal
in larger volumes.
Safe Harvest also guides its partner FPCs to move up the
agricultural value chain by training them in aggregation, storage,
and value addition. Processing of primary commodities offers
a great opportunity to these FPCs to expand their operations.
With an assured market link in place and with working capital
made available, these FPCs have upgraded and invested in
capital assets required to store and process agri-commodities.
Value-addition has resulted in FPCs getting a larger share of the
consumer rupee and has led to increased incomes for FPCs and
farmers associated with the FPCs.
b. Impact of Safe Harvest on consumer markets: Safe Harvest has
been able to steadily expand and increase its product basket and
its consumer base over the years. A larger number of consumers
are now aware and prefer ‘pesticide-free’ products to ‘certified
369
organic’. Safe Harvest has also been able to cement a co-branding

deal with Metro Cash & Carry to launch a pesticide-free
category of staples in their stores. A similar deal with Grofers is
in the offing. These deals are a huge step forward in establishing
a ‘pesticide free’ category in the market.
Furthermore, Safe Harvest has contributed to improving
the transparency in the safe food segment by advocating for
compulsory residue testing in agri-commodities. As a result,
the FSSAI has now made it mandatory for all players in this
segment to test all the products they market for pesticide
residues. This is a welcome move and will address the growing
trust deficit in the market.
c. Impact of Safe Harvest on the FPC ecosystem: Safe Harvest’s
growth has greatly impacted the relatively nascent FPC
ecosystem. SHPL, in a relatively short span of time, has
been able to help partner FPCs forge fruitful relationships
with a variety of actors ranging from lending institutions to
government supported organizations. SHPL has also catalysed
the revival of the NPM Network and has enabled it to form
a working relationship with organizations such as the Bharat
Rural Livelihoods Foundation and the ‘Agricultural Production
Clusters’ initiative of the Govt. of Odisha to promote FPCs
across the country.
7. Reflections of the Promoters
Rangu Rao
On FPCs: Rangu, with his long experience of promoting various farmers’

organizations both formal and informal, suggests that FPCs be provided
handholding support for longer periods. Since the gestation periods for
these farmer-owned institutions to become financially viable will be
long, it is important that these initiatives be supported by promoting
organizations. The promoter should have a well thought out business
logic before promoting an FPC. Critical issues like working capital and
370
Safe Harvest
qualified personnel can be resolved if FPCs work at scale and are able
to move up the value chain.
On Safe Harvest and social enterprises: Rangu initially gave himself

about 4–5 years as CEO of SHPL. Once SHPL’s operations are
stabilized, he intends to make way for someone more experienced to
take the company forward. He hopes that SHPL becomes increasingly
more relevant to its partners and as they grow, he reckons that they
will be able to pick up more equity in the company.
Rangu considers the social aspect of a SE like Safe Harvest a given.
He instead lays emphasis on the business aspect of the SE. He firmly
believes that grants can play a critical role in the incipient stage of
an SE by preparing the base for the SE to build on. For instance, in
the case of Safe Harvest, support accorded to the NPM Network by
the Ford Foundation helped partner FPCs propagate NPM agriculture
among their member farmers. However, the commercial operations of
SEs can attain long-term financial sustainability only if they are able to
raise equity and debt. He opines that SEs working in the agriculture
space ought to come together to create an environment that motivates
venture capital firms to invest in their collective growth.
Ganesan Balachander
Balachander, like Rangu, feels that the availability of capital is not the
only constraint for social enterprises. They need to have sound business
plans, have committed people on the Board with domain knowledge
and experience, and should be able to demonstrate performance metrics
to prospective investors.
Balachander calls for a shift in macro policy to provide incentives
based on metrics. These could be measures such as reduced interest
rates for those who have repaid their loans, support for NPM type
initiatives, and setting up of incubators for handholding.
V. K. Madhavan
Madhavan feels that engaging with markets is a must, and that the
371
journey of SHPL provides useful learning for the NGOs, many of whom
are currently involved in extension and capacity building. Madhavan
believes that NGOs need to understand how to operate in a market-
based environment. He also opines that in the agri-commodity business,
value addition is the way forward for farmers to earn higher margins.1
R. K. Anil
Contact:
Safe Harvest Pvt. Ltd
No. 90/91, Sarakki Gate
Near JP Nagar Metro Station
Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560078
372
Safe Harvest
Researcher’s Analysis
Many NGOs that work for the welfare of small and marginal farmers
(or other rural producers) struggle to crack the market and scale up
their operations. There are valuable lessons in SHPL’s journey for such
organizations when they plan to play the market to obtain sustainable
remunerative returns for their farmers.
The role of initial grant support to such start-ups (that are agri-based
but are new to the ‘market’ domain of sales and consumers) while
necessary, can also make them complacent at the early stage when the
learning curve is riddled with lots of hitherto unforeseen hurdles and
challenges. A clear demarcation of activities to be carried out by using
grant-funds and other funds (equity and debt) could be useful.
Although one gets the impression that the ‘type’ of institutional
framework is immaterial, the legal form of the enterprise should be
carefully thought through before registration, as it has long-term
implications for ownership, capital infusion, governance, and growth of
the enterprise.
The constitution of the governing board with suitable experts and
well-wishers will enable the enterprise to get the all-important domain
advice and also prevent it from drifting away from the organizational
mission because of short-term investor or market compulsions. The
extent of interpersonal trust between the board and promoter(s) also
determines the course of the enterprise.
The support provided by incubators appears to be crucial for a social
enterprise in its formative years, but SHPL didn’t receive any. There
are various issues related to a vision document and business plan of
the enterprise; how robust is the business plan, how participatory has
been its development, periodicity of its revision based on authentic
feedback from the field, etc. Apart from having a good business model,
the enterprise seems to benefit more if the promoters can leverage
373
their goodwill and social capital, while trying to raise funds and other
resources for their enterprise.
The quality of human resources (HR), their pay, job profile, and
the organizational culture (including an enabling and challenging
environment) seem to be inter-related to ensure attracting, hiring, and
retaining suitable HR for a social enterprise.
The switch from a not-for-profit to a for-profit mode for those social
enterprises in which the promoters have spent most of their working
lives in the former could be difficult. It not only requires a change in
their belief system but also needs a transition or a via media of an
intermediary such as CEO (or senior management) who is experienced
in the for-profit sector.
Unlike other social enterprises which comprise of twin entities (a for-
profit and a not-for-profit), SHPL has no such duality as it encompasses
both in a single organization. Although had NPMI (a not-for-profit
society for promotion and certification of NPM produce) been active,
the burden of SHPL would have been reduced (in building NPM-
related capacities of its partner organizations), it now has end-to-end
control and responsibility of all its functions.
Presently some of the services being provided by SHPL to its farmers
(through their FPCs) might be eating into the profits of its investors;
hence the challenge is to increase the financial stakes of the FPCs in
the enterprise so that SHPL doesn’t depend only on the magnanimity
of its angel investors for long.
374
Safe Harvest
References
Apparaju, Dr Hyma and Prativa Sundaray (Eds) (2017), ‘Revitalising Rainfed Agriculture:
Experiences from the grassroot’, 12 December, Revitalising Rainfed Agriculture
Network, http://www.rainfedindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Final-Case-Study-
Rainfed-Agriculture-December-12-2017.pdf
Audited Balance Sheets and Profit & Loss Statements of SHPL (2009–10 to 2017–18).
Promotional material and internal product presentations of SHPL.
Reddy, Suresh (2013) ‘Non-Pesticidal Management of Pests: Status, Issues and Prospects
– A Review’, RULNR Working Paper, November, Hyderabad: Centre for Economic
and Social Sciences.
www.rainfedindia.org
www.safeharvest.co.in
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FARMING

SHPL has had a three-fold impact on farmers, with claims of up to 20 per

Figure 1: Extent of rainfed irrigation in India

Irrigated agriculture promoted by the Green Revolution since the

1. Samaj Pragati Sahayog (SPS), Madhya Pradesh

These NGOs formed the NPM Network to promote pesticide-free

1. To boost the NPM movement at the grassroots and accelerate

SHPL aims to achieve this vision by creating a stable and remunerative

2. Early Years of SHPL (2009–13)

a. Lack of working capital: Equity providers in the social space

i. General Trade (comprising proprietor run brick and mortar

ii. Modern Trade (centrally regulated models like SPAR,

c. Challenges at the back end:

i. Almost all partner farmer producer companies (FPCs) of

3. Turnaround of SHPL (since 2013)

a. At the front end: SHPL has been able to make a mark on

SHPL expanded its operations to the National Capital Region

SHPL also trains and provides handholding support to partner

the Bharat Rural Livelihoods Foundation (BRLF) to assist and promote

3.1 Role of ﬁnancial institutions

Figure 2: Structure of organization, SHPL

Sales, Marketing, Finance and

Source: Company records

1. From founding partners and organizations who have been working

to positively impact farmers and the environment. SHPL trains

Table 1: SHPL’s stock across ﬁve categories

Spices Flavourings Millets

Red chilli (long, round, and Khandsari sugar, Barnyard, Kodo,

Figure 3: Increase in quantity of procurement,

Figure 4: Increase in value of procurement,

4.1.2 Residue testing of commodities

mentioned earlier, in many instances, ‘certiﬁed organic’ products do

4.1.3 Purchase of commodities

1. Pricing and procurement: Safe Harvest draws up a memorandum of

weighing mechanisms followed by Safe Harvest are transparent,

4.1.4 Post-harvest processes – milling and value addition

manage these activities. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, Safe Harvest

4.1.5 Case study of a typical partner

Figure 5: Growth in paddy procurement from JSMBT by SHPL

Source: Company records

Figure 6: Growth in paddy sales by JSMBT to SHPL

JSMBT is run by a 46-member team who hails from 23 villages –

Figure 7: JSMBT–SHPL procurement plan

SHPL JSMBT makes a FPC gets the Warehouse

Source: Based on interactions with JSMBT and SHPL staﬀ

logistics (for bags, transport, etc.) in advance to JSMBT. The price of

Figure 8: SHPL–JSMBT-farmer money and commodity chart

SHPL transfers JSMBT deposits the amount Farmer

SHPL requests JSMBT delivers paddy and

Source: Based on interactions with JSMBT and SHPL staﬀ

Some of the critical issues faced by JSMBT include:

• Farmers (about 15–20 per cent) reneging on the agreement and

Figure 9: External network of SHPL’s Hyderabad hub

Source: Company records

a. Transportation to the hub: Products from various FPCs across

returns the goods to the supplier, depending on the extent of

f. Inventory management: First in ﬁrst out (FIFO) is practised in

The material ﬂow in the hub is as depicted in Figure 10.

Figure 10: Material ﬂow in SHPL’s Hyderabad hub

Cocoon (minimum of 14 days)

Inventory (stock of 1.5 to 2 weeks)

Manual tables (cleaning of physical impurities)

Sales (Purchase order)