https://www.eastasiaforum.

org/2022/12/02/has-singapores-
tech-industry-got-talent/
Has Singapore’s tech industry got talent?
2 December 2022
Author: Faizal Bin Yahya, NUS

COVID-19 border closures disrupted Singapore’s connectivity with global

trading and business networks. Foreign professionals who had been
integrated into Singapore society for years returned to their home countries.

The political push to limit the number of foreign workers is also growing,
especially in the services sector. The sector’s Dependency Ratio Ceiling —
which determines the ratio of foreign to local workers in any company — had
been reduced from 38 to 35 per cent in January 2021.

Before the pandemic, Singapore’s strong economic fundamentals and

strategic location at the heart of Southeast Asia proved attractive to big tech
firms. During the US–China ‘tech cold war’ Singapore has continued to
pursue a strategy of openness and innovation.

But a survey by the human resources firm GlobalManpower ranked

Singapore as the third most talent-starved among forty countries, with 84 per
cent of companies in Singapore reporting talent shortages. Singapore’s
‘hubbing’ strategy to lure multinational companies has come under threat as
a result.

80 of the world’s top 100 tech firms are present in Singapore, increasing the
pressure on a shrinking pool of workers. Traditional tech firms such as
Google, IBM and Microsoft have been present in Singapore for several years,
while newer ones like Zoom, Twitter, Paypal, Tencent, Alibaba and ByteDance
have established operations in the city-state since the pandemic.

The then-minister in charge of the government’s Smart Nation Initiative,

Vivian Balakrishnan, highlighted that the information and communication
technology (ICT) sector will need another 60,000 workers by 2023.
But Singapore’s education system only produces 2,800 ICT graduates per
year — and only a third of Singapore’s tech workforce is local.

Meanwhile, Amazon Web Services estimates that Singapore will need 1.2
million additional digital workers by 2025. This mismatch of supply and
demand indicates that vacancies will continue to be mostly filled by
foreigners. Acknowledging that competition in the digital economy space will
intensify, Singapore introduced a new Tech Pass in January 2021 that allowed
established foreign tech entrepreneurs, leaders and experts to work in
Singapore.

Yet Singapore must balance its need for foreign talent with local unease
about the rate of hiring from abroad, especially in the professional services
positions that are sought after by locals.

Responding to voters’ concerns, the Singaporean government has introduced

several initiatives to nurture local talent, such as the Singapore Global
Executive Programme (SGEP) in its Budget 2022. One way in which the SGEP
supports local companies is by curating a career development journey for
their local staff.

In August 2022, the Minister of Manpower Tan See Leng introduced several
policy initiatives to strengthen Singapore’s position as a talent hub. One of
these is the Overseas Networks & Expertise (ONE) Pass, a 5-year work permit
to be implemented in January 2023. It also allows eligible applicants to work
for multiple companies in Singapore simultaneously.

The ONE Pass is available for employees earning at least S$30,000 (US$
21,000) per month or those with outstanding achievements in arts and
culture, sports, science and technology, or research and academia. For new
overseas candidates, the previous or prospective employer must have a
market capitalisation of US$500 million or an annual revenue of at least
US$200 million.

Unlike the Tech Pass which is meant exclusively for the tech sector, the ONE
Pass is applicable across industries. This was a response to requests from
other business sectors — such as sports and arts — for global talent.

This proactive recruitment strategy is meant to create a virtuous cycle of

economic development. The Singaporean government highlights that the
core of its economic development rests on the skills, knowledge and
creativity of its human capital. The ONE Pass is a key policy lever for this
offensive.

But global talent is in great demand, and Singapore’s own skilled

professionals are also leaving for greener pastures. In the 2022 Global Talent
Competitiveness Index Report, compiled by the INSEAD business school,
Singapore ranked sixth among 175 cities in attracting and developing talent.
Singapore had fallen behind San Francisco, Boston, Zurich, Seattle and
Lausanne.
The ONE Pass could help Singapore regain competitiveness in several ways.
Few locals would be competing in the employment categories it covers,
lessening scrutiny from voters. At the same time, the government will engage
the global talent recruited via the Pass as much as possible while they remain
in Singapore.

The ONE Pass is targeted towards recruiting global talent or ’rainmakers’

across all sectors and forms a key component of Singapore’s talent
recruitment strategy. These highly mobile professionals possess the
networks, deep skills, and expertise that will be essential ingredients in the
innovative economy that Singapore aspires to become. Businesses go where
the talent is, and talent goes where the businesses are. When a core of global
talent are embedded in its economy, Singapore will be able to attract the
best of both.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/08/12/taiwans-
pioneering-pathway-to-net-zero-carbon-emissions/

Taiwan’s pioneering pathway to net-zero carbon emissions

12 August 2023
Author: Darson Chiu, TIER

In 2022, Taiwan unveiled its ‘Pathway to Net-Zero Emissions in 2050’ plan,

which outlines four major transformations in energy, industry, lifestyle and
society. It also includes two essential governance foundations in technology
research and development (R&D) and climate legislation, supported by 12
key strategies.

These strategies encompass renewable sources (wind and solar, hydrogen,

innovative energy), energy systems (storage, savings and efficiency), de-
carbonisation (capture, sinks and carbon-free vehicles), zero waste, green
lifestyle, green finance and just transition.

To achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, Taiwan aims to increase the share of

renewables and natural gas in its energy mix to 20 per cent and 50 per cent
respectively, while reducing the share of coal to 30 per cent by 2025.

Implementing this pathway can contribute to sustainable growth in several

ways. First, it can serve as a model for other Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) member economies. Taiwan has long been an engaged
member of APEC, recognising the value of APEC’s non-binding and voluntary
framework as an ideal platform for facilitating knowledge exchange.

Most APEC economies have committed to achieving net-zero emissions by

2050. This collective commitment can foster the group’s leadership and
cooperation to tackle climate change effectively. By leading efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and promoting sustainable development, this
grouping — led by Taiwan’s example — can inspire and motivate others to
follow suit. Taiwan’s 12 key strategies cover a wider range of sustainability
indicators compared to other economies, so they can be used as a reference
for policy formulation.

The pathway’s emphasis on technology R&D will also drive innovation and
the creation of new technologies. Taiwan can use these advancements as a
bridge between developing and developed countries in APEC — supporting
their transition towards low-carbon and sustainable economies. Taiwan’s
impressive track record in innovation can also be leveraged to develop and
deploy low-carbon technologies and solutions.

Taiwan can also collaborate with like-minded APEC economies through

capacity building, information sharing and collaborative R&D. This can
enhance the capabilities of interested economies within the region to jointly
tackle climate change and advance sustainable development. Taking a
proactive stance in this space can contribute to the construction of a more
resilient and sustainable future for the entire region.

The United States is hosting the 2023 APEC meeting with the theme ‘Creating
a Resilient and Sustainable Future for All’, which centres around three key
priorities of interconnectedness, innovation and inclusiveness. These three
priorities are essential for achieving sustainable growth, as is the active
involvement of the United States.

Interconnectedness emphasises the importance of collaboration among

APEC economies in tackling common challenges, including climate change.
Innovation is critical for developing new technologies and solutions that can
effectively reduce carbon emissions and promote sustainable growth.
Inclusiveness ensures that the benefits of sustainable growth are shared by
all, regardless of their social or economic status.

The United States has also committed to achieving net-zero emissions by

2050. President Joe Biden’s administration has proposed significant
investments in infrastructure, clean energy and R&D, which can drive
innovation and support the transition to a low-carbon economy.

Hosting the 2023 APEC meeting presents a unique opportunity for the United
States to showcase its dedication to sustainable growth and to cultivate
collaboration among APEC economies to address the challenge of climate
change. Through initiatives and policies that prioritise environmental
sustainability, innovation and inclusivity, the United States can harness its
economic leadership to propel sustainable growth forward and construct a
resilient and sustainable future that benefits all stakeholders involved in the
APEC region.

Taiwan’s commitment to net-zero emissions makes it a key player in terms of

realising the priorities of APEC 2023. By focussing on sustainable growth, de-
carbonisation and global collaboration, Taiwan’s pathway aligns well with
APEC’s objectives of promoting sustainable growth and reducing carbon
emissions.

The pathway’s broad range of strategies, including energy transition, circular

economy and disaster risk reduction, represents a crucial step towards
sustainable growth. Adopting Taiwan’s strategy on a regional level can help
APEC economies effectively collaborate to combat climate change, fostering
an environment conducive to inclusive and innovative solutions.
Recognising that climate change is a global issue that necessitates collective
action, the pathway urges APEC economies to collaborate in sharing
knowledge, expertise and best practices. For example, Taiwan organised the
‘APEC Forum on Creating New Employment Opportunities in the Era of Net-
Zero Economy’ in May 2023, with the aim of jointly exploring economic
incentives for net-zero carbon emissions with like-minded APEC economies.

The pathway also aligns with APEC 2023’s inclusiveness priority by promoting
sustainable development across various sectors of the economy and society.
Taiwan’s pathway provides a reference point for APEC economies to tackle
climate change and achieve sustainable growth in their own contexts.

The pathway’s emphasis on technology R&D can fuel innovation and create
new low-carbon technologies and solutions, aligning it well with APEC 2023’s
innovation priority. For example, smart grids are transforming the global
energy market, and Taiwan has been adopting and working on improving
this technology to enhance energy efficiency, decrease reliance on fossil fuels
and promote renewable energy integration. Leveraging Taiwan’s
technological expertise and capabilities, the pathway presents a valuable
opportunity to advance low-carbon and sustainable economies.

Taiwan’s pathway encompasses a comprehensive strategy that aligns with

the objectives of APEC 2023. By promoting collaboration, innovation,
inclusiveness and sustainable development, Taiwan can assume a leading
role in constructing a more resilient and sustainable future for all.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/04/02/averting-fiscal-
crisis-in-laos/

Averting fiscal crisis in Laos

2 April 2022
Author: Souknilanh Keola, IDE-JETRO

Lao Prime Minister Phankham Viphavanh took office in March 2021,

inheriting an economy with decelerating growth since 2017 as well as the
impacts of COVID-19. Between 2001 and 2016, the country’s
average GDP growth rate was around 7.3 per cent. This fell below 7 per
cent in 2017 and continued to decrease to around 5.4 per cent in 2019.

The previous administration made the unprecedented decision to revise the

growth target of the eighth five-year plan, 2016-2020, down three times
from 7.2 per cent to 6.9 per cent, 6.3 per cent and finally 5.5 per cent. The
official growth rate in 2020 was 3.3 per cent, although estimates by several
international financial institutions were closer to zero per cent.

Laos set its growth target assuming an Incremental Capital Output Ratio of
four. This means that investment of about 30 per cent of GDP every year is
needed to generate about 7 per cent annual growth. This could be easily
achieved by investing in a government-led mega project when GDP was in
the low billions in the early 2000s. It became significantly harder to address
when GDP grew to US$16 billion in 2016.

The decelerating growth trend is unlikely to be reversed unless new

strategies are devised which rely less on mega projects. In the meantime, the
government has set the growth target of the ninth five-year plan, 2021-2025,
to 4 per cent in response to the downwards trend and the impacts of COVID-
19.

Concerns about the Lao government’s inability to service its expanding

external debt, particularly related to its multi-billion dollar highspeed railway
and domestic hydroelectric powerplants, started to appear around mid-
2020. Later reports on the liquidation of the majority of the national power
grid confirmed the seriousness of the debt problem. Concern was already
widespread, and the new administration has made it clear that the mounting
debt pressure is a matter of national urgency.

In his first speech at the national assembly, Viphavanh declared fiscal and
economic difficulties a national agenda item. Reducing external debt ratio to
GDP to no more than 55.4 per cent by 2023 was among the critical but very
ambitious targets set in this national agenda. While some are sceptical about
the ability of the new administration to carry out reform, there are reasons
to believe that things may be different this time.

Viphavanh declared that he would not wait until the end of his term to see
results. The major policy cycle in Laos is traditionally based on a five-year
plan. Any cabinet minister can wait until the end of the term to reveal if the
major targets were achieved and leave without having to deal with the
consequences. Viphavanh has set the time frame for this national agenda to
the end of 2023, about two and half years after taking the office.

There have been numerous reforms to government expenditure and

revenue raising. Tax revenue for some items increased several folds after the
introduction of an online tax payment system. Under this new system,
obscurity arising from direct interaction between officers and taxpayers can
be prevented.

Viphavanh also announced that no one, including himself, would be allowed

to retain their official car after leaving office. This has reduced the number of
official cars and will limit the amount spent on the fixed and operating costs
of expensive official vehicles. Even under continuing difficulties of Covid-19,
the fiscal deficit is projected to slightly shrink to 4.7 per cent in 2021 due to
improved revenue collection and lower spending.

The speed of debt accumulation is expected to slow down substantially

because of the lower growth target. The government’s growth strategy is to
secure the investment needed to achieve the growth target defined at the
beginning of each five-year plan. Since the 2000s, about 30 per cent of GDP is
usually set as the necessary investment target to achieve 6-7 per cent annual
growth. This was manageable in 2005 when the Lao economy was
about US$2.5 billion.

In 2015, when Lao GDP was three times larger, this strategy was no longer
feasible, especially because viable investment opportunities outside resource
sectors are limited. The average growth target for the next five years has
been set at 4 per cent, while the investment needed to achieve this is
about 19 per cent of GDP, or US$3.6 billion a year.

The national budget, official development assistance and private investment

are expected to account for 11 per cent, 18 percent and 49 per cent of the
total investment respectively. The lower growth target will reduce the
pressure on the government to venture into difficult and risky investments.

There are expected benefits arising from improved connectivity with China
since the highspeed railway started operation in December 2021. The
emergence of deepened relations with China is an unprecedented economic
opportunity for landlocked Laos, historically distant from global markets. But
the benefits of increased connectivity are not guaranteed as the national
urgency surrounding debt is far from over. There is also the risk that reliance
on China may compromise the political independence of Vientiane.

Whether increased connectivity will deliver benefits will depend on how the
railway and parallel expressways are operated, managed and utilised.
Reducing the debt burden will not happen without the progression of the
proposed national agenda. The uphill battle continues, although the
prospects are getting a little brighter for now.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/01/11/relaying-the-
asean-baton-from-cambodia-to-indonesia/

Relaying the ASEAN baton from Cambodia to Indonesia

11 January 2023
Author: Sharon Seah, ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute

Cambodia assumed the ASEAN chair in 2022 with the theme ‘ASEAN ACT:
Addressing Challenges Together’. Act, it certainly did. The chair started with
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s high-profile visit to Myanmar’s capital
Naypyidaw in January. But Myanmar’s problems proved difficult to crack —
even with a leader typically sympathetic to enforcing state control.

2022 quickly spiralled with challenging international crises beyond ASEAN’s

control. To Cambodia’s credit, ASEAN deftly steered itself through politically
turbulent waters. The war in Ukraine saw divergent positions of member
states as ASEAN came under intense pressure for its weak stance on Ukraine.

ASEAN eventually released the ASEAN–EU commemorative statement — in

which ‘most members strongly condemned the war in Ukraine’. Despite its
perceived closeness with Russia and China, Cambodia’s national
position evolved from refusing to take sides to Hun Sen taking a phone
call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.

The issue of Taiwan was a new litmus test for ASEAN unity on an issue that
the group would prefer never to discuss openly. Yet again, Cambodia
persuaded its fellow members to agree to a stand-alone statement that
firmly reiterated support for member states’ respective one-China policies.

Timor Leste’s provisional admission to ASEAN — an issue debated within the

group for over a decade — can be counted as a feather in Cambodia’s cap.
Though many expected that Indonesia would be the chair to announce
admission for Timor Leste, Cambodia’s tenacity in pushing for a resolution
helped clear the way.

There was no question of ASEAN’s convening power as the ASEAN summitry

season opened. The ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional
Forum and ASEAN Defence Ministerial Meeting Plus continued to draw the
usual slate of luminaries. Cambodia scored one up with Ukraine signing onto
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. A comprehensive
strategic partnership with the United States and India balanced the ASEAN–
China and ASEAN–Australia comprehensive strategic partnerships that were
awarded a year ago. Here again, ASEAN appeared to deliver a balance of
power.

Economically, 2022 was more of an ‘upgrade’ year than one with new
innovative deliverables. Under the Cambodian chair, ASEAN concluded the
ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Agreement upgrade and started
negotiations to update the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement. This will
ensure that both agreements remain relevant, modern and responsive to
regional and global developments.

ASEAN also launched negotiations for the ASEAN Framework Agreement on

Competition to facilitate the creation of a fair and competitive business
environment. It also ran a feasibility study for a new Digital Economic
Framework Agreement which will help ASEAN leapfrog into the new digital
economy.

Indonesia will take over chairing a regional grouping that is navigating

through an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. Existing
challenges like recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic and handling the
Myanmar crisis are being exacerbated by heightened US–China rivalry, the
Russia–Ukraine war, rising energy prices, volatile food security, inflationary
pressures and fears of recession. ASEAN’s ability to coalesce as a group
seems to grow weaker with each succeeding crisis.

Indonesia’s performance will be partly evaluated by how well it manages the

Myanmar crisis. From the early days of shuttle diplomacy to crafting a
regional response, it appears that Indonesia’s adoption of a
relatively hardened position towards the Myanmar military junta will
continue. Thailand’s convening of an ‘open-ended consultative meeting’ not
only undermined the incoming chair but may have also deepened the divide
within ASEAN over the Myanmar issue. Indonesia has decided to establish
an Office of the Special Envoy to Myanmar, in a move that is indicative of an
intent to pour more resources and manpower into addressing the problem.

Riding on the success of Indonesia’s G20 presidency, performance

expectations for Indonesia are high. Indonesia’s new theme ‘ASEAN Matters:
Epicentrum of Growth’ means that economic deliverables will be its
mainstay. Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, Airlangga
Hartarto, explained that the theme is made up of three elements —
strengthening ASEAN’s capacity and effectiveness, unity and centrality. The
focus on growth points to health architecture, energy security, food security
and financial stability. The economic focus will be translated into 16 priority
economic deliverables on recovery and rebuilding, digital economy and
sustainability.

Indonesia will likely also focus on operationalising the ASEAN Outlook on the
Indo-Pacific (AOIP) — a concept initiated by Indonesia but saw little progress
after 2019. Mainstreaming the AOIP’s key areas of maritime cooperation,
connectivity, UN Sustainable Development Goals and economic alongside
other areas of cooperation will be a priority.

The operationalisation of the AOIP is a response to the proliferation of

different Indo-Pacific strategies by its external partners. It can actively project
ASEAN centrality back into the regional security architecture. The AOIP is the
only Indo-Pacific concept that is acceptable to every ASEAN dialogue partner.
Even China, which does not acknowledge the concept of an Indo-Pacific, does
not object to the AOIP.

Given that trade and economics remain at the centre of Indonesia’s chair
theme, ASEAN would be well served if Indonesia were to harmonise the
different trade pacts together. These include the Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework for Prosperity.

Indonesia, one of the more mature democracies in the region, can play a
crucial role in influencing ASEAN’s normative development. ASEAN’s current
visioning exercise for a post-2025 ASEAN Community could benefit from
Indonesia’s co-chair with permanent chair Malaysia. With a risk-averse
outgoing president and upcoming 2024 general elections, Indonesia may not
take the kind of extra-regional bold foreign policy decisions that we expect to
see but it will carry out priorities of the chair.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/12/17/nepals-eroding-
judicial-independence-leaves-supreme-court-in-limbo/

Nepal’s eroding judicial independence leaves Supreme Court

in limbo
17 December 2021
Author: Bikram Timilsina, Griffith University

Nepal’s Supreme Court is in crisis due to unprecedented protest from its

justices and lawyers. Despite over a month of protests demanding the
resignation of Chief Justice Cholendra Shumsher JB Rana, Rana has refused
to step down. But nor have the political parties filed a motion of
impeachment against him.

This is not the first time that Nepal’s Supreme Court has confronted a crisis.
In May 2017, Nepal’s first female Chief Justice, Sushila Karki, was suspended
after two main political parties filed an impeachment motion. The key
reasons behind Karki’s suspension were her strong stance against
corruption, Supreme Court rulings against the government’s appointment of
a police chief and decision to provide amnesty to the Maoist leader
Balkrishna Dhungel.

This suggests that political parties are willing to interfere if the judiciary is
acting against their interests, but not to preserve judicial independence and
integrity. It has been argued that the erosion of judicial independence has
increased in Nepal in recent years due to increased politicisation in the
appointment procedures of the Justices.

Rana has been accused of having connections with politicians to secure

appointments of his people in the cabinet and constitutional bodies. He is
also accused of encouraging and being involved in corruption.

A Supreme Court panel led by Justice Hari Krishna Karki submitted a report
to the chief justice on 29 July 2021 which stated that corruption and
irregularities are rampant in Nepal’s judiciary. It also recommended an
automated system for designating the benches in the Supreme Court,
instead of putting it in the jurisdiction of the chief justice. Since, the chief
justice has faced tremendous pressure to institute reforms.
Gajendra Hamal, Rana’s brother-in-law, was appointed as a cabinet minister
on 8 October 2021. After some controversy, Hamal resigned on 10 October,
but this did little to correct things.

On 25 October, 14 out of 19 Justices boycotted the full court meeting called

by the chief justice. All justices refused to hear any case except for a few
habeas corpus petitions. The Nepal Bar Association started protests in the
Supreme Court seeking Rana’s resignation. Although justices have now
returned to their benches after over a month, they have said that they
would not share the benches with the chief justice. Hundreds of lawyers have
also protested demanding Rana’s resignation.

Rana recently admitted to making deals with KP Sharma Oli, former prime
minister of Nepal, to secure appointments of several of his people in an
interview. In addition, several of Rana’s past rulings have aroused
controversy. This includes reducing the sentence of Ranjan Koirala, Deputy
Inspector General of the Nepal Police, to only eight years despite the fact that
he was serving a life sentence for killing his wife.

Apart from a few leaders speaking in personal capacities to ask for the chief
justice to resign, the ruling party leaders have kept silent about Rana. They
are reluctant to impeach him for two reasons: the ruling alliance lacks a two-
third majority, and the parties fear that the secrecy of their deals with the
Supreme Court may be revealed. Though some party leaders stated that
political steps may be taken if the judiciary is unable to resolve the crisis on
its own, no breakthrough appears imminent.

The next federal election that will elect a new parliament is more than a year
away. The impeachment motion could be passed with the support of the
opposition party. But the opposition has already suggested that it will not
support any act against Rana.

The International Commission of Jurists, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty

International have all asked for the crisis to be resolved — saying that it
has jeopardised the independence and integrity of the Nepalese judiciary.

With Rana as chief justice, the notion of the separation of powers — an

important component of liberal democracy — has been seriously hampered.
As several of his rulings have caused controversies and most of his own
colleagues are not ready to support him as the chief justice, Rana lacks
integrity to remain in the post.

Rana remaining as Nepal’s Chief Justice is against the constitutional

provisions of independent judiciary and separation of powers. He either
needs to resign immediately or the political parties should reach a consensus
to impeach him to protect the sanctity of the system of independent judiciary
in Nepal.

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/09/26/international-
cooperation-needed-to-fight-jihadism-in-the-maldives/
International cooperation needed to fight jihadism in the
Maldives
26 September 2015
Author: Iromi Dharmawardhane, RSIS

Jihadist activity and Islamic radicalism have been visibly growing in the past
decade in the Maldives, traditionally a religiously-relaxed Muslim country.
The Maldives experienced a terrorist attack in 2007, which wounded 12
foreigners, just prior to the inauguration of President Mohamed Nasheed.
During Nasheed’s time in office there was a huge increase in violent
extremism and a spread of radical ideology among the population. The
present administration of Abdulla Yameen Abdul Gayoom is now grappling
with an increasing number of Maldivians participating in transnational
terrorist activity and an actively radicalised community.

The exact number of Maldivians fighting for terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq
today is not known, but various reports estimate it at over 100. It is known
that at least seven Maldivians have died in Syria and Iraq to date. Fighters
have included students, those convicted or accused of terrorism-related or
other crimes in the Maldives, religious figures and former military personnel.
In 2015, departures to Syria have mostly been young men who belong to
criminal gangs in Male, the Maldives capital. Maldivian jihadists travel via Sri
Lanka, India or Thailand (popular holiday destinations), before heading to
Pakistan for training or to Turkey to cross into Syria.

Most Maldivian fighters have joined the al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra

(JN) terrorist group, although others also fight for the Islamic State of Iraq
and Greater Syria (ISIS) and other groups. The Islamic State of Maldives (ISM)
group, which claims to be a local affiliate of ISIS, emerged in July 2014.

While the youth, who make up 60 per cent of the population, are more
socially liberal, there is a growing radicalised community in the Maldives. On
5 September 2014, there was a protest conducted by about 200 people,
some carrying ISIS flags, calling for the full implementation of Sharia law and
an end to secular rule in the Maldives.

Radicalisation and recruitment of Maldivians to fight in Syria occurs both

online and offline, and is conducted in conjunction with fundraising for
radical groups. On the ground, there is a Maldivian network of recruiters that
works with the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Pakistan and operatives in India, as
well as other terrorist groups. Radicalisation also occurs as a result of jihadist
preaching carried out in certain mosques in the Maldives.

The high level of internet penetration in the Maldives (about 43 per cent of
the population), makes its population of active social media users susceptible
to the radical jihadist ideologies propagated online. Extremist Maldivian
NGOs and radical Maldivian preachers have thousands — some, tens of
thousands — of supporters on Facebook, their primary online medium of
communication. Both groups have a presence across the social media
platform on Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Flickr and other sites.
There are also dedicated websites such as Haqqu, launched in August 2014,
which promote ISIS. The website of Bilad Al-Sham Media (BASM), which
started in August 2013, supports al Qaeda-affiliated JN. BASM calls itself the
official media representative of Maldivians fighting in Syria and has produced
detailed accounts of Maldivians who have died while conducting suicide
attacks for JN. BASM and Haqqu also have active Facebook pages.

The Maldives is a fertile ground for jihadist recruitment despite its

geographical remoteness and small population. Maldivians have also been
recruited for other transnational suicide terrorist attacks. Notably, the 27
May 2009 attack on Pakistan’s intelligence service in Lahore was carried-out
by the Maldivian jihadist Ali Jaleel. Two Maldivians were also reportedly
recruited as suicide bombers for the foiled plot to attack the US and Israeli
consulates in southern India in April 2014.

As such, the growth of jihadism in the Maldives is a serious security concern,

particularly for India and other South Asian countries. But organised terrorist
networks operating inside the Maldives and grassroots radicalisation are
both relatively recent phenomena, emerging only in the past decade. Thus
these phenomena can potentially be fully reversed. A further reason for
optimism lies in the fact the Islam practised in the Maldives has historically
been moderate and holistic, introduced as it was in the 12th century by a
Persian Sheikh and a Sufi saint.

The Maldivian government has recently taken some decisive counter-

terrorism measures, but more comprehensive action is needed. Counter-
extremism measures must be increased substantially in islands with
radicalised communities. There must be an immediate crack-down on
criminal gangs, particularly radicalised gangs, many of which are connected
to transnational drug cartels.

A national counter-ideology program conducted online and on the ground

with community support is urgently needed to re-popularise moderate and
true Islam. Comprehensive terrorist and extremist rehabilitation programs
are needed, especially for radicalised gang members and returning fighters.

But the Maldives, a 1200-island archipelago scattered across about 90,000

square kilometres of the Indian Ocean, with its limited resources, cannot
achieve all this alone. A joint effort is required to dismantle regional jihadist
and drug-trafficking networks. Regional and international aid and
cooperation are required to address the country’s counter-extremism needs
and socio-economic issues.

There is an on-going international call to boycott the tourism industry of the

Maldives, due to the present government’s alleged violations of international
law and domestic political complications. But a boycott of its tourist industry
would inflict great suffering, since tourism is the main source of income and
employs approximately 50 per cent of the labour force. A substantial
decrease in tourism would further increase the already-high youth
unemployment rate and in turn increase their level of radicalisation.
It is clear that as a young democracy and a developing country, the Maldives
needs help, not isolation, to stem the proliferation of radicalism and
jihadism.
https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/11/06/bhutans-decisive-
response-to-covid-19/

Bhutan’s decisive response to COVID-19

6 November 2020
Author: Mark Turner, UNSW Canberra

Landlocked and inextricably linked to India (the country with the second
most COVID-19 cases in the world), neighbouring Bhutan’s chances of
avoiding the ravages of the pandemic appeared slim. But on 6 November
2020, the government reported only 358 cases, 333 recovered and no
deaths. The country’s performance in dealing with COVID-19 has been hailed
‘commendable’ by the World Health Organization (WHO).

The leadership triumvirate of the Prime Minister, Health Minister and King
played a major role in this success story. Prime Minister Lotay Tshering is a
physician and Health Minister Dechen Wangmo has a long history in public
health. They based their policy responses on science and both understand
what is required for effective disease control. Their rapid and well-informed
decision-making was strongly supported by the King, who has been highly
visible and vocal in backing the messages from Tshering and Wangmo.

Leadership needs to be complemented by good management for COVID-19

measures to be effective and the government’s speed of action is notable.
When the first case — a US tourist — was identified on 6 March, government
officials immediately restricted entry for foreign visitors. And when a woman
who had been released from quarantine tested positive on 10 August,
officials promptly initiated a national lockdown and contact tracing.

Bhutan exercised maximum effort to prevent community transmission. The

country has recorded a high rate of testing. Tests and quarantine facilities
are free, which encourages people to come forward for testing or present
themselves for quarantine.

Other evidence of good management was the chartering of planes and the
rapid establishment of quarantine facilities for returning Bhutanese citizens,
and the quick announcement of loans and relief measures. The army was
recruited to assist in the construction of living quarters for returning
Bhutanese citizens who are normally residents across the border in the
Indian town of Jaigaon.

Communication from the government is consistently clear, concise and

authoritative. There are daily updates, contact numbers and other specific
information for citizens, government agencies and would-be travellers. High
levels of trust in government and a record of compliance with government
directives aided efforts to contain the virus.

Preparedness was another important feature of Bhutan’s COVID-19

response. The foundation was the country’s universal health care system,
which facilitated timely diagnosis and treatment. The system’s logistics and
supply chains also enabled greater security, efficiency and the dissemination
of equipment needed for the prevention and containment of the virus. A
National Preparedness and Response Plan, for instance, was drafted in
February 2020. And in November 2019, with uncanny prescience, the WHO
and Health Ministry conducted a simulation exercise at Paro Airport — the
country’s only international air gateway — to deal with the arrival of persons
infected with a new strain of coronavirus.

Community strength is the final element in Bhutan’s effective COVID-19

response, with the King, government and community acting in concert. The
King demonstrated concern and fulfilled his traditional role as monarch by
distributing kidu (wellbeing), a system involving the royal provision of
resources to the needy. In the case of COVID-19, kidu came in the form of
income support to 23,000 individuals. Members of parliament donated one
month’s salary, hoteliers offered premises for quarantine, businesses
donated cash and farmers donated food.

Several thousand desuups (guardians of peace), members of a volunteer

organisation established by the previous King in 2011, also played an
important role. Easily identifiable by their orange uniform and trained in
disaster relief, desuups could be seen patrolling the southern border,
ensuring compliance with lockdown, helping medical staff, delivering
essential supplies and more. They were representative of a national belief
that managing COVID-19 is a civic responsibility.

But there is a downside — the economy. Bhutan has a strong record

of sustained economic growth and welfare improvement but the pandemic
measures are having a damaging impact. Compared to a respectable 4.4 per
cent growth rate in 2019, the latest estimate from Bhutan’s Finance Minister
for 2020 is negative 2.1 per cent.

The industry most affected is tourism, the country’s largest source of

revenue after hydropower. Sealing the borders shut down the tourist
industry overnight, affecting 50,000 workers. They comprise 16 per cent of
the economically active population and their loss of livelihood is estimated to
have adversely affected 150,000 people in a country of 750,000. The demise
of the tourist industry is contributing to a steep decline in government
revenue.
Some additional funds to plug the fiscal gap were raised through Bhutan’s
first government bond offering and the welcome rise in electricity export
sales — up 14 per cent as of August 2020. But there are further hold-ups for
the already delayed work on new hydropower projects as well as
construction work more generally. Despite additional aid from donors, the
government was forced to review and ‘reprioritise’ activities in the 12th Five
Year Plan (2018–2023). There is also talk of diversifying the economy and
increasing mineral exports. Such measures will take time. Meanwhile,
unemployment — particularly for youth — continues to rise.

The general view is that there is ‘a long way to recovery’. But it could have
been much longer without effective COVID-19 containment measures.
South Korea says it expressed concern to China for sending North Korean escapees back home | AP
News

South Korea says it expressed concern to

China for sending North Korean escapees back
home

1 of 2 |

FILE - North Korean defectors and human right activists stage a rally demanding Chinese government to release
North Korean defectors captured in China, near the Chinese Embassy in Seoul, South Korea on Sept. 22, 2023.
South Korea on Friday, Oct. 13, 2023 said it had expressed its concerns to China after assessing that it recently
returned a “large number” of North Koreans, including escapees, back to their homeland. (AP Photo/Ahn Young-
joon, File)

Read More

2 of 2 |
FILE - North Korean defectors and human rights activists stage a rally demanding Chinese government to release
North Korean defectors captured in China, near the Chinese Embassy in Seoul, South Korea on Sept. 22, 2023.
South Korea on Friday, Oct. 13, 2023 said it had expressed its concerns to China after assessing that it recently
returned a “large number” of North Koreans, including escapees, back to their homeland. The signs read “Stop
repatriation of North Korean defectors to North Korea.” (AP Photo/Ahn Young-joon, File)

Read More
BY KIM TONG-HYUNG
Updated 11:56 AM GMT+8, October 13, 2023
Share
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korea on Friday said it had expressed its
concerns to China after assessing that it recently returned a “large number” of North
Koreans, including escapees, back to their homeland.

Koo Byoungsam, spokesperson of South Korea’s Unification Ministry, which handles

inter-Korean affairs, said Seoul did not have information on the exact number of
North Koreans repatriated from northeast China or how many of them were
“escapees, medical patients or criminals.”

His comments followed several media reports based on activist sources that alleged
China recently returned hundreds of escapees back to North Korea where they would
face the risk of persecution and harsh treatment.
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“It appears to be true that a large number of North Koreans were repatriated to North
Korea from China’s three northeastern provinces,” Koo said. “(Our) government’s
position is that there should be no circumstances in which North Koreans living
abroad would be forcibly repatriated back home against their will.”

Koo said Seoul “sternly raised the issue with the Chinese side” but did not specify
how it communicated its concerns.

Human rights activists had warned that Chinese repatriations of North Korean
escapees could increase as North Korea slowly reopens its borders after a prolonged
COVID-19 shutdown. Some activist groups believe that the number of North Koreans
detained as “illegal immigrants” in China could exceed 2,000.

When asked about the alleged repatriations of North Koreans on Thursday, Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin did not confirm the reports but said
Beijing has been “properly” handling North Koreans who illegally entered the country
based on “relevant domestic laws, international law and humanitarian principles.”

Citing an activist account, the Human Rights Watch in a report on Thursday alleged
that China this week used several vehicle convoys to forcibly return more than 500
people who had escaped North Korea. The group said most of the returnees were
women and expressed concerns that they were at “grave risk” of being detained in
forced labor camps, and potentially face torture and other violence.
https://www.adb.org/news/indonesia-s-
economic-growth-slow-2020-covid-19-
impact-gradual-recovery-expected-2021
Indonesia’s Economic Growth to Slow in
2020 on COVID-19 Impact, but Gradual
Recovery Expected in 2021


News Release | 03 April 2020

Read time: 3 mins
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JAKARTA, INDONESIA (3 April 2020) — Indonesia’s economy is expected to

grow by 2.5% in 2020 amid the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19)
pandemic, down from 5.0% in 2019, according to an Asian Development Bank
(ADB) report released today.

“Despite Indonesia’s strong macroeconomic fundamentals, the COVID-19

outbreak has changed the course of the economy, with the external
environment deteriorating and domestic demand weakening,” said ADB’s
Country Director for Indonesia Winfried Wicklein. “If decisive actions to
contain the health and economic impacts of the outbreak, particularly to
safeguard the poor and vulnerable, can be effectively implemented, the
economy is expected to gradually return to its growth trajectory next year.”
According to ADB’s flagship annual economic publication, Asian Development
Outlook (ADO) 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic, along with lower commodity
prices and volatile financial markets, will have severe implications for the
global economy and Indonesia this year, with the country’s key trading
partners expecting negative impacts on their economies. Domestic demand is
expected to weaken, as business and consumer sentiment wanes. As the
global economy recovers next year, Indonesia’s growth is expected to gain
momentum, with recently introduced investment reforms providing additional
impetus.

Inflation, which averaged 2.8% last year, is forecast to edge up to 3.0% in

2020, before declining to 2.8% in 2021. Inflationary pressure from tight food
supplies and currency depreciation is expected to be partially offset by lower
prices for non-subsidized fuel, as well as additional subsidies for electricity and
food. Meanwhile, export earnings from tourism and commodities are forecast
to decline, putting the current account deficit at 2.9% of gross domestic
product in 2020. As exports and investment resume in 2021, higher volumes of
imported capital goods will keep the current account deficit at the same level
as 2020.

The government and financial authorities have deployed well-coordinated,

targeted fiscal and monetary measures to mitigate the impact of the COVID-
19 pandemic on the economy and people’s livelihoods. These measures
include timely disbursement of social transfers for the poor and vulnerable, as
well as tax cuts and loan-payment relief for workers and businesses.

Externally, risks to Indonesia’s economic outlook include an extended

outbreak of COVID-19, further declines in commodity prices, and increased
finance market volatility. Domestically, the outlook will depend on how quickly
and effectively the spread of the pandemic can be contained. Constraints in
the health-care system, along with the challenges of imposing social
distancing, could worsen the impact on the economy.

ADB is committed to achieving a prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and

sustainable Asia and the Pacific, while sustaining its efforts to eradicate
extreme poverty. Established in 1966, it is owned by 68 members—49 from
the region.