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Disenchantment and the Environmental Crisis: Lynn White Jr., Max Weber,
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DOI: 10.1163/15685357-01603004

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 WORLDVIEWS

Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 brill.com/wo

Disenchantment and the Environmental Crisis:

Lynn White Jr., Max Weber, and Muhammad Iqbal

Ahmed Afzaal
Assistant Professor, Religion Department, Concordia College
901 8th St S, Moorhead MN 56562, USA
afzaal@cord.edu

Abstract
“The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” by Lynn White Jr. poses specific challenges to
Islamic metaphysics and theology that have yet to be adequately addressed by Muslim
scholars. I argue that the transition from a panentheistic view of God to an increasingly
supernaturalist one is indicative of a larger shift in worldview that White had failed to
emphasize. Reading White’s essay in light of Weber and Iqbal, I argue that a worldview
dominated by rational thought is consistent with supernatural theism. The challenges posed
by White’s essay can be met through Iqbal’s postmodern reconstruction of Islamic theology
in panentheistic terms.

Keywords
Lynn White Jr., Max Weber, Muhammad Iqbal, Islam, ecology, disenchantment

1. Introduction: Islamic Tradition and the Ecological Crisis1

The purpose of my paper is to present the outlines of an Islamic response to

the ecological crisis by engaging the works of Lynn White Jr., Max Weber,
and Muhammad Iqbal. I begin by reinterpreting White’s essay on “The
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis” with the aim of highlighting the
role of worldviews in determining the plausibility and significance of
beliefs, pointing out that the transition from a panentheistic view of God to

1) I am grateful to Dr. David Johnston, whose probing questions compelled me to develop

a clearer articulation of my views; and to my colleagues in the Religion department at
Concordia College for the insightful comments they offered on an earlier draft of this paper.
I would also like to thank Dr. Laurel Kearns (Drew University), whose course on “Religion
and the Earth” in the fall of 1999 was the context for my original encounter with Lynn
White Jr. This paper would not have been written without her persistent support and
encouragement.
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI 10.1163/15685357-01603004
240 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262

an increasingly supernaturalist view signifies the more general shift from

the traditional to the modern worldview. Drawing upon the insights of Max
Weber and Muhammad Iqbal, I argue that a close relationship exists
between these two theological models and the human experiences of
enchantment and disenchantment, respectively. With reference to Iqbal’s
postmodern reconstruction of the Qur’anic deity in panentheistic terms,
I suggest that this can form the basis of an effective Islamic response to the
metaphysical and theological challenges that White’s essay poses for the
Islamic tradition.
Partly because White’s 1967 essay focuses on Christianity, most of the
religious responses to his critique have come from Christian theologians
and ethicists. Yet, the particular beliefs that White finds ecologically prob-
lematic are not unique to Christianity; insofar as similar beliefs are found in
the Islamic tradition, his thesis can be applied to Islam as well.2 Despite the
obvious Islamic relevance of White’s critique, however, there has been rela-
tively little effort on the part of Muslim scholars to face the specific chal-
lenges that his critique poses vis-à-vis Islamic theology and metaphysics.3

2) Even though White does not mention Islam as being responsible for creating the modern
world and for contributing to the ecological crisis, it does not take too big a leap to make that
connection. Islamic monotheism has come to dominate in the Middle East and large areas
of Africa and Asia, and this has frequently come about at the expense of various animistic
forms of indigenous traditions. Furthermore, Islamic cultures have typically developed in
close association with Jewish and Christian traditions, and all three of them have been thor-
oughly soaked in the Greek heritage. An Islamicist notes: “Islam cannot deny its own foun-
dations and live; and in its foundations we have seen that Islam belongs to and is an integral
part of the larger Western society. It is the complement and counterbalance to European
civilization, nourished at the same springs, breathing the same air” (Gibb 1932: 376). Only a
few years after White’s essay, Arnold Toynbee published a similar critique of monotheism,
entitled “The Religious Background of the Present Environmental Crisis” (1971). Toynbee
notes that Judaism and Islam are considerably more uncompromising in their stress on
monotheism than Christianity, for the latter is alone in diluting “its monotheism by giving
God the Father two associates and equals in God the Son and God the Holy Spirit” (Toynbee
1971: 144). If this analysis is to be accepted, the greater stress on God’s unity in the Islamic
tradition makes it more, rather than less, susceptible to White and Toynbee’s ecological
critique.
3) By saying this, I am not suggesting that contemporary Muslim scholars have been indif-
ferent to the ecological crisis. There is a growing body of both scholarly and popular writings
that emphasizes Islam’s eco-friendly heritage and offer creative ways of putting that heritage
into practice; cf., Nasr 1968; Pervez 1984; Haq 2001; Foltz, Denny, & Baharuddin 2003; Abdul-
Matin 2010; etc. There is no doubt, however, that there is an urgent need to expand the
discussion on the ecological relevance of Islamic teachings. Contemporary attitudes
toward science and technology in countries with sizeable Muslim populations are hardly
distinguishable from ecologically destructive attitudes found in the more industrialized,
Western nations. While concerns about the negative influence of secular modernity and
 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 241

Instead of a self-critical engagement with White’s critique, much of the

Muslim contribution to the religion and ecology discussion has taken the
form of reproducing relevant religious doctrines and reasserting juristic and
ethical imperatives. While this work is not without value, its credibility and
reach are limited by its apologetic tone as well as by its reluctance to take
seriously the discoveries of modern science and philosophy. Ultimately,
this approach is ineffective on a wider scale primarily for one reason―it
fails to recognize the uniqueness of the modern condition.4
In any religious tradition, practical attitudes are closely intertwined with
beliefs, and both of these are inevitably expressed within the linguistic and
cognitive frameworks that the reigning worldview allows. By “worldview,”
I mean the subconscious matrix of unacknowledged presuppositions that
permeate an entire society or epoch at any given point in history.5 Part of
the reason that traditional morality does not function organically in mod-
ern societies is that the worldview associated with that morality has lost
much of its taken-for-granted quality. The same phenomenon also gener-
ates a serious predicament for religious faith. Within the linguistic and
cognitive frameworks that the modern worldview allows, many of the tra-
ditional channels of faith―beliefs, symbols, and metaphors―are no lon-
ger experienced with the same lucidity and persuasive force as they
once did. For this reason, a simple reiteration of religious teachings in their

Westernization frequently occur in Islamic discourse, there is relatively little cognizance of

the abuses and excesses of modern science and technology, let alone of any problems that
might be inherent in these practices.
4) I use the phrase “modern condition” to denote in a general way the long-range impact of
the Enlightenment on human societies, with particular reference to rationalization and dis-
enchantment. I realize that the “modern condition” is neither a monolithic nor a static phe-
nomenon, though a detailed exposition of its various facets is beyond the scope of my paper.
See note 13, below.
5) The nature of worldview has been discussed at least since Immanuel Kant (cf. Naugle
2002). As expected, there is no single, agreed upon definition. Some understandings of
worldview overlap with those of myth, ideology, and culture, thereby adding to the semantic
confusion. In the present paper, I am using the term “worldview” to denote the sum total of
our pre-cognitive dispositions or commitments, as opposed to “beliefs” which are more or
less consciously held cognitive commitments or convictions. Specifically, I take worldview
to be a set of assumptions without which we cannot think or believe as we do, assumptions
that most people in a given society or epoch take for granted, simply because they live in a
particular time and place. For the vast majority of people, such assumptions remain at a
subconscious level, almost never taking a verbal or propositional form. As soon as one of
these assumptions rises to conscious awareness in a given society or epoch and becomes an
issue of debate and inquiry, it can no longer be presumed and must be either “believed” or
“disbelieved.” I am indebted to Wilfred Cantwell Smith for my understanding of the relation-
ship between beliefs and worldviews (cf. Smith, 1979/1998).
242 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262

traditional form cannot produce the same impact as it did in the premod-
ern period.
Given this background, no Islamic response to the ecological crisis can
be effective on a wider scale unless the following realities are taken into
account. First, the issue of the relationship between religion and ecology
does not exist in a vacuum; as such, abstracting it from the particular socio-
historical milieu in which it has emerged―i.e. the modern condition―
only renders the genesis of the crisis incomprehensible and therefore
unconquerable. Second, the classical and medieval articulations of Islamic
belief and practice were necessarily constructed within the linguistic and
cognitive frameworks that the traditional worldview allowed. With the
decline in the human capacity to take the traditional worldview for granted,
a substantial portion of this Islamic heritage is not able to “possess” the
modern Muslim’s religious imagination as it did in premodern times.6
Third, modern Muslim scholars cannot afford to remain secluded behind
the walls of their religious tradition; in order to maintain the vitality of
Islamic thought, constant engagement is necessary with the collective
stock of human knowledge as well as with the experiences and insights of
other religious traditions.
The ecological crisis is not an isolated problem in an otherwise perfect
world. The modern worldview has produced an alienating effect in virtually
all dimensions of human experience, and the ecological crisis is only one
among its myriad manifestations. Consequently, an Islamic response to the
ecological crisis can be effective only if it is part of a comprehensive enter-
prise that seeks, from an Islamic perspective, to understand and redress the
problematic aspects of the modern worldview.7 Such an enterprise cannot

6) This situation, of course, is not at all unique to Islam. In his analysis of the religious cli-
mate in Indonesia and Morocco in the 1960s, Clifford Geertz describes what must be a typi-
cal phenomenon in any religious community that first experiences the shock of the modern
worldview: “What is believed to be true has not changed for these peoples, or not changed
very much. What has changed is the way in which it is believed. Where there once was
faith, there now are reasons, and not very convincing ones; what once were deliverances are
now hypotheses, and rather strained ones. There is not much outright skepticism around, or
even much conscious hypocrisy, but there is a great deal of solemn self-deception” (Geertz
1968: 17).
7) Perhaps no Muslim intellectual in the last one hundred years has shown greater aware-
ness of these challenges to religion than the South Asian poet, philosopher, and theolo-
gian Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938). In the preface to his major philosophical statement,
The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, Iqbal argues that religious life is ulti-
mately based on religious faith, which, in turn, rests on a “special type of inner experience.”
Since modernity has rendered obsolete many of the traditional methods for cultivating such
 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 243

be substituted by a one-sided diatribe against modernity, since it is impos-

sible to turn the clock backwards and bring back some idealized condition
of past perfection; rather, it must involve wide-ranging reconstruction in the
areas of Islamic metaphysics and theology. This requires, among other
things, enlisting the help of relevant discoveries in modern science and
philosophy.8

2. Revisiting the Lynn White Thesis

White’s essay is too well-known to require a summary.9 In essence, his cri-

tique of Christianity revolves around three main points: (1) anthropocen-
trism, or the tendency to view human beings as the center of empirical

experiences, fresh methods appropriate to the modern “cultural outlook” are needed to
inspire and sustain religious faith. Consequently, the younger generation’s “demand for a
scientific form of religious knowledge is only natural” (Iqbal 1996: xxi). It is important to
note that Iqbal’s agenda was far from parochial. By making a major contribution to this
project, Iqbal was aiming not only to help meet the religious needs of modern Muslims but
also to rectify the serious flaws that he found in modern ways of thinking. Iqbal viewed these
flaws as representing not simply a Muslim problem but a human problem―as obstructions
in humanity’s spiritual evolution and moral progress (Iqbal 1996: 142).
8) While modern Muslim intellectuals, including those in the Western academia, often
focus on juristic reforms, I am suggesting that metaphysics and theology ought to be the first
order of business. This is because the problems we are encountering at the level of beliefs
and behaviors (such as those associated with the ecological crisis) are symptoms of a deeper
problem that exists at the level of worldview. Even though Iqbal concerned himself with
numerous issues relating to Islamic law and jurisprudence, his main project was ultimately
philosophical. He writes: “With the reawakening of Islam . . . it is necessary to examine, in an
independent spirit, what Europe has thought and how far the conclusions reached by her
can help us in the revision and, if necessary, reconstruction, of theological thought in Islam”
(Iqbal 1996: 6). Recognizing the enormity of the goal, Iqbal emphasizes the inevitability of
innovative thinking: “The task before the modern Muslim is, therefore, immense. He has to
rethink the whole system of Islam without completely breaking with the past. . . . The only
course open to us is to approach modern knowledge with a respectful but independent atti-
tude and to appreciate the teachings of Islam in the light of that knowledge, even though we
may be led to differ from those who have gone before us” (Iqbal 1996: 78).
9) In a nutshell, White’s argument consists of the following steps: He begins by contending
that the origins of the Scientific and Industrial Revolutions can be traced back to the
advancements of science and technology that began in Western Europe in the eleventh cen-
tury, and that these, in turn, were made possible by the slightly earlier “victory of Christianity
over paganism” (White 1967: 1205) that replaced the indigenous “pagan” beliefs with
Christian ones. The latter included the idea that God has planned everything for “man’s
benefit and rule” and that nature exists solely “to serve man’s purposes” (White 1967: 1205).
White notes that “Christianity . . . not only established a dualism of man and nature but also
insisted that it is God’s will that man exploit nature for his proper ends” (White 1967: 1205).
244 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262

reality, or as having greater value than all other life forms; (2) the dualism
between human beings and nature, or the notion that humanity is not part
of the natural world; and (3) the divine mandate allowing humanity to
control and dominate nature.10 Notice that all three components of
White’s critique operate at the level of beliefs. This is problematic because
beliefs do not motivate action in a social and historical vacuum; the efficacy
of beliefs to shape human behavior depends upon the degree of their plau-
sibility within a particular socio-historical context as well as the meanings
they generate in the minds of particular groups of people. In turn, the
plausibility and significance of specific beliefs depend upon the believ-
ers’ subconscious assumptions that, when taken together, constitute their
worldview. This means that the impact of beliefs on human behavior can-
not be analyzed or predicted in an ahistorical fashion, and that part of the
historicizing process is to take into account the reigning worldview.11

Since Western science and technology “got their start” and “acquired their character” during
the European Middle Ages (White 1967: 1204), these particular Christian beliefs became the
fundamental principles guiding the practice of all science and technology. White concludes
that “Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt” (White 1967: 1206) for contributing to the
ecological crisis. While being critical of the Christian tradition, White is also optimistic that
Christianity can become ecologically friendly by recalling some of its own forgotten or sup-
pressed teachings. In fact, White argues that “[s]ince the roots of our troubles are so largely
religious, the remedy must also be essentially religious . . . .” In order to redress the crisis,
White suggests that “we” (i.e. Western Christians) must “find a new religion, or rethink our
old one” (White 1967: 1207). The final section of his essay discusses the legacy of St. Francis
as one way of rethinking Christianity.
10) In the following quote on Islam’s possible guilt in the ecological crisis, one can hear
the echoes of White’s original thesis: “The awakening of ecological consciousness since the
1960’s has had an immediate effect on Islamic theology . . . . The criticism begins from the
argument that Islam, much like other monotheistic religions, is anthropocentric, and con-
cludes that the pursuit of an ecologically-minded theology must necessarily transcend these
religions in search of alternative traditions and belief systems. According to this line of criti-
cism, Islam is anthropocentric because it takes human value and importance as its starting
point; man is given dominion over nature and its other creatures and these have value only
in their use to human beings who are bestowed with stewardship (khilafah) by the Almighty.
What is criticized here are the Qur’anic ideas of nature as a tool, resource, favor, or even a
trust (amanah), and its doctrine of creation which mandates the human subduing of the
earth. Deemed as entirely utilitarianist, these ideas are traced to the theological dualism of
man and nature, and to the corollary axiom that nature as God’s artifact has no purpose save
to serve man” (Afrasiabi 1995: 33).
11) In the passage from Afrasiabi quoted in the footnote above, the author is applying the
three most obvious components of White’s critique to the Islamic tradition, viz., anthropo-
centrism, the dualism of humanity and nature, and the human privilege of dominion. What
is missing from Afrasiabi’s analysis is the less obvious but no less important question of the
worldview that determines the plausibility and significance of the beliefs in question and
therefore the direction of their impact.
 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 245

Throughout his essay, White focuses on the problematic beliefs and does
not seem to take the underlying worldview into consideration.12 However,
in the same essay White points out the Christian teaching that “although
man’s body is made of clay, he is not simply part of nature: he is made in
God’s image,” before going on to contend that “Man shares, in great mea-
sure, God’s transcendence of nature” (White 1967: 1205, my emphasis). Here,
White appears to be suggesting that the belief in humankind’s transcen-
dence of nature is a conclusion drawn from two premises: first, God tran-
scends nature, and second, humanity shares certain characteristics with
God. On this issue, I would suggest that while the latter is an important
belief in both the Christian and Islamic traditions, the former has more
often been a subconscious presupposition rather than an explicit belief.
Consequently, the efficacy of a belief in the “dualism of man and nature” (as
White understands it) requires a worldview that includes a similar dualism
between God and the natural world. One of the fundamental characteris-
tics of such a worldview would be God’s own transcendence vis-à-vis
nature―the presumption that God is separate from, as well as above and
beyond, the empirical reality. White’s critique, therefore, is best appreci-
ated in terms of two processes that evidently take place at a subconscious
level: first, the presumption of an essential separation between God and the
natural world; and second, the projection of that separation on to the rela-
tionship between humanity and nature. In other words, while the ecologi-
cally problematic beliefs may be consciously held, they must derive their
plausibility and significance from the following reasoning that occurs sub-
consciously, at the level of worldview: Just as God’s transcendence of nature
is reflected in humanity’s transcendence of nature, God’s power over nature is
reflected in the human privilege to dominate nature.
In this way, a close reading of White’s essay can reveal that while it
explicitly argues for a causal link between particular religious beliefs and
the ecological crisis, part of the essay implies that the plausibility and sig-
nificance of these beliefs are themselves dependent upon a particular
assumption that most often exists only at a subconscious level. Yet, there is
a tension in White’s essay between what he argues explicitly and what he

12) White does mention at one point that “[o]ur daily habits of actions . . . are dominated by
an implicit faith in perpetual progress” which comes from “Judeo-Christian teleology”
(White 1967: 1205). His reference to an “implicit faith” that determines our everyday actions
without our conscious awareness accurately captures the sense in which I am using the term
“worldview.” The idea of progress and its alleged relation to Biblical religion is beyond the
scope of this paper, but see my discussion of rationalization and disenchantment below.
246 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262

only suggests in an implicit (and perhaps inadvertent) manner. The kind of

historical evidence that White offers in defense of his thesis indicates that
he is convinced of an unbroken continuity in the ecological impact of reli-
gious beliefs across an entire millennium. In other words, the evidence is
designed to suggest that the problematic Christian beliefs had the same
impact on human attitudes in the early middle ages as they were having in
the late 1960s. In light of the dependence of beliefs upon worldview, how-
ever, this kind of continuity is untenable; the dominant worldview in the
early middle ages was vastly different from the one that reigned during the
second half of the twentieth century. Indeed, the rise of the modern world-
view is one of the most revolutionary transformations in human history, of
the same magnitude as the beginning of agriculture or invention of the
alphabet.13 White, however, does not seem to appreciate the relevance of
this transformation for his ecological critique.
There is, however, at least one indication in White’s essay that he is not
completely unmindful of the rupture caused by the advent of modernity,
even though he does not push that observation to its logical conclusion.14
White notices the apparent paradox that the ecologically problematic
Christian beliefs are continuing to thrive even in an age that many are
calling “post-Christian” (White 1967: 1205). He goes on to note that “Despite
Copernicus, all the cosmos rotates around our little globe. Despite Darwin,
we are not, in our hearts, part of the natural process” (White 1967: 1206).
Given what we know about the enormous shift from the traditional to
the modern worldview, it is indeed remarkable that these particular
beliefs should withstand the otherwise sweeping impact of secularization,

13) Marshall Hodgson has used the term “The Great Western Transmutation” to denote the
unprecedented economic, intellectual, and social changes that took place in Western
Europe between 1600 and 1800. The scale and scope of these changes were so enormous that
the five thousand years old agrarinate culture of the Afro-Eurasian Oikoumene gave way to
an entirely new arrangement, consisting of the “technicalist age” and worldwide European
hegemony (Hodgson 1993). While this “Transmutation” was underway, another massive and
equally unprecedented shift was taking place in humanity’s worldview — the traditional
worldview that had dominated all premodern societies in one form or another for almost
five thousand years was losing its unquestioned authority as it was gradually replaced by the
modern worldview, initially in Western Europe but increasingly in the rest of the world.
Numerous authors have documented this shift in worldview from a variety of angles,
e.g. Berger 1967 & 1979, Merchant 1980, Tarnas 1991, Dupré 1993, Spretnak 1997, Smith 2003,
and Appleyard 2004.
14) The terms “modern worldview” and “modernity” are far from synonymous; I am using
them interchangeably because the distinction is not crucial for the purposes of this paper.
Historically speaking, “modernism” and “modernity” have emerged more or less simultane-
ously as interdependent phenomena.
 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 247

emerging unscathed from the cumulative shock of the Enlightenment, the

Scientific Revolution, and the Social Scientific critiques of religion. This
curious fact cannot be left unexplained, nor can it be explained away by
the essentialist answer that “[o]ur science and technology have grown out
of Christian attitudes toward man’s relation to nature” (White 1967: 1206),
for that would render science and technology permanently inseparable
from ecologically destructive attitudes.
I would like to suggest that these beliefs have survived mainly at a verbal
level, while their meanings and implications have undergone a massive
transformation. Their significance today is not the same significance they
had a thousand years ago. This is because a change in worldview does not
necessarily mean that all our beliefs will be replaced by entirely new ones.
As our worldview shifts, many of our existing beliefs do not die off but
begin to acquire new significance. The creeds and doctrines may remain
the same, but their import and implications―mediated through the par-
ticular “moods and motivations” they evoke in us―can be entirely novel.15
Consequently, if certain beliefs are found to be ecologically problematic in
the context of the modern worldview, this tells us very little about their
meanings and implications―and therefore their impact―in the context of
the traditional worldview.

3. Imagining God: Supernatural Theism versus Panentheism

Since White posits a continuity in the impact of particular religious beliefs

across one thousand years, he must assume that these beliefs were more or
less normative (and therefore influential) throughout this period. Since the
plausibility and significance of beliefs are closely tied to the reigning world-
view, White’s thesis implies that a single worldview has also remained dom-
inant during the entire millennium. In other words, the presupposition of a
sharp dualism between God and nature―or the assumption of absolute
divine transcendence―must have been an invariable feature of Western
Christianity, starting at least from the early middle ages and continuing all
the way to the twentieth century. In reality, however, Western Christianity
has produced a wide range of theological views, and the vast majority of
these views do not presuppose divine transcendence in any absolute sense.
The same is true of the Islamic tradition.

15) Here, I am obviously drawing upon Clifford Geertz’ definition of religion (Geertz 1973).
248 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262

To keep the discussion within manageable limits, I propose to reduce

the theological question to a relatively simple scheme. In general, we may
speak of two contrasting models of the divine that have been common to
both Christianity and Islam, each of them representing a particular way of
imagining the relationship between God and the empirical reality.16 In the
first model, God is imagined as absolutely transcendent, i.e. as distinct and
separate from the empirical reality; in the second model, God is imagined
as both transcending the empirical reality and as fully immanent within
it.17 In the former case, sometimes called supernatural theism, God is above
and beyond the empirical world but may intervene in it from the outside, as
it were, either occasionally or regularly. An unbridgeable gap exists between
God and the empirical reality, so that God can neither be experienced
under normal circumstances nor known directly. In the latter case, often
called panentheism, the empirical reality is “in” God, just as God is “in” each
and every part of the empirical reality. God’s transcendence is always
affirmed, but its alienating effect is diminished through a simultaneous
emphasis on divine immanence; this ensures that the experience and
knowledge of God is potentially available at all times.18
At this point in our inquiry, it can be seen that White’s ecological critique
applies to supernatural theism but not to panentheism. In order to estab-
lish that particular religious beliefs in either Christianity or Islam have

16) I take these models not as actual belief systems or theological outlooks but only as ideal-
types, in the strictly Weberian sense of the term. For this reason, I do not expect to find these
models in their pure form in the history of theological reflections. Any actually existing
belief system or theological outlook is likely to fall somewhere between these two concep-
tual extremes, perhaps closer to one end of the spectrum than the other. In addition, for a
tiny intellectual minority, i.e. theologians, these models may operate as consciously held
beliefs; but for the vast majority of adherents, they are much more likely to remain subcon-
scious assumptions at the level of worldview.
17) There is a third possible model, pantheism, in which divine transcendence is completely
or partially denied. God is immanent within the empirical reality or is identical with it. This
model is unusual for either Christianity or Islam.
18) My choice of these two models is not arbitrary, for the polarity of divine transcen-
dence and immanence is a theme that can be traced all the way to the Scriptures of the
Christian and Islamic traditions―the Bible and the Qur’an. Historically, one of the main
tasks of theology in these traditions has been to articulate the proper balance between these
two poles. Indeed, supernatural theism may be understood as a theological position that
privileges divine transcendence while diminishing or disregarding the significance of divine
immanence; on the other hand, panentheism can be understood as a theological position
that seeks to embrace the implications of both divine transcendence and divine imma-
nence. Panentheism, of course, comes in many different forms. I am using the word in its
most generic sense. Cf., Hartshorne & Reese (1953), Clayton & Peacocke (2004), Cooper
(2006), etc.
 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 249

contributed to our ecological crisis, it must first be shown that supernatural

theism has been the normative belief system in that tradition, which entails
the presumption of absolute divine transcendence. Historically, neither of
these has been the case. In the premodern past, even though Christian
and Muslim theologians frequently wrestled with the divine polarity of
transcendence and immanence, they never decisively privileged one pole
over the other; more importantly, they never went so far as to completely
deny the empirical reality any share of divine significance and sacred value.
In general, theological outlooks in both traditions have tended to be con-
siderably closer to panentheism than to supernatural theism.19 It could not
have been otherwise, since the traditional worldview that reigned in all
premodern societies―and was presumed by both theologians and ordi-
nary believers―lacked any absolute or radical separation between the
Sacred and the Profane. Historically, supernatural theism did not acquire
its current influence in either tradition until very recently; it is a peculiarly
modern development that exists in considerable tension with more tradi-
tional approaches.
Given that White’s critique does not apply to panentheism, and that
panentheism has been the preferred model in both Christianity and Islam,
it appears that White’s critique is off the mark. What, then, is the value of
his thesis? To answer this question, we must examine the contemporary
influence of supernatural theism in both Christianity and Islam and then
ask the following question: If supernatural theism is not supported by the
classical heritage of these religious traditions, what has made this model of
God so appealing to modern Christians and Muslims? At this point, White’s
thesis becomes relevant once again. Instead of an indictment of Western
Christianity, or indirectly of Islam, White’s thesis can be read as a critique of
the conditions that have brought about the decline of panentheism and the
rise of supernatural theism. Given that White’s critique does apply to super-
natural theism, and that supernatural theism is a modern phenomenon, his
thesis can be interpreted as a subtle critique of the modern worldview.

19) While a comprehensive treatment of this issue would require a book length study, one
important piece of evidence is immediately available to us. It has been widely accepted in
both the Christian and Islamic traditions that an authentic religious experience can, indeed,
allow a person to have a direct encounter with the divine. The presence of a rich and diverse
mystical dimension provides the most straightforward argument against the prevalence of
supernatural theism in either of these traditions. With this background in mind, it is inter-
esting to note that many contemporary adherents of supernatural theism are skeptical of
the entire mystical dimension, towards which they often adopt a negative and denigrating
attitude. This modern opposition to mysticism has most likely been the result of a hostility
towards divine immanence within the empirical reality.
250 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262

4. Max Weber and the “Disenchantment of the World”

We must dig deeper than the level at which White has found the historical
roots of the ecological crisis; for our aim now is to uncover the histori-
cal roots of the worldview that has made the particular religious beliefs
ecologically destructive in the first place. The critique of the modern world-
view implicit in White’s essay can be made explicit by placing his thesis in
the context of the modern predicament of meaning and religious faith.
I propose to do so by drawing upon the work of Max Weber.
For Weber, the modern experience is characterized by “disenchantment
of the world,” which, in turn, is a product of the historical process of ratio-
nalization. An understanding of rationalization can help us analyze the
evolution of human civilization, as well as that of any particular society, in
terms of a gradual increase in the level of its overall rationality. Weber
shows that there are at least four different types of rationality―practical,
theoretical, substantive, and formal―the growth of which is far from uni-
form across societies or life-spheres.20 All societies undergo rationaliza-
tion, but at different rates and in different directions. Weber argues that the
modern Western society has significantly surpassed all other human groups
in the successful rationalization of its various life-spheres. In this develop-
ment, practical, theoretical, and formal types of rationality have come to
dominate substantive rationality. Overall, there has been a rapid progress
in the systematic mastery of life processes and an increase in their coherent
understanding by means of abstract concepts; at the same time, the ability
of values to order the world has declined.

20) Stephen Kaalberg, one of the foremost Weber scholars, provides a detailed examination
of the four types of rationality. The first type, practical rationality, has to do with aligning
means and ends with the aim of maximizing one’s pragmatic and everyday interests. This
kind of rationality “accepts given realities and calculates the most expedient means of deal-
ing with the difficulties they present” (Kalberg 1980: 1152). The second type, theoretical
rationality, “involves a conscious mastery of reality through the construction of increasingly
precise abstract concepts.” The third type, substantive rationality, is concerned with the
ordering of action into regular patterns on the basis of “value postulates” or clusters of values
(Kalberg 1980: 1155). For Weber, the choice of a particular value postulate is not subject to
rational determination but depends on one’s “ultimate point of view.” The fourth type, for-
mal rationality, involves the ordering of actions on the basis of a means-ends rational calcu-
lation that is similar to practical rationality, but differs from it in its legitimization through
appeals to universally applicable rules and laws (Kalberg 1980: 1158). According to Weber,
formal rationality is seen most clearly in the functioning of modern businesses and
bureaucracies.
 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 251

For Weber, science is the most important form in which theoretical

rationality has manifested in recent history. This type of rationality involves
the ability of human beings to gain control over their environment, which
is achieved by rendering the empirical reality increasingly comprehensible
through abstract concepts. Weber believes that the advancement of science
constitutes the most significant aspect of theoretical (or intellectual) ratio-
nalization. In his essay “Science as a Vocation,” Weber notes that “Scientific
progress is a small part, albeit the most important part, of that process
of intellectualization to which we have been subject for thousands of
years . . .” (Weber 2008: 35). He explains the meaning of this process as
follows:
Let us first of all be clear about what precisely this intellectual rationalization
through science and scientifically oriented technology means in practice.
Does it mean that we today―everyone, for example, sitting here in this hall―
has a greater knowledge of the conditions of life under which he exists than
an Indian or a Hottentot? Hardly. . . . Thus, increasing intellectualization and
rationalization does not mean increasing general knowledge of the conditions
under which we live our lives. It means something else. It means the knowledge
or belief that if we only wanted to we could learn at any time; that there are, in
principle, no mysterious unpredictable forces in play, but that all things―in
principle―can be controlled through calculation. This, however, means the
disenchantment of the world. No longer, like the savage, who believed that
such forces existed, do we have to resort to magical means to gain control over
or pray to the spirits. Technical means and calculations work for us instead.
This, above all, is what intellectualization actually means (Weber 2008: 35).
For Weber, disenchantment has resulted from the tremendous acceleration
of theoretical rationalization that has occurred in recent centuries. In
effect, the same phenomenon that has helped usher in the age of scientific
progress has also brought about the foremost cultural discontent of our
times. Disenchantment does not imply that human beings have, in fact,
achieved a complete understanding of how empirical reality functions; it
only means that a faith has developed in modern societies that, given suf-
ficient time and resources, scientists can figure out virtually anything. At
the same time, a strong trust has emerged in the ability of modern technol-
ogy to endlessly enlarge humankind’s power vis-à-vis the natural world,
and to eventually solve all present and future problems.21
According to Weber, humankind’s recent progress in theoretical ratio-
nality has caused the shrinking, and often disappearance, of those aspects

21) It is important to note that these attitudes are not necessarily warranted by any empiri-
cal evidence.
252 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262

or dimensions of empirical reality that were previously viewed as

“mysterious”―i.e. unknowable in principle. This has led to a gradual loss of
the very possibility of experiencing genuine wonder, which, in turn, implies
a serious blow to the human capacity for constructing and attributing
meaning to the world. Disenchantment then comes to represent the pre-
dicament of having to live in a world that lacks any intrinsic meaning or
purpose, even as it becomes increasingly intelligible in scientific terms. In
this context, I suggest that the tendency towards dividing the empirical
reality by means of increasingly precise concepts is the core of what I have
been calling the modern worldview (with meaninglessness as its most egre-
gious consequence).
If rationalization is a historical process, as Weber argues, we can imagine
that it must have started at a certain point in time, prior to which humanity
lived in a completely enchanted world. Presumably, in such a world the
human condition was marked by harmony and contentment, for human
beings encountered nature as a never ending source of mystery, wonder,
joy, and meaning. They experienced the world as an organic whole that
enveloped them from all sides in a warm, safe cocoon. The very thought of
comprehending their environment―let alone modifying it in any way―
could never have crossed the minds of these enchanted people.22

5. Muhammad Iqbal and the Reason/Intuition Divide

In the previous section, I used a diachronic approach to present the rela-

tionship between the enchanted and disenchanted worlds; I presented the
two as being separated by a period of countless millennia, and therefore as
mutually exclusive. This approach, while fairly common, is challenged by a

22) Describing Weber’s sense of an earlier, enchanted time, Alkis Kontos writes: “The world
was a place of mystery and wonderment; human activity and calculation, creativity and
energy, knowledge and practice could not, nor were they presumed able to, either prevail
over the world or exhaust its mystery. The world, Nature, stood before the mortals as inex-
haustible, mysterious, imbued with spirits, unconquerable” (Kontos 1994: 224). Interpreting
Weber’s view of the relationship between humanity and the nonhuman nature within this
enchanted world, the same author notes: “The enchanted world . . . is treated by Weber as
one in which a symbiosis, an organic unity, is struck between humans and Nature. In an
enchanted world, Nature provides a meaningful, stabilizing foundation to existence; it mod-
erates and gives orientation to life activity; it secures existential satisfaction. Mental and
psychological anxiety does not prevail. Satiation, and, above all, meaning reign supreme”
(Kontos 1994:228). The history of civilization can therefore be seen as the history of human-
ity’s movement out of, and away from, the primordial experience of enchantment.
 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 253

mountain of empirical evidence, since large numbers of people in the mod-

ern world, including those living in technologically sophisticated societies,
have continued to experience enchantment in a wide variety of ways. It
seems as if the enchanted world of our distant past is repeatedly intrud-
ing into our present, supposedly disenchanted, world.23 This difficulty sug-
gests the need for a different approach, one that takes into account the
simultaneous presence of enchantment and disenchantment in the same
socio-historical context and even in the same individual. Such a synchronic
approach would describe the enchanted and disenchanted worlds not as
distinct periods in human history but as alternative modes of human expe-
rience, i.e. as two distinct ways of knowing, of constructing reality, and of
being in the world. This would mean that even though particular epochs
and/or cultures may favor one or the other, both modes are potentially
available to all of us, all the time.
Weber’s work powerfully demonstrates that our social and cultural con-
ditions play a significant role in determining the proportion of enchant-
ment and disenchantment in our experience. At the same time, I think it
would be a mistake to assume that these conditions operate from the out-
side, as it were, on a human psyche that is essentially a blank slate, a passive
recipient of external influences. In other words, there must be innate psy-
chological mechanisms that actively mediate these two modes of experi-
encing reality. I am therefore inclined to think that if Weber’s sociological
approach could be wedded to a psychological understanding of the same
phenomena, we can have a more relational (and therefore more accurate)
view of enchantment and disenchantment.
Towards that end, I suggest that Muhammad Iqbal’s work can be of
immense value. More specifically, we can identify the relevant psychologi-
cal mechanisms by taking into account Iqbal’s description of two funda-
mental human faculties―reason and intuition―and their respective
functions. It may be noted that Iqbal employs several different terms when
referring to these faculties, including “reason,” “thought,” “intellect,” and
“logical understanding” on the one hand, and “intuition,” “heart,” “insight,”
and “love” on the other. In the following paragraphs, I discuss Iqbal’s under-
standing of these two faculties and relate them to Weber’s views on
enchantment and disenchantment.

23) The recognition that theoretical rationalization does not eradicate all possibilities of
enchantment has stimulated new scholarship on Weber, e.g. Jenkins 2000, Green 2005, and
Koshul 2005; as well as on alternative forms of enchantment, e.g. Griffin 1988 & 2001, Bennett
2001, Saler 2006, Landy & Saler 2009, and Sherry 2000.
254 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262

In the following quote from The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in

Islam, Iqbal defines intuition as an instrument of knowledge that is inde-
pendent of ordinary sense perception.
The “heart” is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words
of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of
Reality other than those open to sense-perception. It is, according to the
Qur’an, something which “sees,” and its reports, if properly interpreted, are
never false. We must not, however, regard it as a mysterious special faculty; it
is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological
sense of the word, does not play any part. Yet the vista of experience thus
opened to us is as real and concrete as any other experience. To describe it
as psychic, mystical, or super-natural does not detract from its value as
experience. To the primitive man all experience was supernatural. Prompted
by the immediate necessities of life he was driven to interpret his experience,
and out of this interpretation gradually emerged “Nature” in our sense of the
word (Iqbal 1996: 13).
For Iqbal, the faculty of intuition is just as natural and as reliable as the
faculty of rational thought. Both are based on experience and interpreta-
tion, and both serve to bring us into contact with reality―though intuition
is more fundamental of the two. Iqbal views the faculty of rational thought
as a distinctive human achievement that made its first appearance only
when the necessities of life made conceptual distinctions inevitable. Prior
to that, human beings perceived everything around them as “supernatural,”
i.e. mysterious, wonderful, and sacred. Strictly speaking, of course, they had
not yet made the conceptual distinction between “natural” and “supernatu-
ral,” or between “profane” and “sacred.” Indeed, they did not even perceive
“nature” as something distinct from themselves. But as the faculty of ratio-
nal thought developed, humanity gradually emerged out of its dreamlike
innocence into a state of increasing self-awareness. Among other things,
this involved a sense of separation from what subsequently came to be
known as “nature.” Elsewhere, Iqbal argues that the Qur’anic narrative of
Adam’s creation is a description of this very phenomenon:
. . . the Qur’anic legend of the Fall has nothing to do with the first appearance
of man on this planet. Its purpose is rather to indicate man’s rise from a
primitive state of instinctive appetite to the conscious possession of a free self,
capable of doubt and disobedience. The Fall does not mean any moral
depravity; it is man’s transition from simple consciousness to the first flash of
self-consciousness, a kind of waking from the dream of nature with a throb of
personal causality in one’s own being (Iqbal 1996: 67-68).
It appears that Iqbal’s reference to a “primitive state of instinctive appetite”
is meant to capture essentially the same concept as Weber’s view of an
enchanted world. For Iqbal, humanity stepped out of this primordial
 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 255

“dream of nature” because the pressure for survival in a changing and chal-
lenging environment demanded human initiative, which, in turn, required
the ability to interpret the flow of experience. The beginning of “self-
consciousness” and the recognition of “personal causality” were closely
associated with the emerging ability to make increasingly precise distinc-
tions and to construct abstract concepts. The Qur’an states that God “taught
Adam the names of all things” (Qur’an 2:31), a verse that Iqbal interprets as
pointing out the fact “that man is endowed with the faculty of naming
things, that is to say, forming concepts of them, and forming concepts
of them is capturing them” (Iqbal 1996: 10). It can be seen that Weber’s
conception of theoretical rationality is not too far from Iqbal’s view of
thought or logical understanding. Both notions refer to a human faculty
that (1) makes distinctions in the flow of experience, (2) is conceptual in
nature, (3) relies on the use of language, and (4) confers the power to con-
trol one’s environment.
In the following quote, Iqbal compares the epistemological functions of
thought and intuition, arguing that they represent different but comple-
mentary approaches to knowledge:
Nor is there any reason to suppose that thought and intuition are essentially
opposed to each other. They spring up from the same root and complement
each other. The one grasps Reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its
wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal
aspect of Reality. The one is present enjoyment of the whole of Reality; the
other aims at traversing the whole by slowly specifying and closing up the
various regions of the whole for exclusive observation. Both are in need of
each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek vision of the same Reality which
reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life. In fact, intuition,
as Bergson rightly says, is only a higher kind of intellect (Iqbal 1996: 2).
For Iqbal, reality is one and indivisible. We approach it, however, from two
different directions: intuition is biased towards synthesis while thought is
biased towards analysis. As such, intuition is the ability to know the empiri-
cal reality as a unified whole, while rational thought is the ability to know
the same reality as consisting of discrete and identifiable parts or sections.
Like the inside and outside of a Möbius strip, reality perceived as a unified
whole is continuous with reality perceived as discrete fragments; for there is
no break or interruption in reality. The same holds true for the faculties of
intuition and rational thought.24

24) This is a key philosophical move, for it allows Iqbal to overcome not only the dichotomy
between reason and intuition, but also the one between matter and spirit more generally:
256 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262

Bringing together the insights of Weber and Iqbal, we can notice an inti-
mate relationship between intuition and enchantment on the one hand,
and between rational thought and disenchantment on the other. It also
appears that these modes of knowing and experiencing tend to function
without our conscious awareness; they operate, in other words, at the level
of worldview. I think it is possible to propose two types of worldviews based
on the above scheme: a worldview dominated by rational thought that pro-
duces an increasingly disenchanted world, and a worldview dominated by
intuition that generates an increasingly enchanted world.25

6. Towards a Postmodern Panentheism

It is my contention in this paper that the ecological critique of religion by

Lynn White Jr. points in the right direction but does not go all the way.
White traces the ecological crisis to particular religious beliefs; in response,
I have argued that his critique convincingly indicts a particular theological
model―supernatural theism―but that it does not lead to an indictment
of either Western Christianity or Islam in their traditional manifestations.
White’s critique is incomplete because it does not take into account the
pervasive influence of the reigning worldview on the plausibility and sig-
nificance, and therefore the impact, of particular religious beliefs. As I try to
fill this gap in White’s analysis, his critique of religion increasingly appears
as a critique of the modern worldview.
Bringing together the insights of Weber and Iqbal, it is clear that the
modern worldview is characterized by an emphasis on rational thought
and a corresponding marginalization of intuition. In other words, the
essence of the modern worldview is the “analytical imperative,” i.e. the ten-
dency to continuously divide the empirical reality through increasingly
precise abstractions. With such a worldview in ascendancy, disenchant-
ment results from the loss in our capacity to experience reality as a unified
whole. When it comes to religion, the modern worldview may encourage an

“The unity called man is body when you look at it as acting in regard to what we call the
external world; it is mind or soul when you look at it as acting in regard to the ultimate aim
and ideal of such acting” (Iqbal 1996:122). Given that Cartesian dualism has also been impli-
cated in our ecologically destructive beliefs and behaviors, this aspect of Iqbal’s work is also
relevant for the problem of religion and ecology.
25) Once again, I am using these concepts strictly as ideal-types. In reality, any given world-
view must include both ways of knowing and experiencing, since both tendencies are
inherent in our psychological makeup.
 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 257

overt atheism, but it is equally capable of accommodating a theological

model in which God only exists outside the empirical reality and is essen-
tially unrelated to it. Since the analytical imperative requires an increasing
separation between God and not-God, supernatural theism can be viewed
as an intermediate stage in the same line of reasoning that leads to deism
and subsequently to atheism. The reason supernatural theism continues to
exist in both the Christian and Islamic traditions is because it offers a dis-
tinct “advantage.” It allows a person to fully embrace an empirical reality
that has been de-divinized and desacralized by the modern worldview,
without having to give up his or her “belief” in God.
In this context, the relevance of Iqbal’s work stems from his recognition
that the traditional worldview has collapsed and the modern worldview
does not satisfy. For theology, this means that even though supernatural
theism is not an acceptable option, Christians and Muslims cannot simply
return to traditional forms of panentheism. Iqbal recognizes that the mod-
ern predicament of meaning and religious faith has resulted from a world-
view that privileges rational thought; yet, his project does not call for a
counter-privileging of intuition as a response to that predicament. While
dissatisfied with disenchantment, he does not advocate the impossible
option of returning to an earlier, enchanted world. For Iqbal, our percep-
tion of reality as consisting of discrete parts is the very basis of science; this
perception is relative, but it is not invalid. Nor does he favor abandoning all
distinctions between God and not-God. What he seeks, instead, is the ideal
balance between the two faculties of intuition and rational thought, in
order to allow appropriate freedom to both the enchanting and disenchant-
ing tendencies that are inherent in the human psyche.
One of Iqbal’s major contributions to Islamic theology is an interpreta-
tion of the Qur’anic deity in ways that I would describe as both “postmod-
ern” and “panentheist,” even though Iqbal himself does not employ either
of these terms. The word “postmodern” is justified because Iqbal embraces
the positive achievements of the modern worldview while also seeking to
transcend its limitations.26 The word “panentheist” is justified because
Iqbal emphasizes the immanence of God within empirical reality while cat-
egorically rejecting the notion of pantheism.27

26) In my view, the term “postmodern” is applicable to Iqbal’s work in the same sense in
which it has been applied to the works of Charles Sanders Peirce, Alfred North Whitehead,
and others (Griffin 1993).
27) While a panentheistic understanding of God is by no means a novelty in the Islamic
tradition, Iqbal’s contribution stands out for a number of reasons; not the least of which is
258 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262

A significant piece of what may be taken as Iqbal’s critique of supernatu-

ral theism appears in his discussion of the divine attribute of “creation.”
Iqbal asks the question―“Does the universe confront God as His ‘other,’
with space intervening between Him and it?”―and then responds with an
emphatic “no.” For Iqbal, a finite mind tends to “regard the act of creation as
a specific past event,” which is why it regards nature “as a confronting ‘other’
existing per se, which the mind knows but does not make.” The same
impression is then projected onto God, as a result of which the finite mind
approaches nature as if it were “a manufactured article, which has no
organic relationship to the life of its maker, and of which the maker is noth-
ing more than a mere spectator” (Iqbal 1996: 52). The presumption that God
is separate from the empirical world in an almost physico-spatial sense is
sustained by a worldview that privileges rational thought over intuition. In
contrast, the view of reality generated by our intuitive experience reveals to
us the immanence of God within creation.28
For Iqbal, divine immanence can be recognized intuitively with the help
of an empirical insight into the nature of time. Occasionally, during
moments of “profound meditation,” Iqbal writes, “we sink into our deeper

his ability to bring the Qur’an and other classical Islamic sources in a fertile dialogue with
twentieth century science and philosophy. The panentheistic quality of Iqbal’s view of God
has been recognized as such by at least two Western scholars. Charles Hartshorne included
a selection from Iqbal in the volume he edited with William Reese, titled Philosophers Speak
of God. In this anthology, Iqbal appears in the section on “Modern Panentheism” along with
Charles Sanders Peirce, Alfred North Whitehead, and Martin Buber. In their introductory
note, the editors mentioned Iqbal’s significance as a modern Muslim panentheist: “It is a
pleasure to be able to include a modern Mohammedan among our panentheists. True, there
is a strong and fully acknowledged influence of Bergson and other Western European
authors upon this writer; but the eloquence and sincerity of the numerous references to
Muslem sources are no less striking” (Hartshorne and Reese 1955: 294). Similarly, Robert
Whittemore published an important paper on “Iqbal’s Panentheism” (1956), in which he
emphasized Iqbal’s relevance beyond the Muslim world and called for an appreciation of
his place within the Western intellectual tradition: “That God (whatever his nature) is One,
that this universe is animated (for better or worse) by purpose, and that it has a positive
character and value, that this value is evidenced by the testimony of God to man in
Scripture―in these convictions Islam and the religions of the West find common ground. To
ascribe, therefore, an extra-Islamic significance to Iqbal’s thought is to claim that his view-
point contributes in important measure to the clarification and understanding of these
common convictions, not only as regards their internal coherence but as regards their har-
monization with secular knowledge as well” (Whittemore 1956: 698).
28) We may recall White’s view that the dualism between God and nature is reflected in the
dualism between human beings and nature. Iqbal is clearly making the opposite case. Both
White and Iqbal are assuming a worldview in which knowing is primarily a matter of distin-
guishing, differentiating, and separating, but according to Iqbal it is our own experience of
being distinct from nature that suggests to us the notion of God being separate from nature,
and not the other way around.
 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 259

self and reach the inner centre of experience” (Iqbal 1996: 38). As “the states
of consciousness melt into each other,” we find ourselves in a single and
eternal “now” (Iqbal 1996: 39). This experience of “timelessness” allows us
to realize that even though clock time is a succession of moments, real time
lacks the usual divisions of past, present, and future. To paraphrase Iqbal,
we may say that the analytical imperative of rational thought “pulverizes”
real time into a series of successive moments, thereby making it virtually
indistinguishable from space; yet, intuition can still allow us to experience
“pure duration unadulterated by space” (Iqbal 1996: 38-39). Thus, our intui-
tive experience of time as a single and eternal “now,” rare as it may be, sug-
gests that time conceived as a straight line is nothing more than a useful
fiction constructed by the faculty of rational thought, only because it helps
us in comprehending and mastering our environment. If God is in pure
duration, as Iqbal argues, then our categories of past, present, and future,
and those of before and after, can have no relevance to divine life. From the
viewpoint of God, “there is no creation in the sense of a specific event hav-
ing a ‘before’ and an ‘after’” (Iqbal 1996: 52). Thus, in light of our experience
of the indivisibility of “now,” the claim of supernatural theism that God and
empirical reality are two separate entities―perhaps confronting each
other “in the empty receptacle of an infinite space”―becomes entirely
untenable. Supernatural theism requires that the empirical world be
viewed as a self-sufficient reality that exists not only apart from but also
independent of God. This Iqbal finds unacceptable, arguing that time,
space, and matter are only “interpretations” that a finite mind places on
God’s creative energy; alternatively, they are “intellectual modes of appre-
hending the life of God” (Iqbal 1996: 53). In the final analysis, “the universe
cannot be regarded as an independent reality standing in opposition to
Him” (Iqbal 1996: 52-53).
Iqbal’s panentheism has far-reaching consequences for our view of
nature. According to Iqbal, to encounter nature is not to encounter a static
entity that is separate or discontinuous either from the observing subject or
from God, but to encounter “the perpetual flow of Divine life” in which the
tiniest particle is itself an ego; this is because “from the Ultimate Ego only
egos proceed” (Iqbal 1996: 57). From the viewpoint of God, nature does not
exist as a self-subsisting “other,” but as “a fleeting moment” in God’s creative
life (Iqbal 1996: 45). The same applies to the countless egos that together
constitute “nature,” as we have come to call what is better described as a
“moment” in the eternal flow of divine energy.29 “Beyond Him and apart

29) Iqbal insists that his view does not require sacrificing the individual’s aspiration for eter-
nal life as a unique, self-conscious being. Rejecting the ancient symbolism of a drop of water
260 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262

from his creative activity,” Iqbal contends, “there is neither time nor space
to close Him off in reference to other egos” (Iqbal 1996: 52). In this view of
God, nature acquires an intensity of sacredness and inherent value that is
impossible to imagine within the narrow confines of supernatural theism.
Since the empirical world “in all its details” is nothing other than “the self-
revelation” of God (Iqbal 1996: 57), and since a “self” cannot be conceived
without definite and uniform behavior, Iqbal suggests that nature is best
understood as the very “character” of God.
Nature . . . is not a mass of pure materiality occupying a void. It is a structure of
events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such organic to the Ultimate
Self. Nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self. In the
picturesque phrase of the Qur’an it is the habit of Allah. From the human point
of view it is an interpretation which, in our present situation, we put on the
creative activity of the Absolute Ego. . . . Nature, then, must be understood as a
living, ever-growing organism whose growth has no final external limits. Its
only limit is internal, i.e. the immanent self which animates and sustain the
whole. . . . The knowledge of Nature is the knowledge of God’s behaviour. In
our observation of Nature we are virtually seeking a kind of intimacy with the
Absolute Ego; and this is only another form of worship (Iqbal 1996: 45).
Iqbal’s postmodern panentheism does not allow nature to be objectified.
Nature is not a “thing,” but a dynamic process, “a living, ever-growing organ-
ism” that is animated and sustained by the immanent divine. It is not sim-
ply the case that nature “tells” us about an otherwise distant God; rather,
the countless phenomena of nature are the very “habits” of God. For this
reason, our observation of nature is a form of worship through which we
aspire to develop an ever increasing intimacy with reality, which is another
name for God.30 According to Iqbal, nature is not what God created in the
past; nature is what God does, now.
If the logic of Iqbal’s panentheism is followed, the dualism of humanity
and nature is relativized as being the result of a valid but limited perspec-
tive created by the faculty of rational thought. Similarly, the Biblical and
Qur’anic mandate of human dominion over nature becomes the exciting

merging with the ocean, Iqbal uses the metaphor of a “pearl” to express the Islamic hope of
a distinct selfhood for the human individual that continues beyond death. Amending a
famous New Testament verse (Acts 17:28), Iqbal writes: “Like pearls do we live and move and
have our being in the perpetual flow of Divine life” (Iqbal 1996: 57-58).
30) Iqbal’s view of nature goes far beyond the central assumption of natural theology. Since
any creative work reveals the mind of its creator, to say that the empirical world reveals
the mind of God is merely to state the obvious. The value of Iqbal’s work lies in the fact that
he has something important to say about the relationship between the Creator and the
creation.
 A. Afzaal / Worldviews 16 (2012) 239–262 261

possibility for human beings and God to act as “co-workers” (Iqbal 1996: 10).
Humanity is fated to exercise power vis-à-vis the natural world, but―as
Iqbal repeatedly points out―this privilege comes with a tremendous
responsibility. We are not “free” to use our power in any way we want, for
there are definite consequences for the choices we make. According to
Iqbal, human beings are called to exercise their power, not “in the interest
of unrighteous desire for domination, but in the nobler interest of a free
upward movement of spiritual life” (Iqbal, 1996: 12). The signs that indicate
a continuous worsening in the balance of nature are no less than warnings
from God, informing us in a loud and clear voice that we have been making
the wrong choices. For Iqbal, there is nothing unusual in the claim that God
speaks. The question, rather, is whether or not we are prepared to listen.

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