[G.R. No. 120554. September 21, 1999.
] On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters
SO PING BUN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, TEK HUA ENTERPRISING
CORP. and MANUEL C. TIONG,
Respondents.
This petition for certiorari challenges the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated
October 10, 1994, and the Resolution 2
dated June 5, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No.
38784. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 35, except for the award of attorney’s
fees, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the
appeal of respondent-appellant So Ping Bun
for lack of merit is DISMISSED. The appealed
decision dated April 20, 1992 of the court a
quo is modified by reducing the attorney’s
fees awarded to plaintiff Tek Hua
Enterprising Corporation from P500,000.00
to P200,000.00." 3
The facts are as follows:
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co, through its
managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into
lease agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan &
Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of four (4) lease
contracts were premises located at Nos. 930,
930-Int., 924-B and 924-C, Soler Street,
Binondo, Manila. Tek Hua used the areas to
store its textiles. The contracts each had a
one-year term. They provided that should
the lessee continue to occupy the premises
after the term, the lease shall be on a
month-to-month basis.
When the contracts expired, the parties did
not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua
continued to occupy the premises. In 1976,
Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later,
the original members of Tek Hua Trading Co.
including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua
Enterprising Corp., herein respondent
corporation.
So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua
Trading, died in 1986. So Pek Giok’s
grandson, petitioner So Ping Bun, occupied
the warehouse for his own textile business,
Trendsetter Marketing.
addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, informing
the latter of the 25% increase in rent
effective September 1, 1989. The rent
increase was later on reduced to 20%
effective January 1, 1990, upon other
lessees’ demand. Again on December 1,
1990, the lessor implemented a 30% rent
increase. Enclosed in these letters were new
lease contracts for signing. DCCSI warned
that failure of the lessee to accomplish the
contracts shall be deemed as lack of interest
on the lessee’s part, and agreement to the
termination of the lease. Private respondents
did not answer any of these letters. Still, the
lease contracts were not rescinded.
On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong
sent a letter to petitioner, which reads as
follows:
March 1, 1991
"Mr. So Ping Bun
930 Soler Street
Binondo, Manila
Dear Mr. So,
Due to my closed (sic) business associate
(sic) for three decades with your late
grandfather Mr. So Pek Giok and late father,
Mr. So Chong Bon, I allowed you temporarily
to use the warehouse of Tek Hua Enterprising
Corp. for several years to generate your
personal business.
Since I decided to go back into textile
business, I need a warehouse immediately
for my stocks. Therefore, please be advised
to vacate all your stocks in Tek Hua
Enterprising Corp. Warehouse. You are
hereby given 14 days to vacate the premises
unless you have good reasons that you have
the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be
constrained to take measure to protect my
interest.
Please give this urgent matter your
preferential attention to avoid inconvenience
on your part.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd) Manuel C. Tiong
MANUEL C. TIONG
President" 4
Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4,
1992, petitioner requested formal contracts
of lease with DCCSI in favor of Trendsetter
Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after the
death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, he
had been occupying the premises for his
textile business and religiously paid rent.
DCCSI acceded to petitioner’s request. The
lease contracts in favor of Trendsetter were
executed.
In the suit for injunction, private respondents
pressed for the nullification of the lease
contracts between DCCSI and petitioner.
They also claimed damages.
After trial, the trial court
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:y
1. Annulling the four Contracts of Lease
(Exhibits A, A-1 to A-3, inclusive) all dated
March 11, 1991, between defendant So Ping
Bun, doing business under the name and
style of ‘Trendsetter Marketing’, and
defendant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. over
the premises located at Nos. 924-B, 924-C,
930 and 930, Int., respectively, Soler Street,
Binondo Manila;
2. Making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by this Court on June 21,
1991;
3. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the
aggrieved party, plaintiff Tek Hua
Enterprising Corporation, the sum of
P500,000.00, for attorney’s fees;
4. Dismissing the complaint, insofar as
plaintiff Manuel C. Tiong is concerned, and
the respective counterclaims of the
defendant;
5. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the
costs of this lawsuit;
This judgment is without prejudice to the
rights of plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising
Corporation and defendant Dee C. Chuan &
Sons, Inc. to negotiate for the renewal of
their lease contracts over the premises
located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and
924-C Soler Street, Binondo, Manila, under
such terms and conditions as they agree
upon, provided they are not contrary to law,
public policy, public order, and morals.
SO ORDERED." 5
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
above decision was denied.
On appeal by So Ping Bun, the Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court. On motion for
reconsideration, the appellate court modified
the decision by reducing the award of
attorney’s fees from five hundred thousand
(P500,000.00) pesos to two hundred
thousand (P200,000.00)
Petitioner is now before the Court raising the
following issues:
I. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S
DECISION FINDING SO PING BUN GUILTY OF
TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACT?
II. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED
IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES OF
P200,000.00 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS.
The foregoing issues involve, essentially, the
correct interpretation of the applicable law on
tortuous conduct, particularly unlawful
interference with contract. We have to begin,
obviously, with certain fundamental
principles on torts and damages.
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which
results from injury, and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for
the damage suffered. 6 One becomes liable
in an action for damages for a
nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest
in the private use and enjoyment of asset if
(a) the other has property rights and
privileges with respect to the use or
enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is
substantial, (c) the defendant’s conduct is a
legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the
invasion is either intentional and
unreasonable or unintentional and actionable
under general negligence rules. 7
The elements of tort interference are: (1)
existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge
on the part of the third person of the
existence of contract; and (3) interference of
the third person is without legal justification
or excuse. 8
A duty which the law of torts is concerned
with is respect for the property of others, and
a cause of action ex delicto may be
predicated upon an unlawful interference by
one person of the enjoyment by the other of
his private property. 9 This may pertain to a
situation where a third person induces a
party to renege on or violate his undertaking
under a contract. In the case before us,
petitioner’s Trendsetter Marketing asked
DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor,
and as a result petitioner deprived
respondent corporation of the latter’s
property right. Clearly, and as correctly
viewed by the appellate court, the three
elements of tort interference above-
mentioned are present in the instant
case.cralawnad
Authorities debate on whether interference
may be justified where the defendant acts for
the sole purpose of furthering his own
financial or economic interest. 10 One view is
that, as a general rule, justification for
interfering with the business relations of
another exists where the actor’s motive is to
benefit himself. Such justification does not
exist where his sole motive is to cause harm
to the other. Added to this, some authorities
believe that it is not necessary that the
interferer’s interest outweigh that of the
party whose rights are invaded, and that an
individual acts under an economic interest
that is substantial, not merely de minimis,
such that wrongful and malicious motives are
negatived, for he acts in self-protection. 11
Moreover, justification for protecting one’s
financial position should not be made to
depend on a comparison of his economic
interest in the subject matter with that of
others. 12 It is sufficient if the impetus of his
conduct lies in a proper business interest
rather than in wrongful motives. 13
As early as Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 14 we held
that where there was no malice in the
interference of a contract, and the impulse
behind one’s conduct lies in a proper
business interest rather than in wrongful
motives, a party cannot be a malicious
interferer. Where the alleged interferer is
financially interested, and such interest
motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that
he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.
15
In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner
So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease
the warehouse to his enterprise at the
expense of respondent corporation. Though
petitioner took interest in the property of
respondent corporation and benefited from it,
nothing on record imputes deliberate
wrongful motives or malice on him.
Section 1314 of the Civil Code categorically
provides also that, "Any third person who
induces another to violate his contract shall
be liable for damages to the other
contracting party." Petitioner argues that
damage is an essential element of tort
interference, and since the trial court and the
appellate court ruled that private
respondents were not entitled to actual,
moral or exemplary damages, it follows that
he ought to be absolved of any liability,
including attorney’s fees.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
It is true that the lower courts did not award
damages, but this was only because the
extent of damages was not quantifiable. We
had a similar situation in Gilchrist, where it
was difficult or impossible to determine the
extent of damage and there was nothing on
record to serve as basis thereof. In that case
we refrained from awarding damages. We
believe the same conclusion applies in this
case.
While we do not encourage tort interferers
seeking their economic interest to intrude
into existing contracts at the expense of
others, however, we find that the conduct
herein complained of did not transcend the
limits forbidding an obligatory award for
damages in the absence of any malice. The
business desire is there to make some gain
to the detriment of the contracting parties.
Lack of malice, however, precludes damages.
But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal
liability for entering into contracts and
causing breach of existing ones. The
respondent appellate court correctly
confirmed the permanent injunction and
nullification of the lease contracts between
DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without
awarding damages. The injunction saved the
respondents from further damage or injury
caused by petitioner’s interference.
Lastly, the recovery of attorney’s fees in the
concept of actual or compensatory damages,
is allowed under the circumstances provided
for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 16 One
such occasion is when the defendant’s act or
omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest. 17 But we
have consistently held that the award of
considerable damages should have clear
factual and legal bases. 18 In connection
with attorney’s fees, the award should be
commensurate to the benefits that would
have been derived from a favorable
judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of
the award of damages by the trial court calls
for appellate review such that the award if
far too excessive can be reduced. 19 This
ruling applies with equal force on the award
of attorney’s fees. In a long line of cases we
said, "It is not sound policy to place a
penalty on the right to litigate. To compel the
defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for
his successful opponent would throw wide
open the door of temptation to the opposing
party and his counsel to swell the fees to
undue proportions." 20
Considering that the respondent
corporation’s lease contract, at the time
when the cause of action accrued, ran only
on a month-to-month basis whence before it
was on a yearly basis, we find even the
reduced amount of attorney’s fees ordered
by the Court of Appeals still exorbitant in the
light of prevailing jurisprudence. 21
Consequently, the amount of two hundred
thousand (P200,000.00) awarded by
respondent appellate court should be
reduced to one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos as the reasonable
award for attorney’s fees in favor of private
respondent corporation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784
are hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION
that the award of attorney’s fees is reduced
from two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) to
one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 217004
RAMON R. VILLARAMA, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS,
Respondent
Before this Court is the Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court dated, April 20, 2015, of petitioner
Ramon R. Villarama that seeks to reverse
1
and set aside the Decision dated March
2
31, 2014 and the Resolution dated
February 18, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
3
(CA) reversing the Decision dated May 25,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 100, Quezon City in a case for
collection of sum of money with damages.
The facts follow.
Respondent Atty. Clodualdo De Jesus (Atty.
De Jesus) and petitioner, sometime in
October 1996, entered into a contract
denominated as "Contract for Legal
Services" and "Professional Fees" wherein it
was agreed upon that Atty. De Jesus shall
render legal services for petitioner in order
for the latter to take full possession of a
property located at No. 19 Jose Escaler St.,
Loyola Heights, Quezon City and the titling
of the same property under petitioner's
name; thus, under the heading, "Scope of
Legal Work," it reads:
1.1 The main objective in this
case is to see to it that the
property involved in this case (a
parcel ofland located at #19
Jose Escaler St., Loyola
 Heights, Quezon City, with an
area of 1,754 square meters)
shall remain in the possession
and be titled under the name of
4 the property. According to Atty. De Jesus,
the Client.
The contract also provides for a provision on
Success Fee which reads as follows:
2.3 Success Fee:
In the event Client is successful
in retaining possession and
having said property titled
under the name of the Client,
Counsel shall be paid ONE
MILLION (₱l,000,000.00)
5 demand for petitioner to settle at least 50%
PESOS.
Thereafter, in conformance to the contract,
Atty. De Jesus handled eight (8) cases that
involved petitioner in relation to the property
mentioned in the contract.
To be clear, the subject property was
formerly registered in the name of
petitioner's sister, Rita Reyes, and her
husband Marcial Reyes. The property was
then sold to Crisantomas Guno. Prudential
Bank lent Guno some amount as partial
payment for the purchase of the subject
property secured by a mortgage of the same
property. After Guno failed to pay the loan,
the same property was foreclosed by
Prudential Bank; thus, the 8 cases handled
by Atty. De Jesus stemmed from such
premise.
While acting as lawyer for petitioner, Atty.
De Jesus was able to obtain a favorable
judgment by having the Decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon
City in Civil Case No, 43-12872 reversed by
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85 in Civil
Case No. 43-12872. Petitioner has also
retained, and is still enjoying, the
possession of the said property. Atty. De
Jesus was also able to obtain favorable
decision for petitioner when the RTC of
Makati City declared him to be the owner of
the subject property to the extent of 70%,
the remaining 30% of which was adjudged
in favor of Prudential Bank.
As such, Atty. De Jesus claims that the first
condition for the payment of the success
fee, petitioner's retention of possession, had
been fulfilled. Thus, Atty. De Jesus was able
to pave the way for the partial fulfillment of
the second condition to the extent of70% of
what remains to be titled is only the 30%
portion of the property from Prudential Bank.
Hence, Atty. De Jesus feels that he is
entitled to claim the success fee provided
under the contract for legal services.
Subsequently, Atty. De Jesus stopped
rendering legal services to petitioner after
the former drafted the letter offer dated
November 30, 2005 stating that petitioner is
offering to buy Prudential Bank's ownership
of the 30% portion of the subject property.
Atty. De Jesus further made a formal
of the ₱1,000,000.00 stipulated in the
contract as success fee.
Petitioner, on the other hand, claims that he
has not paid the success fee because one
condition for the payment thereof - the
property being titled to his name has not yet
been fulfilled. According to petitioner, he
cannot yet transfer the title of the subject
property to his name because there are
pending cases initiated by the Spouses
Guno that involves the same property.
Petitioner also avers that there is a Decision
of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 95, in
Civil Case No. Q-52422 annulling Prudential
Bank's title over the property and ordering
the reinstatement thereof to the Spouses
Guno. The said decision has already been
affirmed by this Court and attained its
finality. However, petitioner still paid Atty. De
Jesus the amount of ₱100,000.00 after the
latter made a demand.
Thus, Atty. De Jesus filed a complaint for
the collection of sum of money with
damages with the RTC of Quezon City and,
on May 25, 2011, the said court found in
favor of petitioner. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the complaint is
hereby ordered dismissed for
lack of cause of action and
prematurity. Likewise
dismissed is the defendant's
claim for attorney's fees, moral
damages and exemplary
damages.
 6 there is no legal impossibility for the transfer
SO ORDERED.
Atty. De Jesus elevated the case to the CA
and, on March 31, 2014, the CA reversed
and set aside the Decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the
foregoing premises, the Appeal
is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated
May 25, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 100 in Civil Case No.
Q-06-57463 is hereby
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE
and a new one is entered
declaring Atty. Clodualdo C. De
Jesus entitled to fifty percent
(50%) of the success fee as
stated in the Contract of Legal
Services or FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (PhpS00,000.00)
PESOS. The amount of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (Phpl00,000.00) earlier
paid to him by Ramon R.
Villarama as advanced
payment is ordered deducted
therefrom.
7 paved the way for petitioner to get a
SO ORDERED.
His motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the CA, petitioner thus filed the
present petition with this Court raising the
following issues:
A. Whether the Court of Appeals is correct
in holding that the respondent is discharged
from fulfilling the second condition for the
entitlement of the ₱1,000,000.00 success
fee because the same has been rendered
legally impossible due to the final decision
annulling Prudential Bank's title to the
subject property.
B. Whether respondent is entitled to fifty
percent (50%) of the success fee less the
₱100,000.00 previously paid by the
8 In Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate
petitioner to respondent.
Petitioner argues that the CA is not correct
in discharging Atty. De Jesus from fulfilling
the second condition for the entitlement of
the ₱1,000,000.00 success fee because
of title to the property to petitioner. The CA,
in its Decision, ruled that due to the facts of
the case and the attendant circumstances,
the happening of the second condition was
jeopardized, placed beyond performance,
became legally impossible and manifestly
difficult to perform. Petitioner, however,
claims that there were still several remedies
that Atty. De Jesus could have utilized in
order to meet the second condition but the
latter had given up and abandoned such
task. As such, according to petitioner, Atty.
De Jesus is not entitled to fifty (50%) of the
success fee less the ₱100,000.00 previously
paid by petitioner.
9
In his Comment dated September 11,
2015, Atty. De Jesus contends that while it
is true that there was no legal impossibility
to have the title of the property transferred to
petitioner, it was petitioner upon the advice
of his counsel who refused to pay the value
of the 30% equity of the property in the
amount of ₱1,325,000.00. Thus, the second
condition is deemed fulfilled because
petitioner voluntarily prevented its fulfillment.
Atty. De Jesus further asserts that it was
only him who secured for petitioner
permanent possession of the property and
complete title by merely paying the 30%
equity of the property.
The Rules of Court require that only
questions of law should be raised in
10
petitions filed under Rule 45. This Court
is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain
questions of fact as the factual findings of
the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or
conclusive on the parties and upon this
11
[c]ourt" when supported by substantial
12
evidence. Factual findings of the
appellate courts will not be reviewed nor
13
disturbed on appeal to this Court.
14
Court, this Court distinguished questions
of law from questions of fact, thus:
As distinguished from a question of law -
which exists "when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain
state of facts" - "there is a question of fact
when the doubt or difference arises as to the
truth or the falsehood of alleged facts;" or
when the "query necessarily invites
calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of
witnesses, existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation to each other and to the whole and
15
the probabilities of the situation."
However, these rules do admit of
16
exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to
these rules have expanded. At present,
there are 10 recognized exceptions that
were first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio,
17
Jr.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
or conjectures; (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) Where there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment
is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; (7) The
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) When the facts set forth in
the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is
18
contradicted by the evidence on record.
In the present case, the findings of facts of
the R TC and the CA are apparently in
contrast, hence, this Court deems it proper
to rule on the issues raised in the petition.
After careful consideration, this Court finds
the petition unmeritorious.
The payment of the success fee, as
contained in the Contract for Legal Services,
is dependent on the fulfillment of two
conditions, namely: 1) petitioner retaining
possession of the subject property, and 2)
the property being titled under the name of
petitioner. Clearly, this falls under a
contingent fee contract. In The Conjugal
Partnership of the Spouses Cadavedo v.
19
Lacaya, this Court defined a contingent
fee contract as "an agreement in writing
where the fee, often a fixed percentage of
what may be recovered in the action, is
made to depend upon the success of the
litigation. "Contingent fee contracts are
permitted in this jurisdiction because they
redound to the benefit of the poor client and
the lawyer "especially in cases where the
client has meritorious cause of action, but
no means with which to pay for legal
services unless he can, with the sanction of
law, make a contract for a contingent fee to
be paid out of the proceeds of litigation.
Oftentimes, the contingent fee arrangement
is the only means by which the poor clients
can have their rights vindicated and upheld."
Further, such contracts are sanctioned by
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional
20
Ethics.
In this case, it is beyond dispute that the first
condition stipulated in the Contract for Legal
Services, through the services of Atty. De
Jesus, petitioner was able to retain
possession of the subject property. The
second condition, the transfer of title of the
property under the name of petitioner,
however, is yet to be fulfilled. According to
the CA, the second condition has been
rendered legally impossible to fulfill or
considered manifestly difficult to perform,
thus:
With respect to the second condition,
however, the trial court's assessment is that
the same is yet to be fulfilled and Atty. De
Jesus' claim is premature. We disagree.
1âwphi1
The facts of the case reveal that the second
condition ·has been rendered legally
impossible to fulfill or considered manifestly
difficult to perform. The trial court failed to
take into consideration the manifestation in
Villarama's evidence particularly Exhibit "4"
which states that:
On 1 December 1987, [Crisantomas Guno]
and his wife filed the complaint for
nullification of defendant Bank's title due to
defect in foreclosure proceedings, entitled
'Spouses Crisantomas and Carmelita Guno
vs. Prudential Bank and Trust Company
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-52422 in the
Regional Trial Court Branch 95 of Quezon
City. On 18 October 1991, the RTC
rendered a Decision annulling defendant
Bank's Title and ordering the reinstatement
of the spouses Guno's title. The RTC
Decision was affirmed on appeal by the
Supreme Court and became final and
executory on 11 March 1997. This the
Decision which [Crisantomas Guno] seeks
to enforce in this action.
It must also be noted that when the terms of
the agreement was drafted in 1996, the
prevailing circumstance then was that the
30% portion of the property was titled in the
name of Prudential Bank. Later, however,
spouses Guno was able to obtain a final and
favourable judgment in 1997 ordering the
cancellation of Prudential Bank's title.
Spouses Guno has yet to implement said
Decision. Thus, the previous understanding
that after Atty. De Jesus shall have ensured
the ownership of Villarama over the 70%
portion of the property and the latter shall
buy the remaining 30% of said property from
the bank so that Atty. De Jesus can now
have it fully titled to Villarama' s name was
also rendered legally impossible because of
the final Decision annulling Prudential
Bank's title to the subject property.
Accordingly, under the foregoing
subsequent circumstances, the happening
of the second condition was jeopardized and
placed beyond performance because of
these intervening legal developments. Had
the trial court been more circumspect and
receptive of the present factual
circumstances it would have considered that
our laws on contract admit certain
exceptions in order to discharge the obligor
from fulfilling the condition when said
condition is rendered beyond performance
or it has become so difficult to perform.
xxxx
Here, there is no dispute that the legal
developments that transpired in the string of
cases of Villarama relative to the subject
property has rendered the second condition
impossible to perform which factor cannot
be attributed to Atty. De Jesus. Thus, the
condition should be annulled excuse atty.
De Jesus from the obligation of fulfilling the
same before he could obtain the success
21
fee.
Upon consideration of the arguments of both
parties, this Court finds that the above-
reasoning of the CA is erroneous. There is
no legal impossibility in the fulfillment of the
second condition. There is still a remedy
upon which petitioner may be able to
transfer the title of the subject property
under his name. In fact, respondent
admitted in his Comment that there was no
legal impossibility and that the only
hindrance was the refusal of petitioner to
pay Prudential Bank the value of the 30%
equity of the property in the amount of
₱1,325,000.00. Although petitioner insists
that it has already taken steps in offering
Prudential Bank an amount to settle the
issue, this still negates the finding of the CA
that it is legally impossible for petitioner to
transfer the title of the property under his
name.
Be that as it may, the fact still remains that
petitioner was already awarded 70% of the
subject property by virtue of the RTC's
decision in Civil Case No. 95-973 through
the services of Atty. De Jesus. Thus, this
Court finds that Atty. De Jesus, as well as
every attorney, is entitled to have and
receive a just and reasonable compensation
for services performed at the special
instance and request of his client. Once the
attorney has performed the task assigned to
him in a valid agreement, his compensation
is determined on the basis of what he and
22
the client agreed. In the absence of the
written agreement, the lawyer's
compensation shall be based on quantum
meruit, which means "as much as he
23
deserved." The determination of
attorney's fees on the basis of quantum
meruit is also authorized "when the
counsel, for justifiable cause, was not
able to finish the case to its
24
conclusion." Moreoyer, quantum meruit
becomes the basis of recovery of
compensation by the attorney where the
circumstances of the engagement indicate
that it will be contrary to the parties'
expectation to deprive the attorney of all
 25
compensation. In this case, since
respondent was not able to fulfill one of the
conditions provident in the Contract for
Legal Services, his attorney's fees shall be
based on quantum meruit.
Quantum meruit- literally meaning as much
as he deserves - is used as basis for
determining an attorney's professional fees
in the absence of an express agreement.
The recovery of attorney's fees on the basis
of quantum meruit is a device that prevents
an unscrupulous client from running away
with the fruits of the legal services of
counsel without paying for it and also avoids
unjust enrichment on the part of the attorney
himself. An attorney must show that he is
entitled to reasonable compensation for the
effort in pursuing the client's cause, taking
into account certain factors in fixing the
26
amount of legal fees.
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility lists the guidelines for
determining the proper amount of attorney's
fees, to wit:
Rule 20.1 - A lawyer shall be guided by the
following factors in determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the
services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other
employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar
services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy
and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;
h) The contingency or certainty
compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether
occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Having established that petitioner is entitled
to attorney's fees and that he filed his claim
well within the prescribed period, the proper
remedy is to remand the case to the R TC
for the determination of the correct amount
of attorney's fees. Such a procedural route,
however, would only contribute to the delay
of the final disposition of the controversy as
any ruling by the trial court on the matter
would still be open for questioning before
the CA and this Court. In the interest of
justice, this Court deems it prudent to
suspend the rules and simply resolve the
27
matter at this level.
Based on the considerations set forth in
Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, this Court rules that the CA
was correct in its determination that Atty. De
Jesus is entitled to the extent of 50% of the
Php1,000,000.00 success fee stipulated in
the contract. As ruled by the CA:
At any rate, Atty. De Jesus cannot claim the
entire Phpl,000,000.00 success fee because
the fact remains that Villarama has yet to
place the entire subject property to his
name. Thus, applying the quantum meruit
principle in this case, Atty. De Jesus is
deemed to be entitled only to half of the
success fee for the effort and legal services
he had provided to Villarama. xxx
In fine, Villarama, under the Contract of
Legal Services, is obliged to pay Atty. De
Jesus his success fee to a fair and
reasonable extent of 50% or Php500,000.00
considering the latter's substantial
performance of his part of the contract. The
previous payment made by Villarama in the
amount of Php100,000.00 shall be
considered as an advanced payment
deductible from the Php500,000.00 of which
28
Atty. De Jesus is entitled.
It must always be remembered that the fact
that the practice of law is not a business and
of
the attorney plays a vital role in the
administration of justice underscores the
need to secure him his honorarium lawfully
earned as a means to preserve the decorum
and respectability of the legal profession. A
lawyer is as much entitled to judicial
protection against injustice, imposition or
fraud on the part of his client as the client
against abuse on the part of his counsel.
The duty of the court is not alone to see that
a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner;
it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid
his just fees. With his capital consisting of
his brains and with his skill acquired at
tremendous cost not only in money but in
expenditure of time and energy, he is
entitled to the protection of any judicial
tribunal against any attempt on the part of
his client to escape payment of his just
compensation. It would be ironic if after
putting forth the best in him to secure justice
for his client he himself would not get his
29
due.
WHEREFORE:, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated April 20, 2015, of petitioner
Ramon R. Villarama is DENIED for lack of
merit. Consequently, the Decision dated
March 31, 2014 and the Resolution dated
February 18, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209702. March 23, 2022 ]
SOCORRO P. CABILAO, PETITIONER,
VS. MA. LORNA Q. TAMPAN, REP. BY
HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JUDITH
TAMPAN-MONTINOLA & DANILO
TAMPAN, RESPONDENTS.
1 9
This Petition for Review on Certiorari
seeks to annul the January 31, 2013
2 3
Decision and October 3, 2013 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV.
No. 01695, which reversed the September
4 Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and
21, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29, in
so far as Civil Case No. 4826 is concerned
in the consolidated cases docketed as Civil
Case Nos. 4818 and 4826.
The Antecedents:
On April 7, 1988, Lorna Tampan-
Naldoza (Lorna) purchased a residential
house and lot from Socorro Cabilao
(Socorro) located at 599 Narciso St.,
Surigao City (subject property), covered by
TCT No. T-59, through a Deed of Absolute
Sale of a Residential Land together with a
5
House (Deed of Sale), in the amount of
P10,000.00. Since Lorna was in the United
States, her mother, Antonieta, purchased
6
the property on her behalf. In 1995, Lorna
decided to have TCT No. T-59 registered in
her name but she discovered that the
owner's duplicate got lost while it was kept
by Judith Tampan-Montinola (Judith) in the
house. Thereafter, Lorna, through Judith,
filed a petition for the issuance of a new
owner's duplicate. However, spouses
Lapulapu and Lelita (Lelita) Buyser
(collectively, spouses Buyser) opposed her
petition on the ground that they were in
possession of the said title after buying the
same from Socorro. Thus, Lorna's petition
7
was dismissed.
When Lelita informed Socorro about the
petition for the issuance of a new owner's
copy of the title, Socorro denied having sold
the subject property to Lorna. However, due
to the controversy, Socorro repurchased the
subject property and the owner's duplicate
8
was surrendered back to her.
On April 29, 1996, Lorna and Judith
lodged a complaint for declaration of nullity
of a pacto de retro sale entered into on
January 25, 1995 between Socorro and
spouses Buyser. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 4818.
On May 5, 1996, Socorro filed an action
for Annulment or Cancellation of Document,
Quieting of Title/Recovery of Ownership and
Possession, Injunction, and Damages with
10
Temporary Restraining Order against
Lorna and Danilo Tampan, which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4826. She
alleged that she was the absolute and
registered owner of the subject property
covered by TCT No. T-59 which was in her
possession. Moreover, on April 18, 1990,
she sold the subject property through a
pacto de retro sale to Enriqueta Baybayon
(Enriqueta) for P89,000.00, and to Lelita on
January 25, 1995. During both transactions,
she surrendered her owner's copy of TCT
11
No. T-59 to Enriqueta and Lelita.
12
In her Answer, Lorna maintained that
she owned the subject property and claimed
that Socorro was in full possession of her
mental faculties when they signed the Deed
of Sale before the notary public, Atty.
Ildefonso Mantilla (Atty. Mantilla). Moreover,
the document was translated and
interpreted by Atty. Mantilla to Socorro in the
Surigaonon dialect, which is the dialect she
understands. Since Lorna was in the United
States, her mother, Antonieta, personally
gave the consideration of P10,000.00 to
Socorro in the presence of Atty. Mantilla. In
the Deed of Sale, Antonieta also signed for
and on Lorna's behalf. The true
consideration paid was more or less
P100,000.00 but the Deed of Sale reflected
a lesser amount to avoid a higher payment
of taxes. The owner's copy of TCT No. T-59
was stolen by Socorro while she was living
13
in the subject property.
On August 23, 1996, the RTC ordered
the consolidation of Civil Case Nos. 4818
14
and 4826.
During trial, herein respondents
presented Judith, Matilde Flores (Matilde),
Atty. Mantilla, Jorge Quano (Jorge), and
Reynaldo Tampan (Reynaldo). On the other
hand, petitioner presented Enriqueta, Lelita,
and Socorro herself.
Judith testified that Lorna purchased the
property from Socorro through their mother,
Antonieta. Socorro turned over the owner's
copy of the TCT to Antonieta, who later own
handed it over to Judith when the former left
for the United States. Prior to Lorna's
purchase of the subject property, she used
to live three kilometers away and only
transferred in the subject property after its
purchase. From the time of the purchase,
they have been paying the real estate taxes
on the subject property, as well as the utility
bills. They also shouldered Socorro's
medical check-ups while she was residing
with them. Moreover, the transfer of title to
the property was not immediately done
since the money Lorna sent was only
sufficient for the payment of the property.
When Lorna sent the money for the transfer
of title sometime in 1995, it was also the
time when Socorro suddenly left their house
without notice and took the owner's copy of
15
the title with her.
Atty. Mantilla, the notary public before
whom the Deed of Sale was executed,
testified that he prepared and notarized the
Deed of Sale between Socorro and Lorna.
Socorro appeared personally while
Antonieta represented Lorna and signed on
her behalf The execution of the sale was
witnessed by a certain Roque Miole, legal
aid from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), and Maria Pecante, his
office staff. Socorro handed over a
photocopy of the title to Antonieta and the
16
latter gave Socorro P10,000.00.
Reynaldo confirmed that it was his sister
Lorna who bought the subject property, and
he accompanied Antonieta to the notary
public during the execution of the Deed of
Sale. The real consideration of the property
is P100,000.00 but only P10,000.00 was
declared in order to lessen the payment of
taxes. The following day, Socorro gave to
his mother the owner's copy of TCT No.T-
17
59.
Another witness, Matilde, worked as a
18
laundrywoman for the Tampans.
Meanwhile, Jorge lived in the subject
19
property for quite some time. Both
witnesses testified that Socorro sold the
20
subject property to Lorna.
On the other hand, Enriqueta testified
that the subject property was sold to her by
Socorro through a pacto de retro sale for
P89,000.00. As guarantee, Socorro gave
her the owner's copy of TCT No. T-59. She
gave the money to Socorro, who in turn
handed it over to Danilo Tampan (Danilo)
since the latter asked help from Socorro for
his construction business. Danilo and his was sold to Lorna. The Deed of Sale
father, Felicisimo, accompanied Socorro between Lorna and Socorro is
and signed as witnesses during the unenforceable considering that Lorna did
transaction. It took three years before not sign the document as she was in the
Socorro was able to redeem the property. United States at that time. While Antonieta
Moreover, it was Danilo who made the signed on her behalf, there was nothing on
partial payments and the balance was paid record to prove that Lorna authorized her
by Socorro after the latter found out that the mother to transact on her behalf. The price
21 of P10,000.00 is grossly inadequate thereby
whole amount had not been paid. rendering the contract questionable. Lastly,
the RTC pointed out that it took Lorna seven
Lelita testified that the subject property years before transferring the title to her
was sold to her by Socorro through a pacto name for no valid reason. Hence, the timing
de retro sale and the owner's copy of TCT was suspicious since Lorna wanted to
No. T-59 was also surrendered to her. She transfer the title of the property in her name
and her husband opposed the petition for 26
the issuance of a new owner's copy of the while Socorro was away.
title filed by Lorna. Eventually, Socorro
redeemed the property and Lelita returned The dispositive portion of the decision
the owner's copy of the title of the reads:
22
property. WHEREFORE, in view
of the foregoing, the Court
Lastly, Socorro denied the sale of the finds in favor of Socorro
23 Cabilao.
property in favor of Lorna. The Tampans
would let her sign various documents Civil Case No. 4818
whenever she borrowed money and claimed praying for the declaration
that the alleged Deed of Sale is one of those of the pacto de retro Sale
documents. It was Danilo and Felicisimo entered between
who requested her to mortgage the subject defendants as void; and for
property to Enriqueta since Danilo needed the spouses Buyser to
funds for his construction business. They deliver to the plaintiffs TCT
even promised to redeem the property. The No. T-59 had been
Tampans paid for the utility bills of the rendered moot and
24 academic and is hereby
house. DISMISSED.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court: Under Civil Case No.
4826, judgment is hereby
25 rendered declaring the
In its September 21, 2007 Decision,
"Deed of Absolute Sale of a
the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 4818 Residential Land Together
considering that Socorro had already with a House" dated April 7,
repurchased the property from Lelita and the 1988 null and void. Socorro
latter already returned the owner's copy of Cabilao is hereby confirmed
TCT No. T-59. Thus, the action for nullity of as the lawful owner of the
the pactro de retro sale had already become subject real properties. And
moot and academic. Lorna Q. Tampan-Montinola
and Danilo Q. Tampan and
As to Civil Case No. 4826, the RTC
any and all persons
declared the Deed of Sale between Socorro
claiming any right over the
and Lorna as null and void. It held that since
property through them are
TCT No. T-59 is under the name of Socorro,
hereby ordered to surrender
it was evidence of indefeasible title to the
possession of the subject
property. Moreover, the title was in
properties peacefully to
Socorro's possession which is contrary to
Socorro Cabilao.
the regular course of business, if indeed it
 No pronouncement as
to costs.
27
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondents filed an
28
appeal.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
29
In its January 31, 2013 Decision, the
CA reversed the RTC's findings. It held that
while the Torrens title is evidence of
indefeasible title over the property, the
execution of a deed of sale of such property
transfers the ownership thereof to the buyer
even if the same remains under the name of
the seller or registered owner. Since
Socorro assails the validity of the Deed of
Sale to Lorna, she has the burden of proving
its invalidity. However, Socorro failed to
substantiate her claim that the Tampans
employed fraud and deception in securing
her signature on the Deed of Sale. The
Tampans were paying for the realty taxes
over the property, thereby indicating strong
30
evidence of ownership.
The CA further held that the Deed of
Sale between Socorro and Lorna, being a
notarized document, bears evidentiary
weight with respect to its due execution and
enjoys a presumption of regularity. As to the
gross inadequacy of the consideration, the
CA ruled that it does not affect the validity of
the sale. Likewise, it held that the late or
non-registration of a deed of sale does not
31
affect its validity.
The fallo of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the
instant appeal is
GRANTED. The Decision
dated September 21, 2007
issued by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29, Surigao
City is hereby MODIFIED in
that as to Civil Case No.
4826, the same is hereby
REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the Complaint
for ["]Annulment or
Cancellation of Document,
Quieting of Title/Recovery
of Ownership and
Possession, Injunction, and
Damages with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining
Order" filed by appellee
Socorro Cabilao is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
32
SO ORDERED.
33
Socorro sought reconsideration but it
was denied by the CA in its October 3, 2013
34
Resolution.
35
Hence, the present petition. Socorro
maintains that she never sold the subject
property to Lorna or any of the latter's
representatives. As an illiterate person, she
claims that she does not understand English
and while the purported deed of sale bears
her signature, the same was obtained
through fraud by the Tampans in the guise
of signing loan documents whenever she
borrowed money. Thus, she contends that
the Deed of Sale is a simulated contract or
one tainted with fraud and therefore null and
36
void.
Socorro further claims that her
possession over the owner's duplicate copy
of the TCT is inconsistent with any intention
to convey ownership to another. The
property had been the subject of two pacto
de retro sales which shows that she clearly
had possession over the owner's copy of the
title. She points out that if the sale of the
subject property indeed transpired,
respondents did not take the necessary
steps to register the property in their name
37
for almost seven years.
38
In their Comment, respondents argue
that Socorro has the burden of proving the
existence of fraud which she failed to
discharge. Socorro already admitted the
genuineness of her signature in the Deed of
Sale. However, aside from her bare
assertion, Socorro's claim of the existence
of fraud remains unsubstantiated. More
importantly, the Deed of Sale was notarized.
Hence, it carried the presumption of its due
execution. As to the claim of gross
inadequacy of price and non-registration of
the deed of sale, respondents contend that it
does not affect the validity of a contract of
sale.
Both parties also filed their respective
39
memoranda.
Issue
The issue for resolution before the Court
is whether the Deed of Sale between Lorna
and Socorro is valid.
Our Ruling
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The present controversy hinges on the
validity of the Deed of Sale between Lorna
and Socorro, which however is a question of
40
fact. It is well-settled that questions of fact
are not reviewable in petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. As a general rule, this Court is not
duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the
evidence introduced in and considered by
41
the courts below. Factual findings of the
lower courts, if supported by substantial
evidence, are accorded great respect and
even finality by this Court unless the case
falls under any of the exceptions such as
when the findings are contrary to those of
42
the trial court. In the case at bar, the CA's
factual findings are contrary to those of the
RTC. Hence, this Court is called upon to
reevaluate the factual findings below.
After a judicious review of the records of
the case, We sustain the findings of the CA
and uphold the validity of the Deed of Sale
between Lorna and Socorro.
Article 1305 of New Civil Code (NCC)
provides that a contract is "a meeting of
minds between two persons whereby one
binds himself, with respect to the other, to
give something or to render some service."
The essential requisites are: (1) consent of
the contracting parties; (2) object certain
which is the subject matter of the contract;
and (3) cause of the obligation which is
established. In the present case, all the
elements of a valid contract are present. In
the case at bar, the Deed of Sale validly
transferred the ownership over TCT No. T-
59 from Socorro to Lorna in consideration of
P10,000.00. Arguing the absence of consent
on her part, Socorro claims that the Deed of
Sale is null and void since her signature
thereon was obtained through fraud, or
under the guise of a contract of loan.
However, the evidence on record belies her
theory.
Reynaldo testified that he was present
during the execution of the Deed of Sale
where he witnessed Antonieta and Socorro
sign the document. He further testified that
Socorro gave Antonieta the owner's
duplicate copy of the title the following
43
day.
More importantly, Atty. Mantilla, who
prepared and notarized the Deed of Sale,
testified and categorically stated that
Socorro signed the Deed of Sale and
received the consideration of P10,000.00
from Antonieta. At that instance, Socorro
handed over a photocopy of the duplicate
copy of the title to Antonieta. When asked
why Socorro only handed over a photocopy
of the TCT, she answered that the duplicate
copy was still with a certain Leon Danaque
44
because of her outstanding loan with him.
It is a well-settled rule that a duly
notarized document enjoys the prima facie
presumption of authenticity and due
execution, as well as the full faith and
45
credence attached to a public instrument.
Thus, a party assailing the authenticity and
due execution of a notarized document is
required to present evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely
46
preponderant. Here, Socorro failed to
overcome this burden. Aside from her self-
serving allegation that she did not know that
she was signing a Deed of Sale, there is
nothing else on record that supports her
assertion.
1âшphi1
 While Socorro claims that she is an
illiterate person, she failed to prove this fact.
When a party claims that one is unable to
read or is otherwise illiterate, and fraud is
alleged, a presumption that there is fraud or
mistake in obtaining consent of that party
arises under Article 1332 of the NCC, which
provides:
When one of the parties
is unable to read, or if the
contract is in a language not
understood by him, and
mistake or fraud is alleged,
the person enforcing the
contract must show that the
terms thereof have been
fully explained to the
former.
However, for Article 1332 to be
applicable, the contracting party who alleges
fraud or vitiated consent must establish the
same by full, clear and convincing
47
evidence. The party must show clear and
convincing evidence of one's personal
circumstances and that he or she is unable
to read at the time of execution of the
48
contested contract. Here, there is nothing
in Socorro's testimony showing that she
cannot read English or that she was
illiterate. To the contrary, the pacto de retro
49
sales that she entered into with Enriqueta
and Lelita, respectively, indicate that she is
able to read, affix her signature, freely give
her consent and enter into contracts. Thus,
the presumption of fraud did not arise and
Socorro had the burden of proving that the
Tampans fraudulently secured her signature
under the guise of another loan document
which she would usually sign whenever she
borrowed money. However, she failed to do
so. In fact, such purported loan documents
were not even offered in evidence.
It is also of no moment that the
consideration was in the amount of
P10,000.00. Gross inadequacy of price does
not affect the validity of a contract of sale,
unless it signifies a defect in the consent or
that the parties actually intended a donation
50
or some other contract. Inadequacy of
cause will not invalidate a contract unless
there has been fraud, mistake or undue
51
influence. As earlier stated, fraud was not
proven. Hence, the consideration in the
amount of P10,000.00 did not invalidate the
sale.
We likewise note that the title over the
subject property remained under Socorro's
name despite the execution of the Deed of
Sale. However, this does not also affect the
validity of the deed of sale. Transfer of the
certificate of title in the name of the buyer
and transfer of ownership to the buyer are
52
two different concepts. As correctly held
by the CA, between the seller and buyer,
ownership is transferred not by the issuance
of the new certificate of title in the name of
the buyer but by the execution of the
53
instrument of sale in a public document.
Article 1498 of the New Civil Code provides
that:
Art. 1498. When the
sale is made through a
public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of
the thing which is the object
of the contract, if from the
deed the contrary does not
appear or cannot clearly be
inferred.
Therefore, contrary to Soccoro's
assertion, it is of no moment that the title
was only registered seven years after the
deed of sale was executed. The sale was
already perfected upon the execution of the
Deed of Sale before Atty. Mantilla. The non-
registration of the title was also aptly
explained by Judith in that the money given
by Lorna, who was in the United States, was
only enough for the purchase of the
property. Hence, it took some time before
the same could be registered and
transferred in Lornas's name.
While Socorro was able to enter into
pacto de retro sales for being in possession
of the owner's duplicate of the TCT, this fact
cannot overturn the evidentiary weight of the
notarized Deed of Sale in favor of Lorna. In
fact, Enriqueta testified that the proceeds of
the pacto de retro sale were given to Danilo
for his construction company. During cross
examination, Soccoro confirmed this and
stated that it was Danilo and his dad SO ORDERED.
Felicisimo who requested to mortgage the
54
property. Precisely because the title was
still in Socorro's name despite the sale, it is
logical to conclude that the Tampans had to
ask Socorro to enter into a contract with
Enriqueta to borrow money. If indeed the
pacto de retro sale was entered into
because Danilo borrowed from Socorro as
the latter claims, it would have been prudent
if the loan was put into writing and
presented as evidence. However, such is
not the case.

It is also uncontested that the real

55
property taxes are paid by the Tampans.
It is a settled rule that tax declarations and
realty tax payment of property are not
conclusive evidence of ownership, they are
nonetheless good indicia of the possession
in the concept of owner, for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least
56
constructive possession. Coupled with
the other pieces of respondent's evidence, it
is reasonable to conclude that the property
was indeed sold to Lorna since the
Tampans have been living in the property
and exercising acts of dominion and control
over the property.

As between the testimonies of petitioner

and her other witnesses which failed to
prove clearly, positively, and convincingly
that she did not intend to sell the property,
and the testimonial and documentary
evidence of respondents, i.e., the notarized
Deed of Sale, tax declaration, and tax
receipts, the latter evidence prevails.
Testimonial evidence is susceptible to
fabrication and there is very little room for
choice between testimonial evidence and
documentary evidence. Thus, in the
weighing of evidence, documentary
evidence prevails over testimonial
57
evidence. Taking into account the totality
of evidence in the present case, this Court is
inclined to rule in favor of Lorna.

WHEREFORE, the petition is

hereby DENIED. The January 31,
2013 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 01695
is hereby AFFIRMED.