Sympathy and nobleness

In this section, I aim at offering a clear account of Mill’s sympathy; but before we
start digging deep into the concept, we need to clarify, how motivation, passion, and
action connects in the field of ethology and social psychology. When discussing the
connection between human action and emotion, Mill always focused on the law of
association, “我們愛一事而憎另一事，因某種行動或思考感到愉悅(pleasure)而對
另一種感到痛苦(pain)時，是由於我們的教育或是經驗，而對這些事物抱持著可
悅的或可惡的想法。”, that is, Mill (especially in his earlier years) underline that via
the induction of experiences and analyzing causal connection between concepts, we
are able to understand natural order and human mind comprehensively and
systematically.
Different from Bentham, Mill believed that, if we base our like or dislike of an action
on the expectation of consequences, we are bound to rely on agents’ own capability
of deliberation, which would largely limit the function of law of association on
teleology. Hence, the motivation before action could be responsible for an agent's
like or dislike, affecting agent’s consideration, generating fondness or aversion of the
action. (CW X: 12-13) Based on this argument, Mill considered himself to pay more
attention to human motivation instead of consequences alone compared to
Bentham.
About this methodology, Ryan(1987: xxxi-xxxii, 59) regards that Mill has appeared
inductivism and rationalism at the same time, also rejecting pure moral intuitionism;
however, I should content that, the reason why Mill especially focused on the deep
expression and resonance of human emotion in his later publications such as
Utilitarianism, is strongly connected to his mental crisis in his later years; after Mill’s
mental crisis, Mill had turned his concern from pure rational analysis to the role of
what law of association plays in forming human character, and ponder the
connection between the cultivation of human internal culture and happiness. These
transformations make Mill’s philosophical methodology lean towards intuitionist on
the spectrum of analytical-intuitionist.
Therefore, when discussing the essence of Mill’s thoughts, we cannot overlook his
concern on moral sentiment and the cultivation of character in his later years;
especially, Mill had continuously emphasized that the science of character falls in the
aspect of ethology studies, which is used for diagnosing the tendency of human
behaviours. (CW VIII: 869-870) In the study of character, the concept of sympathy is
the core, plays an irreplaceable role in Mill’s theory, providing normativity and moral
foundation. (U: 51-52) Whereas about the connection of sympathy and moral
sentiment, Mill pointed out that though sympathy is an innate instinct of humans, it
is not part of morality, until it is subject to society. (U: 52) According to Berger (1984:
21-26, 58), Mill distinct social and individual sympathy because the former only
concern the feelings of like or dislike, while the later has the trait of judging right or
wrong, and cares about the public well-being; as so, could the later be rendered
normativity, being considered moral sentiment. Under the premise of sociability,
sympathy could be practiced and cultivated by our daily life in society. This argument
by Berger reflects Mill’s belief in the cultivation of human internal culture, and also
rejects the idea of Mill deconstructing moral philosophy only from an analytic
perspective.
For the role of sympathy in Mill’s view on morality, besides providing normativity,
also plays the basis of human conscientious feelings. Compared to the external
sanctions which stems from the law or society, internal sanctions could originate
from sympathy, love, fear, or other causes such as life experience or social pressure;
nevertheless, the final nail on the coffin to our internal sanction, is still the
conscientious feelings. (U: 29-30)
However, according to Mill’s argument, it seems sympathy does not have priority on
forming conscientious feelings, only a constituent among other experiences or
feelings. On this question, we first need to consider the extension of the law of
association, Mill believed that we could feel the corresponding emotions when
seeing others’ pain or pleasure (Berger, 1984: 20), through the nature of sympathy
could we construct real feelings by imagination, wherefore sympathy is the major
factor of composing individual happiness (CW I: 188). On the other hand, Mill
believed that the happiness of utilitarianism relies on the primitive nature, which is
the “desire to union with fellow creature”; the effect of sympathy is indispensable to
fulfill the desire; that is, by demonstrating sociability to others, which implies the
capability of sympathizing others’ emotions, we are able to feel others’ pleasure and
happiness as our own; and through the interactions between fellow creatures,
sympathy is applicated in a broader scale, rendering the foundation of external
sanction (U: 31-33).
In addition, Mill also emphasized the strong social bonds of fellow creatures, if we do
not sympathize our fellow creatures’ pleasure, the happiness of individual is not
genuine: “the deeply rooted conception which every individual even now has of
himself as a social being tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there
should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures.”
(U: 34). What contrast to the pleasure of happiness is, the pain of disconnection with
fellow creature, Nussbaum(2013: 70-72) further pointed out, Mill intended to build a
“religion of humanity” through the strong moral sentiment formed by the
connection of fellow creatures, in order to diminish the selfishness of human,
constructing the love for the greater collective. Combine the clues and arguments
above, we can boldly suggest that, the origin of internal sanction, which is upheld by
our conscience, besides the fear of losing the connection with fellow creature,
another significant crisis is harming others’ happiness due to the violation of social
norms, which by the law of association, could bring harm to one’s own happiness;
the pain, in utilitarian doctrine, is the primary enemy, hence, we set up our
conscience to avoid these pains. This further explained what Mill claimed, the
supreme position of conscience in our internal sanction.
About the line of connection and sympathy, Mill also regarded the golden rules in
Bible, “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”, and “love thy
neighbor”, as the perfect practice of utilitarian ethics. As we can see, Mill’s attention
to sympathy and conscientious feelings prove my previous argument that Mill's
philosophical methodology in his later years, or at least in Utilitarianism, is closer to
intuitionism.
Though social sympathy provides normativity for human life and laid a solid
foundation for utilitarian morals, Mill had acknowledged that, there exists limitations
of human sympathy, regardless of strength or width, most of the time, our sympathy
only applies for the small number of people around us. (U: 19, Skorupski, 2006: 20,
Brudney, 2006: 488-489) In the humanity Mill had outlined, how to extend our
sympathy to a greater extent, to fulfill the greatest felicity of society? Also, pleasure
and pain are not unanimous, how to determine which kind of pleasures should we
pursue? (U: 11)
First, upon the question of which pleasure worth pursuing, Mill offered the idea that
only “competent judges” could mediate the strife. (U: 11) Onto the definition of
competent judge, Skorupski (1999: 305-306) further pointed out that they should be
judges who are well educated, rich in life experience, and endowed with sufficient
imagination to demonstrate their sympathy; Mill firmly believed that, via experience
or education, people can associate pleasure with utility. (CW I: 182) In which, life
experience matters the most, for Mill’s law of association, every personal experience
is true and eternal, our feelings toward external worlds are built upon the
experience of our internal feelings. (Ryan, 1987: 93, 97) Competent judges should
determine which kind of pleasures could be beneficial for increasing public felicity,
laying down appropriate moral principles.
Following Skorupski’s thoughts, he offered two aspects of thinking regarding Mill’s
competent judge; first is the argument between Schmidt-Petri (2003: 102-104) and
Riley (2003: 410-417), on whether Mill stayed true to his claim, viewed utility
qualitatively instead of quantitatively. I argue, Riley’s explanation of Mill could better
express Mill’s emphasis on the quality of pleasure (U: 8-10), also better highlights
Mill’s cultivation on life experience and internal culture. The second aspect of
thinking would be that why should people with very distinct life experience follow
the moral principle laid down by competent judges altogether.
In the second aspect, deep in its core, would be the root question of why the
academic community has so many disputes on whether Mill is an act-utilitarian or a
rule-utilitarian. When responding to the criticisms on utilitarianism, Mill had stated
the two moral principle of utilitarianism, those be, the first principle concerning the
greatest happiness of the greatest number, and the secondary principle concerning
the norms and customs passed down till now through the inheritance of experience;
most of the time, people only need to follow the guidance of secondary principles to
accord to the pursuit of public utility, only when multiple secondary principles
disputes, do we seek for the resolution of the first principle. (U: 23-26)
In this conclusion, which Mill ranked moral principles seems to imply his slight
patriarchal view on moral, imposing moral principles on others who share no
similarity of life experience, ignoring the self-governing probability of individuals, is
totally opposite to the individuals what Mill had concluded in On Liberty, which are
rich in creativity and vitality. (Himmelfarb, 1990: iv-v) Arneson(1989: 416) offered an
answer to this question, that is, Mill’s patriarchy only appears when attempt to
prevent actions condemned by common experiences, on other occasions, people still
follow their own principle constructed upon their own life experience(CW XVIII: 281).
This technique, which quotes the flaws in other moral philosophy to defend
utilitarianism, pointing out other moral philosophy faces similar problems as
utilitarian morality is a commonplace in Mill’s Utilitarianism.
However, this reply is not satisfying enough, particularly that Mill did not directly
respond to the core moral question of competent judge and utilitarian principle:
unique personal experience, even explained from Riley’s approach, ranking pleasures
based on the competent judges’ ranking, how could the rank built by competent
judges applied universally? To this question, perhaps we could take a bold inference,
Mill had never tried to construct a universal happiness standard.
About the clues of questions above, could be found in Mill’s criticism of Bentham. In
the criticism, Mill pointed out the three aspects of human behaviours, the moral
aspect which judges right or wrong by conscience and reasoning, the aesthetic
aspect which judges admirable or despicable by imagination, and the sympathetic
aspect which judges like or dislike by fellow-feelings; most sentimentality concerns
the latter two, while Bentham, on the contrary, neglects the latter two. (CW X: 112-
113) As I have mentioned, the internal sanction of morality which is formed by our
conscientious feelings, sympathizing our fellow creature plays a key role in Mill’s
theory; by which, we can reasonable believe that, Mill’s principle of utility is a moral
philosophy that systemize the subjective feeling of morality via the concept of
“happiness”.
In addition, Mill appealed to secondary principle as the standard of moral
judgement, combine with my previous argument on Mill’s concern on experience
and competent judge, we could make a bold speculation, that Mill considered these
secondary principles inherited from the experiences of the competent judges, not
only based on competent judges’ judgments, also has become principles could be
sympathized by society in general; these experiences, combine with various social
environment, forming an organism which could adjust to distinct condition; these
experiences, by generations of revision and conservation, are handed down to date,
presenting the results of sympathy to the society in the face of moral principles.
If we put this speculation back to the first question proposed, that is, how to
broaden the boundaries of sympathy from a small number of individuals to a larger
social extent, the experiences inherited by competent judges could also complement
this argument. The experience of sympathy, which only exists in a smaller
community previously, via the social activities of its members, form the secondary
principles suit for the custom or habit of said community; along with the expansion
of the community, and the interactions with other communities, different
communities revise the secondary principles by their imagination of sympathy
altogether, to make which conform to the social activities on larger scales; sympathy,
in this context, start from community-oriented, becoming society-oriented. During
this process, to construct new moral principles based on the experience of different
social members, competent judges would revise and weigh the conflicts between
secondary principles based on their own perspective on the first principle. This
account could also respond to Berger’s (1984: 108-109) integration on Mill’s two
moral principles, utility principle being the first principle, is the measure to all moral
principles.
This account does respond to how Mill extends sympathy, but concerning the
boundaries, do the boundaries of sympathy have maximum limitations? Or do the
minimum units exist? On the minimum units, Mill’s response is the individuals who
purely care about their own pleasure, but what about the maximum limitation?
Skorupski(2006: 22-24) claimed that Mill’s principle of utility must rely on
impartiality, however, due to individuals’ conflicts on their own benefits, it is
improbable to accomplish universal impartiality in practice. But here Skorupski
obviously garbled Mill’s idea on principle of justice and principle of utility; Mill
indeed stated that justice relies on the impartiality of legal system (U: 61-62), but
justice is mere one of the many branches among moral feelings, a secondary
principle subject to the principle of utility, even more, Mill believed that justice is
sometimes expediency that people abuse the principle of utility (U: 42-43, 63-64).
Nevertheless, this issue, concerning impartiality brought up by Skorupski, would be
intriguing if discussed alongside the “impartial spectator” Adam Smith mentioned in
The Theory of Moral Sentiment.
Devigne (2006: 48-49, 80) keenly observed that, the impartial spectator which Smith
argued, should not involve in any personally related issues in order to remain
consistent partiality; on the contrary, Mill’s view on how individuals socialize never
exceeds the bounds of personal experience. This is a small but dangerous mistake in
Skoruski’s argument, he took away personal experience, which Mill valued, from
moral judgement, replacing it with a concept totally different from the original
context, namely, justice, creating an illusion that Mill’s theory has major
inconsistency.
Therefore, considering Mill’s value on personal experience, the exchange of justice
on forming secondary principles, and the importance on how sympathy maintains
social activities, Mill’s perspective on moral and happiness is clear, put it in Berger’s
(1984: 63) words, that is: the best chance of individuals pursuing their paramount
happiness is to make their happiness closely bonded with others’. Out of the pursuit
of paramount happiness, humans need to cultivate their own internal culture, letting
their personal experience, combined with the imagination of sympathy, be able to
feel others’ feelings via the law of association, creating connection between each
individuals’ happiness, to accomplish the maximum general happiness.
Full account of nobleness
Skorupski has provided us sketches on which traits should Mill’s competent judges
carry, they should be well-educated, rich in life-experience, and have sufficient
imagination to express their sympathy. But is becoming a competent judge the same
concept as carrying nobleness? How to define the causal or constituent relation of
these two? For this question, maybe we can find some clues from Mill’s concern on
the “quality of pleasure”.
We are already very familiar that Mill concerned much about the quality of pleasure.
About how to decide the quality of pleasure, competent judges should determine,
based on their life experience, when multiple pleasures cannot be gained at the
same time, which kind of pleasures could be deserted; when pursuing certain
pleasures, could other pleasures be casted away for the satisfaction of the desired
pleasure; from these decisions, the hierarchy of pleasure is constructed. Only
individuals possessing higher faculties can construct the hierarchy, for Mill, they are
the individuals who had been through multiple choices of pleasures. Based on the
reflection of their own experience, they are able to determine which kind of
pleasures provide higher fulfillment of mind, and these determinations decide these
competent judges’ behavior. (U: 10-11) When the actions concern the well-being of
the society combined, it becomes the choice of secondary principles, which is
resolved by the hierarchy of pleasures of the competent judges, to determine which
kind of normative principles are more possible to promote the happiness of all.
Here, Mill did notice that, on pleasure, due to the difference of everyone’s like and
aversion, subjective feelings cannot coincide (U: 3), this seem to weaken Mill’s
argument on the quality of pleasure; on this question, Mill has repeatedly
emphasized: simple physical contentment is different from mental fulfillment, if one
choose physical contentment over mental fulfillment, then one must have never
experienced the later (U: 13-14). Combined with my argument on competent judges
earlier, we can say that one can never be a competent judge without enriching one’s
life experience on various pleasures.
For instance, if we want to construct the hierarchy of pleasure between cuisine(C),
poetry(P) and music(M), competent judge A considers P>M>C, while competent
judge B considers M>P>C; under this condition, though we can confirm that C
provide the least pleasure among three, how should we determine whether P or M
occupy the higher rank of hierarchy? About this, Devigne(2006: 115) offered his
account on Mill, which considers competent judges can reach consensus via their
experience exchange and imagination; while Smart(1973: 17) offered a different
account, based on our distinct perspective on pleasure, our choices on pleasure are
purely intrinsic preferences.
Their different interpretation on Mill does not mean that Mill’s philosophy has
fracture or logically inconsistent, instead, they focus on the different aspect of Mill’s
thoughts; the former concern more on the exchange of experiences, the later
concern more on the distinction of individual preferences. But if the preference is
different, the exchange of experience must be obstructed, then, did Mill make the
reconciliation? We can investigate from Ryan’s (1987: 207, 215-19) viewpoint, he
sees Mill’s idea of moral as an “Art of Life”, through moral, prudence, and aesthetic,
we form a systematic standard to determine whether our actions are legitimate, and
these standards are constructed on the basis of the utilitarian principle, to let us
answer the question of “how to provide moral justification of our self-preference”.
Ryan’s account on Mill shows a clear direction, nevertheless, under the subjective
preference, can Mill’s view of utility provide a stricter hierarchy? Brink (2013: 63, 70-
76) also offers a detailed perspective, he regards that, Mill’s view on happiness, is
not what Benthamite utilitarianism underlines, an hedonist idea that the intensity of
pleasure be determined by individuals’ subjective preference, instead, Mill’s
utilitarianism consists strong objectivism; in Mill’s perspective of happiness, besides
transferring individual’s different attitude on varying pleasures into the solicitude of
public well-being, how to determine which kind of pleasures occupy the higher
position should be based on whether its fulfillment excites the agents’ higher faculty,
and exercising higher faculty could lead to happiness; this account provides a solid
system on how Mill viewed higher quality of pleasure, also brings out a perfectionist
thread of Mill’s idea that individual moral could be nurtured by culture.
Though Brink offered a clear and definite boundary of Mill’s quality of pleasure, I
cannot fully agree with Brink’s account. Focusing Mill’s view on utility on objectivism
and publicity ignores Mill’s emphasis on his construction of individual morals, the
reflection of individuals on particular experiences, neither can respond to Mill’s
solicitude on sympathy. On which, I contend, that the subjective feelings ignored by
Brink could combine with Ryan’s argument on the justification of self-preference:
due to the particularity of life experience, individuals divergent on their faculties,
hence, distinct on the feeling of pleasure, creating the difference of preference;
however, quality of pleasure is objective to every individual, determined by whether
of which could excite the growth of individual faculty to the maximum extent. This
argument, besides corresponding to my previous conclusion, that Mill’s utilitarianism
is a moral philosophy which systematic the subjective feeling of “happiness”, we
could also find a normative basis for the life experience exchanged through
sympathy: provide different imaginations for the individuals to excite the growth of
faculty.
So far, I have constructed Mill’s utility system using faculty as the standard to
determine the quality of pleasure, though individuals differ on subjective preference
of pleasure, excitement of faculty is beneficial to elevating individuals’ character and
maximizing utility. This approach highlights Mill’s concern on the growth of
individuals, and Brink also vividly captures two essences of Mill’s view on individual
growth, providing us some clues: first, higher faculty is helpful on forming internal
culture, which is the cultivation of character; second, cultivating ideal character is
intrinsic valuable. On what is an ideal character, Mill called it nobleness:
“that the cultivation of an ideal nobleness of will and conduct, should be to
individual human beings an end, to which the specific pursuit either of their own
happiness or of that of others (except so far as included in that idea) should, in any
case of conflict, give way. But I hold that the very question, what constitutes this
elevation of character, is itself to be decided by a reference to happiness as the
standard. The character itself should be, to the individual, a paramount end, simply
because the existence of this ideal nobleness of character, or of a near approach to
it, in any abundance, would go further than all things else towards making human
life happy; both in the comparatively humble sense, of pleasure and freedom from
pain, and in the higher meaning, of rendering life, not what it now is almost
universally, puerile and insignificant—but such as human beings with highly
developed faculties can care to have.” (CW VIII: 952)
As we can see from the quote above, Mill expressed strong solicitude on the
cultivation of nobleness, strong enough to be mentioned alongside the pursuit of
happiness; does this imply that Mill abandoned Bentham and his hedonist viewpoint
of utility, abandoning the utilitarian doctrine which sees pleasure the only intrinsic
value, causing his view on utility inconsistent (Brink, 2013: 55, 59)? Or, the utilitarian
principle Mill promoted only serves the purpose of creating people with nobleness?
another argument by Mill may provide thoughts from a different angle, that is,
considering nobleness as the prerequisite of maximizing general happiness:
“for that (utility) standard is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the
greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether
a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that
it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer
by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of
nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness
of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction
from the benefit.” (U: 11)
Through the two quotations above, we can sketch an outline on how Mill linked
utility and nobleness: an individual of nobleness, though not necessarily happy
owing to his/her nobleness, can still increase the general happiness. This outline left
Mill two intriguing parts of Mill’s thought; first, is the combination of happiness be
calculated by the “accumulation” of individual happiness? Second, if based on
accumulation calculation, how could an unhappy individual increase general utility?
For these two questions, we should combine with my account on how Mill treated
sympathy and character elevation excited by faculty. Like what I have argued,
growth of faculty has normative reason on sympathy, under this normativity,
capability of sympathy is exercised not only for the union of fellow creature,
regarding others’ pleasure as one’s own extension; but a higher quality pleasure
which can excite the growth of faculty, rendering individuals broader imaginations of
different life experiences. This interpretation of Mill making his perspective of utility
not a simple arithmetic math maximized by accumulation, instead, is a more
biological understanding, regarding utility as an organism which can adjust to diverse
individuals and ever changing social environment; and the individual growth
concerned by Mill, under this context, could be understood as an ”evolution with
purpose”.
From this perspective, all lives evolve involuntarily to adapt to the environment, just
like the innate conditions and acquired stimulations are very divergent to each
individuals, they are provided with different imagination on character elevation;
meanwhile, all lives have purposes, through the desire on certain lifestyle,
individuals are able to elevate own faculty via the excitement of higher quality
pleasure, making their character growth closer to their own imagination. So far, I
have offered a clear account on Mill’s nobleness: first, on the aspect of moral
sentiment, individuals should cultivate sympathy to extend one's own pleasure to
others, imagining diverse styles of life; second, on the aspect of faculty, individual
could elevate one's own faculty via the excitement of higher quality pleasure; the
final aspect, is the desire on certain character.
The reason why individuals have different desires, is because competent judges have
demonstrated their lifestyles to us, providing evidences on how pleasures excite
faculty elevation, rendering references for individuals on life choices; competent
judges, to the commoners who have not yet cultivated their nobleness, they provide
and shepherd a path of character elevation, which can be seen as the existence of
demi-god. (Green, 2003: 164-166)
By this interpretation, Mill’s ethics congregate sympathy, character elevation, and
enjoying higher quality pleasure into the concept of nobleness, threatening this
foundation for reconciling individual difference and practicing utilitarianism; Mill’s
utilitarianism is also not purely hedonist, seeing pleasure as the only intrinsic value,
but possess the trait of perfectionism, concerning individual growth and character
elevation. However, this interpretation leaves the contradiction between the end of
hedonism and the perfectionist view unresolved; also, how could individual life and
character perfection be associated with the greatest utility of society? I would
further discuss these questions in the following section.
The reconciliation of hedonism and perfectionism
I have demonstrated that Mill’s happiness consists of both hedonism and
perfectionism, concerns about the pursuit of pleasure and the development of
individuals at the same time; however, hedonism and perfectionism aren’t
compatible on their ends, should an individual pursue pleasure or the elevation of
character? Based on my context, it seems that Mill’s perspective on pleasure is more
instrumental than substantial; we desire pleasure in order to elevate our faculty, and
faculty is the constituent of nobleness. But as Brink(1992: 76) has pointed out,
stimulation of faculty does not serve the sole purpose of facilitating character
growth, but also includes the intrinsic value of pleasure in itself. Interpreting Mill in
this fashion wouldn’t deviate his thought from the Utilitarian doctrine since
Bentham, which regards pain and pleasure as the dominant force of life, also echoes
Mill’s continuous emphasis of happiness being the sole end. Nevertheless, Mill’s
argument on individual growth cannot be overlooked, which means that there must
be compromise between pursuing pleasure and individual growth; hence, in this
section, I will dig deeper into Mill’s concept of hedonism and perfectionism,
reconciling the contradiction of their ends.
First, regarding the perspective of perfectionism, Hurka(1993: 4-5, 17, 48) has given
specific definitions on broad and narrow perfectionism. On the broader aspect,
perfectionism emphasize on the development of faculty, in order to reach the
condition of excellence; while the narrow perfectionism focus on the development
of human nature, ”It is an ideal people ought to pursue regardless of whether they
now want it or would want it in a hypothetical circumstances, and apart from any
pleasure it may bring.” And this kind ideal circumstance, instead of the contingency
of adapting to the environment, should be obligatory under all circumstances. Based
on this definition, my account for Mill’s perfectionism does not fit Hurka’s “narrow
perfectionism”, but still possesses the property of perfectionism in a broader sense.
Brudney(2008: 486, 512-515) considers Mill’s perfectionism has two aspects, first is
the extension of sympathy, which includes broadening the subjects, strengthening
the feelings and extending the boundary; while the other aspect is allowing
individual to choose the goal of self-development freely, to fulfill the desiring
character. But Brudney claims the essence of these two aspects are contradictory: an
individual's choice of character is restrained by society, while individuality would be
undermined if sympathy extends. However, I should argue that, Brudney did not
consider the possibility that Mill embedded individuality and character development
into social context; if we consider specific character and lifestyle as part of the social
evolution, then there would be no contradiction between the two aspects.
On the other hand, Brink(2013: 77) has provided an extended version of how Mill
combined perfectionism and hedonism: ”Because appreciation of value is a fitting
response to value, we can understand the appreciation of perfectionist value itself a
perfectionist value. This kind of hedonist value can be part of perfectionism.” About
this interpretation, Beaumont(2019: 556-561) questioned Brink turn Mill into a mere
“nominally hedonist” through the separation of subjective and objective pleasure, he
also cited Mill’s other works to point out Brink’s argument is insufficient to deny
Mill’s commitment to hedonism.
Though Beaumont’s refutation on Brink strengthens the link between Mill and
hedonism, he cannot explain Mill’s heed on elevating character and cultivating
nobleness; however, Brink’s account, which is based on faculty, can answer this
question. Though in Mill’s own writing, especially in the book of Utilitarianism, he
indeed emphasized that “the utilitarian doctrine is that happiness is desirable, and
the only thing desirable, to that end; all other things being only desirable as means
to that end” (U: 35), but in Mill’s other writings, he also treated happiness as an
inessential secondary value inferior to the elevation of nobleness. (CW VIII: 950-952)
About this conflict, I argue, perhaps Mill did not specifically investigate the conflict;
or it could be, by mentioning both values at the same time, Mill tried to imply to his
readers subtly, elevation of character is happiness.
But we need a closer examination on Mill’s understanding of happiness. Mill’s
account of motivation is not purely hedonist, which sees pain and pleasure the only
end; Mill admitted that avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure are the basis to all
behavior, but through the long practice of law of association, our behavior had
attained the purpose of pleasure in itself, instead of just being the mean to the end.
For instance, back in our childhood, when we were in schools, we were always
delighted by hearing the school bell, but the school bell is the mean for dismissing
the class; before the law of association had applied, what pleasured us was the break
time, but under the long term effect of law of association, even school bell itself
become something pleasurable.
Through this mechanism, behavior has become something desirable in itself, adding
on long term desire, habit of will is able to transcend mere like or dislike, into our
own character. (CW VIII: 842-843) Via this connection, we could have a deeper
understanding on why Mill would claim that certain things are “desired and desirable
in and for themselves; besides being means, they are a part of the end”. (U: 37) In
this sense, Mill’s view on desire is not purely hedonist, which considers pleasure as
the only end possessing intrinsic value, also has its instrumental and external value;
as we can see, establishing character is deeply connected with the satisfaction of
desire.
Back to the interpretation of how Mill considered elevating character as happiness,
we can find some clues from his idea on Wordsworth’s poetry:
“What made Wordsworth’s poem a medicine for my state of mind was that they
expressed, not outward beauty but state of feeling, and of thought coloured by
feeling, under the excitement of beauty. They seemed to be the very culture of
feelings which I was in quest of. By their means I seem to draw from a source of
inward joy, of sympathetic and imaginative pleasure, which could be shared by all
human beings, which had no connexion with struggle or imperfection, but would be
made richer by every improvement in the physical or social condition of mankind. I
seemed to learn from them what would be the perennial sources of happiness, when
all the greater evils of life should be removed. And I felt myself at
once better and happier as I came under their influence.”
What this quoted passage highlights is, in Mill’s thought, he did regard the
cultivation of feelings as happiness in the aspect of moral sentiment. Whereabout in
the aspect regarding elevating faculties, Mill argued that one’s mind can never get
satisfied if it cannot prompt its own faculty growth, and an unsatisfied mind is no
way near happiness. Combined with Brink’s account on how Mill treats the relation
between faculty and happiness, we can prove that Mill did associate elevating
faculties, which is a component of nobleness, with happiness.
So far, I have proved that of the first two components of nobleness, Mill regarded
the elevation of feelings and faculties as happiness, but did Mill also link the
fulfillment of desired lifestyle with happiness? We may find some clues by taking a
look on how Mill treated virtue. For Mill, virtue itself isn’t something desirable at the
beginning, it is seen as a kind of pleasure because it is linked with others’ pleasure or
pain, also is a habit of will. On the other hand, Mill had tried to convince his readers
in his book, the reason why virtue is desirable under the utilitarian doctrine, is not
only that virtue being helpful for the greatest happiness of the society; instead, Mill
mentioned virtue alongside other interests such as music and poetry, pointing out
that there’s other preferences other than virtue, all these preferences are desirable
themselves, individual can gain pleasure by fulfilling these desires. (U: 20, 37-41)
From this point of view, Mill had the intention to interpret virtuous persons as one of
the many lifestyles and characters, this brings consistency to his perspective on
happiness and character: “Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to come
and beyond itself, and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself a part of
happiness, and is not desired for itself until it has become so.” (U: 38)
Nussbaum(2004: 65) also pointed out that Mill followed Aristotle(b.c.384-b.c.322),
both considered our plan to a certain lifestyle, and the actions led us to which as part
of pleasure. Combined with the proof I have provided, Mill used virtue as an
example, to demonstrate his idea on elevating character and desire for a certain
lifestyle, establishing a direct and evident connection between these desires and
happiness; this proof can mirror what I argued previously, that Mill regarded
elevating character as happiness.
On an individual level, this article has proved that, among the three components of
nobleness, Mill regarded their elevation as the fulfillment of desire; elevation of
character is not a mean to happiness or the end of happiness, instead, individuals
can gain happiness by the elevation of three components mentioned above. On a
social level, we can reach the same conclusion. Mill considered that nobleness could
bring about the increase of happiness to the whole society, (U: 11) we could provide
two explanations to this argument. First, the utility of society could be maximized by
noble behaviours, especially through the function of sympathy, which connects
individuals and their fellow beings, reaching the utilitarian ethic of “love thy
neighbor”, maximizing the utility and fulfilling the desire via behaviours; second,
because the noble individuals establish a character model of nobleness, via the law
of association, this allows other individuals able to imagine the happiness brought by
specific lifestyle and cultivated nobleness. Both reasons mentioned above can
strengthen my account on Mill on the social level, provide a thicker basis, that is,
elevating character is happiness.
If we make a more understandable, modern example, we can understand how Mill
treated the relation of happiness and nobleness, as the common RPG in electronic
games. In the RPG games, when we select an in-game character, and decide the goal
of which character, though all the leveling-up, gaining equipment, solving quests are
the means to push our in-game character closer to our ideal status during gaming,
these means still bring pleasure to us, becoming the end for the players as well; as
long as we still bear desire to the game content, our in-game character will grow,
adopting the in-game environment in the process, retaining the experience and
distinctiveness of our in-game character.