Consideration essay

(QG)

Q. ‘Consideration must be something “which is of value in the eye of the law”’, Lord Thomas, Chappell
& Co. v Nestlé Co. Ltd [1960] AC 87. Evaluate what will and will not amount to value to satisfy the legal
requirement that a bargain to be enforceable must be supported by sufficient consideration.

Ans: In this essay, we'll break down the elements of proper care and where they fall short. Despite being
one of the most debated topics in English contract law, the idea of consideration is still widely accepted
in the legal system of that country. A lack of regard renders an agreement unenforceable. The concept of
contemplation might be seen as helpful to the promise or harmful. According to the Currie v. Misa (1875)
definition. "A valuable consideration in the sense of the law may consist of some right, interest, profit, or
benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered, or
undertaken by the other,"

A contract is not enforceable without some form of compensation. The courts are unlikely to weigh in on
whether or not the deal was a good one. Consideration must be fair and have an established monetary
value. Consideration cannot be a representation of past performance or the satisfaction of a pre-
existing contractual or public obligation, even if its monetary value is negligible.

The courts uphold the notion of contract freedom by not judging the fairness of the deal. According to
Treitel (Peel, 2011), the very act of including consideration indicates an intent to be legally bound. This
justifies the continued existence of a doctrine that is both technically difficult and operationally unclear.
Regardless of theoretical disagreements, the courts have taken a practical perspective of this theory. The
theory of contemplation is a well-established part of our legal system, as stated by Lord Goff in Johnson
v. Gore Woods & Co. (A Firm) [2001]. In Thomas v. Thomas (1842), the court defined consideration as
"something of value in the eyes of the law, which, in the process of transferring from the claimant to the
defendant, may be of some benefit or detriment to the claimant." Prof. Atiyah argues that case law
demonstrates that "consideration" is a broader concept than a simple bargain: "When the courts found a
sufficient reason to enforce a promise, they did so; and when the courts found that it was undesirable to
enforce a promise for whatever reason, they refrained from doing so." When first used, the term
"consideration" was presumably defined by the courts as nothing more than the existence of a "reason"
for the enforcement of the promise. In Chappell & Co. Ltd v Nestlé Co. Ltd [1960], Nestlé provided a
record at a reduced price of three chocolate wrappers and cash in an effort to boost sales of their
chocolate. Nestlé insisted that the packaging wasn't part of the deal because it was thrown away as soon
as it arrived at the warehouse. Although the wrappers were part of the consideration, the House of
Lords ruled that their value was negligible. Therefore, the record profits were determined as a share of
the album's retail price in both currency and chocolate bars. According to Atiya, "It would be absurd to
assert that the sender suffered an actual detriment or the defendants gained a benefit inherently from
the receipt or transmission of the wrappers." (From Atiyah's "A restatement of consideration"). By
introducing the concept of "invented consideration" and highlighting the fact that consideration need
not be sufficient, Trietal establishes a link between the two, writing, "holding that a piece of paper or act
of forbearance of extremely small value can constitute consideration presents no doctrinal difficulty."

A "sufficient consideration" need not have a high monetary worth, but this raises the question of
whether or not value is limited to monetary factors. The obvious correct answer seems to be the right
one. Since the commitment had gone beyond the statutory requirement of providing for the kid, it was
held in Ward v. Byham [1959] 1 WLR 496 that "making a child happy" constituted acceptable
compensation for the assurance of maintenance payments. However, a father's promise to release his
son from his promissory note of responsibility in exchange for the son's silence about his postmortem
estate distribution intentions was held to be unenforceable in White v Bluett (1853) 23 LJ Ex 36 because
there was no consideration for the father's promise. Not filing a complaint because the son does not
have jurisdiction over the matter is not an acceptable kind of consideration. Inactivity from interacting in
a lawful action, such as not drinking, swearing, gambling, or smoking before the promisee's twenty-first
birthday, can constitute consideration, even though the promise appears to receive both the benefit and
the detriment, as established by the precedent set in Hamer v. Sidway (1881) 124 NY 538. A promise is
only binding if there is an exchange of value for that promise. As the consideration for the promised act
has been fulfilled, the promise is unenforceable. For example, in Re McArdle [1951] Ch 669, the court
ruled that a promissory note for recovery of property renovation costs was unenforceable since it was
made after the improvements were already performed. The typical rule is that previous consideration
may be offered at the promisor's request, but this is an exception to that rule. In the case of Lampleigh v.
Brathwait (1615) Hob 105, the plaintiff was successful in having the culprit pardoned. A guarantee of
£100 from Braithwait seemed, at first look, to be out of the question. Nonetheless, the court ruled that
the commitment to pay, even though the actual sum wasn't established, constituted good consideration.

If a promise is to be kept, it cannot be in exchanged for the performance of a current contractual duty.
According to the ruling in Stilk v. Myrick (1809), the further work done by the remaining crew in place of
the two absent crew members was nothing more than the satisfaction of a legal requirement to
complete the voyage. Lack of sufficient consideration rendered the supplementary payment guarantee
null and void. Contrarily, in Hartley v. Ponsonby (1857), the crew of a ship was able to claim additional
earnings promised when half of the crew departed. The conditions for the return trip were so different
from the original agreement that the original contract was invalid and a new one was made with new
requirements. In Williams v. Roffey [1991], consideration for an additional promise was a 'practical
benefit' acquired by the promisor. Roffey, the primary contractor in Williams v. Roffey, followed with an
existing legal requirement by honoring a promise to pay Williams more money if the apartment
improvements were finished on time. Consideration can be proven by the receipt of a practical
advantage without compulsion and when the promisor recommends an increase in payment, although
Stilk v. Myrick is still applicable. Roffey was able to keep the payment plan, work schedule, and
contractor status quo by not breaking his own contract, thus avoiding the penalty clause. 'Practical
utility' does not apply to debt repayment in part (Re Selectmove Ltd [1995]). Harris v. Sheffield United
Football Club Ltd [1988] held that the cost of extra security at football matches was a good
consideration, even though the police already had a public duty to maintain order (Collins v. Godefroy,
1831). This was because, even though the police had a public duty to preserve order, a larger crowd
would be attracted to the event on a Saturday, creating a greater self-created risk and requiring a larger
police presence. Unless the legal doctrine of promissory estoppel applies, a contract that lacks sufficient
consideration is unenforceable. To meet a sufficiency criterion, you need a 'value' that has been
established in law, not just an assessment of the transaction. When there is even a hint of economic
obligation, parties are more likely to agree to terms that are significant to their mutual benefit. When the
vow is made after the consideration has been provided or when it involves the completion of a
preexisting public or contractual duty, consideration alone is insufficient. Treital's thesis on Invented
Consideration lends credence to the common understanding of bargain consideration. Even yet, he
insists that flexibility in one's bargaining position is key. Furthermore, he suggests the possibility that the
English courts could "invent" contemplation. Despite the promisor's lack of purpose in acquiring the
thing being considered, the court may still hold that the promisor's action or inaction constitutes enough
consideration (Chappell v. Nestle, 1960). Second, there is zero partiality towards the beneficiary
(Shadwell). The United States has a more restrictive view of the doctrine: "Consideration is nothing that
neither party fails to recognize as such" (Philpots v. Gruniger 1872). It would appear that the term of
cognition in English law is more exact than in American law. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has to
be strengthened in American law.