HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
The petitioner, Hanna Eunice D. Serana, was a senior student of UP, Cebu; a government
scholar, and on December 21, 1999, was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a student
regent for a one-year term.
In 2000, Serana discussed with Pres. Estrada about the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman; in the same year, Serana with her siblings and relatives registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Office of the Student Regent Foundation Inc. (OSRFI), and one
of its projects was the aforementioned renovation which Pres. Estrada gave P15, 000,000.00 as
financial assistance. According to the information, the funds came from the Office of the
President.
The succeeding student regent (Kristine Clare Bugayong) and the Secretary-General of the
KASAMA sa UP (Christine Jill de Guzman) filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds
and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman when the project of renovating Vinzons Hall
Annex failed to materialize.
After an investigation, the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge Serana and her brother,
Jade Ian D. Serana, for estafa (docketed as Crim. Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan),
defined and penalized under Par. 2(a), Art. 315 of the RPC, as amended.
Serana moved to quash the information, claiming that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged or her person, in her capacity as student regent in UP. According to her,
R.A. 3019, as amended by R.A. 8249, enumerates the crimes for which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction along with the crimes covered by Title VII, Ch. II, Sec. 2, Book II of the RPC.
Estafa, under Title X, Ch. VI, Book II of the RPC, however, does not fall under it.
In addition to this, Serana argued that Pres. Estrada was swindled, not the government, because
she received the P15 M from him. As a student regent, Serana posited that she only represented
her peers, was not a public officer (possessing no authority), and was not even receiving any
salary.
The Ombudsman opposed the motion, stating that in Sec. 4 (b) of P.D. 1606, the catch-all phrase
“in relation to the office” is present; Serana, as a member of the Board of Regents, has the
general powers of administration and exercised the corporate powers of UP. [Concerning
compensation, it is not an essential part of public office, and allowance (which Serana received)
is included as compensation]. In the end, the Sandiganbayan denied Serana’s motion due to lack
of merit.
ISSUE:
Does the charge against petitioner Serana fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?
RULING:
Serana elevated the issue before the Supreme Court with a petition for certiorari. The Supreme
Court, however, did not grant it. According to them, a petition for certiorari is not a remedy for a
denied motion to quash a criminal case. Remedial measures regarding interlocutory 1 orders, i.e.,
motion to quash, are often dismissed to avoid multiple appeals in a single action. The Court
raised Newsweek, Inc. v Intermediate Appellate Court, which states the rule on the subject:
An order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject to appeal
until final judgment or order is rendered (Sec. 2, Rule 41). The procedure in such cases would
be:
 File an answer
 Go to trial
 If the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment
In denying a motion to quash:
 Enter a plea
 No appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal
A certain exception would be if the court, in denying the motion to dismiss/motion to quash, acts
without or in excess of jurisdiction/with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition
lies. It would be unfair to require the defendant/accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a
trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, among other reasons. In the present
case, however, the Court found that the Sandiganbayan did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion.
As for Serana’s claims about the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, she raised Sec. 4, R.A. 3019
(the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended) but proceeds to quote P.D. 1606, as
amended in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. The Supreme Court finds that
Serana’s claim has no basis in law; it is P.D. 1606 rather than R.A. 3019 that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Historically, the Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. 1486
and was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers
and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times
accountable to the people. Its jurisdiction was expanded with P.D. 1606 and later amended again
by P.D. 1861, R.A. 7975, and ultimately, R.A. 8249. In Sec 4, the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction now includes:
 Violations of Republic Act No. 3019…
o Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher
o Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads
o City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads

1
A decree/judgment handed provisionally (foe the time being) during the course of a legal action.
 o Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher
o Philippine army and Air Force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank… etc.
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. In fact, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019, erroneously cited by Serana, deals not with the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with the prohibition on private individuals.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, Serana contends that estafa is not among the crimes the
Sandiganbayan cognates. We note that in hoisting this argument, Serana isolated the first
paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said
provision. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies
committed by public officials in relation to their office.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent. This is not the first or likely the last time we will be called
upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is
difficult to pinpoint a public officer’s definition. The 1987 Constitution does not define who
public officers are. Rather, different statutes and jurisprudence have varied definitions and
concepts.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular
tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over
other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People, we held that while the first
part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Serena falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express
provision of law.
According to Serana, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She
adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then
President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing body of the state
university. As a result, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. More than
that, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant or respondent
in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to quash. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become
dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant or respondent.
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a
student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government.