Luftwaffe ieWeroMasonmere)o) olbustwacte: the allied Intel tigasce faders Benlod the Files babi acwnee af the allied incelligonen He agaiuss Lhe Seema Ln a! seolving var from a handel af shatters ai, lie beylneing ar Lie war, “Allied axe Agefce soon grew tintin a WEFiciert Lovarmatlon igathertag ng akoiiid) the e1abi, Srsune We HoHeR, Lo eomneT the Renace of the wast wae tachine iemwn from daeloasi Cid fakery clés in tee Biicven bublia’ Keccré Joo. atewnere WI low care be poet quar toe aang ‘seorer geeciere ne keents used bo ginue Lerwal and compaxe them that oe: wit actual facts thet we now kes bow) east aincrals. This unique wnat snows how accurste, or off the norSicme sting intel darean could be. Lutrwarte algo testures pub? Lghed sapcured phalos, inciuting sate or Ft, aerial a guiiecanea, iirsea, captured enemy photos, and [seit Wy AIL teb Fatal jeats cperating candestizely ermat rink Phraugioct che wort gence S shows then che Al. sn bnew sany detsile sf enemy sitenatt becore tiny calt pecational, while courate, bar comple: typieal 111 German sitorafty anfevatfe ds an Unparalielad ¢ ate Wists Fimution tour derstanding of both wartime Lligesne-gathering and the ores of Woild War I,LUFTWAFFE. The Allied Intelligence FilesSelected Aviation Titles from Brassey's Casites in the Air: The Story of she 8-17 Flying Foverese Crews of she U.S. th Air Force — Martin W, lawman _Acey in Commuarcls Fighter Pilots as Commun Leaders — Wislter J, Boyne Ihe dese of Wings: Great Articles fram Wings anc Airpower Magazines —Walter J. Boyne Brassey’s Air Combat Reader: Historic Featsand Aviation Legends — Fated by Walter 1. Boyne and Philip Handleman Crémson Sky! The Air Bale for Korea —fohn R. Bruning Fiengle Aces Col. Gerald R. Jolson, the USAARs Top Fighter Leader of the Pacific War —Toha Bruning German Ai Intelligence aft and Armament — Office of the Assistant Chief of Aa Staff, Brassey's Mader Bighiess: T Weapons, nnd Equipment — Wi sTrinaaie: Guide to Su-Flighr Tactics, Terkuotogy ke Spick. Hitler's Personial Pilots The Life and Tinwes of Hans Bane —C. G. Sweeting Hoier's Squadeom: The Fuehrer’s Personal Aireraft aa —C.G. SheetingLUFTWAFFE The Allied Intelligence Files Christopher Staerck and Paul Sinnott Brassey's, Inc. Washington, D.C.Copyright © 2002 bry Brassey's Ine Pablshed in the United States by Brassey's, Inc Al rights cserved. No pac uf ‘hic hook may be reproduced in any manner sehaesoever without written [pELUNIEEIaW flo the publidhes, except ii he case of brie quot ‘al in critical articles and reviews. Libnaey of Congress Catalogiagein-Pubiication Dat Stacreks Chis, Lufvwaie: the allied intelligence files / Christopher Staerck and Baul Sinnott. —I9 ed. pen. lnchudes biblioerephical wfercnces and index sin 1-57488-387- (cloth: all, paper 1. Aiuplasies, Military Germany. 2. Wanld Wir, 19997045.-Mi intelligence—Cireat Britain. 3, World Wor, 1999-45-—Milicary inelligence—Uinited States. | Sinnott, Paul. 1, Tite, UMG245.164 $74 2002 949, 5474863.-e2) 002018418 Princ! in the Linited States of America on acid-free paper that meets the Anvevican National Standards listitute 239-48 Slade fbrassey's Ine, 22841 Quicksilver Drive Dulles, Virginia 20166 First Edition Wasp esaeetContents Preface arroduerion 5 Arado Ar 240440 Focke-Wulf Fiw 187 Falke (Faleon) Focke-Wulf Pie 194) Focke-Wulf Ts 152 Fooke Wulf la 154 Heinkel He 100/112¢113 Heinkel He 162 Salamander Tieinkel 11219) Messerschmitt BI 109 Messerschmitt BE 110 (Messerschmitt Me 1 amet {Comet} Messerschmitt Me 2104410 Hornisse {Tornet) Messerschmitt Me 242 Schwalbe (Swallowe}/Sturmygel (Stora bir ER: = Arado Ar 234 Dornier bo 17Z f Do 215 Dornier Do 217 Focke- Teinkel Te 111 Heinkel He 177 Henschel Hs 123, Henschel Hs 129 wy 2 Conia Junkers Ju 87 Junkers Ju 88 Junkers Ju 88 Miste! Juokers Ju 188 Junkers ju 288 Junkers Jn 388 Messerschmitt Me 264 a 5 92 9 103 110 15. 116 119 126 133 19. 3 46 149a Bléhm und Voss By 141 153 Eiesler Fi 156 Storch (Stork) 155 Focke-Wulf Pw 189 Uhn (Ow!) 156 Henschel Hs 126 158 160 ‘Bf 108 ‘Yaifun (Iyphoon) ls Sr ee Arado Ar 196 167 Bish und Voss By 138 169 Bll und Voss By 222/238 a) Dornier Do 18 Darnicr De 24 Heinkel He 54 Heinkel He 115 179 Arado Ar 232 185, Tankers Ju 52 187 Junkers Ju 192 Junkers Tu 90¢ 590 196 Messer: mitt Me 321/323 202 Siebel $1204. fhe, ule Aliout the Authors| Preface T* idea for this book arose when the authors stumbled across several files stuffed full of phatographs of larfwaffe aircraft in the archives of the Public Record Office, he photographs were arranged by manulac- turer bul will no other information te explain their history ar reason far having bccn originally collected by the British Air Ministry. Further investigation in the archives revealed the purpose af collecting these pictures: i was part ofa little-known but significant conteibution to the Allied wat effort. A small but clearly dedicated tearm of Royal Air Force ofli- cers, later to be joined by their USAAF colleagues, had been building up a dossier on each German aizeraft in operation and in development. IL was haped that hy understanding their enemy's aircraft, allied aircrew would know how best to tackle their opponents and hopefully not be surprised by new equipment or lactic. For all the-major and some of the more interesting minor types of Luft- vwitffeuirezafl we have provided a summarized history ofthe intelligence data on the plane. The idea is to put you, the reader, in the position of an Allied intelligence officer during the wat: You seceive various fragments of infor mation from a diverse group of sources on a German aircraft, passibly a type thet has not been ancountered before, You may not even be suue exactly which lypeal aircrall the information is referring to or its correct designation, Some sources, such as enemy prisoner of war accounts, perhaps shouldn't be fully trusted, But it is your responsibility to piece wagether the size, shape, and capabilities of the sirceafe concerned, ‘These brie! intelligence reports are edited down from large files on each aircraft; for some of the more common types, there are several bulging forld- ersstulied with reports, diagrams, technical drawings, and photos, Within the scope af this book it is only possible to very hriclly caver the main revelations, about each aircraft and some of the fascinating nuggets of information con- tained in the files. Indeed for some of the types it wiauld be po: duce a whole book on the intelligence record. You may find the imtelligence history contains what we mew know to be mistakes, Where these are obvi ous the authors hase pointed them out in square brackets in the text ‘The "War Record” section on each type of aireralt is present to provide the actual story, with the benefit of hindsight, of how the aitcratt intially was-cre- ated and how it perlormed in the war. This the reader can compaze with what Air Intelligence (Al) kmewat the time, In general, and particularly far thesee~ ond hall of the war, what Al knew was impressive, Indeed, it wos very rare Prefacefir & new Luftwaffe aircraft to enter service without the Allies already know- ing a good deal about it and having a reasonably clear picture of its capabil ities. This book should stand as a recore nf the achievement of those intelli gence officers who, though employed in a less glamorous role than their aircrew comrades, produced sterling work and contributed the victory in the ait war. This book concentrates on the operational and tactical aspects of Luft waffe aircraft. The reason for this is twofold. First, the intelligence fil alihough they contain a wealth of lechnical data, do not add to the consid~ erable sum of knowledge that bas been built up in this field. ther works have drawn from the manufacturers’ fles and those of the designers of the air craft themselves; obviously this information will be more accurate and com prehensive than what could he gathered by the Allies during the war, Sec ond, the authors alsa feel that the technical history of World War [Laircraft hasbeen exhaustively covered already in published books and that there is fit- de point in repeating it here. ‘The introduction and sections on Dornier, Heinkel, and junkers aircraft fe written by Christopher Stacrck, the other aircraft by Paul Sinnott. The authors would like to thank the following people for their help and encour- agement in putting this book together and getting it published: Paul jalinsom, Brian Carter, Hugh Alexander, Anne Kilminster, Don McKeon, Roy Conyers Nesbit, Georges Van Acker, Kate Elsherty and Simon Kooter, John Starck, Dominic Staerck, and Chris HillsIntroduction Be: the outhresk of war with Germany, British Intelligence (hudly understulfe! and underfunded!) could not provide accurate analysis o derail about the Luftwaffe, It was this arm of the German military machine—wilh Lhe perceived threat af its ability te rain explosives and gas on London—that most scared British prime minister Neville Chamber Jain and influenced his poliey of “appeasement” award the Nazi leader, Adolf Hitler. However, after 1 September 139 Air Intelligence expanded and developed swiftly, pulling in resources and data from any and every avenue open to it, especially alter American entry into the war against Ger- many on 12 December 1941 and the initiation of the Combined Bomber Olfensive. A comprehensive picture of every Luflwaffe aircraft was built inclnding many of those that reached only the protatyne stage, ‘The Directorate of Air Intelligence was responsible for the organization and coordination ofall tyres of air intelligence—militar political, and civ- iJathome and abroad, liaison with airattachéeand missions, and questions of security and consership. It gathored data in the form of reparts and pho topraphs of enemy airceait and alifields; details of engines, armaments, fuel systems, and other technical dala; as well as tecerds of enemy air operations. the files, now held in the archives at the Public Record Office tthe UK de to Allied national archive) in London, provide the only aullrorilative g Intelligences wartime knowledge of the German air arm. Many books on the Lultwaife are written with the benefit ef hindsight ‘This book differs; it aims to utilize a unique source of intelligence by put- ting the reader back into the Air Ministry at the time, Lt will tell the story of cach aircraft as if unfolded, but purely in terms of the data Lhat was achiew- able ta Allied intelligence at the time. Prewar British Air Intelligence None af the German armed servives wis of greater concer to the British government than the air force, At the start of Nazi rule, Germany was banned fram orsnership of an ait force under the terms dictated at Veuseilles. The Weimar governments had commenced some clandestine rearmament, but by 1933 the Luttwaite existed chietly on paper, with only a small cadre of expe- rienced aircrew and a few planes, built under contract overseas. No one in Britain expected this situation to persist under the Nazis. The Air Ministry's long-range predictions of Lufiwalfe strength played a major role in the changing picturein Whitchall of German airpower. The pow qualily ofthese TatreductinnLactose predictions before September 1936 represents a significant and important failure in the work of Air Intelligence,| However, the German aireraft indus- tey was the object of intense study by the Industrial Intelligence Center (IIC} and the Air Ministry, which collaborated in producing twelve reports upon it between March 1934 and July 1939.2 Intelligence isan activity that bas to perform three functions: informa- ton has lo be acquired, it has to be analyzed and interpreted, and it has © be put into the hands of those who use it, In Britain, at the outbreak of the ‘war, the organizations that carried out these functions were disorganized both iernally and in terms of coordination af wark. There was no efficient sys- tem.’ An additional obstacle to the achievement of hetter intelligence assess ments between 1933 and 1936 was the depth of bitterness and mistrust between the Foreign Oifice and the Air Ministry, The Air Ministry took sumbrage at Foreign Office criticism and intrusion on what it viewed as its domain—the interpretation of data on the Luftwatte.* The most extensive system for acquiring information was an overt one— British overseas diplomatic missions and the stream of messages, dis- patches, telegrams, and letters they sent to the Foreign Office? Visits by observers to- German factories are recorded as having been a major source of intelligence, as were the reports of the “cnergetic” air attaché in Berlin, who used his awn plane to observe factories and German air force installations rom the air‘ The principal sources of information used by overseas Foveign ‘Office personnel to keep London informed of political, mifitary, and eco nomic developments were the press and other public media. These reports ‘were not regarded a “intelligence," a term restricted to information obtained from secret saurces—that is, matcrial supplied by overseas representatives of SIS, the Secret Intelligence Servise, controlled hy MI6. The Secret Intelligence Service ‘The diplomatic missions, like the press, radio, and other open sources, were alive with conflicting rumors and warnings. Consequently the STS was driv en uy devote ils limited resources Lo collecting political intalligenes in an attempt to reduce the confusion inherent in such a chaotic system.? Short of officers and staff, the SIS placed the burden and responsibility for develop- ing its network of agents within Nazi Germany upon the SIS stations in War- saw, Prague, Bern, Paris, Copenhagen, and The Tague. By 1936, these had become the intelligence-cullection front line, However, as the 19305 pro pressed, London realized that it was receiving insufficient factual informa tion from its hard-worked section heads, ‘Too much of what flowed in was merely political gossip, More technical data was required, as were economic statistics and greater detail on military installations.* In the absence of any input (rom signals intelligence (siginc), it was difficult to distinguish what was reliable from what was dubious in the SIS's own reports, As well as casting doubt on the credibility of its agents, this preoccupation led to complaints thar the 51S was failing to mect the need for factual intelligence about for~ eiga military capabilities, equipment, preparations, and movements,and that vwhaclitde it was providing was inferior even to that provided by the attachés.”By the beginning of 1938 the War Oflice was regularly complaining that tle SIS wes Lailing to meet ils increasingly urgent need for factual informa- tion about the German militery. dn the same year, the Ale Ministry was denouncing MI6 and SIS reports ol this nature as 0) percent unreliable.” However, the permanent undersecretary of state at the Foreign Office, Sir Alexander Cadogan. issued a minute in defense of MI6_ Luter, in a letter to ‘Sir Mevile Hendersan, the British ambassador to Berlin, he said, “Moreover, iis true to say that the recent scares have not originated principally with the SIS agents in Germany, bul have core to us from ather source No all the news regarding Mlé and the SIS was gloomy: Une develop: ment that reflected a changing emphasis in the British intelligence cammu- nity was the introduction af an air scction within Milo. Located at Broad- ‘way Buildings, directly behind and linked to MI6 headquarters, which were aL ZL Queen Anne's: Gate, it was headed by Wing Commander Frederick \Winterotham, Royal lying Corpstltoyal Air Force,"* Recommended for the job personally by the Director of Air Intelligence, Charles Blount, and his deputy, Air Commodore Archibald Boyle, Winterbotham was head af the All (c} branch of the Directorate of Air Lutelligence, which was de facto the air intelligence section af MI6.! ‘Gace in the post, he begon analyzing and assessing Soviet ais steength. However, finding that all Soviel technical assistance carne Irom Germany, he switched his facus to the Reich. Winterbotham could extract very litle intel figence on the Luftwalie fram the SIS station heads in Berlin, Pranklurt, Ham- burg, Cologne, or Munich, because the Abwebr (military intelligence} and the Gestapa Lseerel golive} were too active and too efficient. In fact, he hud litile opportunity te abeain accurate reports on the Luftwatle ather thar fram his one main source, Baron William de Ropp.an agent in the employ of SIS. De Rapp was the Berlin representative of the Bristol Aircrall Company, a position that opened many doors for him, including that of Alfred Rosenberg, Chief Navi Philusopher and head of dhe party's foreign policy office—the ‘Anssen-Politisches Amt der NSDAP: A Baltic émigréaristocrat, De Ropp lived with bis English wile in Belin, where he was nustured by Wintarbotham over 8 period of three ycars, His standing among leading Navis helped facilitate a visit by Winterbotham to Geratany in 1934, an early coup for the MI6. offi- cer, While in Germany he obtained a significant amount of useful data on the growth of the Luftwaffe, including types, engines, numbers, and other technical information on the variaus machines being constructed by Junkers, Heinkel. and Messerschmitt, For exaniple, Winterbatham became the problems facing the Ju 87 Stuka in dive. bombing and warned the RAF. However, it remained skeptical as te bis assessment, because little contirm. ing data was available trom other sources. As the interwar crisis deepened, other avenues and sources of informa- tion became open ta the British. A goad ease in pial is the story of Paul “Thununel. He was a high-saalcing Abwehr officer who initially fornished! frst- lass political and military intelligence on Germany, including information about the equipment of the Lofrwaffe, to the Czechoslovak government in Prague. Aller the outlreak af war in September 1939, he supplied Mlb with Inteudueticnthe same infoemation; it was forwarded by the London-based Czech gover ment-in-exile for the first owo years of the wear. !+ The prewar problem facing MI6 and its network of SIS agents was one of resqurces und funding, a problem that was exacerbated during the Rhineland crisis in 1936, When Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to eeoccupy the Rhineland, a blatant contravention of the 1919 Versailles treaty, SIS's princi pal source of information was its Paris station, This station, in tum, relied heavily upon collaboration with the hwo French intelligence organizations, the Deusitme Bureau, headed by General Gauche, and Colonel Rivel’s Servive de Renseignments, Photographic Reconnaissance One positive result af this collaboration was the joint Anglo-French estab- lishment of an aerial reconnaissance program. In 1938 MI6 made an invalu- able contribution to the future increase of factual intelligence on the Luft waite by helping to develop aetial photographic reconnaissance (PR) Instrumental in getting funds allocated to the project was Freddie Winter- batham., Prewar clandestine flights over Germany were made uncer the cov les and Research Corporation, a Paris-based civil- ian firm. Operating from a French airfield and supplied through the S18 with aircraft and cameras, in March 1939 the “company” became opera- tional, Its head, Australian Sidney Cotton, aided by Canadian Robert Niv- en, put Leica cameras ints a pair of Lockheed 124 aireralt and proceeded er ol the Aeronautical § co over fly Germany Asaresultthe Anglo-French intelligence communities gleaned unuch valu. able data on German sitcraft numbers and! locations, By the outbreak of war, when the Air Ministry took over his firm, Cotton had photographed much of Germany and the Mediterranean. The Air Ministry's Air Intelligence Branch was able to produce a sound appreciation of the Luftwaffe order of battle, thanks to the work of Winterbotham’s Cotton¢Niven teamand also the at-times-perilous work undertaken by the air attaché in Berlin, Group Caps, John Vachell, in aceial reconnaissance work.!? PR rapidly developed during, the war—lhy the suminer of 1940 it had overcome the consequences of pee war neglect and was to become the second most important source of intel ligence for the Allies, second only to sigint, [tis worth noting that the RAF objected te this unerthodas approach and that it was mol until the war had. slarted that the RAF's Photographic Reconnaissance Unit (a PRU wing) was created. The Air Ministry Changes ane developments were also under way at the bureaucratic level in the Air Ministry. From 1935 the status and the establishmenc of the intelli gence staff, particularly the German Section, were steadily improved. As well as creating the post of deputy director of intelligence, the Air Ministry author- ized a modest increase in the staff and elfor! devoted to Germany. Until 1985 the intelligence component of the Directorate of Operations and Lntelli gence—the central authority responsible, on the one hand, for advising the ‘Air Statfon all information about foreign air forces and, on the ather hand,for providing the air commands with Uhe intelligence they neoded For plans and aperations—had consisted of only ten staff officers since 1918, Nevertheless, the Air Ministry, like the War Oflice, was not am excemtive command. Consequently, it was equally, #f not mors, important thet steps were taken from 1936 to form intelligence staffs al the headquarters ated lowe= erlevels in Lhe operati¢nal commands of the Metropolitan Air Foreo—Fight- cr Command, Bomber Command, and Coastal Command. It is soinewhat ironic chat intelligenve stalls ai these wsisted in the averscas commands, Now they were created for the first time inthe United Kingdom, and their function was to filter and dis jgence prepared else where down to the squadrons, as well as o pass information obtained by the squadrons upward for analysis anu interpretation Additionally, in 19:3 the Air Ministry took the further step of arranging that in the event of war all immediately exploitable intelligence would be passed directly from the main RAF intgreeption station at Cheadle to the operational command concerned. Ln practical terms, this aneant all that could be derived from low-grade Tuttwatt tactical wireless traffic, especially the prolificair-to- ground tions of its bomber and long cange recon naissance units. Tt should he noted that @ fully oper- ational immediately an the aucbreak of war, [t was thought necessary that cls alread fale intel ann scheme diel nat the Air Inielligence Branch at the /\ir Ministry, which also received this wire- less intelligence and mated it wich information fiom other sources, should play a part in ils interpretation, By the time intensive German air per against Britain began, however, most teething toubles hadbeen overce Also in 1935, the Air Ministry established the Commiliee lor the Scien= tific Survey of air Defense (CSSAL), under the chainmanship of Sir Henry Tivard. In 1939, under recormiendation «Sir Henry, ar with the SiS and the LL, the Air Ministry appointed a scientific officer" ta the sta/Tol the directoirascientilic research, Funding for the position was not made available until late 1934, and the past vas not filled tntila Sove war began. Ts firs incumbent, ses ponsible tor liaisan with she Air Intelligence Branch “as @ preliminary measure towards improving the eo-peration between scientists anal the intelligence organization,” was Professor 1 Vs Is in consultation Jones. “Lhe Lizard Commitce, sponsoring the development of radar, had wondered whether if Brituin had il, Germany might as well, MIs’ inquiries revealed that the British intelligence service had virtually na knowledge of German scientilicand leclinical developments. It avust be rememibeeed that pre-1939 Mio had not only been underfunded and understalfedl but had been ering political, economic, and order of battle intel- focused primarily 6 ligence.!® Ad the Tizard Commiltee's recommendation, M16 accepted the appoint- ment of a scientist to oversee the arrangements for gaining scientific intelli gence dala on Germany. However, the Whitehall mendarins in the treasury refused to grant the money to cover the appoiniee’s salary—yet another clas sicsymploin of British prewar talaise.'The post was not actually inagurat= ed until 1 September 1939, the day the.Germans invaded Poland, Quce in place, Professor Jones's job sas to anticipate the German applications of scie wlo-Amesicans} could ence to warfare so that the British {then later the Introduction,Laie counter these applications beforethey gave the enemy a decisive edge, His first recommendation was the cteation of scientific sections within the direc torates of military, ais, and naval intelligence, as well as Ml6~-which covered the Government Code and Ciphet School [GC & C5} at Bletchley Park. None of the major powers had an organization in place 10 monitor, eval- toate, ancl disseminate scien ce until (he British established one in 1939, asa direct result of the threat that the Luftwalfe was believed to rep. resent. Uhe dramatic increase in the applications of science to the conduct of modern warfare throughout the interwar years made it inevitable that intelligence relating to this felt would seoner oF layer became as significant 4s traditional forms of military intelligence daa. More significanily for the Briuish, it took the Aie Staff fully chree years to eevognize that the Luftwatte ‘was the brainchild of the Nazi system.a product of Hitler and Goring’: desire to build the biggest air force possible in the shortest possible tims, In. 1934 Loftwatfe front-line strength stood at 228 aircraft, but by the qusbreak of war in September 1939 it was 3.541. should lve pointed ul in defense of Ais Intelligetice that it had perceived that German feant-line stength would be 3,700 aincsaft by the end of 1939. ‘This degree of accuracy was toa little, too lates it was painfully cbyious that ‘even despite the post-Munich fighter-production program Britain had last an ic intel the 1930 air arms race. Air parity had been the first victim, Rarly RAF rear- mament programs were directed loward. Ue achievement of long-term numerical equality with the Luftwaffe, but that goal eluded the air farce. ‘he German military occupation of Austria in March 1938 prompted the goy- emment to abandon all fiscal restrictions to air rearmament; in April 1958, it approved the production af 12,4100 ¢ crisis pushed Britain and Germany a the brink of war, het afl aver two years”! The Murich, ened fears that there was 4 significane air gap and that if Britain were to be at war in the noc too distant future she would be ill prepared to meet the Luftwaffe onslaught, ‘The problem was exacerbated by fuulty intelligence prodictions that by and large underestimated the rate of Luftwaffe expansion.” Wartime ‘With the outbreak of war contact with the Luftwaffe increased, a8 did the amount and variety of intelligence available, Ar the same time, the existing intelligonce organizations benefited from an increase in reseurces, especially in the size and quality of staff, Additionally, arganizalions were created ta gather intelligence fran new “swarlime only” sources. For example the Polit ical Warfave Executive (PWE} was set up to scrutinize enemy and foreign press, radio, and propagan Another “wartime only” éstablishment was the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre {CSTIIC}, set up to interrogate prisoners of war. I proved uselul in gleaning technical data from Luftwaffe ground and ying personnel, ‘Phe first German airmen te fall into British hands were impris: ‘oned in the Tower of London, where there was a reception and interrogation centers carly in 1940 they were moved to Trent Park, in nerth London, Inter- rogators were sent Lo interview prisoners as soon as possible alter capture, the fisst interview often taking place in a police station, Those believed to havevaluable information were sent treat Pack, where skilled interrogators, receiving at first nothing more from: the px ners than name, rank, and serial number, made crnéc threats and then placed them in sililary confinement, If this did not loosen the tangue, a prisoner would be placed in cells with other airmen (and sometiies an eniigeé stooge), where hidden usictophones both inside and aut- sidethe cell would often pick up valuable information, ‘Lhis ‘would help later interrogators, who could display an inli- mate knowledge of a prisoner, his comrades, and his unit. RAF technical intereogetion af Laftwatfe PoP ducted hy ATI (k},a subsection of the Air Lnte torate. For example, during the Battle of Britain, A1L(K] seports extensively circulated within the Air Ministry ancl to the commands (Fighter, Rumber, Coastal! as well as t0 ‘he intelligence uirectorates of the Adunitalty and the War Oifice. Ln total abour al) copies would be disteibuted, the ‘dea being lo disseminate cechmical data to the fighting commands However, two of the already existing sore ‘gence particularly camo of age during the war: Geeman sig- int at Bletchley Park, aad photo-reconnaissance. Still under ‘MIS control, GC 8 C3 at Blewlhiley Park was to hold most ‘promise for Air intelligence. With the Dewxieme Bureau, the: SIS Paris station evacuated the Pol- ish cryptographic service to Britain along wilh ils muck. was ex ence direc of intelli- of the French prized Enigma code machine, — With tis specimen, by January 1940 GC & CS achieved a notable success im breaking the German Eaigma keys? Tt established early ‘on that each of the German serv- feces used different keys fir its Enig. ma machines. The code breakers at GC & CS provided information about German strategy @pera- tions, and Gruppen locations but could furnish very litte in termsat technical data about individual Tofiwatle aireraft types. This was 80 because the Germans did not se encrypled communications to transfer data of this mature, Photu-reconnaissance was ane of the outstanding successes of intelligence gathering during the war, Originally using twin-engine Bristal Blenheims of Bomber “SPER MOST SEQRET Sigua te (ti, Lema eee ee eta ee SEL Bleichley Park was given the wartime cover maine of "Station X" The process of wartime photographic interpretation8 Ff Command, PR sartics suffered disproportionatcly high casualties, a factor that was remedied Ixy mid-Nowember 1938. Two modified Spitfires were allo- cated to the special SIS Might—at the outbreak al war taken over by the RAF and renamed the Photographic Development Unit (PDU), Active operations began immediately over the Siepfried Line fram bases in Belgium. ‘The ever-active, ever-inventive Sidney Cotton was, according to R, VJones, better at operuting cameras and aircrall thas) were the regular RAF airmen RAF cameras suffered ftom condensation on the lenses and other compo: nents asa result of flying at 30,000 feet, Cotton was able to rectify those faults, Te wasalso aware of the need for speed and was successful in getting an addi- tional 30 mph fram each aircralt by stripping iL of protruding items (sueh as gun barvels) and applying smeoth gloss finish to the outer surface, Before Jong Cotton had acquired twa Spitfire I fighters, which he proceeded to mod ify.to suit his needs. First, he improved their speed fram 36010396 mph, sec cond, he “persuaded” RAP technicians at RAE (Royal Aircralt Establishment} Farnborough to install two wenty-inch focal length cameras to replace the previous single eight-inch F24 camera.”* ‘The initial Spitfire T's assipmed to PR work were originally known as the Spe- cial Survey Plight, later a5 212 Squadron? Deficiencies in operational lirnits restricted coverage until Apeil 1940, when a longer range Spittie became avail able. Difficulties were also overcome in photographic interpretation, thus enabling tase intelligenes:to be carived from the pichunss taken. TI was not until July 19400 that the Aie Ministry sel up the Pholagraphic Interpretation Unit (PIU) of the PDDU to interpret photageaphs for che army and the navy, not just the RAF Until sigint and 11 began to yield results of operational value, the serv- ice intclligence branches were dependent upon the S18, British diplomatic missions, neutral attac 5 in Germany, German pressand radio, and whatever the French were prepared co provide, Additionally, the British enilitary mis sion in Poland submitted accurate reports on the nature of the Polish cam- -paien, highlighting especially theslose caoperation-of air units with the army During the“phaney war” period, Air intelligence was able uy locate and iden- tify a large number of Luftwaffe formations via the sigint coming from GC & CS, At the same time, the $1S helped military intelligence to build up its knowledge of the German order of battle for the forthcoming warin the West, The American Intelligence Establishment If the situation was some way short of perfect for the British during the ear ly years of the war, it was not much better for the Americans, At the start of World War IT, the U.S, Army Air Carps had ng coherent philosophy ar doc- Cine on intelligence. In 1938 the War Department printed Field Manual 30 5, aMiitary dnteigences Govt dnteltigenes, which tomained the cornerstone of US, thinking in this field, Effectively, the principles of military intelligence wauld develop as the conflict evolved. FM 30-5 espoused greater emphasis on command decisions and the role of intelligence in their formulation, ury ing intelligence officers to base their evaluations upon an enemy's combat forces and intentions, where known, Prior to ULS. entry into the was, the chief source of military intelligence on European countries was from the reports regularly sent to Washington by US,military attachés stationed in overseas capitals. Vhis was a soriously flawed system, As Dwight D. Eisenhower painted cout, few of Unexe attaches krtew the hasic principles of intel- ligence work, In fact the reports sent by Maj. Truman Sinith ‘fom Germany in the 1934s were deliberately alarmist about ‘thestrength of the Lufrwafte—especially veganding the oder of battle of the Kampfgeschnviacter. Twas not until fall 1939 that the Assistant Chicf of Staff Intelligence created a sepa ‘rateair section in the War Departments Military Intelligence Division with the duty of coordinating all U.S, air intelli: gence actlvities. 1t was this department's responsibility acquire aviation-related data and write technical air invteli gence reports.?* 1930s the U.S, Army's Signal Intelligence Service brake the Japanese diplomatic "Magic" code and built "Purple? anachines for the decoding process, At the same thue, with significant Polish help, the British GC & CS at Bletchley Park unlocked the secrets of the Luftwatfe’s Knigma code, In the closely guarded dimension of'sigmals intelligence, Anglo-American cooperation was discussed at top govern. anent levels in April 1949. In the resulting spirit of cooperation, by August 1940 the British guverninent alficially welcomed 1S. military ‘abserversto the sombat zones, Americanservice personnel rushed to Britain to witness firsthand the prevailing conditions; by April 1941 @ US. Army Special Observers Group had opened in London. In Fume 1941 the British Security Co-ordination Oiice was established in New York, that { summer Maj. Haywood Hansell was posted to Britain, where he sought tar- get informacion from the RAF intelligence establishment, His British hosts did nat let him down, Although he felt the U.S. Army Air Forces (USAAT) asthe Army Air Corps was renamed that year, was better informed about petroleum, synthetic chemicals, and clectric power, the RAP was far more Knowledgeable about the Luftwaffe and German transportation, Hansell returned te the United States with almest a ton of classilied intelligence data anost of it in target folders, Lhis Brisish-supplied information formed the cone data for the USAAF's Air War Plans Division Number | document? Despite these efforts, when America entered the Sceond World War, U.S, Army intelligence was insulficiently prepared. In September 1941 the (ffice ‘of Agsistant Chief of Aur Staff Intelligence 1AC/AS 4-2] numbered jst twelve fans. By | June L945, it was to reach 550 military and 420 sivilian personnel, a fait indication of the rapisl expansion in this fis afficers and nine ci USAAF Daylight Raids Tn January 1942, the USAT established a bomber command in the Lnited Kingdom under the command of Brig. Gen. Ira C. Raker. Within his entourage were (wo intelligence officers, Maj, Harris Hull and Capt, Carl Nor- cross, tasked wi fh establishing. the first intelligence section specifically aimed feet aes (a cs pos Ces ca pepe iee oo ve Peeler tes ‘a ema ar are a However, the picture was not all gloomy. In the late i ae or: ae These Ultra decrypts were Churchill on a daily bass Sleveark Menzies, the head of Mle andi averseer of the Government Code and Cypher Schaal at Bletcn ley Park, This decrypt was given ta Churchill the day before the “Pali Sunday Massacre"—see Ju 52.at catering lo the needs of daylight précisian bombing. The RAP served as a tole model, although serious differenoes were apparent, Aldhough much information was gleaned from the experiences of the RAE’s Bamber Com- mand, Tlull and Norcross hacl to take inte consideration facters that were uncommon ia night area-bombing 0 ed to-assess the observations of the B-17 crews and their reports concerning the tactics employed by the Lufiwatte’s fighter units, as well as other evalaa- tions of the enemy and his capabilities: (On 24 June 1942, Gen. Carl Spaate acrived in England as head of the USAAF’s Eighth Air Force, With him he brought Cal, George C. McDon- ald, whe almost immediately opened an Pighth Air Farce A-2 liaison office in the Air Ministry. The US. officers assigned there nat anly provided nor- mal liaison but worked in tandems wich thelr British hosts in collecting, col: lating, and evaluating intelligen t for crew reports, certain aspects of PIU interpretation, and cechnical intelligence, he US, strategie aie forces in the United Kingdom semained lergely dependent upoa British intelli gence sources, For example the British “Y" teams bore the bureen of radio- signal deeryplion and analysis, while Ultra intelligence fram Bletchley Park ‘was closely guarded, each field command having a special liaison unit attached with the responsibility of revealing special intelligence” to a select low officers. For example, by carly 1943 Ultra and PR enabled the Allied air Jisrees us entoree a debilitating blockade af supply tp the Asis forees in Libya and ‘Tunisia, Cu 18 April 1943, Ulcre alerted the Allies thac there was going ions. bor instance, staff were need- even ace eats mare From aerial photngraphs suck as this (left), target maps (right) were created. The airtiekl, clearly discemible on the photegraph, can also be made aut on the much larger target map.Sometimes aircrew would capture German planes on camera, This Image is unique, tts the only time a German aight fighter was cap tured on fll trailing a bomber it ‘was about to attack, The RAF to be an air convoy of about 100 Junkers Ju 528 attempting to break the ember that took the photograph blockade, In the ensuing aerial melee aver half the Luttwaffe’s transports trom above had jist released! its were destroyed, in what subsequently became known as the “Palm Sunday Payload, triggering the flash camera system, bul hal an image twplured! Massacre.” Ultra and low-grade sigint was vital for the knowledge it provided on the strength, disposition, composition, production, wastage, anu serviceability of the Luftwaffe. Tt was this element of the Reich’s armed services that remained the major American strategic alr target until the implementation of the Transportation Plan in April 1944 during the buildup to Operation Over Jord.” Ln April 1943 Whitehall’sorder-of-battle intelligence showed that Luft- wail fighter strength was 4 percent hhigher than in December 1941. In June 1943, low-grade sigint showed that many fighter squadions in Fronce and Bel- piu were transferring to Germany and by fuly that the Luftatle's top pri ority was to defeat the USAAF's daylight deep-penctration raids over the Reich, By this tine frontline fighter strength had also risen to 1,800 single engipe machines, from 1,250) in December 1942." Using operational intelli« gence from Enigma, AL calculated that 60 percent of the Luftwatfe’s fighter strength had been recalled ta delend the Reich, al the expense al other frents. At estimated 780 single-engine and 740 twin-engine fighters. when actual strength was 964 single-engine and 682 Lwin engine aiccralt, Further evidence that the Luftwatte’s top priority was defeating the USAAF daylight raids was revealed by Enigma and Geciman fighter radio telephone teaffic during Sep- tember 1943, These sources indicated! that the Lultwalle was diverting, twin engine fighters to day fighting and equipping them with a variation of the Ieuoduetion 11army's 21 cm mortar, a weapon that proved deadly agains: the packed for. mations of B-17s and H-24s."* The Lufiwatic Enigma code was an invalisable source oi Gesman arder of battle, dispositions, production, wastage, casualties, serv iceability and reserves, Additionally it revealed much useful infermation on airfields, depos,anel training ields—all just ay ienpor lant wo the USAAF in ils attacks on German fighters on the ground. In January 1944, the U.S. Strategic Air Force (LSSTAF) was established! in Britain, with Spaata in command. Although he wanted close integration between intelligence and operations, which would permit air combat inteli- gence lo be more elective, during spring 144 USSTAT continued to get the bulk of its intelligence from the Air Ministry, Ultra and Y sigint continued to supply valuable means of determining Tuftwalle air order of battle, and sige int enabled the A-2 to establish the serviceability, fighting value and project ed capabilities of the Luétwaiie. The information-sharing partnership with the Tritish was tormatived om 24 February 1944. Under the ler of this agree- ment, each partner recognized the other’s area of expestise. Responsibility for all aviation-related intelligence on Germany would be din London, around the existing Air Ministry organigation, with U.S. personnel aug menting the arrangement. Washington would reciprocate by eaking the Lead role in developing intelligence on the Tapanese, Tactical information was largely scill derived feom the hard won experi ences of the air crews flying into the defensive German maclstrom over the Reich. Pilectively, che Armericans took the best the British had w offer and produced the balance of the required data themselves, For example, by mid- February 1944, Fnigma showed that US. P-51D Mustang long-range figh|- ers were aliering the cousse of the air was. Outmatched by the American fight ers, Luftwatie twin-cngine fighters wers being escorted yy BE 1095 and Fer 197s, whieh thersselves were no enateh for the superior P-51Ds, Consequently, German losses were 80 severe that the US, bomber streams were deliberate- Iy directed at Berlin, overtlying known belts af heavy fighters with the aim of lozcing the Luflvaffe into the air where it could be desteayed in detail.# Asa result of wartime experience, air intelligence gathering and assess- ment came of age. Colonel McDonald bluntly observed that “Air Intelligence throughout the war, was at once an operating agency a training school andl 4 proving ground—it had 1o be, lor intelligence had to produce if ene inethod dida t work, anothee was tied, and still auother if necessary, in order that requirements would be fulfilled." RAF Night Bombing The story of the RAF night oflensive is an allogether different one, It was extremely costly in men and matesiol, owing largely to the efficiency of the German defenses, a subject on which intelligence could provide little data for Boruber Command, For example Enigma vielded Little information on Luftwaffe night fighters. The case of Nachtjapdlpeschwader | (N}G1} ic quite perlinenl Ultra decrypts identified itonly in August 1950; in Jate L941, Al dis. covered ir had its own Enigma key, “Cockroach,” which GC & CS broke in idl-1942 that AE had any understanding of February 1942.11 was nel untilthe German night-fighter and radar systems. [uring the spring, significant data on German radar was fortheoming from Luftwalle Enigina codes, the SIS, PRU, and the CTU, which enabled AT to start establishing the constituent elements of the night fighter system and its control mechanisin.2¢ Thus. during mid+1942 AT hogan to understand the nature and buildup of the German radar and night fighter airceaft systems, but it was uot unt 1943 chat this had any iniluence on the introductian of Allied technical coun~ termeastres, Nor did iteontribute heavily to more effective bombing policies By the end of 1942, the characteristics af German ground radar systerns were well understood, However, collecting intelligence on the Luftwatie’s night fighter force presented problems for AT. Despite the steady accurmulation af information from contact reports sitice June 1940, when Bomber Command began salies inl Germany, a complete pieware of the Lafkwalle’s eapabsili- ties was not gained until about Sepember 1942. Te must by suid thal Lhe Germans [hemselves kept upgrading and expand ing this force as the war progressed, which only added complications to the wark of Air intelli ‘ede virtually no useful information on the equipment, tactics, deployment, nee, Asa resull. GG 80S Enigma sources wereable bo pro- or expansion of the enemy's erganization. Olber sources bau he used; SIS briefed its agents especially in how to report on radar and night-fighter mat- ters, But hy the star! of 1943, acambination of technical and order al battle intelligence enabled Al to understand completely not only the German dedense systern but also the evolution of the aight-fighter orgad how it functioned. Al realized that the radius of operation of controfled night-lighters, initially Gwenty-five miles, was now about ford miles, GCI (ground-contralled interception) radar ilhiminated the bara and then vectored the aireralLio the target” ation and radal 4s the Germans retreated, they had to leave behind much of their matetiel fs the Allies overran former erietny wifiekls, technical crew pored over abandoned aircratt for the slightest piece of useful data, Iniroduetion 13u Therefore, beginning in March 1943, Bomber Cammand commenced the Battle of the Ruhr. Overa five-month period Bomber Command flew 15,504 sorties and dropped 42,349 tons of bombs but Jost 718 aircraft; prompting a strategic rethink, This svas the RAF was unaware, and to a reinforcement of the twin-engine fighter defenses from $19 aircraft in January to 478 by Joly. It was not until August due part to refined German Lactics of which 1944, aller completion of the Overlord support operations that Bomber ‘Command resumed large-scale night bombing sorties against German cities, (They quickly established air superiority, because enemy defenses were hy then collapsing due to the shortages of fuel, losses of teained pilots, and the seizure of the ground radar stations by the advancing Allied armies.) The Combined Bomber Offensive Although the RAF was free to pursue city bombardment, oil was defined as 4 panavea larget. An 11 July decrypt (XL 1671) revealed that Gtring had banned all nonessential dying on account of the fuel shortage problem. On 7 August, Japanese diplomatic decrypts testified to the shortages of fuel when the head of the naval mission declared to Tokyo, “Oil is Germany's prob Jem. The Joint Intelligence Committee (in JIC|44| 407) declared on 16 Sep- rence Commitee believed the shorlage of tember that the Cambined Intel fuel would stop Germany fom any revival of Luttwatie activity. Again the Berlin Japanese naval mission provided valuable data when-a 13 September 1944 intercept revealed that although tighter and roeket aircraft production ‘was improving, the fuel shortage would prevent the Lufrwatfe from display- {ng the show of strength necessary to regain comtrol af the air Tnupravernent waser' all one-way for int November 1944 the Luftwatfe's day fighter arm recovered to an extent that affected the conduct of USSTAF aaperations. Encounters with jet and rockel-propelled lighters began lo inceease, and fighter production was up, In October 194d Al believed that numbers of available fighters had risen to 1,380 from 690.the previous month and that sorties of up to 700 aireraft were nov out of the question, Spaatz accordingly diected bomber operations against fighter production plants and airfields 5 well 9s ofl installations The Luftwaffe The Germans, lully aware of the ultimate consequences for the Reich should the decline not be arrested, devated more energy and resources to their new aircraft types. However, for the Allies, as the wer progressed, s0 too the sources anil voluine af intelligence on German aircraft types increased. Infoemation -came from attachés, OW, SIS agents, neutral observers, PR, captured dec- uments, postal censorship, and patent specifications, Barly in the war section ALI (g} within the Air Ministry collated data om all the aircraft wrecks in-Allied territory and disseminated pamphlets of its findings to the froniline squadrons, [epaid little to no attentin to Une other sources, upon which it was Jater to cely. At the beginning of 1942, when Al1(g} was renamed AI3(g). the technical section of Al became a fully-fledged research section, under the ‘aegis of the Director of latelligence (Operations), As the war progressed, Al2(g) increasingly assumed respansibility for assessment of all sources ofintelligence on eneiny aircraft developments, 11 pravided evi- denee lo the Air Staif and various Whitchall departments, depending.an the perceived natuse of che theeal and whether it ‘was from new lypes of aircrafl, new air engines, m radar, or other myriad equipmen.® owing the first half of 1942, Enigma, law-prade siginl, and in particular Japanese diplomatic signals began to be sent to Al?tg), but these sousces did not reveal information on new types until early 1944, PR was valuable hacause it detected new aircraft types, but only afice they were built and at their test aic fields, Aram mid. 1943, moze reliable data carne from POW andl agents and captured documents, SIS agents in particular proved valuable sourcesat this stage of the war, One of the most wratsu- al sources of technical intelligence on the Lultwaffe was the Roval Aircraft Establishment (MAE), he RAB's Farnborough Experimental Flying department accurnulated its own Lafiwatle as the war progressed, Mock dogfights over Farnham Commen and Frensham Ponds in Surrey (southern England) became cammanplace and enabled Allied Fighter pilots to ovaluate thes performance of enemy machines, notably the vaunted Fw 150, in combat conditions. weapons, L. Dv. T. 2088 A-5/FI Exerzier-Karte Ju 88 A-5 Exerzier-Karte Ausgabe Dezember 1942 De etchant Lotte ‘itd barista ta Lufwsfe ain 3, Baran ra Mert genahmoe oh dle LT, amas AMF When war broke ont, litte technical knowledge af the Luft- walle’ aircealt existed. As the exely a mainly over Allied territory, a stcady supply of wrocks was made available that yielded data om equipment and components from gun mountings, gearboxes, exhaust systems, radio. equipment, engines, peopellers, seconmaissarice cameras, magneto, ltd self sealing fuel tanks. However, this in formation could not provideevaluations af enemy craft performance; complete machines were needed for this, Of the hundreds oF Lufwalfe airceath that RAE handled, many genuisiely landed ia error, “but others, still officially described as having arrived that way, were the result nf defections and deals arcanged by Intelligence" Professor R. ¥, Jones remembers being telephaned on the morning of I May 1943 by Jack Easton, one of the directors of Als Lmtelligence, to state thar 8 Ju 880-6 night-fighter had landed al Dyce, near Aberdeen in Scotland. Inter estingly, the crew had radioed their base in Norway to say they were on fire and were ditching, Liferalis spolied by the German rescue services provided convincing evidence chat this was the case, However, the Ju 88 landed under Spitfire escort! Professor Tones went ta Scotland immediately to inspect the enemy aircraft, and within five days its valuable, brand-new Fu 203 Tich- tensiein BC radar equipmreal was being evaluated at RAE under the super vision of the Ml6 scientific intelligence officer? Before German aircealt were passed to the RAF’s Enemy Aircraft Flight at Duxford, where they were demonstrated lo lhe Observer Corps, antiairceatt personnel, ground crew, and pilots, initial cvahiation work was sh between Parnbarough and Boscombe Dawn, ILwas typical of Allied inven tiveness chat as maintenance proved problematic, the RAP developed its own POW camp ol lechnicians disalfeeted with the Nazis, These men were only Hractles: we fates ea Diese Karte gilt ols Verbraucharateriall AL made much use at enemy maintenance manuials IntreductienAn $1204 of the RAL’s “amiburough Lutwatte too keen t© exchange the boredom of regular camp life for a quasiefree lifestyle at Fara ull not win Une war porough, once ey realized Germany wo For am understanding of the work undertaken by the RAE, some exam- ples al specific aircraft need highlighting, The first isa sadl tale, On 9 Tebru- ary 1940 an He 11 LH-3 of 3./%.G.26 was shot down by Spistires while on antl: shipping duty. Tl erash-landecl on moorland at North Berwick Law and was flown co RAE Farnborough and then passed on te Duxford. Unfortunately, on ademonstration flight for U.S- airmen in November 145, itcrashe ng measures to avoid a head-on vollision with a captured Ju 88A. The RAP pilots of both machines were trying ta land on the sonve runway but from dif- ferent directions. Tragically, six cul af Ue Heinkel’s len American passengers killed. Wechaps the RAE’s biggest prize was Oberleutnant Atnim Faber’s Fer 190, from TIL}, landed al RAP Penbuty in brond daylight on 23 June after chasing saiding Spitfires back from the raid on his airfield at Morlaix in Triltang. The mast formidable of Germany's Bghlerair- ‘constant success agaizist the Spitfire V had created a mood of despon dency among Fighter Commands pilots, Fortunately; tests with this Fre 190 against the soost-t0-4ie-inteoduced Spittire IX res after tak- 7nd, which he anistaber Although the RAF provided useful evaluations on the performance char- aleristigs of individual Luttwalle vpes, it could say nothing on oper ations or tactics. As regards intelligence on Lufrwafie operations within West- en Turope, until D-day this was derived chielly (ree low-grade sigint, PR, and POW intetrogatians, backed up by Mlé reports and whatever was avail- alle from Enigma, British intelligence aulliorities, having already built up & considerable fund of knowledge on these matters, continued te increase their amniliarity with the overall st ment, and order of battle on fof the Tullwafle and with ils strength, deploy ery front, Kor example, in early april 1942 sigint provided information that Kamyfgeschiwader strength in the West was 10 be increased, with INK.G. 100 and 1V/K.G, 40 ordered to Holland, Even though the 1942 German bomber offensive against the UK failed —primari-ly due to Luftwatfe limitations —it did succeed im keeping 141M) Fighters in Britain when they were desperately needed in other theaters, in its defense, AT soon deduced that the enemy's biggest “show” would be no 150 airceafi, with the predominant lorce sise averaging eighty bombers. Perhaps the single most rewarding source on German aircraft develop- ment was Hiroshi Oshima, He continually proved tg be a most valuable, if somewhat unwitting, source, purely in terms of what and whom he saw and heard. He was the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, and as suels he had access (some of Lhe Reich's mos! senior political and military leaders. He report ed reguilary to his uperiors acthe Japanese foreigis ministry in encoded trans. snissions, Lite did he know that the eijsher he was-ernploying bat long bi compromised hy Allied decryption teams using Magic Magic, like Liltra, sup plied the Allies with 4 unique insight segardinig intelligence about Gersnamy's intentions, armaments and eainamic problems, Of all the technical information which Magic produced from the sig- nals of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, perhaps none was mince value able than data concerning weapon whose potentialities the Gor- mans developed moze effectively then the Allies. This was the JeL-progelled aircrall, whieh, when iL vas first empkiysu operational- ly by the Loftwafie, looked as though it might provide the enemy will an advantage ia the shies as signifieant as Ue Americaas' upgrading, of the Mustang into a long-range fighter capable of escorting bombers to the far side of Germany The Japanese weve avid for information about j propulsion. In consequence, the Terlin Embassy fled many ceports which, as translated in the Magic inter cepts, often have the sume authority and exact description as a pur- loined blueprint might have provided. Ronald Lewin, author of the Other Lua, takes the case of the Arado Ar 234 jet bomber, which, aleimy with the Me 262, was prubeloly the must efficient jel ‘ype ploduced and delivered for service with the Luftwaffe. In 1944 over 527 were delivered The Allies knew sirtually everytbing shout iL.A 31 October L944 Mag de decrypt from the Kerlin embassy naval attaché supplice! the spesdat varving altitudes, the ceduction in speed caused by different bomb paylnads,theratc af elim, the oplimurn ceiling ran ing range. the landing speed, the characteristics of its automatic pilot, and details af the Laftwafle units that speefalized in operating the Arado, He argues legit snately, that Magic, Ultra. and systematic sifting of deciphered Krw-prade Tanli= -watfesigint resullcd in thecreational an almost encyclopedic awareness of what “ 4's dimen= ‘the Germans were doing with their jet programs Tnvelligence of this caliber was to pay huge dividends to the Allies until the close of the warin the air, At theend of February 1945, the Alice beeasne jncressingly anxiaus about the Heinkel He 162 and the Messerschmitt Me alte the oserall expansion production 262, a3 well as about mounting references i: jal the jet production program. For example, regarding mon ales with its own, Ln Me 262 pro duction AL estimated 150-200, which compared to the Japanese figure of 500, Tn fact it was actually 296, although Une Geroans had planned to produce figures, AL compared the Japanese esti Introduction 745D in Eebvuary 1945, About thesame time, there wasa marked inctease in jet sirerath activity, which continued throughout Mareby 1945 let fighter opposition marginally incceased against Allied bomber raids toward the ond of February. On 2 March a combinesl force at fifty Me 163 and ble 262 fighters attacked USAAF bombers operating against wil targets. On 15 March, twenty-four U.S. bombers were shot down, predominantly by a force of thirty-six jets that auacked with new Lacties. This tend was enough to suggest to the Allies that the possibility existed for a new phase in the air war oweing. to the new jets. In Lhe mide af March, sigint discovered that uhe Ger- mans were trying to expand the jet fighter arm rapidly, calling for pilots from night-Fighter, day-fightar, ancl len persorinel fiom the YL launcher crews? The token jet force soon disintegrated as the Allied ground forces overran its airfields and their production plants. Notes 1 Wesley Wark, t pround-attack units, and fro Utinnate Kner London: Cornell Liniwersity Heess, 1985), 35-79. 2. Public Revosil Dilies, Kew herealter PRO|, GAR 4/22 aad CAB AG, 3. KH. Hinsley, fritish fnteigence irks Second Whrld Wie, abridged ed, {London 1993), [ler Majesty's Stationery Oice [erealler HMSO | 3 Ware, The Ulsiiars Eien SB IL Alimley, Beitish World War fs Fatluence or Siewte= avnndits HMSO, 1979), vo. | by aud Ope 6. Hinsley, vol. 1, 61 2, Hinsley.abrielged él LI 8. Nig Woot, sifis rinels Secret in 191945 {Lon lgonce Seruico- Operatin don: Weidenield and Nicubbotis 19863545, 9. Hinsloy, abridged ed, 11 LW. Hinsley. wl. 1, 55-56 LL. PRO, FO-8n0/270, 34y9, est, AiG, 46 15. RV Tones, Most Seoret Was Aeish Siendifie tatelicer Hadder and Stoughton, 1975 Le, Hinsley, yok. 1.98 1 West, AHI 67 16. Hinsley. abridged ed, 84-13. 7-8. Jones, “Scientific Intelligence of che Royal Air Force in the Second World Wear” in The Canada of he Ait War fa th J Work Bars An Futeenasionet Comparison, ed, Horst Boog (Berg, Onford, 1992}, 580 ve 1939-1945 (Landon: 18, Jones, “Seientific Intelligence. 19, Jones, "Siem Tatelliged ce” 58 78, UML 20, Wark, ‘he Litdmate Lenny, 35-3 21, PRO, CAB 25/94. 22. Wocley; Wark, “Whe Air Defense Cap: Lritish Air Doctrine and Intelligence Warn ings the 1930s." in The Caondrud of the Air Wor de the Second World Ware Ari international Comparison, ed, Horst oog (Berg: Cxford, 192), 521 24, Werk, “Air Defeane Gap,’ S16, DAK KL Hooton, Kagte in Flames, She Hall af rhe Lapis Armour Press, 1997), 30) (Landon: Arme andWest, M6, 62 RV umes, Most Secret Yirn 179681 Ray Canyors Neshitt, The RAF iu Cament, wal 2, 1939-1943 (Londen Sutton and PRO, 1996}, 7, 28, RF Butrell, "US Ar com cd, Horse Moog (Berg: Chord, 1992), 531 29, Tuteelle"US Army Air Borces,’ $32 33, x ILS Army sir Forces? S340 AL, TEL Hinsley, Revtibh fateligense iy the Sevoaid Wola War its Tapience 0 (London: HMSO, 1984), vol. 2, 517 ged el 803-1, Konald Lewin, ‘Ube Other U 24, Hinsley vol. |, SIAR 38, Futeel, “LS An 36. Hinsley, vol, 2, 250-5: 37, Llinsley. abridged ed 17 38. FH. Hinsley, Heitsk Ineldgence in she Second World War Is {i py ancl Operations {Louskan: FIMSO, 1983}, vol, 4 S11, 39. Hinsley, vol. 5, 313. 40, Hinsley, vol 3, 329-20. 4), Reginald Tornill and Arthur Rood, Harborough: he Story af RAUF (Robert Tales London, 1980), #5, 12. Janes, “Seientifie Inslligence,"17_and ‘Iurchill and Reed, Rarnboreuh, 8 49. Turnill and Reed, Rarmisnongh, 86a, 14, PRO, ADD 223/93, and Hinsley; vo 2.25529, 45. Lewin, The COrher 46. Lewin, The (Other Ultra 42, PRO HIW 123108 48. Hinsley. vol. 3.6 Ss ir Foes Intlligones in the Sechnd ut ofthe Ai War in she Second Ware An era 2s 3. {London [Jus susan, 1982}, Borses) 530-51 Intioduction WONE FIGHTERSArado Ar 240/440 War and Intelligence History The Arado Ar 24th was designed asa "heavy fighter-bomber” and dirst lew in May 1940, It was an aevodynamically adept aiscraft with excelleat pestosan ance. Twa entered service during 1941, flying reconnaissance missions over England, successfully avoiding interception due to theie speed. However, the aircralt was dogged! by instabilily problems and was rejected for mass pro duction in favor ofthe Me 210—somevhat ironically, considering that plane's own aerodynamic problems. The Ard schnel umber (fast bomber}, a clewel~ opment of the Ar 240, shaved promising test results but was rejected in the 194 production program in favor of Dornier’s revolutionary Do 333 “push aircraft, Allied air intelligence commented in August 1944, “Thank the German Air Force for uot having accepted this plane” pu The V3 prototype of the Arado 240. This prototype was develaved for dove bombing and reconnaissance, first thing in late summer 1940. It lacked the propeller bosses added to later versions, [AIR 40/121] Rare photagraph af Arado Ar 240 in fight Fiiree photographs sf the aircratt were cap tured during the Mlied invasion of Sicly in August 1943, [AIR 40/121] Data File (ARADO AR 4404-0) DIMENSIONS Wingspan 54 ft. 6 ir Length 3a Ht. 8 in. Helgi lath sin Mex Sosed 466 mph Range 7,248 mila Engines 2 Daimler Benz 03 603 G famament 2 MK D8 cerron, MG 15120, » MG 15 eh Al issued these drawings of the Arada 240 in Noverniaer 1943. [AIR 40/1 20] Fighters 25Focke-Wulf Fw 187 Falke (Falcon) War Record ‘The Fwy 18? first flew in spring 1937, having been designed without an REM ification, Despite its superior performance in comparison to the BE 110. ot selectual Jor pruduction for Ube heavy fighter role, parily Imecause it was too short to accommodate rear armament, Its cabin was 30 small that it was soine instrumierits were placed oulside the cockpit A few "atk" were unofficially deployed in Norway with 13/26 successful results; BE LGaicciew preferred theit. The aigoraft wasalso used by the Focke Alew oft with Wulf Company-to defend its Bremen plant from Allied bombers, ¢ alsctail were painted in false Luftwatte markings te foot Allied ait ligence into thinking they wore in service. Intelligence History September 1940. Article appears in the Swedish press about a fighter being built at Focke-Wull’s Bremen plant. Bull wo samespecification as BE 130 but it was very maneuverable, fist, and ith reporiedty superior perfarmanc: possessed exlraondinary firepower A January 1941, Air attaché Belgrade reports Tw 167 has excellent aerody- amie form, is the fastest rerstirer in use at the front, possesses flying and ig qualities supposedly better Uns BE LID, 26 Chapter 1 strapped into his Foy 187. The aircraft's cockgit wus sa narrow that as can be seen here, same of the instruments were placed an the inside af the engine cowing. (AIR 40/187) Data File (FW 187 A-0) DIMENSIONS. Wirgsor SON Zi in, Lorgth 3611 Ble in Herohi AL Pin Max 8 moh Ceiling G0 Te Engines 2% 730 bhe dure Acmamer: 4 MG 17, 2. MIG FF cannon crew 1‘An Fu 187 warms up its engines The fighter possessed better per- formance than its two main cor. temporaries trom Messerschmitt, the BF 109 and 110, but despite this, it never received any production orders tram the RLM, [AIR 40/187] 1941. LOW source declaves the Ew 187 probably better than BE 1L0 bu ‘oul loo late le compete with it; Luftwaife standardization resulted in its not going to operational units, 15 July 1941, From WS. naval attaché, Vichy France—tvench journal described Pav 187 as successor te BY LUM. 12 August 1943, AT report: about twelve manufactured, then series discon tinued. ADE () report: five aircraft assembled at Neuenland dting 192 then production stopped; believed to be due to ditliculty in gesting engines. Side view of an Fw 187. The lack of markings suggests it had only recenth lefi the production Inne, [Aik 40, 124] Tiginters 25Focke-Wulf Fw 190 FOEREWULE Fo 190 A vulnerability snd arr see ment diagram of an Fue 190 produces by Al mow tioning noc in 1944. Is features a - BM 801 engine, which ala powered the earlier « versions of the Tocke S Wulf fighter. [AIR 40/5] War Record Data As catly as 1937 the RLM issued a requirement for a replacement for the (FW 190D-9) DIMENSIONS BI 109 as the Luttwalle's main {ighter, Consequently, Kurt Tank, Pocke-Wult’s designer, produced one of the truly great aircraft in aviation history. teeth” GoReRtEtn ‘When ites entered service ver France in August 1941, the RAF could icyg not beliew ity pilots reports that the new Spitfire Mark V veas being om 4a. Goeed 426 mph clase! The only shortcoming of the Fy 190A: Lwasitsrelativelylightarma Geigy gasv0 tk ment, four 7.9 mm machine guns In specs! andl all ather wnajor factors. hE gnoe ee alice Fw 186 outperformed al Aled fighters when itwas intoduced. Luftwaffe p's Bary 98 bhp aptly dubbed their new machine with the nickname Witrger (Butcher Bird) " a F q dune 213A41 The Ew 190's first major operation came when it was employed to give armament 2* 81 nMe 131 2x 20mm MG eannon eg bomb fighter cover to the “Channel dash" made by the baitlecruisers Selsernkorst and Gneisenav and the heary ccuiser Prive Engen from Brest on 12 February 1942. The Fv 190s decimated the hopelessly outdated Swordfish biplane tar pedo bonrbers sent by the British to intercept the warships. The next major encounter with the RAF came ducing the Dieppe said. Fol lowing the capture ofan intact Pw 190, the RAF analyzed the plane and hur- riedly pushed the Spitfire Mark IX into’service to counter it. The British and Canadians were surprised an 19 August L942 when For 190 A-3¥LLL L bombers flew in below the RAF fighter cower to sink two ships involved in Creve mothe Dieppe raid. Tr aerial combat Fur 1908 accounted for ninery-sexen of the 106 RAF losses that day In late 1942 and warly 1943, For 191s were used in a series of “rip and pun” raids on Sonthern England. Schnellkampfgeschwader 10 used Fw 190s in low- level pinpoim attacks; their Fur 1904-3 and A-4 Jabas (Jagebomberssatfedr) inflicted serious damage on several indusisial targets, The RAF was forced to diverLaver twelve squadrons to counter these raiders, although antiaircraft fire. caused most Luftwaffe casualties Surprisingly, the Fw 190 was introduced On the Rastern Front only in Sep- tember 1942, Mostly used in the ground-attack role, beavily laden with bombs and cannon, the Pay 190s would oflen he escorted hy BI 109s. Pye 190s were heavily involved in the struggle for Siclly in August 1943, although still more than a match for any Allied fighter, Ley sulferesl heawy kisses du: to the aver- ‘whelming weight of numbers of Allied aitceatt that comtinvally attacked Ger- man airfields, However, by mid-1943 the growing scale of American davlight raids on Germany led to several Grappen withdrawing Irom Russia and Italy to defend the Fatherland. Atthe end of August Ew 190s and Bf 10¥sshot dawn sixty and damaged a further 100 American heavy hombers raiding Regensberg and Schwweinkurt, Meanwhile the night-lighter wings NIG | and NJG-2 had started experi- menting with the lw 190, the plane was adopted in the Wilde Snw role; this involved solitary sircralt searching for hombers independently of the radar- delection systei, which at che time was suéfering heavily from RAF conn- termeasurss, During August and September 1943, Fw 190 and Bf 109 Wild Boars of 1G 300 accounted for 150 RAF heavy bombers, Although contimu- ‘An Tw: 190 dispiaying USAAF markings ancl a distinctive skull with eanle’s swings insignia below the cockpit. [AIR 40/124] FightersThe original V1 prototype of the Fw 190, which first Mew on 1 June 1939, bearing civil markings, Unie the production version it featured a ducted spanner. (AR 40/124] 28 ing in this role until the end of the wan; therelarively small nember of planes jd the potential available, typically twenty la thirty on any eine aight, lim cftect of this tactic, During late 1943, heavily arened and aeaored Fw 190 AB/R-7s entered the battle against the USAAF, Goring personally ordered the formation of Strmstaffel 1a unit made up of solunteers and pilots undergoing discipti paryaction, The unit flew specially armoreel Fw 190.4hs, Before cornmencing, each mission, pilots signed a declaration stating they would not return to base unless they had destroyed al leusL ane enemy barriber—il all else failed, boy ramming the opponent. More successful was JG 3, led by a Major Moritz, which employed snore conventional lacti¢s, One 7 July L944, 1G 3 shot down thirty-two American heavy bombers, for the loss of only two aircraft. Follawing D-day in June 144, the Luftwatfe rushed Pw 190s to northern Franco, mainly to be employed in the ground-attack role, llied fighters still had great difficulty in shooting down Fw 190s, especially when they used their pitrous-oxide power boosts to outrun the hunters, Towever, Allied antiair- ctaft fire soon whittled down their numbers, the units being eventually with drawn ls Germany, In fall 1944, the last significant Fw 190 variant was inctoduced, ‘The B-9 is generally recognized as the best German pistan-engine fighter af the See ond World War [ts speed and mancoverability, coupled with a heavy cannon acinanent, enabled the Fw 1900 to dogfight Allied fighters adequately and shoot down bombers ‘Over twa hundred Fv 190s took part in the last great offensive operation carried out by the Luftwafle, Qn | January 1945, over eight hundred Ger- man aircreft laanched Operation Badenpintte, attacking Allied aircraft on the