Warriors Notes 2022 Allied Political Laws and Public International

PREPARED BY: ATTY. DARYL BRETCH M.
LARGO
WARRIORS’ NOTES 2022

Warriors’ Notes 2022 POLITICAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
BAR REVIEWER AND NOTES IN ALLIED POLITICAL LAWS1

AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 2022 BAR EXAMS
By:
Daryl Bretch M. Largo

University of San Carlos
School of Law and Governance
College of Law
Cebu City
2022 Revised Edition
LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
General Principles: Definition of “office”, “public officer” and “public official”
1. “Office” refers, within the framework of governmental organization, to any major functional unit
of a department or bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to any position held or
occupied by individual persons, whose functions are defined by law or regulation. (Sec. 2 (9),
Introductory Provisions of Administrative Code)
2. A “public office” is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual
is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. (Laurel v. Desierto
[2002])
3. “Officer”, as distinguished from “clerk” or “employee”, refers to a person whose duties not being
of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the
functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a
particular act or perform a particular act in the exercise of governmental power, “officer” includes
any government employee, agent or body having authority to do the act or exercise that function.
(Sec. 2 (14), Introductory Provisions of Administrative Code)
4. “Public Officer” (for purpose of applying Section 203 of the RPC) refers to any person who, by
direct provision of the law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, shall take
part in the performance of public functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall
perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a public officer. (Sec. 203, RPC)
5. “Public officer” (for the purpose of applying Plunder Law) refers to “any person holding any public
office in the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of an appointment, election
or contract.” (Sec. 1 (a), RA 7080)
6. “Public Officials” (for the purpose of applying RA 6713) include elective and appointive officials
and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including
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Local Government Law (Public Corporation), Administrative Law, Law of Public Officers and Election Laws.
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military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount.
(Sec. 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 6713)
Kinds of Appointment
Appointment vs. Designation
7. Appointment is different from “designation”, the latter involving the giving of additional
functions to an already appointed officer. Appointment requires: (1) that the appointing
authority is vested with that power, (2) the appointee possesses all the qualifications (including
civil service eligibility, and none of the disqualifications, (3) the position is vacant, (4) the
appointment is approved by the CSC, (5) the appointee accepts by taking the oath and discharges
the functions.
An officer who is merely “designated” is not entitled to a security of tenure. He holds the office
only in a temporary character. He is likewise not entitled to additional benefits. (see Santiago vs.
COA [1991]; Sevilla vs. CA & Santos [1992])
Kinds of Appointments under Civil Service Law
8. Permanent – the appointee meets all the qualifications and requirements of law, including the
appropriate eligibility requirement (civil service eligibility requirement); it lasts until lawfully
terminated. (Sec. 9, Rule IV, 2017 CSC Omnibus Rules on Appointments)
Temporary – the appointee meets all the education, experience and training requirements for
the position except the appropriate civil service eligibility. Issued in the absence of an applicant
who meets all the qualification requirements of the position as certified by the appointing
authority/officer. It shall not exceed 12 months and employment ends ipso facto with or without
qualified replacement. Cannot be issued to position that involves practice of profession regulated
by bar/board law for lack of required license. Renewal of temporary appointment is limited to five
(5) times only reckoned from effectivity of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 20, Series of 2017.
(See Sec. 9, Rule IV, supra.; Pangilinan vs. Maglaya [1993]; Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA
[1995])
Substitute – issued when the regular incumbent is temporarily unable to perform the duties of
the position (e.g. on leave of absence for three (3) months or more, under suspension, etc.). It
is effective only until the return of the incumbent. (Sec. 9, Art. IV, supra.)
Co-terminus – issued to a person whose tenure is limited to a period specified by law or whose
continuity in the service is based on the trust and confidence of the appointing officer/authority
or of the head of the organizational unit. (supra.)
Fixed Term – issued to a person with specified term of office, subject to reappointment as
provided by law, such as Chairperson and Members of Commissions and Boards. (supra.)
Contractual – issued to a person whose employment is in accordance with a special contract to

undertake local or foreign-assisted projects or a specific work or job requiring special or technical
skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period. Limited
to one (1) year, but may be renewed every year based on performance until the completion of
the project or specific work. Renewal to the same position shall be submitted to the CSC for
‘notation’ only without need for approval. (supra.)
Casual – issued only for essential and necessary services where there are not enough regular
staff to meet the demands of the service and for emergency cases and intermittent period not to
exceed one (1) year. Renewal to the same position shall be submitted to the CSC for ‘notation’
only without need for approval. (supra.)
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Presidential Appointments
9. Regular – made when Congress is in session.

Ad interim – made when Congress is in recess.
(Note: an ad interim appointment is permanent in nature and takes effect immediately and ceases
to be valid upon disapproval by the Commission on Appointments.)
10. Process of Regular Presidential Appointment: (a) nomination

(b) consent
(c) appointment
(d) acceptance by the nominee (Sec. 16, Art. VII)
11. Process of Ad interim Presidential Appointment: (a) appointment

(b) confirmation
12. An original appointment cannot be validly issued to one who is related “within the third degree
of consanguinity or affinity” to the recommending or appointing authority. Exceptions:
employment in confidential capacity, teacher, physician, or AFP member. (Civil Service Law)
13. One who is next-in-rank is entitled to preferential consideration for promotion to the higher
vacancy but it does not necessarily follow that he and no one else can be appointed. The rule
neither grants a vested right to the holder nor imposes a ministerial duty on the appointing
authority to promote such person to the next higher position. Thus, an officer lower in rank but
of superior qualification may be promoted instead.
Public Officers: Disabilities, Inhibitions, Powers and Duties
14. "No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries." (Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution)
15. The view that an elective official may be appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his office, ignores the clear-out difference in the wording of the two (2)
paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes
holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any
exception to the rule against appointment or designation of an elective official to other
government posts, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the
President as head of the economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be
appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated ex
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. (Flores v. Drilon, G.R. No. 104732, [June 22,
1993], 295 PHIL 643-660)
16. Public office is personal to the incumbent and is not a property which passes to his heirs" (De la
Victoria vs. Comelec, 199 SCRA 561 [1991]). The heirs may no longer prosecute the deceased
protestee's counter-claim for damages against the protestant for that was extinguished when
death terminated his right to occupy the contested office. (Abeja vs. Judge Tanada [1994])
17. A public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of
law, but is a public trust or agency; (Libanan vs. Sandiganbayan [1994]). However, an
incumbent’s right to office may be considered “property” within the protection of due process in
controversies relating to the question as to who of two (2) persons is entitled thereto. (The
General Manager, PPA vs. Monserate [2002])
18. An elected official who refuses without valid motive to be sworn in shall be held criminally liable
under Sec. 234 of the RPC. Exception: Compulsory military and civil service under Sec. 4., Art.
II of the 1987 Constitution and pursuant to the National Defense Act.
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19. Effect of Pardon on the right to hold public office. Under Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Code, pardon
shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. In Monsanto vs. Factoran, the
Supreme Court said that the pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment. The Supreme Court continued to say that pardon looks to the
future and it is not retrospective. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender.
It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been
suffered. This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
20. Doctrine of Official Immunity. It is the duty of the Court to see to it that public officers are not
hampered in the performance of their duties or in making decisions for fear of personal liability
for damages due to honest mistake. Whatever damage they may have caused as a result of such
an erroneous interpretation, if any at all, is in the nature of a damnum absque injuria. Mistakes
concededly committed by public officers are not actionable absent any clear showing that they
were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. After all, "even under the
law of public officers, the acts of the petitioners are protected by the presumption of good
faith.”(Farolan v. Solmac Marketing Corp. [1991])
De facto v. De jure officers
21. A de facto officer must be distinguished from a mere usurper. A “de facto officer” has color of
right or title to the office or has apparent authority to hold the office and has done so in good
faith, while a “usurper” has neither lawful title nor color of right or title to the office; the act of a
de facto officer is valid as if it was done by a de jure officer but that of a usurper is absolutely
null and void; the former may be removed through a direct proceeding only.
The Court resorts to the de facto officer doctrine to accord validity to the actions of
a de facto officer during the period of such officer's wrongful tenure, insofar as the public or third
persons are concerned. This principle was born of necessity, as the public cannot be expected to
investigate the right of a public official to an office before transacting with them. Thus, on the
basis of public policy and convenience, the public may assume that officials are legally qualified
and in office. (Arroyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 202860, [April 10, 2019])
A handling prosecutor who files an Information despite lack of authority but without any indicia of
bad faith or criminal intent will be considered as a de facto officer, clothed with the color of
authority and exercising valid official acts. (Pp v. Rodriguez, G.R. 248181 (Notice), May 5, 2021)
The good faith possession of office is not always one of the standards by which the Court assesses
the applicability of the doctrine. Good faith is often presumed or implied, and frequently used as
a conclusory statement. Furthermore, the presence of good faith on the part of
the de facto officer is ordinarily applied to issues involving the de facto officer's entitlement to
the salaries and emoluments of the de jure office. (Arroyo v. Court of Appeals, supra.)
A de facto public officer cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office
because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is
entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. (Sampayan vs. Daza, [1992]; Arroyo v.
Court of Appeals, supra.)
An incumbent of a public office may recover from a de facto officer the salary received by the
latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he (the de facto officer) occupied the
office in good faith and under color of title. A de facto officer, not having a good title, takes the
salaries at his risk and must, therefore, account to the de jure officer for whatever salary he
received during the period of his wrongful tenure. The Supreme Court has allowed a de facto
officer to receive emoluments for actual services rendered but only when there is no de jure
officer. (see: Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary [1991]; Arroyo v. Court of Appeals,
supra.)
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The Civil Service
Discretion of Appointing Authority; Role of CSC in appointments
22. The appointing authority is given ample discretion in the selection and appointment of qualified
persons to vacant positions, provided that the exercise thereof is in good faith for the
advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements and provided further
that such prerogatives are not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton
manner, or out of malice or spite.
Civil Service Commission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither
does it have the authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only to
ascertain if the appointee possesses the required qualifications. The determination of who among
aspirants with the minimum statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing
authority and not the Civil Service Commission.
Accountability of Public Officers
23. There are two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with
offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending investigation
and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal. Compensation is due only for the period of
preventive suspension pending appeal should the employee be ultimately exonerated.
24. When performing official functions, public officers are liable only in case of (1) malice, (2) bad
faith, and (3) Gross Negligence. They are not liable for wrong interpretation of law, unless in the
case of judges who commit gross ignorance of the law. Heads, on the other hand are liable for
acts of subordinates only when he has authorized by written order the act complained of. Cf.
Arias Doctrine.
When Arias Doctrine not applicable
25. Petitioners cannot hide behind our declaration in Arias v. Sandiganbayan that heads of offices
cannot be convicted of a conspiracy charge just because they did not personally examine every
single detail before they, as the final approving authorities, affixed their signatures to certain
documents. The Court explained in that case that conspiracy was not adequately proven, contrary
to the case at bar in which petitioners' unity of purpose and unity in the execution of an unlawful
objective were sufficiently established. Also, unlike in Arias, where there were no reasons for the
heads of offices to further examine each voucher in detail, petitioners herein, by virtue of the
duty given to them by law as well as by rules and regulations, had the responsibility to examine
each voucher to ascertain whether it was proper to sign it in order to approve and disburse the
cash advance. (Bacasmas vs. Sandiganbayan [2013])
Three-fold Liability Rule
26. It is a basic rule in administrative law that public officials are under a three-fold responsibility for
a violation of their duty or for a wrongful act or omission, such that they may be held civilly,
criminally and administratively liable for the same act. Administrative liability is thus separate
and distinct from penal and civil liability. Moreover, the fact that the administrative case and the
case filed before the Ombudsman are based on the same subject matter is of no moment. It is a
fundamental principle of administrative law that the administrative case may generally proceed
against a respondent independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires
only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the criminal charge. Accordingly, the dismissal of two criminal cases by the
Sandiganbayan and of several criminal complaints by the Ombudsman did not result in the
absolution of petitioner from the administrative charges. (Melendres vs. Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission, [2012])
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Condonation Doctrine
27. Principle of condonation, abandoned. In Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals,2 the Principle of

Condonation has been declared no longer controlling.
Abandonment of principle of condonation, prospective application
28. It should be noted, however, that the abandonment of condonation doctrine can only be given a
prospective application. Thus, it would still be proper to treat the condonation doctrine as "good
law" when, for instance, the COMELEC's petition was commenced on October 29, 2013 (prior to
Carpio-Morales case), and when petitioner filed his Verified Answer cum Memorandum invoking
the same, as illustrated in Dimapilis v. COMELEC.3
29. That the abandonment of the principle of condonation should only be given prospective
application was also reiterated in Giron v. Ochoa, Jr.4 There, and quite interestingly, the Supreme
also ruled that the principle of condonation applies to a public official elected to another office as
each term is deemed separate from other terms.
Cut off date for abandonment of Condonation Doctrine
30. The condonation doctrine is no longer an available defense to a public official who is
reelected on or after April 12, 2016. In other words, the reelection of a public official on or
after April 12, 2016 would no longer absolve him or her from any administrative liability arising
from a previous misconduct that he or she had committed during a prior term. (Madreo v. Bayron,
Nov. 3, 2020).
31. The Ombudsman's Office Circular No. 17 dated May 11, 2016 is null and void, pursuant to the
above-discussed ruling in Madreo. As it stands, the condonation doctrine is still considered as
"good law" in all administrative cases involving public officials whose reelections occurred before
April 12, 2016, regardless of the dates of filing of the administrative cases against them or the
status of said cases when the Carpio-Morales case ruling attained finality. (Gaudan v. Degamo,
G.R. Nos. 226935, 228238 & 228325, [February 9, 2021]).
32. In Office of the Ombudsman v. Mayor Vergara (2017), the Supreme Court explained that a public
official need not be reelected to the same position in the immediately succeeding election for the
condonation doctrine to be an available defense for him or her in an administrative
proceeding. Otherwise stated, "the doctrine can be applied to a public officer who was elected to
a different position, provided that it is shown that the body politic electing the person to another
office is the same." (Gaudan v. Degamo, supra.)
Ombudsman
33. The Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public officials/ employees of GOCCs
with original charters. It can only investigate and prosecute acts of the officials/employees of
government corporations. Even if the government later on will acquire the controlling interest, as
in the case of PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have an “original charter”. (Khan vs.
Ombudsman [2006]; Carandang vs. Ombudsman [2011])
34. The power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government
agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts.
The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public employees and officials
is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local
Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the
President and the local Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials.
(Flores vs. Montemayor [2011])
2
G.R. No. 217126-27, November 10, 2015.
3
G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017.
4
G. R. No. 218463, March 1, 2017.
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However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the
government, the investigation of such cases. (Busuego vs. Ombudsman (Mindandao) and
Busuego, G.R. No. 196842, October 09, 2013)
The provisions of Section 20 (5) of R.A. 6770 are merely directory. The Ombudsman is not
prohibited from conducting an investigation a year after the supposed act was committed. The
issue of whether Section 20 (5) of R.A. 6770 is mandatory or discretionary has been settled by
jurisprudence. [W]ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe.
Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and
employees. In disciplining public officers and employees, the object sought is not the punishment
of the officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the
public's faith and confidence in our government. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Andutan, Jr.
[2011])
Authority to Discipline Deputy Ombudsman
35. Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own alter
egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the Ombudsman's disciplinary
authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman
itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional mandate, includes its key officials,
all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying out her mandate. Unfortunately,
intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is what Section 8 (2) of RA No.
6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only with the independence
that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably
with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman office seeks to
revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her Deputies who act
as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can hardly be
expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials who are not as independent as
she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. This need
for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and truer still in a young democracy like the
Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major problem for the government. For these
reasons, Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that the President may remove a Deputy
Ombudsman) should be declared void. (Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines,
G.R. Nos. 196231 & 196232, [January 28, 2014], 725 PHIL 380-452)
Authority to Discipline Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman
36. While the composition of the independent Office of the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution
does not textually include the Special Prosecutor, the weight of the foregoing discussions
on the unconstitutionality of Section 8 (2) of RA No. 6770 should equally apply to the Special
Prosecutor on the basis of the legislative history of the Office of the Ombudsman as expounded
in jurisprudence. (Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 196231 &
196232, [January 28, 2014], 725 PHIL 380-452)
Judicial Review of Ombudsman Decisions/Resolutions
37. As an independent constitutional body, the power of the Ombudsman to investigate (and
prosecute) is plenary and unqualified such that it has full discretion to determine whether a
criminal case should be filed or not based on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
Generally, the Court does not review the Ombudsman's finding as to the existence or absence of
probable cause, consistent with the policy of non-interference with the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated powers. Following this principle of non-interference, the Court
exercises restraint in reviewing the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause (Quiogue v. Estacio,
Jr., G.R. No. 218530 (Resolution), [January 13, 2021]), except: (a) to afford protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (c) when there is a prejudicial question which
is sub judice; (d) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) when double jeopardy is clearly
apparent; (g) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) where it is a case of
persecution rather than prosecution; and (i) where the charges are manifestly false and
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motivated by the lust for vengeance. (Macasil v. Fraud Audit and Investigation Office-
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 226898 (Resolution), [May 11, 2021])
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
General Principles
38. Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot
be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs.
POEA [1988])
39. CMO No. 16-2005 is ultra vires because it altered the provisions of an existing law, RA No. 7227,
by extending the importation ban of right-hand drive vehicles into the Subic Bay Freeport Zone,
which is considered as a foreign territory. (Bureau of Customs v. Japanese 4 x 4 Export Corp.,
G.R. No. 227542 (Notice), [May 12, 2021])
Government instrumentality, regulatory agency, chartered institution, and GOCC
40. A government instrumentality refers to any agency of the national government, not integrated
within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, enjoying operational
autonomy, usually through a charter. The term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2[10], Introductory
Provisions, EO No. 292)
A regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate,
administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interest of private persons, the
principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body, such as a commission, board or
council. (Sec. 2[11], Introductory Provisions, EO No. 292)
A chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes state universities and colleges and the monetary authority of the State. (Section 2[12],
Introductory Provisions, EO No. 292)
A Government owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) is an agency organized as a stock or non-

stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or
proprietary in nature, and owned by the government directly or indirectly through its
instrumentality either wholly or to the extent of at least 51% of the capital stock in the case of
stock corporation.
Quasi-legislative and Quasi-judicial functions of Administrative Agencies
41. Basic distinctions between quasi-legislative (QL) and quasi-judicial (QJ) functions of
administrative agencies:
• QJ requires notice and hearing, QL only requires publication as a general rule.

• QJ sets different requirements for resort to court: e.g. doctrine of prior exhaustion of
administrative remedy applies (Smart vs. NTC case)
• QJ decisions are, generally, brought to the CA/SC because QJ agencies are deemed equal in
rank with RTC. In the case of QL issuances, RTC has jurisdiction when the action is incapable
of pecuniary estimation.
42. The public prosecutor exercises investigative (not quasi-judicial) powers in the conduct of
preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence presented to him, he
should take further action by filing a criminal complaint in court. In doing so, he does not
adjudicate upon the rights, obligations or liabilities of the parties before him. (MERALCO v.
Atilano, [2012])
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43. The “Doctrine of Necessary Implication” does not authorize the exercise of powers greater than
the express powers, such that, for example, the power to “regulate” does not include the power
to “prohibit”; nor does the power to “investigate” necessarily include the power to “adjudicate”
(Carino vs. CHR, 204 SCRA 483)
Doctrine of Subordinate Legislation
44. As a rule, administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, not to supplant nor to
modify, the law. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. In case of
discrepancy between a provision of statute and a rule or regulation issued to implement said
statute, the statutory provision prevails. (Echegaray vs. DOJ [1998])
However, where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the
statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that
the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the
law. (Holy Spirit Homeowners’ Association vs. Defensor [2006; Atty. Orceo vs. Comelec [2010])
When hearing is required even in Quasi-legislative issuances
45. When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing
further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has
already prescribed. When the administrative rule goes beyond and substantially adds to or
increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord those directly affected
a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the
force and effect of law. (CIR VS. CA, 261 SCRA 236)
Enforceability and Validity of Administrative Issuances
46. The Adm. Code of 1987, Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office
of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center
three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published
or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced. (GMA vs. MTRCB [2007])
47. Requirements for the validity of administrative rules with penal provisions:
1. The statute has declared the violation punishable;

2. The statute must have imposed and specified the penalty for the violation;
3. The rule must be published.
Administrative Due Process
48. The function of granting, denying, suspending or revoking license, permit, franchise or certificate
of public convenience and/or necessity is not just purely administrative, but quasi-judicial or
adjudicative function because it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by the agency upon
which a decision is to be made and rights and liabilities determined. Hence, notice and hearing
and adjudication are required in these cases. (see Sañado vs. Court of Appeals) [What about
“rate-fixing”?]
49. The essence of administrative due process is simply “opportunity to be heard”, or “opportunity
to explain one’s side” or “opportunity to seek a reconsideration” of the action or ruling complained
of. (Utto vs. Comelec, 375 SCRA 523)
50. Exceptions to the requirement of Notice and Hearing; Reasons:
1. Summary Abatement of Nuisance per se (police power)

2. Preventive Suspension (it is not a penalty)
3. Padlocking of filthy restaurants, theaters, etc. (nuisance per se)
4. Cancellation of Passport of accused (pragmatism, accused may escape)
5. Summary distraint and levy (lifeblood theory of taxation; need for taxes)
6. Grant of Provisional Authority (temporary only)
9
51. “Substantial evidence” means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion”. (Rubberworld vs. NLRC, 175 SCRA 450)
Subpoena and Contempt Powers of Administrative Agencies
52. Subpoena and contempt powers are not inherent in admin bodies because these powers are
essentially judicial in nature. Hence, it can only be exercised if (1) duly allowed by law and (2) in
connection with the matter they are authorized to investigate. (Carmelo vs. Ramos, 6 SCRA 836)
[Cf: Sec. 13, Book VII of Administrative Code]
Note: If agency is created not by the Administrative Code but by a special charter (law), the
authority given must at least be the authority to “take testimony or evidence” before Section 13
(Issue Subpoena and in case of disobedience seek the aid of the RTC) of the Code may be invoked.
Hence, authority to merely “investigate” does not confer the QJ body the power to cite a person
in contempt under the Administrative Code. (See: Carmelo vs. Ramos, supra.)
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions
53. Basic Rules on Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions:
1. Decisions may be based on “substantial evidence” only;

2. Findings of facts made therein are to be respected so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence; Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment
with that of the QJ Body;
3. Administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside
on proof of: (a) gross abuse of discretion, (b) fraud, or (c) error of law. (Ombudsman
vs. Bungubung [2008], citing Montemayor vs. Bundalian [2003])
Res Judicata
54. Although a judicial concept in origin, “res judicata” now applies to QJ decisions. The elements
are: (a) sameness of causes of actions, (b) sameness of issues, (c) identity of parties/privies. In
Board of Commissioners vs. Dela Rosa 197 SCRA 853, there is no res judicata in administrative
adjudication of citizenship unless certain requisites are present.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Doctrine of Prior Exhaustion of Administrative

Remedies
55. Under the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction (or Prior Resort), courts cannot and will not resolve a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal,
especially where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact.
56. The Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, on the other hand, requires that before
a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have
availed first of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such
remedy should be exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature
invocation of court’s jurisdiction is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding
of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. Non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not, however, jurisdictional. It only renders the action
premature, i.e., claimed cause of action is not ripe for judicial determination and for that reason
a party has no cause of action to ventilate in court. (Carale v. Abarintos, 269 SCRA 132)
This doctrine, however, is disregarded in the following instances:
1) when there is a violation of due process;

2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (see: Mangune vs. Ermita [2016])
3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
10
4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;

5) when there is irreparable injury;
6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President
bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceeding;
10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
(Paat v. CA, 266 SCRA 167)
57. Even with the advent of RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172 prescribing the administrative
remedy for correction of entries with the civil registry, the regional trial courts are not divested
of their jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for correction of entries. Even the failure to
observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the
jurisdiction of the court. (Republic v. Felix, G.R. No. 203371, [June 30, 2020])
58. The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction is not absolute and may be dispensed with for
reasons of equity. Where jurisdiction is lacking, failure to raise the issue of non-compliance with
the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a subsequent
filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of laches (Republic v. Ontuca y Peleño,
G.R. No. 232053, [July 15, 2020]; Republic v. Maligaya, G.R. No. 233068, November 9, 2020)
or on ground of estoppel (Star Special Corporate Security Management, Inc. v. COA, G.R. No.
225366, September 1, 2020)
59. Administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same acts or
omissions. Given the differences in the quantum of evidence required, the procedures actually
observed, the sanctions imposed, as well as the objective of the two (2) proceedings, the findings
and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other. Hence, the exoneration in
the administrative case is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which
were the subject of the administrative complaint or vice versa. (Josue v. People, G.R. Nos. 240947
& 240975, [June 3, 2019]; Roy III v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 225718, March 4, 2020; Quisumbing
v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 223783. May 5, 2021).
11
ELECTION LAWS
Suffrage
Qualifications
60. All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are at least eighteen (18)
years of age and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and in the
place wherein they propose to vote for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.
Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by reason of
his occupation, profession, employment in private or public service, educational activities, work
in the military or naval reservations within the Philippines, service in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the National Police Forces, or confinement or detention in government institutions in
accordance with law, shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.
Any person, who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of
residence but, who, on the day of the election shall possess such qualifications, may register as
a voter. (Sec. 9, RA 8189).
Disqualifications
61. The following shall be disqualified from registering:
a. Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not
less than one (1) year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty:
Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically
reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence;
b. Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of
having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government
such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the firearms laws or any crime against national security,
unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall
automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence; and
c. Insane or incompetent persons declared as such by competent authority unless

subsequently declared by proper authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.
(Sec. 10, supra.)
Registration of illiterate and disabled persons
62. Any illiterate person may register with the assistance of the Election Officer or any member of an
accredited citizen's arms. The Election Officer shall place such illiterate person under oath, ask
him the questions, and record the answers given in order to accomplish the application form in
the presence of the majority of the members of the Board. …. The application for registration of
a physically disabled person may be prepared by any relative within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity or by the Election Officer or any member of an accredited citizen's arm
using the data supplied by the applicant. (Sec. 14. Supra.)
Jurisdiction in Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings
63. The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities. Decisions of
the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional
Trial Court within five (5) days from receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall
become final executory. The regional trial court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days from
the time it is received and the decision shall immediately become final and executory. No motion
for reconsideration shall be entertained. (Sec. 33, supra.)
64. Will registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin result to abandonment
of residence and an establishment of a new one? (No, according to Perez vs. Comelec, 317 SCRA
12
641). It must be coupled with other acts indicative of animus manendi in that other place and
animus non revertendi to his residence of origin.
Will the act of voting by a voter in a place other than his residence of origin result to
abandonment of residence? (Not necessarily, according to Domino vs. Comelec, 310 SCRA 641.)
It must be coupled with other acts indicative of animus manendi in that other place and animus
non revertendi to his residence of origin.
65. Does reacquisition of citizenship result in automatic reacquisition of residence? No. Thus, the
candidate must still show overt acts constituting “reacquisition of residency” in the Philippines
(e.g. application of Philippine Passport, paying taxes, etc.) [Japzon vs. COMELEC, Jan. 19, 2009]
(See also: Poe-Llamanzares vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016 on “residency”.)
Absentee Voting
66. Section 36.8 of R. A. 9189 as amended by R.A. 10590 [which prohibits the engagement of any
person in partisan political activities abroad during the 30-day overseas voting period] is an
impermissible content-neutral regulation for being overbroad, violating, thus, the free speech
clause under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. It fails to pass the test that the
incidental restriction on the alleged freedom of expression is no greater than what is essential to
the furtherance of the governmental interest, considering that the regulation has extraterritorial
reach (made applicable even outside embassies, consulates and foreign service establishments
abroad) and applies to “any person”. (Nicolas-Lewis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
223705, [August 14, 2019])
Material Misrepresentation
67. The material misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers
to qualifications for elective office. However, it could not have been the intention of the law to
deprive a person of such a basic and substantial political right to be voted for a public office upon
just any innocuous mistake. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation
under Section 78 must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” In other words, it must be made with an intention
to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. (Salcedo vs. Comelec [1999])
Violation of the three-term limit rule is a ground for disqualification under Sect. 78 of the OEC as
it affects eligibility to hold public office. (See: Aratea vs. Comelec [2012])
“Section 78 Petition” vs. “Section 68 Petition”
68. A petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of OEC, or
Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can
only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false.
The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied
due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
(Fermin vs. Comelec [2008], cited in Talaga vs. Comelec [2012])
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification
of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before
proclamation (within 25 days from filing of CoC), while a petition for quo warranto is filed after
proclamation of the winning candidate. A "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or
confused with a "Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds,
and resulting in different eventualities. (Gonzalez vs. Comelec [2011])
Scope of the Doctrine of Rejection of Second Placer
69. In Labo there was no final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other cases because the judgment
declaring the candidate's disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become final before
13
the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer have one common essential condition — the disqualification of the candidate had
not become final before the elections. (Talaga v. COMELEC [2012])
Effects of Filing of Certificate of Candidacy
70. Two Quinto vs. Comelec cases:
2009: The Supreme Court ruled that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive
offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law, and
thus violated the equal protection clause.
2010: THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN “ELECTIVE” AND “APPOINTIVE”

OFFICIALS. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate while the
latter by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. The former are obviously
engaged in partisan political activities while the latter are strictly prohibited from engaging in
partisan political activity.
Thus, the rule that the filing of Certificate of Candidacy by a public officer will automatically result
in resignation applies only to appointive officials.
Substitution of Candidate
71. There are different deadlines set to govern the specific circumstances that would necessitate the
substitution of a candidate due to death, disqualification or withdrawal. In case of death or
disqualification, the substitute had until midday of the election day to file the COC. In case of
withdrawal, the substitute is usually required to file the COC much earlier. In the 2010 elections,
for example, it was set on December 14, 2009. (Renato M. Federico vs. Comelec [2013])
The reason for the distinction can easily be divined. Unlike death or disqualification, withdrawal
is voluntary. Generally, a candidate has sufficient time to ponder on his candidacy and to
withdraw while the printing has not yet started. If a candidate withdraws after the printing, the
name of the substitute candidate can no longer be accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the
substitute will just be wasted. (Renato M. Federico vs. Comelec, supra.)
A candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section
77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied
due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not
considered a candidate. Stated differently, since there would be no candidate to speak of under
a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to
be substituted. (Tagolino v. HRET, [2013])
Void Certificate of Candidacy; Non-application of “Rejection of Second Placer Rule”
72. A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid
votes. Whether the certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial
because the cancellation on such ground means the candidate was never a valid candidate from
the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. If the ineligibility existed on
the day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy
retroacted to the day it was filed (Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Comelec [2012]). In fact, even without a
petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from perpetual special disqualification to
run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction
is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict from running for public
office. (see: Aratea vs. Comelec [2012]; see also Dimapilis vs. Comelec [2017] where the
perpetual disqualification to hold public office was the accessory penalty to an administrative
penalty under the Civil Service Law.)
73. Decisions holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is
14
disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of candidacy
of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled because of
a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing of the
certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person
who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time.
All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-
candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. (Ibid.; see also Chua vs. Comelec [2016]
on ineligibility on ground of residency and Diambrang vs. Comelec [2016] on the ineligibility on
the ground of being a fugitive from justice. In both these cases, the Rejection of the Second
Placer Rule was not applied and the supposed second placer was declared winner.)
Note: In Talaga vs. Comelec [2012] the COC of the original candidate (who was later on
substituted) was declared void ab initio for violating the three-term limit rule. The substitution
was therefore consequently deemed invalid because substitution of a candidate presupposes a
valid candidate. Under this peculiar circumstance, it cannot be said that the electorates were
aware of the ineligibility of the substitute. The second placer, therefore, cannot be declared
winner. The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning
candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that
candidate's disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety but the
electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible candidate.
However, in Maquiling vs. Comelec (2013), the Supreme Court ruled that the element of
“electorates’ awareness” of the disqualification of the proclaimed candidate in order for the second
placer to be declared winner [a rule taken from Labo (1992)] was a mere obiter dictum.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not say in Maquiling that Talaga’s use of “electorates’
awareness” was erroneous. Maquiling involved a candidate who was disqualified by reason of
dual allegiance while Talaga involved a candidate disqualified for not having validly substituted a
candidate who earlier withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
Duty of Comelec to cancel COC of disqualified candidate
74. Under Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC has the duty to
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election x x x."
The Court had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone
suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, albeit,
arising from a criminal conviction. Considering, however, that Section 52 (a), Rule 10 of
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service similarly imposes the penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal
from service, the Court sees no reason why the ratiocination enunciated in such earlier criminal
case should not apply here. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, [April 18,
2017])
Nuisance Candidate
75. Lack of proof of financial capacity to sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign,
by itself, as not a ground to declare an aspirant for senator a nuisance candidate. If the Comelec
does this, it imposes property qualifications that are inconsistent with the nature and essence of
the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying
the same. (Marquez v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 244274, [September 3, 2019])
Remedies against Disqualified Candidates
76. (A) Petition for Disqualification. The grounds are under Sections 12 and 68 of the OEC and
Section 40 of the LGC of 1991. The Petition shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation. (Albania v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 226792, [June 6, 2017])
(B) Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel COC. The ground is “material misrepresentation”. The
Petition must be filed within five (5) days from the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy;
but not later than twenty-five (25) days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy
subject of the Petition. In case of a substitute candidate, the Petition must be filed within five (5)
15
days from the time the substitute candidate filed his certificate of candidacy. (Albania v.
Commission on Elections, supra.). Hence, the remedy against a disqualified candidate by reason
of the three-term limit rule is a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel COC, not Petition for
Disqualification.
Premature Campaign
77. Two Penera vs. Comelec cases:
September 2009: A person, after filing his/her COC but prior to his/her becoming a candidate
(thus, prior to the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts described under
Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity.
However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the beginning of the campaign
period, can said acts be given effect as premature campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Only after said person officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign
period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning.
November 2009: Congress has laid down the law — a candidate is liable for election offenses only
upon the start of the campaign period. This Court has no power to ignore the clear and express
mandate of the law that “any person who files his certificate of candidacy within [the filing] period
shall only be considered a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his
certificate of candidacy.” … Neither can this Court turn a blind eye to the express and clear
language of the law that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect
only upon the start of the campaign period.” The forum for examining the wisdom of the law, and
enacting remedial measures, is not this Court but the Legislature.
Jurisdiction of the COMELEC
78. The rule that the COMELEC should decide cases in division first applies only when COMELEC is
asked to exercise adjudicatory function (QJ). Hence, when exercising purely administrative
function, need not be in division. Correction of manifest errors involves purely administrative
function only.
79. Is a predicate judgment a condition sine qua non before a candidate can be disqualified by the
COMELEC for election offenses under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code? No. To impose
prior conviction of an election offense as a condition sine qua non before a Petition for
Disqualification can be launched would be tantamount to requiring proof beyond reasonable
doubt, which is significantly beyond what our laws require. Jurisprudence is rife with teachings
on the separability of the criminal prosecution for election offenses, or even the determination
for probable cause to criminally charge a candidate for any election violation, from the
administrative proceeding for disqualification. (Francisco v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
230249, [April 24, 2018]). Note: The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Poe-Llamanzares
(March 08, 2016) requiring a “predicate judgment” is revisited and clarified in here in Francisco
vs. Comelec (2018).
Review of COMELEC Resolution
80. What is contemplated by the term “final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC” reviewable
by certiorari by the Supreme Court are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the
COMELEC in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. COMELEC’s Resolution
regulating conduct of Plebiscite is administrative, not adjudicatory. (Salva vs. Makalintal [2000])
Moreover, this decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a
division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no power to
review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections. (Cagas vs. Comelec [2012], citing Ambil vs. Comelec [2000])
16
Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal
81. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member
of the House of Rep., the jurisdiction of the HRET begins over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation
does not divest the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction. (Limkaichong vs. Comelec [2009]; see
also Jalosjos vs. Comelec [2012])). The Codilla Doctrine [2002] applies only when the
proclamation itself is void as when due process had not been observed, in which case, the
Comelec will not be divested of its jurisdiction despite the fact that a proclamation had been
made.
Failure of Elections v. Annulment of Election Results
82. First, the former is an incident of the judicial function of electoral tribunals while the latter is in
the exercise of the COMELEC's administrative function. Second, electoral tribunals only annul the
election results connected with the election contest before it whereas the
declaration of failure of elections by the COMELEC relates to the entire election in the concerned
precinct or political unit. As such, in annulling elections, the HRET does so only to determine who
among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast. The COMELEC, on the other
hand, declares a failure of elections with the objective of holding or continuing the elections,
which were not held or were suspended, or if there was one, resulted in a failure to elect. When
COMELEC declares a failure of elections, special elections will have to be conducted. (Abayon v.
HRET [2016], cited in Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, [February 16, 2021])
83. The power to annul election results rests within the electoral tribunals. This power is "an incident
of the judicial function of electoral tribunals," and an indispensable consequence of the
constitutional mandate of electoral tribunals to decide all election contests within their
jurisdiction. As cited in Abayon, two indispensable requisites must concur to annul an election:
(1) The illegality of the ballots must affect more than fifty percent (50%) of the votes cast
on the specific precinct or precincts sought to be annulled, or in case of the entire
municipality, more than fifty percent (50%) of its total precincts and the votes cast
therein; and
(2) It is impossible to distinguish with reasonable certainty between the lawful and unlawful
ballots.
(Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, [February 16, 2021])
84. On the other hand, it is the Commission on Elections that can declare a failure of elections, a
power that it had been vested with as early as the passage of the 1971 Election Code. (Marcos,
Jr. v. Robredo, supra., the requisites of which are:
(1) No voting has been held (or, held but suspended and did not resume or
resulted in “failure to elect”) in any precinct or precincts due to fraud, force
majeure, violence or terrorism; and
(2) The votes not cast therein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The
cause of such failure may arise before or after the casting of votes or on the day of the
election.
85. At bottom, the power to declare a failure of elections, and consequently conduct special elections,
is lodged exclusively with the Commission on Elections. Meanwhile, an electoral tribunal, after
determining "who among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes cast," is
empowered to annul election results for the contested position before it.
The differences between the two remedies are clear and there is no overlap in their functions.
Nonetheless, declarations of failure of elections and annulment of election results hinge on the
same grounds and quantum of evidence.
The Commission on Elections, upon petition or motu proprio, may declare

a failure of elections and call for special elections if it is shown with strong and convincing
17
evidence that "force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes" made it
impossible to hold the scheduled elections.
Electoral tribunals may, in turn, annul election results if they are strongly convinced that the
conduct of elections was tainted with "fraud, terrorism or other electoral irregularities existed to
warrant the annulment." However, being drastic and extraordinary, the remedy of annulment of
elections must "be judiciously exercised with utmost caution and resorted only in exceptional
circumstances."
(Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, supra.)
Election Contests
86. An election protest is no ordinary petition. It alleges anomalies and irregularities which, if proven
true, would perniciously deprive a significant portion of the voting population of its constitutionally
protected right of suffrage. Given this extraordinary nature, an election protestant takes on the
heavy burden of clearly and specifically alleging (Specificity of Allegation Principle), and then
proving, the irregularities that led to a breakdown in our mechanisms for suffrage.
When the protestant fails to meet the strict requirement of specificity and established rules on
evidence to support the allegations of election irregularities, the election protest must be
dismissed. (Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, P.E.T. Case No. 005, [February 16, 2021])
87. Considering that election contest is imbued with public interest, unlike in an ordinary suit, the
death of the protestant does not extinguish an election contest. The candidate who is likely to
succeed had the protestant been declared the winner, like a vice-elect, will be the real-party-in-
interest. (Poe vs. GMA [2005])
88. The expiration of the term of office renders the election protest moot and academic. The exception
is when the decision of the election protest includes a monetary award for damages. (Malaluan
vs. Comelec, March 6, 1996, cited in Barroga vs. Lawad, June 28, 2017)
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
A. Principles of Local Autonomy
89. Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely
relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only
administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. Thus, policy-
setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. (Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R.
No. 132988, July 19, 2000)
90. Section 17 (e) of the LGC of 1991 which mandates that “national agencies of offices concerned
shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and
facilities….. within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code” should not be interpreted to
mean that no devolution shall ever take place after the lapse of the six-month period. The more
reasonable understanding of the six-month period is that the framers of the law provided for the
period to prompt the national government to speedily devolve the existing services to the LGUs.
However, it was not intended as a prescriptive period, as to absolutely prohibit the national
government from devolving services beyond the period. In any case, the LGC of 1991 mandates
an interpretation that is in favor of devolution. (see Mangune v. Ermita [September 27, 2016])
91. Local Fiscal Autonomy: Local governments have the power to create their own sources of
revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national
government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own
priorities, although this does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by
18
way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent
with national goals. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre [2000])
Under Art. X, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution, local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Thus,
Sec. 4 of A. O. No. 372 which mandates that “pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount
equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld”
contravenes the mandate in Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Art. 286 of the LGC
of 1991 that the share of each local government unit in the national taxes (IRA) shall be
“automatically released” to them and shall “not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
imposed by the National Government for whatever purpose”. (Pimentel v. Aguirre [2000])
Autonomous regions and their relation to the national government.
92. Two groups of LGUs enjoy decentralization in distinct ways. The decentralization of power has
been given to the regional units (namely, the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao [ARMM]
and the constitutionally-mandated Cordillera Autonomous Region [CAR]). The other group of
LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) enjoy the decentralization of
administration. It is to be underscored, however, that the decentralization of power in favor of
the regional units (autonomous regions) is not unlimited but involves only the powers enumerated
by Section 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and by the acts of Congress. (Mandanas v.
Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 199802 & 208488, [July 3, 2018]).
93. The President shall exercise “general supervision” over local government units, under Sec. 4
(Constitution) and Sec. 25 (LGC) and autonomous regions under Sec. 16 (Constitution). “General
Supervision” essentially means that the President shall ensure “that laws are faithfully executed”
and “that LGUs’ acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions”.
Local government units
Powers of local government units
94. There are four (4) general kinds of powers of local government units: a) those that are expressly
granted to them, b) those that are implied from those that are granted to them, c) those that are
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for their efficient and effective governance, and d) those
that are essential to the promotion of the general welfare of their inhabitants. (Aquilino Pimentel,
The Local Government Code of 1991: The Key to National Development (1993), p. 15.
Police Power
95. In matters that are deemed within the competence of local governments to handle, Congress
delegates this power to local governments under the Local Government Code, through Section
16 thereof, the General Welfare Clause. Section 16 of LGC of 1991 comprehends two branches
of delegated powers, namely: the general legislative power and the police power proper.5
Under Section 5 of LGC 1991, the general welfare provision shall be liberally construed to give
more powers to the LGU.
96. To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged test
or requisite: the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of
the local government unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed
by law); and the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance
with the limitations under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of
fairness and reason, and its consistency with public policy). The formalities in enacting an
ordinance are laid down in Section 53 and Section 54 of The Local Government Code.6 (Legaspi
5
Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., G.R. Nos. 189185 & 189305, August 16, 2016.
6
Legaspi v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013; Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters
Association, Inc., supra note 7.
19
vs. City of Cebu [2013; Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc.
[August 16, 2016])There must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.7
97. There are two (2) tests that are usually applied to police power ordinances: (1) Rational
Relationship Test and the (2) Strict Scrutiny Test. Using the rational basis examination,
laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.
Governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that
interest.8
98. Curfew Ordinances aimed at promoting juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime,
inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's movement and
activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew
period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved
in crimes and criminal activities. This was the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the 2017
Curfew Ordinances case9 when certain curfew ordinances for minors were challenged on
grounds, among others, that these ordinances violate (a) the natural and primary right of parents
in the rearing of the youth and (2) the minors’ right to travel.
99. In the twin Social Justice cases,10 when the City of Manila barred the continued operation of oil
companies in certain identifiable areas in the City of Manila, the Supreme Court affirmed the right
of the people to life over the property rights of oil companies even when the City of Manila later
on changes its policy in favor of business.
100. The exercise of local police power is discretionary in nature and cannot be compelled by
mandamus. This was the ruling of the Supreme Court in Laygo v. Municipal Mayor of Solano11
where it was said that the privilege of operating a market stall under license is always subject to
the police power of the city government and may be refused or granted for reason of public policy
and sound public administration. Being a delegated police power falling under the general welfare
clause of Section 16 of the LGC of 1991, the grant or revocation of the privilege is, therefore,
discretionary in nature. This rule should not, however, be confused with the twin Social Justice
Society cases mentioned earlier where the decision of local government of the City of Manila
concerning its exercise of police power (zoning ordinance) was subordinated by a paramount
interest of the right to life of its own people.
101. The exercise of the power to issue business permit is a delegated police power and hence,
discretionary in nature. A mayor cannot, therefore, be compelled by mandamus to issue a
business permit. (Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor [2006]; Rimando vs. Naguilian Emission
Testing Center, Inc. [2012]).
102. Zoning Ordinance is a police measure. It prevails over contractual obligations. Therefore,
parties to a contract who may be affected by zoning ordinances cannot invoke the constitutional
right against “impairment of obligations and contracts” because in constitutional law, police power
prevails over the “non-impairment clause”. (Ortigas and Company, Limited Partnership vs. Feati
Bank and Trust Company, 94 SCRA 533).
103. An ordinance that prohibits PAGCOR from operating a lawful game of chance violates
Presidential Decree No. 1869, which authorizes the PAGCOR to operate casinos within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. The power of a local government unit to suppress gambling
and prohibited games of chance excludes of chance permitted by law. Implied repeals are not
favored. (Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., 234 SCRA 255).
7
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, G.R. No. 148339, February 23, 2005.
8
Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013.
9
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017 (citations omitted).
10
Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052, February 13, 2008; Social Justice Society Officers v. Lim,
G.R. Nos. 187836 & 187916, November 25, 2014.
11
G.R. No. 188448, January 11, 2017.
20
104. In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr. (2005), the Court nullified a city ordinance barring the operation
of motels and inns, among other establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at
bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments from
offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or “wash up” rates for such abbreviated stays.
(White Light Corporation vs. City of Manila [2009]).
Local Eminent Domain
105. The specific requirements for local eminent domain are:
a. It is exercised through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance;

b. It is for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless;
c. Payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws; and
d. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted.
Note: In case of urban development, e.g. housing projects, by the LGU, Sections 9 and 10 of
R.A. 7279 provide for additional requirements.
106. Where the taking of private property is done for the benefit of a small community which seeks
to have its own sports and recreational facility, notwithstanding that there is such a recreational
facility only a short distance away, such taking cannot be considered to be for public use. The
Court defines what constitutes a genuine necessity for public use. (De la Paz Masikip vs. City of
Pasig [2006]).
107. The landowner is entitled to recover possession of the property expropriated if the
government fails to fully pay just compensation to the owner within a period of five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment in an expropriation proceeding. (Republic vs. Lim [2005])
108. If the genuine public necessity of expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then
there is no more cogent point for the government’s retention of the expropriated land. The same
legal situation should hold if the government devotes the property to another public use very
much different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit another private
person. (Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano vs. Republic [2011])
109. Reversing “Fery vs. Mun. of Cabanatuan” (1921): “The expropriator should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation filed, failing which, it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator
to return the said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same.”
(MCIAA vs. Lozada, Sr. [2010]).
110. Prohibition is generally not proper in Eminent Domain. The interest of the affected landowner
is thus made subordinate to the power of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power
of eminent domain, the power of judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be
left to determine the appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected
landowners. Only when the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of
their property or when there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may
the remedy of prohibition become available. (Sps. Yusay vs. CA [2011]).
111. Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be
expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance in the
proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the property's fair market value
based on its current tax declaration. The law does not make the determination of a public purpose
a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession. (Francia vs. Meycauayan [2008])
Local Taxation
112. MIAA is exempt from real property taxation by the local government because, first, MIAA is
not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National
Government and thus exempt from local taxation and second, the real properties of MIAA are
owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. (Manila
International Airport Authority vs. CA [2006]; see also Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
21
System vs. Quezon City, November 7, 2018; cf: Tests of (1) Common Good, (2) Economic
Viability and (3) Control)
Section 133 of the Code limits the grant to local governments of the power to tax, and not merely
the exercise of a delegated power to tax. Section 133 states that the taxing powers of local
governments "shall not extend to the levy" of any kind of tax on the national government, its
agencies and instrumentalities. (Ibid., See also Republic vs. Philippine Reclamation Authority
(PRA) [2012])
113. Section 284 of the LGC deviates from the plain language of Section 6, Article X of the 1987
Constitution. Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional
lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. The phrase national
internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the
term national taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually departed from the letter
of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base from which the just
share of the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum (from
the words of a statute there should be no departure). Equally impermissible is that Congress has
also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987
Constitution. (Mandanas v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. Nos. 199802 & 208488, [July 3, 2018])
Closure of roads, alley, park or square
114. The closure of a road, alley, park or square presupposes an exercise of police power. Hence,
for any loss or inconvenience caused to a property owner, is a “damnum absque injuria” (literally
“damage without injury”), hence, no compensation. (See Cabrera vs. CA [1991])
115. To convert a barrio road into patrimonial property, the law requires the LGU to enact an
ordinance, approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of the Sanggunian members, permanently
closing the road. A resolution will not suffice. (Alolino v. Flores [April 4, 2016]).
116. As a general rule, local roads used for public service are considered public property under the
absolute control of Congress; hence, local governments have no authority to control or regulate
their use. However, under Section Section 21 of LGC of 1991, Congress delegated to political
subdivisions some control of local roads.12
117. The local legislative body has the competence to determine whether or not a certain property
is still necessary for public use. Such power therefore is discretionary and this discretion will not
ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or
collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the fact that some private interests
may be served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance. 13
Requisites of valid ordinance
118. To be substantively valid, municipal ordinances: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute, (2) must not be unfair or oppressive, (3) must not be partial or discriminatory, (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade, (5) must be general and consistent with public policy,
and (6) must not be unreasonable. There must be “lawful subject” and “lawful means”.
119. Every ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, or

Sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as
the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his
signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with
his objections to the Sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same.
The Sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3)
vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents
and purposes. The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the
12
Figuracion v. Spouses Libi, G.R. No. 155688, November 28, 2007.
13
Favis v. City of Baguio, G.R. No. L-29910, April 25, 1969.
22
Sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a
city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it.
Ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its
members, be signed by the Punong Barangay.14
120. Not all ordinances require the conduct of public hearing. Under the LGC of 1991, prior public
hearings are required in the following instances:
a. Transfer of local government sites, offices and facilities (pars. B and C, Sec. 11);
b. Reclassification of agricultural lands (Sec. 20);
c. Contribution of funds, real estate, equipment, and other kinds of property and
appointment and assignment of personnel in support of undertakings commonly beneficial
to local government units which have grouped themselves, consolidated or coordinated
their efforts, services and resources (Sec. 33);
d. Levy of taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specially enumerated
in the Local Government Code or taxed under the NIRC, as amended, or other applicable
laws (Sec. 186), and
e. Enactment of local tax ordinance and revenue measures (Sec. 187) 15
121. Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local development
plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date
a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city,
municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places
in the local government unit concerned.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and
in the language or dialect understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit
concerned, and the secretary to the Sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the
purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting.
The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence
of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be
made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the Sanggunian of origin is situated.
In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the
ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published
once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city, provided, that in the absence
thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation. 16
Ordinances with penal sanctions shall be posted at conspicuous places in the provincial capitol,
or city, municipal or barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum period of three (3)
consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a newspaper of general circulation,
where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU concerned, except in the case of
barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the
day following its publication, or at the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later. 17
Initiative and Referendum
122. Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit
may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.18 Local referendum, on the other hand, is
the legal process whereby the registered voters of the local government units may approve,
14
Section 54, LGC of 1991.
15
See DILG Opinion No. 19, s. 2018, April 19, 2018.
16
17
Section 511(a), LGC of 1991; Article 114, Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991.
18
23
amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the Sanggunian.19 While initiative is entirely the work
of the electorate, referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a
process of law-making by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes
of their elected representatives, while referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or
rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the
voting in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a referendum where expectedly
the voters will simply write either “Yes” or “No” in the ballot.20
123. Initiative and referendum are the means by which the sovereign people exercise their
legislative power, and the valid exercise thereof should not be easily defeated by claiming lack of
specific budgetary appropriation for their conduct. The Court reiterates its ruling in Goh that the
grant of a line item in the FY 2014 GAA for the conduct and supervision of elections constitutes
as sufficient authority for the COMELEC to use the amount for elections and other political
exercises, including initiative and recall, and to augment this amount from the COMELEC's
existing savings. (Marmeto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 213953, [September 26,
2017]).
124. Inasmuch as the COMELEC also has quasi-judicial and administrative functions, it is the
COMELEC which has the power to determine whether the propositions in an initiative petition are
within the powers of a concerned sanggunian to enact. (Marmeto v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 213953, [September 26, 2017]).
125. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but also resolutions as appropriate
subjects of a local initiative.21 While Section 124 states that, “Initiative shall extend only to
subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact,” certainly, a
resolution is within the legal powers of any Sanggunian to enact (supra.).
126. Basic Procedure:
a. Not less than 1,000 registered voters in case of provinces and cities, 100 in case of
municipalities, and 50 in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Sanggunian
concerned proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or amendment of an ordinance.
b. If no favorable action thereon is taken by the Sanggunian concerned within thirty (30)
days from its presentation, the proponents, through their duly authorized and registered
representatives, may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the
Sanggunian concerned.
c. Two (2) or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
d. Proponents shall have ninety (90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in
case of municipalities, and thirty (30) days in case of Barangays, from notice to collect
the required number of signatures.
e. The petition shall be signed before the election registrar, or his designated
representatives, in the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a
representative of the Sanggunian concerned in a public place in the local government
unit, as the case may be. Stations for collecting signatures may be established in as many
places as may be warranted.
f. Upon the lapse of the period provided by the Code, the COMELEC, through its office in the
local government unit concerned, shall certify as to whether or not the required number
of signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number defeats the
proposition.
19
20
Supra.
21
Garcia v. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279, September 30, 1994.
24
g. If the required number of signatures is obtained, the COMELEC shall then set a date for
the initiative during which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in
the local government unit concerned for their approval within sixty (60) days from the
date of certification by the COMELEC, as provided in subsection (g) of Section 122 of the
Code, in case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and
thirty (30) days in case of Barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set,
after which the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the COMELEC.22
127. Any proposition or ordinance approved through the system of initiative and referendum shall
not be repealed, modified or amended by the Sanggunian concerned within six (6) months from
the date of the approval thereof, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the Sanggunian
within three (3) years thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members. In case of
barangays, the period shall be eighteen (18) months after the approval thereof.23
Corporate Powers
128. The Local Government Code, thus, mandates that every local government unit, as a corporation,
shall have the following powers:
(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name;
(2) To sue and be sued;
(3) To have and use a corporate seal;
(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property;
(5) To enter into contracts; and
(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations
provided in the Code and other laws.24
129. The right of local lawmakers to sue in order to question a contract entered into by the local
chief executive without prior authorization from the Sanggunian was affirmed in the case of Lao,
Jr. v. LGU of Cagayan De Oro City.25
130. As a rule, local government units cannot be represented by private lawyers in suits filed by
or against them. Local government units must be represented by “accountable public officers”
like a City Attorney or a Provincial Fiscal when appropriate. It is only when the government lawyer
is clearly disqualified to handle the case that the local government unit may hire private lawyers.
(See Ramos v. Court of Appeals.26)
131. In cases that are within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, however, the Solicitor
General shall appear and represent the local government unit. These cases include petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
132. In Alinsug v. RTC, Br. 58, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, 225 SCRA 559 (1993), the
Supreme Court laid down the rule that, in resolving whether a local government official may
secure the services of private counsel in an action filed against him in his official capacity, the
nature of the action and the relief sought are to be considered. In Albuera v. Torres, 192 Phil.
211 (1957), the Supreme Court approved the representation by private counsel of a provincial
governor sued in his official capacity, where the complaint contained other allegations and a
prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their
private capacity. In Province of Cebu v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 447 (1987), the
Supreme Court declared that where rigid adherence to the law on representation would deprive
a party of his right to redress for a valid grievance, the hiring of private counsel would be proper.27
22
23
24
See Section 22, LGC of 1991.
25
G.R. No. 187869, September 13, 2017.
26
269 SCRA 34 (1997).
27
Edgardo Mancenido v. CA, G.R. No. 118605, April 12, 2000.
25
133. Fishing ports were constructed by the State for public use and/or public service falls within
the term “port” in Article 420 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines. Being properties of public
dominion, ports cannot be subject to execution, foreclosure sale (Philippine Fisheries
Development Authority v. CA28) or public auction in satisfaction of the tax delinquency
assessments (Philippine Fisheries Development Authority v. CA29). In Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority (the Amari case) the Court declared that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain
and cannot, without Congressional fiat, be subject of a sale, public or private.
134. Requisites for Validity of Contracts entered into by LGUs:
A. The local government unit must have the power to enter into the particular contract;
B. Pursuant to Section 22(c) of the Local Government Code, there must be a prior
authorization by the Sanggunian concerned, and a legible copy of the contract shall be
posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or
barangay hall;
C. In accordance with Secs. 46 and 47, Chapter 8, Subtitle B, Book V, 1987 Admin.
Code, if the contract involves the expenditure of public funds, there should be an actual
appropriation and a certificate of availability of funds by the treasurer of the local
government unit (Except in the case of a contract for supplies to be carried in stock)
D. The contract must conform with the formal requisites of written contracts prescribed
by law;
When a contract is entered into without compliance with (A) and (C) requisites, the
same is ultra vires and is null and void. Such contract cannot be ratified or validated.
Ratification of defective municipal contracts is possible only when there is non-
compliance with (B) and (D) requirements. Ratification may either be express or
implied.
135. Where, however, the City Mayor (under Section 455(b)(1)(vi) of LGC of 1991) or the Governor
(under Section 465(b)(1)(vi) of LGC of 1991) is already authorized by “law” or “ordinance” to
represent the city or the province, as the case may be, in its business transactions, no prior
authorization by the Sanggunian concerned is required. These are the exceptions to Section 22(c)
of the LGC of 1991.30 Interestingly, there is no similar provision for Mayor of Municipality and
Punong Barangay, where prior authorization by the Sanggunian appears to be always a
requirement.31
Ultra Vires Acts
136. An act which is outside of the municipality's jurisdiction is considered as a void ultra vires
act, while an act attended only by an irregularity but remains within the municipality's power is
considered as an ultra vires act subject to ratification and/or validation. To the former
belongs municipal contracts which (a) are entered into beyond the express, implied or inherent
powers of the LGU; and (b) do not comply with the substantive requirements of law e.g., when
expenditure of public funds is to be made, there must be an actual appropriation and certificate
of availability of funds; while to the latter belongs those which (a) are entered into by the
improper department, board, officer of agent; and (b) do not comply with the formal
requirements of a written contract e.g., the Statute of Frauds. (Land Bank vs. Cacayuran [2013]).
137. The prior authorization for the local chief executive to enter into contracts on behalf of the
local government unit may be in the form of an appropriation ordinance passed for the year which
specifically covers the project, cost, or contract to be entered into by the local government unit.
28
G.R. No. 169836, July 31, 2007.
29
G.R. No. 150301, October 2, 2007.
30
See DILG Opinion No. 20, s. 2006; DILG Opinion No. 3, s. 2015; DILG Opinion No. 39, s. 2019.
31
See Sections 444(b)(1)(vi) & 389(b)(1)(2) of LGC of 1991.
26
The LGC requires the local chief executive to secure prior authorization from the sanggunian
before he can enter into contracts on behalf of the LGU. A separate prior authorization is no
longer required if the specific projects are covered by appropriations of the LGU. The
appropriation ordinance passed by the sanggunian is the local chief executive's authority to enter
into a contract implementing the project. As required in Quisumbing Case, the local chief
executive must inquire if the provisions in the appropriation ordinance specifically cover the
expense to be incurred or the contract to be entered into. If the project or program is identified
in the appropriation ordinance in sufficient detail, then there is no more need to obtain a separate
or additional authority from the sanggunian.In such case, the project and the cost are already
identified and approved by the sanggunian through the appropriation ordinance. (See:
Quisumbing v. Garcia [2008]; Verceles, Jr. v. COA [September 13, 2016]; see also Germar vs.
Legaspi, October 1, 2018)
Liability of Local Government Units; Personal Liability of Municipal Officers
138. The LGU is considered as a private person liable ex contractu. But, the rule applies only when
the contract is within the authority of the LGU (intra vires), otherwise, if LGU has no authority
(ultra vires), it cannot be held liable ex contractu because a void contract cannot be cured, not
even by the application of the Doctrine of Estoppel. Doctrine of Estoppel will not apply to void
contracts as when the LGU already received benefits because it will only validate an otherwise
void contract.
The prevailing rule in the law of municipal corporations is that a municipality is not liable for the
torts committed by its regular employees in the discharge of governmental functions. The
municipality is answerable only when it is acting in a proprietary capacity. (San Fernando v.
Firme, 195 SCRA 692.). However, under Section 24 of the Local Government Code, local
government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons
or damage to property.
Jurisprudence teaches that for liability to arise under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, ownership of
the roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works, is not a controlling factor, it
being sufficient that a province, city or municipality has control or supervision thereof.
(Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila vs. CA, G.R. No. 121920 [2005])
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to
have been performed in connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where
there is a showing of bad faith. (Chavez vs. SB [1991])
While the Subject Loans cannot bind the Municipality for being ultra vires, the officers who
authorized the passage of the Subject Resolutions are personally liable. Case law states that
public officials can be held personally accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in
connection with official duties where they have acted ultra vires. (Land Bank vs. Cacayuran
[2013])
Enforcement of Monetary Judgment against LGUs
139. One of the available remedies to enforce favorable monetary judgment against a local
government unit is to levy on the patrimonial properties of the judgment local government unit.
Property which is patrimonial and which is held by a municipality in its proprietary capacity as
treated by the great weight of authority as the private asset of the town and may be levied upon
and sold under an ordinary execution.” (Municipality of Paoay vs. Manaois, 86 Phil. 629)
But, if the local government does not have patrimonial properties, the remedy of the judgment
creditor is to file a petition for mandamus to compel it to appropriate money to satisfy the
judgment. “When a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of
a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus
in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and
the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefore.” (Municipality of Makati vs. Court
of Appeals, 190 SCRA 206)
As his other option, he can file the money claim with the COA.
27
However, the money of a local government unit in the bank cannot be garnished if it came from
public funds. As held in Municipality of Makati vs. Court o Appeals, 190 SCRA 206, 212, public
funds are exempted from garnishment.
Settlement of Boundary Disputes
140. Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be
settled amicably. To this end:
(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality
shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan
concerned.
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall
be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall
be jointly referred for settlement to the sanggunians of the province concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a
highly urbanized city on the other, or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be
jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days
from the date the dispute was referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect.
Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall
decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.
(Sec. 118, LGC)
Within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the
decision of the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction
over the area in dispute. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year
from the filing thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the dispute shall
be maintained and continued for all legal purposes. (Sec. 119, LGC)
141. There is a “boundary dispute” when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of an LGU is
claimed by two or more LGUs. Nothing in this definition excludes an “island”. So, as long as the
island is claimed by different local government units, there exists a “boundary dispute”.
Accordingly, the RTC cannot immediately take jurisdiction over the dispute without observing the
appropriate procedure in the LGC of 1991. Boundary disputes involving municipalities and
component cities of different provinces shall first be jointly referred for settlement to the
Sanggunians of the provinces concerned. It is only upon the failure of this intermediary step will
resort to the RTC will follow, as provided for in Sec. 119 of the Local Government Code of 1991.
(Province of Antique and Municipality of Caluya vs. Hon. Calabocal [June 8, 2016])
142. By virtue of the Local Government Code of 1991, the RTC lost its power to try, at the first
instance, cases of boundary disputes, and it is only when the intermediary steps have failed that
resort to the RTC will follow as provided in the laws. (Barangay Mayamot, Antipolo City v. Antipolo
[August 17, 2016])
Vacancies and Succession
143. A “permanent vacancy” arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office, refuses
to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. For purposes of succession
“ranking” in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained
by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each district in the
immediately preceding local election.32
144. The “last vacancy” in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the member
formerly occupying the next higher in rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the
causes already enumerated, and the term “last vacancy” is thus used in Section 45 (b), Local
Government Code, to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created....The reason
behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy
32
Ibid.
28
occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the
election. (Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 355 SCRA 672)
145. The conditions for the rule of succession under Section 45 of the LGC to apply are: 1. The
appointee shall come from the same political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused
the vacancy; 2. The appointee must have a nomination and a Certificate of Membership (bona
fide membership) from the highest official of the political party concerned. (Damasen vs.
Tumamao [2010])
146. The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot apply in instances
when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a
de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Local Government
Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections,
has the legal right to assume the position. (Svetlana Jalosjos vs. Comelec [2013])
Possible Problem:
X, Y and Z were the candidates for Mayor in Municipality of A. Y had earlier filed a
petition for the cancellation of X’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that X failed
to comply with the 6-month residency requirement. During the election, and while the
disqualification case was still pending, X received the highest number of votes followed
by Y. Thereafter, the Comelec disqualified X. W, the elected Vice-Mayor, insisted that
he should become the Mayor. Should W be allowed to assume the office of the Mayor?
(Note: Because the ground for disqualification affects eligibility of candidate, the
disqualified candidate shall be deemed not a candidate at all, hence, the “Rejection of
the Second Placer Rule” will not apply. X here is a de facto officer while Y, the de jure
officer, will be declared the true winner.) (See also Dimapilis vs. Comelec [2017] where
the candidate was earlier found administratively guilty of grave misconduct and was
removed from office as penalty with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification
to hold public office under Civil Service Law.)
147. Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic successions provided do not apply
shall be filled by appointment in the following manner:
(1) The President, through the Executive Secretary, in the case of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities;
(2) The governor, in the case of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities and the
Sangguniang bayan;
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of Sangguniang Barangay, upon
recommendation of the Sangguniang Barangay concerned;
(4) Except for the Sangguniang Barangay, only the nominee of the political party under
which the Sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the
position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed
in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same political
party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the
unexpired term of the vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination
and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political
party concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without such nomination
and certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for administrative
action against the official responsible therefor;
(5) In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a Sanggunian member who does not
belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the
Sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy; and
(6) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the Barangay in the
Sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the
organization concerned.33
33
29
148. The ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the “proportion of the
votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters of each
district.” (Victoria v. COMELEC.34)
149. In case of a permanent vacancy in the Sanggunian, say in Sangguniang Bayan, caused by the
cessation from office of a member who does not belong to any political party, who can appoint
the replacement and in accordance with what procedure? The law speaks of “the local chief
executive” as having the authority to make the appointment. In Fariñas v. Court of Appeals35,
the Supreme Court ruled that the phrase ‘sanggunian concerned’ in §45(c) should more properly
be understood as referring to the Sanggunian in which the vacancy is created. This is in keeping
with the policy implicit in §45(a)(3).
Recall
150. Some rules on Recall:
a. Based on “trust and confidence” only; grounds for recall must, however, be stated in the
petition;
b. No more Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) as mode of initiating recall, only by registered
voters subject to certain percentages pursuant R.A. 9244 (2004);
c. Official subject of recall becomes automatic candidate in the recall election;
d. The official subject of recall cannot resign during recall process;
e. Recall election should only be once during the term of the official. (note of “election”, not
“proceeding”)
f. No recall (election) shall take place within one (1) year from date of official’s assumption
to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular election (day of election and that
election affecting the office of the official concerned).
Term Limits
151. The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law
describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period
during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized
by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. (see
Albania v. Commission on Elections [2017], citing Aldovino [2009]).
152. The Constitutional Commission's deliberations on Section 8 (of Article X of the 1987
Constitution) show that the authority of Congress to legislate relates not only to the fixing of the
term of office of barangay officials but also to the application of the three-term limit. In Comelec
vs. Cruz (2009), it was argued that while the term of barangay officials is not fixed in the
constitution and is therefore to be fixed by law, Congress’ authority in this matter should be
limited only to fixing the term. It was, therefore, argued that the phrase “and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms” found in Section 8 of Article X of the
constitution shall not apply to barangay officials and Congress cannot pass a law applying the
three-term limit rule to barangay officials. The Supreme Court rejected this argument.
153. Three-term Limit Rule:
Elements: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
34
G.R. No. 109005, January 10, 1994.
35
G.R. No. 116763, April 19, 1996.
30
The 2013 case of Abundo, Sr. vs. Comelec summarized the prevailing jurisprudence on issues
affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, as follows:
“1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely
assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said position
is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon,
citing Borja, Jr.).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek
the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the official's service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from
the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent official's continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officer's

continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension,
although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office,
his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office
had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for
a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for any length
of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service
(Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after
said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does not
constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).”
In the case of Abundo, the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as
mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo's case from
the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
154. “Interruption” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one
that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. An officer who is preventively
suspended is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office but title to office is not lost.
Preventive suspension, therefore, does not interrupt the term for which the official was elected.
(see Aldovino vs. Comelec [2009])
155. What if the suspension imposed upon the official was in the form of a penalty, will Aldovino
doctrine still apply? One may invoke Justice Mendoza’s opinion when he penned Borja vs. Comelec
(1998). In explaining the Court’s decision, J. Mendoza used illustrations that included a Mayor
who was “twice suspended for misconduct for a total of one (1) year “during a first term and who
was subsequently elected and served for two consecutive terms. J. Mendoza opined that the
Mayor’s suspension effectively interrupted the term of the Mayor concerned and he, therefore,
has “not fully served three consecutive terms”. However, one may argue that the Court’s
reasoning in Aldovino, which came after Borja, would still apply to suspension as penalty. Firstly,
J. Mendoza’s opinion in Borja may be treated as obiter. Secondly, under the LGC of 1991, when
a Mayor is suspended (as penalty), the Vice-mayor succeeds only in an acting capacity, indicating
that the office of the Mayor was never vacated when the Mayor got suspended.
156. Will the three-term limit rule apply upon local elective officials in renamed and/or
reapportioned districts? The Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative in Naval
vs. Comelec (2014), a case of first impression. In this case, Mr. Naval already served for two (2)
31
consecutive terms (2007-2010) as member of the Provincial Board of Camarines Sur Second
District. The second district consisted of ten (10) municipalities. A reapportionment law was
thereafter passed creating a Third District which consisted of the eight (8) municipalities of the
Second District. When Naval ran for the Third District for the same position of Member of the
Provincial Board, the Supreme Court ruled that the three-term limit rule should be applied to him.
The Supreme Court applied the reasoning in Latasa (see also Halili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 231643,
January 15, 2019.)
157. In Albania vs. Comelec (2017), while respondent therein ran as Governor of Camarines Norte
in the 2007 elections, he did not win as such. It was only after he filed a petition for correction
of manifest error that he was proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor. He assumed the post and
served the unexpired term of his opponent from March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010.
Consequently, he did not hold the office for the full term of three years to which he was
supposedly entitled to. Thus, such period of time that respondent served as Governor did not
constitute a complete and full service of his term. The period when he was out of office
involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his service as Governor. As he had not fully served the
2007-2010 term, and had not been elected for three consecutive terms as Governor, there was
no violation of the three-term limit rule when he ran again in the 2016 elections.
158. An interesting question was raised in the 2019 case of Tallado v. COMELEC.36 Tallado was
duly elected as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte in the 2010, 2013 and 2016
elections. He fully served his 2010-2013 and 2013-2016 terms. It was the turn of events in
respect of Tallado’s 2016-2019 term that has spawned the controversy that the Supreme Court
had to resolve. It appears that on April 18, 2016, while Tallado was serving his 2013-2016 term,
the Office of the Ombudsman found and declared him administratively liable and imposed upon
him the penalty of dismissal from service, which decision was immediately implemented by the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) on November 8, 2016. The DILG also
directed the Vice-Governor, Pimentel, to assume the office of the Governor. Pimentel then took
an oath of office as Governor of Camarines Norte and thereupon assumed office and exercised
the functions of Governor. Based on record, however, Tallado was in fact able to timely appeal
the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman ordering his dismissal. The question then was
whether Tallado’s removal from office despite the pendency of the appeal questioning the order
of dismissal interrupted his 2013-2016 term. The Supreme Court ruled that once the order of the
Office of the Ombudsman to dismiss an elective local official is executed, the dismissed official
thereby loses title to the office even if he or she has filed a timely appeal assailing the dismissal
which would have prevented it from attaining finality. The loss of title to the office constitutes an
involuntary interruption of the official's service of his or her full term.
Local Taxation Power
159. In Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. CA,37 the Supreme Court ruled that
MIAA is exempt from real property taxation by the local government because, first, MIAA is not
a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government
and thus exempt from local taxation and second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the
Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. (See also Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) v. City of Lapulapu and Pacaldo 38).
160. The following fundamental principles shall govern the exercise of the taxing and other
revenue-raising powers of local government units:
(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;

(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
(1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay;
(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;
(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
36
G.R. No. 246679, September 10, 2019.
37
G.R. No. 155650, July 20, 2006.
38
G.R. No. 181756, June 15, 2015; see also Light Rail Transit Authority v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 221626, October 9,
2019.
32
(4) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint of
trade;
(c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be
let to any private person;
(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the Code shall inure solely to the
benefit of, and be subject to disposition by, the local government unit levying the tax, fee,
charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided in the Code; and
(e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of
taxation.39
161. Local governments have no power to tax the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities, except as otherwise provided in the Local Government Code pursuant to the
saving clause in Section 133 stating “[u]nless otherwise provided in this Code.” This exception —
which is an exception to the exemption of the Republic from real estate tax imposed by local
governments — refers to Section 234(a) of the Code. The exception to the exemption in Section
234(a) subjects real property owned by the Republic, whether titled in the name of the national
government, its agencies or instrumentalities, to real estate tax if the beneficial use of such
property is given to a taxable entity.40
162. As a mandatory requirement, public hearings shall always be conducted for the purpose prior
to the enactment of tax ordinances and measures.41 Likewise, and within ten (10) days after their
approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue
measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local
circulation, provided, however, that in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no
newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and
publicly accessible places.42 Copies of all provincial, city, and municipal and barangay tax
ordinances and revenue measures shall be furnished the respective local treasurers for public
dissemination.43
163. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them.44 A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue.45 Pursuant to the
constitutional mandate that this share in the national taxes, called Internal Revenue Allotment
(IRA), be automatically released to the local governments, the Code specifically mandates that
“the share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of any further action,
directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly
basis within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien
or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.” 46
164. Section 284, in limiting the “just share” of LGUs to the share in the “national internal revenue
taxes” only (effectively excluding other “national taxes” such as customs duties), has, however,
been found by the Supreme Court in the 2018 case of Mandanas v. Ochoa, Jr. 47 as a deviation
from the plain language of Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, although the
power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional lawmaking remains subject
to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. The phrase national internal revenue
39
40
Ibid.
41
42
43
44
Section 6, Article X, 1987 Constitution.
45
Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000.
46
47
G.R. Nos. 199802 & 208488, July 3, 2018.
33
taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national
taxes written in Section 6, Article X, of the Constitution. As such, Congress has actually departed
from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base from which
the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible.
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Jus Cogens; Erga Omnes Norms
165. Under Art. 53, Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna, 1969), a treaty or treaty provision
is void if it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law, “a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character”. This norm is called Jus Cogens. Examples of jus
cogens rules are prohibition on the use of force, of genocide, slavery, gross violation of the right
of people to self-determination, racial discrimination, and torture.
Erga Omnes norms, on the other hand, are obligations of a state to the international community.
Examples of erga omnes norms are the obligations not to commit/fail to punish International
crimes and not to violate people’s right to self-determination.
Decision Ex Aequo Et Bono
166. As a rule, a judge or arbitrator can always use equity to interpret of fill gaps in the law, even
when he has not been expressly authorized to do so. But, he may not give a decision “ex aequo
et bono” (a decision in which equity overrides all other rules) unless he has been expressly
authorized to do so by the parties.
Under Article 38 (2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the list of sources of
international law under Article 38(1) “shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide ex
aequo et bono if the parties agree thereto”.
Relationship between International Law and Municipal Law
167. Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the law of the land
and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in the domestic sphere.
This is the by-product of Monism Theory which perceives international law and domestic law as
belonging to one and the same system of law. In the Philippines, only the “generally accepted
principles of international law” form part of the law of the land without need of government action.
Thus, a treaty that does not contain generally accepted principle of international law, forms part
of the law of the land only when ratified by the President and concurred in by the Senate.
The Doctrine of Transformation allows international law to form part of the law of the land only
through an affirmative act by the government, usually in the form of legislation. Treaties become
part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of
the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and
effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus,
treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by
the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic
conflicts. (Wilson v. Ermita, G.R. No. 189220, [December 7, 2016])
Sources of Obligations in International Law
168. The sources of obligations in international law are (1) those “sources of international law”
that the ICJ will apply in cases before it under Art. 38(1) of the State of the ICJ and (2)
“unilateral acts and declarations” pursuant to the Nuclear Test Cases (1974)
169. Article 38(1) of the Statute of International Court of Justice lists down the sources of
international law that the ICJ will apply, thus:
34
Primary (Formal/Law-making) Sources:
International conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly

recognized by the contesting States;
International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law
General principle of law recognized by civilized nations
Subsidiary (Material/Law-determining) Sources:
Judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations
170. Unilateral Declaration of State Doctrine (See: Nuclear Test Cases and the 2006 ILC
Guiding Principles on Unilateral Declaration of States): A unilateral declaration binds the State
internationally when:
1. Publicly made and manifesting will to be bound

2. Made by an authority vested with the power to do so (Heads of State, Heads of Gov’t.,
and Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and other officers representing the State in specified
areas and within their competence)
3. Made orally or in writing
4. Addressed to the international community or to specific state or entity
5. Stated in clear and specific terms
6. Consistent with jus cogens
7. Will not bind third states who do not accept it
8. Not validly revoked
171. Treaties are agreements between and among States, by which parties obligate themselves to
act, or refrain from acting, according to the terms of the treaty. Rules regarding treaty procedure
and interpretation are defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VLCT). Article 26
sets out the fundamental principle relating to treaties, pacta sunt servanda, which provides,
“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith.” Once a State becomes a party to a treaty, it is bound by that treaty. Article 34 provides
that a treaty does not create rights or obligations for State that are not parties to the treaty. But,
even if a State is not party to a treaty, the treaty may serve as evidence of customary
international law. Article 38 of the VCLT recognizes this “back-door” means by which a treaty
may become binding on non-parties.
Customary International Law
172. For international law to be customary, two (2) elements are required: (1) widespread state
practice [except in the case of “instant” customary law] and (2) opinio juris sive necesitatis – the
mutual conviction that the recurrence (of state practice) is the result of an obligatory or
compulsory rule.
Secondary Sources
173. “Teachings” refers simply to the writings of learned scholars. This does not refer, however, to
every single published article on international law. The provision is expressly limited to teachings
of “the most highly qualified publicists” such as Grotius, Lauterpacht, and Brownlie.
174. Persistent Objector or Dissenter Doctrine: A state, that from the outset consistently
objects to a particular practice, is not bound by any rule of alleged customary international law
which may arise from the practice. (UK vs. Norway, ICJ Report, 1951)
Subjects
Subjects and Objects of International Law
175. “Subjects” of international law are those that enjoy international legal personality and being
capable of possessing international rights and duties, including the right to bring international
claims. States are primarily the subjects of international law. However, modern international law
35
has recognized secondary subjects of international law such as International Organizations (e.g.
UN, WTO), individuals (protected persons of IHL, insurgents and national liberation movements,
minorities), juridical persons (multinational companies), and NGOs (e.g. ICRC, Greenpeace,
Amnesty Int’l.).
International Organizations are established through the agreements by States (e.g. UN). It is
different from NGOs which are established by individuals or private organizations (e.g.
Greenpeace and Amnesty International). See Reparation for Injuries Case” (ICJ) where UN was
recognized as having legal personality to espouse a claim in behalf of its officer.
While it is conceded that original international legal personality belongs to the main actors of
international law, namely states, the UN had international legal personality through the fact that
its member states, by the very fact of creating such an organization, must have transferred some
of their powers over the organization. (“Derivative international legal personality”) [See:
Reparation for Injuries Case)
“International legal personality” means “the ability to possess international rights and duties and
the power to sustain these rights by bringing international claims”.
Individuals and Companies are generally considered “objects” of international law, especially
insofar as international rights are concerned. (Cf. “espousal claims” by States; “right to self-
determination”). Insofar as international duties are concerned, however, they may be called
“subjects” of international law to the extent that their breach of international law is internationally
actionable as in the case of military commanders held liable for violation of international
humanitarian law.
Statehood
176. Requisites:
1. permanent population (sufficient number to maintain status of statehood.)

2. defined territory (only sufficient sufficiency, not accurate definition, is required.)
3. government (Effective control test: sovereignty, not legitimacy, is require.)
4. capacity to enter into relations with other States (mere capacity, not actual exercise)
(Art. 1, 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States)
Jurisdiction
177. Types:
1. Jurisdiction to prescribe law (the authority of a state to make its policy applicable
to persons or activities) (See: Restatement 402, except for universal jurisdiction,
which is in Restatement 404)
2. Jurisdiction to adjudicate (authority of the state to subject particular persons or
things to its courts)
3. Jurisdiction to enforce (concerned with the authority of a state to use the resources
of government to induce or compel compliance with its law; includes authority to
arrest)
Criminal Jurisdiction
178. Territorial Jurisdiction: State has jurisdiction over property, persons, acts, or events occurring
within its territory.
Subjective Territorial Principle: jurisdiction to prosecute or punish crimes commenced within

their territory but completed or consummated in the territory of another state.
Objective Territorial Principle: certain states apply their territorial jurisdiction to offenses or acts
commenced in another state, but (i) consummated or completed within their territory, or (ii)
producing gravely harmful consequences to the social or economic order inside their territory.
179. Nationality Principles in Jurisdiction
36
Kinds:
Active Nationality: states may regulate the conduct of their nationals wherever they
are in the world
Passive Nationality: a state may prescribe law for situations where its nationals are a
victim of the conduct being regulated; this has limited scope, usually applicable to terrorist
attacks
180. Protective Principle in Jurisdiction: a state can legislate crimes that it considers to be a threat
to its security, integrity, or economic interests. Common examples: espionage, counterfeiting.
This principle is limited to conduct that occurs outside a state’s territory, by noncitizens.
Note: Restatement 402: “…a state has jurisdiction to prescribe the law with respect to…(3)
certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.” (see: United States vs.
Osama Bin Laden, 2000)
Note: Protective Principle in Jurisdiction is different from “Diplomatic Protection”, which is an

espousal of claim by the State in international tribunal (e.g. ICJ) for acts of other states against
the espousing State’s citizens.
In Diplomatic Protection cases, the ICJ requires Effective Nationality Link as illustrated in the
1955 Nottebohm Case: Nationality as a basis for exercising jurisdiction must be real and effective
to give a right to a state who has conferred it. Real and effective link with the state of nationality
necessary. Right to diplomatic protection and protection by means of international judicial
proceedings only arises when proper nationality link exist between the individual concerned and
the state seeking to exercise such rights. [“Effective Nationality Theory”]
Legality of Abduction of Criminals in foreign territory
181. Abduction of criminals in the territory of another state is understood as “intervention” and
therefore violates customary law and the UN Charter (Art. 2 (4); It can only be justified if done
invoking self-defense.
But, the illegal apprehension will not affect the jurisdiction of the apprehending state unless the
defendant was secured torture, brutality, or similar outrageous conduct. (See: Ker vs. Illinois
[1886]; Frisbie vs. Collins [1952])
Exemptions from Jurisdiction
State Immunity
182. Which agency of the Executive Branch can make a determination of immunity from suit, which
may be considered as conclusive upon the courts? The Supreme Court in Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) v. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) (1996) emphasized the DFA's
competence and authority to provide such necessary determination. The DFA's function includes,
among its other mandates, the determination of persons and institutions covered by diplomatic
immunities, a determination which, when challenge, (sic) entitles it to seek relief from the court
so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations. This authority is in
fact exclusive to the DFA. (China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. vs. Santamaria [2012])
183. Under the Restrictive theory of State Immunity (also known as the Doctrine of Qualified
Immunity), the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts
jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
In the Philippines, the Supreme Court had considered the following transactions by a foreign state
with private parties as acts jure imperii: (1) the lease by a foreign government of apartment
buildings for use of its military officers (Syquia v. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 [1949]); (2) the conduct of
public bidding for the repair of a wharf at a United States Naval Station (United States of America
v. Ruiz, supra.); and (3) the change of employment status of base employees (Sanders v.
Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88 [1988]) and the following transactions as acts jure gestionis: (1) the
hiring of a cook in the recreation center, consisting of three restaurants, a cafeteria, a bakery, a
store, and a coffee and pastry shop at the John Hay Air Station in Baguio City, to cater to American
37
servicemen and the general public (United States of America v. Rodrigo, 182 SCRA 644 [1990];
and (2) the bidding for the operation of barber shops in Clark Air Base in Angeles City (United
States of America v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 [1990]). The operation of the restaurants and other
facilities open to the general public is undoubtedly for profit as a commercial and not a
governmental activity. By entering into the employment contract with the cook in the discharge
of its proprietary function, the United States government impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity from suit. (see Holy See, The v. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524)
Take note also of the following cases:
Republic of Indonesia vs. Vinzon (2003): The mere entering into a contract by a foreign State
with a private party cannot be construed as the ultimate test of whether or not it is an act jure
imperii or jure gestionis. The State may enter into contracts with private entities to maintain the
premises, furnishings and equipment of the embassy and the living quarters of its agents and
officials, and such acts are public acts.
WHO vs. Aquino (1972): Officer of WHO assigned in the Philippines was entitled to diplomatic
immunity pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine
Government and the World Health Organization.
Minucher vs. CA (2003): A foreign agent (DEA), operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit when it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending
state and when the Philippines has given imprimatur to his presence here.
Liang vs. People (2000): the commission of a crime (slander) is not part of official duty. ADB’s
immunity covers “official duty”.
184. Act of State Doctrine:
• Courts generally will not pass judgment on the validity of the public and official acts of a
foreign government within its own territory.
• Rationale for the Act of State Doctrine: Co-equality among states; respect for
sovereignty of foreign states. (See: Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 US 250 (1897)
Immunity of Head of State; Former Head of State; Foreign Ministers
185. Presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president's incumbency.
Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president
even for acts committed during his or her tenure. Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential
privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication
of a right. (In re: Petition for Writ of Amparo in favor of Francis Saez, Saez vs. Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo [2012])
186. The House of Lords of UK ruled that “the absolute prohibition of torture, a jus cogens norm,
overrides immunity afforded to a former Head of State in criminal proceedings. The commission
of a crime against humanity and jus cogens cannot be done in an official capacity on behalf of a
state.” (see In re: Pinochet [House of Lords of UK, 2001])
187. Do head of state immunities apply to foreign ministers even for international crimes? Answer:
The ICJ said that immunity for current foreign ministers is absolute, even for international crimes
– there is no exception to head of state immunity for all violations of international law (including
jus cogens, customary international law, etc.). This immunity ratione personae extended to
current foreign ministers is justified by the fact that they too exercise diplomatic functions similar
to heads of states and ambassadors. (see Democratic Republic of Congo vs. Belgium [ICJ, 2002])
38
Diplomatic Immunity
Inviolability of Diplomatic Mission
188. The premises of a foreign diplomatic mission are inviolable and no person, even a member of
the government of the receiving state, may enter the premises without the authority of the
mission. The receiving state has in fact the duty to protect the mission against intrusion or
damage and to prevent disturbances of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
(See Art. 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations [VCDR]). Thus, in Tehran Hostages
Case [ICJ, 1980], the ICJ found Iran to have violated the provisions of the Vienna Conventions
on Diplomatic and Consular Relations (1961, 1963) as it failed, as receiving State, to take
appropriate steps to ensure the protection of the United States Embassy and Consulates, their
staffs, archives, means of communication, and freedom of movement. These obligations are even
customary.
189. Under Article 27 of VCDR, a receiving state shall permit and protect the free communication
on behalf of the mission for all official purposes. Such official communication shall not be
interfered with. The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained. The use of sniffer dogs and
external examination of the bag is, however, permitted customarily per ILC Draft Articles. A
reasonable suspicion that the bag contains illegal article will also allow the authorities to have the
bag opened in the presence of a representative of the sending state. The bag, however, must
bear visible external marks of its character and contain only diplomatic documents or official
articles.
Personal and Functional Immunity of Diplomatic Officials
190. In terms of personal immunity from jurisdiction, a distinction must be drawn between civil
and criminal process. In terms of criminal jurisdiction, diplomatic agents have total immunity
from the law of the receiving state and the only remedy available to the receiving state is to
declare the diplomat persona non grata. The immunity from criminal jurisdiction applies to any
offense committed by the diplomat whether official or not. In terms of civil jurisdiction, diplomats
are immune from the civil jurisdiction of the receiving state except in three (3) cases. The
immunity of diplomats extends to “arrests” and “detentions”.
191. As for Consuls, however, although they enjoy more or less the same immunities and privileges
as diplomats, their immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction extends to their official acts only.
General Principles of Treaty Law
Treaty vs. International Agreement vs. Executive Agreement vs. Exchange of Notes
192. A treaty for purposes of the application of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) is “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed
by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments, and whatever its particular designation.”
193. In international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their
binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the functionaries have remained within their
powers. International law continues to make no distinction between treaties and executive
agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations. In the Philippines, we distinguish
a treaty from an international agreement for the purpose of determining whether ratification by
the President requires the concurrence of the Senate. In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the
binding effect of executive agreements even without the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.
(BAYAN vs. Zamora [2000])
194. In Philippine law, how are “international agreement”, “treaty” and “executive agreement”
distinguished from each other?
a. International agreement — shall refer to a contract or understanding, regardless of

nomenclature, entered into between the Philippines and another government in written form and
governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments.
39
b. Treaties — international agreements entered into by the Philippines which require legislative
concurrence after executive ratification. This term may include compacts like conventions,
declarations, covenants and acts.
c. Executive Agreements — similar to treaties except that they do not require legislative
concurrence. (Sec. 2, E.O. No. 459)
195. International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties.
But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established
national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature usually take the form of executive agreements. (Commissioner of Customs vs. Eastern
Sea Trading, October 31, 1961)
196. In the Philippines, the DFA, by virtue of Sec. 9 of E.O. 459, is initially given the power to
determine whether an agreement is to be treated as a treaty or as an executive agreement.
(Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204605, [July 19, 2016],
790 PHIL 276-347)
197. The terms "exchange of notes" and "executive agreements" have been used interchangeably,
exchange of notes being considered a form of executive agreement that becomes binding through
executive action. On the other hand, executive agreements concluded by the President
"sometimes take the form of exchange of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated 'agreements' or 'protocols.'” Concurrence of the Senate is not required in executive
agreements, such as the “RP-US Non Surrender Agreement”. (Bayan Muna vs. Romulo [2011])
Executive Agreements Allowing Foreign Military Bases, Troops, or Facilities
198. Section 25 of the Transitory Provisions appears to require a “treaty” before foreign military
bases, troops or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines. However, this constitutional
restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once
entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided
by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity
through a treaty. The VFA has already allowed the entry of troops in the Philippines as affirmed
in Lim vs. Executive Secretary (2002). The Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA)
between the US and the Philippines can, therefore, be in the form of an executive agreement,
especially that it merely involves "adjustments in detail" in the implementation of the MDT and
the VFA. (Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr., [January 12, 2016].
Signature; Ratification; Role of Senate
199. The signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct steps in the treaty-
making process. The signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument
and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state's authorized
representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by
which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It
is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.
The power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role
of the Senate, however, is limited nly to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the
ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. (Pimentel vs. Romulo
[2006])
Consent to be bound
200. Consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of

instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other
means if so agreed (Art. 11, VCLT). Ratification occurs only when instruments of ratification are
exchanged between the contracting states or are deposited with the depositary. (Arts. 2 (1)(b)
& 16, VCLT)
40
Entry into force
201. Generally, a treaty enters into force generally as soon as all negotiating states have
expressed their consent to be bound by it, unless otherwise stipulated. A State is obliged to
refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed
the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the
treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed (Art. 18, VCLT).
Reservation
202. Reservation is “a unilateral statement… made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting,
approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to the State.” (Article (2)(1)(d), VCLT).
Reservation is allowed only when it is accepted by all the states which had signed (not necessarily
ratified) or adhered to the treaty.
Invocation of rebus sic stantibus
203. The doctrine of rebus sic stantibus does not operate automatically to render the treaty
inoperative. There is a necessity for a formal act of rejection, usually made by the head of state,
with a statement of the reasons why compliance with the treaty is no longer required. (Santos
III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256)
Unilateral Termination of Treaty
204. As for treaties with no exit rules: “Denunciation is not permitted unless: (1) Intended by the
parties or (2) Implied by the nature of the treaty”; 12-month notice is required in either case.
Otherwise, the party may only terminate the treaty on exclusive legal grounds such as Material
Breach, Impossibility of Performance and Fundamental Change of Circumstance. In which case,
the state must observe “notification-sommation”, “3-month notice” and “pacific means of
settlement” rules.
A party cannot invoke its internal law in order to evade compliance of treaty obligations. (see Art.
27, VCLT)
Doctrine of State Responsibility
205. Internationally Wrongful Act: (a) action or omission attributable to the State under
International Law; (b) constitutes a breach of international obligation of State. (Art. 2, ARSIWA)
Add: The “nexus” requirement.
206. “Imputability Doctrine” (Principle of Attribution):
A State is liable only for its own acts and omissions, and in this context, the State is identified
with its governmental organs and apparatus, not with the population (nor with private [vs. ultra
vires] acts of government agents).
“Governmental Organs or Apparatus”: Domestic Administrative Law is irrelevant. The issue is to

be settled applying international law principles.
207. Covered Conducts/Acts (under ARSIWA):
A. By State Organs and Quasi-State Organs (“Parastatal” entities):
• Act of any State organ or official without regard to nature of function; (Art. 4) [State
Organ]
• Act of a person or entity empowered to exercise governmental authority (Art. 5), placed
at the disposal of a State by another state (Art. 6), even if such act is in excess of
authority or contravenes instructions; (Art. 7) [Quasi-state Organ]
41
B. By Non-State Organs (Private Persons or Group of Persons):
• Act done pursuant to instruction of, or under the direction or control of, the State; (Art.
8) [What is the threshold of “direction or control”?]
• Act done in the exercise of governmental authority in default of official authorities; (Art.
9)
• Conduct of rebel movement which becomes the new Government of a State; (Art. 10)
C. By Any Other Person/Entity:
- Conduct is acknowledged and adopted by the State, either expressly or by conduct, as

its own. (Art. 11)
208. Scope of Responsibility:
a. Cessation (with Assurances of Non-repetition)

b. Reparation
-Restitution,
-Compensation and/or
-Satisfaction
c. Lawful countermeasures (self-help) by the victim
209. Circumstances precluding wrongfulness:
a. Non-compliance with rules concerning nationality of claims. [see: Nottebohm and

Barcelona Traction cases; see also 2006 ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection];
b. Failure to exhaust local remedies (ILC Draft Article 22) [see: Interhandel Case
(Switzerland vs. U.S., ICJ Report, 1959)]
c. Waiver by the State (vs. “Calvo Clause”)
d. Unreasonable Delay and Improper Behavior of injured alien
e. Consent of injured State
f. Lawful exercise of Self-defense under UN Charter and in conformity with IHRL and IHL
g. Lawful Countermeasure (see Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case for the elements of valid
countermeasure: 1. prior internationally wrongful act, 2. invoking state had called upon
the other to discontinue the wrongful act or to make reparation, and 3. proportionality of
the measure);
h. Force Majeure (irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of a State,
making the performance of obligation materially impossible)
i. Distress (Art. 24, ARSIWA)
j. Necessity (Art. 25, ARSIWA)
Espousal of Claims
210. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative
to determine whether to espouse petitioners' claims against Japan. The Philippines is not under
any international obligation to espouse petitioners' claims. The International Law Commission's
(ILC's) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection fully support this traditional view. They (i) state
that "the right of diplomatic protection belongs to or vests in the State," (ii) affirm its discretionary
nature by clarifying that diplomatic protection is a "sovereign prerogative" of the State; and (iii)
stress that the state "has the right to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a national. It is
under no duty or obligation to do so." (Vinuya vs. Romulo [2010])
International Refugee Law
211. It sets of rules and procedures that aims to protect (1) persons seeking asylum from
persecution (2) persons recognized as refugees under relevant instruments; a legal regime that
covers both IHL and IHRL.
Main Sources: (1) 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol, (2) Customary International
Law (CIL);
42
212. Who is a “refugee”? Answer: any person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” (Art. 1(A)(2), 1951 Refugee Convention) vs. “asylum
seeker”
213. “Principle of Non-refoulement”: Art. 33 (Refugee Convention): “No Contracting State shall
expel or return (“refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” Already part of customary
international law; also found in Convention Against Torture, Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949;
ICCPR; Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance; and Principles
on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions;
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) sees to it that rights of refugees are
protected and/or promoted.
Refugees vs. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): IDPs: “persons or groups of persons who have
been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular
as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence,
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an
internationally recognized State border” (1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement).
There is no specific treaty instrument covering IDPs. The International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) helps promote/protect the rights of IDPs.
Extradition
214. Extradition is the “process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime against the
law of a State and found in a foreign State are returned by the latter to the former for trial or
punishment. It applies to those who are merely charged with an offense but have not been
brought to trial; to those who have been tried and convicted and have subsequently escaped
from custody; and those who have been convicted in absentia. It does not apply to persons
merely suspected of having committed an offense but against whom no charge has been laid or
to a person whose presence is desired as a witness or for obtaining or enforcing a civil judgment.”
(Puno in Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion [2000]).
Under international law there is no duty to extradite in the absence of treaty, whether bilateral
or multilateral. (Billot)
The prohibition against ex post facto law applies only to criminal legislation which affects the
substantial rights of the accused. This being so, there is no merit in the contention that the ruling
sustaining an extradition treaty’s retroactive application violates the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. The treaty is neither a piece of criminal legislation nor a criminal
procedural statute. (Wright v. CA, 235 SCRA 341)
215. Deportation is different from extradition because deportation is unilateral act of a state and
does need a treaty. Destination of deportee is irrelevant in deportation, unlike in extradition.
216. Under the rule of specialty in international law, a Requested State shall surrender to a
Requesting State a person to be tried only for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of
extradition. Conformably with the dual criminality rule embodied in the extradition treaty
between the Philippines and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), however,
the Philippines as the Requested State is not bound to extradite the respondent to the jurisdiction
of the HKSAR as the Requesting State for the offense of accepting an advantage as an
agent considering that the extradition treaty is forthright in providing that surrender shall only
be granted for an offense coming within the descriptions of offenses in its Article 2 insofar as the
offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one year, or
by a more severe penalty according to the laws of both parties. (Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region v. Muñoz, G.R. No. 207342 (Resolution), [November 7, 2017])
43
International Human Rights Law
217. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the UN is not a legally binding instrument as it
merely recommends states to keep it in mind in the enactment of legal measures. However, if
the particular right mentioned there has already ripened into a customary international law (e.g.
torture, slavery, racial discrimination), violation of the human right becomes a “matter of
international concern” that allows criminal prosecution.
218. Is a View issued by the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) binding upon the
Philippines? May mandamus lie to enforce a View issued by the UNHRC?
No. Any View issued by the Committee only displays "important characteristics of a judicial
decision" and are not per se decisions which may be enforced outright. These Views, therefore,
are mere recommendations to guide the State it is issued against. These are matters which are
best taken up by the Legislative and the Executive branches of government as can be seen by
the formation of the Presidential Human Rights Committee. (Wilson v. Ermita, G.R. No. 189220,
[December 7, 2016])
219. May the burial of a Dictator, who once seriously violated human rights of his people, in the
Libingan Ng Mga Bayani violate the rights of the victims to full and effective reparation under the
ICCPR and other human rights instruments?
No. The ICCPR, as well as the U.N. principles on reparation and to combat impunity, call for the
enactment of legislative measures, establishment of national programmes, and provision for
administrative and judicial recourse, in accordance with the country's constitutional processes,
that are necessary to give effect to human rights embodied in treaties, covenants and other
international laws. (Ocampo v. Enriquez, [November 8, 2016])
International Humanitarian Law (Jus in Bello)
220. In International Humanitarian Law (IHL), which regulates the conduct of war to protect
civilians and civilian objects, an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups within a State. The kinds of wars that render International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) applicable are: 1. International Armed Conflict and 2. Non-international
Armed Conflict.
An armed conflict is international if it takes place between two or more States. This includes the
concept of “internationalized armed conflict”. “Wars of National Liberation” are considered
International Armed Conflict.
Article 1(4) of AP I provides that armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination, alien occupation or racist regimes (wars of national liberation) are to be considered
international conflicts. International armed conflicts are governed by the Geneva Conventions
and Additional Protocol (AP) I.
Armed conflict is non-international if it is restricted to the territory of a single State involving

either regular armed forces fighting against armed group or armed groups fighting each other.
The armed violence must be “protracted” and engaged in by “organized groups”, thus, mere riots
are not covered. Non-international armed conflicts are governed by Common Article 3 of the 4
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol (AP) II.
221. IHL protects (1) civilians and (2) civilian objects. Civilians are persons who do not belong to
armed force and who are not combatants. Civilian Objects are objects which are not military
objectives. “Military Objects” are those which by their nature, location, purpose or use make
effective contribution to military action and advantage.
222. Fundamental Principles in IHL:
a. Principle of Humanity – as expressed in the so-called “Martens Clause”: “Until a

more complete code of the laws of war has been issued, the High Contracting
44
Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection
and the rule of the law of nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.”
(Preamble, Hague Convention of 1899
b. Principle of Distinction - “In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.” (Art. 48, Additional Protocol [AP] 1)
c. Principle of Proportionality – prohibits an attack “which may be expected to cause

incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated”. (Art. 51 (5) (b), AP 1)
d. Military Necessity - Attacks must be limited strictly to military objectives. Insofar

as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military
action whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization offers a definite
military advantage. (Art. 52(2), AP 1)
e. Principle of Precaution - In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall

be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. (Art. 57 (1),
AP 1)
The Principle of Complementarity
223. The ICC is constituted as an ultima ratio jurisdiction, with competency only as a result of the
total inactivity or inefficiency of national jurisdictions, whether because of unwillingness or
inability to prosecution core crimes under the Rome Statute.
Peoples’ Right to Self-Determination
224. It is a customary international law; a jus cogens and erga omnes norm.
Set out in Art. 1(2) and Art. 55 of the UN Charter, Art. 2 of G.A. Resolution entitled Declaration
on the Granting of Independence (1960) [“All peoples have the right to self-determination;
by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development”]; in ICCPR and ICESCR, and in 1970 Declaration
on Friendly Relations of the G.A..
225. Article 1(4) of Protocol I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions make the laws of international
armed conflict applicable to "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-
determination.”
Any group within a territory claiming to be fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation
or a racist regime (national liberation movement) is now protected by the laws of war, and that
its members are entitled to prisoner-of-war status.
Law of the Sea
226. RA 9522 (Baseline Law) is not Unconstitutional. RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate
the Country's Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate
Philippine Territory. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is
a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the
territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from
the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental
shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the
acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation,
45
accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of
sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty's terms to delimit maritime zones
and continental shelves. (Magallona vs. Ermita [2011])
RA 9522's Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the
KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines' Claim of Sovereignty Over
these Areas. The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that
RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints
that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline
(and thus comply with UNCLOS III's limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA
3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn
around the Philippine archipelago. (Magallona vs. Ermita [2011])
227. Internal waters include ports, harbors, rivers, lakes and canals. The coastal state can prohibit
entry into its internal waters by foreign ships, except for ships in distress. When already within
internal waters, different legal questions arise depending on the kind of vessel that is within the
internal water: merchant ships, warships, other foreign non-commercial ships.
The territorial sea of a state does not exceed twelve (12) n. m. from the “baseline”. The baselines
are based either on (1) Normal Baseline (Low-Water Mark Method), and (2) Straight Baseline
Method. The territorial sea is subject to the “Right of Innocent Passage” by foreign ships. It is
innocent if not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. Fishing vessels
must comply with local laws and submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag.
The contiguous zone of a state does not exceed twenty-four (24) n.m. from the baseline. The
coastal State is limited to Protective Jurisdiction only, that is, to prevent infringement of its
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations.
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) does not exceed two hundred (200) n.m. from the baseline.
The coastal state has sovereign rights over all the economic resources of the sea, seabed, and
subsoil which include not only fish but also minerals beneath the seabed. However, if the coastal
state is unable to fully exploit the resources, it must make arrangement to share the surplus with
other states.
The High Seas extend beyond 200 n.m. from the baseline. It may be used freely by ships of all
nations (including land-locked states). ”Freedom on the high seas” includes: freedom of
navigation, freedom of fishing, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines and freedom to fly
over the high seas. These freedoms are, however, subject to certain conventions and agreements.
As a rule, ships in the high seas are governed only by (1) international law and (2) law of the
flag state. The “Flag of the State” refers to the nationality of the flag, which is determined by the
place of registration. A ship can only use one flag. ”Flags of Convenience” are countries that allow
registration of a ship for a fee.
The continental shelf refers to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond
its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 n. m. from the baselines, where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance. The state has exclusive right over natural
resources in the continental shelf.
The extended continental shelf reaches 350 n. m. from the baseline where the continental margin
extends beyond 200 n. m.; or up to a maximum of 100 n.m. from the 2,500 meter isobaths (Par.
5, Art. 76, UNCLOS III).
Under the “Median Line” principle, the coasts of two states are opposite or adjacent to each other,
neither of them is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its
territorial sea beyond the median line every point of which is “equidistant” from the nearest points
on the baselines. This is also applicable in the case of continental shelf. The median line principle
is, however, subject to exceptions such as Historic title or other special circumstances.
46
International Environmental Law
Precautionary Principle
228. Rule 20 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases provides for the applicability and
standards for application of the precautionary principle as a rule of evidence:
RULE 20
Precautionary Principle
SECTION 1. Applicability. — When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in

establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall
apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.
The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology is given
the benefit of the doubt.
SECTION 2. Standards for Application. — In applying the precautionary principle, the

following factors, among others, may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health;
(2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to the environment without
legal consideration of the environmental rights of those affected.
The formulation of the precautionary principle in Rule 20 is similar to Principle 15 of the 1992
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:
Principle 15 (Precautionary principle): "In order to protect the environment, the

precautionary approach shall be widely applied by the States according to their
capabilities. Where there are threats of serious and irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation."
In Mosqueda v. Philippine Banana Growers (2016), the Supreme Court said that there must
be uncertainty for the precautionary principle to apply. As a "principle of last
resort," the precautionary principle has no application "where the threat is relatively certain, or that
the causal link between an action and environmental damage can be established, or the probability
of occurrence can be calculated[.]"
Our jurisdiction adopts the weak version of the precautionary principle, as opposed to
its strong version.
The weak version of the precautionary principle means "that a lack of decisive evidence of
harm should not be a ground for refusing to regulate." On the other hand, the strong version of
the precautionary principle requires governmental regulation "whenever there is a possible risk to
health, safety, or the environment, even if the supporting evidence is speculative and even if the
economic costs of regulation are high." Prof. Sunstein warns that applying the strong version of
the precautionary principle may "[forbid] all courses of action, including inaction," to the point that
society is "deprive[d] . . . of significant benefits, and for that reason produce risks and even deaths
that would otherwise not occur."
Indeed, prohibiting an activity comes with benefits and costs. While

the precautionary principle may ensure that no risk of harm to the environment will directly result
from the activity being avoided, the costs that come with foregoing the activity — though not
obvious, are equally important. Hence, the public may be deprived of benefits from undertaking the
activity.
The Supreme Court rules that the precautionary principle does not apply precisely
because regulatory precautions have already been taken. It is not uncertain that exposure to high-
frequency electromagnetic fields has health effects, with some studies even claiming that
electromagnetic fields cause leukemia in children. Other possible explanations for this association,
however, have not yet been ruled out.
(Dela Cruz v. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. 197878, [November 10, 2020])
47

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Warriors Notes 2022 Allied Political Laws and Public International

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PREPARED BY: ATTY. DARYL BRETCH M.

WARRIORS’ NOTES 2022

BAR REVIEWER AND NOTES IN ALLIED POLITICAL LAWS1

Daryl Bretch M. Largo

2022 Revised Edition

LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

General Principles: Definition of “office”, “public officer” and “public official”

Appointment vs. Designation

Kinds of Appointments under Civil Service Law

Contractual – issued to a person whose employment is in accordance with a special contract to

9. Regular – made when Congress is in session.

10. Process of Regular Presidential Appointment: (a) nomination

11. Process of Ad interim Presidential Appointment: (a) appointment

Public Officers: Disabilities, Inhibitions, Powers and Duties

De facto v. De jure officers

The Civil Service

Discretion of Appointing Authority; Role of CSC in appointments

Accountability of Public Officers

When Arias Doctrine not applicable

Three-fold Liability Rule

27. Principle of condonation, abandoned. In Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals,2 the Principle of

Abandonment of principle of condonation, prospective application

Cut off date for abandonment of Condonation Doctrine

Authority to Discipline Deputy Ombudsman

Authority to Discipline Special Prosecutor of the Ombudsman

Judicial Review of Ombudsman Decisions/Resolutions

Government instrumentality, regulatory agency, chartered institution, and GOCC

A Government owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) is an agency organized as a stock or non-

Quasi-legislative and Quasi-judicial functions of Administrative Agencies

• QJ requires notice and hearing, QL only requires publication as a general rule.

Doctrine of Subordinate Legislation

When hearing is required even in Quasi-legislative issuances

Enforceability and Validity of Administrative Issuances

1. The statute has declared the violation punishable;

Administrative Due Process

50. Exceptions to the requirement of Notice and Hearing; Reasons:

1. Summary Abatement of Nuisance per se (police power)

Subpoena and Contempt Powers of Administrative Agencies

Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions

53. Basic Rules on Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions:

1. Decisions may be based on “substantial evidence” only;

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Doctrine of Prior Exhaustion of Administrative

This doctrine, however, is disregarded in the following instances:

1) when there is a violation of due process;

4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;

61. The following shall be disqualified from registering:

c. Insane or incompetent persons declared as such by competent authority unless

Registration of illiterate and disabled persons

Jurisdiction in Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings

“Section 78 Petition” vs. “Section 68 Petition”

Scope of the Doctrine of Rejection of Second Placer

Effects of Filing of Certificate of Candidacy

70. Two Quinto vs. Comelec cases:

2010: THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN “ELECTIVE” AND “APPOINTIVE”

Void Certificate of Candidacy; Non-application of “Rejection of Second Placer Rule”

Duty of Comelec to cancel COC of disqualified candidate

Remedies against Disqualified Candidates

77. Two Penera vs. Comelec cases:

Jurisdiction of the COMELEC

Review of COMELEC Resolution

Jurisdiction of Electoral Tribunal

Failure of Elections v. Annulment of Election Results

The Commission on Elections, upon petition or motu proprio, may declare

(Marcos, Jr. v. Robredo, supra.)