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N Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 Huzaifahaider51 Gmailcom 20231005 214401 1 73
N Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 Huzaifahaider51 Gmailcom 20231005 214401 1 73
The
Negotiable Instruments Act, 18811
(Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881)
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY
2. Repeal of enactments
3. Interpretation clause
CHAPTER II
4. “Promissory note”
5. “Bill of exchange”
6. Cheque
7. “Drawer”, “Drawee”
8. “Holder”
14. Negotiation
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15. Indorsement
22. “Maturity”
CHAPTER III
27. Agency
39. Suretyship
CHAPTER IV
OF NEGOTIATION
46. Delivery
CHAPTER V
OF PRESENTMENT
CHAPTER VI
CHAPTER VII
CHAPTER VIII
OF NOTICE OF DISHONOUR
CHAPTER IX
99. Noting
100. Protest
CHAPTER X
OF REASONABLE TIME
CHAPTER XI
CHAPTER XII
OF COMPENSATION
CHAPTER XIII
CHAPTER XIV
OF CROSSED CHEQUES
CHAPTER XV
OF BILLS IN SETS
CHAPTER XVI
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
[CHAPTER XVII
SCHEDULE
———
the principles of English Law and where no special considerations arise with
reference to Indian circumstances the courts are justified in construing the statute
conformably to the provisions of English Law, K.T.V.R.T. Veerappa Chetty v.
Vellayan Ambalam, 1918 SCC OnLine Mad 182 : AIR 1919 Mad 179.
Chapter I
PRELIMINARY
1. Short title, local extent, saving of usages relating to hundis, etc.,
commencement.—This Act may be called the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881. It extends to 2 [the whole of India] 3 [* * *] but nothing
herein contained affects the 4 [Indian Paper Currency Act, 1871 (II of
1871)], Section 21, or affects any local usages relating to any
instrument in an oriental language : Provided that such usages may be
excluded by any words in the body of the instrument which indicate an
intention that the legal relations of the parties thereto shall be
governed by this Act, and it shall come into force on the first day of
March, 1882.
► Usages.—Relying on Goodwin v. Roberts, [1875] 10 Ex. 337, it was
observed that mercantile usage, however extensive, should not be allowed to
prevail if contrary to positive law. The saving clause in Section 1 saved only local
usage relating to instruments in oriental languages such as Hundis, and did not
save general usage like Section 1 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Dossabhai
Hirchand v. Virchand Dalchharam, 1918 SCC OnLine Bom 115 : AIR 1919 Bom
73.
If any local usage relating to bills and notes in an oriental language- the
operation of which usage is saved by Section 1, though such usage may be at
variance with the Act- be relied upon, such usage should be alleged and
established by the party relying upon it, Jambu Chetty v. Palaniappa Chettiar, ILR
(1903) 26 Mad 526.
NOTES ► The section clearly indicates that an instrument, even if it
be within the definition of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque
will, if written in an oriental language, be governed by usage, if any,
applicable to it and not by the provisions of the Act; but in the absence
of any such usage, such instrument (though in an oriental language)
would be governed by the provisions of the Act [11th Law Commission
Report, 1958].
2. Repeal of enactments.—5 [* * *]
3. Interpretation clause.—In this Act—
6 [* * *]
[Banker.—“Banker” includes any person acting as a banker and any
7
description only.
[6. Cheque.—A “cheque” is a bill of exchange drawn on a specified
9
exchange has been lost before it is over-due, the person who was the
holder of it may apply to the drawer to give him another bill of the
same tenor, giving security to the drawer, if required, to indemnify him
against all persons whatever in case the bill alleged to have been lost
shall be found again.
If the drawer on request as aforesaid refuses to give such duplicate
bill he may be compelled to do so.]
Chapter IV
OF NEGOTIATION
46. Delivery.—The making, acceptance or indorsement of a
promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque is completed by delivery,
actual or constructive.
As between parties standing in immediate relation delivery to be
effectual must be made by the party making, accepting or indorsing the
instrument, or by a person authorised by him in that behalf.
As between such parties and any holder of the instrument other than
a holder in due course, it may be shown that the instrument was
delivered conditionally or for special purpose only, and not for the
purpose of transferring absolutely the property therein.
A promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable to bearer is
negotiable by the delivery thereof.
A promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable to order is
negotiable by the holder by indorsement and delivery thereof.
► Escrow.—Under the English law a deed may be delivered conditionally to a
person other than the obligee but not to the obligee himself. A deed thus delivered
is called an escrow. But the ‘term’ escrow is also applied loosely to denote a bill
delivered conditionally.
Whether the instrument was taken as an absolute or a conditional payment is a
question of fact which would depend upon intention of the parties. When creditor
takes the instrument as an absolute payment of debt, he would be restricted to the
terms of the instrument only and cannot fall back on the original transaction, CITI
Bank N.A. v. Standard Chartered Bank, (2004) 1 SCC 12.
47. Negotiation by delivery.—Subject to the provisions of Section 58,
a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque payable to bearer is
negotiable by delivery thereof.
Exception.—A promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque delivered
on condition that it is not to take effect except in a certain event is not
negotiable (except in the hands of a holder for value without notice of
the condition) unless such event happens.
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Illustrations
(a) A, the holder of a negotiable instrument payable to bearer,
delivers it to B‘s agent to keep for B. The instrument has been
negotiated.
(b) A, the holder of a negotiable instrument payable to bearer, which
is in the hands of A‘s banker, who is at the time the banker of B,
directs the banker to transfer the instrument to B‘s credit in the
banker's account with B. The banker does so, and accordingly now
possesses the instrument as B‘s agent. The instrument has been
negotiated, and B has become the holder of it.
48. Negotiation by indorsement.—Subject to the provisions of
Section 58 a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque 25 [payable to
order], is negotiable by the holder by indorsement and delivery thereof.
49. Conversion of indorsement in blank into indorsement in full.—
The holder of negotiable instrument indorsed in blank may without
signing his own name, by writing above the indorser's signature a
direction to pay any other person as indorsee, convert the indorsement
in blank into an indorsement in full; and the holder does not thereby
incur the responsibility of an indorser.
50. Effect of indorsement.—The indorsement of a negotiable
instrument followed by delivery transfers to the indorsee the property
therein with right of further negotiation; but the indorsement may, by
express words, restrict or include such right, or may merely constitute
the indorsee an agent to indorse the instrument or to receive its
contents for the indorser, or for some other specified person.
Illustration
B signs the following indorsements on different negotiable
instrument payable to bearer:
(a) “Pay the contents to C only.”
(b) “Pay C for my use.”
(c) “Pay C or order for the account of B.”
(d) “The within must be credited to C.”
These indorsements exclude the right of further negotiation by C.
(e) “Pay C.”
(f) “Pay C value in account with the Oriental Bank.”
(g) “Pay the contents to C, being part of the consideration in a
certain deed of assignment executed by C to the indorser and
others.”.
These indorsements do not exclude the right of further negotiation
by C.
51. Who may negotiate.—Every sole maker, drawer, payee or
indorsee, or all of several joint makers, drawers, payees or indorsees, of
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not having been paid at maturity, the drawer sold the goods and
retained the proceeds, but indorsed the bill to A. A's title is subject to
the same objection as the drawer's title.
60. Instrument negotiable till payment or satisfaction.—A negotiable
instrument may be negotiated (except by the maker, drawee or
acceptor after maturity) until payment or satisfaction thereof by the
maker, drawee or acceptor at or after maturity, but not after such
payment or satisfaction.
Chapter V
OF PRESENTMENT
61. Presentment for acceptance.—A bill of exchange payable after
sight must, if no time or place is specified therein for presentment, be
presented to the drawee thereof for acceptance, if he can, after
reasonable search, be found, by a person entitled to demand
acceptance, within a reasonable time after it is drawn, and in business
hours on a business day. In default of such presentment, no party
thereto is liable thereon to the person making such default.
If the drawee cannot, after reasonable search, be found, the bill is
dishonoured.
If the bill is directed to the drawee at a particular place, it must be
presented at that place; and if at the due date for presentment he
cannot, after reasonable search, be found there, the bill is dishonoured.
[Where authorised by agreement or usage, a presentment through
26
he can be found.
72. Presentment of cheque to charge drawer.—31 [Subject to the
provisions of Section 84,] a cheque must, in order to charge the
drawer, be presented at the bank upon which it is drawn before the
relation between the drawer and his banker has been altered to the
prejudice of the drawer.
73. Presentment of cheque to charge any other person.—A cheque
must, in order to charge any person except the drawer, be presented
within a reasonable time after delivery by such person.
74. Presentment of instrument payable on demand.—Subject to the
provisions of Section 31, a negotiable instrument payable on demand
must be presented for payment within a reasonable time after it is
received by the holder.
75. Presentment by or to agent, representative of deceased assignee
of insolvent.—Presentment for acceptance or payment may be made to
the duly authorised agent of the drawee, maker or acceptor, as the case
may be, or, where the drawee, maker, or acceptor has died, to his legal
representative, or, where he has been declared an insolvent, to his
assignee.
[75-A. Excuse for delay in presentment for acceptance or payment.
32
cheque, even after the payment the banker who received the payment
shall be entitled to retain the truncated cheque.
(3) A certificate issued on the foot of the printout of the electronic
image of a truncated cheque by the banker who paid the instrument,
shall be prima facie proof of such payment.]
Chapter VII
OF DISCHARGE FROM LIABILITY, ON NOTES, BILLS AND CHEQUES
82. Discharge from liability.—The maker, acceptor or indorser
respectively of a negotiable instrument is discharged from liability
thereon—
(a) by cancellation, to a holder thereof who cancels such
acceptor's or indorser's name with intent to discharge him, and
to all parties claiming under such holder;
(b) by release, to a holder thereof who otherwise discharges such
maker, acceptor or indorser, and to all parties deriving title
under such holder after notice of such discharge;
(c) by payment, to all parties thereto, if the instrument is
payable to bearers, or has been indorsed in blank, and such
maker, acceptor or indorser makes payment in due course of
the amount due thereon.
► Promissory notes—Whether effects absolute discharge of debt.—
Depends upon intention of the parties to the contract.—It is always a question of
intention of the parties whether a negotiable instrument taken on account of a debt
operates as an absolute discharge of the debt or not. A bill or a promissory note
can never go in the discharge of a debt unless it is a part of a contract that it shall
be so. In the present case the execution of the promissory notes also cannot be
said to be in complete discharge of obligation to pay price and interest thereon
under the contract. The execution of those notes clearly intended to operate as
conditional payments. The various factors and circumstances and particularly, the
fact that these notes were as between the seller and the purchaser subject to
several conditions leading to variation and adjustment and replacement and the
default clause contained in each, clearly indicate that these were not intended to
constitute independent or separate contracts by themselves but that they were a
part and parcel of one integrated transaction embodied in the contract, Renusagar
Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., (1984) 4 SCC 679.
83. Discharge by allowing drawee more than forty-eight hours to
accept.—If the holder of a bill of exchange allows the drawee more than
39
[forty-eight] hours, exclusive of public holidays, to consider, whether
he will accept the same, all previous parties not consenting to such
allowance are thereby discharged from liability to such holder.
40
[84. When cheque not duly presented and drawer damaged
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order.—Where any draft, that is, an order to pay money, drawn by one
office of a bank upon another office of the same bank for a sum of
money payable to order on demand, purports to be endorsed by or on
behalf of payee, the bank is discharged by payment in due course.]
86. Parties not consenting discharged by qualified or limited
acceptance.—If the holder of a bill of exchange acquiesces in a qualified
acceptance, or one limited to part of the sum mentioned in the bill, or
which substitutes a different place or time for payment, or which where
the drawees are not partners, is not signed by all the drawees all
previous parties whose consent is not obtained to such acceptance are
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discharged as against the holder and those claiming under him, unless
on notice given by the holder they assent to such acceptance.
Explanation.—An acceptance is qualified—
(a) where it is conditional, declaring the payment to be dependent
on the happening of an event therein stated;
(b) where it undertakes the payment of part only of the sum
ordered to be paid;
(c) where no place of payment being specified on the order, it
undertakes the payment at a specified place and not otherwise
or elsewhere; or where, a place of payment being specified in
the order, it undertakes the payment at some other place and
not otherwise or elsewhere;
(d) where it undertakes the payment at a time other than that at
which under the order it would be legally due.
87. Effect of material alteration.—Any material alteration of
negotiable instrument renders the same void as against any one who is
a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not
consent thereto, unless it was made in order to carry out the common
intention of the original parties;
Alteration by indorsee, And any such alteration, if made by an
indorsee, discharges his indorser from all liability to him in respect of
the consideration thereof.
The provisions of this section are subject to those of Sections 20, 49,
86 and 125.
88. Acceptor or indorser bound notwithstanding previous alteration.
—An acceptor or indorser of a negotiable instrument is bound by his
acceptance or indorsement notwithstanding any previous alteration of
the instrument.
89. Payment of instrument on which alteration is not apparent.—44
[(1)] Where a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque has been
materially altered but does not appear to have been so altered,
or where a cheque is presented for payment which does not at the
time of presentation appear to be crossed or to have had a crossing
which has been obliterated,
payment thereof by a person or banker liable to pay, and paying the
sum according to the apparent tenor thereof at the time of payment
and otherwise in due course, shall discharge such person or banker
from all liability thereon; and such payment shall not be questioned by
reason of the instrument having been altered, or the cheque crossed.
[(2) Where the cheque is an electronic image of a truncated
45
may, if written, be sent by post; and may be in any form; but it must
inform the party to whom it is given either in express terms or by
reasonable intendment, that the instrument has been dishonoured, and
in what way, and that he will be held liable thereon; and it must be
given within a reasonable time after dishonour, at the place of business
or (in case such party has no place of business) at the residence of the
party for whom it is intended.
If the notice is duly directed and sent by post and miscarries, such
miscarriage does not render the notice invalid.
► Requirement of Notice.—The provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act
are really based on the principles of English Common Law relating to mercantile
instruments. The law has always been, both in England and in India, that there
must be dishonour and notice of dishonour to be given within reasonable time, in
order to sustain an action against the drawee or any other holder of the bill,
K.T.V.R.T. Veerappa Chetty v. Vellayan Ambalam, 1918 SCC OnLine Bom 115 :
AIR 1919 Bom 73.
► Validity of Notice of Demand.—Contended that under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, the holder of the cheque can issue notice and under
Section 93 of the Act, the notice cannot be issued by more than one person; that
the holder of the cheque as mentioned in Section 138 of the Act cannot be more
than one person and the notice issued on behalf of two distinct legal persons is
bad in law. It was held by the Calcutta High Court that this fact is to be considered
at the stage of trial and cannot constitute a ground for quashing of proceedings
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Pradeep Kumar
Malhotra v. State of West Bengal, 2011 SCC OnLine Cal 1700.
95. Party receiving must transmit notice of dishonour.—Any party
receiving notice of dishonour must, in order to render any prior party
liable to himself, give notice of dishonour to such party within a
reasonable time, unless such party otherwise receives due notice as
provided by Section 93.
96. Agent of presentment.—When the instrument is deposited with
an agent for presentment, the agent is entitled to the same time to
give notice to his principal as if he were the holder giving notice of
dishonour, and the principal is entitled to a further like period to give
notice of dishonour.
97. When party to whom notice given is dead.—When the party to
whom notice of dishonour is despatched is dead, but the party
despatching the notice is ignorant of his death, the notice is sufficient.
98. When notice of dishonour is unnecessary.—No notice of
dishonour is necessary—
(a) when it is dispensed with by the party entitled thereto;
(b) in order to charge the drawer, when he has countermanded
payment;
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(c) when the party charged could not suffer damage for want of
notice;
(d) when the party entitled to notice cannot after due search be
found; or the party bound to give notice is, for any other
reason, unable without any fault of his own to give it;
(e) to charge the drawers, when the acceptor is also a drawer;
(f) in the case of a promissory note which is not negotiable;
(g) when the party entitled to notice, knowing the facts, promise
unconditionally to pay the amount due on the instrument.
Chapter IX
OF NOTING AND PROTEST
99. Noting.—When a promissory note or bill of exchange has been
dishonoured by non-acceptance or non-payment, the holder may cause
such dishonour to be noted by a notary public upon the instrument, or
upon a paper attached thereto, or partly upon each.
Such note must be made within a reasonable time after dishonour,
and must specify the date of dishonour, the reason, if any, assigned for
such dishonour, or if the instrument has not been expressly
dishonoured, the reason why the holder treats it as dishonoured, and
the notary's charges.
100. Protest.—When a promissory note or bill of exchange has been
dishonoured by non-acceptance or non-payment, the holder may,
within a reasonable time, cause such dishonour to be noted and
certified by a notary public. Such certificate is called a protest.
Protest for better security.—When the acceptor of a bill of
exchange has become insolvent, or his credit has been publicly
impeached before the maturity of the bill, the holder may, within a
reasonable time, cause a notary public to demand better security of the
acceptor, and on its being refused may, within a reasonable time, cause
such facts to be noted and certified as aforesaid. Such certificate is
called a protest for better security.
101. Contents of protest.—A protest under Section 100 must
contain:
(a) either the instrument itself, or a literal transcript of the
instrument and of everything written or printed thereupon;
(b) the name of the person for whom and against whom the
instrument has been protested;
(c) a statement that payment or acceptance or better security, as
the case may be, has been demanded of such person by the
notary public; the terms of his answer, if any or a statement
that he gave no answer, or that he could not be found;
(d) when the note or bill has been dishonoured, the place and
time of dishonour, and, when better security has been refused,
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reach its destination on the day next after the day of dishonour.
107. Reasonable time for transmitting such notice.—A party
receiving notice of dishonour, who seeks to enforce his right against a
prior party, transmits the notice within a reasonable time if he
transmits it within the same time after its receipt as he would have had
to give notice if he had been the holder.
Chapter XI
OF ACCEPTANCE AND PAYMENT FOR HONOUR AND REFERENCE IN
CASE OF NEED
108. Acceptance for honour.—When a bill of exchange has been
noted or protested for non-acceptance or for better security, any person
not being a party already liable thereon may, with the consent of the
holder, by writing on the bill, accept the same for honour of any party
thereto.
48
[* * *]
109. How acceptance for honour must be made.—A person desiring
to accept for honour must, 49 [by writing on the bill under his hand,]
declare that he accepts under protest the protested bill for the honour
of the drawer or of a particular indorser whom he names, generally for
honour 50 [* * *].
110. Acceptance not specifying for whose honour it is made.—Where
the acceptance does not express for whose honour it is made it shall be
deemed to be made for the honour of the drawer.
111. Liability of acceptor for honour.—An acceptor for honour binds
himself to all parties subsequent to the party for whose honour he
accepts to pay the amount of the bill if the drawee do not; and such
party and all prior parties are liable in their respective capacities to
compensate the acceptor for honour for all loss or damages sustained
by him in consequence for such acceptance.
But an acceptor for honour is not liable to the holder of the bill
unless it is presented, or (in case the address given by such acceptor
on the bill is a place other than the place where the bill is made
payable) forwarded for presentment, not later than the day next after
the day of its maturity.
112. When acceptor for honour may be charged.—Any acceptor for
honour cannot be charged unless the bill has at its maturity been
presented to the drawee for payment and has been dishonoured by
him, and noted or protested for dishonour.
113. Payment for honour.—When a bill of exchange has been noted
or protested for non-payment, any person may pay the same for the
honour of any party liable to pay the same, provided that the person so
paying 51 [or his agent in that behalf] has previously declared before a
notary public the party for whose honour he pays, and that such
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exchange and does not affect the rule contained in Section 114 of the Evidence
Act, in cases not falling within Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
Official Receiver v. Abdul Shakoor, (1965) 1 SCR 254 : AIR 1965 SC 920.
► Value of Statutory Presumptions.—A statutory presumption has an
evidentiary value. The question as to whether the presumption stood rebutted or
not must, therefore, be determined keeping in view the other evidence on record.
In a case where chances of false implication cannot be ruled out, the background
fact and the conduct of parties together with their legal requirements are required
to be taken into consideration, Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde,
(2008) 4 SCC 54.
► Rebuttability of Presumptions.—The use of the phrase “until the contrary
is proved” in Section 118 of the Act and use of the words “unless the contrary is
proved” in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of “may presume” and
“shall presume” as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it clear that
presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable, Kumar
Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513.
Once execution of the promissory note is admitted, the presumption under
Section 118(a) would arise that it is supported by a consideration. Such a
presumption is rebuttable. The defendant can prove the non-existence of a
consideration by raising a probable defence. If the defendant is proved to have
discharged the initial onus of proof showing that the existence of consideration
was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the
plaintiff who will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to
prove would disentitle him to the grant of relief on the basis of the negotiable
instrument, Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal, (1999) 3
SCC 35.
In terms of Section 4 of the Evidence Act, whenever it is provided by the Act
that the court shall presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved unless and
until it is disproved. The words “proved” and “disproved” have been defined in
Section 3 of the Evidence Act. Applying the said definitions to the principle behind
Section 118(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the court shall presume a
negotiable instrument to be for consideration unless and until after considering the
matter before it, it either believes that the consideration does not exist or considers
the non-existence of consideration so probable that a prudent man ought, under
the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that the
consideration does not exist, M.S. Narayana Menon v. State of Kerala, (2006) 6
SCC 39.
It is not necessary for the defendant to disprove the existence of consideration
by way of direct evidence; the standard of proof is preponderance of probabilities.
Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn not only from the
materials on record but also by reference to the circumstances upon which he
relies, Reverend Mother Marykutty v. Reni C. Kottaram, (2013) 1 SCC 327.
► Drawing of presumption.—Principles summarized regarding drawing of
presumption under, and how said presumption can be rebutted. While prosecution
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must establish its case beyond reasonable doubt, accused to prove a defence
must only meet standard of preponderance of probabilities, Basalingappa v.
Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418.
► Presumption of consideration.—If presumption under Section 118 can be
raised in the facts and circumstances of the case, non-examination of witness to
pronote will have no effect, Kapil Kumar v. Raj Kumar, (2022) 10 SCC 281.
119. Presumption on proof of protest.—In a suit upon an instrument
which has been dishonoured, the court shall on proof of the protest,
presume the fact of dishonour, unless and until such fact is disproved.
120. Estoppel against denying original validity of instrument.—No
maker of a promissory note, and no drawer of a bill of exchange or
cheque, and no acceptor of a bill of exchange for the honour of the
drawer shall, in a suit thereon by a holder in due course, be permitted
to deny the validity of the instrument as originally made or drawn.
121. Estoppel against denying capacity of payee to indorse.—No
maker of a promissory note and no acceptor of a bill of exchange 54
[payable to order] shall, in a suit thereon by a holder in due course, be
permitted to deny the payee's capacity, at the date of the note or bill,
to indorse the same.
122. Estoppel against denying signature or capacity of prior party.—
No indorser of a negotiable instrument shall, in a suit thereon by a
subsequent holder, be permitted to deny the signature or capacity to
contract of any prior party to the instrument.
Chapter XIV
OF CROSSED CHEQUES
123. Cheque crossed generally.—Where a cheque bears across its
face an addition of the words “and company” or any abbreviation
thereof, between two parallel transverse lines, or of two parallel
transverse lines simply, either with or without the words, “not
negotiable”, the addition shall be deemed a crossing, and the cheque
shall be deemed to be crossed generally.
124. Cheque crossed specially.—Where a cheque bears across its
face an addition of the name of a banker, either with or without the
words “not negotiable”, that addition shall be deemed a crossing, and
the cheque shall be deemed to be crossed specially, and to be crossed
to that banker.
125. Crossing after issue.—Where a cheque is uncrossed, the holder
may cross it generally or specially.
Where a cheque is crossed generally, the holder may cross it
specially.
Where a cheque is crossed generally or specially, the holder may add
the words “not negotiable”.
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of the cheque but taking cognizance of the same by any court is forbidden so
long as the complainant does not have the cause of action to file a complaint in
terms of clause (c) of the proviso read with Section 142, Dashrath Rupsingh
Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129.
In declaring the law as above, the Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod Case, (2014) 9
SCC 129, overruled the law set forth by the Supreme Court previously, identifying
five ingredients of the offence under Section 138:
(1) drawing of the cheque;
(2) presentation of the cheque to the bank;
(3) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank;
(4) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment
of the cheque amount;
(5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of receipt of the
notice, K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, (1999) 7 SCC 510
and Shamshad Begum v. B. Mohammed, (2008) 13 SCC 77.
The decision of a three-judge bench, Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri
Pandey, (2014) 10 SCC 713, subsequent and coordinate to that of Dashrath
Rupsingh Rathod, (2014) 9 SCC 129, however, delivered a judgment that had the
effect of restoring K. Bhaskaran:
► Dishonour of cheque.—Once a cheque has been signed and issued in
favour of holder of cheque, there is statutory presumption under Section 139 of NI
Act that the cheque is issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
However, said presumption is a rebuttable one. Issuer of cheque can rebut that
presumption by adducing credible evidence that the cheque was issued for some
other purpose like security for loan, T.P. Murugan v. Bojan, (2018) 8 SCC 469.
► Mens Rea.—None of the provisions of the Penal Code, 1860 have been
rendered nugatory by Section 138 and both operate on their own. It is trite that
mens rea is the quintessential of every crime. The objective of Parliament was to
strengthen the use of cheques, distinct from other negotiable instruments, as
mercantile tender and therefore it became essential for the Section 138 offence to
be freed from the requirement of proving mens rea, Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v.
State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129.
► Presentation of Cheque.—For prosecuting a person for an offence under
Section 138, it is inevitable that the cheque is presented to the bank within a
period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its
validity, whichever is earlier. When a post-dated cheque is written or drawn, it is
only a bill of exchange and so long the same remains a bill of exchange, the
provisions of Section 138 are not applicable to the instrument. The post-dated
cheque becomes a cheque within the meaning of Section 138 on the date which it
is written thereon, Ashok Yeshwant Badave v. Surendra Madhavrao Nighojakar,
(2001) 3 SCC 726.
The crucial date for computing the period of limitation is the date of filing of the
complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance
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position and in the complaint itself having not been mentioned that the notice had
been served, the complaint itself is not maintainable, Shakti Travel & Tours v.
State of Bihar, (2002) 9 SCC 415.
The complaint under Section 138 of the Act, without signature, is maintainable
when such complaint is verified by the complainant and the process is issued by
the Magistrate after due verification, Indra Kumar Patodia v. Reliance Industries
Ltd., (2012) 13 SCC 1.
► Maintainability of complaint — Prerequisites.—When a company is
payee of cheque based on which a complaint is filed under Section 138 of the NI
Act, the complainant necessarily should be the company represented by an
authorised employee. For maintainability of complaint in such cases, prima facie
indication in complaint and sworn statement (either orally or by an affidavit) before
court to the effect that complainant company is represented by an authorised
person who has knowledge about transaction in question, would be sufficient.
Such averment and prima facie material is enough to take cognizance and issue
process. Issue as to whether aforesaid authorisation and knowledge about
transaction is proper, is a matter for trial, TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. v. SMS
Asia (P) Ltd., (2022) 7 SCC 612.
► Continuance of Criminal Proceedings.—There being no dispute that the
cheques had been given to Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(Overseas) Ltd. (BCCI) and the same on being dishonoured the criminal complaint
had been lodged by BCCI and the Magistrate had already taken cognizance of the
same. The successor [of the complainant company] SBICIB would be fully entitled
to pursue the criminal litigation, particularly in view of the terms of agreement
between BCCI and SBICIB, Bombay Offshore Services Ltd. v. Shankar Narayan,
(2000) 10 SCC 375.
► Nature of Punishment.—With respect to the offence of dishonour of
cheques, it is the compensatory aspect of remedy which should be given priority
over punitive aspect, Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H., (2010) 5 SCC
663.
► Quashing of Complaint.—The quashing of FIR or a complaint in exercise
of the inherent powers of the High Court should be limited to very extreme
exceptions, State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
Merely because an act has a civil profile is not sufficient to denude it of its
criminal outfit. [It is untenable that] the provision incorporated in the agreement for
referring the disputes to arbitration is an effective substitute for a criminal
prosecution when the disputed act is an offence. Arbitration is a remedy for
affording reliefs to the party affected by breach of the agreement but the arbitrator
cannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an offence albeit the same
act may be connected with the discharge of any function under the agreement.
Hence, those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe down the complaint
at the threshold itself, Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8
SCC 686.
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It was submitted that when the cheques were dishonoured, a separate liability
arose in terms of Section 138 of the Act, whereas the arbitration proceedings
were under the agreement signed between the parties; the commencement and
continuance of the arbitration proceedings could in no way affect the criminal
proceedings taken separately. It was held by the Court that there can be no bar to
the simultaneous continuance of a criminal proceeding and a civil proceeding if
the two arise from separate causes of action, Sri Krishna Agencies v. State of
Andhra Pradesh, (2009) 1 SCC 69.
► Liability Incurred by Drawer of Cheque.—The words ‘any cheque’ and
‘other liability’ occurring in Section 138 are the two key expressions which stand
as clarifying the legislative intent…These expressions leave no manner of doubt
that for whatever reason it may be, the liability under Section 138 cannot be
avoided in the event the cheque stands returned by the banker unpaid. Any contra
-interpretation would defeat the intent of the legislature, ICDS Ltd. v. Beena
Shabeer, (2002) 6 SCC 426.
If the cheque is given towards any liability or debt which might have been
incurred even by someone else, the person who is the drawer of the cheque can
be made liable under Section 138 of the Act, Anil Sachar v. Shree Nath Spinners
Private Limited, (2011) 13 SCC 148.
► Liability of Company to be Wound Up.—A company cannot escape from
penal liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on the premise
that a petition for winding up of the company has been presented and was
pending during the relevant time; the contention that the creditor would be disabled
from legally enforcing the debt with the commencement of winding-up proceedings
was rejected.
There is no provision in the Companies Act which prohibits enforcement of the
debt due from a company. When a company goes into liquidation, enforcement of
debt due from the company is only made subject to the conditions prescribed
therein; the debt does not become unenforceable altogether. The words “the
drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment” are ostensibly different from
saying “the drawer refuses to make payment”. Failure to make payment can be
for reasons beyond the control of the drawer, Pankaj Mehra v. State of
Maharashtra(2000) 2 SCC 756.
► Corporate Criminal Liability.—In response to the question as to whether a
company can be proceeded against when a mandatory imprisonment is
prescribed in law, the Court set forth (inter alia, on the basis of the principle of lex
non cogit ad impossibilia):
• As the company cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, the court has to
resort to punishment of imposition of fine which is also a prescribed punishment;
as the company cannot be sentenced to imprisonment, the court cannot impose
that punishment, but when imprisonment and fine is the prescribed punishment the
court can impose the punishment of fine which could be enforced against the
company.
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• Such a discretion is to be read into the section so far as the juristic person is
concerned. Of course, the Court cannot exercise the same discretion as regards
a natural person. Then the court would not be passing the sentence in accordance
with law, Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2005) 4 SCC
530.
There can be no quarrel against the proposition that a company can be
proceeded against in the criminal proceeding even where the imposition of
sentence is provided for. However, there is nothing to suggest that there cannot be
prosecution of the signatory alone in the absence of the company, Aneeta Hada
v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited, (2008) 13 SCC 703.
Even if the prosecution proceedings against the company were not taken or
could not be continued, it is no bar for proceeding against the other persons
falling within the purview of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 141 of the Act
[read with Section 138], Anil Hada v. Indian Acrylic Ltd., (2000) 1 SCC 1.
► Liability of Surety of Debtor.—The question posed is whether A can issue
a cheque in discharge of the liability of B, in spite of the fact that the liability of B
has been taken over by A. In the absence of any documents, the mere statement
that the cheque was issued by A on behalf of B will not be sufficient to give the
cause of action for a complaint under Section 138; even in the notice sent to
petitioner, it has not been mentioned that A [the drawer of the cheque] has taken
over the liability of B. “Any liability” occurred in the section is only to mean that
any kind of liability of the drawer; and not any others liability, unless the payee,
the drawer and the original debtor entered into any agreement to that effect. In
order to entertain a complaint, the Magistrate should have material before him to
the effect that there is tripartite agreement in the above nature. Sometime, a
surety of debtor will also issue a cheque. In that case also section 138 will attract
in the case of dishonour, Hiten Sagar v. IMC Ltd., (2001) 3 BOM LR 563 : 2001
Cri LJ 4311.
► Legal Fiction.—Section 138 creates a legal fiction. A legal fiction, though
required to be given full effect, has its own limitations. Legal fiction cannot be
taken recourse to for any purpose other than the one mentioned in the statute
itself. Parameters for invoking Section 138 are limited. Refusal on the part of the
bank to honour the cheque on the ground that the cheque has been reported as
lost would not bring the matter within the mischief of Section 138, Raj Kumar
Khurana v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 6 SCC 72.
► Guarantor's/Surety's Rights and Liabilities.—“Any debt or other liability”
under Section 138 NI Act need not be only of person who has directly/primarily
enjoyed benefit thereof like the principal debtor. Person who is secondarily liable,
such as surety or guarantor may also be convicted under Section 138 of NI Act if
the ingredients thereof are satisfied, Don Ayengia v. State of Assam, (2016) 3
SCC 1 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 673 : (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 1.
In case of dishonour of post-dated cheque described as ‘security’ towards
repayment of instalment of already disbursed loan amount, proceedings under
Section 138, held, maintainable, crucial point is whether cheque represents
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of Section 138 proviso (b) would stand complied with. Subsequent notice should
be treated only as reminder and would not affect validity of first notice. Provisions
should be so interpreted in consonance with object which legislation sought to
achieve that right of honest lender is not defeated, N. Parameswaran Unni v. G.
Kanna, (2017) 5 SCC 737 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 668 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 219.
►Scope of Demand notice.—It should contain only cheque amount and
mentioning any other amount higher than cheque amount is not permissible.
Where cheque amount and loan amount are the same, held, demand notice would
be valid even if the loan amount (equal to the cheque amount) is mentioned. It is
only in those cases where loan amount is higher than the cheque amount that
mentioning the loan amount would vitiate the demand notice, Vijay Gopala Lohar
v. Pandurang Ramchandra Ghorpade, (2020) 14 SCC 806.
►Rebuttal of presumption.—Proper stage for rebuttal of said presumption is
at stage of trial and rebuttal of presumption cannot be considered at stage of
taking cognizance when all ingredients for taking of cognizance of case under
Section 138 are satisfied, Shiv Kumar v. Ramavtar Agarwal, (2020) 12 SCC 500.
► Trial proceedings.—Offence under Section 138 primarily in nature of civil
wrong and proceedings primarily compensatory in nature. Summary procedure
should normally be followed except where exercise of power under second proviso
to Section 143 considered necessary. Court has jurisdiction under Section 357(3)
CrPC to award suitable compensation with default sentence under Section 64 IPC
with further powers of recovery under Section 431 CrPC. Court may close
proceedings if accused deposits amount as assessed by it having regard to
cheque amount, interest/costs, etc. within stipulated period. Compounding at initial
stage and even at later stage is acceptable. Certain proceedings can be
conducted online. Affidavit evidence can be received as evidence at all stages of
trial or proceedings, Meters and Instruments (P) Ltd. v. Kachan Mehta, (2018) 1
SCC 560.
► Necessary conditions for constituting offence under Section 138.—In
order to make out offence under Section 138 necessary conditions to be fulfilled
are (i) presentation of cheque to bank within six months from date on which it is
drawn or within period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (ii) demand being made
in writing by payee or holder of cheque in due course by issuance of notice in
writing to drawer of cheque within thirty days of receipt of information from bank
of return of cheques; and (iii) failure of drawer to make payment of amount of
money to payee or holder in due course within fifteen days of receipt of notice.
Only upon compliance with these conditions, offence under Section 138 can be
said to have been committed by person issuing cheque. Further held, commission
of offence by company is express condition precedent to attract vicarious liability
of others. When company can be prosecuted, then only persons mentioned in
other categories could be vicariously liable for offence subject to pleadings and
proof. While prosecuting Directors, company must be arraigned as accused,
Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy, (2019) 3 SCC 797.
► Maintainability of prosecution.—Prosecution based on second or
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successive default where drawee did not bring prosecution after first default and
issuance of statutory notice, is maintainable, Sicagen India Ltd. v. Mahindra
Vadineni, (2019) 4 SCC 271.
► Legally enforceable debt or liability.—Cheques issued in pursuance of
agreement to sell qualify as being towards legally enforceable debt or liability and
amenable for prosecution under Section 138 in case of dishonour. Though
agreement to sell does not create interest in immovable property, however it
constitutes enforceable contract between parties. Any payment made in
pursuance of such agreement is duly enforceable debt or liability for purpose of
Section 138, Ripudaman Singh v. Balkrishna, (2019) 4 SCC 767.
► Filing and proof of statutory notice.—Service of statutory notice calling
upon drawer of cheque (after it has been dishonoured) to pay amount of cheque
is a necessary precondition for filing of complaint under Section 138. It was
incumbent upon respondent to produce such statutory notice on record to prove
same as well, H.N. Jagadeesh v. R. Rajeshwari, (2019) 16 SCC 730.
► Expeditious disposal of cheque dishonour cases.—The need for
comprehensive mechanism for expeditious disposal of cheque dishonour cases,
emphasized. Setting up mechanism for online disposal of cheque dishonour
cases, directed. Steps to be taken for securing presence of accused,
enumerated. Duty of banks to provide email ID and other details of accused for
speedy disposal of cases, emphasized. Legal Services Authority directed to
develop mechanism for pre-litigation stage settlements, Makwana Mangaldas
Tulsidas v. State of Gujarat, (2020) 4 SCC 695.
► Section 138 vis-à-vis offences under IPC.—Gravity of complaint under
Section 138 of the NI Act cannot be equated with offences under Penal Code,
1860, Triyambak S. Hegde v. Sripad, (2022) 1 SCC 742.
► Quashment of proceedings against corporate debtor.—Sections
138/141 of the NI Act proceeding against corporate debtor is covered by Section
14 (1)(a) IBC. Hence, corporate debtor cannot be proceeded against under
Section 138 of the NI Act, Nag Leathers (P) Ltd. v. Dynamic Mktg. Partnership,
(2022) 2 SCC 271.
► Complaint on behalf of company — Manner and form in which to be
filed.—Complaint filed by Managing Director on behalf of Company, held, cannot
be dismissed only on ground that name of Managing Director is mentioned first
followed by post held in company. There could be a format where Company's
name is described first, suing through Managing Director but merely because
name of Managing Director is stated first followed by post held in Company, held,
would not amount to a fundamental defect warranting dismissal of the complaint at
the threshold, Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasia, (2022) 2 SCC
355.
► Effect of part-payment of debt prior to presentation of cheque for
encashment.—For attracting Section 138, as per proviso (b) a demand notice
needs to be made by the drawee of the cheque and an omnibus demand notice
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without specifying as to what was the amount due under the dishonoured cheque
would not subserve the requirement of law. Further, when a part-payment of the
debt is made after the cheque was drawn but before the cheque is encashed,
such payment, held, must be endorsed on the cheque under Section 56 and the
cheque cannot be presented for encashment without recording the part-payment.
Therefore, if the unendorsed cheque is dishonoured on presentation, the offence
under Section 138 would not be attracted since the cheque does not represent a
legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment, Dashrathbhai Trikambhai
Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel, (2023) 1 SCC 578.
► Post-dated cheques and cheque issued for purpose of security
against a loan.—Principles explained regarding difference in manner of
treatment between post-dated cheques and cheque issued for purpose of security
against a loan, Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel,
(2023) 1 SCC 578.
► Phrase “debt or other liability” — Meaning and scope.—This phrase
takes within its meaning a “sum of money promised to be paid on a future day by
reason of a present obligation”. Further, a post-dated cheque issued after the debt
was incurred, held, would be covered within the meaning of “debt” and, thus,
Section 138 would also include cases where the debt is incurred after the cheque
is drawn but before it is presented for encashment, Dashrathbhai Trikambhai
Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel, (2023) 1 SCC 578.
► Dishonour of Post-dated cheques.—Relevant date for determination of
whether the cheque in question represents legally enforceable debt is at the time
of maturity or encashment. If there has been a material change in the
circumstance such that the sum in the cheque does not represent a legally
enforceable debt at the time of maturity or encashment, then the offence under
Section 138 is not made out, Dashrathbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh
Mahendrabhai Patel, (2023) 1 SCC 578.
CIRCULAR
RBI/2011-12/251
DBOD.AML BC.NO.47/14.01.001/2011-12
November 4, 2011
The Chairmen/Chief Executive Officers
All Scheduled Commercial Banks (excluding RRBs)/Local Area Banks
Dear Sir,
Payment of Cheques/Drafts/Pay Orders/Banker's Cheques
In India, it has been the usual practice among bankers to make
payment of only such cheques and drafts as are presented for payment
within a period of six months from the date of the instrument.
2. It has been brought to the notice of Reserve Bank by Government
of India that some persons are taking undue advantage of the said
practice of banks of making payment of cheques/drafts/pay
orders/banker's cheques presented within a period of six months from
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by client may not debar client from contesting liability to pay fees claimed by
advocate. If liability is disputed, advocate has to independently prove contract. A
contingent fee claim cannot be the basis for a complaint by an advocate under
Section 138, NI Act. In any case contingent fee claim is a professional
misconduct and against public policy, B. Sunitha v. State of Telangana, (2018) 1
SCC 638.
► Rebuttable presumption — Probable defence.—Accused can rebut the
presumption by establishing probable defence that no consideration was received
from complainant, Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant, (2022) 6 SCC 735.
► Burden of rebuttal of presumption.—The presumption mandated by
Section 139 does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or
liability. Bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, is
not enough to rebut the presumption. To rebut the statutory presumptions an
accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is
expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. Rather, something which is
probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the
complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record
such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the court may either
believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so
probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon
the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that
the consideration did not exist, or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the
accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so
relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on to the
complainant. Accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance,
those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions
arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act, Uttam Ram v. Devinder Singh
Hudan, (2019) 10 SCC 287.
► Burden of proof.—Once cheque is issued by drawer, a presumption under
Section 139 arises in favour of holder. Section 139 creates a statutory
presumption that cheque received of the nature referred to under Section 138 is
for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or other liability. Initial burden lies
upon complainant to prove the circumstances under which cheque was issued in
his favour and that same was issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt. It
is for accused to adduce evidence of such facts and circumstances to rebut the
presumption that such debt does not exist or that the cheques are not supported
by consideration, Shree Daneshwari Traders v. Sanjay Jain, (2019) 16 SCC 83.
►Legally enforceable debt.—Presumption in case of voluntarily signed blank
cheque leaf as to legally enforceable debt, held, available against the accused
even in case when he voluntarily signed and handed over a blank cheque leaf
towards some payment, Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC
283.
140. Defence which may not be allowed in any prosecution under
Section 138.—It shall not be a defence in a prosecution for an offence
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under Section 138 that the drawer had no reason to believe when he
issued the cheque that the cheque may be dishonoured on presentment
for the reasons stated in that section.
141. Offences by companies.—(1) If the person committing an
offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time
the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to
the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as
the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be
liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any
person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was
committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due
diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.
[Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of
70
within its fold, Sham Sunder v. State of Haryana, (1989) 4 SCC 630.
The laudable object of preventing bouncing of cheques and sustaining the
credibility of commercial transactions resulting in enactments of Sections 138 and
141 has to be borne in mind. These provisions create a statutory presumption of
dishonesty, exposing a person to criminal liability if payment is not made within the
statutory period even after issue of notice, Monaben Ketanbhai Shah v. State of
Gujarat, (2004) 7 SCC 15.
► Person in charge of the business of company.—The words refer to a
person who is in overall control of the day-to-day business of the company. A
person may be a Director and thus may belong to the group of persons making
the policy followed by the company, but yet may not be in charge of the business
of the company; that a person may be a manager who is in charge of the
business but may not be in overall charge of the business; and that a person may
be an officer who may be in charge of only some part of the business, K.K. Ahuja
v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48.
Section 291 of the Companies Act, 1956 [corresponding to Section 179 of the
Companies Act, 2013] provides that subject to the provisions of that Act, the Board
of Directors of a company shall be entitled to exercise all such powers, and to do
all such acts and things, as the company is authorised to exercise and do. A
company, though a legal entity, can act only through its Board of Directors. The
settled position is that a Managing Director is prima facie in charge of and
responsible for the company's business and affairs and can be prosecuted for
offences by the company. But insofar as other Directors are concerned, they can
be prosecuted only if they were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of
the company's business, K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48.
► Company.—For the purpose of Section 141, a firm comes within the ambit
of a company, Monaben Ketanbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 7 SCC 15.
► Offence by Company/Samiti.—When cheque has been issued on behalf
of Company/Samiti, impleadment, as accused, of company/samiti in trial,
mandatory, applying Aneeta Hada, (2012) 5 SCC 661. Aforesaid decision may be
prospective, but that will be applicable to all pending cases including trial, appeal
or revision or SLP/appeal pending before Supreme Court, Ajit Balse v. Ranga
Karkere, (2015) 15 SCC 748 : (2016) 3 SCC (Cri) 379 : (2016) 3 SCC (Civ) 465.
To fasten vicarious liability under Section 141 on a person, law is well settled
by Supreme Court, that complainant should specifically show as to how and in
what manner accused was responsible. Simply because a person is a Director of
defaulter Company, does not make him liable under the Act. Only the person who
was at the helm of affairs of the Company and in charge of and responsible for
conduct of business at the time of commission of an offence, will be liable for
criminal action. Hence, for making a Director of a Company liable for offences
committed by Company under Section 141, there must be specific averments
against Director showing as to how and in what manner the Director was
responsible for conduct of business of Company, Ashoke Mal Bafna v. Upper
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India Steel Manufacturing & Engineering Co. Ltd., (2018) 14 SCC 202.
► Nature of Liability.—Liability arises on account of conduct, act or
omission on part of a person and not merely on account of holding an office or a
position in a company. Therefore in order to bring a case within Section 141 of
the Act, the complaint must disclose the necessary facts which make a person
liable. Vicarious Liability has been fastened on those who are in charge of and
responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, Monaben Ketanbhai
Shah v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 7 SCC 15.
It was held by the court that the liability of a Director of a company (as also
“every person”, as contemplated in Section 141) is a vicarious one in terms of
Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, Dilip S. Dhanukar v. Kotak
Mahindra Co. Ltd., (2007) 6 SCC 528.
Vicarious liability on part of the person must be pleaded and proved and not
inferred, National Small Industries Corp. Ltd. v. Harmeet Singh Paintal, 2010 (4)
Mh.L.J. (SC) 269 : 2010 (2) Mh.L.J. (Cri) (SC) 627 : 2010 ALL MR (Cri) 921
(SC).
Section 141 postulates constructive liability of the Directors of the Company or
other persons responsible for its conduct or the business of the company, N.K.
Wahi v. Shekhar Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 481 and Saroj Kumar Poddar v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2007) 3 SCC 693.
► Constructive vicarious liability.—Merely a person acting as Director does
not make him responsible for cheque issued on behalf of company. Director must
be in charge and responsible for conduct of business of company and there has
to be specific averment in complaint that person accused was in charge of
conduct of business of company at the time of commission of offence, T.N. News
Print & Papers Ltd. v. D. Karunakar, (2016) 6 SCC 78 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 519 :
(2016) 3 SCC (Civ) 78.
► Vicarious liability of person(s) in charge.—It is necessary to specifically
aver in complaint under Section 141, that at the time offence was committed,
person accused was in charge of, and responsible for conduct of business of
company. Such averment is essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be
made in complaint. Without such averment, requirements of Section 141 cannot
be said to be satisfied. Liability depends on role one plays in affairs of company
and not on his designation or status. Further, there cannot be any vicarious
liability unless there is prosecution against company, Standard Chartered Bank v.
State of Maharashtra, (2016) 6 SCC 62 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 505 : (2016) 3 SCC
(Civ) 62.
► Corporate criminal liability.—Penal Code, 1860 does not provide for
vicarious liability for any offence alleged to be committed by a company. If and
when a statute contemplates creation of such a legal fiction, it provides specifically
therefor e.g Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, HDFC Securities Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra, (2017) 1 SCC 640 : (2017) 1 SCC (Cri) 485.
► Legal Fiction.—The liability of a Director must be determined on the date
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on which the offence is committed. There may be a large number of Directors but
some of them may not associate themselves in the management of the day-to-day
affairs of the company and thus, are not responsible for the conduct of the
business of the company. The averments must state the person who is vicariously
liable for the commission of the offence and was both in charge of and
responsible for the conduct of the business of the company. Requirements laid
down thereunder must be read conjointly and not disjunctively. When a legal
fiction is raised, the ingredients therefor must be satisfied, S.M.S.
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2007) 4 SCC 70.
► Liability of Directors.—Proceedings against non-executive independent
Directors of accused Company, when maintainable, principles clarified.
Conditions required to be satisfied to rope in such non-signatory Directors i.e.
Directors other than a Managing or Joint Managing Director, namely : (i)
involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the company or in the running of its
business, and (ii) specific averments in the pleadings to substantiate such
contention. Mere statement that all Directors of an accused Company are in
charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company, without
anything more, is not sufficient, Sunita Palita v. Panchami Stone Quarry, (2022)
10 SCC 152.
142. Cognizance of offences.—71 [(1)] Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),—
(a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under
Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the
payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the
cheque;
(b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on
which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso
to Section 138:
72[Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by
the court after the prescribed period, if the complainant
satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making a
complaint within such period.]
(c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a
Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence
punishable under Section 138.
[(2) The offence under Section 138 shall be inquired into and tried
73
234 and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani, (2005) 2 SCC 217 and ruling of law herein
reconciles view taken in both cases. In M.M.T.C. Ltd. case, view taken was that if
complaint is filed for and on behalf of payee or holder in due course, that is good
enough compliance with Section 142, NI Act and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani case,
(2005) 2 SCC 217, concluded that a complaint by a power-of-attorney holder on
behalf of the original plaintiff is maintainable provided he has personal knowledge
of the transaction in question. Clarified however, power-of-attorney holder cannot
file a complaint in his own name as if he was the complainant. Power-of-attorney
holder can only initiate criminal proceedings on behalf of the principal, A.C.
Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC 790 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ)
343.
[142-A.
74 Validation for transfer of pending cases.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any judgment, decree, order or direction of any
court, all cases transferred to the court having jurisdiction under sub-
section (2) of Section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, shall be deemed to have been
transferred under this Act, as if that sub-section had been in force at all
material times.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of Section
142 or sub-section (1), where the payee or the holder in due course, as
the case may be, has filed a complaint against the drawer of a cheque
in the court having jurisdiction under sub-section (2) of Section 142 or
the case has been transferred to that court under sub-section (1) and
such complaint is pending in that court, all subsequent complaints
arising out of Section 138 against the same drawer shall be filed before
the same court irrespective of whether those cheques were delivered for
collection or presented for payment within the territorial jurisdiction of
that court.
(3) If, on the date of the commencement of the Negotiable
Instruments (Amendment) Act, 2015, more than one prosecution filed
by the same payee or holder in due course, as the case may be, against
the same drawer of cheques is pending before different courts, upon
the said fact having been brought to the notice of the court, such court
shall transfer the case to the court having jurisdiction under sub-
section (2) of Section 142, as amended by the Negotiable Instruments
(Amendment) Ordinance, 2015, before which the first case was filed
and is pending, as if that sub-section had been in force at all material
times.]
[143. Power of court to try cases summarily.—(1) Notwithstanding
75
Provided that if the appellant is acquitted, the Court shall direct the
complainant to repay to the appellant the amount so released, with
interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India,
prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty
days from the date of the order, or within such further period not
exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient
cause being shown by the complainant.]
► Applicability of Section 148 (as amended by Act 20 of 2018 w.e.f 1-9-
2018).—Even in such appeals which were preferred after 1-9-2018 even if
original complaint is filed prior to its amendment, power under Section 148 can be
exercised on application of original complainant or while suspending sentence on
application of accused. Use of word “may” in Section 148 has to be read as
“shall” and appellate courts must ordinarily order deposit of minimum 20% of
compensation or fine amount imposed by trial court, Surinder Singh Deswal v.
Virender Gandhi, (2019) 11 SCC 341.
SCHEDULE
Enactments Repealed
82
[* * *]
———
1. For the S.O.R. see Gaz. of India, 1876, p. 1836, for the Reports of the Select Committee,
see ibid., 1877, Pt. V, p. 321; 1878, Pt. V, p. 145; 1879, Pt. V, p. 75; 1881, Pt. V, p. 85; for
discussions in the Council, see ibid., 1876, Supplement, p. 1081; and ibid., 1881, Supplement,
p. 1409.
2.
Subs. for “all the Provinces of India” by the A.O. 1950.
3. The words “except the State of Jammu and Kashmir” were omitted by the Jammu and
Kashmir (Extension of Law) Act, 1956.
4. See now the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (11 of 1934).
6. Definition of the word “India”, which was subs. by Act 3 of 1951 for the definition of the
word “State”, omitted by Act 62 of 1956, S. 2 and Sch. Prior to omission it read as:
‘India.—“India” means the territory of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir.’
10. Subs. by Act 26 of 2015, S. 2(i) (w.r.e.f. 15-6-2015). Prior to substitution it read as:
‘(a) “a cheque in the electronic form” means a cheque which contains the exact mirror
image of a paper cheque, and is generated, written and signed in a secure system
ensuring the minimum safety standards with the use of digital signature (with or without
biometrics signature) and asymmetric crypto system;’
12. Subs. by Act 2 of 1885, S. 2 (w.e.f. 30-1-1885). Prior to substitution it read as:
“When acceptance is refused and the bill is protested for non-acceptance”
13. Subs. by Act 8 of 1919, S. 2 for “payable to, or to the order of, a payee”.
15.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1957, S. 3 and Sch. 11, for “a State”.
17.
Ins. by Act 5 of 1914, S. 2.
18. Renumbered as sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) was ins. by S. 3 of Act 5 of 1914.
21. The words “New Year's Day, Christmas Day, if either of such days falls on a Sunday, the
next following Monday” were omitted by S. 3 of Act 37 of 1955.
22.
Subs. by the A.O. 1937, for “Local Government”.
23. By Govt. of India Noti. No. 20/25-56-Pub-1, dated June 8, 1957 the power is exercisable
by the State Government.
25.
Subs. by Act 8 of 1919, S. 4, for “payable to the order of a specified person or to
specified person or order”.
26.
Ins. by Act 2 of 1885, S. 4 (w.e.f. 30-1-1885).
28.
Section 64 re-numbered as sub-section (1) by Act 55 of 2002, S. 3 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
30.
Ins. by Act 55 of 2002, S. 3 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
34. This section was inserted by S. 2 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Indian Limitation
Act (Temporary Amendment) Ordinance No. 31 of 1947, promulgated under S. 42 of the Govt.
of India Act, 1935. Omitted by Repealing and Amending Act, 1957 (36 of 1957). Prior to
omission it read as:
“75-B. Presentment of negotiable instruments in riot areas unnecessary.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in
force no, presentment for acceptance or payment of a negotiable instrument shall be
necessary, and the instrument shall be deemed to be dishonoured at the due date for
presentment if it is not possible for the holder thereof, being a bank, to present the
instrument for acceptance or payment on account of the prevalence of riot or other
disturbances in the area in which such payment is to be made.
(2) Every bank which treats any negotiable instrument as dishonoured under sub-
section (1) shall send to the Reserve Bank of India a return signed by two responsible
officers of the bank in such form and manner as may be prescribed by the Reserve Bank
of India.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this section a bank shall include a company or
corporation incorporated by or under any law in force in any place in or outside the
Provinces of India, which transacts the business of banking in any of the Provinces of
India.”
35. Subs. by Act 30 of 1926, S. 2, for “except in cases provided for by the Code of Civil
Procedure, S. 522”.
36.
Subs. for “six per centum” by Act 66 of 1988, S. 2 (w.e.f. 30-12-1988).
37.
Section 81 renumbered as sub-section (1) by Act 55 of 2002, S. 4 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
39.
Subs. by Act 12 of 1921, S. 21, for “twenty-four”.
42.
Ins. by Act 17 of 1934, S. 2.
44.
Section 89 renumbered as sub-section (1) by Act 55 of 2002, S. 5 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
45.
Ins. by the Act 55 of 2002, S. 5 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
48.
Last portion was omitted by Act 2 of 1885, S. 7 (w.e.f. 30-1-1885). Prior to omission it
read as:
“Unless the person who intends to accept supra protest first declares, in the presence
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of a notary, that he does it for honour, and has such declaration duly recorded in the
notarial register at the time, his acceptance shall be a nullity.”
49. Subs. for “in the presence of a notary public subscribes the bill with his own hand and” by
Act 2 of 1885, S. 8(a) (w.e.f. 30-1-1885).
50.
The words “and such declaration must be recorded by the notary in his register” omitted
by Act 2 of 1885, S. 88(b) (w.e.f. 30-1-1885).
52. The words, figures and brackets “(except in cases provided for by the Code of Civil
Procedure, S. 532)” were omitted by Act 30 1926, S. 3 (w.e.f. 3-9-1926).
53.
Subs. for “six per centum” by Act 66 of 1988, S. 3 (w.e.f. 30-12-1988).
54.
Subs. for “payable to, or to the order of, a specified person” by Act 8 of 1919, S. 5 (w.e.f.
19-3-1919).
56.
Explanation renumbered as Explanation I by Act 55 of 2002, S. 6 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
59.
Subs. for “the States” by Act 3 of 1951 (w.e.f. 1-4-1951).
60.
Subs. for “the States” by Act 3 of 1951 (w.e.f. 1-4-1951).
61.
Subs. for “the States” by Act 3 of 1951 (w.e.f. 1-4-1951).
62.
Subs. for “out of British India” by the A.O. 1948; the A.O. 1950 and Part B States (Laws)
Act, 1951 (3 of 1951) (w.e.f. 1-4-1951).
63. Subs. for “law of British India” by the A.O. 1948; the A.O. 1950 and Part B States (Laws)
Act, 1951 (3 of 1951) (w.e.f. 1-4-1951).
64. Subs. for “in British India” by the A.O. 1948; the A.O. 1950 and Part B States (Laws) Act,
1951 (3 of 1951) (w.e.f. 1-4-1951).
65.
The words “or the State of Jammu and Kashmir” omitted by Act 62 of 1956, S. 2 and Sch.
66. Subs. for “British India” by the A.O. 1948; the A.O. 1950 and Part B States (Laws) Act,
1951 (3 of 1951) (w.e.f. 1-4-1951).
67. Chapter XVII covering Ss. 138 to 142 ins. by Act 66 of 1988, S. 4 (w.e.f. 1-4-1989 vide
S.O. 240(E), dt. 29-3-1989). Earlier Chap. XVII relating to ‘Notaries Public’ omitted by Act 53
of 1952 (w.e.f. 14-2-1956).
68.
Subs. for “one” by Act 55 of 2002, S. 7 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
* Ed. : The period of “six months” mentioned in S. 138 proviso (a) remains unchanged as
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there has been no amendment in this regard. However, RBI vide Circular RBI/2011-12/251
DBOD AML BC No. 47/14.01.001/2011-12, dated 4-11-2011, in exercise of the power under S.
35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 has changed the default period within which a
cheque may be presented for payment, from a period of six months from the date of the
instrument, to a period of only three months from such date, w.e.f. 1-4-2012. The operative
part of the said Circular reads:
“Accordingly, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 35-A of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949, Reserve Bank hereby directs that w.e.f. April 1, 2012, banks should
not make payment of cheques/drafts/pay orders/banker's cheques bearing that date or
any subsequent date, if they are presented beyond the period of three months from the
date of such instrument.”
The result is that the impact of the above RBI Circular is covered by the latter part of
proviso (a), namely, “or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;”.
69. Subs. for “within fifteen days” by Act 55 of 2002, S. 7 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
71.
Renumbered by Act 26 of 2015, S. 3 (w.r.e.f. 15-6-2015).
72.
Ins. by Act 55 of 2002, S. 9 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
74.
Ins. by Act 26 of 2015, S. 4 (w.r.e.f. 15-6-2015).
77.
Ins. by Act 55 of 2002, S. 10 (w.e.f. 6-2-2003).
82.
Omitted by the Amending Act, 1891 (XII of 1891). Prior to omission it read as:
“SCHEDULE
(a) Statutes
9 Wm. III, c. 17 An Act for the better payment of Inland Bills The whole
of Exchange.
3 & 4 Anne, c. 8 An Act for giving like remedy upon promissory The whole
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XV of 1874 The Laws Local Extent Act, 1874 The first schedule, so
far as relates to Act VI
of 1840, and Act V of
1866, Sections 11, 12
and 13.”
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