Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

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Energy Reports
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/egyr

Research paper

Risk assessment of Floating Offshore Wind Turbine

∗
Gabriela Grasu, Pengfei Liu
School of Engineering, Newcastle University, Newcastle upon Tyne, UK

article info a b s t r a c t

Article history: Floating Offshore Wind has the potential to provide an effective solution for the increasing energy
Received 17 March 2022 demand of coastal communities around the world if the specific risks associated with this novel
Received in revised form 9 November 2022 technology are understood and evaluated. In this paper an enhanced risk matrix methodology was
Accepted 17 November 2022
developed for the risk assessment of a generic FOWT through the introduction of a third risk
Available online xxxx
parameter namely the ‘technology category’. The final risk score is calculated using the average value
Keywords: of all contributing parameters: consequence, likelihood and ‘technology category’ for the avoidance
Renewable energy of identical risk values. Individual data collection will eliminate the biases associated with the
Floating Offshore Wind Turbine conventional risk assessment process. The critical failure causes/hazards and failure modes, ranked
Risk assessment based on the obtained risk scores, indicate the Floater Unit as the most hazardous of the supporting
Offshore wind structures
sub-structures with corrosion as its dominant failure cause. The proposed methodology validation is
Technology category
ascertained through the comparison of obtained results with two similar studies. Its flexibility of use
and implementation, combined with its familiar background, facilitate the application of the proposed
method for a technological risk assessment of any young sector.
© 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Introduction 2017 WindEurope organisation within its statement (Wind Eu-

The Floating Offshore Wind Turbine (FOWT) sector is expected
to be part of future sustainable sources of energy if sufficient
commercial wind farms will be deployed. The DNV-GL estima-
tion indicates a total contribution of 250 GW toward the total
world electricity generation by 2050 (DNV GL, 2020). Several
FOWT markets are already existing worldwide featuring com-
mon characteristics such as deep sea and high wind potential.
Their location is in the proximity of highly populated coastal
areas with advanced technological and economic levels. The dif-
ferences between these markets are primarily in the form of
legislation, government support, supply chain maturity, existing
infrastructure and culture.
The FOWT market covers more than one hundred floating
structure concepts together with solutions for their stability and
station keeping. However, amongst all of them, the most common
concepts, for which Class Societies have developed Guidelines
and Standards are the semi-submersible, spar buoy, tension leg
platform and barge (ABS, 2020; Bureau Veritas, 2019; DNV GL,
2018a; Wind Europe, 2017). The strongpoint of these concepts
originates from the Oil and Gas (O&G) industry expertise with
more than 50 years of record of their structural behaviour. In
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: G.Grasu2@newcastle.ac.uk (G. Grasu),
pengfei.liu@newcastle.ac.uk (P. Liu).
rope, 2017) presented the expected commissioning dates for the
most advanced European FOWT projects at that time. The Table 1
compares the initial estimation with their status in March 2021.
It is noticeable that almost 50% of the initial projects have
been cancelled and only one project was delivered on time. One
of the major factors is the technical complexity of maintaining
asset integrity. Projects in the UK, including any renewable en-
ergy structure construction, are required by law to undertake
a risk assessment for the health and safety of the personnel,
environment and asset for the identification of critical systems
and components of which failure could have a negative impact
on all project phases.
The main function of FOWT is to safely produce sustainable
energy at a competitive cost. However, each system composing
a FOWT plant will present its own set of specific hazards and
associated risk scores, having a distinct impact on the FOWT over-
all performance. As an example, wind turbine blade failure will
trigger extremely high consequences, especially when occurring
during operation. Based on the daily renewable energy newslet-
ters, the most frequent blade failure modes are a blade becoming
loose due to bonding failure of the blade root inserts, blade
separated from the hub, blade breaking or destroyed and blade
loss due to the blade internal structural member failure known
as shear web (reNEWS.BIZ, 2018a, 2020b,c, 2021). Blade parts or
an entire blade could affect the plant systems and/or the sup-
porting sub-structures causing minor or major damage to their
function. The same source is also indicating major equipment

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egyr.2022.11.147
2352-4847/© 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
G. Grasu and P. Liu
Table 1
European FOWT projects overview.
Project name Capacity Country Expected
commissioning date
Dounreay Tri 2 × 5 MW Scotland 2018
Gaelectic 30 MW Ireland 2021
Hywind Scotland 30 MW Scotland 2017
WindFloat Atlantic 30 MW Portugal 2018–2019
Kincardine 48 MW Scotland From 2018
French pre-commercial farms 4 × 25 MW France 2020
Antlantis/Ideol project 100 MW UK 2021
failure modes such as nacelle fire and RNA collapse (reNEWS.BIZ,
2015, 2018b). Failures of the FOWT, such as extreme heeling
of the Floater Unit (Foster, 2016), have been recorded during
the transportation phase. Cases of capsizing and sinking of the
prototypes occurred due to improper installation maneuvers or
extreme weather conditions (north american Windpower, 2011;
offshore.WIND.biz, 2014; reNEWS.BIZ, 2020a).
This research is proposing an improved qualitative risk as-
sessment built on the foundation laid by IEA’s Lifes50+ program,
which will contain an additional risk parameter accounting for
the novel elements which characterise the floating offshore mar-
ket at this moment in time. The introduction of the technology
category as the specific risk parameter for this market has been
decided following the consultation of DNV GL’s recommended
practice (Det Norske Veritas As, 2013). In addition, data collection
will be performed individually from the participating experts and
a plain average value of each defined parameter will be used
rather than a commonly agreed figure.
2. Methodology
Risk assessment could be performed qualitatively or quanti-
tatively. The technique type selection is driven by the data or
industry experts’ availability which is recognised by Kang et al.
(2017) within their FOWT analysis. Within the offshore industry,
the most common technique is of a qualitative type based on a
risk matrix acceptance criterion and the main goal is to maintain
the asset’s safety level as agreed within the Safety Case document.
Mitigation actions are applied only for risk scores higher than the
defined acceptable level.
2.1. Analysis of risk assessment
Risks are related to every aspect of a project: organisational,
commercial, technological, HSE, financial, political, cultural and
to every system composing an asset. Therefore, it is important
to define, internally and externally, the context and the extent to
which the risk assessment is performed. In addition, the existence
of a regulatory framework could impact on the requirement for
performing the risk assessment and its level of detail.
There are various risk assessment approaches from failure
analysis methods such as fault tree analysis (FTA) adopted by
Kang et al. (2017) or enhanced failure modes and effect analysis
(FMEA) by Li et al. (2021), where weights have been allocated
to risk parameters for differentiating their influence and avoiding
the occurrence of identical risk score numbers. Under IEA’s Lifes
50+ program a specific risk assessment framework, for FOWT in-
stallations, has been constructed with the support of international
standards and DNV GL’s recommended practice (International
Organization for Standardization, 2010, 2018, 2019; Det Norske
Veritas As, 2013). The steps for performing a risk assessment
and its integration within the overall risk management have
been described by Proskovics and Hutton (2016) within the D6.1
report — Risk Management for Deep Water Substructures and are
presented within Fig. 1.
2
Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18
Status (March 2021) Source
Under Development with Hexicon Russell (2021)
Cancelled 4C Offshore (2021)
Generating electricity since October 2017 Equinor (2017)
Fully operational in July 2020 Richard (2020)
On-going manufacturing and installation Cruickshank (2021)
The new estimated commissioning date is 2023 Randall-Smith (2020)
Cancelled 4C Offshore (2020)
This process is providing a disciplined approach and is manda-
tory, within UK’s renewable energy zone, to be documented
throughout all project phases. The outcomes of risk evaluation
will provide an insight into the most critical structures and
systems and it will support the decisions for risk mitigation. Only
the outcomes with a rank above the agreed level of acceptable
risk are considered for design and/or maintenance procedures
optimisation.
2.2. New proposed methodology for FOWT risk assessment
The main goal of this proposed methodology is to create the
baseline for a new method of risk assessment that will not only
account for the novelty of the system’s components and/or their
application area but will provide increased visibility of the various
levels of novelty associated with each system’s component.
FOWT market is in its infancy and extremely competitive,
therefore, the limited failure data and the restricted access to
the existing database have determined to perform a qualitative
type of risk assessment. It will be applied only to the Tower
Unit, Tower Pedestal and Floater Unit as these sub-structures
have been indicated by Stehly and Beiter (2019) amongst the
main contributors of a FOWT Plant CAPEX. Starting from the risk
matrix developed within DNV-RP-A203 to perform a qualitative
risk assessment and the framework created by International En-
ergy Agency (IEA)’s Life 50+ program the proposed methodology
introduces the technology category as the third risk parameter
for calculating the final risk scores of the hazards associated with
the considered sub-structures.
An excel template, namely risk parameters and hazards, will
be created for collecting and recording all three risk parameters:
technology category, consequence and likelihood. It will contain
two workbooks for separating the novel technology parame-
ter from the more commonly used consequence and likelihood
parameters. The first workbook will contain the technology de-
composition and categorisation of the considered sub-structures
based on their functions and performed following the standard
DNVGL-ST-0119 (DNV GL, 2018a,b) and the recommended prac-
tice DNVGL-RP-A203 (Det Norske Veritas As, 2013), see Tables 2,
5 and 6. It will be used for gathering the input regarding the novel
risk parameter, namely ‘technology category’, associated with
each sub-structure major component. The second workbook will
record all identified hazards, the failure causes and the potential
failure modes. The remaining risk parameters, namely conse-
quence and likelihood will be allocated for each failure cause/
hazard. A unique ID number has been allocated for every fail-
ure cause/hazard associated with each considered sub-structure
based on two numerical grouping parts, X.Y. The first group, X,
identifies the sub-structure number as follows: 1 for Tower Unit,
2 for Tower Pedestal and 3 for Floater Unit. The second numer-
ical group represents the failure cause/hazard identification per
sub-structure, see Appendix A.
All risk parameter values will be collected individually, via
email, from the participating experts and consistently using the
aforementioned excel template. A second excel spreadsheet,
G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Fig. 1. Risk assessment: A sub-process of risk management (Proskovics and Hutton, 2016), Courtesy of Roberts Proskovics.

namely failure modes and hazards register, will be developed for Table 2
calculating the risk scores of each hazard and their graphical rep- FOWT plant: Sub-structures function and composition.

resentation. Its structure will contain all identified hazards, the Function Sub-structure Major component

failure causes and the potential failure modes together with all Primary structure
Tower Unit [TU]
Welding
collected risk parameter values. For the calculation of the initial
risk score, namely Risk Score 1, only the averaged value of hazard Special structure
Tower Pedestal [TP]
Structural integrity Welding
likelihood and consequence will be used. The obtained risk scores
will form the basis for failure causes and sub-structures initial Special structure
Primary structure
riskiness ranking, and their values will be used as a reference base Floater Unit [FU]
Secondary structure
for comparison of the technology category parameter impact on Welding
failure causes/hazards and sub-structures ranking. Bolting connection
A second risk score, namely Risk Score 2, will be calculated for RNA interfacing Tower Unit [TU]
Welding
each identified hazard by using the averaged value of all three risk Special structure
Tower interfacing Tower Pedestal [TP]
parameters: likelihood, consequence and technology category. Welding
However, the most onerous value of the averaged technology Special structure
category will be used where multiple functions of a sub-structure Primary structure
Buoyancy and Stability Floater Unit [FU]
are affected with the aim to account for the worst-case scenario Secondary structure
Welding
triggered by the novel element. Risk Score 2 will represent the
final ranking criteria for each failure cause/hazard, and failure Primary structure
Tower Unit [TU]
Welding
mode of the considered sub-structures, with the aim to highlight
the specific risks triggered by the novel elements associated with Special structure
Tower Pedestal [TP]
Power transmission protection Welding
the FOWT sector.
Special structure
The obtained results, based on both risk scores, will be com-
Primary structure
pared and analysed only for the top five results due to their higher Floater Unit [FU]
Secondary structure
impact and the mitigation actions’ effectiveness. The effect of Welding
technology categorisation on the failure causes/hazards ranking
and sub-structures riskiness level will be assessed. The correla-
tion between failure modes is not covered by this methodology
been applied to the FOWT Plant decomposition illustrated within
as it is related to reliability estimation and the primary scope is
Table 2.
to assess the impact of technology category parameter on con-
In addition, the main functions of the selected sub-structures
ventional failure analysis. Experts’ input has been conservatively
have been only indicated to assist with hazard identification and
provided to account for the sub-structure’s failure causes and
technology category value determination as the obtained level of
modes of intercorrelation.
risk may partially or totally impair the sub-structure functions.
A case study will be conducted for the validation of the pro-
Several online HAZard IDentification (HAZID) brainstorming
posed methodology only for the Tower Unit, Tower Pedestal and
workshops have been held individually with each participat-
Floater Unit of a generic FOWT Plant located within the UK’s
ing expert for discussing the proposed hazards and each sub-
renewable zone. An overall presentation of the boundaries and structure’s functions and specificity. Therefore, the qualitative
scenarios for risk assessment will be provided together with the O&G hazard identification techniques, namely HAZID, have been
resources, tools, decision criteria and results. Agreement analysis adopted for the case study.
of the collected data will be performed with the aim to unveil
the possible debates between the experts if this methodology was 2.2.2. Assessing consequences
applied within an interactive environment (see Fig. 2). For the proposed method, the consequence level has been
conservatively estimated by the participating experts based on
2.2.1. Identifying hazards their field experience and without any mitigations.
As the main concepts of FOWT have evolved as a hybrid The Table 3 presents the qualitative consequence scale which
between the mature O&G installations and the Bottom Fixed has been used for the proposed methodology.
Offshore Wind Turbine (BFOWT), the hazard identification is con-
ducted on the literature review outcomes, and the O&G stan- 2.2.3. Assessing likelihood
dardised guidewords (International Electrotechnical Commission, Hazards will occur only under specific conditions which can be
2016) and DNV-RP-203 (Det Norske Veritas As, 2013) which have statistically determined if sufficient field data has been recorded
3
G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Fig. 2. FOWT risk assessment: New proposed methodology diagram.

and documented. Currently, floating offshore wind is still consid- gathering a higher number of experts the effect of bias can be
ered a new market and highly competitive which is not eager reduced.
to share much information. Therefore, the qualitative likelihood
scale presented by Proskovics and Hutton (2016) has been cho-
sen for this methodology. For each identified hazard, an oc-
2.2.4. Risk score evaluation
currence likelihood level will be allocated which, in the case
of the qualitative technique, will be conservatively estimated Initially, a Risk Score 1 will be calculated as the product of
by the experts without any preventive measures implemented. two risk parameters: the averaged consequence levels and the av-
The experts’ opinion technique is a subjective method hence, by eraged likelihood levels obtained from the participating experts’
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G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table 3
Technology qualitative consequence scale (Proskovics and Hutton, 2016), courtesy of Roberts Proskovics.
Category Local system Global system
Consequence scale: 5 Extensive Loss of main function and damage to Severe damage to interfacing
interfacing and surrounding system and surrounding system
(based on Lifes50+_D6.1 4 Major Loss of the main function Noticeable damage to interfacing
Risk Management for and surrounding system
Deep Water
Substructures) 3 Severe Loss of parts of the main function The shutdown of interfacing and
surrounding system
2 Moderate The reduced part of the main Insignificant effect on interfacing
function and surrounding system
1 Minor Insignificant No effect on interfacing and
surrounding system

Table 4 unacceptable. It could be observed that for risk values between

Risk evaluation matrix (Proskovics and Hutton, 2016), courtesy of Roberts 12 and 15 the matrix does not provide any categorisation. As
Proskovics.
Risk Score 1 is the average of all participating experts’ input, risk
5 5 10 15 20 25
score values could be obtained within this interval; hence, the
4 4 8 12 16 20
Likelihood scale 3 3 6 9 12 15 author has decided to categorise these risks as unacceptable and
2 2 4 6 8 10 highlight them in red. The use of a ‘traffic light’ colour code for the
1 1 2 3 4 5 three risk categories is a simple and efficient technique providing
1 2 3 4 5 an optimal and standardised visual impact for the risk assessment
Consequence scale team.
In general, the acceptable risk level is represented by the green
area and low-risk score values of the amber area of the matrix, see
Table 5
Table 4. All risks of which the risk scores are located above these
FOWT technology categorisation matrix (Det Norske Veritas As, 2013).
areas of the matrix are considered to require mitigation actions
Technology categorisation i.a.w. DNV-RP-A203
which should be applied for the reduction of likelihood and/or
Application area Degree of novelty of technology consequence levels.
Proven Limited field history New or Unproven Failure cause/hazards will be evaluated and ranked, in de-
Known 1 2 3 scending order, based on the obtained risk scores. The sub-
Limited knowledge 2 3 4 structures riskiness level will be obtained by calculating the mean
New 3 4 4
value of associated failure causes as a different number of failure
causes could be identified for each sub-structure. However, Risk
Table 6 Score 1 does not account if the component contains limited field
FOWT technology categories scale (Det Norske Veritas As, 2013). history or new technology or whether its application area is new
Technology categories i.a.w. DNV-RP-A203 or even bearing limited knowledge all of which will classify it as
Technology category Indicator a novel element.
1 No new technical uncertainties (proven technology)
2 New technical uncertainties 2.2.5. Assessing technology category
3 New technical challenges The DNV’s recommended practice (Det Norske Veritas As,
4 Demanding new technical challenges 2013) has been selected to provide guidance for sub-structures
decomposition and the identification of novel components as it
has been recognised by the offshore industry as a reliable frame-
input. work with a reduced level of subjectivism. This recommended
practice will also be used for the definition of the third parameter,
RS1 = L × C (1) namely the ‘technology category’, which will be utilised for the
calculation of Risk Score 2. This will become the criterion for
The average for likelihood and consequence, L and C, have been
the final ranking of the failure cause/hazards, failure modes and
calculated based on each expert’s input using the formulas:
∑n sub-structure riskiness.
i=1 Li A top-down analysis of the technology composition will con-
L= (2) sist in the identification of each sub-structure function/s which
∑n n will be performed to assist with each defined major component
i=1Ci
C= (3) technology categorisation. As the aim of this document is to
n perform a risk assessment for a generic FOWT plant at a macro
where n represents the number of experts taking part in the risk level, the system level is considered to be the FOWT plant itself,
assessment. the sub-system level to be the sub-structures composing the
Integrating the previously defined likelihood and consequence plant, and the major component level by the specific structural
scales and following Proskovics and Hutton (2016) example, a risk category together with the connection type between them, see
matrix has been utilised for evaluating all initially obtained risk Table 2.
scores, namely RS1 , see Table 4. The specific structural category definition of the major com-
Based on the obtained RS1 and the risk evaluation matrix, ponents has followed DNVGL-ST-0119 (p.79 DNV GL, 2018b).
risks will be categorised on three levels: the low level (green), For each major component defined within Table 2 under each
where the obtained score is between 1 to 4 which is considered sub-structure function, a technology category level will be allo-
acceptable; medium level (amber) for scores between 4 and 12 cated based on the technology categorisation matrix and scales
which could be described as potentially tolerable and the high developed within DNV-RP-A203, see Tables 5 and 6. The depen-
level (red) for scores between 15 and 25 which is regarded as dency of the obtained technology category level is the result of
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G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table 7
Participating experts sector profile and work experience.
ID No. Company sector profile Role Experience in the field Country
A Class society Offshore technology manager 18 years U.K.
B Marine warranty Marine warranty surveyor 21 years U.K.
C Consultancy O&G naval architecture designer 12 years U.K.
D BFWT Project manager 14 years U.K.
E Consultancy O&G/F.O.W. naval architecture consultant 18 years U.K.
F Consultancy Lead engineer 28 years (wind power) of which U.K.
10 years (floating support structures)
G University Researcher 15 years of which U.K.
6 years F.O.W.
9 years of O&G engineering and
marine operations
Total averaged experience 18.14 years

Table 8
Technology Category (TC) average based on seven experts input and experts score agreement.
Function Sub-structure Major component TC A TC B TC C TC D TC E TC F TC G TC Experts Experts Ave.
average agreement agreement
(%) (%)
Primary structure 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 1.86 43%
Tower Unit [TU] 50%
Welding 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1.43 57%
Special structure 4 2 3 1 2 1 3 2.29 29%
Tower Pedestal [TP] 43%
Structural integrity Welding 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1.43 57%
Special structure 4 2 3 3 2 2 3 2.71 43%
Primary structure 4 2 3 3 1 1 3 2.43 43%
Floater Unit [FU] 50%
Secondary structure 2 1 2 3 1 3 2 2.00 43%
Welding 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1.29 71%
Bolting connection 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1.71 71%
RNA interfacing Tower Unit [TU] 64%
Welding 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1.57 57%
Special structure 3 2 3 1 3 2 2 2.29 43%
Tower interfacing Tower Pedestal [TP] 43%
Welding 2 2 2 1 3 1 1 1.71 43%
Special structure 3 3 2 3 1 3 2 2.43 57%
Buoyancy and Primary structure 3 2 2 3 1 2 3 2.29 43%
Floater Unit [FU] 57%
Stability Secondary structure 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 2.00 71%
Welding 1 1 2 3 1 2 1 1.57 57%
Primary structure 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 1.57 57%
Tower Unit [TU] 57%
Welding 1 2 2 3 1 1 1 1.57 57%
Special structure 1 2 3 3 1 2 2 2.00 43%
Power transmission Tower Pedestal [TP] 57%
Welding 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1.43 71%
protection
Special structure 1 2 3 3 1 4 3 2.43 43%
Primary structure 1 2 3 3 1 2 3 2.14 43%
Floater Unit [FU] 50%
Secondary structure 2 2 2 3 1 3 3 2.29 43%
Welding 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1.29 71%

Table 9 A second value of the risk score, namely Risk Score 2, will be
Risk parameter agreement level for each sub-structure. calculated by multiplying the Risk Score 1 by the most onerous
Agreement higher than 50% between the experts averaged technology category of the affected component.
Likelihood Consequence
RS2 = RS1 × TC (5)
Tower Unit 50% 14%
Tower Pedestal 35% 10% A graphical representation of the two different risk scores will
Floater Unit 41% 59%
be created, for each considered sub-structure and for all failure
causes, to illustrate the technology categorisation effect on the
risk level and subsequently on the failure mode criticality. The
both technology novelty and its application area. Hence, even a two defined risk scores, namely Risk Score 1 and Risk Score 2, are
proven technology could yield a high level under the technology the main tools for assessing the impact of technology category on
category if the area of application is new. failure cause/hazard, failure modes and sub-structures riskiness
level. Based on Risk Score 2 the failure cause/hazards and failure
The components’ technology category level will be obtained as
modes will be ranked and the most hazardous sub-structure will
the averaged value based on the industry experts’ input by using
be determined based on the plain average of failure modes risk
the formulae: score.
∑n
i=1 TCi
TC = (4) 3. Case of study
n
The components obtaining a technology category value which 3.1. Goal and objectives
mathematically could be rounded to two or above, see Table 6,
are considered novel and they will increase the risk score directly This case study purpose is to apply, test and validate the pro-
proportional to their obtained value. posed methodology by conducting a qualitative risk assessment
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G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table 10
Top five hazards/failure causes summary based on Risk Score 1.
Failure cause/hazard Based on seven experts’ input and without the technology category applied
Tower Unit Tower Pedestal Floater Unit
Risk No: Average Hazard Risk No: Average Hazard Risk No: Average Hazard
Risk Score 1 contribution Risk Score 1 contribution Risk Score 1 contribution
(%) (%) (%)
Fatigue due to 1.4 9.02 20 2.4 10.61 20 3.4 10.80 20
continuous
vibrations/resonance
Design parameters 1.9 10.65 20 – – – 3.9 10.61 20
superseded due to
climate change
Large forces acting on 1.3 10.29 20 2.3 11.43 20 – – –
structures due to large
accelera-
tions/displacements
variations between tower
ends
Undetected defects due to 1.12 9.71 20 2.12 10.29 20 – – –
poor quality control
Reduced structural – – – – – – 3.11 11.67 20
strength due to corrosion
Blade/RNA – – – – – – 3.12 10.29 20
collapse/Dropped object
Lightning strike due to 1.14 12.73 20 – – – – – –
improper lightning
protection
Extreme waves impact – – – 2.7 10.08 20 – – –
due to wave spectra
change
Analysis and Calculation – – – 2.10 9.18 20 – – –
fault due to human error
Structural component – – – – – – 3.24 11.02 20
degradation due to
corrosion
Risk score range 9.02 to 12.73 9.18 to 11.43 10.29 to 11.67
Risk score range mean 10.88 10.31 10.98
value

at a macro level only for the supporting structures of a generic
FOWT plant, namely: Tower Unit, Tower Pedestal and Floater
Unit.
The internal and external boundaries are selected for defining
the spatial and operational domains for testing the functionality
of the proposed method. An ample number of highly experienced
specialists from the offshore wind sector will be carefully selected
to contribute to the risk parameters input and guarantee a solid
base for analysis. The excel spreadsheet for data collection, pro-
cessing and analysis will be organised to reflect the functional
decomposition of the selected sub-structures and assemble the
outcomes to assist the validation process through comparison
with previous similar studies which are based on recognised
methodologies.
3.2. The model of FOWT plant, boundaries and operational scenarios
Turbine rating and array size selection: 10 MW and twenty
units’ array have been estimated on the indications presented
during DNV GL’s on-line webinar (Ebbesen and Smith, 2019).
It is assumed that a 10 MW upwind three-bladed turbine
rotor and nacelle is supported by the Tower Unit through a
bolted connection which in turn is structurally connected and
integrated into the Floater Unit through a transition unit namely
Tower Pedestal. The Floater Unit provides structural support and
buoyancy for the rotor–nacelle assembly, Tower Unit and Tower
Pedestal. It represents the gateway point of the dynamic cables
7
and connections with the mooring system. All sub-structures are
built entirely of steel following a project specification.
The FOWT plant’s sub-structures selection: the Tower Unit,
Tower Pedestal and Floater Unit have been considered the opti-
mal choice for a unified structural risk assessment due to their
highest CAPEX value as indicated by Stehly and Beiter (2019)
and are forming the internal boundaries of the model considered
for applying the proposed risk assessment methodology which
also includes its structural connections with the mooring system.
The entire FOWT plant is maintained in location using catenary
mooring lines and seabed anchors.
The FOWT plant is considered to be manufactured within a
European yard, experienced and accredited for offshore installa-
tions construction hence, the turbine tilting angle will provide
clearance with the Tower Unit as per IEC 61400-1, Section 7.6.5
(International Electrotechnical Commission, 2010) and clearance
between the blade’s tip and the water level should be in ac-
cordance with DNVGL-ST-0119, Section 7, item 1.2.3 (DNV GL,
2018a,b). Furthermore, the air gap for the Floater Unit deck is
assumed that has been determined based on DNVGL-ST-0119,
Section 7, item 6.1.4 (DNV GL, 2018a,b) and does not contain
lower values to account for the effect of slamming forces. It
is expected for the FOWT plant to be operational for at least
25 years.
Site selection: the North-East Coast of Scotland has been cho-
sen based on a brief evaluation of UK’s Renewable Energy Zone
following the importance index criteria described by Bahaj et al.
G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table 11
Top five hazards/failure causes summary based on Risk Score 2.
Failure cause/hazard Based on seven experts’ input and with technology category applied
Tower Unit Tower Pedestal Floater Unit
Risk No: Average Hazard Risk No: Average Hazard Risk No: Average Hazard
Risk Score 2 contribution Risk Score 2 contribution Risk Score 2 contribution
(%) (%) (%)
Fatigue due to 1.4 16.75 20 2.4 24.26 20 3.4 26.22 20
continuous
vibrations/resonance
Design parameters 1.9 19.78 20 – – – 3.9 28.80 20
superseded due to
climate change
Large forces acting on 1.3 19.10 20 2.3 26.12 20 – – –
structures due to large
accelera-
tions/displacements
variations between tower
ends
Undetected defects due to 1.12 18.04 20 2.12 23.51 20 – – –
poor quality control
Reduced structural – – – – – – 3.11 31.69 20
strength due to corrosion
Blade/RNA – – – – – – 3.12 27.92 20
collapse/Dropped object
Lightning strike due to 1.14 23.65 20 – – – – – –
improper lightning
protection
Extreme waves impact – – – 2.7 23.04 20 – – –
due to wave spectra
change
Analysis and Calculation – – – 2.10 20.99 20 – – –
fault due to human error
Structural component – – – – – – 3.24 25.19 20
degradation due to
corrosion
Risk score range 16.75 to 23.65 20.99 to 26.12 25.19 to 31.69
Risk score range mean 20.20 23.56 28.44
value

Fig. 3. Schematic diagram of a generic FOWT plant.

8
G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table 12 Table 14
Tower Unit - Failure causes/hazards ranking and comparison. Floater Unit - Failure causes/hazards ranking and comparison.
Tower Unit - Failure cause/hazard ranking and comparison Floater Unit - Failure cause/hazard ranking and comparison
Results of this study Results of Li et al. Generic results of Results of this study Results of Li et al. Generic results of
(2021) Kang et al. (2017) (2021) Kang et al. (2017)
Lightning strike due Fatigue (31, RPN = Intense vibrations Reduced structural Planes crash (38, RPN Intense vibrations
to improper lightning 0.0240) due to extreme sea strength due to = 0.0229) due to extreme sea
protection conditions corrosion conditions
Design parameters Faulty welding (30, Fatigue Design parameters Bilge piping/pumps Corrosion
superseded due to RPN = 0.0216) superseded due to fail (54, RPN =
climate change climate change 0.0210)
Large forces acting on Plastic deformation Mechanical overload Blade/RNA Dynamic umbilical Fatigue
structures due to (34, RPN = 0.0202) collapse/Dropped connection fail (51,
large accelera- object RPN = 0.0203)
tions/displacements Fatigue due to Manholes fail (56, Mechanical overload
variations between continuous RPN = 0.0197)
tower ends vibrations/resonance
Undetected defects Cyclic degradation Manufacturing defect Structural component Towing Manufacturing defect
due to poor quality (35, RPN = 0.0193) degradation due to brackets/bollards fail
control corrosion (52, RPN = 0.0195)
Fatigue due to Corrosion (33, RPN = Installation defect
continuous 0.0185)
vibrations/resonance
the unpredictability of the forces transmitted to the turbine tower
Table 13
and their distribution direction. No maximum accelerations and
Tower Pedestal - Failure causes/hazards ranking and comparison. overall damping will be prescribed as operational limits for the
Tower Pedestal - Failure cause/hazard ranking and comparison generic FOWT plant as these are unique each of the Floater Unit
Results of this study Results of Li et al. Generic results of
concept, for example, the TLP concept does not induce vertical
(2021) Kang et al. (2017) accelerations, but higher loads are applied to the floater in com-
Large forces acting on Fatigue (31, RPN = Intense vibrations parison with the other technologies using a catenary mooring.
structures due to 0.0240) due to extreme sea Amongst the substantial number of load cases associated with a
large accelera- conditions FOWT plant, only the Power Production, Power Production plus
tions/displacements the occurrence of a fault and Parked (standing still or idling)
variations between
tower ends
scenarios have been proposed to be taken into consideration for
the operational and maintenance phases:
Fatigue due to Faulty welding (30, Corrosion
continuous RPN = 0.0216)
vibrations/resonance 3.3. Resources and tools definition
Undetected defects Plastic deformation Fatigue
due to poor quality (34, RPN = 0.0202) Individual online meetings and workshops have been held
control with FOWT and O&G structural experts for discussing the selected
Extreme waves Cyclic degradation Mechanical Overload boundaries and scenarios, hazards, technology categories, and
impact due to wave (35, RPN = 0.0193) risk scores together with the failure modes and their effects. The
spectra change experts’ professional details, at the study time, are presented in
Analysis and Corrosion (33, RPN = Manufacturing defect the Table 7:
Calculation fault due 0.0185)
Table 7 illustrates the expertise of all seven engineers, re-
to human error
searchers and specialists who have contributed to the risk pa-
rameters input required for the case study. Qualitative risk as-
sessments are recognised subjective methods and for reducing
(2020) which contain the parameters wind potential, sea water the biases and associated risks, an increased number of experts
depth, distance to shoreline and power grid in this descending have been selected to cover diverse backgrounds and different
order. The assumed shallowest position within this site is con- companies’ appurtenance. Their expertise within offshore wind
sidered to be at 50 m and with the deepest position estimated and O&G covers a minimum experience of 12 years with a total
at 100 m water depth. The water level range due to the tidal average of more than 18 years should provide a strong foundation
variation, the current climate, and soil conditions have not been for sound results.
considered as the mooring system has not been included in Two bespoke excel spreadsheets, containing several work-
this case study. No assessment will be performed for the power books, have been developed for gathering and processing data
transmission effectiveness with regards to the windfarm location, provided by the participating experts; their structure and use
hence the windfarm distance from the shoreline will not be have been described within Section 2.2.
provided. However, the site location has been selected to achieve
a minimum distance between the windfarm and power grid. 3.4. Documentation and reporting provisions
The external boundaries, represented by the site location, of
the North-East Coast of Scotland. are characterised by strong The failure modes and hazards register represent the basis for
winds and high waves with air temperatures between −3 ◦ C to presenting each component technology category and the graph-
+26 ◦ C which are rarely below minus 10 ◦ C or above 30 ◦ C. ical representation of the final risk ranking. Some of its content
The water temperature varies between 6 ◦ C and 17 ◦ C. The air is illustrated in Appendix A. The failure causes and the graphical
turbulence levels within the windfarm are a combination be- illustration of technology categorisation impact will provide a
tween the site’s natural turbulence and the downwind turbulence quick insight into the most highly ranked hazards, and these will
induced by each turbine wake. This turbulence will contribute to be the first to be addressed by risk mitigation actions. For their
9
G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table 15
Top five failure causes/hazards classification.
Top five failure causes/hazards classification
Tower Unit Tower Pedestal Floater Unit
Design Unavoidable and Unknown Material
Environment Material Environment
Unavoidable and Unknown Human error System interdependencies
Human error Environment Material
Material Human error Material

Table 16 descending order of their criticality, which is estimated based on

Tower Unit - Failure modes ranking and comparison.
Tower Unit - Failure modes ranking and comparison
Results of this study
Tower unit break/collapse
(RS2 = 16.42)
Cracks (RS2 = 16.42)
Abnormal vibration
(RS2 = 16.42)
Structural plastic
deformation
(RS2 = 16.42)
their uncertainty level.
Results of Li et al. Generic results of
a. Environment
(2021) Kang et al. (2017)
• Design parameters superseded due to climate change.
Tower collapse Fracture
(RPN = 0.0827)
• Bearing damage due to unpredicted high wind speed
• Wave spectra change
Crack (RPN = Detachment
0.0455) • Extreme horizontal oscillatory force due to extreme waves
Abnormal Looseness
• Unavoidable and/or Unknown
vibration (RPN = • Large forces acting on structures
0.0171) • Tower abnormal vibration
– Deformation
b. System Interdependencies

• Mooring system failure

Table 17 • Blade/RNA collapse
Tower Pedestal - Failure modes ranking and comparison. • Floater extreme heel due to ship collision or non-responsive
Tower Pedestal - Failure modes ranking and comparison control systems
Results of this study Results of Li et al. Generic results of • Incorrect installation
(2021) Kang et al. (2017) • insufficient/reduced structural strength due to ship collision
Cracks (RS2 = 19.95) Crack (RPN = Fracture • Structural break/collapse due to collision with other FWT
0.1116)
Structural plastic – Detachment
deformation (RS2 = 19.00)
c. Human Errors
Tower Pedestal – Looseness
• Welding failure due to inadequate quality control
break/collapse
(RS2 = 18.63) • Analysis and calculation of fault
• Undetected defects due to inadequate quality control
Abnormal vibration – Deformation
(RS2 = 16.98) • Ventilation heads/manholes failure
Watertight fault – –
(RS2 = 16.36) d. Design

• Fatigue
• Under-designed structure/component
Table 18
Floater Unit - Failure modes ranking and comparison.
• Unproper lightning protection
Floater Unit - Failure modes ranking and comparison
Results of this study Results of Li et al. Generic results of e. Material
(2021) Kang et al. (2017)
Structural break Additional Fracture
• fatigue
(RS2 = 23.28) structure fail (RPN • brittle fracture
= 0.1764) • low ductile strength
Capsize (RS2 = 22.16) Watertight fault Detachment • structural degradation due to corrosion
(RPN = 0.085)
Structural plastic Hit By Dropped Looseness 3.5. Analysis and results
deformation (RS2 = 22.02) objects (RPN =
0.0574)
The results of this study are based on individual likelihood,
Floater Unit sinkage – Deformation
consequence and technology category levels provided separately
(RS2 = 21.64)
by each participating expert, considering the FOWT plant model
Cracks (RS2 = 19.41) – –
and data under Section 3.2, using the supplied risk parameters
Watertight fault – –
and hazards template. Based on received inputs and obtained
(RS2 = 18.96)
risk score values, a broad analysis of the failure causes/ haz-
ards and failure modes associated with FOWT technology will be
performed. The participating experts’ input is considered equally
better understanding, a classification of the failure causes/hazards weighted by the authors due to their expertise within offshore
nature is proposed which will also support the validation of wind, floating or fixed, in combination with O&G experience, see
the obtained rankings. The considered categories are listed in Table 7. Initially, utilising the data collected using risk parameters
10
G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table A.19

Risk Function Component Predicted Failure effect Failure Cause Hazard Project Average Average Average Remarks Average Average
No: Failure mode phase likeli- conse- Risk tech- Risk
hood quence Score 1 nology Score 2
cate-
gory
1. Tower Unit
1.1 Primary Fatigue Out of tolerance M, 2.14 3.71 7.96 1.86 14.78
structure Potential tower alignment O&M
Structural Cracks
unit collapse
1.2 integrity Welding Welding failure Welding defect M, 2.57 4.00 10.29 1.43 14.69
O&M
1.3 Primary Large forces acting Large Accelera- O&M 2.57 4.00 10.29 The most onerous 1.86 19.10
structure & on structures tions/Displacements technology category
Welding Variations between of the two
tower ends components have
been selected
1.4 Primary Fatigue Continuous vibra- O&M 2.43 3.71 9.02 The most onerous 1.86 16.75
structure & tions/resonance technology category
Welding of the two
components have
been selected
1.5 Primary Abnormal Potential tower Bearings Damage Unpredicted high O&M 2.00 3.43 6.86 The most onerous 1.86 12.73
structure & vibration unit collapse wind speed technology category
Welding of the two
components have
been selected
1.6 Primary Structural Local stress Insufficient Ship collision O&M 1.29 4.00 5.14 1.86 9.55
Structural
structure plastic accumulation structural strength
integrity
deformation
1.7 RNA interfacing Primary Under-designed Insufficient D 1.71 4.14 7.10 1.86 13.19
structure struc- environmental data
Rotor–Nacelle
Power ture/Component
Assembly (RNA)
transmission Tower unit
1.8 Primary loss Analysis and Human error D 2.14 4.14 8.88 1.86 16.49
protection break/collapse
structure Energy Calculation fault
production loss
1.9 Primary Design parameters Climate change D 2.57 4.14 10.65 1.86 19.78
structure superseded
1.10 Primary Brittle fracture Extreme O&M 1.57 4.14 6.51 The most onerous 1.86 12.09
structure & environmental technology category
Welding temperature of the two
components have
been selected
1.11 Primary Low ductile Unsuitable material D, M 1.71 4.00 6.86 1.86 12.73
structure strength
1.12 Primary Undetected defects Poor quality control M, 2.43 4.00 9.71 The most onerous 1.86 18.04
structure & O&M technology category
Welding of the two
components have
been selected
1.13 Primary Mooring system Collision with O&M 2.00 4.14 8.29 1.86 15.39
structure failure other FWT
1.14 Primary Improper lightning Lightning strike O&M 3.71 3.43 12.73 The most onerous 1.86 23.65
structure & protection technology category
Welding of the two
components has
been selected

and hazards template, the average of technology category param-
eters for each major component of the selected sub-structure has
been calculated, see Table 8.
Based on DNV-RP-A203 (Det Norske Veritas As, 2013;
Proskovics and Hutton, 2016) report, only the structural compo-
nents which have obtained an averaged value equal or greater
than two for their technology category could be classified as a
novel element. It could be observed that several components have
obtained an averaged value of their technology category which
mathematically can be rounded up to the value of 2, therefore
conservatively could be considered a novel element.
The highest values for the averaged technology category, of all
sub-structures, have been obtained by all structural components
of the Floater Unit. The maximum averaged values have been
recorded for its structural integrity function with a value of 2.71
for its special structure followed by the primary structure with
a 2.43 score. For ranking the sub-structures, in regard to their
level of novelty, the mean value of all components’ averaged
technology category has been calculated for each sub-structure.
The Floater Unit leads with a value of 2.07 followed by the Tower
Pedestal with 1.86 and Tower Unit with a value of 1.62.
The obtained technology category values close to the value of
two or greater provide a preliminary validation of the proposed
methodology. The experts’ agreement is highest for the lowest
technology categories which represents a lower novelty ranking.
Where a wide understanding amongst experts exists, a higher
level of agreement is obtained as is the case of Tower Unit. How-
ever, the lowest agreement has not been obtained for the Floater
11
Unit and this suggests the positive influence of O&G expertise.
The lowest agreement obtained for Tower Pedestal is an indicator
of the criticality of this sub-structure.
Secondly, the risk score one, namely RS1 , has been calculated
based on the averaged values of hazard consequence and its
likelihood which have been collected using the same risk pa-
rameters and hazards template as for the technology category
parameter. For all analysed sub-structures, it has been observed
that the obtained RS1 is lower than the value of 15 defined as
the threshold for high risks. Therefore, only the top five obtained
risk scores, before and after the introduction of the technology
category, have been selected for further analysis of their failure
causes/hazards, see Section 3.2.
The likelihood and consequence inputs received from partici-
pating experts, for each sub-structure, have been also analysed for
a level of agreement higher than 50%. A summary of this analysis
is presented in the Table 9:
The lowest agreement, for both likelihood and consequence,
has been obtained by the Tower Pedestal, which reinforces the
criticality of this sub-structure. The highest agreement, for both
likelihood and consequence, obtained by the Floater Unit con-
firms the acknowledged expertise from the O&G sector, which
provides sufficient recorded data for risk understanding, espe-
cially within the UK market. A detailed analysis of the participat-
ing expert’s agreement can be found the master’s thesis (Grasu
and Liu, 2021).
The following step is the calculation of the second risk score,
namely RS2 , which is the product between RS1 and the novel risk
G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table A.20

Risk Function Component Predicted Failure effect Failure cause Hazard Project Average Average Average Remarks Average Average
No: Failure mode phase likeli- conse- Risk tech- Risk
hood quence Score 1 nology Score 2
cate-
gory
2. Tower Pedestal (Transition unit)
2.1 Special Tower Pedestal Fatigue Out-of-tolerance M, 1.86 3.86 7.16 2.29 16.37
Structural structure Cracks connections alignment O&M
integrity failure
2.2 Welding Welding failure Welding defect M, 2.29 4.00 9.14 1.43 13.06
O&M
2.3 Special Large forces acting Large accelera- O&M 2.86 4.00 11.43 The most onerous 2.29 26.12
structure & on structures tions/displacements technology category
Welding variations between of the two
tower ends components have
been selected
2.4 Special Fatigue Continuous vibra- O&M 2.86 3.71 10.61 The most onerous 2.29 24.26
structure & tions/resonance technology category
Welding of the two
components have
been selected
2.5 Special Abnormal Potential tower Tower abnormal Unpredicted high O&M 1.86 4.00 7.43 The most onerous 2.29 16.98
structure & vibration connections vibration wind speed technology category
Welding failure of the two
components have
been selected
2.6 Special Structural Local stress Insufficient Ship collision O&M 1.57 4.00 6.29 2.29 14.37
Structural
structure plastic accumulation structural strength
integrity
deformation
2.7 Special Wave spectra Extreme waves O&M 2.71 3.71 10.08 The most onerous 2.29 23.04
Tower Unit structure & change impact technology category
interfacing Welding of the two
components have
Power been selected
transmission
2.8 protection Special RNA collapse/fall Fire O&M 2.14 4.00 8.57 2.29 19.59
structure
2.9 Special Under-designed Insufficient D 1.71 4.29 7.35 2.29 16.79
structure structure/ environmental data
Tower Tower Unit Component
Pedestal collapse, Floater
2.10 Special Analysis and Human error D 2.14 4.29 9.18 2.29 20.99
break/collapse Unit damage
structure Calculation fault
2.11 Special Design parameters Climate change D 2.14 3.86 8.27 2.29 18.89
structure superseded
2.12 Special Undetected defects Poor quality control M, 2.57 4.00 10.29 The most onerous 2.29 23.51
structure & O&M technology category
Welding of the two
components have
been selected
2.13 Special Reduced structural Corrosion O&M 3.00 3.43 10.29 Subject to spray, 2.29 23.51
structure strength not splash
2.14 Special Blade/RNA collapse Dropped object O&M 2.14 3.71 7.96 2.29 18.19
structure
2.15 Special Brittle fracture Extreme O&M 1.29 4.00 5.14 The most onerous 2.29 11.76
structure & environmental technology category
Welding temperature of the two
components have
been selected
2.16 Special Mooring system Collision with O&M 1.57 4.29 6.73 2.29 15.39
structure failure other FWT
2.17 Structural Special Watertight Floater reduced Ventilation Manufacturing M, 1.71 3.43 5.88 The most onerous 2.29 13.43
integrity structure & fault stability heads/Manholes defect, Welding O&M technology category
Welding failure defect of the two
Power components have
transmission been selected
protection
2.18 Special Structural Corrosion O&M 2.71 3.43 9.31 Subject to spray, 2.29 21.27
structure degradation not splash
2.19 Special Insufficient Ship collision O&M 1.57 4.00 6.29 2.29 14.37
structure structural strength

parameter: technology category. For each affected component,
the most onerous averaged technology category value per sub-
structure is selected. Using the values obtained for risk scores
RS1 and RS2 , different graphs have been created, with the aim
to illustrate the influence of the technology category parameter.
For some instances, the ranking of failure causes/hazards has been
changed. The full set of results, for each considered sub-structure,
is presented in detail within the master’s thesis (Grasu and Liu,
2021). Fig. 3 illustrates only the RS1 and RS2 graphs for the Floater
Unit (see Fig. 4).
3.6. Failure cause/hazard ranking variations due to technology cat-
egory
The impact of novel components, functions or processes has
been recognised by professionals and industry and formally ad-
dressed by DNV within a bespoke recommended practice DNV-
RP-A203 (Det Norske Veritas As, 2013). For assessing their impact,
the top five failure causes/ hazards have been identified and
12
ranked, separately, for each sub-structure and for each calculated
risk score RS1 and RS2, respectively. Both results are illustrated
in Tables 10 and 11.
Using the mean value of Risk Score 1 range the sub-structures
hierarchy is: Tower Unit, Floater Unit and Tower Pedestal.
The introduction of technology category is not impacting the
failure cause/hazard componence for any of the sub-structures.
However, the same ranking is maintained only for the Tower
Unit and Tower Pedestal. To obtain the sub-structures riskiness
hierarchy, the method of risk score range mean value is applied
and the most critical is the Floater Unit followed, in descending
order, by the Tower Pedestal and Tower Unit. This outcome
endorses the importance of the Floater Unit and emphasises the
criticality of the Tower Pedestal for which the hazard with the
highest score is the large accelerations/displacement variations
between tower ends. The Tower Pedestal integration within the
Floater Unit should receive special attention during the design,
manufacture and O&M phases as this represents the structural
envelope where the aerodynamic forces transmitted by the Tower
G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table A.21

Risk Function Component Predicted Failure effect Failure cause Hazard Project Average Average Average Remarks Average Average
No: failure mode phase likeli- conse- Risk tech- Risk
hood quence Score 1 nology Score 2
cate-
gory
3. Floater Unit
3.1 All Structural Fatigue Out of tolerance M, 2.00 3.00 6.00 The most onerous 2.71 16.29
structures Cracks failure alignment O&M technology category
Structural
of all components
integrity
has been selected
3.2 Welding Watertight fault Welding failure Welding defect M, 2.29 3.14 7.18 1.29 9.24
O&M
3.3 Secondary Watertight fault Large forces acting Large accelera- O&M 3.29 3.14 10.33 2.00 20.65
structure & on structures tions/displacements
Welding variations between
tower ends
3.4 Primary Structural Fatigue Continuous vibra- 3.29 3.29 10.80 The most onerous 2.43 26.22
structure & failure tions/resonance technology category
Welding of the two
components have
been selected
3.5 All Structural Local stress RNA collapse/fall Fire 2.14 3.71 7.96 The most onerous 2.71 21.60
structures plastic accumulation, technology category
deformation Local increased of all components
corrosion has been selected
3.6 All Local stress Insufficient Ship collision 2.14 3.86 8.27 The most onerous 2.71 22.43
structures accumulation structural strength technology category
of all components
has been selected
3.7 All Watertight Under designed Insufficient D 2.00 4.00 8.00 The most onerous 2.71 21.71
structures fault, Potential struc- environmental data technology category
Structural Floater Unit ture/component of all components
Structural
break sinkage has been selected
integrity
3.8 All Analysis and Human error D 2.14 3.57 7.65 The most onerous 2.71 20.77
Buoyancy and structures Calculation fault technology category
Stability of all components
has been selected
Power
3.9 transmission All Project Design parameters Climate change D 2.86 3.71 10.61 The most onerous 2.71 28.80
protection structures cancellation superseded technology category
of all components
has been selected
3.10 All Watertight Undetected defects Poor quality control M, 2.57 3.00 7.71 The most onerous 2.71 20.94
structures fault, Potential O&M technology category
& Welding Floater Unit of all components
sinkage has been selected
3.11 All Structural Corrosion O&M 3.71 3.14 11.67 The most onerous 2.71 31.69
structures degradation technology category
of all components
has been selected
3.12 All Blade/RNA collapse Dropped object O&M 2.57 4.00 10.29 The most onerous 2.71 27.92
structures technology category
of all components
has been selected
3.13 Primary Tower collapse Structure brittle Extreme O&M 1.14 4.00 4.57 The most onerous 2.43 11.10
structure & fracture environmental technology category
Welding temperature of the two
components has
been selected
3.14 Primary Capsize Project Analysis and Human error D 2.14 4.00 8.57 2.43 20.82
structure cancellation Calculation fault
3.19 Secondary Asset damage Extreme horizontal Extreme waves O&M 3.00 3.43 10.29 The most onerous 2.29 23.51
structure & Energy oscillatory force impact technology category
Welding production loss of the two
components has
been selected
3.23 Secondary Reduced Ventilation Manufacturing M, 2.00 2.86 5.71 The most onerous 2.29 13.06
Watertight
structure & stability heads/Manholes defect/Welding O&M technology category
fault
Welding failure defect of the two
components has
been selected
3.24 Secondary Asset loss Structural Corrosion O&M 3.86 2.86 11.02 2.29 25.19
structure Energy component
production loss degradation
3.25 Secondary Insufficient Ship collision O&M 2.14 4.14 8.88 2.29 20.29
structure structural strength
3.26 All Reduced Blade/RNA collapse Dropped object O&M 1.86 3.43 6.37 The most onerous 2.71 17.28
structures stability technology category
of all components
has been selected
3.28 Secondary Floater Unit Asset Loss Insufficient Ship collision O&M 1.86 4.71 8.76 2.29 20.01
structure sinkage Energy structural strength
production loss
3.29 All Structures Collision with O&M 2.00 4.29 8.57 The most onerous 2.71 23.27
structures break/collapse other FWT technology category
of all components
has been selected

13
G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table B.22

Risk Function Component Predicted Failure effect Failure cause Hazard Project Average Failure
No: failure mode phase Risk Score 2 mode mean
Risk Score 2
1. Tower Unit
1.1 Primary Potential Fatigue Out of tolerance M, O&M 14.78
Structural structure Cracks Tower unit alignment 16.33
1.2 integrity Welding collapse Welding failure Welding defect M, O&M 14.69
1.3 Primary Large forces Large accelera- O&M 19.10
structure & acting on tions/displacements
Welding structures variations between
tower ends
1.4 Primary Fatigue Continuous O&M 16.75
structure & vibrations/resonance
Welding
1.5 Primary Abnormal Potential Tower Bearings Unpredicted high O&M 12.73 12.73
structure & vibration unit collapse damage wind speed
Welding
1.6 Structural Primary Structural plastic Local stress Insufficient Ship collision O&M 9.55 9.55
integrity structure deformation accumulation structural
strength
1.7 RNA Primary Under-designed Insufficient D 13.19
interfacing structure Rotor–Nacelle structure/ environmental data
Assembly Component
Power Tower Unit
1.8 Primary (RNA) loss Analysis and Human error D 16.49 16.42
transmission break/collapse
structure Energy Calculation
protection production loss fault
1.9 Primary Design Climate change D 19.78
structure parameters
superseded
1.10 Primary Brittle fracture Extreme O&M 12.09
structure & environmental
Welding temperature
1.11 Primary Low ductile Unsuitable material D, M 12.73
structure strength
1.12 Primary Undetected Poor quality control M, O&M 18.04
structure & defects
Welding
1.13 Primary Mooring Collision with other O&M 15.39
structure system failure FWT
1.14 Primary Unproper Lightning strike O&M 23.65
structure & lightning
Welding protection
Overall failure modes average 13.76

Unit intersect with the hydrodynamic forces transmitted by the type of FOWT and the focus on these areas should be maintained
Floater Unit. over the entire life of the project.

3.7. Methodology validation

3.7.1. Failure causes/hazards ranking comparison with previous
studies
The failure causes/hazards ranking is based on the RS2 values
and only the top five have been considered for comparison with
previous similar studies (see Tables 12–14).
For the Tower Unit the failure cause/hazard ‘Large forces act-
ing on Structures’ has been considered similar to the ‘Plastic
Deformation’ (Li et al., 2021) and the ‘Mechanical Overload’ (Kang
et al., 2017). In addition, vibration has been recognised as one of
the critical and common hazards for all supporting structures by
Kang et al. (2017). In supporting the validation process, the clas-
sification developed under paragraph 3.1.5, has been applied to
the top five failure causes/hazards related to each sub-structure,
for creating a common ground with the previous studies and it is
presented within the next figure (see Table 15):
This classification provides a good indication of the concern
areas which need to be addressed from the design stage of any
14
3.7.2. Final failure modes ranking and comparison with previous
studies
For each sub-structure, a different number of failure causes/
hazards have been identified for each described failure mode.
Therefore, the failure modes ranking will be accomplished based
on the mean Risk Scores 2 (RS2) of all failure causes/hazards con-
tributing to it, see Appendix B. For completing the validation pro-
cess, a summary of failure modes ranking and their comparison
with previous studies are presented in the Table 16:
An identical ranking of the first three failure modes, between
the results of this work and outcomes obtained by Li et al. (2021)
study, is observed for the Tower Unit (see Table 17).
For Tower Pedestal only one identical failure mode is re-
marked with the results obtained by Li et al. (2021) (see Table 18).
Failure modes similarities are observed, for the Floater Unit,
with the previous studies such as the structural break, watertight
fault and deformation.
G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table B.23

Risk Function Component Predicted failure Failure effect Failure cause Hazard Project Average Failure
No: mode phase Risk Score 2 mode mean
risk Score 2
2. Tower Pedestal (Transition unit)
2.1 Special Tower Fatigue Out of tolerance M, O&M 16.37
Structural structure Cracks Pedestal alignment 19.95
2.2 integrity Welding connections Welding failure Welding defect M, O&M 13.06
failure
2.3 Special Large forces Large accelera- O&M 26.12
structure & acting on tions/displacements
Welding structures variations between
tower ends
2.4 Special Fatigue Continuous O&M 24.26
structure & vibrations/resonance
Welding
2.5 Special Abnormal Potential tower Tower Unpredicted high O&M 16.98 16.98
structure & vibration connections abnormal wind speed
Welding failure vibration
2.6 Special Structural Local stress Insufficient Ship collision O&M 14.37
Structural 19.00
structure plastic accumulation structural
integrity
deformation strength
2.7 Tower Unit Special Wave spectra Extreme waves O&M 23.04
interfacing structure & change impact
Welding
2.8 Power Special RNA Fire O&M 19.59
transmission structure collapse/fall
protection
2.9 Special Under-designed Insufficient D 16.79
structure structure/ environmental data
Tower Unit
Component
Tower Pedestal collapse,
2.10 Special Analysis and Human error D 20.99 18.63
break/collapse Floater Unit
structure damage Calculation
fault
2.11 Special Design Climate change D 18.89
structure parameters
superseded
2.12 Special Undetected Poor quality control M, O&M 23.51
structure & defects
Welding
2.13 Special Reduced Corrosion O&M 23.51
structure structural
strength
2.14 Special Blade/RNA Dropped object O&M 18.19
structure collapse
2.15 Special Brittle fracture Extreme O&M 11.76
structure & environmental
Welding temperature
2.16 Special Mooring Collision with other O&M 15.39
structure system failure FWT
2.17 Structural Special Watertight Floater Ventilation Manufacturing defect, M, O&M 13.43
16.36
integrity structure & fault reduced heads/Manholes Welding defect
Welding stability failure
2.18 Power Special Structural Corrosion O&M 21.27
transmission structure degradation
protection
2.19 Special Insufficient Ship collision O&M 14.37
structure structural
strength
Overall failure modes average 18.18

4. Conclusions The introduction of the technology category as a risk param-

A good level of objectivity and low riskiness has been achieved
through the similarities and identical rankings ascertained be-
tween the outcomes of the newly proposed methodology and the
previous similar studies performed by Kang et al. (2017) and Li
et al. (2021), of which results are based on data field from China
and the latter drawing on a mix of experts from China and Spain.
15
eter has proved as an efficient approach toward the analysis of
FOWT sub-structures failure modes and their causes as currently,
the increased deployment of new technologies and/or new fields
of application of the mature engineering require to be accounted
for.
Simple to apply, the major merit of the proposed methodology
relies on its similarity with the current offshore wind industry
practice which could ensure its coherent implementation in this
G. Grasu and P. Liu Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18

Table B.24

Risk Function Component Predicted failure Failure effect Failure cause Hazard Project Average Failure
No: mode phase Risk Score 2 mode mean
Risk Score 2
3. Floater Unit
3.1 All Structural Fatigue Out of tolerance M, O&M 16.29
structures Cracks failure alignment 19.41
Structural
3.2 integrity Welding Watertight Welding failure Welding defect M, O&M 9.24
fault
3.3 Secondary Watertight Large forces Large accelera- O&M 20.65
structure & fault acting on tions/displacements
Welding structures variations between
tower ends
3.4 Primary Structural Fatigue Continuous 26.22
structure & failure vibrations/resonance
Welding
3.5 All Structural plastic Local stress RNA Fire 21.60 22.02
structures deformation accumulation, collapse/fall
Local increased
corrosion
3.6 All Local stress Insufficient Ship collision 22.43
structures accumulation structural
strength
3.7 All Watertight Under designed Insufficient D 21.71
structures fault, Potential structure/ environmental data
Structural Floater Unit Component
Structural 23.28
break sinkage
integrity
3.8 All Analysis and Human error D 20.77
Buoyancy structures Calculation
and Stability fault
3.9 All Project Design Climate change D 28.80
Power structures cancellation parameters
transmission superseded
protection
3.10 All Watertight Undetected Poor quality control M, O&M 20.94
structures & fault, defects
Welding Potential
3.11 All Floater Unit Structural Corrosion O&M 31.69
structures sinkage degradation
3.12 All Blade/RNA Dropped object O&M 27.92
structures collapse
3.13 Primary Tower collapse Structure Extreme O&M 11.10
structure & brittle fracture environmental
Welding temperature
3.14 Primary Capsize Project Analysis and Human error D 20.82 22.16
structure cancellation Calculation
fault
3.19 Secondary Asset damage Extreme Extreme waves O&M 23.51
structure & Energy horizontal impact
Welding production loss oscillatory force
3.23 Secondary Reduced Ventilation Manufacturing M, O&M 13.06
Watertight
structure & stability heads/Manholes defect/Welding defect 18.96
fault
Welding failure
3.24 Secondary Asset loss Structural Corrosion O&M 25.19
structure Energy component
production loss degradation
3.25 Secondary Insufficient Ship collision O&M 20.29
structure structural
strength
3.26 All Reduced Blade/RNA Dropped object O&M 17.28
structures stability collapse
3.28 Secondary Floater Unit Asset Loss Insufficient Ship collision O&M 20.01 21.64
structure sinkage Energy structural
production loss strength
3.29 All Structures Collision with other O&M 23.27
structures break/collapse FWT
Overall failure modes average 21.24

16
G. Grasu and P. Liu
Fig. 4. Risk scores obtained for floater unit-based on seven experts input.
sector and all other industries for capturing the impact of novel
elements.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Gabriela Grasu: Methodology, Study design, Validation, For-
mal analysis, Data curation, Writing – original draft, Visualization.
Pengfei Liu: Conceptualization, Resources, Writing – review &
editing, Software, Project administration, Funding acquisition.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing finan-
cial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared
to influence the work reported in this paper.
Data availability
Data will be made available on request.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Newcastle University and The Royal Society
UK - National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) Inter-
national Exchange Grant (IEC\NSFC\201152) for their support. The
authors are grateful to the following companies and individuals
who have helped and contributed to this research work: Lloyd’s
Register, Cammell-Laird, RINA North-West Branch Committee,
Mark Tipping, Duncan Swinson, Peter Edwards, Linton Roberts,
Professor Das Purnendu, Neil McNaughton and Luis Fernando
Lavezzo. Last but not least, the authors are deeply appreciating
their families’ continuous encouragement and understanding.
17
Energy Reports 9 (2023) 1–18
Appendix A. Risk register (risk score 1 and risk score 2) based
on a seven experts input
See Tables A.19–A.21.
Appendix B. Sub-structures’ failure modes risk scores 2 based
on seven experts input
See Tables B.22–B.24.
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